Point II. On Cooperation

248. • DEFINITION. Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. - But insofar as it can be opposed to Charity, it is a certain participation in the depraved action of another ¹.

¹ Cooperation can be opposed to charity, insofar as this virtue requires that we impede the sins of others, and accordingly that we not assist others in sinning by our works.

DIVISION. Cooperation is distinguished:

1º Immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator acts with the sinner in the very act of sin, or places other actions having some connection with the sin of another.

2º Proximate or remote, according as the action of the cooperator is connected more nearly or more remotely with the depraved action of another.

3º Positive or negative, according as the cooperator either places some action influencing the sin of another, for example by helping him, or omits a due act, for example if he does not obstruct, when he ought to obstruct.

4º Formal, which concurs with the evil will of another, and cannot be without sin; or material, which concurs only with the evil action of another without the intention of cooperating with sin.

There is also direct or indirect, physical or moral cooperation, as was said where voluntary in itself and in its cause was discussed: De Act. hum. n. 5. and 7.

Cooperation is made chiefly in nine ways, namely by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising, providing recourse, participating in action or profit, being silent, not obstructing, not manifesting. Hence the verses

Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse,
Participant, mute, not obstructing, not manifesting.

See the things to be said in the Treatise on Justice.

Principles. - I. It is certain that formal cooperation is never lawful, since this morally influences the sin of another, and consequently is a moral cause of it. - St. Lig. n. 63.

II. Material cooperation is lawful, provided the action is per se good or at least indifferent, and there is present a just and proportionate cause relative to the gravity of the sin of another, and to the proximity of the concurrence to the execution of the sin. The reason is, because when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if another should wish to abuse it for executing sin, you are bound to impede that only from Charity; and since Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore by placing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin; for his sin does not arise from your cooperation, but from the malice of the one who abuses your action. - St. Lig. ibid. - See On Human Acts, n. 9.

III. The greater the reason required for cooperating, the nearer and greater the cooperation is, - the more probable and worse the effect that is to follow is, - the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin, - the more the sin is repugnant to justice or Charity.

249. Resolves. - 1º What cannot be granted without sin can never be asked ², such as the violation of some obligation, for example from a notary something opposed to his office.

² Understand this when the malice holds itself on the part of the act, but not if merely on the part of the agent, as is clear from Resol. 3.

2º It is not lawful to paint obscene things; nor is it lawful to guard the rear for a thief, because it is to influence the depraved will of the thief ³. - St. Lig. n. 571.

³ Recall the first example rather to the general doctrine on scandal; and then except, if something of this kind must be painted, for example for the aid of anatomical or obstetrical science. The other example supposes a common design with the thief; for otherwise to watch for another and to warn him are acts indifferent per se, and consequently they could be recalled to material cooperation.

3º It is lawful to ask a loan from a usurer, Sacraments from an unworthy minister, an oath from him who perhaps will perjure himself, provided there is a just cause. - St. Lig. n. 77. 79.

Namely chiefly 1º with regard to servants; 2º with regard to workers; 3º with regard to merchants; 4º with regard to innkeepers.

From the principles posited above it can for the most part be gathered when servants and others can or cannot cooperate with the sins of masters, associates, or others. Nevertheless several doubts are to be solved for the greater clarity of matters. Hence:

250. Questions. - Q. 1º Can a servant, from fear of death or mutilation, place his shoulders under his master ascending to fornicate?

Resp. Affirm. more probably, because he does not place an action intrinsically evil. - St. Lig. n. 66. 68. But afterward he is bound to leave the house of his master, if he fears anything else of this kind. - Scavini. Resolve the same in similar cases.

Q. 2º Is it lawful for a servant to open the door of the house to a prostitute?

Resp. The more common affirm, provided there is another who, if he himself did not open, would open. - St. Lig. n. 66. For this circumstance makes the cooperation sufficiently remote.

Nevertheless several contend that it is never lawful to open the door to a prostitute, and they rely on the following proposition 51, condemned by Innocent XI: A servant who, with shoulders lowered, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to deflower a virgin, and serves him many times, by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally, if he does this from fear of notable detriment, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house. - But these words opening a door manifestly must be understood of opening by force another's house, as is clear from the context. Besides, this proposition is damnable because it permitted cooperation even for the lightest cause, namely lest the servant be looked upon even with stern eyes.

In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, usurers or prostitutes are permitted to dwell, it is lawful to rent a house to them, especially if other tenants are lacking, or if it would be easy for them to rent other buildings; unless nevertheless the prostitutes gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the situation of the dwelling they furnish a greater occasion for sinning. - St. Lig. n. 70.

