§ II. On the Qualities of Contrition

449. The qualities necessarily required for the validity of contrition, both perfect and imperfect, are numbered as four, namely: 1. that it be internal; 2. supernatural; 3. supreme; 4. universal.

I. Internal or true, that is, truly conceived in the heart and soul, according to Joel 2:13: Rend your hearts, and not your garments. For contrition, according to the Council of Trent, is sorrow of the soul; and soul signifies the rational will.

II. Supernatural, that is, elicited through the help of grace and from a motive which is in some way referred to God ¹. For sorrow elicited from a merely human motive, for example, from fear of infamy, can contribute nothing toward obtaining justification.

¹ By this manner of speaking, the Author wished also to include moral rectitude, to which sin is opposed, according to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, which numbers the turpitude of sin also as an apt motive of sorrow.

It can be noted here that, just as for an action to be meritorious it is not necessary that someone act from a supernatural motive, that is, one known by the aid of faith (see vol. 1, no. 32, qq. 6 and 8), so Ripalda consequently concludes (De Fide, disp. 17, no. 209) that attrition disposing toward sacramental justification can be elicited under the direction of infused prudence or under the direction of knowledge which some affection of faith - namely, one seeking justification in the Sacrament - directs. For, as he himself says (no. 187), a disposition sufficient for sacramental justification can exist without theological faith strictly so called. For sorrow elicited by a moral virtue to which sin is opposed (namely, from the turpitude of sin according to Trent) suffices for sacramental justification. But we premised above that it is consonant with Sacred Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, theological reasons, and the judgment of grave Theologians that salutary and supernatural acts of the moral virtues can exist without strict faith. We have already seen (loc. sup. cit.), in the Treatise On Human Acts, that this doctrine is that of St. Thomas. On the same matter, the things which the same Ripalda teaches in De Ente Supernaturali, last disp., nos. 458-460, and disp. 22, no. 100, are to be seen.

The suitable motives can be reduced to four: 1. fear of punishment; 2. hope of reward; 3. the turpitude of sin; 4. the goodness of God.

III. Supreme, namely, so that the sinner appreciatively detests his crime more than every other evil, and is prepared in soul rather to lose and suffer all things than to commit sin.

IV. Universal, namely, it must extend to all grave sins, either from one universal motive or from several particular motives which, at least taken together, extend to all mortal sins committed, even those not occurring to the memory. The reason is that no actual sin is remitted without sorrow; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, since remission occurs through the infusion of grace, which cannot stand together with mortal sin.

450. Questions. QUESTION 1. Must contrition be supremely intense?

Reply. Negative. The reason is that intensity is something merely accidental. For the degree of sorrow, or the greater or lesser affection or effort, does not pertain to the essence of contrition, which can exist in its entirety without a degree of intensity of this kind. Besides, how would you know that this or that degree of intensity must be attained? Moreover, the intensity of sorrow is not always in our power. Hence, at times with respect to sensation we are moved more vehemently by a temporal evil than by an offense against God, although the will is ready rather to suffer all temporal evils than to offend God. Therefore, it suffices that it be appreciatively supreme, that is, that sin be held in hatred before other things by a serious judgment. - St. Lig., nos. 433-442 ².

² Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, nos. 84-87), after concluding that the opinion which requires contrition to be supremely intense is rightly commonly rejected, and that the opinion which requires contrition to be at least more intense than the acts by which a man is affected toward other objects is likewise to be rejected as exposed to many fallacies and dangers, nevertheless adds: We do not deny that it is expedient for the sinner to endeavor to grieve with the highest intensity, both so that he may be more certain of his penance and so that he may satisfy more fully not only for the fault but also for the punishment; in this sense the Fathers who require the highest sorrow must be understood.

QUESTION 2. Is a FORMAL comparison required in the appreciation between various evils and sin, or God?

Reply. Negative. For it suffices that the sinner sincerely and truly detest his sins and be unwilling to sin any more. Indeed, Confessors act very imprudently who, in order to discover whether sorrow is supreme, propose to penitents certain very dangerous comparisons, for example: Would you rather be burned alive, or undergo all the torments of the martyrs, or eat poisonous reptiles, than sin again? For such comparisons move the imagination more vividly, and when a strong temptation approaches, the true disposition which previously existed is easily lost. - St. Lig., no. 433. - Elbel, no. 79 ³.

³ St. Alphonsus and Elbel are not alone in admonishing that these comparisons must be avoided; indeed, St. Alphonsus rightly says that this is common to all. This is common among all, he says (loc. cit.), with St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, etc., in Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 731, namely, that an explicit comparison between sin and other evils is not expedient ..., and still less to choose hell, etc. Hence it is plain that certain formulas of contrition in which you may see comparisons of this kind - rather a thousand deaths, or even rather hell, etc. - are less to be approved. And this admonition can indeed be useful also to preachers. For if, after the affections of penance or charity have been excited, they imprudently leap to those comparisons, they will easily accomplish this: that the fervor kindled in the hearers quickly becomes lukewarm, indeed grows cold and perhaps is entirely extinguished. The special help of divine grace for undertaking and overcoming any arduous things can and ought certainly to be hoped for when the hour presses, but not whenever someone rashly commits himself to dangers through empty imaginings.

Navarrus (Manuale, ch. 10, no. 4) well calls comparisons of this kind harmful and superfluous temptations. And (ch. 1, no. 17) he thus notes their imprudence: No one ... is bound to compare specifically, judging within himself that he would rather suffer this and that kind of death and punishments than sin or have sinned. Indeed, this would be imprudence; just as the confessor would be imprudent who asks the penitent whether he would rather that his children or he himself had died than sinned; or whether he is prepared rather to die or lose his children than to admit a mortal sin.... For such a temptation is excessive.... Therefore, it suffices for the confessor that the penitent appears to have sufficient repentance for his sins.

