§ II. On Sacrilege

284. • Sacrilege is the violation or unworthy handling of a sacred thing. It is distinguished as threefold: 1. personal; 2. local; 3. real.

Principles. - I. Sacred here is said of whatever is deputed to divine worship by a public rite from divine or ecclesiastical institution, and for that reason merits special reverence. - St. Thomas 2. 2. q. 99. art. 3.

Hence 1. Sacred persons are those who are deputed to divine worship by sacred tonsure, or by religious vows.

2. Sacred places are those which by public authority of the Church are dedicated to divine worship, as churches, cemeteries, public chapels, even those not consecrated or blessed; but not private chapels.

3. Sacred things are those which pertain to divine worship or are proximately referred to it, as the Sacraments, consecrated vessels, Relics or images of Saints; likewise those things which pertain to the adornment of the Church or of ministers; and finally ecclesiastical goods, even movable ones. - St. Thomas ibid., etc.

II. Sacrilege is a mortal sin from its kind, because it is opposed to the most excellent virtue, namely religion, and for the most part regards grave matter. - Nevertheless it can become light by reason of smallness of matter, or imperfection of the act. - St. Lig. n. 33, etc.

III. Sacrilege differs in species according as it affects a person, a place, or a sacred thing ¹; hence in confession these circumstances are to be explained. - St. Lig. n. 34. - St. Thomas ibid., etc.

¹ Although Suarez (De Relig. Tract. 3. Lib. 3. Cap. 1. n. 8) notes that the sufficiency of this division is not to be demanded with speculative rigor, and that no reason is given for this partition according to matter except that this magisterial division is commonly admitted, and is accommodated to explaining all sacrileges and comprehending them under certain heads, and to excluding whatever does not pertain to sacrilege; nevertheless (ibid. Cap. 5) he adheres to the common opinion, which recognizes in this threefold partition a threefold distinct species of sacrilege, and therefore holds that it must be explained in confession.

But it must be added with St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3. n. 34) that it is more probable that these species of sacrilege are not subaltern, but lowest species; for which opinion those words of St. Thomas make (2. 2. q. 99. art. 3. ad 2): And thus likewise it is possible that two sins differ in species according to the material acts, but agree in species according to one formal notion of sacrilege, for instance if someone should violate a nun by striking her or by lying with her.

285. You will resolve. - 1. Personal sacrilege is committed 1. by laying violent hands on a Cleric or Religious; 2. by lustfully violating persons dedicated to God, even by mere touches; 3. by subjecting ecclesiastical persons to the judgment of the forum. - But it will not be sacrilege to detract from a priest, because only his person is sacred, but not his reputation. - St. Lig. n. 35.

2. Local sacrilege is committed 1. by all sins by which a Church is polluted by Canon Law, namely by the shedding of blood and of human seed, by homicide, by the burial of an excommunicated person or infidel in a Church; 2. by all sins which are committed against the immunity ² and sanctity of a sacred place, such as breaking in, spoliation, theft, quarrels, and the like; 3. by actions unbecoming to the sanctity of the place, such as trading, clamors, the noise of trials, unless a grave cause excuses. - St. Lig. n. 36.

² Where there is question of sacrilege on account of the violated immunity of a sacred place, the notion of a sacred place extends much more widely than when there is question of acts directly opposed to the sanctity of a sacred place. For as regards these acts, by which a Church can also be polluted, sacred place means only the enclosure of a blessed place deputed for divine offices or for burying the dead, from roof down to pavement. But if the discussion is about the immunity of a sacred place, here the exterior parts of the Church also are included: the porticoes, e.g., the sacristy, tower, roof, subterranean crypts, stairs to the church, and the whole exterior base. Cemeteries even separated from the Church are held in the same reckoning, the Bishop's palace, and even the house of the parish priest, if it is joined to the Church, the convents of Religious with barns, gardens, and all those things which are enclosed by their precinct, and finally hospitals erected by authority of the Bishop and having a chapel for celebrating.

3. Real sacrilege is committed 1. by unworthy administration or reception of the Sacraments; 2. by unworthy handling of sacred Relics, images, etc.; 3. by profanation of sacred vessels, instruments, and ornaments; 4. by theft of a thing pertaining to divine worship or to the Church; 5. by abuse of Scripture, e.g., by twisting its words to vain things, etc.; 6. by negligence concerning sacred vessels, corporals, etc., in those who ought to care for these things religiously. - St. Lig. n. 40 and 48.

286. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether the violation of a person bound outside Religion by a simple vow of chastity is sacrilege?

Resp. It is controverted. The 1st OPINION affirms, because through any vow of chastity whatsoever a man is truly consecrated to God. For one's own will suffices for consecrating one's own acts to God, just as public authority is sufficient for public consecration. - Billuart, diss. 10. - St. Lig. n. 47, as more probable ³.

³ This opinion has against it the common doctrine of Theologians, which defines sacrilege as the violation of a sacred thing, understanding under this name of sacred thing not only things, but also persons and places which by some special reason are destined for divine worship. But if there is discussion of sacred persons, Not every private devotion, as Suarez well says (De Sacrileg. Lib. 3. Cap. 2. n. 1), or purpose of dedicating oneself wholly to divine worship constitutes a sacred person, but it is necessary that such a consecration of the person be made by law. But this consecration is made either by sacred ordination in clerics, or by dedication to the perpetual worship of God in some state approved by the Church (Suarez, ibid. n. 1 and 4). Therefore a person is never made sacred unless he has been dedicated to divine worship by the public law of the Church, either through reception of sacred Order or through a religious state, as Laymann says (Lib. 4. Tr. 10. c. 7. n. 4), and as Cap. Duo sunt 7. Caus. 12. q. 1 also suggests.

And indeed St. Alphonsus seems to have preferred the opposite opinion, relying on the doctrine which the Salmanticenses (Tr. 21. Cap. 12. n. 22) attributed to St. Thomas, as if the violation of any vow were truly and properly sacrilege. But in fact, just as the same men (ibid. n. 21) falsely ascribe this opinion both to Azor and Bonacina, who hand down nothing of this kind, and to Lessius, who on the contrary writes expressly (Lib. 2. Cap. 45. n. 11) that it is called sacrilege rather improperly, so they wrongly invoke St. Thomas for it, and gratuitously imagine for themselves that the Holy Doctor, when (2. 2. q. 99. a. 3. ad 3) he names a virgin dedicated to God, understood this of a virgin bound by a simple vow. For the opposite is clear not only from the parallel place 2. 2. q. 154. a. 10. ad 2 and 3, where he more clearly names a person specially consecrated, but especially from a comparison made with 4. Dist. 38. q. 1. art. 3. q. 2 and 3, and 2. 2. q. 154. art. 1. ad 3; but also, and much more evidently, from his general doctrine, which does not bring back violation of a vow (2. 2. q. 88. a. 3) to the species of sacrilege, but to the vice opposed to fidelity. Moreover (2. 2. q. 97. Prooem.) he counts infidelity in promises, no otherwise than perjury, among sins which pertain directly to irreverence toward God, and altogether distinguishes them from sins which pertain to irreverence toward sacred things, of which sort sacrilege is by its own nature and definition. Therefore the reason collapses, namely the authority of St. Thomas, on account of which St. Alphonsus inclined to that opinion. Compare Suarez (De Sacril. Lib. 3. Cap. 3 and De voto Lib. 5. Cap. 3. n. 4 and 5), who also from the doctrine of St. Thomas plainly shows how greatly Cajetan hallucinated, who (Comm. ad 2. 2. q. 99. a. 3) was the first to bring in the anomalous opinion which recalls to sacrileges any infractions whatsoever of any vow, which for that reason Billuart also (De Relig. Dissert. 10) admits to be foreign to the common opinion, although he himself preferred to except the vow of chastity, less noticing that the condition of any private vow whatsoever, as regards making a thing sacred, is altogether equal. And this also shines forth from this, that by the consent of all sacrilege concerning persons truly sacred is committed not only through acts opposed to chastity, but also through violent laying on of hands upon them. But no one has regarded as guilty of sacrilege him who has laid hands upon a person obliged by a private vow of chastity.

