Point I. Excommunications Reserved to the Supreme Pontiff

972. • Concerning these, the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis reads thus:

We declare subject to a latae sententiae excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Roman Pontiff:

I. All apostates from the Christian faith ¹, and each and every heretic, by whatever name they may be designated and of whatever sect they may be ², and those believing them ³, and their receivers, supporters, and generally any defenders of them.

¹ ** Understand apostasy here as a withdrawal from the Christian faith, and an apostate as one who has departed from the Christian faith. And since the crime of apostasy consists in a withdrawal of this kind, it therefore makes no difference whether the apostate has gone over to Judaism or to Paganism, or whether he has fallen into Deism, Atheism, or Indifferentism. And to this last is commonly referred the sect of those who call themselves in Italian liberi pensatori, and in French libres penseurs, whom otherwise you would better call monsters of nature, more foolish than stupid beasts. For beasts follow the guidance of nature. But these two-footed monsters trample upon nature. Namely, just as the bodily eye is ignorant of liberty, so reason and intellect are ignorant of liberty. And just as it is indeed free for you to close your eyes or not to look at the objects placed around you, but it will not likewise be free for you not to see those objects if you look at them with open eyes, so must you also speak concerning truth placed before the eye of the mind which beholds it. Therefore, even the name of the sect itself displays foolishness more stupid than asinine stupidity, so that in this apostasy from the Christian faith that saying of the ancients shines forth most manifestly: the corruption of the best is the worst. But what civil society can also hope for in practice or fear from those men, if they are worthy of this designation, who according to their arbitrary manner of thinking and judging fashion right and wrong for themselves at pleasure, anyone easily sees.

² ** Concerning the crime of heresy, see where faith was treated (volume I, no. 208). Note this, with the distinguished Author of the Rieti Commentary: it makes no difference whether someone has outwardly disclosed heresy by words or only by a deed, for example, if he has attempted to know the secrets of hearts or to divine the future free actions of men, which are open to God alone, through self-moving tables or the so-called Cristacos (magnetized persons). See the Encyclical Letter of the Sacred Inquisition, 30 July 1856 (above, volume I, no. 281), where it is declared that heretical deception is found in these things.

³ ** By those believing them, understand those who believe heretics either explicitly or implicitly.

These are distinguished in the text from heretics: 1. because someone can adhere to errors condemned by heretics, although he does not formally belong to the sects of heretics; 2. because a believer of this kind is understood both if in the forum of conscience he is a heretic properly so called and if he is not altogether a heretic, namely, when internal pertinacity of mind against the faith is not joined with the external act of believing. For under either hypothesis he shows himself a follower of the errors of heretics, and therefore, as one implicated in the cause of heresy, he is punished in the external forum with the penalty of heretics and is subjected to this censure in such a way that he cannot be absolved without a special faculty.

By receivers understand not those who for any other cause receive or conceal them in their houses or lands, but those who directly intend through this to foster or defend the heretic, for example, so that he may thus escape the penalties of heresy.

II. Each and every person knowingly ⁴ reading, without the authority of the Apostolic See ⁵, books ⁶ of the same apostates and heretics ⁷ which defend heresy ⁸, and also books of any author prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters ⁹, and those retaining, printing, and in any manner defending those same books ¹⁰.

⁴ ** Knowingly, that is, with knowledge: 1. that the book is by an apostate or a heretic according to the sense of the preceding article; 2. that the book defends heresy; and 3. that the reading is punished by the penalty of this censure. But understand this also of those retaining, printing, etc.

⁵ ** That is, without a faculty granted either by the Supreme Pontiff or by those to whom the Supreme Pontiff has committed the faculty of dispensing.

⁶ ** Whether journals or newspapers are comprehended by these laws, see below where the reading of bad books is treated.

⁷ ** Avanzini raises a doubt (Commentary, no. 7) whether the books of those who are added in the preceding article, namely, believers, supporters, etc., are also comprehended if they defend heresy; and he replies: They do not appear to be comprehended. But immediately he so tempers the assertion that he all but destroys it: provided (he says) that these two things are not verified, namely: 1. that in the book is contained an indubitable defense of heresy or of apostasy from the faith; 2. and that the defense of heresy is made so pertinaciously that it cannot be doubted that the author of the book is certainly a heretic.

⁸ ** To these matters the excellent Rieti Commentary says well: To defend is, if I judge anything rightly, to undertake the patronage of heresy deliberately and as though with all one's strength; wherefore the excommunication does not bind one who reads a book of an apostate or a heretic if it does not defend heresy, even though it contains it, and indeed even defends it, but incidentally, in a few words, and as though while doing something else.

⁹ ** By books prohibited by name are not understood just any books condemned through Apostolic Letters, unless the proper title of the book has been expressed in those Letters. But understand by Apostolic Letters those which proceed immediately in the name of the Roman Pontiff, whether in the form of a Brief, a Bull, an Encyclical, or in any other form, provided that in them is read By Apostolic Authority, or something equivalent. Furthermore, if before this other books not prohibited by name were condemned through Apostolic Letters without any excommunication, or with an excommunication not reserved, one reading them today incurs no excommunication; because our Constitution in the former case does not introduce an excommunication, and in the latter, since it does not enumerate it among the non-reserved censures, has abolished it; and if they were prohibited under some other censure, for example, suspension, this also ceases (Rieti Commentary).

¹⁰ ** Concerning those printing, the Rieti Commentary has these things: To this belong all who cooperate proximately in the printing; and therefore: 1. those who furnish any work whatever for this matter, such as those who set the type, coat it with ink,

moisten the paper, etc.; 2. those who hire their labors, that is, the printer, and all the more the publisher, who is understood to hire the labors of both; and the author of the book, if the book is published through his care. Cretoni adds (Note on this place): With respect to manual workers or subordinate cooperators, in order to incur this censure, besides the required knowledge it must also be judged from the circumstances whether in the case they are to be regarded as formal or material cooperators and, under this latter hypothesis, whether they are excused from the fault of cooperation (add, or at least from the penalty) by a just and proportionate cause or not.

Those defending the book in any manner are considered (Lugo, On Faith, disputation 21, no. 94) those who conceal the book lest it be denounced or burned, or who prevent this by force or fraud; one who tries to persuade others that the book is good and therefore not worthy of prohibition; one who tries to uphold the depraved doctrine contained in it and to defend it from every stain. For all these defend books by deed or word. See Sanchez and Palao, who note that this censure does not comprehend one who approves and praises the good and true doctrine contained in a book, provided that he is not considered to approve the book itself absolutely; nor one who praises the style, eloquence, diction, or talent, provided that he does not assert praise and approval of the book.

III. Schismatics and those who pertinaciously withdraw themselves or depart from the obedience of the Roman Pontiff for the time being ¹¹.

IV. Each and every person, of whatever state, rank, or condition they may be, appealing from ordinances or mandates of the Roman Pontiffs for the time being to a future general Council, and also those by whose aid, counsel, or favor the appeal was made ¹².

¹¹ ** By schismatics properly so called are understood those who not only pertinaciously depart from the subjection owed to the Roman Pontiff, but, erecting themselves into an authority, establish new assemblies separated from the center of unity, such as the promoters of national churches, or follow those same assemblies. And these indeed pertain to perfect schism, even if you understand schism, as they call it, pure, namely, with which no heresy is mingled, which scarcely occurs. For if a schismatic holds something contrary to the faith, for example, that the Roman Pontiff is not the head of the Church, or indeed is, but only the primacy of honor belongs to him, as the Jansenist hypocrites hold, he would in addition be a heretic and therefore entangled in a twofold excommunication.

But by those who pertinaciously withdraw themselves or depart from the obedience of the Roman Pontiff for the time being are signified those who pertain to imperfect schism. And in this sense Avanzini (Commentary, no. 10) thinks that those who call themselves liberal Catholics are comprehended, namely, those who, setting aside the laws and mandates of the Roman Pontiff, publicly conduct themselves as though released from his obedience, since these also in the true sense are rebels against the obedience of the Roman Pontiff for the time being.

¹² ** Lest those who pertinaciously withdraw themselves or depart from the obedience of the Roman Pontiff for the time being, concerning whom the preceding article treats, should pretend to do this with impunity under the pretext of an appeal to a future Council, contrary to the defined rights of the Primacy, this special crime of rebellion was punished with a special censure.

But to incur this censure of excommunication it is necessary to appeal to a future Council. Therefore, if an appeal has been made to a future Roman Pontiff or to a present Council, there is no place for the censure. But if not some individual person, but some community or moral person, has interposed an appeal of this kind, it incurs the Interdict reserved in a special manner, as will be said below.

V. All who kill, mutilate, strike, seize, imprison, detain, or pursue in a hostile manner Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops, and Legates or Nuncios of the Apostolic See, or cast them out of their Dioceses, Territories, Lands, or Dominions; and also those commanding these things, or ratifying them, or furnishing aid, counsel, or favor in them ¹³.

VI. Those directly or indirectly impeding the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whether of the internal or external forum, and those having recourse for this purpose to the secular forum and procuring or issuing its mandates, or furnishing aid or favor ¹⁴.

¹³ ** The excellent Rieti Commentary thus treats these: By this censure are punished injuries against the body, liberty, and dignity of the Princes of the Church. Against the body, namely, by killing, mutilating, or striking. To kill is to put to death in any manner, for example, by poison, hunger, etc.; to mutilate is to cut off a member; by striking we understand every injury which is done by the hand.