Indeed, St. Thomas charges that custom not only with imprudence but with foolishness (Quodlibet 1, art. 9): One who is contrite is bound IN GENERAL to will to suffer any punishment rather than to sin.... But he is not bound IN PARTICULAR to descend to this punishment or that; indeed, he would act FOOLISHLY if someone should solicit himself or another concerning particular punishments of this kind. For it is manifest that, just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall under a lesser temptation who perhaps would fall under a greater one. Thus, someone hearing adultery is not incited to lust; but if through consideration he descends to each enticement, he is moved more. And similarly, someone would not refuse to suffer death for Christ; but if he should descend to considering each punishment, he would be drawn back more. And therefore, to descend to particulars in such things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sin.

QUESTION 3. What duration of time is required for conceiving true and supreme contrition?

Reply. None per se, because duration does not pertain to the essence of the act but is merely accidental to it; therefore, it suffices that the act be substantially completed, which can occur even in a very brief moment. Nevertheless, it is safer to elicit a more intense and more prolonged act of contrition, lest perhaps from levity or excessive haste no act be conceived as to its substance. - St. Lig., no. 433, and others commonly.

451. QUESTION 4. Must contrition for venial sins possess the same four qualities?

Reply 1. It must necessarily possess the first three: 1. it must be internal, because contrition which is not elicited from the intimate heart is not true; 2. it must be supernatural, because, as was said ⁴, natural contrition cannot be a means to a supernatural effect; 3. it must also be supreme, or the sinner must detest venial sin more than all natural evils ⁵.

⁴ In what sense this is to be understood, see above at no. 449.

⁵ This is said most truly; and if someone grieves over a venial sin in such a way that, when a difficulty occurs, he is prepared to commit it again, for example, to lie in order to avoid discord or rebukes, he certainly does not grieve rightly. But if that temptation of which we spoke above (at q. 2) must be avoided both with regard to oneself and others, it must be avoided much more when only venial sins are treated; and the confessor would act most imprudently who, to explore the force of sorrow for venial sins, should ask whether the penitent would rather suffer all evils than relapse into one or another of his customary venial faults.

Reply 2. It need not necessarily be universal, either in the Sacrament or outside the Sacrament. The reason is that, since venial sin is not incompatible with sanctifying grace, one venial sin can be remitted without the others. - St. Lig., no. 449.

QUESTION 5. Does FEARFUL attrition, or attrition conceived from fear of hell, suffice for justification in the Sacrament of Penance?

Reply. Affirmative, provided that it is truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and servile only materially, not formally or servilely. The reason is: 1. because attrition of this kind is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin; 2. because this is clearly drawn from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4, where it says that attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments is honorable and disposes the sinner to obtain justification in the Sacrament of Penance ⁶.

⁶ Concerning this doctrine, St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 440) most truly establishes thus against Merbes, Juvenin, Antoine, and any others of this kind: It is certain and common among the Doctors that perfect contrition is not required, but attrition suffices.

Nor should it move anyone that certain persons have represented this doctrine as new and first introduced by Melchior Cano (see Benedict XIV, De Synodo, bk. 7, ch. 13, no. 6, and Perrone, De Poenitentia, no. 90, in the note). For if, Juvenin, Louis Habert, Le Drou, Van Espen, Witasse, and others of this kind having been cast aside, they had approached Suarez with their own eyes, for example (De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 1, no. 9), they would certainly have found St. Thomas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, St. Antoninus, Sylvester, etc., all older than Cano, cited for that doctrine.

But Joseph Benaglio, in a plainly excellent work entitled Dell'attrizione quasi materia e parte del Sacramento della Penitenza, ecc., Milan, 1846 (ch. 5, art. 11, vol. 2, p. 101), adduces many more Doctors for the same matter. He also makes plain (ch. 4, art. 7, and ch. 5, art. 13) that absolutely all the things gathered from the aforesaid Juvenin, Habert, etc., for the defense of the stated paradox in the cited place of the work De Dioecesana Synodo are wholly unstable, and moreover are wrongly attributed to John Morinus. For whatever may be the case concerning other opinions of this writer, as regards attrition he not only professed its sufficiency with the common opinion of the Theologians, but also vindicated the antiquity, and indeed the perpetuity, of the same doctrine.

And it is pleasing to adduce that place where he modestly reproves Dominic Soto, to whom the old doctrine of attrition, which becomes contrition in the Sacrament, had not appeared very satisfactory; for he employs principles which must never fail to be kept before one's eyes in these matters. Thus Morinus (Commentarius historicus De Poenitentia, bk. 1, ch. 13, no. 19): In these words of Dominic Soto two things appear to me hard and difficult to understand. The first is that the opinion which asserts that attrition becomes contrition in the Sacrament is true, but was nevertheless not recognized by the Fathers. If some new and sublime theological problem were treated, it would certainly be euparedecton (credible) that something had been discovered by distinguished Theologians and Philosophers which had escaped the ancients. But since the way and manner of recovering eternal salvation through the Sacrament of Penance is treated, can some new and easier manner of attaining salvation be discovered by a scholastic philosophical device than that which the Fathers, having received it from the Apostles, handed down to their successors? If the Fathers recognized contrition alone as necessary for attaining salvation through the Sacrament of Penance, the dullness of my mind does not grasp by what reason, or relying upon what authority, the Scholastics after at least twelve hundred years could prescribe a new and easier way than that which the Fathers handed down to us.... The second thing which appears hard to me is that the Fathers thought contrition alone necessary for Confession. For although the Ancients did not recognize the name Attrition, much less the axiom, Attrition becomes Contrition in the Sacrament, nevertheless they not only taught the thing itself signified by this axiom, but also commended it most highly as a principle and the foundation of all penitential discipline. Thus far Morinus.

