Point II. On Habitual Sinners and Recidivists

632. • An habitual sinner, insofar as he is distinguished from a recidivist, according to more recent authors is said to be one who has contracted a habit of some sin into which, nevertheless, he has not yet relapsed after confession. But a recidivist is called one who has contracted a habit and, after confession, relapses into the same sin. - St. Ligorius, no. 457 ¹.

¹ The Author attributes these definitions to the more recent authors because in fact a distinction of this kind between an habitual sinner and a recidivist belonged only to certain more recent writers: so that the former is called one who has contracted a habit of some sin which he has not yet confessed (they add that a habit is contracted by an act repeated five times in a month); but the latter is one who, after once confessing following the contraction of such a habit, has relapsed into the same sins (see St. Alphonsus, Practice of the Confessor, nos. 70-71). These indeed can perhaps be admitted in some sense, as also that one should be called a recidivist who, after confession, relapses into a sin even of a different species, as a certain Franzoia wished with some others, who disfigured rather than illustrated the Marrow of Moral Theology of Hermann Busembaum with his Notes. But in the theological acceptation, the Doctors understand a frequent relapse into the same sins after many confessions without any correction, as Cardinal De Lugo says (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 166); or, as the Salmanticenses have (treatise 17, chapter 2, no. 167): The question concerns one who, having been admonished more frequently, always remains in the same state, applying no care on his part so that he may return to better fruit. And Gobat (Experimental Theology, treatise 7, case 16, no. 518): When moral Theologians treat of recidivists..., they speak only of those recidivists who continue to commit the same mortal sin even after a purpose of correction and after several confessions, as John Sanchez, De Lugo, Lessius, and Filliucci express. And Venerable Father Segneri (The Instructed Christian, part 3, discourse 22): I intend to speak of another kind of recidivists, and they are those who, after confession, immediately return to the same fault without any correction and without any effort to correct themselves. And Ludovicus of Granada describes the same persons: when they have first confessed their crimes at this time, they immediately relapse into the same things and remit nothing of their depraved habit and license of swearing, perjuring, lying, defaming, cursing, imprecating evil, and coveting, nor do they embrace any office of virtue and piety, but remain the same as they had been before. Thus this most holy man in Andreucci, who from the common opinion of the Doctors (In the Opuscule The Recidivist Confessor, section 1, in the appendix to volume 2 of Busembaum's Marrow, Rome, 1844, Press of the Propagation of the Faith) gathers that these three things are required to constitute a recidivist in the theological acceptation: 1. frequent relapse after several confessions; 2. relapse into sins of the same species; 3. a defect of every correction, even one begun.

Therefore, consideration of an habitual sinner who is not a recidivist in this sense can pertain here only when someone, perhaps abstaining from confession for several years and frequently relapsing into the same sins by force of the contracted habit, needs the particular care of the confessor, as laboring under that habit which, as Suarez says (On Religion, treatise 5, book 3, chapter 8, no. 7), has in a certain way passed into nature. For the Theologians inquire into a habit of this kind, and further into the difficulty of correcting it, not into the one more recently devised by the more recent writers.

The reason is readily evident why this diversity between the Theologians of the School and certain more recent writers in handing down the notions of an habitual sinner or a recidivist must be kept before the eyes. For once it is evident that these notions are received differently by the Theologians and by those more recent writers, it will manifestly appear that the subject of disputation is different for each, and that the authority and support of Theologians who were disputing about another subject are therefore wrongly invoked for theories built upon the new notion, although each uses the same terms.

633. Rule I. - Every habitual sinner can always be absolved, even the first time he confesses the depraved habit, although no correction has preceded, provided that he seriously proposes this and shows signs of repentance, even if only ordinary. - St. Ligorius, no. 450, and others commonly ².

² This is against Juvenin and that Ludovicus Habert who, on account of his pertinacity in attacking the Constitution Unigenitus, was expelled from the Sorbonne

Academy and died unhappily in exile at Blois on April 7, 1718. They, with certain others, require that true conversion first be proved through correction of life; otherwise, as Juvenin says in his condemned Theological Institutions (see the Index of Prohibited Books, Rome, 1744, under JUVENIN, and more recent editions under Theological Institutions), On Penance, dissertation 5, chapter 5, article 1, it is morally certain that an affection for mortal sin is found in them. In these words you see two things badly confounded: namely, a certain inclination to evil, or better, a certain facility of some power toward its acts, and a deliberate affection for mortal sin. And from this it would surely be proved that all are affected toward mortal sin and accordingly are always unworthy of the benefit of absolution, since, as Scripture says (Genesis 8:21), the sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from youth.