251. • Q. 3º Can a servant, by reason of service, saddle the horse of a master about to set out for sinning, or accompany him?

Resp. Indeed it does not seem illicit if the servant only saddles the horse, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more with the sin of the master than by opening the door to a prostitute ⁴. But unless grave harm threatens, it would not be permitted to him to accompany the master to the place where the sin is to be committed, because the cooperation is nearer. - St. Lig. n. 64, and in Retract. n. 10. ⁵.

⁴ To saddle the horse for a master seems to bear itself toward his sin in the same way as to hand him shoes or a hat when he is about to leave the house.

⁵ St. Alphonsus affirms this not absolutely, but only as more probable, saying: More probably the reason of service alone does not suffice for this, even if without the servant's help the master would go; at least fear that is grave is required. Thus Sanchez Dec. Lib. 1. Cap. 7. n. 22., Viva in Prop. 51., Innoc. XI., n. 5., Salmant. Tract. 21. Cap. 8. n. 72. For the rest, neither Sanchez nor the Salmanticenses actually have the doctrine which St. Alphonsus here hands down in their name; but they suppose that the sin of the master, if the servant did not accompany him, was to be avoided. Thus Sanchez (l. c.): It is deduced that servants can saddle the horse, accompany and wait for the master (when not for the sake of keeping watch, as we shall say in the following number), although they know that he goes away to fornicate. Because these services are indifferent of themselves, nor are they exhibited by servants so that they may connive at the depraved intention of the master, but by an urgent necessity of obeying a master commanding an indifferent thing. Thus Angles, Navarr., Manuel... But the common reason of service

I judge not to excuse servants when that master would avoid the sin, if the servant did not saddle the horse or did not accompany him. For then a more ample cause would be required, such as that this service could not conveniently be denied to the master, and that it would be troublesome and harmful to the servant to leave the master on this account. - But the Salmanticenses (l. c.): It is lawful for servants... to accompany the master to the house of a concubine, when even if the servant were not his companion, the master would go, nor is he rendered bolder from this, because then it is mere accompaniment. But if the master were employing the servant as companion so that he might sin more safely and freely, ... it would be altogether illicit; because then it would already influence the sin proximately. See Sanch. and Diana... Therefore neither reason nor the authority of A. supports the doctrine; for Viva too, alleged by St. Alphonsus, relies only on a fallacious citation of Sanchez.

** VV. undertook to attack this Note in altogether sixteen columns (Pages 165-172.); whether by useful labor or by vain labor, let the equitable reader judge.

1º For could they bring forward anything by which they would show that that is false which shines forth evidently from the texts premised, namely that both Sanchez and the Salmanticenses teach the opposite opinion to that which St. Alphonsus attributed to them, who otherwise confirms his opinion by no argument other than by the authority of these? By no means indeed.

2º VV. heaped up many things from many Authors through those sixteen columns. But could they produce even one testimony of anyone, Viva excepted, in which the opinion of St. Alphonsus is contained, namely that even when without the help of the servant the master would go, the reason of service does not suffice so that he can licitly saddle the horse or accompany the master? By no means indeed. For the rest, what is said in the Note, that Viva relies only on a fallacious citation of Sanchez, is indeed less exact: namely it ought to have been written that Viva relies on a fallacious citation both of Sanchez and of Navarrus. For that Viva wrongly alleged also Navarrus is clear from the words which even VV. themselves (Page 169. in the Note) describe; since in them Navarrus speaks of servants when, if they themselves did not accompany, the master would not go; whereas Viva speaks (l. c.) of a servant who merely materially accompanies the master, and therefore is in no way a cause that the master goes out to sin.

Since these things are so, and since nothing else occurs in those sixteen columns which pertains to this question, there is no need that anything further be added here. It is useful to remember this one thing, also with regard to this question, that probabilities do not furnish a foundation by which the Confessor can impose obligations.

Q. 4º Is it lawful for a servant to carry gifts to a prostitute?

Resp. Neg. at least without a very grave cause, because since these gifts are apt for fostering lust, the cooperation is proximate ⁶. - Thus commonly. Indeed St. Lig. n. 65 judges this intrinsically evil; because per se they foster shameful love. But more probably Viva contradicts this with others.