Moreover, because the praised Benaglio allowed himself to depart entirely from the things read concerning this argument in Lambertini's work De Synodo, he rightly judged that the faculty to do so had been granted to him from the things which Benedict XIV himself declared at the end of the Preface prefixed to the latest editions in these words: Where neither our Predecessors the Roman Pontiffs nor We ourselves have defined anything by Apostolic authority either in the Bullarium or elsewhere, and generally in all matters to which no weight has accrued from the public authority of the Church, we do not intend to define anything or present it as though decretory. For this always was, and still is, Our mind: that, in proposing Our opinion, We defend it only insofar as it is recognized that sufficient strength and firmness are present in the reasons and authorities which impelled Us to embrace it; and with willing mind We subscribe to the doctrine ... of Melchior Cano, who ..., treating of books which are written by Supreme Pontiffs and published, says this: When they publish books concerning any matter, the Roman Pontiffs express their opinion as other learned men, not as judges of the Church pronouncing upon faith.* And after relating the history of Innocent IV, who wrote Commentaries on the books of the Decretals while he held the Pontificate, he adds: Nor indeed did Innocent ever arrogate this to himself, that whatever he had written in that Work should be held as a defined matter; rather, he readily allowed his opinions, which he had proposed as a private doctor, to be attacked by other doctors, as is plain from ... his life, and much more from the very ample liberty which later Canonists took for themselves in this matter, when they did not hesitate often to abandon opinions inserted by Innocent in his Commentaries and to pass entirely to others.

Moreover, attrition is called servilely servile when someone indeed grieves over sin and wishes to avoid it on account of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God, but would still be prepared to sin if those punishments did not exist. But it is called simply servile when someone, on account of fear of punishments, abstains from sin, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist. The former is evil, not insofar as it is fear of punishments, but because of the depraved disposition of the soul. - Scavini.

452. QUESTION 6. Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory suffice for venial sins?

Reply. Affirmative, according to the most common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell also hold here.

QUESTION 7. Does attrition from fear of the temporal punishments of this life to be undergone for sin, insofar as they are inflicted by God, suffice?

Reply. Affirmative, more probably, provided that it is supernatural ⁷. The reason is:

⁷ When supernatural attrition is required, the opinion of those who said that natural attrition suffices is excluded; that is (as Suarez indicates, De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 2, no. 7), attrition elicited by the powers of nature alone, whether it is conceived from an eternal and honorable motive, such as fleeing the punishments of hell or the turpitude of sin, or from a temporal and indifferent motive, such as avoiding infamy or temporal loss, because these temporal harms also are given by God on account of our sins. Suarez then opposes to this false opinion (ibid., no. 8) the thesis that attrition must be elicited with the help of grace. See the same Suarez, disp. 4, sect. 1, nos. 3-4.

Moreover, although St. Alphonsus (no. 443) does not deny that this opinion is judged most probable by some and even morally certain by others (from Croix, from whom he took it, it could be added that others call the same altogether certain), nevertheless he notes three things to the contrary: 1. that Cardenas doubts whether it is morally certain; 2. that Cano, Pasqualigus, and Hurtadus, in Diana, held the contrary; 3. that the Council of Trent speaks copulatively of hell and punishments, and does not distinguish disjunctively between hell or punishments. Hence he concludes: Since the second (opinion) does not lack its own probability, at least extrinsic, I think it is better that it be observed in practice. Hence the Author also calls the opinion which he proposes only more probable.

But in reality these reasons of St. Alphonsus neither detract anything from the firmness of the doctrine which the Author relates from the common opinion of the Doctors, nor can confer any, even slight, probability upon the opposite.

As regards the first, therefore, it was said in the preceding edition, because of an inexact citation, that Cardenas was wrongly cited, inasmuch as, cohering badly with himself, he confused everything indiscriminately. Now, more aptly to the matter, Reply. Cardenas himself gives this reason why he doubted whether the affirmative opinion was morally certain (Crisis, pt. 4, on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, disp. 2, q. 2, no. 69): because there are not lacking, he says, authors who deny that this manner of attrition is sufficient; and the affirmative opinion does not rest upon an infallibly certain foundation, but only upon a probable one. But: 1. it is false that these authors existed;

2. likewise, that a sufficient foundation of moral certainty is lacking is found false by the common judgment of the gravest Doctors. Therefore, that suffrage of Cardenas profits the cause nothing.

As regards the second, it is very well known that Cano (see Faure, Dubitationes Theologicae, dub. IV, sect. IV) and Hurtadus held the contrary opinion to that which St. Alphonsus says, so much so that Diana, to whom he refers, uses the very doctrine of Hurtadus to confirm the common opinion (see vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108, no. 2). Diana does not even name Pasqualigus, nor does Pasqualigus, insofar as it was possible to know from inspection of his writings, have any word concerning this controversy. Therefore, the whole foundation upon which that extrinsic probability was built is altogether wanting. Moreover, St. Alphonsus did not produce these false citations from himself, but in good faith took them from Croix (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 884); whether Croix himself noted them carelessly or unfortunately borrowed them from elsewhere matters little to us now.

As regards the third, finally, it is plain that this reason also is deprived of all efficacy; and, contrary to the common sense of all, it would prove of itself that fear of hell does not suffice for attrition unless fear of temporal evils also accompanied it.

