Article II. On the Purpose

458. Definition. The purpose is the will not to sin hereafter.

Division. It is twofold: 1. explicit, or formal, by which someone, thinking of the future, resolves not to sin any more; 2. implicit, or virtual, which is included in contrition itself, without the future time being held before the eyes.

459. Principles. - I. A purpose at least implicit is altogether necessary for the remission of sin; because the purpose is a necessary consequence of contrition and is included in it at least virtually, as is evident from its nature and definition.

II. A true purpose must possess three conditions; namely, it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal.

1. Firm; namely, the penitent must have a sincere will not to relapse into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience ¹ or human fear; otherwise he would not wish to be converted to God totally and sincerely. The Confessor, however, ought not to put the mind of the penitent to the test by employing comparisons suited to disturb his imagination ².

¹ It is useful to set down here what the gravest Authors judge that the confessor must be admonished concerning this matter.

Suarez (De Poenitentia, disp. 32, sect. 2, no. 2): The Doctors observe that the Confessor ought not to set before the penitent all the difficulties which can occur in avoiding sins; because he will place him in manifest danger not only of not having an efficacious purpose for the future, but also of sinning anew. It is sufficient, therefore, that, the foulness of sin, the goodness of God, and the danger of damnation, etc., having been proposed IN GENERAL, the penitent conceive a GENERAL purpose never again to sin mortally.

To this pertain those words of Cardinal Cajetan (Summa, V. Confessio, on the twelfth quality): Penitents, however, must not be cast into temptation by an overzealous confessor imprudently investigating whether... he intends to avoid mortal sins above everything avoidable, such as plundering, killing, etc.; for an interrogation of this sort would lead many into temptation.... Let him exhort him to the love of God above all things, and that from love of this kind he ought to grieve over the past and purpose avoidance for the future.... And thus he will kindle the heart of the penitent and will not place him in danger of temptation.

And Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 7, no. 199), recalling a certain weakness of spirit which does not have strength to burst forth into a generous act, adds: This weakness is not a new sin, as is evident in those penitents before whose eyes the Confessor ought not explicitly to place circumstances that are exceedingly difficult, so that concerning them, if they occur, they may explicitly purpose not to sin in them also. And below (ibid., no. 238), speaking of those who ardently pursue honor or bodily pleasure, who, although they have retracted their sins in confession with some remiss sorrow, afterward, when an occasion of honor or pleasure is given, easily relapse because of the vehemence of the affection which they corrected only confusedly and remissly, he adds: Indeed, neither do we dare to set distinctly before them in confession the temptations or dangers of sinning which can occur, so that concerning those things they may distinctly purpose; because we prudently fear that now they would not retract their former sins even confusedly.

Finally, to omit others, Laymann (De Poenitentia, ch. 4, no. 8) has these words: The Confessor does not act rightly if he compels the penitent to a special promise... concerning avoiding this or that sin in the future, except in a rare case, if, for example, the sin is very harmful to the commonwealth, etc.

² Compare what was said above in the note to no. 450, q. 2.

2. Efficacious; that is, the penitent must not only resolve firmly that he does not wish to sin any more, but must also employ the necessary means for avoiding sin and fleeing proximate occasions, etc., etc. - It suffices, however, that the purpose be efficacious affectively; that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in mind to employ the necessary means, because future amendment in fact is not of the essence of the purpose ³.

³ By these things the Author warns that the doctrine of those who think that proof from works must be demanded beforehand is not to be admitted; concerning this he afterward expressly discusses in Question I.

3. Universal; or it must extend to all mortal sins, not only those which have been committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that a full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from every mortal sin.

But as regards venial sins, for the validity of the Sacrament it is required and suffices that a firm and efficacious purpose be present of avoiding at least one of the venial sins.

460. Questions. - QUESTION 1. For the purpose to be firm, must it also be found constant?

Reply. Negative; at least this is not absolutely necessary. The reason is that the purpose affects the present will, which otherwise is variable by its nature. Hence the weakness of the purpose cannot of itself be inferred from a relapse after confession. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 451; Lugo, disp. 14, no. 166, etc., against some.

I said: at least this is not absolutely necessary. For if the penitent relapses immediately and with almost no resistance, it can sometimes provide some indication, or at least a suspicion, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for he who purposes firmly generally does not so easily forget his purpose, but is accustomed to persevere constantly for at least some time and to employ efforts to resist temptations or occasions of sin, and consequently ordinarily falls with greater difficulty and more rarely. - Thus St. Lig., no. 459, where he treats of the recidivist; Lugo, disp. 14, no. 160, etc.

461. QUESTION 2. Can the purpose of one who indeed has the intention not to sin, but nevertheless fears and in some way foresees that he will relapse, be judged firm? Reply. Affirmative, generally; for fear which arises from past frailty and the inconstancy of the human will does not impede a sincere will. Hence that penitent has a true purpose who, when questioned by the Confessor concerning the will not to sin, replies: I am frail; I fear a fall; nevertheless I do not now will or choose the fall; these are the words of Gerson in Croix (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 1733) ⁴.

⁴ Elsewhere Croix (loc. cit., no. 1822) writes thus: I showed in no. 1733 that, for a serious purpose even concerning mortal sins, it is not required that one believe a relapse will not follow; but it is sufficient that a serious will now be present, with which, for as long as it stands, a will to relapse cannot stand, although perhaps it is foreseen that it will be changed through frailty. Just as St. Peter was not therefore judged indisposed for Communion because Christ knew he would relapse, so neither is one who is habituated to sin to be judged indisposed for absolution, although it may be MORALLY known that he will relapse.

Sporer has things identical with these (De Poenitentia, no. 310): A firm purpose, he says, of the will merely not to sin hereafter is required, but not likewise necessarily a belief or certain persuasion on the part of the intellect, namely that the penitent certainly believe, or persuade himself in his mind, that he will sin no more, or will no more commit this or that sin, as the Doctors commonly note.... For someone can truly grieve over and detest sin, and truly and absolutely purpose that he will not sin hereafter...; although he greatly fears or even thinks, indeed certainly believes, that on account of the experienced inconstancy of his will and his frailty he will relapse again, that he will not avoid all mortal sins, or even this certain kind of sin.

Since these things are so, it scarcely appears why St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 451) says that he does not acquiesce in the opinion (which he does not deny is called common) both of other most weighty Doctors and also of Sporer, but that he prefers to think with Croix. For although Croix added these things (loc. cit.): If, however, the habituated sinner himself despairs of his amendment, he will have a true purpose with difficulty; hence before he is absolved, he ought to be disposed so that he hopes, not through his own strength but through the grace of God, with which, if he cooperates, he will be able, as innumerable examples of men similar to himself have taught; Sporer also had added these things (loc. cit.): Moreover, if the penitent, in view of his frailty and inveterate evil habit, judges it altogether impossible for him hereafter to abstain from some one or more mortal sins, he must efficaciously be led by the Confessor; and, with the efficacy of divine grace considered, he must altogether persuade himself that it is not impossible, and, trusting in divine grace alone and not in himself, conceive a firm purpose of abstaining hereafter, saying with the Apostle: I can do all things in Him who strengthens me.... But if he cannot do this, or rather does not wish to, although he truly can, then, as destitute of true contrition, despairing of the grace of God, and thus indisposed for justification and the Sacrament, he cannot be absolved through his own fault. See in La Croix (loc. cit., nos. 1823, 1824) the cavils resolved by which Juvenin and Genettus attacked the common doctrine.