Against these St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 459) urges these words of the Roman Catechism (On the Sacrament of Penance, no. 60): If, after hearing the confession, the priest judges that neither diligence in enumerating the sins nor sorrow in detesting them has been altogether lacking to the penitent, he can be absolved. And he adds: Note, HAS NOT BEEN ALTOGETHER LACKING. And indeed these things fit the matter excellently. Yet it may seem to someone that this must be asked: why do those words of the Catechism, which are most general, not equally avail even when the penitent has relapsed into the same sins after confession, but are gratuitously restricted to this single case?

But absolution is to be denied to an habitual sinner if he refuses to employ the means prudently proposed by the Confessor and necessary for conquering the habit. The reason is that by this very fact he does not sincerely wish to be corrected, although he asserts that he wishes to change his life; and therefore he is simply indisposed ³.

³ These things pertain to the general doctrine concerning which it was said above (no. 626) that whoever refuses to fulfill some certain and grave obligation is incapable of absolution.

634. Rule III. - A recidivist furnishing extraordinary or special signs of sorrow can be absolved as often as he comes. The reason is that by extraordinary signs of sorrow every prudent suspicion which the preceding falls, even if frequent, could have induced is removed, and the Confessor can prudently judge the penitent to be sufficiently disposed. - I said can be absolved, but not that he necessarily must be; for the Confessor can defer absolution in this case if he judges that the deferral will be useful to the penitent, although ordinarily it is more expedient that it not be deferred ⁴. - St. Ligorius, no. 460, and Practice of the Confessor, no. 76.

⁴ See those things said more diffusely concerning this argument above (no. 621).

635. Rule IV. - A recidivist, even one furnishing only ordinary signs of contrition ⁵, can be absolved and generally must be whenever absolution cannot easily be deferred. The reason is that, on the one hand, he can be judged absolutely to be sufficiently disposed from the ordinary signs, and, on the other hand, there is a grave reason for absolving him, lest he remain for a long time in the state of mortal sin; but before the Confessor absolves such a person, he will employ care to dispose him better and more certainly to receive the benefit of absolution ⁶.

⁵ Above, in the Note to no. 625, we observed that the Author calls ordinary almost those signs which St. Alphonsus reckons among the extraordinary.

⁶ Concerning this necessary care in Confessors, see the Note to the following number 27.

636. Rule V. - A recidivist returning with the same depraved habit, with no effort employed and none of the means prescribed by the Confessor fulfilled, cannot be absolved unless he shows extraordinary signs of sorrow. Thus St. Ligorius ⁷: The third common opinion which we follow, and which Sanchez, Palaus, Bonacina, De Lugo, Petrocorensis, Sporer, Azor, Viva, Laymann, Holzmann, Anacletus, Milante, Wigandt, and the Salmanticenses, treatise 17, chapter 2, nos. 168 and 170, with Suarez, Sayrus, Hurtado, Prado, Rodriguez, Lopez, etc., hold, teaches, that a recidivist sinner returning with the same depraved habit cannot be absolved unless he brings extraordinary signs of his disposition.... The reason is that, in order that a confessor may absolve a penitent, he must be morally certain of his disposition; hence, although a sinner confessing for the first time is to be judged disposed, because (as we said) no presumption to the contrary stands against him, nevertheless, when he has already been admonished in another that frequent relapse furnishes a sign, or at least gives a prudent suspicion, that his repentance is not true; for one who firmly proposes (De Lugo well says, disputation 14, no. 160) a thing morally possible for himself does not so easily forget his purpose, but perseveres at least for some time and falls with greater difficulty or less frequently (book 6, no. 459).