But what St. Alphonsus intimates (ibid.), that in the context of the Council of Trent the word punishments signifies only the punishments of hell, manifestly contradicts the same context; for there immediately follows the example of the fear by which the Ninevites, struck by Jonah's preaching full of terrors, did penance. But Jonah's preaching full of terrors, according to Sacred Scripture (Jonah 3:4), was this: Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown.

** The twenty-eight columns which the VV. opposed to this Note (pp. 426-440) must now be answered. First (pp. 427-428), they note that the holy Doctor said the negative opinion must be observed more safely in practice because it does not lack its own probability, at least extrinsic. Therefore, since validity is at issue, Proposition 1 among those condemned by Innocent XI pertains here. Reply. Here again it must be denied that either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, even slight, supports this negative opinion; and this will be more apparent below. Therefore, that condemned Proposition has no place here.

The VV. then undertake (pp. 428-433) to vindicate the Authors whom St. Alphonsus cited for the negative: Pasqualigus, Hurtadus (the VV. add Diana, but neither the holy Doctor nor the Note has anything concerning the opinion of Diana), Cano, Cardenas, and Concina. Reply. It is difficult to know what the VV. mean when they write, They are vindicated. For: 1. they concede that Pasqualigus has not even one word concerning this matter, but was cited by St. Alphonsus because of a typographical error which had crept into the book of Croix, from which the holy Doctor took his citations. Does this produce probability for the opinion of St. Alphonsus? 2. The VV. themselves (p. 430) relate these words of Hurtadus, in Diana: Some teach, AND RIGHTLY, that attrition on account of a temporal evil with reference to God ... suffices for the effect of the Sacrament; St. Alphonsus, on the contrary, says that Hurtadus in Diana denies that this attrition suffices. Is the citation of St. Alphonsus thus vindicated as correct? 3. From Concina the VV. (p. 433) adduce this judgment: I consider this opinion (namely, the affirmative) not only false and lax, but contained in the Decree of Innocent XI. Reply. Excellent indeed! But does not St. Alphonsus say that this affirmative opinion appears to him more probable? Nor is this enough. Concina (Manuale, bk. 11, ch. 7, sec. 5), concerning the sufficiency of attrition which St. Alphonsus also defends as morally certain, judges thus: This boasted moral certainty is a falsity of fact clearer than midday light; it is a fiction, an imaginary and manifest chimera, condemned by Alexander VII. I now ask the VV.: Is this a patron of such a kind that his judgments can add or take away any probability from opinions? Hence let the VV. understand why no account was taken in the Note of the suffrage of Concina.

4. As regards Cano, we said in the Note that it is established from the things which Faure has that he is cited in vain. Thus briefly: Cano (Relectio De Poenitentia, pt. 6) has these words: If you ask when one who is attrite becomes contrite by virtue of the Sacrament, I reply that this first occurs, by whatever kind of attrition a man is attrite, if he thinks that he has performed what was necessary and is invincibly ignorant that he does not have a sufficient disposition. Moreover, ibid., among the species of attrition he also mentions that which proceeds from fear of infamy, or of any temporal evil, as when one detests sin and purposes to confess lest he be cast out of the Church or fined money, etc. Hence it is argued thus: Cano here teaches that attrition from a merely human motive suffices. Therefore, a fortiori, he admits that attrition from fear of punishments which elsewhere (pt. 3) he calls spiritual or supernatural suffices, punishments which require the help of God in order to be believed and which are known by the light of faith. The VV. object here that this doctrine is false. Reply. It is not asked here whether this doctrine of Cano is true or false, but what his doctrine is, and whether he was aptly cited by St. Alphonsus for the matter. See Dicastillo, De Poenitentia, tr. 8, disp. 6, no. 6, and Candidus, disp. 24, art. 11, no. IV.

5. Finally, what force the opinion of Cardenas has was stated in the Note and will be apparent from what is to be said.

The VV. add (pp. 437-438) an article with the title: The solid reasons favoring the negative opinion are set forth. Reply 1. If solid reasons had not been lacking, St. Alphonsus would not have said that at least extrinsic probability inheres in this opinion. For solid reasons also produce intrinsic probability. 2. All those reasons which the VV. gather from Croix come to this: that the force of the argument which the Doctors take against them from the Council of Trent may in some way, if possible, be broken. But this is by no means to adduce solid reasons for the thesis. Therefore, in that entire article no reason in reality is contained, either solid or less solid. Moreover, if Croix had had at hand some solid reason for the negative opinion, he certainly would not have written concerning the affirmative (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 884): IT IS MOST PROBABLE that ... it suffices, etc.

And let these things suffice so that the truth of what had been said in the Note may be established, namely, that the reasons adduced by St. Alphonsus confer no probability, not even slight, upon the negative opinion. Two things now remain: 1. that the scruple which the doubt of Cardenas concerning the moral certainty of the affirmative opinion cast upon St. Alphonsus be removed; 2. that the weight of the citations which the VV. added (pp. 433-438) be weighed.

Therefore, to the scruples of Cardenas we shall oppose Cardinal Toletus, who (In S. Thomam, pt. 3, q. 85, art. 5), disputing concerning fear of punishment, and indeed, as he says, not only when one fears the punishment of hell, but the turpitude of sin and the loss of temporal goods, after establishing against Luther that this fear and detestation is good and useful, and that through it grace is given with the Sacrament, concludes: This doctrine is Catholic, and the contrary is heretical. To Toletus let Suarez be added, who writes (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, sect. 2, no. 15): This opinion is true. - Illsung, according to whom (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 3, nos. 29 and 39): This conclusion is of faith. - Jerome Llamas, who (Methodus Curae, pt. 2, ch. 2, sec. 6) says that it is certain, and that it is heretical to deny it. - Seraphinus a Conceptione, who (De Poenitentia, bk. 1, disp. 3, dub. 2, nos. 461, 462, and 485) affirms that it is a Catholic truth. - Elbel, who (conf. 3, no. 59) calls this opinion most common and morally certain. - George Gobat, who writes (tr. 6, no. 47) that it must by no means be doubted that it is true and supernatural attrition, proportioned to obtaining the effect of the Sacrament. - Arriaga, who (in Croix, loc. cit.) defends the same doctrine as certain.

