Chapter I. On the Killing of Oneself, or on Suicide

389. Principles. - I. It is never lawful for anyone to kill himself directly, that is, from intention and by his own authority ¹. This is clear: 1. from the divine precept: Thou shalt not kill. Exod. 20. 13. - I will kill, and I will make alive. Deut. 32. 39. - For Thou art, O Lord, who hast power of life and death. Wisd. 16. 13. 2. From natural law. For man does not have direct dominion over his body, nor over his life, but only useful dominion and administration, since he does not have these from himself, but has received them from God ², and he must return them to God alone when He demands them. Therefore a suicide injures the supreme dominion of God by destroying a thing not his own. He also injures society, of which he is a part, as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 64, art. 5 ³.

¹ Namely, divine authority being excluded. Yet Lessius suggests that this crime can be excused by ignorance according to the sense of the holy Fathers (De Iust. et Iur., lib. 2, cap. 9, n. 23).

² Why man, who has received from God both life and extrinsic goods, has dominion of these goods but not likewise of his own life, Molina (De Iust. et Iur., tom. IV, disp. 1, n. 1) and Lugo (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 10, n. 9 and 17) explain excellently.

The reason can be added that the present life is essentially the condition of a man serving God, and therefore subject to His laws and obeying His precepts; from which condition afterward he obtains either reward or punishment in the future life. But: 1. it ought not to be in the power of one serving God to end the time of serving according to his own choice; and 2. much less ought it to be in his power to be able, with impunity and at pleasure, to withdraw himself from the precepts of God perhaps troublesome to him. But each inconvenience of this sort would follow if man were free to place the end of his own life whenever it pleased him. Therefore.

³ The canons of the Church forbid suicides to be buried in a sacred place. Yet this is not to be understood of those who killed themselves from fury, insanity, or a passion of most grave sadness with imagination disturbed, or who before death truly grieved concerning this (St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 375). The reason is that the pious mother Church is not accustomed to inflict this penalty unless it is clear that someone, while he killed himself, was plainly in possession of himself. But in doubt whether a suicide was endowed with full judgment, one must incline in his favor, although such persons have been accustomed to be buried with less ceremony, for example with only one or another priest accompanying.

But from common civil law, both suicides and those who attempt this crime, even when death has not followed, are punished with the penalty of infamy.

II. Without divine authority it is never right to place an external act tending per se immediately to one's own destruction, unless that act has another good and immediate effect which alone is intended, and a most grave reason urges that this good effect be obtained. The reason is that where a physical act, even one per se indifferent, has no other effect than suicide, it now becomes evil, since no reason is present by which the precept of preserving life and of guarding against danger of death ceases. Therefore in any case whatever it is prohibited.

III. It is lawful to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself, or to place an action from which, besides one's intention, one's own death will certainly follow; provided from that action there follows equally immediately some good which compensates the loss of life, and this alone is intended. The reason is clear from what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where voluntary indirect is treated, n. 9.

390. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether it is lawful to set fire to a ship or tower so that the enemies may suffer grave damage, but with certain loss of one's own life?

Resp. It is affirmed, at least more probably; because it is expedient that public damage be avoided, or the common good be procured, even with the most certain damage of private persons. - Lugo, Lessius... - St. Alphonsus, n. 367 ⁴.

⁴ St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 367, q. II) brings in Doctors on this matter as if dissenting, and for the negative opinion he also alleges St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 64, art. 5). But in reality there is no dissension among the Doctors; they prefer a diverse solution of the question only because they establish a diverse hypothesis or question. And so St. Thomas and others with him deny that this is lawful for avoiding a private inconvenience, or for escaping other miseries of this life, for example captivity or even death to be inflicted on oneself by others. But this does not fight against the common opinion of others, that this is lawful where the cause of the public good or the reason of averting public damage intervenes.