This also is added, finally, that nowhere, as Suarez notes (De voto Lib. 5. Cap. 3. n. 4), is it found in the Canons that by a simple vow alone (unless, namely, a special consecration or handing over intervenes) a thing or person is made sacred. But with private vows of this kind no handing over of a thing or person is joined. The reason is that God does not accept these oblations or donations through Himself, but, as Suarez says (De Stat. Relig. Lib. 2. Cap. 7. n. 12), if anything is given to Him or for His worship, He wills it to be given to His ministers, so that it may be accepted and administered by them in His name; and otherwise the donation made is vain and void, as being foreign to the ordinary providence of God. From these things the same Suarez (ibid. n. 13) concludes that in this that opinion proceeds rightly... which establishes a difference between the simple and solemn vow of chastity; because a simple vow is only a promise not joined with a handing over; but a solemn vow of chastity always has some handing over joined to it, which is made not immediately to God, but through His ministers, and is accepted through them, and therefore the thing thus handed over to God remains under their care and governance.

Moreover, the opinion of which Suarez speaks here is that which he himself elsewhere (De Voto Lib. 1. Cap. 14. n. 7) had called common to very many Doctors, and among these also to St. Thomas, who hands down the reason for the difference between each vow, namely solemn and simple, which elsewhere (4. Dist. 38. Q. 1. a. 2. q. 2) he calls private, in this way (Quodl. 3. a. 18): The reason for this diversity is that a solemn vow has a promise with a certain handing over; hence a vow of continence is not solemnized except by the reception of sacred Order..., or by profession according to a certain rule, and the reception of the habit of the Professed.... But a simple vow has a promise without handing over. But it is manifest that after someone not only promises to someone a thing which was within his power, but also hands it over, he cannot afterward give it to another...; and even if afterward he should wish to donate it to another, the second donation is not valid.... But he who promises something to someone, but has not yet handed it over, if afterward he actually hands it over to another, although he breaks the fidelity of the promise, nevertheless the second donation is valid. And hence elsewhere (4. Dist. 38. Q. 1. art. 3. q. 2. ad 1) he adds: In like manner a simple vow obliges, just as betrothals do; and in the same way, comparing a solemn vow elsewhere with marriage, he concludes (2. 2. Q. 154. art. 1. ad 3) that the sacrilege which is committed in the violation of such a woman is a certain spiritual adultery.

But by no means should you think it must be feared that through these things the doctrine, now common and certain after the Constitutions of Boniface VIII and Gregory XIII, is perhaps weakened, namely that the solemnity of vows and the force attached to them of producing certain effects is to be derived merely from ecclesiastical law. And indeed how would Suarez, as we have seen, have said that the difference between a solemn and a simple vow is rightly established by those Doctors, if this were repugnant to the doctrine of the Apostolic Constitutions just mentioned, which in the same place he defends with all his strength? It must be noted, namely, what the same Suarez most learnedly premisses in these words when he is about to call that doctrine to examination (cit. cap. 7. Lib. 2. Tract. de Stat. Relig.): For accurately investigating the truth or probability of such an opinion, I suppose that IN TWO WAYS that handing over can be understood to incapacitate the person for marriage, EITHER FROM ITS OWN NATURE AND THEREFORE BY NATURAL DIVINE LAW, OR FROM THE INSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH. Having premised these things, he adds that concerning the former manner the whole controversy exists, and that it is attacked by Scotus, Paludanus, and many other authors, although by reasons in his judgment less firm, for which then he himself (ibid. from n. 14) substitutes more efficacious ones from the Apostolic Constitutions. Therefore, provided that you hold that the incapacity for marriage which is attached to a solemn vow is to be derived from the institution of the Church, you can most rightly retain, even in the judgment of Suarez himself, that difference between a solemn and simple vow which we have said was commonly admitted by the Doctors.

Since, moreover, the discussion has fallen upon the doctrines of Suarez, it will be useful to hint in passing that there is by no means a need to embrace also that opinion of the Excellent Doctor by which he establishes that the nature or essence of the solemnity of vows consists in the power of voiding certain acts contrary to vows, or, as he himself speaks (De Stat. Relig. Lib. 2. Cap. 14. n. 10), in the force of incapacitating the person for certain moral effects, namely of bringing it about that those solemnly professed are incapable of contracting marriage, or of acquiring ownership, or of entering firm contracts; as if, namely, a vow could not be solemn unless it produced these effects. This opinion, as it is not supported by any solid reason, so it labors under many difficulties and disadvantages, and these not light.