Paul de Palacio, who writes (In Cap. 16 S. Matthaei): The opinion is most certain. - Michel Augustinus, Canon Regular, who (Theologia Canonico-moralis, vol. 4, tr. 4, pt. 2, q. 1, punct. 1, sect. 2, no. 18) aptly refutes Cardenas as though this doctrine were contained within the limits of probability. - Aversa, who (De Poenitentia, disp. 2, sect. 14) says that it is most manifest from Sacred Scripture. - Holzmann, who (tr. 4, no. 532) says: This doctrine is pronounced morally certain by Fathers Gobat and Elbel, to whom I also assent. - And Martinonus too hands it down as certain (disp. 48, sect. 7, no. 82). - Likewise, James Granadus (Controversiae 7, De Poenitentia, tr. 2, disp. 8, sect. 1, no. 5) teaches it as certain. - Ithuriaga, whose words are these (Dissertatio Moralis XI, no. 19): This opinion is not merely probable, but true and morally certain, just as certain as the opinion concerning attrition conceived from fear of hell. - Dominic Viva, who (on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26) affirms that we can licitly follow the same opinion as morally certain. - Mazzotta, who (tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, ch. 3, sec. 1, no. 2) says: This opinion is most probable by authority and reason, so that Gobat calls it indubitable and Arriaga altogether certain; wherefore it is not subject to Prop. 1 condemned by Innocent XI, whatever Croix may have said....

To these are to be added the very many who teach the same doctrine absolutely and without introducing any doubt, but as beyond controversy, and indeed hold it as handed down by the Council of Trent. Concerning this Ithuriaga says (loc. cit., no. 18): It is more certain than certain to me that the Council of Trent, in describing attrition which is conceived from fear of hell and punishments, used this manner of speaking lest it should appear to wish to restrict the things which it there teaches concerning attrition to attrition from fear of hell; therefore, I think these things must be extended to attrition which is conceived generally from fear of other punishments also.... Thus the example of the Ninevites also fits more suitably, etc. Thus also Ferraris (s.v. Poenitentia, art. 2, no. 13), Moya (disp. 5, q. 4, nos. 2-3), Giribaldi (tr. 6, ch. 3, dub. 7, no. 43, and tr. 7, ch. 4, dub. 5, no. 29), Dominic Soto (In IV Sent., disp. 17, q. 2, art. 5, and De Natura et Gratia, bk. 2, ch. 14), in which latter place he expressly teaches that this attrition is informed by grace, contrary to what some have attributed to him; Fagundez (De Secundo Ecclesiae Praecepto, bk. 2, ch. 4, no. 9); Navarrus (Enchiridion, ch. 1, no. 8, and ch. 2, no. 38); John Medina (q. 4); Villalobos (tr. 9, diff. 22); Stoz (bk. 1, ch. 2, q. 1, art. 5, no. 8); Reiffenstuel (De Poenitentia, dist. 6, q. 4, nos. 42-43); Escobar (Theologia Moralis, tr. 7, exam. 4, ch. 7, no. 35); Nicholas Muszka (De Sacramentis, sec. 2, no. 29); Marin (tr. 22, disp. 7, sect. 4, no. 55); Reginaldus (bk. 5, ch. 3, no. 28); Anthony of the Holy Ghost (Directorium Confessariorum, tr. 5, disp. 3, sect. 2, no. 69); Babenstuber (tr. 8, pt. 6, disp. 4, art. 3, no. 13); De Blanchis (disp. 6, pp. 267 and 271); Thomas Hurtadus (De Poenitentia, disp. 6, diff. 5); Francis Suarez (De Poenitentia, tr. 3, disp. 1, sect. 3, sec. 2, no. 92); Candidus (Disquisitiones Morales 24, art. 11, dub. 3, no. 5); Cardinal Brancatus (In IV Sent., De Poenitentia, disp. 9, art. 3, sec. 10); Crescentius Krisper (Theologia Scholastica Scotica, tr. 12, dist. 3, q. 1, no. 2); Mastrius (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, q. 6, no. 138, and Theologia Moralis, disp. 21, q. 2, no. 40); Voit (vol. 2, nos. 493 and 495); Honoratus Faber (De Poenitentia, ch. 1, no. 17); Clericatus (De Poenitentia, decis. 14, no. 5 ff.); Ulloa (disp. 6, ch. 1); Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 6, nos. 6-8); Sporer (pt. 3, ch. 2, nos. 227 and 259); Bonacina (De Sacramentis, disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 1, punct. 3, no. 1); Peter de Fay (De Poenitentia, q. 9, art. 1, disp. 3); Marchant (tr. 4, tit. 2, q. 4); Becanus (pt. 5, tr. 2, ch. 35, q. 1, no. 6); Maurus Berardusius (Summa Coronae, ch. 3); Roncaglia (tr. 19, ch. 1, q. 2, rule 1); Potestas (no. 5063); Ochagavia (De Poenitentia, tr. 1, no. 18). To these add Nugnus (in Candidus, loc. cit.), Madernus (in Giribaldi, loc. cit.), and Gaspar Hurtadus (in Escobar, loc. cit., and Diana, vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108, no. 2).

