Chapter — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Chapter I. On the Obligation of Restitution
Restitution, as regards the name, sounds the same as the placing of a thing into its pristine state. As regards the reality, it is the repair of another's injured right.
- Principles. I. Restitution in reality, or at least in vow, is absolutely necessary of itself for salvation if it is a matter of grave matter.
- It is evident from the principles established above, n. 532. For commutative justice necessarily demands that the violation of another's right cease; but it cannot cease except through restitution. Therefore.
- It is evident also from Sacred Scripture. Thus Ezek. 33:14: But if you say to the impious man: You shall die the death; and he does penance for his sin, and does judgment and justice, and that impious man has restored the pledge and has returned robbery..., he shall live life and shall not die. - And Epist. St. Jas. 5:4: Behold the wages of the laborers who have reaped your fields, which have been defrauded by you, cry out; and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.
- It is evident from the unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers. Thus St. Augustine, ep. 153 to Macedonius: The sin is not forgiven unless the thing taken away is restored, when it can be restored. - These words of the holy Doctor were inserted into Canon Law (Decret. Gratiani, cap. Si res aliena 1, causa 14, q. 6); and thence the fourth rule of law in the Sext: Sin is not forgiven unless the thing taken away is restored.
I said in reality or in vow; for restitution is not necessary by necessity of means for salvation in reality; wherefore if it is impossible in reality, it does not obstruct salvation. But no one can be excused from restitution in vow; and whoever has injured another's right must always have a firm purpose of restoring when he can; for otherwise he would retain affection toward an evil thing, and thus would be found in habitual sin. - Thus all. - Hence St. Augustine in the text just cited says: when it can be restored.
- II. The precept of restitution is primarily negative, but secondarily affirmative. The first reason is that the precept of restitution is immediately founded on the obligation of not violating another's right, or on the obligation of neither accepting nor retaining another's thing. But this obligation is primarily negative, as is plain, and therefore it urges always and for always, that is, it urges at any moment until restitution has been made. - The second reason is that the obligation of not receiving or retaining another's thing, on which the precept of restitution is primarily and immediately founded, cannot be fulfilled without there thence being made a positive action by which that which is his is returned to the owner.
III. There is no obligation of restitution except on account of the violation of strict right, or of commutative justice; but otherwise not on account of violation of the right of uprightness simply. The reason is that restitution brings it about that the thing owed to the neighbor equals his right unjustly violated. But now this cannot be done when speech is of the violation of the right of uprightness. For if someone injures the right of his Superior or of his neighbor, by denying obedience to the former, and offices of charity to the latter, that violation cannot be strictly repaired, because a new act of obedience or charity would not repair the violated right, but would only satisfy the precept, which always urges, namely of obeying the Superior and relieving the neighbor in straits.
- Questions. Q. 1. Whether one unable to restore from goods of the same order is held to restore from goods of a diverse order?
Resp. More probably negatively. The reason is that no comparison is given between goods of a diverse order; therefore neither can compensation be given. And indeed it could never be decreed how much arithmetically ought to be restored, since between goods of a diverse order no common measure is given. - St. Lig., n. 627. - Lacroix, etc., and others more commonly.
Nevertheless certain others affirm, because, they say, he who cannot repair the whole damage is held at least to compensate the part which he can. - St. Th., 2. 2, q. 62, art. 2. St. Lig. calls this sentence probable, but holds the first as more probable.
Nevertheless, through vindicative justice it can be imposed by a judge or by a Superior that for injury concerning one kind of goods someone provide something in goods of another order; yet more probably by reason of penalty only, but not by reason of justice. The injured person besides has the right of denouncing before a judge him from whom he accepted injury, and therefore of accepting money from him so that he may omit the denunciation; thus, for example, a woman violently oppressed by someone can compel the violator to court, or exact money from the scoundrel so that she may renounce her right.
- Q. 2. Whether an obligation of restitution is induced from an action affectively only, but not effectively injuring another's right?
Resp. Wholly negatively, because no real injury is inflicted on the neighbor, although the agent sins gravely by an internal act against justice. Hence a malicious judge bringing forth a sentence which he thinks unjust, if in reality it is just, is to be exempted from the burden of restitution; or he who snatches away a thing which he thinks another's, while it is his own. - St. Lig., n. 556. - Recall what was said above, n. 602, 605.
Q. 3. Whether sins are multiplied by delay of restitution?
Resp. More probably negatively, if the bad will of not restoring habitually perseveres. - St. Lig., l. 5, n. 40. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on Sins, n. 166.
- Q. 4. Whether little thefts made to diverse persons oblige to restitution under grave obligation if they have arrived at grave matter, and whether restitution must be made under grave obligation also to the owners themselves?
Resp. to the first: Affirmatively, because the precept not to steal not only prohibits damage from being brought on another, but also that someone be unjustly enriched by another's thing. - Thus commonly. - Recall what was said above, n. 609.