Q. 2. Whether a virgin can expose herself to danger of death for preserving chastity?

Resp. It is affirmed, at least if death is not certainly going to follow, and this both on account of love of chastity and on account of the danger of sin which is rather often had in such an occasion. Thus commonly theologians. - Indeed more probably it must still be affirmed, although death is certainly going to follow and there is not a proximate danger of consent; because even the integrity of the body alone is esteemed most highly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 366; Hom. apost., n. 1. - Laymann, etc.

Q. 3. Whether a virgin is bound to permit herself to be killed rather than violated ⁵?

⁵ Note that the question is posed whether she is bound, not whether it is lawful; for all agree that it is lawful to suffer death rather than the loss of modesty. Moreover, Taberna says that a girl does not sin if, on account of evident danger of death or of immense infamy, she does not apply all means for repelling the ravisher, for example if, when she could, she does not kill him, does not call out to the neighborhood, but merely suffers intercourse, nevertheless with every danger of consent excluded. But although more than fifty Authors hold this proposition in published books..., among whom are St. Antoninus, Sylvester, Soto, Navarre, Toletus, Lessius, Reginald, Gonet, etc.; nevertheless it is not expedient to propose it publicly..., because it is apt to cause abuses especially among the uneducated. Thus Croix, lib. 5, part. 1, n. 916, where Fr. Ant. Zacharia added a not useless note.

The opinion of Cornelius a Lapide on Daniel, chap. XIII, v. 23, where he treats of Susanna provoked by the elders to sin, also bears on this: "Yet in such a danger of infamy and death, Susanna could have conducted herself negatively, and permitted their lust upon herself, provided by an internal act she had not consented to it, but had detested and execrated it; because reputation and life are a greater good than modesty, whence it is lawful to expose this for that... But that she cried out... was an act of distinguished and heroic chastity: for such is to prefer to die than to be polluted."

Resp. No, probably, at least speaking speculatively, provided she positively resists by the will, and the proximate danger of consent is absent. The reason is that this permission is not formal cooperation in the sin of another, but material only; and a just cause of permission is present, namely danger of death. Yet this practice does not seem to be counseled when a danger of some consent can prudently be feared.

Q. 4. Whether it is lawful for a guilty person to present himself before a judge, although he must certainly be punished by death?

Resp. It is affirmed. Because that action per se is indifferent, indeed also honorable; for in the case to will to die is equivalent to willing the order of justice; and just as it is lawful from a just cause to desire death for another, and even to procure it in a legitimate manner, so also for oneself. - Lugo. - Lessius. - St. Alphonsus, Hom. apost., n. 2.

391. Resolves. - 1. Each one is bound to preserving life, since no one can cast away the gift of this life without sin, and not to preserve life is equivalent to taking it from oneself ⁶.

⁶ ** Nevertheless, from the most common opinion of the Doctors, it is lawful to yield a plank to a friend in a shipwreck even with certain loss of life; indeed from St. Thomas this would be of the most perfect virtue (see Fagundez, In Dec., lib. V, cap. 12, n. 18). St. Alphonsus also agrees (lib. 3, n. 366), even if the plank has already been taken, and to confirm this he reports the remembered doctrine of St. Thomas. But then he is moved by the scruple of Sylvius, who (In 2. 2, q. 26, a. 1) does not concede this unless on account of skill in swimming the danger of death is absent. Whence St. Alphonsus adds: "But Sylvius rightly observes that he cannot, in order to yield the plank, throw himself into the sea, because no one can positively kill himself." But these things are with difficulty reconciled with the preceding; for if he has already taken the plank, the lowering or throwing of himself into the sea is a necessary consequence of the plank yielded, even according to Sylvius, who says: "If he has already begun to use the plank, he does not seem able to relinquish it unless he throws himself into the sea."

Moreover, as Fagundez (l.c.) observes, you can indeed lawfully yield the plank then, but you are not bound, other things being equal. Other things being equal, I say; for you could be bound if the public good required that the life of the other be preserved; and on the contrary it would not be lawful if from the loss of your life grave damage were threatening others, for example a family necessarily to be supported.