Against liberty, namely, by seizing, imprisoning, or detaining. To seize is to apprehend. To imprison is to cast or confine one in any place, even a private one. To detain is to keep one enclosed in any place lest he be able to depart.

Against dignity, namely, by pursuing in a hostile manner or casting out. To pursue in a hostile manner is to pursue with the intention of harming; therefore those who pursue them for the sake of frightening or despoiling them do not incur this excommunication. To cast out is to expel one previously received, and therefore those who do not receive them are not bound by it. From their Lands or dominions: interpreters understand by Lands also those where they maintain a domicile or were born. Nor is it distinguished by what authority they cast them out, public or private, or in what manner, whether by force employed, by threats, or by a bare precept.

Moreover, in this place not only those who strike, mutilate, etc., and those who furnish them aid or favor are excommunicated, but also those who ratify it. But in order that these incur excommunication, it is necessary: 1. that the striking, mutilation, etc., was done in their name, because someone cannot ratify what was not done in his name (chapter 23, On the Sentence of Excommunication, in the Sext); 2. that at the time when these things were perpetrated, they could have authorized and therefore commanded them, for ratification is retroactive and is equated with a mandate.

¹⁴ ** The action which is restrained by this excommunication is to impede the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, both ordinary and delegated, whether of the external or internal forum; of this kind especially is that which the Sacred Penitentiary uses.

Moreover, to the power of jurisdiction belongs the issuing of laws and mandates, binding and loosing, conferring Benefices, deputing to ecclesiastical duties, sending preachers, visiting a Diocese, and committing to others for performance those things which belong to Order. And these things must be distinguished both from those which pertain to the power of Order, such as performing sacred rites, ministering the Sacraments, blessing and consecrating persons and things, etc.; and from those which are more matters of office or right, such as teaching, preaching, acquiring or alienating goods, and, in a word, entering into contracts.

Therefore, in order that someone be said to impede the exercise of jurisdiction, it is necessary that he oppose the one in whom jurisdiction resides, for example, an Ordinary, Pastor, or judge, and indeed oppose him so that he neither begin nor continue to use the jurisdiction. To this also pertains if someone impedes the execution of any sentence or decree of this kind, especially if he does this by appealing or otherwise having recourse in any manner to the lay power, as it is said, on account of abuse.

Or: 2. by issuing mandates, which is understood of one who establishes or decrees a mandate.

Or: 3. by having recourse to the secular forum and procuring its mandates, namely, in order to elude the judgment of the ecclesiastical forum.

Or finally: 4. all those who furnish aid, counsel, or favor in all these things, for example, those who procure mandates for persons wishing to impede.

Thus far from the excellent Rieti Commentary, where it is added that, when the effect has not yet followed, neither those impeding, nor those issuing mandates, nor those having recourse, and consequently neither those furnishing aid, etc., contract the excommunication. The contrary opinion, at least with respect to those having recourse, pleased Avanzini (Commentary, no. 11). But (the Rieti Commentary subjoins at article 8), I think that one ought not easily to depart from the general rules of law.

But this excommunication is incurred by those impeding the exercise of this jurisdiction, namely: 1. by some deed, for example, by force, threats, or command, either directly, for example, if someone threatens a Bishop with death, etc., or indirectly, as if by a deed

VII. Those directly or indirectly compelling lay judges to draw ecclesiastical persons before their tribunal contrary to the canonical provisions ¹⁵; likewise those issuing laws or decrees against the liberty or rights of the Church ¹⁶.

VIII. Those having recourse to the lay power ¹⁷ in order to impede he prohibits those attached to the Ecclesiastical Court from performing their duty in that matter, etc. > any letters or acts ¹⁸ proceeding from the Apostolic See or from any of its Legates or Delegates ¹⁹, and those directly or indirectly prohibiting their promulgation or execution ²⁰, or on account of them injuring or gravely frightening either the parties themselves or others ²¹.

IX. All forgers of Apostolic Letters, even in the form of a Brief, and of petitions concerning grace or justice, signed by the Roman Pontiff, or by the Vice-Chancellors of the Holy Roman Church or those acting in their place, or at the mandate of the same Roman Pontiff; and also those falsely publishing Apostolic Letters, even in the form of a Brief, and also those falsely signing petitions of this kind under the name of the Roman Pontiff or the Vice-Chancellor or of one acting in the place of the aforesaid persons ²².

X. Those absolving an accomplice in a shameful sin even at the point of death > if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can hear the confession of the dying person without grave infamy and scandal being likely to arise ²³.

XI. Those usurping or sequestering ²⁴ jurisdiction, goods, or revenues belonging to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their Churches or Benefices ²⁵.

XII. Those invading, destroying, or detaining, by themselves or through others, Cities, Lands, places, or rights belonging to the Roman Church; or those usurping, disturbing, or retaining the supreme jurisdiction in them; and also those furnishing aid, counsel, or favor toward any of the aforesaid acts ²⁶.

¹⁵ ** Formerly (Bull Coenae, section 15), judges who drew Ecclesiastics before their tribunal were subject to excommunication; today those who compel the lay judges themselves to this are subject, that is, those who exercise judgment by lay power. Thus the Declaration of the Sacred Inquisition, 1 February 1871: The word compelling certainly indicates that the excommunication does not reach those who are subordinate, even if they were judges, but was imposed only upon those who, compelled by no one, either perform such acts or compel others to perform them. Therefore, he contracts the excommunication who, either directly, for example, by threats, or indirectly, for example, through another, compels ecclesiastics to be drawn into court as though accused, whether on account of a penal cause for even a most grave crime, or on account of a civil cause of even a single farthing.

The Constitution limits it: Contrary to the canonical sanctions, namely, unless at some time through them an ecclesiastic is permitted to be drawn before a lay tribunal, with the conditions under which this is permitted otherwise observed.

¹⁶ ** With respect to the other part of this article, attention is directed to those issuing, that is, establishing laws or decrees against the liberty and rights of the Church, namely, of the universal Church.

Laws are those which are established in perpetuity by the supreme power; Decrees are those which are issued generally by any power, for example, by the Prefect of a city, Municipalities, etc., but not those which are issued against individual persons or in individual cases, which you would rather call mandates, and therefore not the sentences of judges.

But the words Against the liberty or rights, etc., extend most widely and strike altogether every kind of law or decree by which not only the exercise of ecclesiastical power, whether of Jurisdiction or Order, but any other right is intercepted, restricted, or disturbed, such as the right of teaching; promoting to Orders; conducting public supplications outside churches or at night; erecting Churches, Benefices, and Pious Associations; and conferring Benefices without any intervention of the lay power; indeed, also the rights which belong to the Church as a Society, such as the right of acquiring by acts of last will or among the living; alienating; or leasing her goods beyond nine years, etc.

But this excommunication is incurred by those issuing laws or decrees of this kind by lay authority; and if these were proposed by the vote, for example, of the people, senate, etc., all who voted for them are bound by this censure as soon as they have been promulgated.

¹⁷ ** Namely, to persons who exercise some jurisdiction over citizens, of which kind, for example, are judges, presidents, prefects of cities, etc. Nor does it matter in what manner someone had recourse, whether by appealing, by calling upon them, or by presenting a petition.

¹⁸ ** Acts of the Apostolic See are called those which are transacted at Rome by the Roman Pontiff or at his mandate, whether they contain a spiritual or temporal matter.

¹⁹ ** By Delegates understand those to whom the transaction of some matter is committed.

²⁰ ** Promulgation, rather than being taken for dissemination, which consists in fact, appears to be taken for publication in the customary form and manner, which consists rather in law. It is disputed whether, in order to incur this censure, it is necessary that the publication or execution be prohibited by public authority. The Rieti Commentary follows those affirming, for the Pontiff appears to speak of that prohibition which flows from recourse to the lay power.

²¹ ** To injure appears to be taken in the strict signification, by which, namely, the body is said to be injured. But to frighten indicates the instilling of fear which is certainly grave. By the parties themselves understand those to whom the Apostolic Letters or Acts pertain, but by others those to whom the publication or execution of the Apostolic Letters pertains.

²² ** Not all forgers incur this excommunication, but only forgers of Apostolic Letters, whether they contain grace or justice. Those are said to contain grace which contain some favor or liberality of the Roman Pontiff; but letters of justice are those which pertain to lawsuits and therefore to the cognizance or determination of some cause. Indeed, Apostolic Letters or rescripts do not pertain here if they have not yet been signed or furnished with a seal or leaden bulla, because, since they are not yet authentic, they do not yet avail.

Since the crime of forgery concerning letters of this kind can be committed in several ways, it is punished with excommunication if it is done: 1. by corrupting; or 2. by fabricating Apostolic Letters; or 3. by signing petitions, etc. By corrupting, whenever something is varied, deleted, or added, which must be estimated not materially but formally, that is, from the sense principally intended by the Roman Pontiff. By fabricating, whenever a false writing is substituted. Finally, by signing petitions, etc., whenever Fiat is falsely subscribed in them.