As regards practice, the chief difficulty occurs when (as not rarely happens) a penitent, otherwise of good will but frightened by the difficulty of the matter, says that he cannot promise this or that, lest he afterward appear to break his word, or that he cannot trust himself, etc. This indeed occurs especially with those who have a habit of vainly using the names of God and the Saints, of cursing, or of becoming enraged on account of continual and at the same time necessary occasions, etc.

Furthermore, a penitent of this kind must not only be raised up by hope of divine assistance, but taught that this one thing is required of him: that here and now he have the will not to relapse, especially since it is uncertain whether his life will be prolonged any longer, etc.; no differently than the present will to perform the thing vowed suffices for the validity of a vow. And he must be confirmed by his own example: that he should not think that he had purposed less sincerely on other occasions merely because he afterward relapsed. But the principal effort of the Confessor ought to be directed to this: that he appear to require only those things which the penitent will admit without difficulty to be within his power.

He will attain this both by proposing means which the penitent may use, whether when assailed by temptation or when he enjoys peace; and also by inculcating that this alone is ultimately demanded of him: that he guard against faults which are committed knowingly or with full advertence. This indeed is accustomed to refresh and greatly raise the spirits of those who, when they labor under an evil habit of blaspheming, cursing, etc., think that something impossible is required of them if they are ordered not to break forth any more into words of this kind, etc.

** From this Note the VV. took an argument for filling six columns (pp. 440-443). But to what purpose? For they write (p. 442): We freely concede that the holy Doctor erred in an accidental matter. And again (ibid.): We spontaneously admit that certain other writers alleged for the first opinion are cited less correctly. And again (ibid.): The holy Doctor took those citations from the Salmanticenses, not sufficiently observing, etc. But why, therefore, do the same VV. fill the whole world with such bitter outcries and complaints against those who noticed and warned that the citations which appear in the holy Doctor sometimes do not correspond to the end for which they are adduced? Nevertheless, they judged that readers must be warned (ibid.) that nothing therefore can be objected to St. Alphonsus except that he cited less correctly certain authors whom he thought contrary to himself, but who rather agree with him; and it is manifest otherwise that this error makes no difference to the matter. But again, to what purpose are these things? They are, namely, the things of men in whose minds it is most deeply fixed that whatever at length may be noted concerning the writings of the holy Doctor tends not toward anyone's advancement in learning, but by deliberate design toward undermining the doctrines of St. Alphonsus himself. Hence that method of disputing of theirs, which aims at anything else rather than casting some light upon theological questions. But they ought not to have thought in this way concerning these matters. And after Divine Providence wished to use especially the work of St. Alphonsus so that, the ill-fated writings of Juvenin, Merbes, Collet, Habert, Witasse, Genettus, and others of the same sort, which were worn in the hands of both teachers and students, having been banished, the doctrines of the Catholic schools might be restored, assuredly it seemed that, not anger, but rather encouragement should be given to those who contributed some little work of their own to the common good for polishing more and more, and perfecting, the work of the holy Doctor and rendering it more useful.

The VV. censure (ibid.) the statement in the Note that St. Alphonsus does not deny that the first opinion is called common, as though those words insinuate either that it was judged common by St. Alphonsus, or by others besides Navarrus. - Reply. The obvious sense of the Note is that St. Alphonsus opposed nothing to the first opinion's having been called common. But whether it was called common by one or by several matters little. If the VV. desire others speaking thus, let them consult, for example, Potestas (no. 3073); let them consult Gobat (tr. 6, no. 189); here they will find this opinion called common. But in this matter there is no need for more; for St. Alphonsus also shows that it is common, since he found no other whom he could truly oppose except Concina, who (De Poenitentia, bk. 1, diss. 3, ch. 2, sec. 4, no. VIII) attacks it with most diffuse declamations. Moreover, since it is manifestly apparent that St. Alphonsus, in this question of such slight moment, merely employed the Salmanticenses and Concina together with Croix, and did not dwell upon it laboriously, we can indeed know from him what he himself judged concerning it; but what the common opinion of the Doctors really was must not be sought from him.

In practice, however, you will inspect the disposition and character of the penitent; for you will not rarely find sinners asserting that they will relapse, and therefore fearing that they do not have a sufficiently firm purpose, although they show nothing other than fear of relapsing and distrust of themselves. It must be inculcated upon penitents of this kind that the matter concerns not those things which perhaps are going to happen, but their present will, and confidence to be placed in divine assistance. - Thus commonly.

462. QUESTION 3. For rightly receiving the Sacrament of Penance, is an explicit purpose required?

Reply. According to St. Lig. (no. 450), there are three opinions. The first, which a certain few ⁵ hold, affirms absolutely; because, although sorrow necessarily includes a purpose, nevertheless an explicit one seems to be required by Trent, which says: With the purpose of not sinning hereafter ⁶.

⁵ The Author rightly attributes this opinion to a few. For you indeed see Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, Bl. Albert, Scotus, and Durandus alleged for it. But even Bellarmine himself (De Poenitentia, bk. 2, ch. 6) frankly admits that those older authors indeed asserted the necessity of some purpose, but did not distinguish between a formal and a virtual one. Therefore, they are alleged gratuitously for this opinion rather than for the other. Likewise, in St. Alphonsus (no. 450), Suarez, Cajetan, Bonacina, Henriquez, Valentia, Reginaldus, and Toletus are cited for the same opinion. But Suarez (De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 4, no. 34) establishes the contradictory thesis; likewise Cajetan (Summa, V. Confessio, no. 12) and Bonacina (disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 1, punct. 3, no. 9) plainly teach the opposite; Henriquez, however (Summa, bk. 4, ch. 24, no. 2), expressly hands down the third opinion; and Valentia (disp. VII, q. 8, punct. 6) distinctly affirms that this express purpose is not required by a necessity of means for justification, but that sometimes a sinner can be justified with only an implicit purpose of this kind; and he says sometimes because, by a most singular opinion, he judged that an explicit one is necessary when the positive precept of penance urges: as though, namely, for fulfilling the precept of penance, the penance which suffices for justification did not suffice! Finally, Reginaldus and Toletus do not so prefer the first that they reject the other.

⁶ Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 53) shows that the argument which is taken for this opinion from the words of the Council of Trent is plainly weak; moreover, there (ibid.) he openly shows that the contrary is plainly proved from Tridentine doctrine.