To these add also those who call the same doctrine most probable, such as Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 1, no. 11), Reuter (pt. 4, no. 283), Gormaz (De Poenitentia, sect. 5, no. 454), Mazzotta (loc. cit.), etc.

But now it comes to mind to ask: will all these things lose their force solely for this reason, that, as St. Alphonsus said, Cardenas doubts whether this opinion is morally certain? But from an inspection of that paragraph of the holy Doctor (bk. 6, no. 443), it sufficiently appears that he did not labor very extensively upon this question; but, apart from the fact that he employed the opinion of Concina, he had at hand no other apparatus except what he excerpted from Lacroix. Yet neither that apparatus for the holy Doctor, nor that paragraph of the holy Doctor for others, could have been equal to furnishing a full knowledge of this controversy. But let us come to the things which are objected.

Cardenas (Crisis, pt. 4, diss. 2, ch. 6, no. 70) regards it as of great moment that Lessius (In III Partem S. Thomae, q. 1, dub. 5, no. 18) said concerning the sufficiency of this attrition, this is sufficiently probable. But the VV. (p. 434) say that the same doctrine was called probable also by Diana (vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108), and by Tanner (De Poenitentia, q. 6, dub. 4, no. 21), and indeed also by Lugo, who (disp. 5, no. 137) employs the word appears, which is the word of one opining. Therefore, they conclude (pp. 434-435), even the opposite opinion is judged probable by these, and by Tanner as more probable. Reply with Cardenas: I deny the consequence. Of two contradictory propositions, says Cardenas (tr. 1, disp. 2, ch. 2, no. 10), one can be probable without the other being probable; I maintain this conclusion as altogether certain. This conclusion is common among the Authors. For then each proposition will be probable when some equal authority or intrinsic reason militates on each side. But in the case neither any intrinsic reason nor any authority can be cited for the negative opinion. Therefore. And in fact, neither Lugo, Tanner, nor Diana adduces anything to the contrary. Concerning the Authors, some of whom Cardenas boasts of in vain, a little below. Meanwhile note that, concerning our thesis, Lugo does not say it appears, but I JUDGE.

The VV. insist and (pp. 437-438) adduce these words from Billuart (De Poenitentia, diss. 4, art. 1): Contrition must be supernatural.... Hence you will infer that one who grieves over sin ... because from it follows loss of reputation or temporal goods, and from similar natural motives, is insufficiently ... contrite; otherwise, if he grieves over sin ... as productive of the punishments of purgatory, hell, the loss of grace, glory, etc. Although the VV. attach no conclusion here, nevertheless in the Additional Summary (col. 83) they concluded thus: Billuart therefore does not admit attrition from fear of the temporal punishments of this life, even if they are considered as inflicted by God, ... because attrition of this kind is not supernatural. Reply 1. It is false, as is plain from the context, that Billuart there discusses loss of reputation, etc., as punishments considered to have been inflicted by God. It is therefore false that these are excluded there by Billuart. Reply 2. Nor ought they to be thought excluded because they are not expressly indicated in the latter part of the text. And here the manner of proceeding of the VV. is somewhat displeasing. Let the etc. in the text of Billuart be noted. In the VV. it does not appear whether it belongs to Billuart or to the VV.; but in the Additional Summary it is written in letters different from those of the text of Billuart, and thus you would believe that it does not belong to Billuart, but to the Writers indicating that they omit the rest. Yet in reality it belongs to Billuart. And since it must not be called idle, is the conjecture empty that the Author tacitly indicated there that he also intended temporal punishments as inflicted by God? But there is no need for conjectures; for Billuart himself afterward expressly sets forth his opinion thus (loc. cit., art. 4): To grieve over sin, ... charity being excluded, either because ... it produces temporal evil, or because it produces hell, or because it excludes glory, or because it is an evil and an offense against God, are so many modes of attrition. Therefore, Billuart does not confirm, as the VV. say (p. 433), the opinion of St. Alphonsus, but departs from it.

The VV. object (p. 438): Amort (tr. 13, sec. 2, q. 6) does not hold as sufficient sorrow from fear of temporal punishment, even if it is known by faith as sent by God, because this sorrow is not supernatural. Reply. Let all of it pass. Amort holds it as a merely natural motive even if someone grieves from fear of punishments in the other world (which words the VV. would have done better not to omit), and gives as the reason that this motive does not befit a son of God; immediately afterward, moreover (q. 7), he denies that attrition from fear of the punishments of hell suffices, because this fear indicates not the soul of a friend or son, but of a servant, and does not exclude the will to sin. But what weight, I ask, will finally appear to be attributable to the authority of a Writer who declines into these anomalies? Therefore, let the VV. have this man together with Concina for themselves.

The VV. insist (p. 435) that according to Coninck (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, dub. 5, no. 39), attrition of this kind can be suspect; these words of Coninck also somewhat disturbed Reuter. Reply. Did Coninck call it suspect as though it did not suffice per se? I deny it; for he expressly affirms that it is sufficient. Did he call it suspect because of an extrinsic motive which might be present per accidens? Let it pass. The same is said even of fear of hell, which per accidens can decline into servilely servile fear; much more can this hold with regard to attrition on account of the turpitude of sins, in which the quality of universality can more easily be lacking. But these things pertain not to the hinge of the question, but to opportune admonitions for those who explain catechesis to the people, that they may hand down the genuine notion of attrition.

Finally, to confirm, as they say, the opinion of St. Alphonsus, the VV. produce other authors (pp. 433-438), and especially Toletus, Vasquez, and Leonard Jansen. I said especially these, for the many things which they adduce from Suarez, Tamburini, Roncaglia, and Henno have nothing to do with the matter and serve merely to increase the bulk of the book.