But in order that the censure be incurred, it is necessary: 1. that these things were committed with evil intent; 2. that, if they concern another, this gravely harms or can harm the other; I said, if another, for if they concern only you, it suffices to have falsified them in any manner; 3. finally, that you have perfected and completed the falsity. But when the falsity has been perfected, the excommunication is immediately incurred even if you do not use the falsified Letters or Rescripts. Except that which is committed by fabricating Apostolic Letters, before whose publication this censure is not incurred. But one who uses these Letters incurs another excommunication reserved to the Bishop, as will be said below.

²³ Concerning this article there is nothing to be added to those things which were said above (at no. 584).

²⁴ Someone is said to usurp when, as though using a power of ruling and by his own right, he takes prior possession of something (Suarez, On Censures, disputation 21, section 2, no. 96). Therefore thieves, robbers, etc., are not comprehended here, as the Sacred Inquisition also declared, 9 March 1870. But to sequester in the present case is to impede something from being received by those to whom it belongs.

²⁵ By jurisdiction understand either spiritual or temporal jurisdiction (Suarez, loc. cit., no. 95); but by goods understand immovable or movable goods, or even rights; and by revenues, whatever a thing bears or is received in consideration of the thing. Moreover, those jurisdictions, goods, and revenues are understood which belong to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches or benefices. Avanzini (Commentary, no. 18) thinks that the goods of monasteries also pertain here, as belonging to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches. Indeed, in the Bull Coenae (section 17), from which this article is taken, it is said: Belonging to any ecclesiastical persons by reason of Churches, monasteries, and other Ecclesiastical benefices. But the word other there suggests that Monasteries are comprehended under the name of benefices rather than churches; otherwise, as is acutely noted in the Rieti Commentary, goods of this kind, etc., belong either to the monasteries themselves, to their Sacristies, or to the Roman Church.

Since by this article only those usurping and sequestering, etc., appear expressly to be subjected to this excommunication, it was doubted whether someone who purchases the aforesaid things from a usurper incurs the same excommunication. But that it is indeed incurred is settled law from the Allocution of Pius IX, 25 July 1873. Add the reply of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 8 July 1874: It must by no means be doubted that those purchasing ecclesiastical goods usurped by usurpers fall into the excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff. For, setting aside the question whether the aforesaid purchase is in some manner touched by article XI of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, it can be doubtful to no one that it is comprehended by the most clear disposition of chapter XI, On Reformation, session 22 of the Council of Trent.

The replies of the Sacred Penitentiary concerning those who in any manner retain ecclesiastical goods of this kind, see below from no. 1092 in the Appendix.

²⁶ This excommunication pertains to the defense and protection of the temporal Dominion belonging to the Apostolic See. Therefore, rights and jurisdiction here are taken as temporal, and jurisdiction is understood as supreme, that is, that which belongs to the Prince alone, such as the right of life and death, the right of imposing taxes, creating Magistrates, etc.

But this excommunication is incurred: 1. by those who destroy cities, lands, places, etc., and those who invade them by employing force; 2. by those who disturb the supreme jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff in them, for example, those who impede Him from promulgating laws in these cities, imposing taxes, etc.; 3. by those who retain this jurisdiction or the cities, etc., even if they received them from others, such as heirs and heirs of heirs. 4. Finally, by those who furnish aid, counsel, or favor toward any of the aforesaid acts.

And as regards these last, it is a difficult matter, as the Rieti Commentary well says, to define when they incur excommunication by reason of aid, favor, etc., in detaining. A twofold kind of these (it says) must be distinguished. The one is of those who hold some public office; the other, of those who exercise none. And as regards the former, public offices pertain either to the necessities or utilities of the citizens, or to preserving the government, or to both. It can indeed be harmless to undertake the former, because society cannot kill itself.

But two things above the rest must be observed: 1. that they do not take an oath by which active obedience, as they say, is promised to the usurper, which would be as the price of the office. And if it is altogether necessary to swear, let them promise only passive obedience, and obedience to laws both divine and ecclesiastical, as was enjoined through the Letter of Pius VII to the Bishops of the Marches, 30 August 1808, and by the Sacred Penitentiary, 10 December 1860, replies 10 and 14.

2. That while they swear, they openly profess that they will do nothing contrary to divine and ecclesiastical laws. Wherefore, if something contrary to these laws should have to be done, it is necessary either to abstain from it or to renounce the office.

But with respect to public duties which do not pertain merely to the utilities and necessities of citizens but to preserving the government, the Sacred Penitentiary had already replied on 10 October 1860 (reply 11) that they can be tolerated, provided that there is no question of offices which directly and proximately contribute to the spoliation or to the maintenance of that same spoliation, and which cannot be exercised without danger of violating divine and ecclesiastical laws. But those who hold the first or supreme magistracy in any province, city, land, or town are understood to contribute by office to the maintenance of the spoliation. Thus the Instruction of Pius VII, 22 May 1809, declares: It is not lawful to accept employments and charges which have a more or less direct tendency to recognize, assist, and consolidate the new government in the exercise of the usurped power. But what duties are of this kind is declared more expressly thus in the Instruction of 10 June 1809: It is declared that by such employments are understood especially the offices of Governors, Prefects, or Mayors, who under this or another designation represent the first magistrate in each province, city, land, castle, or country whatever.

But departure from this policy began after it left no hope of impeding the consolidation of the usurpation, and otherwise the office of governing, committed and permitted only to rebels and wicked men, finally produced this sole fruit: that a policy of this kind turned to the destruction of Religion and to ever worse harms of subjects. And indeed, where an unjust usurper permits the oppressed subjects of another to provide in some manner for themselves and the common good, no reason at all appears why either the legitimate prince ought to be considered unwilling, for he would not reasonably be unwilling, or why oppressed subjects ought to be considered free of fault if they refuse offices through negligence. For they will not act thus as though they recognize some right in the most unjust usurper, but as persons who use the law of nature to provide for themselves and society. See the things said in volume I, no. 394, in the Note.

These things concern those holding public duties. But with respect to those who perform no office of this kind, those are understood to favor those detaining who furnish proximate assistance so that the usurpers remain in possession, for example, through money, denunciations, counsels, writings, etc.

Avanzini writes (Commentary, no. 19) that, if this article of the Constitution is compared with article XII of the Bull Coenae, it appears that adherents, supporters, and their defenders have been removed; concerning which matter he nevertheless subjoins that the Apostolic Letters of the year 1860 still remain in force. But unless by adherents you understand, as some are accustomed, those who merely stand for the usurpers, and by defenders those who contribute nothing to the maintenance of the spoliation, you certainly have these also sufficiently comprehended among those who furnish aid or favor.

973. • XIII. From the Bull Romanus Pontifex of Pius IX, 28 August 1873, there is added an excommunication likewise reserved in a special manner to the Roman Pontiff against dignitaries and canons (add: and those who, when chapters are lacking, have power to appoint the administrator or Vicar of a vacant Church, or who legitimately administer vacant Churches), > who, before the exhibition of the Apostolic Letters, have dared, under any title, name, or specious pretext, to grant and transfer the care, governance, and administration of a vacant Church either to one elected, even legitimately, by Chapters as Bishop, or to one nominated or presented, even legitimately, by the lay power to the said vacant Church; then also those who, having been nominated and presented to vacant churches, dare to undertake their care, governance, and administration from the concession and transfer made to them by dignitaries, Canons, and others of whom above; and also those who have obeyed the aforesaid persons or furnished aid, counsel, or favor, of whatever state, condition, preeminence, and dignity they may be ²⁷.

²⁷ ** All who are subjected to the aforesaid excommunication are punished also with another penalty in the same Bull thus: And We bind them also with the penalties, likewise to be incurred by that very fact, of deprivation of the ecclesiastical fruits of any Benefices whatever and of other ecclesiastical revenues respectively obtained by them, and decree and declare that they shall be bound; and We reserve the relaxation of those penalties... ONLY IN A SPECIAL MANNER to Ourselves and to the Roman Pontiff for the time being.

Furthermore, with respect to those elected or presented in this manner, it is added: Moreover, We decree that those nominated and presented are by that very fact deprived of the right which perhaps was acquired for them through nomination and presentation. And below: Furthermore, We declare and decree by the tenor of the present Letters that whatever things are done, commanded, decreed, and ordained by those thus nominated and presented, intruded into the administration of vacant Churches, together with each and every thing in any manner following therefrom and in any manner to follow, are and shall perpetually be null, invalid, empty, void, damnably attempted and presumed in fact by those not having power, and of no value, moment, or efficacy; and We condemn and reprobate them.

The interdict which is added against those nominated, etc., if they are marked with the episcopal character, will be set forth below in its place.

XIV. Likewise: Whoever in the aforementioned dioceses (namely, those subject to the Patriarchate of Venice and the Metropolitan See of Milan), having been elected by the vote of the people to the office of Pastor or Vicar, dare to seize the pretended possession either of the Church or of its rights and goods, and to perform the duties of the ecclesiastical ministry, by that very fact incur major excommunication peculiarly reserved to the Holy See, and other canonical penalties. See the Encyclical Letter of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 21 November 1873 ²⁸.

²⁸ ** In the same place these things follow: And let all those same persons (namely, the intruded) be avoided by the faithful according to the divine warning, as strangers or thieves, who come only to steal, slaughter, and destroy.