2. It is never lawful to place, with the intention of killing oneself, an action from which death is going to follow, although only by accident; because ⁷ it is never lawful to will a forbidden thing and to reduce this will to act.

⁷ The reason is sought from the preceding resolution, or also from principle II above, n. 389, of which here you have a repetition.

3. Someone is not bound to preserve life by extraordinary remedies, or those which bring the greatest pain. The reason is that there is no obligation of preserving life except by ordinary means, namely those which neither bring great inconveniences, nor demand expenses immense according to the varied condition of each person, nor cause very bitter pains, etc. Thus, for example, you are not bound for the sake of preserving life to suffer the amputation of a leg or arm, or an incision of the belly for extracting a stone. - St. Alphonsus, n. 372.

4. A virgin is not bound to suffer an operation by the hands of a physician, even if life is in danger, when on account of shame this befalls her as something most grave and brings upon her a greater horror than death itself. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.; Hom. apost., n. 2.

5. It is never lawful to macerate the body for shortening life, nor, even with such an end excluded, gravely to ruin health by immoderate and altogether indiscreet penances. Yet it is lawful from virtue to use penances ordinarily grave with a certain shortening of life, because from the common opinion of the Doctors, on account of merit or the mortification of depraved nature, some loss of a longer life can be contemned. - St. Alphonsus, n. 371; Hom. apost., n. 2.

6. Craftsmen do not sin who climb upon the roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers where there is need; nor blacksmiths who daily lessen their life by handling fire; the reason is that they do this from a reasonable cause. On the contrary, bold men sin gravely who from a rash wager and vain glory cast themselves without cause into grave dangers by climbing high, letting themselves down, carrying heavier burdens, etc., etc.

7. It is not lawful to mutilate oneself unless it is necessary for the preservation of the whole body, because man is not the master of his members, but only the custodian, and whatever man is, the whole is God's, nor does he have any other dominion over his body except useful or indirect dominion. Yet St. Alphonsus does not reject as improbable the opinion affirming that this is lawful for the preservation of the voice, if other conditions are present ⁸. - St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 374.

⁸ The conditions from St. Alphonsus are that moral danger of life be absent, and that it not be done to boys unwilling. The reason of this opinion is, says St. Alphonsus, both because eunuchs are useful to the common good for singing divine praises in churches more sweetly, and because the preservation of the voice must be said to be a good of no small moment in them, since through it they notably change their condition for the better..., and therefore so great a good seems to be a just cause that with it such a harm of the body can lawfully be compensated; so much the more because this is daily brought into use and is tolerated by the Church, as Elbel says. Benedict XIV, although he inclined to the opinion which he called more common, that voluntary emasculation is not to be excused from sin, nevertheless advises Bishops not to wish to prepare troubles and offenses for themselves without cause by eliminating singers of this sort from musical choirs. De Synod., lib. 2, cap. 7, n. 3-6.

8. It is not lawful to mutilate oneself for a spiritual good, or for avoiding any sin whatever. For as St. Thomas says, "spiritual safety can always be assisted otherwise than by the cutting off of a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it lawful to cut off a member for avoiding whatever sin" (2. 2, q. 65, art. 1, ad 3) ⁹.

⁹ Add that mutilation of this sort indeed renders someone impotent for generating, yet it does not exempt from carnal temptations. But the discipline of the Church brands with the mark of irregularity the eunuch who, outside the necessity of saving life, has furnished consent to his mutilation. Benedict XIV, De Syn., lib. 2, cap. 7, n. 5.

9. More probably it is lawful for one to cut off for himself a hand bound by a chain, for avoiding death threatening from a beast, or a tyrant, or a fire, because the part must yield to the good of the whole man. - Lugo, de Iustitia, disp. 10, n. 22. - Lacroix, n. 786. - Billuart, against others. - See Cases, n. 376 and following.