⁶ Sporer, on the contrary, excuses these servants (de V. Praecepto Cap. 1. n. 99.), because (he says) on the one hand they by their office and condition are bound to serve and obey their masters; but on the other hand cooperation with sin is merely material, and only remote. Nor is that true which A. intimates, that the opposite opinion is commonly taught. For St. Alphonsus alleges no one for it except Concina, and the reason which the latter brings forward is rejected by all.

** There are two things which we must prove concerning this Note against the objections of VV. (Pages 173-175.). First, that no one, Concina excepted, favors the opinion of St. Alphonsus; second, that the reason brought forward by him, namely that carrying gifts is intrinsically evil, is rejected by all.

And as to the first, the matter is clear from this, that VV. were able to allege no one except Concina. For Amort and Cardenas, whom they invoke, do not have this question.

But the second becomes manifest from this, that even the Authors alleged by VV. (but not fully) acknowledge that this is lawful, at least if a grave cause is at hand. But if the thing is intrinsically evil, for no cause, and even if otherwise death is threatened, does it ever become lawful. Therefore.

With regard to this latter point, VV. acknowledge (Page 174.) that the reason of Concina, adopted by St. Alphonsus, is opposed to the common opinion of the Doctors; nevertheless they warn (ibid. p. 173.) that it could not have been rejected by all Authors, since Concina is later than they. - Resp. In order that the Doctors should reject Concina's reason, it was by no means necessary that they should foresee that someday Concina would employ it. But the Doctors more than sufficiently rejected that reason, when all, and even Cardenas, unanimously either supposed, or established as undoubted and evident, that the action about which the question is, or others of this kind, are per se indifferent. For to say that one and the same thing is per se indifferent, and at the same time intrinsically evil, is to speak contradictory things.

Q. 5º Is it lawful for a servant to carry amorous letters to the concubine of his master?

Resp. Neg., unless there is present a very grave reason. Indeed according to St. Lig. n. 68, it is never lawful, even when a most grave cause has been posited, because (as he says) this is intrinsically evil ⁷; nevertheless Vogler teaches the opposite with others. For the rest, a servant is not bound to inquire what is contained in the letters.

⁷ As sometimes at other times, so also here, it happened to St. Alphonsus that he was led away by fallacious allegations which he found among the Salmanticenses and Dominic Viva. For not even one of the doctors whom the Salmanticenses and Viva bring forward actually hands down a doctrine circumscribed by those limits. Thus, for example, Sanchez, whom all these allege, after many things concludes (Dec. Lib. 1. Cap. 7. n. 26.): Wherefore then these servants are judged to be, and truly are, pimps, when, helping the depraved intention of the master, they exhibit these services, as commonly happens; otherwise, when compelled by a good intention and by necessity of avoiding their own notable harm.

** VV. contend that St. Alphonsus was not indeed led away by fallacious allegations, as is said in this Note, but rather that readers are led into error by fallacious assertions from the author of the Note. Thus VV., who then through ten columns (Pages 175-180.) try to prove that the opinion of Sanchez, Bonacina, Laymann, Tamburini, Croix, etc., is the same as that of St. Alphonsus.

But VV. do not seem to have sufficiently inspected the thesis of St. Alphonsus. For how does that saying of St. Alphonsus, never lawful, cohere with the words of Sanchez, described in the Note, saying that one is excused by fear of notable harm? VV. also (Page 176.) wished to bring forward for themselves certain words of Sanchez; but they ought not to have cut off from that text also these words: For since these things (namely, by writing or by a messenger to agree with the concubine that she come at such an hour, or to such a place, or await the master), although in themselves indifferent, come very near to sin, and seem to cooperate with it almost directly, the common reason of service will not excuse, but notable detriment of the servant will. Now the never lawful of St. Alphonsus and the notable detriment excuses of Sanchez are mutually in conflict.

VV. bring forward for themselves the text of Bonacina. But they truncate these words: The same must be said (namely, that one can be excused when it is not lawful to desist from things of this kind... without grave harm) concerning a servant who... carries gifts or a letter, or acts as a messenger, or who writes letters, in which it is contained that a prostitute come to him at such a time... Now do perhaps that saying of Bonacina, one can be excused etc., and that saying of St. Alphonsus, never lawful, cohere?

Then VV. describe in the aforesaid aim certain words of Tamburini. But the things which followed there, and stand in this way, were not to be omitted by them (In Dec. Lib. 5. c. 1. §. 4. n. 19.): Besides, a subject will be excused not from the reason of service alone, but by fear of notable detriment... if he reports to the adulteress..., that at such an hour she should come to the house of the master, or to the appointed place...; for these things and similar things, since they are somewhat nearer to the sin of the one abusing, need a cause somewhat graver than is the reason of service. But that he will be excused of Tamburini, and that never lawful of St. Alphonsus, are far distant from each other.

