Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ II. On the Dispensation of Vows
Dispensation of a vow is its absolute condonation made in the name of God by a legitimate superior.
- Principles. I. The Church has true power of dispensing in vows, just as also in oaths. This is clear from the words of Christ, Matthew 16. 19: "Whatever you shall loose," etc.; and from the constant practice of the Church. - Common.
II. Only prelates to whom jurisdiction in the external forum has been given 1 can dispense from vows, because this power pertains to the external governance of the Church, just as the power of making laws and censures. Hence only the Pope can dispense from vows for the whole Church 2; but bishops or regular prelates only for their respective subjects 3, and only in vows not reserved to the Pope. - St. Alphonsus, n. 256.
1 Understand: by proper and ordinary right; for others also, although they possess no jurisdiction in the external forum, have this power from privilege, as for example the mendicant regulars.
2 Even from solemn vows. See St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 256.
3 Can a bishop dispense in vows even with travelers? St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 158) brings forth four opinions. The reason for this disagreement seems to be: 1. that the doctors do not agree whether a traveler becomes a subject; 2. and again they disagree whence some power of dispensing with travelers must be derived; and to this disagreement there accedes another inconvenience, namely of citations heaped together without relation to the matter, which can be found even in St. Alphonsus.
Besides, those four opinions are easily reduced to two. For the first attributes this faculty absolutely to bishops; the remaining three agree in denying it unless the traveler becomes a subject by domicile or quasi-domicile, that is, unless the traveler ceases to be a traveler. Pontius defends the first, although with empty reasons, and Tanner is wrongly joined to him; most all defend the other; from among these, however, Suarez (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 11, n. 11) judges that a bishop, when grave spiritual necessity urges, can, if not dispense, at least suspend the obligation of the vow for several days, until the travelers can be consulted by their own judge.
Concerning these matters two things occur to be noted. 1. Since regulars by special privilege can dispense in vows and oaths of those whose confessions they can hear, therefore where there is need, travelers also could safely have recourse to them. Thus, from the common opinion, also Barbosa (De Offic. Episc., part 2, alleg. 36, n. 15). 2. Nothing certain and solid will ever be concluded concerning questions of this sort unless it is inquired more diligently whether and how far some jurisdiction can be exercised over those who are not subjects, and therefore over those concerning whom there is no ordinary power. On this matter it is surely astonishing how much certain theologians, especially more recent ones, wandering from the beaten path of the older writers, have entangled this whole matter in inextricable knots. But these things are more conveniently reserved to the tract on Penance, where the power of absolving travelers is treated.
III. For the validity of dispensation, a just cause is always required, because since vows are made to God alone, man cannot dispense from them except as delegate; but a delegate cannot dispense validly without just cause, as was said concerning laws. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 250.
- Questions. Q. 1. What are the just causes of this dispensation?
Resp. The good of the Church, of society, of the family, and even of him who is bound by the vow; for example, if because of the vow he is oppressed by scruples or by grave temptations; if he experiences notable difficulty in fulfilling the vow; if the act of vowing was not perfectly deliberate 4, etc. - St. Alphonsus, n. 252.
4 On this matter St. Alphonsus says (lib. 3, n. 253): "Even if danger of transgression and great difficulty in execution are absent, it suffices as cause that the vow was emitted immaturely, namely with too much facility, or from imperfect deliberation, or without perfect liberty... Because of this reason, the vows of those before puberty can be absolutely dispensed without any commutation... The same must be said if the vow was emitted because of light fear inflicted from without... The same, when imperfect deliberation or liberty in vowing proceeded from sadness, or anger, or intrinsic fear of shipwreck, death, or another evil, because then vows are usually made immaturely, and therefore can be dispensed without commutation. But if it were clear that mature deliberation was then present, then some commutation should be mixed with the dispensation.
But to the question which St. Alphonsus raises (l.c., n. 251), whether a dispensation is valid if in good faith it is believed that a just cause is present which in reality is not present, respond by distinguishing according to the things handed down in the tract On Laws: namely, it will be valid if the error occurred concerning the sufficiency of a cause which in reality is present in some measure; it will not be valid if the error is concerning the existence of some cause, when none exists.
Q. 2. Whether a superior can dispense in vows made for the utility of a neighbor?
Resp. It is affirmed, if the vow has not been accepted by the neighbor. Otherwise no, because then the obligation of a contract intervenes. - St. Alphonsus, n. 254 5.
5 Understand this if the promise was made only or chiefly in favor of a third party. For if the promise is gratuitous, and the vow is made principally in honor of God, according to the probable opinion of many (in St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 255), it could be commuted or dispensed even without the consent of the third party who accepted it. The reason is that, as St. Alphonsus says, "although the promise is made to a particular person, nevertheless it is made on account of God. Therefore God is the whole cause of the promise, and it is accidental that it was accepted by that third party, who, if he acquired any right, nevertheless did not acquire it except dependently on the good pleasure of God, to whom the promise is to be kept."
I have said: if the promise is gratuitous; for if it is onerous, of which sort is, for example, the vow of perseverance in certain congregations of regulars, which, by accepting the vow, obligate themselves mutually to sustain, instruct, and not dismiss novices without just cause, this cannot be commuted or dispensed without the consent of those whom it concerns, as Benedict XIV also sanctioned in the constitution Convocatis, 25 Nov. 1749, §32, and in the constitution Inter praeteritos, 3 Dec. 1749, §66.
Q. 3. What vows are reserved to the Pope?
Resp. Besides vows emitted in a religious community, these are reserved to the Pope: 1. the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, but not the vow of virginity alone 6; 2. the vow of entering a religion approved by the Church; 3. the vow of a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, to the sepulcher of Christ; 4. the vow of a Roman pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles; 5. the vow of a Compostellan pilgrimage to St. James. But these are not reserved unless they are absolute, determined, and perfect by reason of matter and liberty. Hence disjunctive, penal, and conditioned vows are not reserved, even, more probably, when the condition has been fulfilled; because a vow, in order to be reserved, must proceed from a sole and perfect affection for the promised matter. - St. Alphonsus, n. 258 7.
6 Namely, if mere integrity of the flesh is understood; otherwise, if abstinence from every venereal act, and also from every internal act against the same virtue, is understood, as the faithful more commonly are accustomed to take a vow of this sort.
7 Although the faculty of dispensing from an oath is customarily equated with, indeed and associated with, the faculty of dispensing from a vow, nevertheless, as St. Alphonsus observes (lib. 3, n. 259), a mere oath of chastity, of religion, etc., is not reserved. I have said: a mere oath, namely one which someone emits to confirm a purpose, but not to confirm a vow; although even in the latter hypothesis the vow would indeed be reserved, but not the added oath.
Q. 4. Whether a bishop can dispense a spouse from a vow of perpetual chastity emitted both before and after marriage, in order to asking the debt?
Resp. It is affirmed, according to the common opinion, against some; because he can dispense from every impediment that impedes the exercise of the conjugal act. - St. Alphonsus, n. 258, and lib. 6, n. 986, 987 8. - See Cases, n. 332 and following.
8 St. Alphonsus teaches, in each place alleged by the author, that mendicant confessors also can do this, and indeed both within and outside confession, as the same St. Alphonsus has according to the common opinion, l.c., n. 257.