As regards Toletus, therefore, we have already explained his opinion above, where he does not hesitate to call the attrition of which we speak sufficient and a Catholic doctrine, and the contrary heretical. But the things which the VV. (p. 433) produce from his Instructio Sacerdotum (bk. 3, ch. 4) prove either too much or nothing. For the VV. themselves relate the double reading of the place which they object. The first has it thus: The first attrition, if it is such that the penitent knows that he does not detest sin as it is an offense against God, BUT ONLY AS IT IS THE CAUSE OF SOME EVIL AND OF THE PUNISHMENT OF HELL, although this act is good, nevertheless does not suffice for the Sacrament. But these words prove too much, because they exclude even attrition conceived from fear of hell. But the other reading is: BUT ONLY AS IT IS THE CAUSE OF SOME TEMPORAL EVIL. These words, however, prove nothing, because they do not exclude temporal punishments which are understood by the light of faith as inflicted by God. And the VV. indeed prefer the first reading because, as they reason, not only the motive of temporal evil but also the motive of eternal evil is opposed to the motive of an offense against God; and thus they do not hesitate to affix to Toletus an error nearly heretical and certainly opposed to the words of Trent. But the canons of interpretation: 1. do not permit that these absurdities be attributed to so great a man (let the VV. see what the distinguished Father Haringer said concerning him in the catalogue of Writers); 2. nor do they permit that a doctrine be attributed to him which he elsewhere, as we saw, calls heretical. But the reason adduced by the VV. for preferring the first reading is not good: 1. because those words, not as it is an offense against God, would be required in either reading, since Toletus appends them so that this first species of attrition may be distinguished from the following ones, in which the detestation of sin is on account of the motive of offense against God; 2. Toletus premises that some attrition is sufficient. Therefore, he must aptly be said to have omitted mention of hell in the adduced text, which he had mentioned above, lest otherwise we say that Toletus has now excluded all species of attrition.

As regards the Vasquez who is objected, it must be denied that the temporal punishments which he rejects as insufficient for attrition are those concerning which we dispute here. For he thus writes concerning the fear which he rejects (In III Partem, q. 92, art. 1, dub. 3, no. 3): Just as fear which concerns temporal punishment is called worldly, which of itself is the principle of good as well as of evil, so also sorrow of this nature; hence, the reason which moves toward attrition must be higher. Hence thus: sorrow for sin which has as its object punishments known by the light of faith as sent by God for sins can neither be called worldly, nor is it the principle of good equally with evil. But Vasquez rejects this fear alone. Therefore. And this is confirmed. For he continues (ibid., no. 4): Cano teaches this opinion, that attrition, in order to be a disposition for this Sacrament, is not sorrow over sins on account of temporal punishment, Relectio de Poenitentia, pt. 6, sec. Altera quoque attritio. But this attrition of Cano is that which proceeds from fear of infamy, lest someone be cast out of the Church or fined money, etc., as we related above, and in one word is worldly fear. Therefore.

But the objection that Vasquez requires some eternal motive for attrition is empty; the VV. renew this difficulty with regard to Cano, who himself also admits fear from eternal punishments. Reply. Lugo wrote well (disp. 5, no. 137) that Vasquez did not please him, since he thus appeared to exclude the punishments of Purgatory. But it is not lawful to ascribe this absurd exclusion of the punishments of Purgatory either to Vasquez or to Cano. Hence Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 6, no. 8) denies that Vasquez dissents, since sorrow on account of temporal evil thus regarding God ... involves a formal reason in some manner eternal, and orderable to an eternal end. And Ithuriaga (Dissertatio XI, no. 22), on the same matter: We assign an eternal motive, namely, the vindicatory justice of God. And also Cardenas (pt. 3, tr. 4, disp. 71, no. 2): I premise that sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of temporal evils insofar as they are inflicted by God as punishment for sin is not elicited from a human motive; for this motive is supernatural. Hence Diana (vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108, no. 5) does not hesitate to associate Vasquez with Hurtadus as regards the punishments of Purgatory. And Candidus (loc. cit., no. IV), where he recalls fear of punishments to an eternal motive (under the enumeration of those punishments he includes, as we saw, even temporal punishments), also cites Cano among those who affirm that this attrition is supernatural, just as Thomas Hurtadus also cites him.

Moreover, as regards Cano, the matter can be finished briefly and beyond all doubt. For after he had premised generally (pt. 6): Not every attrition is sufficient for one approaching the Sacrament of Penance to obtain grace, he then numbers four kinds of attrition thus: First, when someone has conditional attrition, that is, one which arises from a velleity by which a man would wish to please God and be reconciled to Him. 2. Another attrition also is ... that which, for example, proceeds from fear of infamy, or ... lest he be cast out of the Church or fined money, etc. 3. Then also efficacious attrition from fear of supernatural punishments.... Finally, 4. Also attrition which proceeds from natural love of God above all things. Hence the reasoning is easy: it would be altogether absurd to imagine that Cano, a theologian at the Council of Trent, had no account of attrition which has for its object the punishments of Purgatory or the temporal punishments of this life, apprehended by faith as inflicted by God. Therefore, attrition conceived on account of these punishments must be recalled to some foregoing kind of attrition. But it can be recalled only to efficacious attrition from fear of supernatural punishments, which, as Cano adds, is a suitable disposition for the Sacrament. Therefore.