VV. pluck out some words from Laymann (Lib. 2. Tr. 3. C. 13. n. 5.). But three things ought to have been noted. 1º Laymann speaks only doubtingly or by way of opinion: It does not seem, he says, to be permitted. 2º Laymann alleges for this opinion Angles against Navarrus, who (Laymann continues) says that services of this kind also of servants, if they are done by command without depraved affection, can be excused from mortal sin: and Rodriguez and Azor in part followed him: in whom you see opinions reported on both sides. 3º The reason is brought forward by Laymann, that these things contain a certain species of pimping; but in these things you have a hypothesis different from the hypothesis of Navarrus; whence it happens that on account of the diversity of hypotheses the two conclusions, otherwise opposite in appearance, are very well reconciled, as you can discern them reconciled in the text of Sanchez described in the Note, and as Rodriguez also reconciles them (Sum. P. 1. Cap. 205. n. 3.) saying: And thus they seem to me able to be reconciled with Navarrus who rise up against him, among whom is Angles: yet that absolute saying of St. Alphonsus, never lawful, does not admit this reconciliation.

VV. report certain words also from Mazzotta (Tr. 2. Disp. 2. Q. 1. c. 3. §. 4.). But they do not well omit the preceding things, in which, when he also reviews to carry messages or writings... containing the appointment of place or hour; these he enumerates among those things: for which the reason of service does not suffice, but a more urgent cause is required..., because they are actions, however indifferent according to themselves, yet nearer to the sin of another. These indeed, as is clear, are wholly repugnant to the absolute opinion of St. Alphonsus, never lawful.

For the rest, both from Mazzotta and also from others, the reason can be detected why VV. could seize upon some words from the cited Doctors which seem to harmonize with the opinion of St. Alphonsus, although nevertheless the things which we have brought forward up to this point plainly show that the opinion of St. Alphonsus is one thing, and the opinion of those Doctors another. For Mazzotta (l. c.) excepts shameful writings; and below he excepts knowingly carrying shameful messages or writings, or writing them. Sanchez (Dec. Lib. 1. c. 7. n. 26.) condemns if the writing contains shameful and amorous words or signs, and dishonorable things. Likewise Tamburini (l. c.) reproves if they contain shameful and amorous things, or things directly provoking to sin. And Laymann (l. c.) discusses letters inciting to shameful things and the induction of a woman to sin. Therefore the Doctors distinguish when writings or messages contain a direct provocation to shameful things and to sinning, and when otherwise. And Croix indeed (Lib. 2. n. 273.) touches only the other hypothesis, namely concerning letters or messages tending directly to sin, and likewise Viva (In Prop. 51. Innoc. XI. n. 5.) concerning letters provoking to sin. Rebellus, on the contrary, touches only the other hypothesis, concerning which the Doctors above; (P. I. Lib. 2. Q. 14. n. 53.).

Now since St. Alphonsus distinguishes nothing, and therefore when he alleges Rebellus as contrary to himself, he manifestly pronounces that never lawful concerning any hypothesis whatever; it is plain that the Holy Doctor departed from the authors whom he brings forward for himself after the Salmanticenses and Viva.

Now the things which have been said concerning servants are to be applied almost to other inferiors or subjects, for example to children, wives, etc.

252. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it lawful for workers to build theaters, adorn them, etc.?

Resp. 1º As to building, it seems generally to be lawful, even if another grave reason is lacking; the reason is that it is lawful for Princes to permit spectacles.

Resp. 2º As to ornaments and other actions to be furnished by workers, it likewise seems lawful, if these are honorable in themselves, because the cooperation seems so remote that it is not sinful.

Q. 2º Is it lawful for workers to build temples of heretics?

Resp. 1º Neg. absolutely, if this is sought by heretics out of hatred of Religion.

Resp. 2º Affirm. in another hypothesis, when a grave cause urges, scandal and any contempt of Religion nevertheless being excluded ⁸.

⁸ Concerning this matter Laymann (Lib. 2. Cap. 13. n. 4.): It is right to restore or build synagogues of Jews, temples of heretics, when the legitimate magistrate permits: concerning which Navarrus can be seen Lib. 5. Consil. 1. De Judaeis. And St. Alphonsus seems to have followed him (Lib. 2. n. 72.), as also Croix (Lib. 2. n. 250.), since they add no observation to Busembaum bringing forward the same doctrine from Laymann.