⁷ I would say that it was not done by chance that the Author alleges only St. Alphonsus for this doctrine. For (and these things are said only so that the rights of history and truth may be preserved) he indeed brings forward many authors (loc. cit.) and does not hesitate to call this opinion of his common. But: 1. Most of those whom he alleges here are the very same whom you have cited above in the note to no. 621, namely, Sanchez, Suarez, Palaus, Bonacina, Azor, Sayrus, Hurtado, De Lugo, etc.; and for the rest he indicates no other places of theirs than those which we brought forward there. Moreover, their opinion, which we indicated there by their own words brought forward, differs from this thesis by the whole heaven; for they expressly affirm, or manifestly suppose, that the penitent can be absolved, and propose a deferral of absolution as merely useful, and accordingly to be employed only from salutary counsel and only sometimes. Hence it seems attributable only to a slip of the eyes or of memory that St. Alphonsus took the citations from treatise 17, chapter 2, no. 168 of the Salmanticenses, as he himself alleges them there. For those Doctors are indeed brought forward there; but the opinion for which they are invoked there is not the thesis of St. Alphonsus, but another, which the Salmanticenses thus express: Although IT IS A SALUTARY COUNSEL to defer absolution when such a deferral is believed likely to profit...; yet if the penitent approaches with sorrow and a firm purpose..., the confessor CAN ABSOLVE HIM, even if hitherto, after being admonished several times, he has not taken care to be corrected. These words are as consonant with the sense of the Doctors alleged as they differ from the opinion of St. Alphonsus.

2. But St. Alphonsus himself (loc. cit.) also manifestly reveals that his doctrine is one thing and the opinion of the Doctors whom he had alleged for himself a little before is another. For not long afterward, after mentioning the opinion of Sanchez, Laymann, De Lugo, Palaus, Viva, Sporer, and others that a recidivist can well be absolved several times, even if he has relapsed in the same manner and employed no remedy, he adds: I venerate the authority of such great Doctors; but I have never been able to acquiesce in their opinion. But what the Doctors named here by St. Alphonsus hold, namely, that a recidivist can be absolved several times even if, etc., is common without exception to all whom he had previously cited for himself, and even to the author of the theology for the use of the Seminary of Perigueux, although the latter is accustomed to follow the footsteps of Juvenin, Habert, and Gennett rather than those of the theological schools.

3. If there are a few who introduce mention of an extraordinary sign of disposition, they do not exact this as a condition without which the Confessor cannot absolve, but either merely say that it also contributes to discerning disposition, as De Lugo (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 166), or mention it as a case in which, contrary to what St. Alphonsus thought (nos. 463-464), absolution is not to be deferred, as Laymann (On Penance, chapter 5, no. 10). Therefore you will find only the Salmanticenses who, in treatise 17, chapter 2, no. 170, hand down as more probable that then it will not only be a salutary counsel to defer absolution, but the Confessor will be bound to do so. Nevertheless, their opinion also departs from the opinion of St. Alphonsus. For first, they judge other opinions probable as well (ibid., no. 167), the first of which (ibid., no. 168), against the opinion of St. Alphonsus, teaches that absolution can be conferred, although it can sometimes be salutary from counsel to defer it. Then they limit that obligation of deferring absolution (ibid., no. 170), unless some scandal or other extrinsic inconvenience follows from denied absolution; by which limitation they all but overthrow the thesis of St. Alphonsus, while by that very fact they concede that, speaking per se, absolution can be conferred. Finally (ibid., no. 168), they themselves treat of one who, having been admonished MORE FREQUENTLY, always remains in the same state, etc.; wherefore they too must now be reckoned among those to whose opinion St. Alphonsus says, as we recently saw, that he was never able to acquiesce.