Therefore it seemed otherwise to very weighty Theologians, such as Michael Medina, theologian of the Council of Trent, Cardinal Bellarmine, Gabriel Vasquez, John Azor, Cardinal De Lugo, John Malderus, etc., that this matter ought to be determined. And since from the Apostolic Constitutions we find the scholastics of the Society of Jesus incapable of marriage; and moreover the Formed Coadjutors of the same Society are declared incapable not only of marriage, but also of any ownership and property whatsoever, although both are bound to the same Society by simple vows only; while on the other hand many examples prove that at other times solemn vows in the Church did not obtain these effects, it is easy to conclude that that force of voiding certain acts is not necessarily implanted in, and in a certain manner essential to, the solemnity of vows itself, but comes to it extrinsically from a positive decree of the Church, whose right and power it is, as Bellarmine says (De Matrim. Lib. 1. Cap. 21), to render contracts of this kind legitimate or illegitimate by her decree, by making them altogether valid or invalid. And lest perhaps you conclude that therefore no distinction remains between a solemn and simple vow, compare those things which the praised Bellarmine, wisely in his usual manner, discusses at the end of the cited Chapter.

** A few things concerning the argument of this Note had been inserted in the Edition of the year 1866. Then more fully (Edition of the year 1869) the difficulty of certain persons in France introduced the necessity of explaining and confirming them, as if that Note detracted from the most true doctrine which holds that the solemnity of vows is of ecclesiastical law; which difficulty indeed also deterred Sanchez (De Matr. Lib. 7. Disp. 25. n. 14) from the opinion set forth above, which otherwise (ibid. n. 7) he shows to be the most common and to have been that of St. Thomas. But now behold, the VV. oppose to these things no fewer than twenty-eight columns. To what end? Namely that they may conclude that what St. Alphonsus says after the Salmanticenses is more probable, that even the violation of a simple vow is sacrilege. This conclusion indeed, as to practice, would conclude nothing. And indeed, if you suppose, e.g., that the sin of sacrilege is reserved, this probability would not forbid a simple Confessor from being able to absolve from the violation of a simple vow. But the VV. did not devote their labors, as would have been desirable, to recalling the question to its own principles, which they could have seen indicated at the beginning of the Note, and thus shedding some light upon it; but merely they heaped up from every side shreds of Authors which with some appearance might seem somehow to disagree with the opinions of this Note, as they almost always do. Therefore it will be better not to omit that which was of greatest importance. For if the question is recalled to its own principles, it will soon become clear what judgment must be made concerning that enormous mass of twenty-eight columns, and concerning all those texts or shreds of Authors.

It must first be premised that the name sacrilege is used both in a strict sense and in a broad one; but in this latter sense any sin against the virtue of Religion has been accustomed to be called sacrilege. See Azor (P. 1. L. 9. c. 27. q. 1), Filliuccius (Tr. 24. C. 9. n. 220), Palaus (Tr. 17. D. 1. Q. 2. C. 1. init.), Tamburini (Dec. L. 2. C. 6. § 3. n. 1), Catalani (Part. 2. Q. 7. C. 1. n. 1), Mazzotta (Tr. 2. D. 1. Q. 2. C. 1. init.), etc. In this sense, therefore, perjury, blasphemy, idolatry, etc., can be called sacrilege. - But in the strict sense, and insofar as it is a special sin, sacrilege is called the violation of a sacred thing. Thus Palaus (l. c.): Therefore the proper meaning of sacrilege is that which is taken from the injury or violation of a sacred thing, distinct from God: thus St. Thomas, RECEIVED BY ALL, 2. 2. q. 99. a. 1 and 3.