The second opinion, which Cardenas calls morally certain, absolutely denies it. The reason is that sorrow, if elicited from a general motive, includes a plainly efficacious purpose. Otherwise, according to the Council of Trent, when attrition excludes the will to sin, it sufficiently disposes a man for obtaining grace in the Sacrament. Elbel, no. 87; Laymann, ch. 4, no. 6; the Salmanticenses, ch. 5, no. 54; Lugo, disp. 14, no. 51, who says that this opinion is common among the more recent authors.

The third opinion, which St. Liguori testifies is called common, teaches that, if the penitent thinks about his future life, he must formally purpose amendment ⁷. It is otherwise if the penitent thinks nothing about the future. For if he thinks about the future, all agree that it can scarcely happen that a sincere penitent does not at the same time elicit an explicit and formal purpose ⁸.

⁷ This obligation seems to be inculcated altogether uselessly. For if a thought of future life arises, the discussion of an obligation is made in vain; since, as Bellarmine says with others (De Poenitentia, bk. 2, ch. 6), it cannot happen that sorrow for sins committed be true in the mind without a purpose of avoiding future sins also immediately arising (in one thinking of future life). But if a thought about the future does not occur, the obligation, of which there is no advertence, is inculcated in vain.

⁸ Yet this sometimes happens to the contrary in pious persons, especially those who diligently guard against even light but fully deliberate sins, and are accustomed immediately to grieve over some chance fall and soon restore themselves to the right way. For since the purpose of guarding against sins is not in them some new will which then supervenes while they dispose themselves for receiving the Sacrament of Penance, but is continually and habitually firm within them, it is therefore no wonder that perhaps they do not think again about confirming this will in some manner.

St. Liguori, however, interposes his own judgment concerning these things thus (ibid.): These latter two opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first is not without its own probability ⁹, in practice, before the fact, the safer is to be followed.

⁹ Thus St. Alphonsus judged, moved, namely, by empty citations, concerning which we have just spoken.

Since, however, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.), most even of those who are alleged for the first opinion agree that if you have confessed in good faith with true sorrow but without a formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the confession, although he adds that he cannot acquiesce in these ¹⁰, it is now clear that, in this conclusion, which alone is of service to practice, all the opinions and the suffrage of all the Doctors finally agree. There is added the authority of the Roman Council under Benedict XIII, celebrated in the Lateran Basilica in the year of the universal Jubilee 1725. The Supreme Pontiff says (Tit. XXXII, ch. 3): We shall give instructions at once brief and clear pertaining to the use and worship of the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist, which are first to be received by children, at the end of this Council of Ours. But the Supreme Pontiff says that clear instructions are to be given, in order to meet the inconveniences of which it is read thus in the Appendix (no. 1): Although pastors do not fail substantially to supply the milk of Christian piety by instructing them (the children) in the same Doctrine, nevertheless some do it in so confused and inept a manner that they cause the children either not to understand it well, or at least to take it in an undigested manner and with difficulty. Therefore, there is no room for doubt that the principal points of Christian doctrine are handed down clearly there.

¹⁰ Thus the holy Doctor: I say before the fact; for Croix, Viva, Elbel, Gobat, and Bonacina, with Bellarmine, Suarez, Vasquez, Reginaldus, Henriquez, say that if you have confessed in good faith with true sorrow but without a formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the confession.... Nevertheless, neither can I acquiesce in this opinion; the reason is that, since the first opinion is sufficiently probable, the penitent who has perpetrated a grave and certain fault is bound to complete a confession of it which is not only probably but also certainly valid. But these things openly conflict with the doctrine which he himself hands down elsewhere (bk. 6, no. 505) in these words: Here it must diligently be noted that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat confessions UNLESS IT IS MORALLY CERTAIN THAT THEY WERE INVALID, as Croix, Gobat, etc., RIGHTLY SAY WITH THE COMMON OPINION, against Antoine, who holds no low place among the rigorous authors of our time. But in the case, rather than its being certain that the confession was invalid, on the contrary you will rightly say that it is morally certain that the confession was valid: for, as he himself admits, the Authors of the first, the second, and the third opinion agree in denying the necessity of repeating the confession. Moreover, they would not deny this necessity unless they judged the confession valid. Therefore morally all the Doctors affirm that the confession is valid. But the unanimous consensus of the Doctors, from a canon received by all, produces moral certainty. Therefore, etc.

Moreover, there seem to have been two causes why St. Alphonsus turned aside to that singular conclusion. For first, deceived by Croix, he ascribed that first opinion to several who do not hold it at all, as we have already seen (in the preceding note). Then he did not sufficiently observe that the patrons of that first opinion, however many they may finally be, while at the same time teaching with the others, as he admits, that the confession is not to be repeated, by no means judged that an explicit purpose was necessary by a necessity of means (as Valentia says), and that they therefore pertain rather to the third opinion; so much so that the first opinion, insofar as it is distinguished from the third, in reality scarcely has any patron, and accordingly some probability is attributed to it only from a false supposition.

** It may appear altogether incredible; nevertheless the matter is thus: the VV. filled fifty-four columns (four others, namely, being omitted, which, although they have a different subject, are inserted among them), pp. 443-472, concerning this argument, contending, namely, that St. Alphonsus rightly and deservedly establishes that a confession made without a formal and explicit purpose is not certainly valid and therefore must be repeated. We shall cover the matter in a few words. But let the fruit of this Note be that of which we spoke in the Monitum, vol. 1, so that this question also may now pass into the state of an adjudicated matter.

Let the argument therefore be this: Whoever teaches 1. that an explicit purpose is by no means of the essence of that contrition which, as Suarez says (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, sect. 3, no. 1), is the ultimate disposition toward grace; and 2. that detestation of sin without a formal purpose, as the same Suarez says (loc. cit., no. 6), is a sufficient disposition toward grace; and 3. that a virtual purpose included in sorrow suffices for the Sacrament to be valid, as the same Suarez says (ibid., disp. 20, sect. 4, no. 34); he assuredly holds that a confession made without a formal or explicit purpose, and only with a virtual or implicit purpose, is valid, and therefore does not necessarily have to be repeated. But this must be called the unanimous opinion of the Catholic school. Therefore.

Proof of the minor.

1. Suarez (disp. 4, sect. 3, no. 7): It is concluded that a formal purpose of not sinning hereafter is not of the essence and formal nature of contrition. And again (ibid., no. 6): The detestation of sin alone without a formal purpose can be a sufficient disposition toward grace. And again (disp. 20, sect. 4, no. 34): I judge that the Sacrament is valid, and that a virtual purpose included in sorrow suffices. Hence it is clear with what fruit the VV. fill seven columns with texts of Suarez (pp. 447-449). You will say: Suarez (disp. 4, sect. 3, no. 3) establishes that a formal purpose, speaking of itself, is necessary. Reply. Distinguish: He establishes that it is necessary for the validity of the Sacrament, I deny; for other extrinsic reasons, speaking of itself, let it pass; but the present question concerns the validity of the Sacrament.