But what these things mean can be learned from those which, under Pius VI, had to be observed by prescription with respect to intruded persons in France. They are as follows:

1. It is not licit to approach an intruded pastor for the administration of baptism except in a case of extreme necessity, namely, if there is no other person capable of baptizing; nor is it licit to perform the office of sponsor if perhaps the intruded person baptizes.

2. It is not licit, even on feast days, to be present at the Mass of an intruded priest, even if another Mass is lacking; nor is it licit to be present at a sermon or other functions of the intruded person, or to ask other ministries from him, or to entrust a Mass to him to celebrate.

3. It is not licit to receive Communion from an intruded person, even when the Paschal season is pressing.

4. Although one must genuflect before Hosts consecrated by an intruded person, care must nevertheless be taken, lest in this worship Catholics appear to communicate with schismatics, that an encounter with the intruded person be avoided while he carries the Holy Eucharist. And it is licit for a Catholic priest, even if not fasting, to consume hosts consecrated by a Catholic, if they cannot be reverently preserved, lest they come into the hands of the intruded person.

5. It is not licit to approach an intruded Pastor for contracting matrimony; wherefore, if no other means is available and the superior cannot provide another Pastor or priest, the faithful ought to contract without the presence of a pastor.

6. It is not licit for women, after completing childbirth, to receive from an intruded person the blessing which is customarily given after childbirth.

7. The obsequies of the dead are to be celebrated by the legitimate pastor even in private houses, if they cannot be performed otherwise; but if the intruded person carries the body to the Church, let Catholics neither accompany the funeral nor recite sacred prayers nor perform other rites of the Church in association with him.

8. But whether in danger of death the faithful can licitly receive absolution from an intruded Pastor, it was replied: The course which certain Prelates of France entered upon is not to be disapproved, who, in that moment, permitted the sacrament of penance... when any other Catholic priest was lacking and scandal had been removed, to be received from intruded pastors in that necessity.

But it must be noted here that the Censure and Decree of which there is now question indeed pertain to the ecclesiastical provinces of Venice and Milan; but it must not be thought that persons intruded into parishes in this manner elsewhere are by no means subject to these penalties. For neither will these escape the excommunication set forth above in article XI. For either a legitimate pastor is supposed already to have been given to the parish, and thus we have on the part of the intruded person a usurpation of jurisdiction belonging to another by reason of a benefice; or we suppose that a legitimate pastor has not yet been given, and thus we have the jurisdiction of the Ordinary over the same parish violated. Therefore, the special Decree for the said Provinces can be regarded as a mere consequence or application of article XI.

974. • In the same Constitution these things are subjoined: We declare that absolution from all the excommunications enumerated up to this point is and remains reserved in a special manner to the Roman Pontiff for the time being, and that for it a general concession of absolving from cases and censures or excommunications reserved to the Roman Pontiff in no manner suffices; any indults whatever granted in any form and to any persons, even Regulars of any Order, Congregation, Society, and Institute, even those worthy of special mention and constituted in any dignity, being revoked in addition with respect to those same excommunications ²⁹. But those presuming to absolve > without due faculty, even under any pretext, are to know themselves bound by a bond of excommunication > reserved to the Roman Pontiff ³⁰, provided that there is no question of the point of death, in which nevertheless the obligation, with respect to those absolved, of standing by the mandates of the Church if they recover remains firm ³¹.

²⁹ ** On account of those derogatory clauses a doubt had arisen whether all faculties, whether ordinary, namely, those customarily granted, or extraordinary, granted by the Apostolic See before the promulgation of the same Constitution, had been diminished or taken away by this Constitution, for example, the faculty of absolving from the crime of heresy which was contained in the Pagella of the Sacred Penitentiary. But by mandate of the Supreme Pontiff it was declared through the Office of the Sacred Inquisition as follows: Through the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis the Most Holy Father in no way intends to inflict even the least detriment upon faculties of whatever kind which were granted by the Holy See before the promulgation of the same Constitution, whether they are quinquennial or extraordinary or regard the present Jubilee; and he wills that they remain in their full force while the time defined in the said concessions or indults endures.

See above, no. 175, and the things noted there; concerning which the Reply of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 December 1873, must not be omitted. Namely, to the doubt, Whether Regular Prelates, after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, enjoy the same privileges which they did before, that is, whether or not they can absolve their subjects from papal cases simply reserved in the said Bull, this reply was made: The Sacred Penitentiary replies to the proposed doubt: Negatively, saving other faculties which proceed from particular Rescripts granted for a time.

But from this a question could be raised whether through these things something must be said to have been detracted from the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, confirmed by Pontifical authority, which elsewhere (above, page 114, in the Note) we reported in these words: The Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, after the matter had been spoken of with the Most Holy Clement VIII, ABSOLUTELY DECREED that all Bulls and Decrees derogating from the Privileges of Regulars with respect to the faculty of absolving from cases reserved to the Pope are to be understood only in relation to secular persons, but not in relation to their Regular subjects.

And, saving indeed a better judgment, it seems that it must be answered that these things can be reconciled together very well. For, besides the fact that what belongs to Bishops from chapter Liceat also belongs to Regular Prelates, see above, no. 175, the doubt proposed to the Sacred Penitentiary treats of Privileges properly so called. But what is established in the aforesaid Decree ought to be called not so much a Privilege as a certain provident disposition which, by a certain general norm, applies the principles of the common law to the condition and state of Regulars. For it is very well known both from the nature of the matter and from the consensus of all the Doctors that Regulars are numbered among those who are considered to have a perpetual impediment preventing them from being free and unimpeded to approach the Apostolic See personally for absolution from censures. But in these circumstances it is settled law that the faculty of absolving devolves upon the Ordinary, so that he can both absolve by himself and also through another, because this faculty belongs to him by ordinary law, and therefore he can delegate it to another. Thus in chapter Nuper 29, On the Sentence of Excommunication: We grant... that he may be absolved by his Bishop or his own Priest. But no one is ignorant that the Ordinaries of exempt Regulars are none other than their Prelates. Therefore the faculty is given to the Prelates of Regulars to absolve their subjects in the case, not by force of some special privilege, but by a norm taken from the common law. Nevertheless, this norm has a certain appearance of a privilege, insofar as, to remove all doubts for the future, the Apostolic See through the organ of the Sacred Congregation established this canon generally for Regulars. And indeed, what is worthy of note is that a Declaration or Decree of this kind appeared at the time when the same Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, by the Mandate and Authority of the same Clement VIII, under penalty of excommunication, deprivation of offices, and incapacity for hearing confessions, etc., had forbidden all Regulars to presume to absolve from cases reserved or to be reserved in any manner to the Apostolic See. For His Holiness (it is added in that decree) insofar as there is need, has willed and wills that the faculties and concessions themselves in this part are henceforth to be held as utterly null and void. Therefore, by this very fact the Sacred Congregation most manifestly declared that that disposition concerning Regulars pertained in no way to that privilege properly so called of absolving from Papal cases which Clement VIII, by that Decree of 9 January 1601, no less than Our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, willed to be annulled, rendered void, and taken away. Therefore, the reply of the Sacred Penitentiary, which regards the privileges of which there is discussion in the proposed doubt, contradicts or detracts nothing from the Decree which, at the command of Clement VIII, established that special canon for the singular condition of Regulars.

³⁰ ** You have, therefore, another excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and accordingly to be added to the following catalogue.

³¹ ** These persons, therefore, will have to present themselves in order to receive mandates, unless nevertheless these are already known and enjoined, for example, those which were prescribed by the Sacred Penitentiary to those who purchased ecclesiastical goods from a usurper, concerning whom in article XI.

975. • I. Those teaching or defending, whether publicly or privately, propositions condemned by the Apostolic See under penalty of a latae sententiae excommunication ³²; likewise those teaching or defending as licit the practice of inquiring from a penitent the name of an accomplice, as it was condemned by Benedict XIV in the Constitutions Suprema, > 7 July 1745; Ubi primum, 2 July 1746; Ad eradicandum, 28 September 1746 ³³.

II. Those who, at the instigation of the devil, lay violent hands upon Clerics or monks of either sex ³⁴, excepting, with respect to the reservation, the cases and persons concerning whom it is permitted by law or privilege that the Bishop or another absolve ³⁵.

III. Those perpetrating a duel, or simply challenging another to it, or accepting it, and any accomplices, or those furnishing any assistance or favor, and also those deliberately watching it, and those permitting it or, so far as it is in their power, not prohibiting it, of whatever dignity they may be, even royal or imperial ³⁶.

³² ** The propositions which it is forbidden by the Apostolic See to teach or defend under penalty of a latae sententiae excommunication are commonly enumerated as follows:

1. The 45 Articles of John Wycliffe and the 30 Articles of John Hus. From the Constitution In eminentis Apostolicae, etc., of Martin V, dated at Rome, 13 February 1450. (See volume I, page XXXV.)

2. The 41 Errors of Martin Luther, condemned by Leo X in the Bull Exsurge Domine, etc., 16 May 1520. (Above, volume I, page XL.)

3. The 79 Propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V in the Bull Ex omnibus, 1 October 1567, etc. (Above, volume I, page XLIII.)

4. The Proposition concerning sacramental confession and absolution to be obtained by letters. Clement VIII, through the Decree of the Sacred Inquisition, 20 July 1602. (Above, volume I, page XLVIII.)

