§ IV. On Force, or Violence

20. • DEFINITION. Force or violence is coercion which is inflicted on someone by an extrinsic and free cause, his will resisting.

DIVISION. A twofold violence is distinguished, namely absolute or in a certain respect, according as coercion is inflicted on someone resisting in every way, or resisting only to some extent ¹.

¹ It happens in two ways that someone resists only to some extent, namely 1. when the force is not of such a kind that it cannot be broken or weakened by stubborn resistance; 2. or when someone does not suffer the force inflicted, whatever it may be, unwillingly.

Principles. - I. Elicited acts of the will can in no way be coerced, because force cannot be brought upon the will. Hence St. Anselm: No one unwilling (he says) can will, because no one can will not willing (On Free Choice, ch. 6). And St. Thomas: It is contrary to the notion of the act itself of the will that it be coerced or violent (I-II, q. 6, art. 4).

II. External acts ² posited from absolute violence are in no way voluntary or free, and therefore neither sinful nor demeritorious; but external acts which are posited from violence only in a certain respect are more or less free according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection with which someone suffers force. - St. Lig., nos. 17-18.

² Understand acts extrinsic to the will, which are elicited by other powers, whether external or internal. For not only the exterior members of the body, but even the interior faculties, such as imagination, the sensitive appetite, etc., can be moved by some extrinsic force, for example of an Angel, both good and evil, to some acts, while the will resists in vain.

21. You Will Resolve. - 1. A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her in no way sins, even if she suffers rape; for no one sins wholly unwilling.

2. Women suffering force sin gravely if through pusillanimity or vain fear, for example of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even apart from danger of consent; because even if they do not consent to sensual pleasure, nevertheless while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves and cooperate in the crime of another. - But whether a woman oppressed by force sins if, because of fear of death, she omits to cry out, is controverted. - It seems probably to be denied, apart from danger of consent. Indeed very probably, apart from the aforesaid danger, a woman is not held to cry out when there stands a danger of any notable harm, whether of infamy or of excessive shame; for if otherwise she already resists as much as she can, she is not held with so great an inconvenience to repel force. Thus expressly St. Lig., book 3, no. 430. Yet in practice the opposite manner of acting is to be advised, on account of some danger of consent ³. - St. Lig., book 3, no. 368.

³ But indeed if the danger of consent is present, the opposite manner of acting is not merely to be advised, but altogether to be enjoined. But if this kind of danger can prudently be judged absent, it does not appear that a penitent is easily to be induced to undergo grave danger of harm or infamy without an equal cause. Compare La Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 916.

3. Sometimes absolute and continuous resistance to coercion inflicted is not required, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other hand the matter at issue is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of the pagans did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required to avert the danger of scandal, or injury to Religion.