§ I. On Pollution

428. • Pollution is the effusion of semen without intercourse with another. Voluntary pollution, of which alone we treat, is either directly or indirectly sought. It is also called mollities. But it differs from distillation, which is the light effusion of another more subtle humor. In pollution semen is ordinarily ejaculated with vehement delight and great commotion; but distillation is had ordinarily with no delight and commotion, or with very slight.

429. Principles. - I. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never lawful to procure it. The reason is, 1. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the effusion of semen solely to generation ¹; 2. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial sin, a habit of pollution would most easily be contracted because of the great proclivity of corrupted nature into lust, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 3. it is clear from various texts of Sacred Scripture, for example 1 Cor. 6. 10: "Nor the effeminate... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 4. it is also clear from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good..." - See St. Lig., n. 476.

¹ ** It is certainly important to know accurately in what the special malice of this sin resides, so that from this the Confessor may take some norm by which, concerning the questioning of penitents, he may more easily free himself from troublesome scruples. Therefore the proper notion of this sin ought to be sought from the character of a sin against nature. Concerning this, Filliuccius says generally thus (tr. 30, n. 137): "This sin is called against nature, because it is not only repugnant to the rational order - for this is common to any sin of lust, which is against reason and is repugnant to the rational order - but also because it is repugnant to the natural order of the venereal act in the human species; for the natural order of such an act ought to be of such a kind that from it the generation of a human being can follow; for this is its end. Therefore if it cannot follow, such an act will be against the natural order, and therefore will be called a sin against nature." But more briefly and more distinctly Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 254) says of the special malice of this sin: "The reason is that human seed is ordered by nature to generation; therefore to pour it forth for another end (pleasure) is repugnant to the order of nature." Therefore, since this special malice consists in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature, now it is clear why this sin differs in species from any immodest act which venereal pleasure indeed follows, but no effusion of semen; and therefore why the Confessor (with those cautions indeed which all the Doctors deservedly require) not imprudently asks about this as an object of a peculiar species.

But again, since this special disorder is placed in the vain effusion of semen, which was instituted by nature solely for conjugal copula so that offspring might be received from it, now the reason is clear why the Doctors judge differently about this baseness as regards those who either can emit no semen, or certainly not true semen. Hence what Sporer has (Theol. Sacr., p. 4, c. 2, n. 39) concerning the prepubescent: "If boys or girls, who cannot yet sow seed, touch themselves basely..., it is indeed a mortal sin; ... yet it seems to differ in species from true pollution, through which seed is sown, and in proper species it must be reduced to the immodesty of touch." Likewise Holzmann (part 2, tr. 2, n. 686): "If the prepubescent, whether boys or girls, try by immodest motion to elicit seed, when they cannot yet do so, they commit a sin diverse in species from true pollution, in reality pertaining to the immodesty of touch.... The reason is that... since they do not pour forth semen, they do not commit the sin of true pollution, but another diverse in species." Think the same thing of eunuchs deprived of seed apt for generation. Nor otherwise Babenstuber (tr. 5, disp. 7, art. 2, n. 71): "The prepubescent..., who try by immodest motion to pour forth seed, when they cannot yet do so, do indeed sin mortally...; nevertheless that sin of theirs differs in species from true and properly so-called pollution. The reason is that it belongs to the nature of true pollution to pour forth seed against the end of human generation; but in persons of this sort there is no effusion of seed. Therefore this sin in reality and properly pertains to the immodesty of touch.... What has been said of the prepubescent must also be understood of eunuchs. For in these there is no seed useful for generation." And Tamburini had gone before (De 2. Eccl. Praec., c. 17, n. 13), saying: "Those who from defect of age, or from another cause (such as the prepubescent, as also eunuchs), cannot by immodest motion pour forth seed, or pour forth useless seed, sin mortally...; but certainly this species of sin differs from true pollution, to which it belongs to throw forth seed against the end of generation; this throwing forth is not in the aforesaid persons of this sort; therefore the sin in the prepubescent is reduced in reality to immodest touch." From this, moreover, to the reasons which Doctors are accustomed wisely to bring forward why the Confessor must be most cautious in questioning penitents of this sort about this argument, this peremptory reason accedes: that as soon as they shall prudently have searched sufficiently whether these things were maliciously carried out, no place remains for further questions.