5. The 45 Propositions condemned by Alexander VII through Decrees of the Sacred Inquisition, 24 September 1665 and 18 March 1666. (Above, volume I, page L.)

6. The 65 Propositions condemned by Innocent XI through the Decree of the Sacred Inquisition, 2 March 1679. (Above, volume I, page LIII.)

7. The 68 Propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI in the Constitution Caelestis Pastor, 20 November 1687. (Above, volume I, page LVIII.)

8. The 2 Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, 24 August 1690. (Above, volume I, page LXIV.)

9. The 31 Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII through the Decree of the Sacred Inquisition, 7 December 1690. (Above, volume I, page LXIV.)

10. The 101 Propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI in the Constitution Unigenitus, 8 September 1713. (Above, volume I, page LXVI.)

11. The 5 Propositions On the Duel, condemned by Benedict XIV in the Constitution Detestabilem, 10 November 1752. (Above, volume I, page LXIX.)

12. The 85 Propositions of the diocesan Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI in the Constitution Auctorem fidei, 28 August 1794. (Above, volume I, page LXXV.)

³³ ** See the things given above concerning this argument, no. 501.

³⁴ ** Since this privilege, which is customarily called the privilege of the canon, is in favor not of persons but of the Order, it is taken most widely. Therefore, under the name of Clerics are included whoever have received tonsure; but under the designation of Monks, all Regulars of either sex, and their Novices and Tertiaries, indeed also Hermits who by mandate of the Bishop are assigned to the custody and service of some Church or chapel.

A violent laying on of hands is understood whenever injury is done by deeds to a person, namely, by harming either his body, liberty, or dignity; the body indeed by striking, wounding, or even harming by poison, or by in any way causing him to fall, tumble headlong, etc.; liberty, as if you thrust him into a prison or another place, even a private one; dignity, if force is in any manner employed against him, as, for example, by stopping the carriage or horse on which he is being conveyed, by violently taking something from him, such as a hat, purse, or staff; or by committing some other insulting act against him, for example, if you soil him with spittle, mud, or dust, or tear the clothes which he is wearing, etc.

All, even those who have not reached puberty, are subject to this excommunication. Nevertheless, a cleric who lays hands upon himself does not incur it (St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 274); nor, on account of a defect of full advertence, does one who strikes from sudden anger or in jest, or for the sake of correction or defense, or for some other just cause, as if he finds him acting shamefully with his daughter, sister, etc. Indeed, as can deservedly be held, neither do those commanding or ratifying it incur the censure, since the law, which expressed others (see article V among the excommunications reserved in a special manner), passes over these here.

³⁵ ** Namely, if the striking was light, the Bishop can absolve the striker, whoever he may be. But a striking is called light which indeed inflicts grave injury but without grave harm, for example, one done with a fist, foot, stone, or club. But if the striking was grave, the Bishop can absolve only those who live collegiately, from chapter 50, On the Sentence of Excommunication; but it is held as grave, besides the fact that it must also be estimated from the place, the person, and other circumstances, from the Extravagant Perlectis of John XXII, if, for example, a tooth is knocked out or an abundance of blood is shed. Finally, if the striking was enormous, such as mutilation, the gouging out of an eye, the severing of a member, etc., the Bishop can absolve only those who have not reached puberty, whether they seek absolution before or after puberty, from chapter 60, On the Sentence of Excommunication. But in doubt whether the striking was light, grave, or enormous, according to the cited Extravagant the graver classification must be maintained.

But as to what Regular Prelates can do by common law concerning their subjects, compare the things brought forward above from St. Alphonsus in the Note to no. 175.

³⁶ ** With the Rieti Commentary, note that for the character of a duel of this kind it is required that the combat be fought with lethal weapons; and therefore it does not pertain here if there is fighting with fists, sticks, or even iron with a blunted edge, although death follows accidentally. Nor is this contrary to the Constitution Illius vices of Clement VIII. at no. 405, page 388, volume I; because, namely, in this place also St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 220) refers to those things which he had written (book 3, no. 400), namely, that after those five Propositions on the Duel were condemned by Benedict XIV, that opinion which asserts that a Duel can licitly be accepted for the necessary defense of goods of great importance cannot be held as probable. St. Alphonsus indeed attributes this opinion to Lessius, Sanchez, Palao, Coninck, Valentia, Holzmann, Pichler, Reiffenstuel, Sporer, Albel, and others, and adds that it is called probable by Croix and Roncaglia. Indeed, it would certainly be licit for these Authors to add even the vote of St. Alphonsus himself; for he held the same doctrine altogether approved when he wrote these things (Note 1 of the Author on article 3, doubt 4, chapter 2, book 7, edition of the year 1748): It must be noted that a duel can sometimes be justified by just causes, for example, to avoid a loss of goods which the other challenger threatens; nevertheless the loss ought to be certain, and it ought to be impossible to meet it by another way unless the duel is accepted. And indeed, since St. Alphonsus afterward departed from this doctrine for no other cause than because he thought that it had been condemned by Benedict XIV, as he himself thus testifies concerning himself (Catalogue of Reformed Propositions, no. 97), therefore, when it can prudently be considered that this condemnation is not sufficiently established, nothing now prevents us from numbering the Holy Doctor among the patrons of that opinion.

But this is the argument of that Note to no. 405, volume I; there, namely, it is demonstrated that the falsity of the aforesaid opinion can by no means be logically deduced from the aforesaid condemned Propositions. For otherwise that opinion is by no means defended in the same Note by any positive reason; but, from a weighing of the Propositions proscribed by Benedict XIV, this alone was inferred: It must therefore be concluded that it is indeed lawful for anyone to seek reasons by which he may attack that opinion and whatever probability it has; but reasons of this kind must plainly be sought elsewhere than from those proscribed propositions.

And this plainly is what greatly displeases the VV. Wherefore, through fourteen columns (pages 879-885) they labor to establish that that doctrine was truly condemned in the aforesaid propositions. Nor indeed do they hesitate to write thus concerning those things which we said in the Note to no. 405: Father Ballerini appears to deceive himself. For even by observing the rules which he himself hands down for rightly converting condemned propositions, it is clearly gathered from the same propositions that the acceptance of a duel for preserving one's fortunes with honor is condemned.

Again, therefore, a few things concerning this argument. Concerning this matter I would note that it by no means appears why the VV. write, even by observing the rules which he himself (Father Ballerini) hands down, etc., as though Father Ballerini had brought forth here some singular and less well-established rules. For does any rule concerning condemned Propositions exist or can one be devised other than that which all have always admitted, namely, that nothing can certainly be forced from them except that the contradictory of that proposition which was condemned as false must be held as true? The contradictory, I say, but not the contrary, since two contrary propositions indeed cannot both be true, but certainly can both be false. Or can other rules for finding the contradictory of some proposition be produced than those which are everywhere extant in the first elements of dialectic?

Let us therefore come to the matter. The VV., after St. Alphonsus, object with the first and fourth of those five propositions. But the first reads thus: A military man who, unless he offers OR accepts (both in St. Alphonsus and in Gury and the VV. it is read incorrectly, AND accepts) a Duel, would be regarded as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military duties, and would therefore be deprived of the office by which he supports himself and his family, or would have to lack perpetually the hope of a promotion otherwise

due and merited by him, would be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts the duel.

But concerning this the VV. write thus (page 881): The contradictory of the first condemned Proposition can be no other than the following: "A military man who, unless he offers and accepts a duel... would be deprived of the office by which he supports himself and his family,... would not be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts the duel"; and they add: Surely nothing clearer could be desired.

Yet this is by no means the contradictory of the preceding proposition, but its contrary. For, as the dialecticians teach, the distinction is this: in contradictories, one affirms or denies only as much as suffices for the other to be false; and therefore both can never be true, nor can both be false at the same time. But in contraries, one denies or affirms more than is necessary for the other to be false; whence it happens that both indeed cannot be true at the same time, but both can be false. Yet in this case we have the latter, not the former.

For let the Proposition be reduced to this simpler form: A military man... is free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts a duel. Here take care to observe that the words whether he offers or accepts a duel are expressed not disjunctively but copulatively, just as if one were to say: he is free from fault both if he offers and if he accepts a duel. Hence it follows that, if with the VV. you say, he is not free from fault both if he offers and if he accepts a duel, you now deny more than is necessary for the other proposition to be false; and therefore both can be false, namely, when he would be free from fault if he accepts, but not if he offers, or vice versa. You will have the contradictory only if you say: Either he is not free from fault if he offers, or he is not free from fault if he accepts. Which part of this disjunction is then true must be determined from elsewhere, and not by force of the proposition itself. It is therefore evident that, by force of the condemned Proposition, it cannot be concluded that both cases are subject to fault and penalty.

Say the same of the other Proposition which the VV., following St. Alphonsus, press: It is licit in the natural state of man to accept and offer a duel in order to preserve one's fortunes with honor, when their loss cannot be warded off by another remedy.

Concerning this the VV. write thus (page 882): The other proposition sounds contradictorily thus: "It is not licit... to accept and offer a duel in order to preserve one's fortunes with honor." Yet this is opposed to the condemned proposition not contradictorily but contrarily, and can be false just as much as the opposite proposition, because it denies more than is fitting. If you wish the contradictory, say: Either to offer a duel in order to preserve one's fortunes with honor, or to accept it, is not licit.

