§ II. On Concupiscence

15. • DEFINITION. Concupiscence is a motion of the sensitive appetite, by which the will is borne toward a sensible good ¹.

¹ Namely, by the name concupiscence here is understood not indeed that perpetual tinder of depraved desires inborn in us, concerning which the Apostle says (Rom. 7. 23): I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, etc., but, as St. Thomas says after Damascene (3, Dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1): A motion of the sensible appetitive power, which is from the imagination of good or evil.

DIVISION. A twofold concupiscence is distinguished: one antecedent, and another consequent. The former is that which, in the order of causality, precedes any deliberation or consent of the will, and entices and draws it to consent. But the latter is that which, in the order of causality, follows an act of the will, either because a vehement motion of the will overflows into the inferior appetite, or because the will directly and deliberately excites this very appetite ².

² A twofold consequent concupiscence must namely be distinguished; for one is, as it were, indirect from overflow, insofar as the motion of the will overflows into the appetite; but another is directly stirred by the will. The former must be called voluntary rather in the cause than in itself; otherwise, however, where someone excites the appetite, or studiously fosters and continues it once excited, as for example when someone purposely thinks about an enemy and injuries received, so that he may kindle hatred in himself or increase the desire of revenge. Thus (says Suarez on I-II, Treatise 2, Disputation 3, Section 3, no. 1) studious men excite in themselves similar affections for exercising actions better, and concerning this (concupiscence) Aristotle said (3 Ethics, ch. 8) that to operate from anger is not of a brave man, but to excite anger in oneself through the virtue of fortitude, so that one may operate better: he adduces Homer saying: send fury into virtue; and concerning this Augustine (City of God, book 14, ch. 9) says that the wise man cannot live in this life without affections. And to this indeed pertains that someone who is going to rebuke those whom he loves with tender affection ought in some manner to stir himself to applying rebuke seriously.

Principles. - I. Antecedent concupiscence, and therefore concupiscence not voluntary, the greater and more vehement it is, the more it lessens sin; indeed it can excuse from sin entirely. The reason is that the motion of the sensible appetite disturbs, lessens, or even impedes the judgment of reason; but causes which diminish the judgment of reason diminish also the voluntary. Therefore, since an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary, by that very fact concupiscence, while it lessens the voluntary, also lessens sin; and thus where concupiscence is more intense and stronger, there is less sin; indeed the account of sin will utterly cease if the motion of concupiscence totally impedes the use of reason. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, art. 6; and q. 77, art. 2, 6, and 7 ³.

³ St. Thomas: Passion is sometimes so great that it totally takes away the use of reason, as is clear in those who become insane because of love or anger. And then, if such passion... was not voluntary... the act is rendered entirely involuntary, and consequently excuses totally from sin. But sometimes passion is not so great that it totally intercepts the use of reason. And then reason can exclude passion... Whence such passion does not totally excuse from sin. I-II, q. 77, art. 7.

II. Consequent concupiscence, and therefore voluntary, does not diminish sin, but rather increases it; or rather (as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 77, art. 6) it is a sign of its magnitude, insofar as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, art. 6.

The first part is proved, because sin consists in the act of the rational will, which by hypothesis precedes the motion of concupiscence, just as cause precedes effect. Therefore the later disturbance of reason which concupiscence introduces cannot affect the act of sinning which has already preceded, and therefore cannot lessen the account of the voluntary and of sin.

The second part is proved, because, as St. Thomas has it (On Evil, q. 3, art. 11): When from a strong motion of the will the sensitive appetite is moved to passion, passion adds merit or demerit, because it is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger: and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more ⁴, and he who sins with greater lust sins more: because this is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger.

⁴ From these things it is clear that what is said here about the motions of the sensitive appetite pertains equally to evil and good acts. Hence St. Thomas applies the whole doctrine thus to good acts (I-II, q. 77, art. 6, ad 2): A good passion consequent upon the judgment of reason augments merit; but if it precedes, so that he is moved more from passion than from the judgment of reason toward acting well, such passion diminishes the goodness and praise of the act.

16. • Thus far concerning concupiscence, insofar as it is a passion of the sensitive appetite toward good or evil indifferent, and is considered by Theologians as lessening or even utterly taking away the voluntary. Now some other things must be said concerning concupiscence, insofar as by this name the tinder of depraved desires is designated, about which the Apostle often treats, and which is a propensity toward evil residing not only in the inferior, but also in the superior appetite ⁵.

⁵ The more suitable place for disputing about these things commonly, and indeed deservedly, is reserved in the Treatise On Sins. For they in no way pertain to the present question about those things which lessen the voluntary or altogether take it away.

Principles. - I. However much the soul is struck by the goads of the depraved tinder, there will never be any stain of sin, unless in some way the will either consents to them, or does not impede them when it can and ought to impede them. Common and certain. - See St. Thomas, 2, dist. 34, q. 3, art. 1; and Quodlib. 4, art. 21.

II. First-first motions of the will, namely those which forestall any deliberation of reason, and are elicited before advertence is given to the object's agreement with the rule of morals, are altogether without fault. The reason is that insofar as they forestall deliberation of reason and advertence to moral malice, they are neither voluntary nor free, and consequently are without formal sin. Thus all Theologians.

III. Second-first motions of the will, namely those which follow upon some use of reason, yet are elicited with only slight, obscure, and imperfect advertence to the rule of morals, are in any grave matter also only venial sin. The reason is that acts of this kind are imperfectly free and only semi-deliberate; and thus on account of the imperfection of the act they are excused from grave fault. Thus likewise the Common opinion of Theologians.

You Will Resolve. - 1. Motions, however depraved, as long as they displease the will, even after advertence to the rule of morals, are free from every fault. The reason is that where there is displeasure of this kind, there is no consent. For concupiscence is not able to harm those not consenting, but manfully resisting through the grace of Christ, as the Synod of Trent teaches, session 5.

2. Motions of concupiscence, after advertence of reason, must be resisted at least through virtual displeasure, namely by distracting the mind to other things; nor is it sufficient then to hold oneself negatively or neutrally, even if the danger of consent seems absent. Thus commonly the Theologians.

3. But especially this holds regarding motions of concupiscence in venereal matter, which must not be retained even under the pretext of struggle and exercise of virtue.

4. Nevertheless there is no obligation of resisting carnal motions positively, since such resistance sometimes excites them more; and much less is material resistance necessary.

5. Not only regarding carnal motions, but also regarding motions against faith and charity, merely indirect resistance by distraction of the mind is to be counseled, rather than any direct resistance or opposition. - St. Alphonsus, book 5, no. 6.

6. Nor likewise are we held to positive resistance against any temptation which is prolonged for a long time; for this would be too troublesome and liable to innumerable scruples.

7. When the danger of consent is absent, in motions of concupiscence to hold oneself merely negatively, according to the truer opinion, is only a venial sin, although it concerns a grave object, and no other cause excusing from resistance is present. - St. Alphonsus, book 5, no. 9.

YOU WILL ASK: What are the remedies against motions of concupiscence?

I answer. Generally those which are opposed to their causes. Hence if they arise from imagination, this is to be restrained, or turned to other things; if from external objects, or occasions, these are to be fled, unless just reasons demand the contrary, or one is moved by all objects; if from temperament, or an abundance of humors, mortification is to be applied; if from fear, this must be conquered, or the motions must be despised. - See Cases, no. 21.