There follows a question of the highest importance: What comes under the name of a sacred thing? Laymann answers (Lib. 4. Tr. 10. Cap. 7. n. 2) that properly that thing alone is considered sacred WHICH BY PUBLIC RITE OR INSTITUTION HAS BEEN DEPUTED TO THE WORSHIP OF GOD, as the jurists teach in L. In tantum, and L. Sacra ff. de divisione rerum. Palaus has the very same thing (l. c. § 1. n. 1), Voit (T. 1. n. 465), Suarez (De Rel. Tr. 3. L. 3. C. 1), Struggl (Tr. 5. Q. 6. art. 2. n. 9), Filliuccius (l. c.), Azor (l. c.), etc. And in fact the texts cited by Laymann agree. For L. Summa 1. ff. de divis. rer.: Some things are of divine right..., such as sacred things: whence that statement of St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 99. a. 1): From the fact that something is deputed to the worship of God, it is made something divine. And L. Sacra 9. ff. De divis. rer. has it thus: Sacred places are those which have been publicly dedicated. And § 1: It must be known that a place can become sacred when the Prince has dedicated it, or has given the power of dedicating it. And L. In tantum § 3. ff. eod.: Sacred things, however, are those which have been publicly consecrated, not privately: therefore if someone privately shall have constituted something sacred for himself, it is not sacred, but profane.

And from these things it is clear why Laymann (l. c.) added: A thing or person is not made sacred by any private purpose or vow whatsoever, but it is necessary that it have a public consecration by law, or deputation to the worship of God. And Suarez (l. c. C. 2. n. 1): Not every private devotion or purpose of devoting oneself wholly to divine worship constitutes a sacred person, but it is necessary that such a consecration of the person be made by law. And Filliuccius (l. c. n. 224): Not every private devotion or purpose of dedicating oneself to God constitutes a sacred person, but it is required that it be made according to the use of the Church and juridically.

Hence follows the consequence that a private vow of itself makes neither the thing vowed nor the person vowing sacred, because here no public and juridical deputation, dedication, or consecration of the thing or of the person to the worship of God intervenes. Therefore violation of a vow of this kind is indeed a sin against the virtue of Religion, because it involves a great irreverence toward God by breaking the fidelity given to Him; and insofar as it is a sin against the virtue of Religion, it can also be called sacrilege in that broad sense in which we have said that perjury, idolatry, divination, vain observance, blasphemy, etc., are called sacrilege; but it can in no way be called sacrilege in that strict sense by which violation of a sacred thing is denoted.

When, therefore, on account of a violated vow of chastity, which is the question, will sacrilege properly so called be present? Resp. When by juridical dedication to the worship of God a person has been consecrated, not in just any manner, but in order to preserve chastity perpetually. I have said, not in just any manner; because, e.g., clerics constituted in minor orders are sacred persons; but because they are not yet consecrated to preserving chastity, just as neither are priests of the Greek rite, hence by violating chastity they do not incur the guilt of sacrilege properly so called. Therefore there is required consecration in order to preserving continence, which has place 1. in sacred ordination, and 2. in religious profession.

Indeed, if it is asked whether the reason of sacrilege in the injury of chastity is to be derived rather from the nature of a vow, even a solemn one, or from the constitution of the Church ordering continence to the worship of God, we ought to conclude that the guilt of sacrilege proceeds from this ordinance of the Church. For let it now pass that the guilt of sacrilege is incurred also by those who, although they are truly Religious, are still bound only by simple perpetual vows; concerning which matter see Suarez and Filliuccius (ll. cc.). But this is more clearly evident from the doctrine of Theologians, which St. Alphonsus also (Lib. 6. n. 808 and 809) maintains, namely that a priest is to be said no less guilty of sacrilege because of violation of chastity, even if he is thought to be bound to preserving chastity not by force of any vow, but only by ecclesiastical law.

Therefore let it be concluded that, if the question is brought back to its own principles, no reason is available why the injury of a simple and private vow should have attached to it the guilt of sacrilege properly taken.

But for passing judgment concerning the weight of the authority of so many Writers, which is objected against this conclusion, it is better to inquire in what sense authors use the word sacrilege; indeed whether it is certain that they noticed the different sense in which it is used; furthermore whether they prefer any, or the genuine, notion of a sacred thing; and then whether they have weighed whence persons are made sacred. Finally, even if they have rightly premised those notions, whether they then determined coherently concerning individual matters, or whether they permitted themselves to be carried away by the authority of others, with the matter in no way weighed.

The 2nd OPINION, not less probable, denies, because by a simple vow of chastity a person is not made sacred; for public deputation by the Church is required for consecrating any person. - Elbel, n. 584.

But whoever is bound by a vow of chastity, as often as he violates this, certainly commits a twofold sin, namely one against chastity, and the other against Religion. - Lacroix, l. 3. n. 55. QUESTION 2. Whether all sins of lust committed in a Church or cemetery are sacrileges?