Here the VV. add (loc. cit.): If the one accepting is not condemned because the proposition is copulative, for the same reason neither can the one offering be condemned; therefore, in the condemned proposition neither is certainly condemned: which is absurd.

But to these things it must be answered: I concede the whole, except that this must be called absurd. And indeed, if someone should say: Peter and Paul were crucified at Rome, its contradictory will not be, Neither Peter nor Paul was crucified at Rome, but the disjunctive: Either Peter or Paul was not crucified at Rome. But is that said absurdly because, by force of the proposition, it remains uncertain which of them was, or was not, crucified? This must be gathered from elsewhere, as we have said, and not by force of the contradictory proposition. And this indeed is also recommended by those things which the VV. themselves bring forward thus from Reuter: Since a condemned proposition can bear either a universal or a particular sense, while a composite proposition can bear either a copulative or a divided sense, in order that it may be understood in what sense it was condemned and which contradictory opposed to it is true, one must consider both the matter which is proscribed and the weight of the reasons on account of which it deserved to be proscribed, as well as the mind of those who taught that proposition, and finally the common sense of the Doctors.

Take careful note of those words: which contradictory opposed to it IS

TRUE; for several contradictories are disjunctively opposed to a complex proposition, as is evident from the one aforesaid: either he is not free from fault and penalty while he offers, or he is not free from fault and penalty while he accepts. Which of these is true, Reuter rightly says must be argued from the matter, from the weight of the reasons, from the sense of the Doctors, etc.

And that recourse must finally be had to this is manifestly evident from innumerable other examples concerning condemned theses. Let there be, for example, proposition 36 among those proscribed by Innocent XI: It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity but also in grave necessity; which, as regards its form, is certainly equivalent to this other: It is licit not only to accept but also to offer a duel. All agree that something false and condemnable lies within it. But without an inspection of the matter or of the sense of the Doctors, what at length will you extract? This one thing, namely, which the contradictory presents: that it is not permitted to steal either in extreme necessity, or in grave necessity, or in both cases. But behold Doctors disagreeing as to whether that thesis is to be understood of formal theft, or merely of the material taking of another's thing, so that to steal there is the same as to carry off another's property. I ask, therefore: can this controversy be determined from the mere inspection of the thesis in itself? Or shall we on that account cry out with the VV. that it is absurd that nothing certain is gathered from the condemned Proposition?

Again, if you understand formal theft there as an unjust taking, unless you recur to a consideration of the matter, will you be able, from the contradictory thesis inspected in itself, to determine whether all the members of the disjunction, or only one of them, and which one, is to be judged true?

And again, if with Viva and St. Alphonsus you take that to steal not for formal theft but for a material taking, do you find it thus determined in that condemnation which member of the contradictory thesis is certainly to be held true and which false? Finally, do we not determine solely from an inspection of the matter, from the force of the reasons, and from the sense of the Doctors, what is true and what is false? And, what is chief, is not the rule which St. Alphonsus provides shown, from the interpretation of this thesis, to be deficient and fallacious, the rule by which the VV. contended that the propositions concerning the duel, as we saw above, ought to be converted? Indeed, according to the rule by force of which they convert the first proposition thus: he is not free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts a duel; and the fourth thus: it is not licit to accept and offer a duel, etc.; according to this rule, I say, the aforesaid proposition 36 would also have to be converted thus: it is not permitted to carry off another's thing either in extreme necessity or in grave necessity. Yet St. Alphonsus (book 3, no. 520) indeed says that by this proposition it is condemned that it is licit to carry off another's things in grave necessity alone; but he acknowledges, with the consensus of all, that it is licit to carry off another's property in extreme necessity. Therefore the rule proposed by the VV. is fallacious; therefore by a fallacious conversion of the propositions premised concerning the duel, the VV. contend that both members of those complex theses must be held as condemned.

Since, therefore, it is not determined by force of conversion upon which member of a proscribed complex proposition the condemnation certainly falls, but in order to argue this it is finally necessary to appeal to the nature of the matter, to the force of the reasons, and to the sense of the Doctors, certainly, if someone should consider that St. Alphonsus too, with many grave Authors, could have agreed with that doctrine that a duel can sometimes be justified by just causes, etc., as we described above, he will plainly be able to deduce a consequence wholly opposite to the consequences which the VV. contend must be elicited from these propositions. Let us, however, be content with that conclusion which in the Note to no. 405 we deduced thus: It must be concluded that it is indeed lawful for anyone to seek reasons by which he may attack that opinion and whatever probability it has; but reasons of this kind must plainly be sought elsewhere than from those proscribed propositions.

To that which the VV. add (pages 882-885), that there have been several after Concina and Patuzzi who understand those condemned propositions in the same sense as St. Alphonsus, let this be the very brief reply: Let the VV. themselves assume the care of investigating whence this has happened; whether, namely, because the cited Authors did not inspect the matter attentively enough, or because, without weighing the matter for themselves, they adopted the opinion of others. For it is certainly not right to have thought them so unskilled in dialectic that they were ignorant either of the mode of arguing from condemned theses or of the mode of finding the contradictory of some Proposition. And these things suffice concerning this question.

The VV. have two other things in the Notes to this question (pages 880, 881), which nevertheless pertain to other arguments. First, therefore (page 880, note 1), they bring forth these words of St. Thomas (2.2, q. 64, art. 5, ad 4): It must be said that, as Augustine says, Samson is not otherwise excused for having overwhelmed himself together with his enemies by the ruin of the house, except that the Holy Spirit, who performed miracles through him, had secretly commanded this. And he assigns the same reason concerning certain holy women who killed themselves in time of persecution, whose memory is celebrated in the Church. From these words the VV. conclude that St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 367, q. 2) rightly said that St. Thomas disagrees with the Doctors who more commonly hold that it is licit to set fire to a ship or tower so that the enemies may suffer grave harm, but with the certain loss of one's own life. To these things it must be answered that this was rightly observed when it is established that St. Thomas and St. Augustine had turned their eyes to a question of this kind.

The other observation of the VV. concerns these words of St. Alphonsus (book 3, no. 366): It is licit in a shipwreck to yield the plank... even if the plank has already been seized, as Sylvius apud Tournely and the Salamancans teach against Soto, Rodriguez, etc.... But Sylvius rightly observes that he cannot, in order to yield the plank, cast himself into the sea, because no one can positively kill himself. The VV. therefore censure (page 881) that in the Note to no. 391, volume I, page 372, we said that Sylvius's scruple was empty. I reply: In this third edition (loc. cit.) we added the reason why it must be called a scruple and why this limitation of Sylvius cannot be reconciled with the preceding words of St. Alphonsus. We shall add two things here. The first is that St. Alphonsus says that it is licit to yield the plank even if it has been seized, as Sylvius teaches against Soto. But these are the words of Soto (On Justice and Right, book 5, q. 1, art. 6, final proposition): He who relinquished the plank would be in the same position as if he cast himself into the sea, which is directly to kill himself. How then does St. Alphonsus cite Sylvius for himself against Soto, when, as is evident, the doctrine of Soto and Sylvius is the same? Again, St. Alphonsus cites the Salamancans (On Restitution, chapter 2, no. 34) together with Sylvius for his opinion. Yet the Salamancans, when they say that it is licit to give the plank to another, bring forward a reason which overturns the opinion of Sylvius and, in a certain way, even that of St. Alphonsus, namely (they say): This is not to concur directly in death.... It is not to kill oneself, but to commit oneself to a certain danger of death, which one is not bound to avert by so difficult a means as leaving one's neighbor in danger and not helping him. Besides, for an honorable and praiseworthy cause he exposes himself to such danger, which is always licit. When all these things have been weighed, this one consequence results: that paragraph of the Holy Doctor would have been most fortunate if he had left to Tournely, that is, to Collet, that citation of Sylvius which thoroughly disturbs everything there.

In this place the VV. cast their complaints against those things which the reader will find noted concerning the duel

IV. Those giving their names to the Masonic or Carbonari sect, or > other sects of the same kind which plot against the Church or legitimate > powers, either openly or secretly; and likewise those furnishing to those same > sects any favor whatever; and those not denouncing their secret chiefs and leaders until they have denounced them ³⁷.

³⁷ According to the Constitution of Pius VII (Ecclesiam a Iesu Christo, section 10) and that of Leo XII (Constitution Quo graviora, section 13), under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, all those had to be denounced whom one knew to have given their names to these societies, or to have furnished them assistance, favor, etc., in any manner. But here a limitation is made, so that only those incur this penalty who do not denounce their secret chiefs and leaders.

Moreover, a Confessor must keep two things before his eyes before he indicates to a penitent the obligation of denunciation. The first is that which the Doctors commonly admonish and which Thomas Del Bene expresses in these words (On the Office of the Holy Inquisition, part I, doubt 19, no. 9): You are not bound to denounce on account of fear falling upon a constant man, just as a woman is not bound on account of fear falling upon a constant woman, as if you fear that for this reason you may be killed or maltreated. And again (ibid., doubt 21, no. 1): One is not bound to denounce with probable danger of death, infamy, or grave harm to oneself, or to one's father or mother, or wife, brothers, or others most closely joined by blood.

