On the Sixth and Ninth Precepts of the Decalogue

You shall not commit adultery. - You shall not desire his (your neighbor's) wife. Exod. 20. 14.

410. • It is useful, first of all, to report and make our own the words of St. Liguori at the beginning of the Treatise on the sixth Precept:

Now with difficulty we approach the treatment of that matter, the very name alone of which infects the minds of men... Would that I had been able to explain myself more briefly or more obscurely! But since this is the more frequent and more abundant matter of confessions, on account of which the greater number of souls slips down to hell, hence it was necessary for me, for the instruction of those who desire to learn moral science, to explain myself clearly (although as chastely as could be done), and to discuss very many particulars. Yet I beg students who are preparing themselves for the office of hearing confessions that they read this treatise, as also the other concerning the conjugal debt..., for this one end alone, casting aside altogether every curiosity, and at that time often raising the mind to God, and commending themselves to the Immaculate Virgin, lest, while they strive to acquire the souls of others for God, they themselves suffer detriment of their own.

411. • The sixth precept of the Decalogue prohibits any external lust, that is, lust committed by deed. - But the ninth precept prohibits also merely internal lust, namely immodest delights and desires.

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing, and consists in venereal delight voluntarily admitted outside marriage. But venereal delight is a delight arisen from the commotion of the spirits serving generation. Therefore it is not to be confused with delight merely sensible, which arises from the proportion of a sensible object to some sense, for example of a visible object to sight, of an audible object to hearing, etc. Therefore the matter or object of lust is one thing, that of sensuality another. Sensible delight either is free from fault, or does not exceed venial fault, at least for the most part and per se ¹.

¹ In this matter different distinctions are found among different Authors. For besides the distinction of venereal delight into sensible venereal and spiritual venereal, which Roncaglia (tr. 12, q. 3, p. 295), after the Salamancans (tr. 26, c. 3, n. 31), admitted with some others (in the preceding edition it was erroneously read: "which St. Alphonsus admitted after Roncaglia"; which error the VV. usefully noted, p. 286), some again distinguish venereal delight into venereal simply, and sensible venereal (see Sanchez, De Matr., lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 4); some seem to take carnal venereal and sensitive venereal as one and the same (see Laymann, lib. 1, tr. 3, cap. 6, n. 6-8); others, distinguishing sensitive and sensible altogether from venereal, again divide that into purely sensible and carnal sensible (see Croix, lib. 5, n. 93); finally others, as also the Author, use a simpler two-membered distinction into venereal and sensible delight, which they also call natural. While some pay little attention to these various distinctions, and therefore to the various definitions of the same among different Authors, they have fallen into the inconvenience that they ascribed to some Authors those opinions which those Authors had not even thought of in a dream.

Meanwhile, as regards sensible or natural delight, as it is taken by the Author and others, namely that which arises from the proportion of the object with the organs of the senses, the question about its guilt is easily solved. For it is the same thing as to ask what guilt there can be in a delight which is perceived, for example, from smelling a flower, from looking at the sky, or from a draft of cold water. Therefore deservedly La Croix (lib. 5, n. 94), to whom Viva subscribes (on proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, n. 20), after saying that it is not evil in itself, nor can any other malice be found in it except that which is found generically in an act which is not referred to a reasonable end, sends the reader to n. 210 of the same book, where he treats generically of the end which renders human acts honorable; which argument, however, he handles unhappily, namely not wholly avoiding the confusions introduced into this matter by the Jansenists. See above n. 32 and note a, p. 26.

Moreover, since sensible delight has the character which we have described, it will indeed seem strange that St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 416) sets up the question: Whether smallness of matter is given in sensible or natural delight; and that he adds that the negative opinion must be held, calling in favor of it the suffrage of several authors, whom he says were alleged by the Salamancans (De VI Praec., cap. 3, n. 40).