But from these things arises an occasion of almost the same question concerning the same sin, if there is question of women. For however theologians may introduce speech concerning female seed, and indeed for many causes, nevertheless when they then ask about its nature, they commonly have nothing except what is altogether uncertain. Let Bonacina stand for all (De Matr., q. 4, p. 6, n. 13), who writes: "According to the most probable opinion the seed of a woman concurs neither actively nor passively toward generation." And Sanchez (lib. 9, disp. 17, n. 9): "That female seed is not necessary, nor concurs actively toward generation, Galen, contrary to himself, Aristotle, Avicenna, Albertus M., Hugo Senensis, and many others teach, and the whole school of theologians with St. Thomas, 3, q. 31, art. 4, ad 3. This is clear from this, that, experience testifying, women wholly unwilling... conceive when receiving male seed; but then they by no means emit seed. Therefore since without that seed... generation follows," etc. But although the old followers of Scotus, as Sanchez suggests (l. c.), and then Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 252), after Hippocrates thought that the seed of a woman concurs actively toward generation, nevertheless Elbel himself (ibid., n. 253) then confesses that today it is commonly denied by learned Physicians that true seed, or true testicles, are given in women, but rather ovaries filled with certain little things (by others they are called vesicles). Thus Georgius Francus in Paulus Zacchia, Quaest. medic. legal. From this, as from a hypothesis, the same one (l. c.) rightly concludes from the premised principles: "Whatever nevertheless may be about this matter, among theologians it remains certain and undoubted that it is as little permitted to women as to the prepubescent or eunuchs to provoke themselves to venery by their own touch or that of another." Now since the matter is now no longer uncertain or hypothetical, but certain and most thoroughly investigated among Physicians or those skilled in physiology, namely that what has been customarily called female seed is wholly diverse from the nature of true seed, and that no other end has been established by nature for humors of this sort than that they may make the work of marriage easier; from the principles posited before, a reason is supplied for gravely doubting whether as regards this matter one must now judge otherwise about women than we have already seen to be judged about the prepubescent or eunuchs. Whence it would follow that, since the Doctors have already been accustomed to bring forward other causes on account of which questions about any such female pollution are to be spared, much more now it would seem that they are to be spared, while it is now sufficiently clear that in women, however gravely they may sin, nevertheless there is not present the reason of that special malice which is proper to true and strictly so-called pollution. But concerning this whole matter let the more skilled judge.

II. Pollution indirectly, or voluntary only in the cause, is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, that is, one per se directly and by its nature tending to pollution, for example lingering thoughts concerning very libidinous things, etc., is placed without just reason (Scav. - St. Lig., n. 482); but it is venial whenever the cause which is placed is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it per accidens or rarely. - Thus commonly. - The reason of each is evident. - St. Lig., n. 484.

III. Pollution indirectly voluntary lacks every sin whenever there is sufficient reason for placing its cause, consent or affection of the will into the consequent pleasure being removed. The reason is that where two effects follow from the same cause indifferent in itself, one evil and the other good or equivalent, it is lawful to place the cause by intending the good and permitting the evil ². But a greater reason is required for a greater danger. - Recall the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 9. - See St. Lig., n. 483.

² In these adjuncts neither ought the evil effect in reality to be called voluntary, nor will the agent properly be called its cause. For when there is question merely of the obligation of abstaining from some action by reason of an effect which follows besides the intention, the reason of causality is taken not from physical influence, but from moral influence, and therefore there is question of causality which induces the moral imputation of the effect that followed, so that causality sounds almost the same as something culpable. Therefore then someone will properly be said to be in the cause, when for this reason he was bound to abstain from the action, lest that effect should follow; but he will not be judged to be in the cause when he was not bound for this reason to abstain from the work, but exercised it licitly and according to his right. And in altogether this sense the effect is said to follow per accidens, not as if namely the effect itself does not spontaneously follow from some action, but because it cannot be imputed to the agent as to a moral cause; and by this very fact, when we say that the effect follows besides the intention, we already say that the effect is not voluntary, namely by that will to which it ought morally to be imputed.

430. Resolves. - 1. Pollution altogether involuntary is in no way sinful, as is clear. Hence pollution which a physician, surgeon, or Confessor can suffer in carrying out the duties of his office is free from every fault, provided that he acts with pure intention ³, and provides no consent at all to the delight.

