Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ II. On the Matter of a Vow
- Principles. I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, indeed concerning a better good. The reason is that God is not worshiped by an indifferent action, or one whose placing is not better than its omission. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to the circumstances.
II. The matter of a vow must be morally possible; because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obliging oneself; but no one can obligate himself to something morally impossible to himself. But if the thing is divisible and in part possible, the vow is valid for this part 1; but it is not valid if it is morally indivisible. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 202.
1 Except, however, if it were clear that the one vowing wished to obligate himself to each part by way of one whole, and had each indivisibly before his eyes. The reason is that a vow is a particular law which is not extended beyond the intention of the one vowing; and therefore if the one vowing collectively promised each part, and one dependent on the other, if one part is impossible... the whole whole remains void. Thus the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 74), who soon after (ibid., n. 75-76) add many examples of vows which either must be observed from the part which remains possible, or are judged void because of the impossibility of some part.
- Questions. Q. 1. Whether a vow concerning matter already prescribed from another source is valid?
Resp. It is affirmed, first because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obligated by diverse titles; then because a vow of this sort concerns a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to be prescribed, and it concerns a better good, since a new bond can confer greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law 2. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 213. - Salamancans.
2 Moreover, to actions placed from a vow of this sort there accedes the nobility which flows from the virtue of religion and the notion of richer merit.
Q. 2. Whether a vow of a good thing with an evil end, or an evil condition, is valid?
Resp. To the first. No, if the evil end holds itself on the part of the thing vowed, for example if you vow alms in order to obtain a successful outcome to theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as though God were bringing aid for sinning. It must be said otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accompanies the vow accidentally, and the wicked end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself entirely on the part of the one vowing; for example if someone, vowing for the glory of God, then more willingly vows externally from vain ostentation. - St. Alphonsus, n. 206 3.
3 At this place St. Alphonsus also intimates the opinion of the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 66-68), namely that a vow is invalid even if the wicked end is only impulsive, yet such that without it the vow would not have occurred; and these things indeed can seem contradictory. For when the cause of an act is of such a kind that without it the act would not happen, it is called not only impulsive, but motive, principal, and primary. Besides, if the end is merely impulsive, it is therefore an end joined to another principal end. Therefore this end is not the total nor principal cause of the thing vowed or of vowing. But an end of this sort, thus added to the principal end, does not wholly corrupt an act formally good from its object, but can be held as something coming accidentally and extrinsic to the act. Therefore it does not take away the validity of the vow.
** The VV. rebuke us (p. 919) because in the Note it is said that he speaks contradictory things who calls that cause impulsive without which the matter would not occur; and they wish to prove this by the example of a man who from a desire for eternal salvation wishes to embrace the religious state, and from a desire for fish chooses the Carthusian order. Resp. Since otherwise this man would have chosen not the Carthusian order but another religious order, the desire for fish will be called the motive cause of choosing that order, no differently than the desire for eternal salvation will be called the motive cause of choosing the religious state in general; and only abusively will either desire be called merely impulsive.
Resp. To the second. It is affirmed, if the vow is made from affection toward a good thing, as good, although joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not to be harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more, however, does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition; as if someone vows alms if and whenever he blasphemes. - Laymann, lib. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 7.
Q. 3. Whether a vow of not sinning is valid?
Resp. 1. A vow of avoiding all sins, even the very slightest, is not valid, because this is impossible. - Trent, sess. 6.
Resp. 2. But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or all fully deliberate venial sins, is valid, because this is possible with divine grace and without a special privilege, if, however, the matter concerns pious persons 4. Likewise a vow of not committing venial sins of a certain kind is valid, for example of never lying, although because of the excessive difficulty of execution, vows of this sort are not expedient for most people. - Bouvier, and not a few others.
4 Understand persons not professing piety in just any way, but, as St. Alphonsus has it (lib. 3, n. 203), striving intensely for Christian perfection. Say the same of a vow of avoiding venial sins of a certain kind; for it will be valid, as St. Alphonsus says (ibid.), "in persons of great virtue," that is, in those long exercised in solid virtue; "but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed," St. Alphonsus goes on, "in some matters, such as dishonorable thoughts" (understand as to any subreption whatever or even the slightest, not as to plainly deliberate fault), "idle thoughts, etc., since they are unavoidable for all, the vow is null." And to this pertains a vow of avoiding acts of impatience or anger. For since the passion of anger is indifferent to good and evil, to be angry at times is not only in accord with reason, but plainly necessary; but otherwise to hold the mean in such a way that one sins neither by excess nor by defect is most difficult, not to say morally impossible.
Others add (in Suarez, De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, n. 2) that a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or mortal sins of a certain kind, is not valid if the matter concerns a fragile person. Although Suarez himself does not adhere to this opinion, he nevertheless approves what Navarrus says, that vows of this sort are neither useful nor expedient, and that sufficient cause for dispensation or commutation is present. On this matter, what some object is childish: that a dispensation of this sort is equated with a license to sin, which therefore must be denied. For this dispensation is neither sought nor granted so that one may sin more freely, but so that the bond may be taken away which, considering the fragility of the one vowing, does not hold him back from sinning, and thus redounds solely, rather than to his spiritual utility and the glory of God, indeed to him as a snare and to God as a graver offense.