But one will scarcely grasp the true sense of St. Alphonsus unless he goes to the Salamancans, whose doctrine he exhibits in compendium. Therefore the Salamancans do not treat of any sensible delight whatsoever, but expressly handle the question about that which is sought and perceived from kisses, touches, and embraces even of an adult person and of a different sex (see l. c., n. 34). And although (ibid., n. 41) they assert that speculatively the true and probable opinion is that acts of this sort, if they are done precisely on account of natural and purely sensitive delight, which corresponds to the sense of touch because of proportion with its sensible object, such as is given in the touch of a smooth and pleasant thing, stopping there and with the further danger of carnal and venereal delight removed, are free from mortal fault; because such delight of itself is not morally evil, but indifferent, just as the touch itself, which according to itself names an indifferent act, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2, q. 154, art. 4, and the Theologians commonly, and thus it can be done for some honorable end; nevertheless they deservedly add (ibid., n. 48) that, because of the corruption of human nature, acts of this sort can hardly be reduced to practice on account of sensitive delight without carnal and venereal delight being joined; therefore there will almost always be an occasion and danger of mortal sin, unless these things are done from a just cause, as will be said in the following note. And indeed (ibid., n. 40) they expressly warn that the authors who condemn these acts as grave fault (whom namely St. Alphonsus later alleged, as it were, for the guilt of sensible delight) speak not of merely sensible delight, but of carnal and venereal delight, and therefore are alleged altogether beside the point in the question concerning purely sensible delight.

Therefore the doctrine proposed by St. Alphonsus is to be called back hither; who besides skillfully warns in the same place that it is one thing to act on account of delight, another to act with delight. For the hypothesis concerning kisses, embraces, and touches which are had on account of merely sensible delight arising precisely from them, seems scarcely to have place in practice. Indeed, both that precision is too difficult, and in reality he who studiously seeks delights from touches of this sort, etc., will certainly be carried further both by the interior mind and often also by exterior acts. But if delights of this sort are not sought, for the most part the question will return to acts which are done not on account of delight (at least one advertently and expressly sought), but with delight. Then judgment concerning guilt will have to be formed after looking both at the nature of the cause which induces these acts and at the danger of consent in the effects, as will be said in the next note.

** Through twenty-six columns (pp. 283-296) the VV. are occupied with this Note, yet in such a way that it is hardly apparent what they wanted for themselves, unless perhaps to place before the eyes of readers some appearance or shadow of refutation. For after so many circuits, they finally concede the things which are suggested in the Note, while they seem to reprehend and deny the same things. Therefore it will be enough to have responded briefly to some of their complaints.

Therefore they reprehend, 1. that in the Note it is said to be strange that St. Alphonsus proposes such a question, and they add (p. 287) that in this way a foolish opinion is attributed to the holy Doctor.

Resp. The Salamancans (tr. 25, cap. 3, n. 34), from whom St. Alphonsus took these things in compendious form, expressly set up the question concerning sensitive and natural delight which is taken from touches, embraces, and kisses. On the contrary, St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 416), asking nothing concerning kisses, etc., asks in the most generic words, which are extended most broadly: Whether smallness of matter is given in sensible or natural delight, namely if someone is delighted by the contact of a woman's hand, as by the contact of a smooth thing, say of a rose, of silken cloth, and the like. Therefore it is added in the Note that, to grasp the sense of St. Alphonsus, the Salamancans must be gone to, whose doctrine he exhibits in compendium. Moreover, does it not of itself present something strange that, when the question is proposed so generically, it is added that smallness of matter is not given?

2. Contrary to what is said in the Note, the VV. (p. 287) state that the holy Doctor most rightly cites the authors alleged for his opinion.

Resp. The Salamancans, after they had brought forward (l. c., n. 34-37) both reasons and authorities for the opinion which maintains that sensitive and natural delight is free from grave fault, then (n. 38-40) set forth both reasons and authors condemning delight of this sort as grave fault; nearly all of which they themselves transcribed from Sanchez (De Matr., lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 7). But truly the Salamancans themselves (n. 34) expressly warn that Sanchez (l. c.) speaks of venereal delight, not of natural; and again (n. 40) they warn that, except for Abulensis, the rest (of the authors) speak of touches on account of venereal delight. Now St. Alphonsus alleges the same n. 40, and the authors there reported, who speak of venereal delight, so that he may condemn as grave sin a delight not indeed venereal, of which they treat, but delight merely sensible and natural. How then do the VV. wish to persuade us that St. Alphonsus most rightly alleged those authors?