³ That is, he does not intend that effect.

2. Likewise nocturnal pollution is free from fault, because it does not arise from a free will, nor is any assent provided to it, as is supposed; but neither does it always denote a libidinous mind, since it can come from many natural causes, for example from the superfluity of nature, from weakness of organs, or from the disposition of nerves. But it will be mortal or venial if before sleep it was caused and foreseen according to greater or lesser advertence and influence of the cause. Thus voluntary wicked thoughts, wicked conversations, and other things of this sort preceding sleep will easily render it mortal. But intemperance in food or drink, etc., ordinarily will make it only venial. Likewise nocturnal pollution which happens with imperfect will and liberty must not be judged mortal, as sometimes happens in those half-asleep; but it must be judged that no consent was present, or at most a very imperfect one, when it ordinarily displeases in the state of wakefulness; because judgment must be made from things ordinarily occurring. Hold the same thing also concerning nocturnal touches.

431. • 3. Pollution which follows from touch, look, or gravely base reading is a mortal sin even when actual consent is removed, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that then pollution is voluntary at least in the cause, since these things per se induce grave danger of pollution. But it will be only a venial sin if these things are lightly base, provided the pollution follows besides the intention of the agent and against his at least direct will; because then in these things there is not given a proximate danger of consent either into pollution or into venereal delight. Yet danger remote in itself can become proximate per accidens for someone by reason of his own weakness. - St. Lig., n. 482-485.

4. Every deliberate effusion of seed, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. - Lacroix, de Poenit., n. 1034. - Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the delight of pollution even for the briefest time, and even if it happens besides the intention and spontaneously from whatever cause. - St. Lig., n. 477. A fortiori if pollution begun is promoted by some effort.

5. He who caused pollution in another must explain in confession whether this person is sacred, related by blood, etc.; because he contracted the malice of sacrilege, or incest, etc. - St. Lig., n. 476.

6. It is not a sin per se to ride a horse for the sake of reasonable recreation, to lie in bed in a certain position, to take heating foods temperately, to speak with the other sex from an honorable cause, to serve the sick, to help them in baths, to exercise the surgical art, and similar things, although it is foreseen that pollution is going to follow per accidens, provided it is not intended, and there is a firm purpose of not assenting to it if it happens, and proximate danger of consent is absent. - St. Lig., n. 483.

432. • 7. Voluntary distillation, even only indirectly voluntary, if it is notable or happens with notable commotion of the genital spirits, can be a mortal sin ⁴; because it is grave disorder, and induces proximate danger of pollution. But if it is small and without notable commotion, one must distinguish: 1. If it is directly voluntary, it cannot be excused from mortal sin; because any distillation whatever always, or for the most part, brings with itself commotion and some effusion of semen. 2. If it is only indirectly voluntary, it will easily even be excused from every sin; because no more care is to be taken concerning such flow than concerning the emission of any other excrement by which nature is accustomed to unload itself. - Thus expressly St. Lig., n. 477.

⁴ It has often already been noted what is here called indirectly voluntary: that which happens besides the intention; and therefore that those things are valid also concerning indirectly voluntary distillation which in the note to n. 412 were said about wicked motions, and by the Author in n. 429 about indirectly voluntary pollution; which indeed the Author also suggests a little later.

8. Disordered motions with venereal delight, whether grave or light, are mortal sins whenever they are directly voluntary, or also whenever the will adheres to them after they arise spontaneously; because then venereal delight sought in itself is present, which never admits smallness of matter. - But if they do not depend on the will either in themselves or in the cause, as often happens, and no consent is provided to them, they are immune from every sin. - Finally, if their cause is freely placed without their being intended, concerning them it must be said as concerning pollution indirectly voluntary, with due proportion nevertheless being given. Hence a light cause of motions will easily excuse from grave sin, since the Doctors commonly assert this concerning pollution itself with St. Lig., n. 484. - For a cause of such motions can be placed more easily than a cause of pollution, as is clear.

9. It is lawful for someone suffering great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows, provided that itching proceeds from acrimony of the blood, as ordinarily happens, but not from the ardor of lust. For if pollution happens, with danger of consent removed, it happens per accidens and therefore inculpably. Moreover, penitents are to be exhorted that, insofar as it can be done without grave trouble, they restrain themselves from touches of this sort. - St. Lig., n. 483.