The other is that which others admonish apud Bonacina (On the Obligation of Denunciation, part I, section 4, no. 3): there is no obligation of denunciation when it is certainly known, or probably believed, that no remedy will be applied by the Prelate after denunciation has been made; for no one is bound to a useless work; or, as Scavini says (treatise 8, disputation 1, chapter 4, article 2, section 1): when there is altogether no hope of punishment; for no one is bound to a useless work; or, as the Decree of the Sacred Inquisition has it (see above in the Note to no. 593, question 5), when it is believed that those denounced can easily escape punishment.

Here it must be observed that, since under the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (above, no. 972, no. II) those reading books of any author prohibited by name through Apostolic letters, and those retaining, printing, or defending those same books in any manner, incur an excommunication reserved in a special manner, a question can be raised whether books of sectaries of this kind are comprehended in this class, concerning which Pius VII thus decreed (Constitution Ecclesiam a Iesu Christo, section 11, 13 September 1821): Finally, that every danger of error may be warded off more efficaciously, We condemn and proscribe all catechisms, as they call them, of the Carbonari, and books in which there are described by the Carbonari the things which are customarily done in their assemblies; also their statutes, codes, and all books written in their defense, whether printed or manuscript; and under the same penalty of major excommunication reserved in the same manner, We prohibit any of the faithful from reading or retaining the aforesaid books or any one of them. And it seems that it must be answered that those whose title is designated can sufficiently be considered prohibited by name. But here we have Statutes, Codes, Catechisms, and a Description of acts in the Assemblies, etc. Therefore.

Gury has two questions concerning these sectaries. The first is:

Can those who have given their names to the aforesaid sect be absolved if, although they repent of the oath they took, they nevertheless communicate externally with the same associates?

Reply. Negatively, because it is not enough that someone internally renounce his errors if he appears externally to profess those same errors. This is evident from the reply of the Congregation of the Holy Office. For when this doubt had been proposed: Ecclesiastical penalties have been established by several Roman Pontiffs against those who have given their names to the society which they call that of the Freemasons and have taken an oath to preserve the secret in their little assemblies. The doubt arises whether those who, although they repent of the oath they took, nevertheless persevere in openly exhibiting themselves as true adherents of the same society by communicating with others adhering to the same sect, or by attending their little assemblies, or in any other manner, can lawfully be admitted by a Confessor to participation in the Sacrament of Penance or of the Most Holy Eucharist. Certain Priests are found who in fact admit men of this kind. It is asked: how ought the Confessor to conduct himself?

To this petition the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office replied on 5 July 1837: According to the things set forth, it is not licit.

The other is:

Are those associations to be held as prohibited which profess that they plot nothing against Religion or the civil Commonwealth and nevertheless secretly enter into a compact confirmed by oath?

Reply. Affirmatively. This is established from the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, 21 August 1850. For it replied: Those associations are comprehended in the Pontifical Bulls.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid Declaration, Kenrick contends that associations of workers joining together for their own advantages are licit in themselves, even if signs are employed in them and a secret is maintained. According to this opinion, the workers commonly called Compagnons du Devoir would not incur excommunication, at least certainly, since they chiefly enter into a compact to assist one another. But on account of the secrecy the matter is full of danger.

Meanwhile it is known from the Declaration of the Office of the Sacred Inquisition, 12 January 1870, that the society of the Fenians is comprehended among the condemned sects.

V. Those ordering the immunity of ecclesiastical asylum to be violated with rash audacity, or violating it ³⁸.

³⁸ See below, Appendix On the Enclosure of Monasteries.

VI. Those violating the enclosure of Nuns, of whatever class or condition, sex, or age they may be, by entering their monasteries without legitimate permission; likewise those introducing or admitting them, and also Nuns departing from it outside the cases and form prescribed by St. Pius V in the Constitution Decori ³⁹.

VII. Women violating the enclosure of male Regulars, and superiors or others admitting them ⁴⁰.

VIII. Those guilty of real simony in any benefices whatsoever, and their accomplices ⁴¹.

IX. Those guilty of confidential simony in Benefices of any kind, of whatever dignity they may be.

X. Those guilty of real simony on account of entrance into Religion.

XI. All who, making profit from indulgences and other spiritual graces, are struck with the censure of excommunication by the Constitution Quam plenum of St. Pius V, 2 January 1569 ⁴².

³⁹ Which places enjoy the immunity of ecclesiastical asylum has been said elsewhere (volume I, in the Note to no. 285).

But this immunity is violated: 1. if one who has fled to those places is drawn out thence by force; but otherwise if he has been led out by deceit and fraud, or has departed deceived by false promises; for by the right of asylum provision is made for the sanctity and reverence of the place, not for the persons taking refuge; 2. if others are prohibited from carrying there those things which are necessary for life; 3. finally, if by any device the sacred place is besieged so that one who protects himself there is compelled to surrender himself (Benedict XIV, Constitution Officii nostri, section 14).

Moreover, for excommunication to be incurred there must be rash audacity, namely, when someone, in no way compelled by others, deliberately and knowingly either orders the right of asylum to be violated or violates it by executing the order, as one devoid of every excuse (Sacred Inquisition, 1 February 1871).

⁴⁰ See the same Appendix.

⁴¹ With regard to this and the following two articles, compare the things said concerning Simony in volume I.

⁴² According to this Constitution of St. Pius V, for excommunication to be incurred it is required that someone have made profit by granting or publishing indulgences or other spiritual graces (cited Constitution, sections 1 and 4). But one who orders a list of indulgences to be posted in sacred buildings is also considered to publish (ibid., section 2).

The spiritual graces enumerated by this Constitution are: 1. the faculty of choosing for oneself a priest who may absolve one from reserved cases (ibid., section 1); 2. the sacrifice of the Mass and burial during an interdict (ibid., section 3); 3. the use of prohibited foods (ibid.); 4. the taking of two or more sponsors at sacred baptism contrary to the Decree of the Council of Trent (ibid.); 5. absolution from the guilt of simony reserved to the Apostolic See (ibid.). Moreover, only those inferior to Bishops incur the excommunication (ibid., section 6).

XII. Those collecting alms of greater value for Masses and taking profit from them by causing those Masses to be celebrated in places where Mass stipends are customarily of lesser value ⁴³.

⁴³ Although sin can be committed in many ways by reason of shameful profit sought from Mass stipends (see above from no. 367), nevertheless, for this excommunication to be incurred, it is necessary: 1. that in a certain proper sense someone be said to collect Masses, or to devote effort to collecting Masses. But one is not of this kind to whom Masses are entrusted to be celebrated by himself; nor one to whom, apart from the character of a collector, they are spontaneously committed to be celebrated even by others; nor, finally, one who seeks them from only one or another person. Avanzini well says (Commentary, no. 34): It is sufficiently indicated that there is no question of one or a few stipends in number, but of a certain abundant collection to be made in the manner of commerce. 2. That the collection be made of Masses which are customarily called manual; for the word collecting seems to import this, and it is sufficiently gathered from the Constitution Quanta cura of Benedict XIV. 3. That this be done for the sake of gain or profit; wherefore one who deducts a part from the stipends so that it may be expended upon certain pious uses does not incur excommunication, although the Sacred Congregation of the Council disapproved this on 9 September 1874 (above, in the Note to no. 375); nor one who retains some part for himself as compensation for his labor or effort.

Moreover, all indeed agree that the sanction of Benedict XIV, by which only laics were punished with the penalty of excommunication, was extended by this article, because it also comprehends clerics. But a doubt arises whether it was also limited in some respect. Avanzini (loc. cit.) judged it to have been limited because the article does not say in the same place (that is, in the place where the stipends were collected), but in places where Mass stipends are customarily of lesser value. Wherefore Del Vecchio (Compendium of Scavini, treatise 4, no. 611) thinks it more probable that, for the censure to be incurred, the Masses must be celebrated elsewhere, where stipends are customarily of lesser value. Avanzini, however, adds that the opinion of those asserting that the censure is incurred even if the Masses are celebrated where the stipends were collected is not to be disapproved, attention being given, namely, to the identity, if not of the wording, certainly of the rationale, between the Benedictine Constitution and the present article. Cretoni presses this rationale more tenaciously (Note to this article), adding that it is also gathered from those words of the Benedictine Constitution (section 5): Whether in the same place or elsewhere... he caused them to be celebrated.

But whatever this disagreement may be, it makes plain that the matter is somewhat more obscure. Indeed, if the Constitution of Benedict XIV is inspected, the greater stipends are understood (section 5) which customs or synodal statutes require in some place; but the lesser ones (section 1) are those where the alms or stipends, either by custom or by synodal law... are of lesser value, lesser, namely, than custom or a synodal statute requires elsewhere. With these things posited, it is asked: what do those words of the same Constitution (section 5) mean: "Whether in the same place" (where, namely, the greater stipends are given by custom or statute), "or elsewhere, where lesser stipends are given for Masses to be celebrated, he caused them to be celebrated"? Certainly, if the Masses are celebrated in the same place, retention of part of the stipend cannot occur unless either a stipend below the synodal rate is given to another or another is defrauded of the excess from a stipend exceeding the synodal rate. But neither case is easily reconciled with the words of this article XII. Not the former, because the Masses are not celebrated in places where Mass stipends are customarily of lesser value. Not the latter, because a certain abundant collection of stipends exceeding the synodal rate, which is signified in the Article, scarcely can have place. Therefore it is not without cause that it is written in the Rieti Commentary: Nor, finally, does he incur the censure who causes Masses to be celebrated either in the same place in which he collected them or in another where they are celebrated for the same stipend; although one who retains for himself a part of the stipend, unless it is freely given by the recipient, is guilty of theft, whether grave or light according to the quantity of the matter; and a grave quantity is otherwise required for incurring the censure. And this censure indeed is incurred, not when someone collects stipends with this depraved intention, but when, in handing over a stipend for Masses either celebrated or to be celebrated, he retains a part of it for himself.

