§ II. On the One Counseling

676. Principles. - I. One counseling sins against justice whenever knowingly and willingly he furnishes an iniquitous counsel by which another is efficaciously induced to inflict damage unjustly, because the damage is imputable to him. This is clear also from proposition 39 condemned by Innocent XI, which lies thus: He who moves or induces another to inflict grave damage on a third person is not held to restitution of that damage inflicted.

II. One counseling who in good faith gave damaging counsel, when the truth has been known, is held to retract it, and indeed from justice. This follows from what was said above concerning him who inculpably placed the cause of damage, n. 662. - Vogler, etc.

III. But one counseling is not held to restitution if the executor, without that counsel, would have inflicted the damage equally well and in the same way, because then the counsel did not efficaciously influence the damage. - St. Lig., n. 561.

677. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether one counseling is held to restitution who revokes his counsel before the execution of the damage?

Resp. 1. Negatively, if the counsel was bare, that is, simple, because through revocation the whole force of the counsel is removed. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2. If the counsel was clothed, or resting on motives, it is controverted. Probably also negatively, provided other motives, at least equally efficacious, have been applied in the retraction ¹. - Thus Azor, etc., against others, whose sentence St. Lig. says is the more probable. Except if you have shown to a thief determined to inflict damage the way of entering a house, which otherwise he would not have found, or something similar; because your cooperation was then truly efficacious, especially if you foresaw that the thief would not change his depraved proposal; unless, however, you warned him to whom the damage is imminent, to which in the case you are held, as the Doctors apud St. Alphonsus, n. 559, judge ².

¹ Reasons sought from faith are most especially efficacious by their own nature; if the other pays no regard to them, he turns the whole cause of the damage back upon himself. Besides, although St. Alphonsus says the opposite opinion is more probable, nevertheless he admits that this one is sufficiently probable; and since some others, such as Laymann, have called this same opinion very probable, and others even most probable, such as Roncaglia apud St. Alph., Lib. 3, n. 559, surely an obligation of restoring ought not and cannot be imposed, especially because he who inflicted the damage has the most certain burden of restoring, and thus the damaged person has been sufficiently provided for.

² St. Alphonsus alleges the Salmanticenses and Sporer, who nevertheless (Tr. 4, Cap. 3, Sect. 1, n. 22) limits it: if without equal or greater damage the counselor can warn the one to be damaged concerning the imminent damage.

Q. 2. Whether one counseling the lesser evil for averting the greater is held to restitution?

Resp. Negatively, if it is a matter of the same person, because the counsel favors him, far from harming him; but otherwise according to many, if it is a matter of another person concerning whom the damager was not thinking, because this person is reasonably judged deservedly unwilling. - St. Lig., n. 565. Yet others hold the contrary, led by a sufficiently probable reason ³.

³ The reason is, says Vasquez (Op. De Scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14), that this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that the greater sin not be committed; from which it happens that he from whom the robber steals what is lesser is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who furnished the counsel. And Turrianus (De Fid., Spe, etc., Disp. 95, dub. 6): To me it is more probable that such counsel is licit when by no other reason could someone be drawn back from committing that greater sin, because to counsel a lesser sin in this case is not evil. Then he upon whom injury is inflicted is not reasonably unwilling with respect to the counselor, because he only advised a lesser theft so that the robber would not commit a greater sin; yet he would be unwilling with respect to the robber. This observation of Turrianus indeed is most wise, namely that he who suffers damage has a just cause of complaint not against the one counseling the lesser damage, but only against the robber. And surely charity demands that to one willing to perpetrate evil I advise the lesser; and likewise charity requires that I rather impede the damage of him who would suffer more than of him who would suffer less. Therefore this latter cannot be reasonably unwilling with respect to him who manages the matter according to the norm of the precept of charity.

678. • Q. 3. Whether one knowingly counseling evil to another is held also concerning the damages which this latter has suffered in executing the depraved counsel?

Resp. Negatively, of itself. The reason is that he brought no injury upon him, since no injury is done to one knowing and willing. - Otherwise, however, if the one counseling so circumvented the executor with frauds or sophisms that this latter did not advert to the iniquity of the counsel.

Q. 4. Whether one counseling only the manner of an unjust action is held to restitution?

Resp. Negatively, if the manner is merely accidental, as commonly are circumstances of time, place, or means. But otherwise, if the manner in some way redounds to the substance, for example, if it increases the damage, etc. - St. Lig., n. 563.

Q. 5. Whether he is held to restitution who persuades that damage be inflicted sooner?

Resp. Negatively, if he is certain that the other is determined to evil and will not change his depraved mind; otherwise in the other hypothesis. - St. Lig., n. 563, etc.

679. • Q. 6. Whether one counseling is held to restitution primarily or only secondarily?

Resp. Of himself he is held only secondarily, because the executor is principally acting, as one who is judged to act in his own name and for his own utility ⁴.

⁴ It does not seem to pertain to the matter whether the executor acts for his own utility or another's.

Q. 7. Whether or how one giving harmful doctrinal counsel from gravely culpable ignorance is held to restitution?

Resp. 1. If the one giving counsel does this from his state or office, for example, an advocate, physician, Confessor, etc., he is held to restitution for the unjust damage which follows from his counsel, whether toward the one seeking counsel, or toward him against whom it is given. The reason is that society has a right that he have the knowledge suitable to his office. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2. If the one counseling is not such a person who by reason of his office or state makes a show of skill, 1. he is not held toward the one seeking counsel unless from deceitful counsel, or unless he affects great skill which he lacks; 2. nevertheless he is obligated toward a third person who suffers damage thence, if he himself knew his own lack of skill and foresaw at least in a confused way that damage would follow. - St. Lig., n. 564, and others commonly.

680. Resolutions. - 1. Women, common people, and others generally whose insufficiency is known, and who do not deceitfully affect skill, are held to restore nothing to those who sought counsel from them. Yet they are held toward others to whom damage has been inflicted from their counsel, if they sufficiently foresaw that damage; for they are guilty when, by giving rash counsels in those matters which they do not know, they expose themselves to the danger of injuring an innocent person unwillingly. - St. Lig., ibid.

2. If by persuasion or exhortation you were the cause that a greater damage was inflicted than otherwise would have been inflicted, you are held only for the excess of damage. Hence if you persuaded a thief prepared of himself to steal 100 gold pieces that he should steal 200, more probably you contract only the obligation of restoring 100.

3. If two together counsel theft to Peter, who, induced by their counsel, steals, each is held to restitution; for although Peter would have stolen even with only one of them counseling, nevertheless in fact each influenced by his counsel, and by that very fact each was the cause of the theft. - St. Lig., n. 561. - Lugo, D. 19, n. 2.

4. If a thief orders me to show him my treasure, and I show the treasure of another, I am held to restore, because I am the cause of the damage; for the thief does not have a determined will to steal the treasure of another. - St. Lig., n. 565. ⁵.

⁵ St. Alphonsus in this place, namely Lib. 3, n. 565, has nothing concerning a special case of this kind, but only touches the general question, whether to a man prepared to inflict a greater damage one can advise a lesser even against another; which question the Author also touched above, n. 677, Q. 2. Therefore if the whole force of this fourth resolution depends on the principles laid down there beforehand, the things said there concerning the general question must be brought back to this special case.

5. One counseling is not exempted from the obligation of repairing the damage which he counseled, if the executor whom he warned to restore does not restore, because he efficaciously cooperated in the damage; but efficacious cooperation necessarily exacts efficacious reparation. For the damaged person must be made wholly unharmed. - See Casus, n. 662 and 665.