4. Likewise, if some whom the Salmanticenses (no. 170) most eagerly sought out used those phrases, cannot be absolved, are not to be absolved, nevertheless their opinion favors in no way either the opinion of St. Alphonsus or even that of the Salmanticenses. And surely, what support does it give to their theory that Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45), when he says that one accustomed to blasphemies can be absolved, indeed is to be absolved, nevertheless excepts a case in which scandal is to be repaired: unless, he says, he furnished enormous scandal to others by those blasphemies, and thus the Confessor judged that his private consolation was to be postponed, and that it was expedient for the divine glory that he not be absolved until he had satisfied for the public scandal by striving for the correction of his life? And this is the same as what Bonacina says (On the Second Precept, disputation 4, question 1, point 14, no. 7): By reason of the scandal which one who perjures himself is accustomed to furnish to others, absolution is to be denied according to the judgment of a prudent confessor; for scandal is to be prevented. Again, what support does it give their theory that Ludovicus Lopez and Bartholomew Medina, alleged by them, said that one who does not have a purpose of correcting the vice is not to be absolved? For Lopez, proposing his own opinion and that of Medina (Instruction of Conscience, part 1, chapter 25), says: Medina seems to subscribe to this opinion of Soto, that one who is everywhere held by a habit of swearing, without choice and consideration whether he swears what is true or false, AND LACKS A TRUE PURPOSE of rooting out the wicked habit, is not to be absolved. But if he resolves upon correction and with a good will has embraced the remedies enjoined upon him by the Confessor, there is no reason why absolution should be prolonged for him. What does it profit that Rodriguez, alleged by them (Summary, part 1, chapter 192, no. 13), said these things while transcribing Medina? But one who is so defective in his depraved habit that in confession itself he swears at every word ought not to be absolved for that time. Indeed, Ludovicus Lopez (loc. cit.) regards as more rigorous that which Medina had suggested and which Rodericus takes from Medina: that one who has burst forth into many oaths, snatched into them by the evil habit by which he is held, and who, although he had previously confessed this several times, never furnished correction, is not to be absolved but is to be sent away so that for some days he may conduct himself attentively toward rooting out so pernicious a habit. And the reason which Medina brings forward here for deferring absolution introduces another enormous difference between their opinion and the recent opinion of St. Alphonsus. Namely, St. Alphonsus, according to the theories of Juvenin and the like, universally denies that a penitent of this kind can be absolved, since he must be judged indisposed; but most of the Doctors whom either he himself or the Salmanticenses allege do otherwise. For these, as we noted elsewhere above in the note to no. 621, since they treat especially of vices of the tongue, regard deferral of absolution as a mere expedient for at length arousing and stimulating the sluggishness of those who, by force of a depraved habit, break forth into blasphemous or perjurious words that are even less deliberate and who are in a continual state of mortal sin, as Trullench also notes (On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, doubt 20, no. 6), though he was wrongly cited for that reason by the Salmanticenses, unless they employ suitable care for correcting the vice. Indeed, as Medina expressly observes (Instruction of Confessors, book 1, chapter 54, section 5), since this sin is in the tongue rather than in the heart or affection, they disputed nothing about the disposition of the penitent; and therefore Azor also (part 1, book 11, chapter 3, question 4), himself wrongly alleged by the Salmanticenses, after saying, Nevertheless, absolution seems to be deferred for a time so that he may meanwhile devote some effort to it (to correcting the habit), immediately adds: unless there is otherwise a just cause by which he ought to be absolved from sins immediately.

If there are some who introduce discussion of deferring absolution on account of a suspicion that the penitent has approached less disposed, they do not propose it as a rule to be universally observed with recidivists, but say only that there is a place for a suspicion of this kind sometimes or at some time; concerning this we shall treat in the following Note. Furthermore, they themselves suppose that a penitent of this kind has already been absolved several times; in which, again, St. Alphonsus, as we saw, professes that he departs from them.

5. And these things, although few in view of the gravity of the argument (for the brevity of the Note does not permit more things which would make for a clearer demonstration of the matter), can suffice to establish that the preceding opinion of St. Alphonsus, whenever it is considered whole with all its parts, can be called, rather than common, contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors. Yet this is not said as any censure of that opinion, but only, as was said above, so that its own place and right may remain for historical truth, and from this there may remain the faculty of using that canon which the same St. Alphonsus (no. 460) praises, saying: I think that he by no means errs who directs himself according to opinions commonly received from Doctors of no humble reputation. For the rest, in what manner the opinion of St. Alphonsus can in some way be drawn toward the common opinion, we shall indicate in the following Note.

6. Meanwhile, note that the reason which the Author brings forward for that rule, and which certain others are accustomed to bring forward, is not free from a logical fault (for this must not be concealed). For grant that, after confession, someone has relapsed into the same sins in the same manner and, if you wish, even in a worse manner and measure; this could perhaps introduce some suspicion that the purpose in that confession was less efficacious; and I said, perhaps some suspicion, because, since the human will is subject to change, not even from a subsequent relapse can we logically argue to some defect of the preceding confession, since this must very often be ascribed not to a defect of a most sincere purpose, but, as daily experience teaches, to frailty and inconstancy after a sincere purpose. But if someone wishes further to argue from preceding falls to a defect of sorrow and purpose in the present, no law of logic permits it, as all Theologians reason excellently with St. Thomas.

** Indeed, it is not our intention, nor can it be, to pursue the VV. through those two hundred and eighty columns by which, with almost useless labor, they oppress every most patient reader. It will suffice us at present to give a sufficient account of those things which we noted concerning this argument.