Resp. to the second: More probably negatively. The reason is that by hypothesis no owner has suffered grave injury. - Therefore, even if the owners are known, without grave injury of anyone restitution can be made to the poor, or to pious places; indeed if a reasonable cause accedes, for example, the urgent necessity of the poor, etc., even venial sin will be absent. - St. Ligorius, n. 534, 595. But if the owners are unknown, restitution must be made under grave obligation to the poor or to pious places. - St. Lig., ibid.
Q. 5. Whether he who in minute thefts did not sin gravely, but from inadvertence arrived at grave matter, is held to restore under grave obligation?
Resp. Affirmatively; because although he did not sin gravely by stealing, nevertheless he is an unjust possessor of grave matter, and therefore he will sin gravely by retaining the stolen thing. This is valid even if the thefts were made to diverse persons; for otherwise he could be unjustly enriched by another's thing without grave sin, which from what has been said is not lawful.
- Q. 6. Whether a thief who has stolen a grave sum of money is held to restore it whole under grave obligation?
Resp. Negatively. For he is held under grave obligation to restore only that which completes grave matter, because when this has been restored the matter retained is no longer grave. Hence someone can be obligated under grave obligation to restore light matter; but then the obligation arises not from the light thing, but from the grave quantity. - St. Lig., n. 555.
Q. 7. Whether the soul of a deceased person, as they say, is detained in purgatory until restitution has been made by his heirs?
Resp. Negatively. This error of the common people has arisen from certain fictitious or badly understood revelations, in which souls dwelling in purgatory are reported to have appeared and to have begged for restitution, that they might be liberated from the flames. The reason is plain. For no one in the other life is punished except for fault which he personally committed in the present life; but no one is punished on account of the fault of heirs. Nevertheless, if the heirs have been solicitous to accomplish restitution so that they may exhibit some satisfaction for the soul of the debtor, it must piously be trusted that God will benignly accept this for it, at least in part.
- Resolutions. 1. He who is found in inability to restore another's thing or its value must always have a firm purpose of restoring when he can, and meanwhile to acquire, if he can, something by which he may satisfy his obligation as soon as possible.
- If someone cannot restore the whole, and it is a matter of a divisible thing, he is held to the part which he can. For the injured person has a right to the individual parts, just as to the whole.
- He who has inflicted light damage on his neighbor is held to restitution toward the injured owner under light obligation, and with inconvenience proportionate to the thing; for light injustice must be repaired under light obligation, just as grave under grave. Yet a reason excusing from restitution can then more easily be present, especially from making it to the owner himself. But if it is a matter of a very slight thing, any difficulty whatever will suffice so that restitution can be made to the poor. - St. Lig., n. 534.
- He is deservedly held unworthy of absolution who refuses to promise restitution; who leaves to his heirs the care of restoring, while he can do it by himself; who, burdened by debt, in food, clothing, service of servants..., undergoes expenses of such a kind on account of which he foresees that he will afterwards be unequal to paying his debts. The same must be said of him who, enjoying good fortune, does not wish gradually to diminish his state so that he may satisfy creditors. But with him who twice or three times has promised that he will restore, and has by no means kept his promises, it will belong to the prudent Confessor to judge whether restitution is to be exacted before absolution or not 1.
1 Namely, even if the Confessor judges the penitent to be wholly prepared to fulfill as soon as possible the obligation of restoring, nevertheless, unless circumstances persuade otherwise, it is expedient that he rescue him from the danger which can be feared from his inconstancy.
- Nor are those to be absolved who bring forth futile pretexts for delaying restitution, for example, those who are accustomed to keep saying: I shall not carry my goods into the tomb...; the heirs will restore...; I shall establish in my testament that restitution must be made...; or: I have already instructed my children that they themselves restore as soon as possible... For those are to be reckoned badly disposed who do not wish to do here and now whatever they morally can for satisfying the neighbor: 1. because the precept of restitution urges without ceasing, and the creditor suffers injury and often also damage from delay; 2. because provision is badly made for restitution to be made by committing it to heirs; for they too can similarly put it off to the end of their life; 3. because perhaps time will be lacking for making a testament, or, if it is made, perhaps also for various reasons or pretexts it will happen that it is not executed.
- The Confessor ought to act cautiously with dying persons subject to restitution. But he will be able to proceed thus: 1. If the penitent seems to be in good faith, and there is no time remaining for prudently warning him concerning his obligation, or it is foreseen that the warning will not be of use, this having been omitted, he is to be absolved. 2. But if fruit from the warning is hoped for, or if the penitent is not in good faith, he will have to be warned of the obligation of restitution both firmly and gently, and aided to accomplish it immediately. 3. If the obligation is hidden and cannot be done immediately, the sick man will have to be induced to commit a sum of money to himself the Confessor, or rather, if it can be done, to a faithful man, so that afterwards it may be secretly committed to the creditor; or to leave that sum to him in the testament, mention of restitution having been omitted. 4. If the obligation is not hidden, nor can it be fulfilled immediately, let the Confessor bring it about that it is certainly cared for by the heirs, whether through a small note to be handed to the creditor, etc. - See Casus, n. 580 and following.