3. The VV. note (pp. 293-294) that in the last part of the Note a rule not to be admitted is proposed. For there it is said that, if those delights are not sought, for the most part the question will return to acts, etc. But, they say, sensitive delight arising from kisses, embraces, and touches is regularly joined with proximate danger of falling into libidinous delight. Hence they conclude that judgment concerning guilt must not be taken from danger, which must always be supposed to be present, but from the nature alone of the cause, which, if it is grave, can render licit the act by which one exposes himself to danger of lethal fault, and by which otherwise he would sin gravely. If, for example, a physician touches a woman for the sake of healing, etc. And to that matter they bring forward the things which St. Alphonsus has (lib. 5, n. 63) concerning the danger of a surgeon in healing women.

Resp. Therefore the rule sins because it is said "for the most part," when it should have been said "regularly" or "commonly." Truly, let it be committed to the judgment of others whether this question is fit to furnish serious matter of disputing through four columns. It ought rather to be answered, 1. I deny the supposition. The particle "for the most part," in that most general question, removes cases concerning which no controversy is usually set up as to guilt, for example concerning kisses which a mother imprints on a little son; therefore all those things heaped together through four columns are beside the matter. But it can be answered, 2. I deny that in every occasion of some sensible delight not sought there is danger of falling (add also, and of consenting) into libidinous delight. 3. Let it be known from the VV. whether they approve or not this reasoning: Danger is present as regards surgeons in healing women (it would have to be added, on account of merely sensible delight not sought); therefore every merely sensible delight, even from taking hold of a boy's hand, introduces danger which we are bound to avoid under grave sin?

4. Finally the VV. reprehend (p. 287) that it is said in the Note that La Croix treated unhappily of the relation of works to an end; and they refer to those things which they themselves had written on pp. 133 and 146.

Resp. The things which the VV. wrote on p. 146 pertain nothing hither. But the things which they had written on p. 133 have their response in those things which are had above, note b, p. 29.

The species of lust are various, according as its objects are diverse. Thus immodest touches and looks differ in species; solitary acts, and acts exercised with others; consummated acts, and non-consummated acts; likewise consummated acts according to nature, and consummated acts against nature. These species, moreover, also contain under themselves other subordinated or inferior species, as will be evident from what is to be said. Lust is one thing when directly sought, another when indirectly. The former is had when carnal pleasure is intended precisely in itself; the latter, when something else is intended from which carnal pleasure arises besides the intention, as happens in less chaste looks or readings had from curiosity or another end.

412. General Principles. - I. Lust of any kind or species is per se a grave sin. The reason is, 1. because it fights gravely against nature. For the use of the venereal thing by its nature was instituted and is necessary for the sole preservation and propagation of the human race; therefore it cannot be usurped outside marriage (indeed not even in marriage except in the due manner) without grave disturbance of the right order; 2. because it is prohibited under grave sin by God, the Author of nature, as is clear from innumerable places of Sacred Scripture; thus Gal. 5. 19: The works of the flesh, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust..., concerning which I foretell you, as I have foretold; because those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.

II. Lust directly voluntary in any kind never admits smallness of matter. The reason is that any delight directly sought necessarily brings in the subversion of the natural order established by the Creator. This is also clear from proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, which lies thus: The opinion is probable which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible delight which arises from the kiss, with danger of further consent and pollution removed, is only venial.

III. But lust indirectly voluntary admits smallness of matter; because then there is no consent or direct intention into venereal pleasure, but only into the cause, which is lightly or gravely sinful according as it lightly or gravely influences the delight ². - Thus all.

² Concerning the causes of carnal motions and of the connected delight (which motions indeed can reach even to the ultimate effect of pollution), for the sake of clarity a threefold hypothesis must be made.

The first will be when someone aptly and deliberately, intending these motions, places their causes so that he may enjoy the proper delight of them. And then already you have lust directly voluntary, concerning whose guilt nothing is to be doubted.

The second, plainly opposite hypothesis will be when motions of this sort are stirred up spontaneously and naturally, with no voluntary cause given to them by him who then merely suffers them. And then there is no reason why we should seek guilt in the will as their cause.

Finally, the third, middle between the preceding, will be when some action is voluntarily placed which furnishes some cause, proximate or remote, for stirring up those motions; and yet one does not place the action for this end or intention, that he may stir up such motions in himself, or enjoy them. But then the principle is valid which from St. Alphonsus we reported elsewhere (note to n. 176), namely that in these effects, since they are voluntary only in the cause, there is only so much guilt as there is in the cause itself. Hence St. Alphonsus concludes (lib. 3, n. 484): "The common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal unless it proceeds from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." And indeed he says watchfully, "from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust"; for if the cause, although gravely culpable in itself, is outside the genus of lust, as for example drunkenness or eating meat on Friday, or indeed is in the genus of lust but lightly culpable, as for example curious reading venially base, then the efficacy of causality is lacking, and (as St. Alphonsus says, l. c.) "since the cause concurs lightly toward pollution, there is no grave obligation of avoiding that cause on account of pollution which happens besides the intention."