2. Peter Soto, a theologian at the Council of Trent (De Sacramento Poenitentiae, lect. 17, final proposition): It is openly evident that complete sorrow, such as has been described, suffices: in which this purpose is included. It is therefore enough to have these things implicitly. - The VV. say (p. 447) that Peter Soto is attacked by Suarez (disp. 20, sect. 4, no. 32), because he said (dist. 17, q. 1, art. 2) that a confession is never feigned from a defect of purpose, provided the penitent confesses his defect. - Reply 1. The man who has a work with distinctions, questions, and articles is not Peter Soto but Dominic. 2. If Suarez attacks Dominic Soto because the latter, as the same Suarez says, requires not even a virtual purpose, how do the VV. object Dominic Soto to us as requiring not only a virtual but even a formal purpose?

3. Vasquez (In III Partem, q. 86, art. 2, dub. 4, no. 3): For sin to be blotted out, a purpose of abstaining in the future suffices if it is virtual.... This opinion, in my judgment, is most true.

4. St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, tr. 4, ch. 1, dub. II, note A, ed. 1748): Here we think it worth the labor to note which opinions are morally certain.... They are: II. That a virtual purpose, or one implicit in sorrow conceived from a general motive, suffices. And again (ed. 1757, bk. 6, no. 540): Croix, Viva, and others commonly teach very well that if you have confessed in good faith with true sorrow but without a formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the Confession. I ask: if the holy Doctor had then been taken up into heaven, would it have been lawful to follow this doctrine of his and of the others in common?

5. Collet (De Poenitentia, pt. 2, ch. 4, no. 230): If the (formal) purpose of a new life pertains to the essence of contrition, then, even when it is omitted without fault, the substance of contrition will be lacking; and thus the salvation of the penitent who, intent upon detesting sin above all things, has not thought about the future will be given up as lost. But this indeed appears absurd to me and ridiculous to other more learned men. Collet, moreover, as all know, cannot be numbered among lax authors.

6. Francis Sylvius (in Collet, loc. cit., no. 231): It must be said with Navarrus... that per accidens an implicit purpose suffices.... Hence if someone, occupied either in examining his conscience or in detesting his past life,... does not actually think, I wish to amend my life..., but goes in good faith to the Confessor..., such a confession of his is good.

7. Even the most rigorous Concina (Epitome Theologiae Christianae, bk. 11, ch. 8): It can nevertheless happen that the penitent is carried away by such vehement sorrow that he does not think about the purpose; but if he adverted to it, he would conceive the firmest resolution of not sinning hereafter. But now the discussion concerns those things which commonly happen. He has identical things elsewhere (De Poenitentia, diss. 3, ch. 1, no. 18). Since therefore a confession without a formal purpose is here asserted to be valid, to what purpose do the VV. number even Concina (p. 455) in the article whose title is: The authorities alleged by St. Alphonsus are vindicated?

8. Cardenas (pt. 4, diss. 2, no. 80): It is altogether certain beyond all probability that this virtual purpose suffices.... Since therefore it is certain that a virtual purpose of this kind suffices, that condemnation has no place here, namely, of the first proposition among those proscribed by Innocent XI.

9. Bonacina (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 1, punct. 3, no. 9): Observe, however, that a virtual purpose suffices, by which one so detests sins that, if they occurred to his mind, he would elicit a firm purpose of guarding against them. - The VV. adduce Bonacina (pp. 451-452; loc. cit., punct. 8), where he says that each opinion is probable. - Reply 1. Which opinion he himself absolutely prefers is plain from his words adduced. Let the words which he has in the place alleged by the VV. (no. 2) be noted: The Sacrament received by one who in good faith detests sin and confesses it without a formal purpose does not seem to be judged invalid.

10. Laymann (bk. 5, tr. 6, ch. 1, no. 8): In the act of contrition there is included also the purpose, at least implicit, of observing God's commandments in the future, if life remains. - Nevertheless, for justification, an implicit desire or purpose of these Sacraments suffices. And more clearly (bk. 5, tr. 6, ch. 4, no. 6): Assertion VI. For justification outside and within the Sacrament, speaking of itself and necessarily, an express purpose of observing the commandments of God, or of abstaining from sins, is not required, but the implicit purpose which is virtually contained in the very detestation of sins suffices.

11. Viva (On Proposition 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26): Since it appears morally certain that in the Sacrament of Penance a formal purpose of not sinning hereafter is not required, but a virtual one suffices..., therefore we follow propositions of this kind which are most probable, the safer ones being omitted.

12. Resolution of Cases of the Diocese of Bologna, by command of Benedict XIV (p. 151): It must be said that the absence of a formal purpose does not render the confession invalid.

13. Felix Potestas (vol. 1, pt. 4, no. 3072), absolutely: For the validity of the Sacrament... a purpose of not sinning hereafter is required.... It suffices that the purpose be implicit and virtual.

14. Trullench (bk. 4, ch. 5, dub. 5, no. 5), absolutely: A virtual purpose suffices. Navarrus, Bonacina.

15. Andreucci (Memoriale Confessariorum, pt. 1, ch. 1, sec. 3, no. 2), absolutely: For the validity and effect of the Sacrament, it must be said that... the virtual purpose included in the sorrow and detestation itself suffices, if the sorrow arose from some universal motive.... Nor does this opinion seem in any way affected by the proscription of Proposition 1 condemned by Innocent XI.

16. Peter Catalani (pt. 3, De Poenitentia, q. 6, ch. 4, no. 16): The authors of the first opinion (which, namely, requires a formal purpose) do not deny that the Sacrament is valid if someone approaches it in good faith and detests his sins... with only a virtual purpose.

17. Reiffenstuel (tr. 14, dist. 6, q. 4, no. 49): The purpose of not sinning hereafter... regularly indeed must be formal and explicit.... Nevertheless, per accidens a virtual and implicit purpose can also suffice. Thus the common opinion. Hence argue: if a formal purpose pertained essentially to the validity of the Sacrament, its absence, although per accidens, would remove the validity, because it would remove the essence. But it does not. Therefore.

18. Holzmann (pt. 5, no. 501), absolutely: That per accidens at least a virtual and implicit purpose can suffice is the common opinion of the Doctors:... in which case he who has a virtual and implicit purpose... is judged sufficiently disposed to receive sacramental absolution; so that this principle holds: The tacit and the express have the same efficacy.

19. Fagundez (On the Second Precept of the Church, bk. 2, ch. 3, no. 14), absolutely: The common opinion teaches that a formal purpose is not required, but a virtual one suffices..., which is most especially true when, through inculpable inadvertence, the penitent does not remember this formal purpose.