Finally, as regards Leonard Jansen, whose words the VV. relate (p. 436), he affirms that this attrition suffices speculatively but not practically, because Cano, Hurtadus, and Vasquez probably deny it, etc. The difficulty therefore rests upon three empty citations; it must therefore be answered: I deny the supposition. This Jansen adds: If someone with such sorrow has confessed in good faith, according to Tamburini, Lugo, Sporer, Lacroix, he is not bound to repeat the confession, because that sorrow is MOST PROBABLY sufficient. But the opposite pleases me more, because a certain law is not satisfied by an uncertain solution. Therefore, this Jansen does not judge that the law is satisfied even by a most probable solution; namely, this Jansen did not remember the condemned proposition: It is not lawful to follow an opinion even among probable opinions which is most probable.

But what is to be noted concerning Jansen is likewise to be noted concerning certain others who feared to call the sufficiency of this attrition certain, having been moved by empty citations. Thus, for example, Leander (De Poenitentia, disp. 7, q. 14) relates Suarez, Reginaldus, and Vasquez as contrary. Likewise, Thomas Hurtadus (De Sacramentis, disp. 6, sect. 2) cites Suarez and Reginaldus as contrary, while meanwhile he cites Cano and Soto for the common opinion. Thus Escobar (loc. cit.) presents Vega, whom Suarez (loc. cit.) rightly cites for himself, as contrary. But Mazzotta (loc. cit.) cites Cano against himself, and no differently than St. Alphonsus, because of a typographical error in Croix, adds Pasqualigus to Cano. Hence that statement of Cardenas (loc. cit.), that authors who deny the sufficiency, etc., are not lacking, which you then see copied by Tamburini and Reuter, who generally name certain authors. Marin (tr. 22, disp. 7, sect. 4, no. 55) aptly notes here that most of those who are adduced for the contrary side are found to dispute not about supernatural attrition, which is presently at issue, but about attrition conceived from merely human motives; this is manifestly apparent, for example, concerning Reginaldus and Suarez, whose places are adduced in which they reject sorrow from merely natural motives; therefore, they are objected here in vain.

1. because it appears established from the words of the Council of Trent, where it says: Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and punishments; for it distinguishes between the punishments of hell and other punishments; 2. because in fear of this kind all the conditions of true attrition can be present. - St. Lig., no. 443.

453. QUESTION 8. For obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance, is a beginning of love also required with attrition? Reply. Negative, if by a beginning of love is understood some degree of perfect charity by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that an act which essentially justifies outside the Sacrament is not necessarily prerequired for rightly receiving the Sacrament. But every act of charity, and therefore sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it may be, blots out every fault, as St. Thomas says, Supplement, q. 5, art. 3. Therefore, etc. St. Lig., no. 440, says that this is morally certain.

It can, however, be conceded that some beginning of love is required insofar as attrition, in order to dispose toward the Sacrament, must exclude, as the holy Council speaks, the will to sin; but otherwise, as St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 17, art. 8), someone is introduced to loving God through this, that, fearing to be punished by Him, he ceases from sin, as Augustine says ⁸.

⁸ In the same sense St. Thomas (ibid.) finds some beginning of charity in hope. For the entire cited text reads thus: In the way of generation hope is prior to charity. For just as someone is introduced to loving God through this, that, fearing to be punished by Him, he ceases from sin, as Augustine says; so also hope introduces one to charity insofar as someone, hoping to be rewarded by God, is kindled to love God and to observe His precepts. But in the penitent there must at least be hope of pardon, as the Council of Trent expressly declares. Yet, as is plain, charity is treated here, not as included in acts either of fear or attrition or hope, or as necessarily accompanying these acts, but as that which can arise from those affections.

There were others who imagined an inchoate charity of such a kind that it loved God, but not above all things. But this is a charity which prefers the creature to the Creator; because this altogether destroys the essence of the Purpose necessary for true penance, rather than disposing the penitent more aptly to receive the grace of justification, it renders him altogether unfit of itself for obtaining this benefit.

Finally, there are those who require that beginning of love or inchoate charity which is necessary for the true (as they say) conversion of the sinner to God. But unless they explain what this inchoate charity is, they assuredly sell us words empty of meaning. Meanwhile, let this be noted: that ambiguous phrase true conversion to God is an artifice which Juvenin employs in his condemned Institutions (loc. cit., sec. IV) to infer from it the necessity of love of God above all things, concerning which we spoke in the preceding note. Thus a true conversion to God can and must be admitted, which consists, as St. Thomas says, in the will to observe the precepts of God. But unless this will is supposed to proceed from the motives of mere attrition, we fall back again into that necessity of perfect charity or contrition which, otherwise, the Catholic schools do not admit, not as though the affection of the penitent positively excluded that perfect love, but insofar as he can be sufficiently aroused to the will to observe the law of God by other honorable motives.

Moreover, the reason why St. Alphonsus says that the thesis set forth is morally certain is manifest. For the question ultimately comes down to whether contrition perfected by charity is prerequired in the penitent. But that it is not prerequired is an opinion most commonly received in the schools after the Council of Trent as morally certain. Furthermore, the thesis directly and immediately attacks the opinion of certain men who maintained as necessary a certain charity that was indeed predominant (by which, namely, God is loved above all things), but which nevertheless would not suffice to justify a man, and thus could coexist with the state of mortal sin. Thus, for example, Gaspar Juvenin in his condemned Theological Institutions (pt. 8, diss. V, ch. 4, art. 2); who afterward (sec. V) does not hesitate to assert that this contrition conceived from merely inchoate charity of God above all things, in a case of necessity, suffices for the justification of the impious with the desire of the Sacrament alone; but that outside a case of necessity it does not suffice with the desire of the Sacrament alone for someone to receive sanctifying grace. These things, moreover, fall back into those paradoxes of Baius and Francis Sylvius of which we shall speak a little later (in the note to the following no. 454).