Point I. Presence of Body

Moral and continuous presence of the body is required.

341. I. Moral, namely a person must be so present where Mass is being celebrated that he can be called one of the number of those assisting and offering the Sacrifice; for this it is enough that he be in a place from which he can follow the Mass with respect to its principal parts, whether by seeing, or by hearing, or by attending to the signs of the other assistants.

II. Continuous, that is, persevering from the beginning to the end of Mass, so that he sins gravely who omits a notable part of it, and venially who omits a slight part, unless he is excused by a just cause.

Resolves. 1. He validly assists at Mass who, although he does not see the priest nor hear the words, distinguishes the parts of the Mass by the sound of the bell, the singing of the choir, or the movements of the assistants, to whom he is morally joined, although he is outside the church, in which the crowd cannot be contained. Likewise he who stands behind the altar, behind a column, or behind a wall, provided he can advert to the principal parts of the Mass.

2. Likewise, more probably, he who is in a nearby house, from which through a window or door he sees the altar or the assistants, or distinguishes the parts of the Mass, provided there is a small space between the church and the place in which he is. It is otherwise if a great space or a street intervenes, as is more commonly taught. - St. Alphonsus, n. 312.

3. He does not assist at Mass who remains far away, even if he sees the church, the altar, and the crowd, because in common usage he cannot be said to hear and to be morally present. According to Lugo and others, a space of thirty paces from the crowd of assistants does not seem so great that it prevents someone from being present at Mass ¹.

¹ Understand this resolution, like the preceding one, concerning one who looks out from a house, etc., but with a long space, for example of a street, interposed. For if someone in the corner or chapel of an immense basilica can advert to what the priest celebrating in the opposite part, however distant, is doing, he certainly satisfies; for whoever is within the church is sufficiently present at Mass.

** Concerning the opinion of Cardinal de Lugo about a distance of thirty paces, St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 312) writes that Tamburini in Croix (lib. 3, p. 1, n. 643) does not admit it. But Tamburini (Decal., lib. 4, c. 2, §1, n. 14) has it thus: "I infer secondly that from the window of your house, if there is a small distance to the altar of the church, you can satisfy the precept by hearing Mass from there, even if a public way is between. Thus de Lugo, De Euch., disp. 22, n. 21, because in this way you are truly morally present at the Mass. It will be otherwise at a great distance according to the judgment of a prudent person, on account of the opposite reason." Now de Lugo does not indicate there generically a small distance, but only one which extends to thirty paces. Thus he says (l.c.): "It can happen that a window is so near the altar that it does not impede moral presence; as in fact in this our Roman College we have a private chapel whose altar is no more than thirty paces distant from the windows of the opposite house, and for that reason Mass can be heard or perceived from that window, although a public way intervenes." Therefore Tamburini plainly embraces the opinion of de Lugo.

342. Questions. Q. 1. What omission is to be regarded as grave or light in Mass?

Resp. It cannot easily be determined ²; for although according to all a third part of Mass is notable, nevertheless it is not clear what the third part is, since a notable part must not be judged only from duration. Yet the following things seem able to be established according to the common opinion.

² As regards the judgment whether the penitent sinned gravely or lightly by these omissions, this question is scarcely of any use. For these omissions generally happen by chance and involuntarily, or from a certain negligence. But in sins of negligence, as Suarez appropriately observes in this matter (De Euch., disp. 88, sect. 2), the gravity is not to be measured by the event or effect, but by the foresight of these things. Therefore the question serves almost only for this, that it be defined when someone, by force of the precept, is bound again to hear another Mass if he omitted part of one; or whether, when some part has been omitted, whether culpably or inculpably, someone is bound by force of the precept to assist at the part which remains and at which alone he can be present.

Moreover, although by force of the precept we are bound to be present at the whole Mass in such a way that no voluntary omission per se lacks some fault, nevertheless, since not all parts have the same dignity, and since the character of the Mass of the catechumens is one thing and that of the Mass of the faithful another, which extends from the Offertory to the consumption, indeed since in this itself some parts are essential to the Sacrifice, while others have more or less proximity and necessity to the substance of the Sacrifice, hence the reason is clear why the gravity of omission or satisfaction of the precept as to substance must be defined now by the material measure of time, and now by the dignity of the parts.

1. It is grave to omit everything up to and including the Offertory. But it is certainly light to omit everything up to, but excluding, the Epistle, and more probably also including it; indeed probably even, according to St. Alphonsus, n. 310, up to and including the Gospel, although the holy Doctor holds the opposite opinion as more probable. The reason for these things is that the things which precede do not properly pertain to the Sacrifice, but are only, as it were, preparation for it. - Lugo, etc.

2. According to all, it is grave to omit everything before the Gospel and at the same time everything after Communion; but not to omit only those things which follow Communion, indeed not even to omit everything before the Epistle and everything after Communion. - St. Alphonsus, n. 310. - Lacroix, n. 666.

3. The omission of the Canon from the Consecration up to, but excluding, the Pater must be held grave; because it is a notable part by duration and dignity. But the omission of the Offertory is regarded as light; likewise the omission of the Creed ³ and of the Preface, even if they are sung, because these do not pertain to the essence of the Mass. - St. Alphonsus, ibid. - The Gospel of St. John at the end probably is not a part of the Mass, because before it the people are already dismissed by the blessing.