Q. 3º Is it lawful to make statues of false gods?

Resp. 1º Affirm., if these ought not to be employed for false worship, but for the ornament of streets, buildings, etc.

Resp. 2º Neg. altogether, if they are to be handed over to a pagan..., etc. - St. Lig. n. 69.

253. • Q. 4º Is it lawful for Christian captives, from grave fear, to row in the galleys of infidels against Catholics?

Resp. Affirm.; for they do not do anything intrinsically evil, nor proximately pernicious to Christians; on the other hand, from a most grave cause they are impelled to rowing, as is clear. - St. Lig. n. 73, etc.

Q. 5º Is it ever lawful to cooperate with publishing evil books?

Resp. 1º Generally it does not seem lawful immediately to cooperate with the printing of such books, for example to arrange the type, to set the paper to the type, to direct the printing, etc., because this is something intrinsically materially evil. Yet in the case of most grave detriment Laymann indicates that such a thing can be furnished for a brief time, de Charitate c. 13. n. 4.

Resp. 2º But it is lawful for a grave cause to cooperate mediately, or remotely, for example to prepare ink or paper, or to arrange printed books. - Thus commonly.

254. Rules. - First. It is lawful to sell indifferent things, or things which can easily have a good use, if the seller knows nothing concerning the evil intention of the buyer, because evil is not to be presumed.

Second. It is not lawful to sell indifferent things when it is certainly known that the buyer will use them badly, unless they cannot be denied without grave inconvenience.

Third. It is not lawful to sell things which from their institution or use are destined for evil, unless in the particular case it is established that the danger of abuse is absent, or unless a grave and proportionate reason excuses. - Vogler, n. 315..., etc.

Resolves. - 1º It is lawful for artisans or merchants to sell dice, swords, paints..., etc., although very many abuse these, because these things are not ordered per se to sin; indeed they often serve a good use, nor can they simply be impeded. - St. Lig. n. 71., and in Retr. n. 14.

2º It is lawful to sell honorable ornaments to a girl, which perhaps she will abuse, especially if she would equally buy from others; otherwise, however, if it were established to the seller himself concerning future abuse, unless otherwise he would suffer notable harm ⁹. - St. Lig. n. 71. - See Sanchez, de praeceptis Decalogi, l. 1. c. 7. n. 12., where he aptly warns that the solution of these questions depends upon the consideration of many circumstances ¹⁰.

⁹ The doctrine conceived in these words is altogether singular, and does not have support from the things which St. Alph. discusses lib. 2. n. 47. (to which place St. Alphonsus himself refers), nor is it true that it is handed down by Palaus or Suarez, who are usually alleged for it. The common doctrine is thus expounded by Croix (Lib. 2. n. 263.): He does not sin who sells ornaments to a girl, who through them will solicit others to sin, which ornaments would be sold by another. Thus Sanchez, Navar., Azor, Bonac., Diana... The reason is, partly because that sale is something indifferent and remotely bearing itself toward sin; partly also because if the seller sinned, it would therefore be because he does not impede the sin of the neighbor; but, although he did not sell, he would not for that reason impede it, for there would be another who would sell. Therefore by selling he does not sin. Compare the things which Sanchez, also alleged by A., discusses, whose words are brought forward in the following Note.

** In this Note nothing is said concerning the opinion of St. Alphonsus, as is clear; but it is only intimated that the opinion of Fr. Gury does not have support in St. Alphonsus, whom nevertheless he alleges; and the reason is that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus and Fr. Gury is not the same. Nevertheless VV. (Pages 180-185.) undertook to attack the Note through ten columns, because (they say) perhaps readers will extend to the doctrine of St. Alphonsus the things which are said concerning the opinion of Gury! But in reality it does not seem worth the labor to pursue even those things which do not bear upon the matter. Therefore let those take care of these things, if any are seized by suspicions of this kind.

Let there be some response to that one thing which pertains to Palaus and Suarez alleged in the Note. VV. contend that Palaus and Suarez favor the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. - Resp. Let it pass, and I deny the consequence with regard to Gury, because his opinion is not the same as that of St. Alphonsus; and neither Palaus nor Suarez requires that which Gury has, that is, notable harm.