Resp. 1. Merely internal sins are not to be held as sacrileges, because they do not seem specially to affect the sacred place, unless there is an external desire of sinning in the sacred place itself. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. n. 462. - But if they are held as sacrileges, nevertheless this circumstance, as being lightly culpable, is not necessarily to be disclosed in confession. Likewise, sacrilege will be a desire of sinning in a sacred place held outside that place, but not a desire conceived in a sacred place of sinning outside the same. - St. Lig. n. 462.

Resp. 2. As regards external sins, it is certain that sacrilege is committed by consummated acts, namely by voluntary pollution, fornication, etc. This is openly clear from Canon Law ⁴. But whether it is also committed by other grave external sins, e.g., gravely shameful touches, is controverted. St. Lig. n. 459, Collet, etc., more probably affirm. Sanchez, Tamburini, Bonacina, etc. deny, however, not improbably ⁵.

⁴ The sole chapter De Consecr. in VI, C. Si Ecclesia fin. De Consecr., and C. Ecclesiis 20. De Consecr. Dist. 2 are usually cited. But in fact these texts have only this: that a Church polluted by the spilling of seed needs reconciliation.

⁵ The principle on which that opinion rests you have in Sanchez (De Matrim. Lib. 9. Disp. 15. n. 4), namely that this malice and special deformity does not arise from the law of nature, but from the statute of the Church alone; but no ecclesiastical law is found prohibiting these things from being done in a sacred place except the texts ... which establish that a Church is violated by the shedding of blood or seed. But this principle utterly recoils from the common sense of men. For certain actions are so shameful in themselves, or at least profane, that even if the Church's prohibition is set aside, they are unbecoming to the sanctity of sacred places, and are so opposed to this that, if they are perpetrated in those places, they are judged to detract from the honor and reverence due to them; and this, truly, not only the Christian people, but even the heathens themselves recognized by the natural light of reason and always professed. For it is indecent in itself that a place deputed to prayer and divine worship be converted into a place of sinning and offending the same God, as Lugo says (De Poenit. Disp. 16. n. 466). Moreover the malice of this irreverence, as the same Lugo cleverly notes (l. c.), does not appear opposed to any virtue except religion on account of the special reverence which is owed to a sacred place, and therefore it does not appear to belong to any species of sin, besides sacrilege.

There is also the disadvantage of the opposite opinion. For the ecclesiastical law from which those theologians draw the notion of sacrilege speaks merely of the necessity of reconciling a Church; whence the first authors of this doctrine, Cajetan (Opusc. Tom. 1. Resp. 12) and Navarrus (In C. Consideret n. 20), infer that sacrilege is had only in an act by which a place is made unsuitable for divine worship. But from this flows the consequence which Pontius (De Matr. Lib. 10. Cap. 10. n. 15) with others drew: that no crime of lust, even the most unspeakable, perpetrated in a church, can be held and called sacrilegious if the shedding of seed remains hidden; since if this is entirely concealed, or becomes known only to some few, the church does not need reconciliation. Hence two absurdities spontaneously flow. First, that no action in itself, while it remains hidden, will be sacrilegious. Then, that an action will not be sacrilegious as long as it remains hidden; but afterward it will become sacrilegious if perhaps the crime, which long remained hidden, comes to the knowledge of many.

Hence the truer doctrine must be considered that which Lugo handed down (l. c.), namely that, ignorance and inadvertence being set aside, all sins committed in churches include some special irreverence; and although this is not always grave, but can be light and therefore not necessarily to be explained in confession, nevertheless it pertains to the malice of sacrilege.

It must not here be passed over in silence that St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3. n. 485), after the Salmanticenses (Tract. IX. Cap. 15. n. 61-62), hands down as probable that, scandal apart, marital intercourse had in a Church is never sacrilege. But this opinion has no foundation, besides fallacious citations. For the doctors cited by the Salmanticenses in fact affirm this only concerning a case of necessity. But the circumstance of scandal does not of itself introduce the malice of sacrilege.

** On the occasion of this Note, the VV. wrote thirty-two columns (Pag. 205-221), yet with no other profit than that the bulk of the book was not a little increased.