20. Cuniliati (tr. 14, ch. 4, sec. 3, no. 6), absolutely: The purpose regularly ought to be explicit and formal.... I said regularly..., because if it is omitted merely from inadvertence, then it is judged implicitly contained in the sorrow.

21. Anthony of the Holy Ghost, Compendium Salmanticense, tr. 27, ch. 2, punct. 7, no. 79, absolutely: 1. Some purpose, at least virtual, is required for the validity of this Sacrament.... 2. A formal and express purpose is not essentially required for a valid Sacrament.

22. Emmanuel Rodriguez (Summa, vol. 1, ch. 48, no. 4), absolutely: The penance for sins which the sinner has without a formal purpose of avoiding them... is sufficient for that sinner to remain justified.

23. Dupasquier (Theologia Scotica, tr. 15, disp. 3, q. 2, concl. 3): Contrition ought to be with a formal purpose...; nevertheless, in some case a virtual and implicit one could suffice. It is the common opinion.... Otherwise, if someone detested his sins with his whole heart, not thinking about the future, and died in that state, he would be damned from the absence of such a formal purpose; but this is false, unfitting, and harsh.

24. Billuart (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, art. 1), absolutely: The purpose seems, speaking of itself, to have to be explicit.... Nevertheless, per accidens... an implicit or virtual one suffices.... The reason is that a formal purpose is not of the essence of contrition, and consequently is not an essential part of the Sacrament. The VV. also adduce the first part of this text (p. 456); but they ought not to have cut away the second, which decides the question against them.

25. Platelius (Cursus Theologicus, pt. 5, ch. 6, sec. 2, no. 646): The necessity of a formal purpose distinct from an efficacious detestation of sins, virtually containing the efficacious will not to sin hereafter, can be proved from no source; since this virtual purpose amply suffices for explaining the Councils which indefinitely require a purpose of amendment.

26. Filliuccius (tr. 7, ch. 7, no. 161), absolutely: If someone in good faith detests the sin which he confesses, and does not advert to a formal purpose for the future..., the confession will be valid, and then a virtual purpose suffices..., as Suarez proves from Medina and more firmly from the Councils of Florence and Trent.

27. Coninck (De Poenitentia, disp. 2, no. 58): A purpose of avoiding all sins in the future which is distinct from the preceding acts is not always necessarily required. For it can happen that, while someone elicits those prior acts (namely, of sorrow), he thinks nothing about avoiding sins in the future; in which case he will not be able to have a formal purpose concerning this, and nevertheless he will be justified.

28. Peter Marchant (Tribunal Poenitentiae, tr. 4, tit. 3, q. 4), to the question, Whether a formal purpose of not sinning hereafter is required for true contrition or attrition, replies: For true contrition or attrition a virtual purpose of not sinning hereafter and of observing the commandments suffices, nor is a formal one necessary.

29. Mastrius (Theologia Moralis, disp. 21, q. 2, no. 32), absolutely: In a case of natural forgetfulness... an express purpose of guarding against sins in the future is not necessary for justification, but a virtual and implicit one suffices.

30. Giribaldi (tr. 7, ch. 5, no. 75), absolutely: I reply that for the Sacrament of Penance a virtual purpose included in the very detestation, without a formal and express one, suffices. This is gathered from Trent.

31. John Medina (Codex de Poenitentia, tr. 1, q. 3, near the end), absolutely: It is sufficient if the penitent virtually purposes, according as the purpose is virtually contained in the act of penance.

32. Illsung (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 3, no. 34): The Council of Trent... approved imperfect contrition as a sufficient disposition toward justification through the Sacrament of Penance..., if it excludes the will to sin, without distinction whether that exclusion is made through a virtual purpose included in it or through a formal one...; nevertheless it sufficiently intimates that formal detestation is more required than a formal purpose.

33. The Salmanticenses (tr. 6, ch. 5, no. 54), absolutely: For the Sacrament of Penance a virtual purpose suffices, by which one so detests sinning that, if future sins occurred to the mind, he would elicit a firm purpose of guarding against them in the future.

34. Roncaglia (tr. 19, q. 2, ch. 1, q. 2, reply 2): If someone, with his whole mind occupied in detesting past sins, thought nothing about future amendment, and thus received the Sacrament of Penance without an explicit purpose, I would judge him to be justified by its power. The reason is that... the omission of an explicit purpose would not be from a defect of sorrow, but from a defect of advertence.

35. Wagemann (Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, pt. 3, tr. 2, ch. 4, no. 53): It is the more common opinion that a virtual purpose suffices.... This opinion can serve so that one who through forgetfulness omits a formal purpose and, after the Sacrament, discovers the defect, can rest satisfied.

36. Elbel (De Poenitentia, conf. 4, no. 86): For the validity of the Sacrament of Penance, a virtual purpose most probably suffices.... I said most probably for the validity, etc. For Stoz, with other most approved and classical authors, judges this opinion truly safe even in practice, and that through it the Sacrament is not exposed to danger, etc.

37. Marcus Struggl (tr. 11, q. 2, art. 2, no. 27), absolutely: For the validity of the Sacrament of Penance, speaking of itself, a formal purpose of a better life is not necessarily required as an act distinct from sorrow, but a virtual purpose identified with the universal sorrow suffices.

38. Honoratus Fabri (Theologia Moralis, tr. 9, ch. 2, no. 11): If attrition is from a universal motive extending to all mortal sins,... in that act of contrition there is included the purpose of not sinning in the future..., nor is anything else required by the Council. And again (ibid., no. 12): I reply that the virtual purpose which is included in the very detestation suffices.

39. Aversa (De Poenitentia, q. 2, sect. 12): It cannot be denied that that act of repentance can be elicited without a distinct act of purpose.... But in that case it must be admitted that the sinner is justified: for through that act he is turned away from sin... and virtually has the intention of not sinning any more.... Therefore, it ought not to be denied that he is justified. And again (q. 11, sect. 2): If the penitent confesses in good faith, neither thinking nor having been admonished by the Confessor about eliciting such a purpose, it will be sufficient if he has sufficient sorrow, which virtually includes such a purpose, so that he also receives the effect of grace.

40. Reuter (pt. 4, tr. 4, no. 290): Regularly speaking, it is also required that the purpose be formal and explicit.... I said: regularly speaking; for it is far more probable, indeed according to Gormaz, Cardenas, and others morally certain, that a virtual purpose contained in universal sorrow suffices. For the Council of Trent, etc.

41. Henriquez (bk. 4, ch. 24, no. 2), absolutely: It can happen that, from inadvertence, or because he remembers nothing about future life, the penitent has true love and contrition, with every virtual affection for sin excluded, and is justified without the aforesaid formal purpose, which is sufficiently included in the contrition of one who does not remember. Does Henriquez not therefore affirm most clearly that the Sacrament is thus valid? To what purpose, then, do the VV. consume an entire column (p. 455) so that his words may be taken in another sense?