¹⁰ The things which Sanchez has are truly excellent; from them one may learn how many are the things which need diligent consideration, so that questions so manifold and varied in this matter may be rightly defined. Therefore, after distinguishing both those things which can serve only for evil, and those whose use is indifferent to good and evil, he discusses these things thus (In Decal. Lib. 1. C. 7. n. 12.): The same cause will not always be sufficient for excusing the ministration of these indifferent things. The reason is gathered from what has been said. For since the obligation of avoiding that ministration arises from the obligation of the virtue to which that sin of the neighbor, to which that occasion is given, is opposed, and the obligation of all virtues is not equal, but some oblige more than another; nor are the occasions equal, because some are more indifferent and bear themselves more remotely toward evil abuse, but some come more proximately to it and contain greater malice in themselves; moreover neither is the preparation of the one about to abuse them for evil use always equal, but sometimes he is more, sometimes less prepared; nor is the hope that he will desist from the depraved abuse, if I do not minister, always equal: therefore an equal cause will not always be proportionate for excusing this ministration, but sometimes a greater, sometimes a lesser will be necessary. Wherefore no certain rule of the quantity of this cause can be prescribed, but it must be left to the judgment of a prudent man. But in order that that judgment be prudent, he ought to attend, that a greater cause is required in proportion as the sin to which that ministration gives occasion is graver; and in proportion as it more proximately touches that sin, or of itself is more determined to evil; and in proportion as the effect of sin is more certain; and in proportion as it is more probable that that sin will be impeded by not ministering this. Therefore it must be observed most especially, that a more urgent cause is required which excuses one furnishing these indifferent things, when the abuse is against justice, and such a cause as can deservedly be preferred to the damage of another. And the reason is, because one is held by a greater bond to avoid the sins of another which are against justice than those which are against charity alone. For in the former an innocent person unwillingly suffers damage; but in the latter only the sinner suffers spiritual detriment, and this by his own will. He undergoes the same spiritual detriment when he sins against justice. And thus well Azor, lib. 8. Tom. 1. c. 22. q. 6., and cap. 24. q. 14. judges that the loss which someone suffers if he does not sell his goods which he has for sale is a just cause for selling indifferent things which of themselves do not proximately touch evil use, and when that use is not against justice.

3º It is lawful to sell meats on days of abstinence and in the time of Lent, because the seller cannot judge concerning the reasons of those buying, nor does it pertain to him to inquire concerning them. - Lacroix, n. 258.

4º It is not lawful to sell poison, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it well, for example for the preparation of colors, medicine, etc.; because very great destruction of the human race would follow if this were permitted indiscriminately. - Vogler, n. 316.

255. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it lawful for innkeepers to give wine to those who are foreseen that they will become drunk?

Resp. It is not lawful without a grave reason, as is clear. But it is lawful on account of fear of some grave harm, for example cruelties, quarrels, etc.; because Charity does not oblige that we turn another away from sin with grave inconvenience. Likewise for preventing blasphemies, which are graver evils. - St. Lig. n. 69. - Billuart, de Scandalo, art. 6.

Q. 2º Is it lawful for innkeepers to give meats on prohibited days?

Resp. 1º It is not lawful by one's own motion without a sufficient reason, or unless fear of grave harm urges.

2º But it is commonly lawful when meats are asked for, unless the request is made in contempt of Religion; the reason is that it would be too difficult to inquire concerning the reasons of each one asking. - Bouvier, de praec. Ecclesiae, c. 3. art. 5. - Gousset, n. 303.

3º Indeed it is generally lawful for innkeepers, at whose establishments public coaches stop, to set the table with lawful and unlawful foods; because since it is established that most are going to ask for meats, it does not seem necessary to ask each one what they want. - Gousset, ibid.

256. • Q. 3º How must one act with innkeepers who admit dances in their buildings, so that they may entice more guests?

Resp. Generally they are to be turned away from this, insofar as can be done; because dances, especially those which are held in inns, are for the most part done less honorably, and furnish occasion for many sins. Yet absolution would not always have to be denied to them, but the circumstances and the ordinary manner in which those dances are done must be considered.

Q. 4º Is it lawful for the masters of establishments which are commonly called CAFEs to set before guests any public sheets whatever to be read?

Resp. 1º They cannot admit those which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to Religion and good morals, even if guests should cease to flow to them on that account.

Resp. 2º They can admit all those which treat of merely political matters ¹¹. Nor do they seem to be bound to reject some sheet because it sometimes contains something less right by reason of Faith, provided it is not generally opposed to Religion.

¹¹ Understand, unless the treatment itself of political matters is opposed to good morals; which indeed would happen if false and therefore harmful principles were either openly defended or craftily insinuated, or if the legitimate rights of anyone whatever were attacked, or peoples were excited to hatreds, disobedience, etc.

End of the Treatise on Virtues.