And indeed as to the first part of the Note, the VV. remark that the opinion of Sanchez is also rejected by St. Alphonsus; nevertheless they add that it is less rightly explained in the Note. But, I ask, could it have been explained more rightly than by faithfully transcribing the words of Sanchez?

They wish to prove this by adducing the conclusion of Suarez (De Relig. Tr. 2. Lib. 3. c. 7. n. 11), that it seems more probable that immodest touches, especially the graver ones and those in dishonorable parts, are grave sacrileges. Then they add: Therefore he judges the opposite probable. I answer: I deny the consequence; for the VV. themselves immediately before report these words of Suarez: I say: every sin, at least an external one, done in a Church has thence some malice, at least venial. Therefore from those words of Suarez it follows indeed that the fault of sacrilege is probably not mortal, but not that the principle of Sanchez is probable. Indeed Sanchez himself, little consistent with himself (l. c. n. 21), admits that because of irreverence toward the place there is a venial fault. I have said, little consistent with himself; for if he derives the fault from irreverence, therefore from natural law, and not from positive law alone, he admits that a shameful act has sacrilegious malice; therefore he himself condemns his own principle.

The VV. then add (Pag. 208) that the opinion of Cajetan and Navarrus is less rightly explained in the Note. Resp. In the Note it is said that, according to the mind of Cajetan and Navarrus, sacrilege is had only in an act by which a place is made unsuitable for divine worship. But the VV. (Pag. 210) write thus: From this doctrine of Cajetan and Navarrus... it follows that, for sacrilege, it is always required that the sin be such that divine worship is impeded: because the Church..... has prescribed that, once the crime has been perpetrated, the sacred place be reconciled. Therefore by their own testimony the VV. admit that the opinion of Cajetan and Navarrus is rightly explained in the Note.

To these things the VV. undertake to defend the opinion of Pontius (Pag. 212), although they not only admit that rather few have admitted it, but add that it is commonly rejected, and must altogether be rejected. Nevertheless they contend that from it those two absurdities of which the Note speaks do not follow. - Resp. As to the first absurd consequence, namely that no action, however shameful, be it even the unspeakable crime of sodomy or bestiality, would ever be sacrilegious as long as it remains hidden, the VV. say nothing. Will that saying hold here or not: He who is silent seems to consent, even if they did not conceal their inclination to deny? - But as to the second absurdity, namely that an action would not be sacrilegious as long as it remains hidden, but would become sacrilegious if perhaps the crime which long remained hidden comes to the knowledge of many, the VV. observe (ibid.) that, according to the mind of Pontius, one is not sacrilegious in the forum of conscience if someone exercises fornication in a Church without contempt, if the crime remains hidden; but if afterward the crime becomes known, he is reputed sacrilegious in the external forum, and punished as such, because it is presumed to have been done with contempt. - Resp. Thus the absurdity is not avoided, but doubled. For Pontius surely must be understood of formal contempt; for otherwise, if you understand him also of virtual contempt, the question would now be about one who performs shameful things in a Church without any advertence to irreverence; but thus it would be altogether ridiculous to oppose the opinion of Pontius to the opinions of others. Therefore the opinion of Pontius will be this: that he is guilty of sacrilege, whoever exercises fornication in a temple with the direct intention of dishonoring the temple; but that he is not guilty of sacrilege, if he indeed knows that through his shameless acts he dishonors the sanctity of the temple, yet does not directly intend this. But 1. even this is said absurdly, that he is not guilty of irreverence who knows that he acts irreverently, although he does not directly intend this. And what is sacrilege except irreverence toward a sacred place? But 2. not even if formal contempt is present will the crime of fornication be sacrilegious according to the mind of Pontius. For he contends that sacrilege does not exist unless the reverence which the Church requires by positive precept, and on account of whose violation the temple must be reconciled, is injured. But, as he himself reasons (Lib. 10. C. 10. n. 15), the Church is judged to be polluted by the spilling of seed because it brings irreverence, and reverence consists also in the common estimation of men; it is therefore necessary that this quasi-defamation of the Church be notorious. Therefore if the crime remains hidden, sacrilege will be absent; and then, if it becomes notorious after the crime has long lain hidden, behold the absurdity of an act which was not sacrilegious and afterward becomes sacrilegious by becoming known.