³ St. Alphonsus judges with others that the Creed, whether it is sung or recited, as being a non-regular part, is not to be considered, lib. 3, n. 310.

4. It is grave to omit the Consecration and Communion; indeed also the Consecration alone, because it is the most dignified part, in which, at least chiefly, the notion of Sacrifice consists. Indeed, more probably, it is grave not to be present at even one Consecration alone, because the essence of the Sacrifice more probably consists in each Consecration. - St. Alphonsus, Homo apostolicus, n. 33.

But whether to pass over Communion alone is grave is disputed; the affirmative opinion is more probable to St. Alphonsus, because he judges that the essence of the Sacrifice consists also in Communion. Nevertheless the more common opinion places it in the Consecration alone.

343. Q. 2. Whether one who hears two half Masses from different priests, either simultaneously or successively, satisfies the precept?

Resp. 1. No, if he hears them simultaneously. The reason is drawn from the common interpretation of the law, which is confirmed by proposition 53, condemned by Innocent XI, and reads thus: "He satisfies the precept of the Church concerning hearing Mass who hears two of its parts, indeed four, simultaneously from diverse celebrants."

Resp. 2. But if successively, distinguish. 1. No, if the Consecration and Communion are not in the same part. The reason is that the Church commands the faithful to be present at an integral and perfect Sacrifice. But that is not had unless both the Consecration and Communion come together in the same Mass. - St. Alphonsus, Homo apostolicus, n. 34. - 2. But it is affirmed, probably, if the Consecration and Communion are found in the same Mass; because then the integral notion of the Sacrifice is had in the same part. - St. Alphonsus, n. 311. - Lugo, Azor, against others.

Q. 3. Whether he ought to hear the remaining parts who arrives after the Consecration?

Resp. Probably no, because the essence of the Sacrifice is now lacking; and therefore the obligation of assisting at it ceases, since the precept cannot be fulfilled by this. - Mazzotta, St. Alphonsus, n. 310, and others ⁴.

⁴ Here the VV. (p. 920) object the words of St. Alphonsus (Hom. Ap., tr. 6, n. 33): "We say that the opposite must be held with Continuator Tournely and Fr. Zacharia in Croix. The reason is that, since it is sufficiently probable that the essence of the Sacrifice consists in the consumption, we say that he is indeed obligated." - Resp. 1. It must be held as sufficiently probable that the essence of the Sacrifice consists in the consumption, I deny, or let it pass. It must be held that a foundation which is merely sufficiently probable suffices for inducing an obligation, I deny. - Resp. 2. Collet relies on a reason which, as the same St. Alphonsus says, does not persuade; but Croix (not Zacharia, who does not have even a word about this matter), when he is induced to prefer such an opinion as more probable, is induced by that same reason which St. Alphonsus rejects in Collet. You may conclude that neither Collet nor Croix adds even the smallest weight to that opinion.

The VV. add (l.c.) these other words of St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 310): "This affirmative opinion is very probable, and in practice must be held, as Fr. Zacharia," that is, Croix, "says from another reason, namely that a notable part of the ceremony prescribed by the Church can be heard." - Resp. 1. The Church prescribes that the faithful be present at the Sacrifice and the ceremonies connected with the Sacrifice, I concede. She prescribes that they be present at the ceremonies alone without the Sacrifice, indeed even only at some part of the ceremonies, I deny. - Resp. 2. This affirmative opinion is very probable, let it pass; therefore in practice it must be held, I distinguish: as a matter of good counsel, I concede; as a matter of precept, I deny. St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 132, in the letter to Rev. Abbot Bartholomew De Marco) inculcates that saying (c. Cum iure 32, De Offic. et Potest. iudic. deleg.): "Unless you shall have been certain of the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is mandated." And a little after, the same St. Alphonsus says: "Hence Benedict XIV, most wisely, in his work On the Synod, in many chapters warns bishops of nothing else than never to condemn as grave sin those opinions which doctors of each side defend as probable."

Q. 4. Whether he who omits a light part of Mass is bound to supply it, if he can?

Resp. It is affirmed more probably, because he is bound to hear a whole Mass; except unless the matter concerns a very slight part. - Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 310. - The Salamancans against others ⁵. Besides, a sufficiently light reason can exempt from this obligation of supplying. - See Cases, n. 345 and following.

⁵ And those others indeed, as is easy to understand, judged their own opinion more probable. Of these, Suarez (De Euch., disp. 88, sect. 2) excuses from supplying the omitted part, whether the defect was involuntary or voluntary; because, he says, "the precept has already been fulfilled substantially... and that mode of supplying it is very imperfect, and does not contribute much to the integrity of the Mass... and because moral matters are not to be weighed so rigorously, especially when they are lighter."

But it is worthwhile here to remember that obligations are proposed or urged in vain whenever the matter is contained within the limits of probability. For a probable, or even more probable, obligation is not an obligation, nor can it lawfully be imposed as a true obligation, when non-obligation is probable, as was handed down above in the tract on conscience. Therefore mention of probable obligations of this sort will perhaps be able to serve for some erudition, but for practice and for prescribing duties it can contribute nothing.