42. Castropalaus (De Sacramentis, Poenitentia, punct. 1, no. 8), absolutely: In penance, a firm and absolute purpose of never sinning need not be made by an act distinct from detestation and sorrow; for he who seriously and perfectly detests and grieves over a sin committed has at least virtually the will never to commit sin again. Thereupon (punct. 2, no. 15) he adds: No sin, whether mortal or venial, is remitted without either a formal or a virtual purpose.

43. Mansi (Theologia Moralis, bk. 5, tr. 6, ch. 4, no. 6), absolutely: An implicit purpose of not sinning hereafter suffices for justification; it is virtually contained in the very detestation of sin.

44. John Pontas (V. Contritio, case IV), absolutely: It is indeed certain that for true contrition a firm purpose of not sinning hereafter is necessarily required.... But it is not required for the essence of contrition that that purpose be express and explicit.... It is therefore sufficient that that purpose be implicit and virtual.

45. Babenstuber (tr. 8, pt. 6, disp. 4, art. 1, no. 11), absolutely: Per accidens or extraordinarily, a virtual purpose suffices.... The reason is that it can happen that the penitent, when he grieves efficaciously over sins committed, thinks nothing about future sins and a life to be amended hereafter. In that event he has a virtual purpose included in the formal sorrow itself.... But such a virtual purpose then suffices, as the Doctors commonly agree, and in this case also the force of the tacit and the express is the same.

46. The Wurzburg theologians (De Sacramentis, Poenitentia, ch. 3, art. 5, no. 173), absolutely: I say: A formal purpose, speaking of itself, is necessary for contrition.... Nevertheless, per accidens a virtual one suffices. Council of Trent.

47. Ysambertus (De Sacramento Poenitentiae, disp. IX, art. 3): Let this be the proposition: The purpose of not sinning hereafter, likewise of confessing one's sins sacramentally and of making satisfaction, required in contrition, need not necessarily be formal and explicit, as though, when it is omitted as such, contrition were insufficient; but a virtual and implicit one can suffice.... Our aforesaid proposition is very common among the scholastics.... For in moral matters the virtual and the formal or express are equated.

48. Reginaldus (bk. 5, ch. 1, nos. 7-8): Whether it suffices that the purpose be virtual..., Bellarmine and Suarez relate diverse authors for each side.... Although the negative side is not altogether to be rejected,... nevertheless the affirmative seems to be followed in practice and recommended to the penitent. The VV. (p. 454) fill two solid columns with those things which Reginaldus (loc. cit.), following Bellarmine, pursues at length, so that, namely, he may prove that the affirmative opinion is to be recommended in practice. But the present question is not which opinion is to be recommended, but whether a virtual purpose suffices. Moreover, St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 540) numbers Reginaldus among those who deny that a confession made with a virtual purpose must be repeated. Do the VV. also undertake to refute the holy Doctor, and indeed in that article in which they strive to vindicate the authorities alleged by the holy Doctor? And in fact Reginaldus, enumerating the conditions of perfect sorrow, writes (ibid., no. 69): Fifth, that it exclude the will to sin and be with at least a virtual purpose of avoiding sins hereafter.

49. Lessius (In Additiones S. Thomae, q. 1, dub. 2, no. 6): I say secondly: This purpose must be formal and express if a man thinks about the manner of life to be led in the future. If, however, this thought does not occur, an implicit and virtual purpose included in serious sorrow for sins suffices.... For if virtual penance sometimes suffices, why does not a virtual purpose of amendment included in sorrow for sin also suffice?

50. Navarrus (Manuale, ch. 1, no. 1): Following the opinion of the ancients and the more recent authors..., we define that contrition is repentance... with a purpose of not sinning any more, at least virtually.... (no. 11) I said, at least virtually, because just as the act which suffices for virtual penance, so for the same reason that which is a virtual purpose of not sinning any more seems to suffice.... (no. 6): When I was asked, however, whether this... was to be held, namely... that a virtual purpose suffices, I replied affirmatively, provided he so repents that, if he adverted to future things, he would purpose never to repeat those things nor to admit future ones.

51. Mazzotta (tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, ch. 4, sec. 1, no. 3): You ask, Must the purpose be formal and express, or does a virtual and implicit one suffice? I reply that a virtual and implicit purpose in the act of sorrow also suffices, provided this sorrow is elicited from a universal motive.... This opinion is so received by Theologians and fortified by such firm reasons that its truth must not be doubted in practice.

52. Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 1, no. 7): An explicit purpose of not sinning hereafter, although it is laudably added and, in the opinion of many, necessarily...; nevertheless, in the probable opinion of others an implicit one suffices, that is, that which is involved in the very act of detestation.... For no one wishes to commit what displeases him. Since he says merely that an explicit one is laudably added, it is plain that he by no means held it necessary.

53. Esparza (bk. 10, q. 88, art. 4): If it could in any way happen that the penitent conceived contrition... without a formal purpose of not sinning hereafter, he would without doubt obtain the true effect of the Sacrament.

54. Magister Candidus (De Confessione, disq. 24, art. 12, no. III): I say secondly: An implicit and virtual purpose, by which one so detests sins that, if future sins occurred to his mind, he would elicit a firm purpose and an absolute will of guarding against them in the future, is sufficient for the validity of the Sacrament and for obtaining its effect.

55. Voit (vol. 2, no. 511): Per accidens a virtual purpose sometimes suffices (for obtaining grace... in confession), which is included in serious sorrow, by virtue of which the penitent is so disposed that he does not wish to sin any more.... Thus it seems to be reconciled with our opinion and that of others, that a virtual purpose suffices.

56. Escobar (bk. 14, sect. 2, no. 157): A formal purpose does not seem to me so necessary.... Hence, if someone in good faith truly detests the sin which he confesses, and does not advert to a formal purpose, so that he does not sin in omitting it, the Sacrament will be valid, and a virtual purpose included in the sorrow will suffice.

57. Francis Anthony of Gorizia (Tabula 151): A virtual and implicit purpose included in the sorrow itself suffices, if in some case one were so carried away by bitter sorrow and vehement contrition that he thought nothing about ordering his life in the future.

58. Reding (Theologia Scholastica, De Poenitentia, q. 6, art. 2, controv. 3, no. 5): Thesis: From the definition of the Council of Trent it is not proved that the purpose of not sinning hereafter, required for the Sacrament of Penance, must be formal and explicit; but, speaking of itself, an implicit and virtual one suffices for the validity of this Sacrament, provided that it is universal.

59. Moya (tr. 3, De Poenitentia, disp. 5, q. 11, no. 4): The true opinion hands down that, both for the validity and for the effect of the Sacrament, a virtual purpose included in sorrow suffices, provided that the sorrow is such that it extends at least implicitly to all mortal sins.