Afterward the VV. write (Pag. 213) that they cannot sufficiently marvel that in the Note against the others there is invoked as the truer doctrine the one which Lugo hands down. For, they say, Lugo S.J. judges the doctrine of Sanchez to be truer, namely that touches, looks, and shameful words, provided they are not done with danger of pollution... do not have the species of GRAVE SACRILEGE. - Resp. The VV. themselves (Pag. 214) report the words by which Lugo S.J. teaches that all sins contract from a sacred place some special irreverence, and that this, although light, pertains to the species of sacrilege. Moreover that all sins contract from a sacred place some malice of sacrilege, at least light, is not opposed to the assertion that the aforesaid looks, touches, and words do not have grave malice of sacrilege. Therefore the VV. can well restrain themselves, without any risk, from that immense astonishment.

Finally, the VV. (Pag. 215-221) undertake, through fourteen columns, to attack the last little part of the Note, in which it is said that, with no other foundation except fallacious citations, after the Salmanticenses it is handed down by St. Alphonsus as probable that, scandal apart, marital intercourse had in a Church is never sacrilege. And the reason is given in the Note, because the Authors cited by the Salmanticenses affirm this only concerning a case of necessity. Resp. The VV. themselves (Pag. 220) write: This opinion supposes that intercourse is exercised in the Church on account of an URGENT CAUSE. But if the matter so stands, why do they attack the Note, which says only that the opinion is based on false citations, the opinion which contends that intercourse in a Church is lawful even outside the case of an urgent cause or necessity? Besides, from so many Authors whom the VV. cite, only Pontius, and after him Perez, dared to affirm this. - But if there are any who say that it is in some manner probable, or not improbable, we find that this is always based on false citations of others, which one can see heaped up not only among the Salmanticenses, but also in Pontius. And the VV. too wished to contribute their token, citing for that opinion the Summa Rosella, Sa, and Soto. Let them consult that Summa (V. Consecratio § 1. n. 9), Emmanuel Sa (V. Debitum coniugale n. 12), and Soto (In 4. Sent. Dist. 32. art. 3. penult. col.), and they will find that the opposite is most manifestly handed down by them.

QUESTION 3. Whether every theft in a Church is sacrilege?

Resp. 1. It is certain that every theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, and also of a non-sacred thing, but one committed to the custody of a sacred place, as is clear from Canon Law C. Quisquis, 21. § 2. causa 17. Quaest. 4, where it is read: Likewise sacrilege is committed by taking a sacred thing from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place.

Resp. 2. As regards things which are found in a Church by chance or per accidens, such as purses, a watch, etc., it is controverted. More probably it is denied with Lugo, Azor, Lessius, etc., against Laymann and others ⁶.

⁶ From the doctrine set forth it must better be said that even these thefts, from the circumstance of a sacred place, are not lacking the malice of sacrilege; yet since this is light, it will not necessarily have to be expressed by the penitent.

287. • QUESTION 4. Whether injury to any goods whatsoever pertaining to Clerics constitutes sacrilege?

Resp. No, but only injury to goods which Clerics possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, and of which they cannot dispose, because only these are sacred. - St. Lig. n. 42 and others commonly.

QUESTION 5. Whether sacred vessels and vestments can be converted to profane use?

Resp. Affirmatively, if the thing is so totally changed that it is reduced to common use, e.g., if a Chalice by fire or iron is made into a mass of silver.

But otherwise, if it is not totally changed. Hence it is not lawful from an old chasuble to repair profane garments, nor to apply the ornaments of Priests to profane uses. But otherwise concerning those which are not blessed, such as carpets and candlesticks. - St. Lig. n. 41.

QUESTION 6. Whether Chalices and other vessels, consecrated by sacred unction, whether they still retain consecration or not, before they are handed over to an artisan to be repaired, must be desecrated by a priest?

Resp. S. R. C., April 20, 1822. Negatively.

QUESTION 7. To whom is it lawful to touch sacred vessels?

Resp. To all and only Clerics without special permission. This is also granted to regular lay sacristans by privilege of Sixtus IV, and also to nun sacristans by communication of privileges. - St. Lig. n. 48. - Salmanticenses, and others commonly.

But it is lawful for all to touch other sacred things, of which sort are, e.g., an Agnus Dei, at least by today's custom, Relics of Saints, sacred ornaments, except those which immediately touch the Holy Eucharist.