XIII. All who are punished with excommunication in the Constitutions Admonet nos of St. Pius V, on the fourth day before the Kalends of April 1567; Quae ab hac Sede of Innocent IX, on the day before the Nones of November 1591; Ad Romani Pontificis curam of Clement VIII, 26 June 1592; and Inter caeteras of Alexander VII, on the ninth day before the Kalends of November 1660, which concern the alienation and enfeoffment of Cities and Places of the Holy Roman Church ⁴⁴.

XIV. Religious presuming to administer the sacrament of Extreme Unction or the Eucharist as Viaticum to clerics or laics outside a case of necessity without permission of the pastor ⁴⁵.

⁴⁴ Concerning this article the Rieti Commentary, deducing everything briefly and properly from the cited Constitutions, writes thus: The action which is restrained by this excommunication is to act before the Roman Pontiff concerning the alienation of Cities, Towns, or places belonging either immediately or mediately to the right and ownership of the Holy See, except places confiscated and assigned to the treasury. Nor is one excused under whatever title this may be sought, for example, that of government, Vicariate, fief, census, exchange, etc.; or from whatever cause, even merits toward the Holy See, necessity, or evident utility; or for whatever time, even a long time only, or for life, or only at pleasure.

But the following become subject to this excommunication: 1. those treating, consulting, or otherwise speaking about this matter, and consequently about choosing Orators to the Holy See for this purpose; 2. Orators receiving an office of this kind; 3. finally, any others who by themselves or through another suggest or recommend alienations of this kind to the Roman Pontiff; nor does it matter whether they have acted by voice or in writing. The first indeed incur excommunication as soon as they have proposed Orators, provided these have been elected; the Orators themselves when they have accepted the mandate; and the last when they have spoken with the Roman Pontiff concerning this matter or have offered a writing, even if they have lost their labor and oil.

⁴⁵ Four things are required for contracting this censure. 1. That the sacraments of which the Article speaks be administered without the permission of the pastor. But by pastor here is understood one who has the care of souls there, by whatever name he may be called, or one who acts in his place in this matter. Permission is also understood as merely presumed, that is, if the pastor certainly would have given it, or at least is probably believed to be going to ratify it, or if the pastor gave it to the sick person, although perhaps he would not have given it to the one who in fact administers these sacraments.

2. That those sacraments be administered outside a case of necessity. But a case of necessity must be estimated not only from the danger under which the sick person labors, but also from whether the Pastor can easily be summoned. Therefore the excommunication will not be incurred if either of these is not lacking, even though perhaps you falsely judged both to be lacking, since our judgment does not change the truth of the matter; or even if, conversely, you thought that either one was not lacking, that is, either that necessity was urgent or that the pastor would not be unwilling, although in fact both are lacking. The reason is that one administering thus is not said to presume.

3. That the one administering be a Religious properly so called. Therefore the excommunication ceases if either a secular priest or even one who professes an Institute in which only simple vows are emitted administers the sacraments in this manner. For in penal matters Institutes of this kind are called neither Religious nor Regular.

4. Finally, that the Religious administer those sacraments to Clerics or Laics. Therefore the excommunication ceases if a Regular has administered them to Regulars, even of another Order and outside a Monastery; or even to those who are reckoned as Regulars by law, that is, Novices and servants who actually serve them and live within the enclosure under their obedience; and probably also to their resident pupils (see above, no. 564, and Extracted Acts, etc., volume 3, page 61). Add to these the poor dwelling in the hospitals of Regulars and male Tertiaries who live collegiately or dwell with cloistered Religious.

XV. Those removing relics without legitimate permission from the Sacred Cemeteries or Catacombs of the City of Rome and its territory, and those furnishing them assistance or favor ⁴⁶.

XVI. Those communicating with one excommunicated by name by the Pope in the crimen criminosum, namely, by furnishing him assistance or favor.

XVII. Clerics knowingly and voluntarily communicating in divine things with persons excommunicated by name by the Roman Pontiff and receiving them in the offices ⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ From the Edict of 24 August 1613, by command of Paul V, and the Constitution Ex commissae of Clement X, 13 January 1672. Since in those same crypts (says Avanzini, no. 37), or catacombs, bones and ashes are everywhere found in open niches, concerning which it is now established that they are not the bones and ashes of martyrs but of the faithful who were laid there, one who, while visiting the crypts, takes for himself something from these bones or ashes as a remembrance or for the sake of devotion does not appear to incur the censure. It is otherwise if there is question of relics concerning which it is not yet established whether they are of Martyrs or merely of the faithful.

⁴⁷ By the ancient law, all who had incurred major excommunication, whether imposed ab homine or by law, were to be avoided, with this distinction alone: those whose excommunication was public and notorious were to be avoided publicly; but those whose excommunication was not publicly known were to be avoided only privately by those who were aware of it. See chapter Cum non ab homine 14, On the Sentence of Excommunication.

Then by the new law introduced by Martin V, it was granted that no one was bound to abstain from communion with anyone, whatever censure, whether by law or ab homine, bound him, unless a sentence against a definite person had been specially and expressly published by the judge; or unless it was so notoriously established that someone had incurred the excommunication imposed by the Canon through a sacrilegious laying of hands upon a cleric that the deed could not be concealed by any evasion or excused by any defense.

But on account of communication with one to be avoided, minor excommunication was incurred by the law itself, both if one communicated with him in divine and spiritual things and if in other merely civil matters. Nevertheless, in two cases, not minor but major excommunication was incurred by the law itself for this cause: 1. if a cleric had communicated in divine things with one excommunicated by the Supreme Pontiff, not in any manner whatever, but by admitting him voluntarily, freely, and willingly, while knowing that he was excommunicated by the Pope by name and, in addition, denounced (from chapter Significavit 18, this title; see Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, no. 179); 2. if someone had communicated with one to be avoided in the crimen criminosum, or in the crime on account of which someone was struck with excommunication by name and denounced as such, by furnishing him assistance, counsel, or favor, lest he repent of that crime.

But by the most recent law of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, first, minor excommunication was entirely abolished. Major excommunication nevertheless remains; but it is not incurred except by those who communicate with one excommunicated by name by the Supreme Pontiff, and this only in the two aforesaid cases, namely: 1. according to article XVI, if they communicate in the crimen criminosum with one excommunicated by name by the Supreme Pontiff; and 2. according to article XVII, if Clerics knowingly and voluntarily receive one excommunicated in this manner in divine offices, that is, admit him to the exercise of those offices. To the former, as is evident, both clerics and laics are subject; but to the latter, clerics only. Moreover, by one excommunicated by name by the Pontiff is not understood one who, after he has incurred a papal excommunication, is then denounced by name as excommunicated by any other Ordinary; but one who has been excommunicated by name by the same Pontiff, or one excommunicated by Him who is denounced by name.

XVIII. Those presuming outside the point of death to absolve from excommunications reserved in a special manner to the Apostolic See, without the due faculty, even under any pretext whatever (Constitution Apostolicae Sedis) ⁴⁸.

XIX. Clerics or laics, in whatever dignity they may shine forth, even imperial or royal, who presume, by themselves or through others, by force or fear inflicted, or even through substituted persons, Clerics or laics, or by any art or under any specious pretext whatever, to convert to their own uses and usurp the jurisdictions, goods, revenues, and rights, even feudal and emphyteutic, the fruits, emoluments, or any proceeds whatever of any Church, or of any secular or regular Benefice, of charitable loan institutions, and of other pious places, which ought to be converted to the necessities of ministers and the poor; or to impede them from being received by those to whom they belong by law. Council of Trent, session 22, chapter 11, On Reformation ⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ In this case are not comprehended those who, according to the Canons, absolve persons legitimately impeded from approaching the Apostolic See even from cases specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.

⁴⁹ That those withholding tithes or impeding them are not comprehended by this Tridentine sanction is sufficiently gathered from the fact that in session 25, chapter 12, On Reformation, these are said to be excommunicated thus: The Holy Synod commands all, of whatever rank and condition they may be, to whom the payment of tithes pertains, that henceforth they pay in full those which they are bound by law to pay.... But let those who withhold or impede them be excommunicated; nor are they to be absolved from this crime unless full restitution has followed.

Moreover, it is manifest that the purchasers of the ecclesiastical goods of which there is question also fall under this censure: both because (as Avanzini rightly says, no. 62) purchasers convert goods of this kind to their own uses by usurping them under the guise of a contract, although they know that the usurper is neither their owner nor legitimate administrator, and finally that the goods are stolen and cry out for their owner; and because this point of law was defined by the Allocution of 25 July 1873, in which this Decree of Trent is also brought forward.

Avanzini judged (Commentary, page LVIII) that the excommunication imposed upon Missionaries engaging in commerce, etc., should be referred to this place. But this will be treated more conveniently below, where there is discussion of excommunications reserved to no one.