60. Ulloa (disp. 5, ch. 3, no. 47): When you hear that detestation, sorrow, and purpose are required essentially and constitutively for the Sacrament of Penance, do not understand this determinately of those acts as formal, but either of formal or virtual acts. And again (no. 72): This purpose can be distinct or indistinct from the two preceding acts, or from either of them.

61. Paul Mezger (tr. 18, disp. 44, art. 2, sec. 1): Conclusion. In order that sorrow be efficacious and thus useful for the remission of sins, whether within or outside the Sacrament, the purpose of not sinning hereafter is necessary: ordinarily indeed a formal one; per accidens and extraordinarily, a virtual one.

62. Lucius Ferraris (V. Poenitentiae Sacramentum, art. 2, no. 40): The purpose of not sinning hereafter, although, speaking of itself, it ought to be formal and explicit,... nevertheless it also suffices that it be implicit and virtual. Scotus.

63. Sporer (Theologia Sacramentalis, pt. 3, ch. 2, no. 316), absolutely: For contrition even perfect, which justifies outside or within the Sacrament, a formal, express purpose of not sinning mortally hereafter is not per se universally necessary, but a virtual purpose always included in true formal contrition itself can also suffice.

64. Granadus (De Sacramentis, controv. 7, tr. 18, disp. 3, sect. 1, no. 6; in Diana, vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 109): I judge that for attrition a virtual purpose intrinsically enclosed in sorrow suffices.... Wherefore he who sincerely grieves over sins because of the punishments of hell is sufficiently disposed and approaches

the Sacrament of Penance without another formal purpose of not sinning hereafter.

65. Villalobos (Summa, vol. 2, tr. 9, diff. 19, no. 8): When the penitent thinks about future sins, he is bound to have an actual purpose of avoiding them; otherwise he will have a virtual one; but this suffices much more if he does not think about future things.

66. Gobat (tr. 6, no. 205): That it can happen per accidens that the remission of sins is obtained without an express and formal purpose, either through attrition together with confession or through contrition even outside confession, is so received by the more recent theologians and fortified by such firm reasons that its truth must not be doubted in practice.

67. Gormaz (De Sacramentis, disp. 4, sect. 3, no. 223), absolutely: I assert secondly: For a true act of Penance and for the validity of the Sacrament of Penance, the purpose which is customarily called virtual suffices.... And again (no. 224): That act (of sorrow) without a formal purpose has the formality of the purpose required by Trent, and therefore is certainly sufficient... for constituting the Sacrament of Penance.

68. Valentia (vol. 4, disp. 7, q. 8, punct. 6, near the end): The things which Maior and Medina adduce... prove only that this express purpose is not required even by a necessity of means for justification; but that sometimes a sinner can be justified with only an implicit purpose of this kind, contained, namely, in the very detestation of past sin: that is, outside the time of the precept, or even at the time of the precept if someone is then prevented by a sudden occurrence from being able to think about the future. - Concerning Valentia the VV. spend three columns (pp. 457-458); and although they suppress the words related here, they do not deny that, according to the opinion of Valentia, the Sacrament is valid without a formal purpose even at the time of the precept. But if the VV. concede this, let them therefore also concede that Valentia is wrongly alleged for the opinion of St. Alphonsus, who contends that the confession in the case must be repeated.

69. Praepositus (De Poenitentia, q. 2, dub. 3): A formal purpose is not required, because true and efficacious sorrow is found even thus.

70. Meratius (De Poenitentia, q. 17, sect. 2): It is the common opinion of the more recent authors that a virtual and implicit purpose suffices.

71. Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 2, dub. 6, no. 141): It must be asserted that some purpose of not sinning is indeed necessary for the nature of perfect contrition; nevertheless, a purpose which is an act distinct from the act of penance itself is not necessary. And again (disp. 6, dub. 14, no. 212): That a virtual purpose contained in sorrow suffices... is now the common opinion in the School in this and the preceding century after Trent. And again (disp. 2, no. 144): Therefore, theologians do not so commonly teach the opposite as Lugo absolutely thinks, disp. 5, no. 97.

72. Toletus (bk. 3, ch. 4, no. 2): This purpose must be express; and this is more probable..., although some say that the first act suffices; but what we have said is safer. Moreover, he who says it is safer implicitly admits that the other also suffices of itself. This is confirmed from these words of the same Toletus (In III Partem S. Thomae, q. 85, art. 1): In the fact that a man is displeased with a sin committed, there is virtually included a certain purpose of not committing it any more.... Although, therefore, in such detestation there is no formal purpose, which also sometimes happens, nevertheless this purpose is virtually included in it.

Thereupon he attributes the same power for obtaining the effect to an implicit purpose as to an explicit one (ibid., q. 87, art. 1): Formal penance is not necessary, but an act of love, which nevertheless is virtual penance, suffices for blotting out a venial sin. Moreover, it ought to seem superfluous to doubt the opinion of Toletus concerning this, when it is established that, concerning a penitent who does not detest sin above everything detestable, and likewise concerning one who desires to have contrition which he does not have, he absolutely established (Summa, loc. cit., nos. 6-7) that such contrition, if the defect is not known to the penitent, suffices for receiving grace in the Sacrament.

73. Lugo (disp. 14, no. 52): Sometimes sorrow is of such a kind that the required purpose is virtually included in it; and then another formal purpose is not required for the validity of the Sacrament. And a little later (no. 53): The words of the Councils of Florence and Trent, which require with sorrow a purpose of not sinning..., are understood of a formal purpose or of a virtual one implicit in it. For there can be some sorrow... which does not bring with it such a universal purpose; therefore the Fathers explained that sorrow was not of just any kind, but with a purpose of not sinning, whether formal or virtual.

Let us break off the series, not as though as many and more witnesses were lacking, but 1. because we dwell in exile, violently torn away from libraries; 2. because those already produced here can suffice for showing the consensus of all the schools. But now let us compare these with those who are objected as though adversaries and whom we have collected by Bellarmine (De Poenitentia, bk. 4, ch. 6).

But (as St. Alphonsus himself, bk. 6, no. 450, distinctly testifies after others) Bellarmine judged that if you have confessed in good faith with true sorrow but without a formal purpose, you are not bound to repeat the confession (these are the words of St. Alphonsus). And since Bellarmine (loc. cit.) writes: The common path well-worn by the ancients has always seemed safer and more convenient to us, is it not openly deduced from this that those ancients held the same opinion as Bellarmine concerning the validity of the Sacrament received in this way? Moreover, let it now be omitted by what right Bellarmine contends that those ancients must be interpreted concerning a formal purpose rather than also a virtual one, while, for example, Mastrius, Ferraris, and Dupasquier (locc. citt.) relate and prove that Scotus distinctly taught the sufficiency of a virtual purpose; but is not the doctrine of those ancients also most well known concerning virtual penance included in an act of perfect charity, by virtue of which they professed that remission of sins is obtained? And if merely virtual penance, and therefore contrition, suffices, does it not appear a fortiori that this must be said of the purpose?