Indeed, since not all actions which bring grave fault in the genus of lust have of themselves that efficacy, nor even have equal efficacy as to all men, but one plainly diverse according to the diverse weakness of persons; hence, by reason of the effect, grave fault can be absent even when grave fault was present in the act which furnished occasion for the motions, which for that reason are then judged to follow per accidens. Hence the Salamancans conclude (tr. 26, cap. 7, n. 41): "If in some body, by reason of weakness... or of another cause, there is a positive indisposition to Venus, although causes be applied to him which otherwise of themselves gravely influence pollution or carnal delight with respect to others...; nevertheless with respect to him... they will not be gravely influencing, but only lightly or even in no way, or they will be causes materially only in the genus of lust; wherefore commonly... by reason of their influence on pollution he will not sin mortally."

But all fault can be absent when the action is per se licit and honorable, although wicked motions to follow are foreseen, which nevertheless one in no way wills or intends. Hence St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 483): "If the aforesaid actions" (which otherwise in n. 482 he had said were causes gravely influencing) "are placed from a cause necessary, or useful, or suitable to soul or body, then... pollutions proceeding from them, even foreseen, are not sins, provided danger of consent is absent. Thus commonly Sylvius, Croix, and others with the common opinion and St. Thomas." And in reality the Angelic Doctor says thus (3, q. 80, art. 7): "Previous lascivious thoughts sometimes can be wholly without sin, for example when someone, for the sake of reading or disputation, is compelled to think of such things. And if this is without concupiscence and delight, they will not be unclean thoughts, but honorable; from which, however, pollution can follow, as is clear from the authority of Augustine..." But the words of Augustine (De Gen. ad litt., lib. 12, cap. 15) are: "since this happens as much without sin as it is said without sin by those who are awake."

But of acts which, by reason of necessity, are without fault, St. Alphonsus adds these examples (lib. 3, n. 483): "Hence, even when involuntary pollution is foreseen (and a fortiori these things ought to be valid concerning wicked motions of lesser moment), it is lawful for pastors and also other confessors to hear the confessions of women, and to read treatises on base matters; for surgeons to look at and touch the parts of a sick woman, and to study medical matters... to serve in baths.... It is lawful for someone who suffers great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." But examples of actions free from fault by reason of a certain propriety he has these (ibid.): "It is lawful for others to address, kiss, or embrace women according to the custom of the country... and the like." Finally (ibid.), as regards actions which, notwithstanding pollution foreseen, are lawfully exercised as suitable to soul or body, he adds these three examples: namely, that it is lawful, 1. to ride a horse not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also recreation; 2. to lie down in a certain position of the body for resting more conveniently; 3. to take hot foods or drink moderately, and to lead honorable dances. - And indeed to all and each of these things St. Alphonsus observes that opinions of this sort pertain to the doctrine commonly received.

Nevertheless, the limitation must be kept before the eyes which St. Alphonsus (l. c.) appends from the common opinion: "provided danger of consent is absent," namely into wicked motions and the delight that has arisen. Indeed the obligation of avoiding the danger of sinning is sufficient for an action to become illicit which otherwise would be dishonorable neither by reason of itself nor precisely by reason of the motions which it induces.

But if it is asked of what sort the danger ought to be which renders the cause of motions gravely illicit, let it suffice for the present to have suggested that the norm can be taken from those things which are customarily handed down in the Treatise on Penance concerning the proximate occasion of sinning, since this must therefore be removed or fled because it induces the danger of sinning. Therefore that frequency of falls, and the other adjuncts which according to the common doctrine constitute a proximate occasion, necessarily to be removed, will constitute this same danger on account of which someone is obliged to abstain from placing the cause of carnal motions.

Sins of this genus are kisses, touches, looks, base conversations, and readings.

Here we must treat only of external sins; for concerning internal sins, or concerning lingering delight and wicked desire, it has already been said in the Treatise on Sins, n. 167 and following. Hence we shall speak, 1. of sins not consummated; 2. of consummated sins.