Chapter I. On the Notion of Human Acts

1. • DEFINITION. An act in general is the determination of a potency, or it is the faculty of acting placed in exercise, or also it is the exercise of the faculty of acting. The potency itself is customarily called first act, and its determination second act.

But a human act is that which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or it is an act proceeding from a free will with advertence to the goodness or malice of the act.

For that alone can be called a human act which proceeds from man insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures ¹. Now man acts then only, as such, when in acting he uses the faculties essential to himself, namely of knowing, willing, and freely determining himself; therefore there is not given an act properly human unless it proceeds from the deliberate or free will of man. Hence a human act at length is the same as a moral act. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, art. 1.

¹ From this manner of speaking certain moderns, after Alasia, ineptly conclude that also any acts of the intellect, such as thought, perception, judgment, reasoning, and likewise acts of the will even not free, are altogether human acts, because, they say, they are perfected by those powers by which man essentially differs from brutes. They did not understand, namely, that the distinction of man from brutes is employed here by the Doctors not only as to the substance of the faculties, but especially as to the mode of operating (see Suarez, on I-II, Treatise 1, Disputation 2, Section 2, from no. 7). And indeed this abuse of innovating can bring only this fruit: both that men do not understand one another and move controversies which arise merely from the opinions of another not being perceived, and that in reading the books of the Doctors, indeed also ecclesiastical monuments and decrees, they undergo the gravest danger of erring.

Hence it differs from an act of man ², which is done in man, or by man, without any deliberation, such as indeliberate acts, first-first motions, or acts of a man wholly distracted, sleeping, delirious, insane, drunk, or deprived in any way whatsoever of the use of reason ³.

² A certain modern, having rejected the customary distinction of the ancients into acts of man and human acts, introduced a new one of natural or animal acts and personal acts; for, as he says, the faculties of intellect and will, as the highest active principle, constitute personality. But from this an easy path lies open to grave errors; for if personality is constituted in the highest or supreme active principle, then God, for one nature or active principle, will have one person, but Christ, for a twofold nature, will have two.

³ It has pleased some to distinguish manifold acts in man according as St. Gregory the Great (Homily 29 on the Gospel) said that man has something from every creature, so that consequently 1. some acts are called natural, as to live, vegetate, grow, etc.; 2. others animal, common also to brutes, as to eat, walk, etc.; 3. others of man, as to speak, laugh, understand, etc.; and 4. finally human, which proceed from a deliberate will; in these the intellect holds itself as condition, but the free will as cause.

2. • DIVISION. A human act is distinguished in many ways.

1. Elicited, or commanded. That is called elicited which is consummated in the will itself, as an act of love, hatred, desire. But commanded is that which, with the will commanding, is perfected by another potency, whether internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking, writing.

2. Internal, or external. An internal act is that which is perfected only in the internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking, loving. But an external act, or mixed act, is that which the will perfects through the organs of the body. An internal act is called more specially an act, and an external act is rather named an action ⁴.

⁴ The consideration of an internal or external act now especially regards whether the internal act, for example the consent of the will, in any way comes forth exteriorly or is manifested; so that thence it may be gathered whether it is subjected to a law, or censure, or reservation, etc.

3. Good, evil, indifferent. A good act is called that which is conformable to right reason; evil, that which is not agreeable to it; indifferent, that which neither is conformable to the norm of reason nor is repugnant to it. - A good or indifferent act is also called licit ⁵; but an evil act, illicit.

⁵ Those who do not admit indifferent acts in the individual by that very fact hold any licit act also as morally good. See what is to be said below, Chapter III, Article 1.

4. Natural, or supernatural. The former is that which is produced by the powers of nature alone; but the latter, that which is perfected by the help of divine grace ⁶.

⁶ A supernatural act is called meritorious either de condigno or de congruo, according as some retribution is repaid to it either from justice, or from the mere fittingness and benignity of God.

5. Valid, or invalid. A valid act is that which enjoys all the essentials required for producing its proper effect. But invalid is that which lacks even one of the essentials. Thus a contract is valid in which the things required for its validity, whether by natural law or by positive law, are found. Otherwise it must be held invalid.