Bellarmine adds that the necessity of a formal purpose is more openly handed down by Adrian VI, Cajetan, Dominic Soto, and Cano. - Reply. I distinguish: For the validity of the Sacrament, I deny; otherwise, let it pass. And as regards Adrian, Suarez (disp. 4, sect. 3, no. 2) has these words: Adrian, in IV, q. 1, De Poenitentia, says that a purpose at least implicit is necessary, explaining what he had said absolutely in Quodlibet 5, art. 5 (which place Bellarmine alleges), that a purpose is required for contrition. Therefore Adrian must be removed from their number. As regards Soto, it is customary to say (and this is also read among the VV.) that the opinion concerning the sufficiency of a virtual purpose was called by him a pernicious error. Behold the passage of Soto (De Natura et Gratia, bk. 2, ch. 14): Nor indeed would I think it should be passed over in silence that certain of the Nominalists doubt whether, for the nature of contrition, a purpose of guarding against vices in the future is necessary. And they deny it because they find nothing in Sacred Scripture concerning a purpose of this kind. Concerning this, assuredly, if my slight judgment were of any weight, they ought to be condemned: not only because it is an error, but because it is pernicious. Is this the scholastic doctrine concerning a virtual purpose, such that this censure of Soto aptly agrees with it?

But (lest we dwell upon these things longer without profit) two things are to be noted concerning these three theologians. One is that they also profess the common doctrine concerning the efficacy of virtual penance. Thus, for example, Cajetan (Commentary on III, q. 87, art. 1): Virtual displeasure is called that which is not formally displeasure, but is formally another act, such as love of God, of such force that displeasure with sin is naturally to follow from it, so that, if the memory of sin then occurred, by virtue of that act a formal displeasure with sin would follow; and thus every act of love of God proceeding from charity can be called virtually a displeasure with mortal sin. Thereupon he adds below: If, by a special gift of God, virtual displeasure alone had been present, the concurrence of displeasure implicitly and virtually is sufficiently preserved (in justification). The other is that the doctrine concerning the sufficiency of merely supposed attrition was commonly approved (as is known) by Soto, Cajetan, and Cano; and, as we saw above, Suarez reproaches Soto for having thought that the absence of any purpose did not impede obtaining the grace of the Sacrament. Hence nothing is more alien, not merely from truth but even from probability, than that, according to their opinion, a confession which lacked a formal purpose must be repeated.

From these things, then, what conclusion will it finally be lawful to draw? Let the VV. keep Amort for themselves, who employs this magnificent argument for the necessity of an explicit purpose for justification (Theologia Moralis, tr. 13, sec. 8, q. 12): For justification the love of God is required; but the love of God is an explicit purpose of observing the commandments. Therefore. To this argument someone will rightly reply: I deny the major, because charity is not prerequired for receiving grace in the Sacrament; I deny the minor, because an act of love of God can be elicited with a merely implicit will to observe the commandments. Finally, I deny the consequent and the consequence, because it has against it the unanimous opinion of the Catholic school, as we have seen. Indeed, this unanimous doctrine of the Catholic school also effects this: that anyone can set aside the scruple by which the holy Doctor Alphonsus was moved to judge that, in the case, the confession must be repeated, without the note of temerity and with due reverence toward the holy Doctor preserved.

In these instructions, both imperfect sorrow or attrition and a merely implicit purpose are plainly equated as sufficient for obtaining the pardon of sins in the Sacrament. Indeed, we find expressed there with even less controversy that which pertains to an implicit purpose than that which pertains to attrition. For as regards the latter, it is intimated in the preceding question that it had not yet been defined by the Apostolic See whether it ought to be joined with some beginning of love; but concerning an implicit purpose you find nothing of this kind said there.

Moreover, in the Instruction for children approaching the Sacrament of Penance, which is seen appended at the end of the same Council, these things are found (pt. III, no. XXIX, p. 303):

Penitent. Does one who confesses without sorrow for sins and without the purpose of sinning no more receive forgiveness?

Confessor. If he does not have at least imperfect sorrow, that is, attrition, with the firm purpose, AT LEAST IMPLICIT, of never sinning again, certainly, if he confesses, the Confession is invalid, and he does not receive forgiveness of sins. Moreover, even now at Rome it is prescribed that these instructions be employed for children to be imbued with catechesis.

463. QUESTION 4. What purpose is required, or suffices, for venial sins?

Reply 1. For the validity of the Sacrament, it is required and suffices to have an efficacious purpose of avoiding at least one venial sin; because it suffices to grieve over even one for sufficient matter of the Sacrament ¹¹; therefore, a fortiori, an efficacious purpose of avoiding all the venial sins which are accused suffices.

¹¹ Compare Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 141), who teaches that the opinion of those who think that sufficient sorrow can be present concerning one venial sin, even if no virtual sorrow, or certainly less sufficient sorrow, is present concerning other venial sins of the same species, is truer.

2. It suffices to purpose amendment concerning some class of venial sins, for example, concerning lies, by saying: I do not wish to lie any more.

3. It suffices to wish to avoid all deliberate sins, because these can be avoided; and semi-deliberate sins insofar as it can be done. - St. Lig., bk. 6, no. 449, dub. 2.

4. It suffices to wish firmly and efficaciously to diminish the frequency and multitude of venial sins, because, as was said concerning contrition, the purpose falls upon at least some one of them ¹². In practice, it is safer to elicit a purpose concerning certain determinate sins, especially the graver ones and chiefly those which are committed from habit, and to join to them some sin of one's former life. - Reuter, no. 295.

¹² To this pertain those words of St. Thomas (III, q. 87, art. 1, ad 1): Penance for mortal sins requires that a man purpose to abstain from each and every mortal sin. But for penance for venial sins it is required that a man purpose to abstain from individual sins, but not from all, because the frailty of human nature does not permit this; nevertheless, he must have the purpose of preparing himself to diminish venial sins; otherwise, there would be a danger of his falling away, since he would abandon the desire of advancing, or of removing the impediments to spiritual progress, which are venial sins.

When the faithful, including those who are regarded as pious and confess frequently, are seen to make no or almost no progress after innumerable confessions, it is permissible to conjecture that they conceive purposes which are too general and confused, and therefore sluggish and languid. - Elbel, no. 112.

Not rarely, moreover, penitents are found, women especially, who devote a long time to the examination of conscience, seek out the smallest faults with the greatest anxiety, and prolong their confessions beyond measure, and nevertheless are not very solicitous about sorrow and an efficacious purpose. These are to be seriously exhorted that, omitting the anxious care of declaring all venial sins in species and number, they subject to the keys with serious sorrow and a purpose of amendment only those which weigh more heavily upon the conscience and which especially are to be rooted out. Indeed, it is expedient that from these venial sins they select one principal sin upon which, above the rest, they diligently concentrate in detesting and amending it. - Sporer, no. 339; Elbel, no. 113; etc.