It is said in the Note (no. 1) that St. Alphonsus did not hesitate indeed to call his opinion common; nevertheless, as is added (no. 5), it can be called, rather than common, contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors. Yet, so that a fair judgment may be formed concerning this affirmation, the words which are added there must not be neglected: WHENEVER IT IS CONSIDERED WHOLE WITH ALL ITS PARTS. Yet the VV. nowhere seem to have taken any account of these words throughout those two hundred and eighty columns.

Therefore, the first reason why we affirmed this is the one which we touched upon above in the Note to no. 632: namely, because the notion both of an habitual sinner and of a recidivist which St. Alphonsus hands down and Gury followed (see above no. 632 and below no. 638) is one thing, while that commonly handed down by the Doctors is another. Moreover, as was observed there, once it is evident that these notions are employed in a different sense by the Theologians and by those more recent writers, it will manifestly appear that the subject of disputation is different for each and that the authority and support of Theologians who were disputing about another subject are therefore wrongly invoked for theories built upon the new notion, although each uses the same terms.

To this reasoning, which otherwise is neither slight nor abstruse, you will seek in vain throughout those two hundred and eighty columns for any reply whatsoever.

And indeed in that Note to no. 632 we neither expressly attributed those new notions of an Habitual Sinner and a Recidivist to the holy Doctor, out of a certain reverence for him, nor there expressly deduced against him that latter conclusion. Nevertheless, if the VV. preferred this way of defending the holy Doctor, not so that they might defend his doctrine as it truly is in itself, but so that they might endeavor to show its consonance with the common doctrines of the schools, which is a question not of right but of fact, surely it was in no way lawful to neglect this part of the question, which is of the gravest moment.

We brought forward another reason for our affirmation, and one manifestly decisive, in the Note (no. 2), namely, by bringing forward those words of the holy Doctor himself: I venerate the authority of such great Doctors; but I have never been able to acquiesce in their opinion; where he says that he departs from the opinion of Sanchez, Laymann, De Lugo, Palaus, Viva, Sporer, and OTHERS. It does not pertain here now to inquire whether the opinion which the holy Doctor professes is better, or the opinion of those in whom he says he was never able to acquiesce; the question now concerns the fact itself: Does the holy Doctor depart from the common opinion? Concerning the controversy touched upon there by the holy Doctor, the VV. write (p. 656): St. Alphonsus, AGAINST SEVERAL DOCTORS alleged for the first proposition, who judge that such a (recidivist) can be absolved up to the third or fourth time, establishes the following doctrine: An Habitual Sinner, or one Habituated, who, having already once been admonished, has relapsed in the same manner, cannot be absolved, etc. Here the VV. speak the truth, but not the whole truth: namely, they admit that the holy Doctor departs from the Authors whom he had alleged for his own thesis. But if, by the admission of the VV. themselves, St. Alphonsus departs from the opinion of those great Doctors whom he himself had alleged for his doctrine, why, I ask, are they so angry with those who perhaps say that those Authors in no way support the thesis of the holy Doctor?

But I said that the VV. have here confessed the truth, but not the whole truth. For they say that St. Alphonsus established his thesis against several; which is most true. But the word several can indicate either simply many or, taken comparatively, some greater multitude in comparison with the contrary party. Yet in neither sense does that word express the whole truth. Why? Because the holy Doctor Alphonsus had no Author whom he could allege for his opinion, nor did the VV. find anyone, nor will they find anyone, unless perhaps they have recourse either to those who, as St. Alphonsus says (book 6, no. 459), with intolerable rigor say that an habitual sinner can never be absolved unless his correction is established by long experience, or to someone among those who perhaps resolved to transcribe St. Alphonsus for themselves, whose support otherwise would not prove that the holy Doctor did not depart from the unanimous opinion of all the Doctors.

And since it is most openly evident, even from the most express testimony of the holy Doctor Alphonsus, that he departed from the most common and indeed the unanimous opinion of all the Doctors, what finally is to be thought of those two hundred and eighty columns by which the VV. wish to contend that it was asserted only through calumny that the opinion of St. Alphonsus can be called, rather than common, contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors? To these things add what we indicated above: that the notions both of an Habitual Sinner and of a Recidivist which St. Alphonsus adopts are employed in another sense by all the Doctors whom he alleges, so that even if the theses of the holy Doctor agreed verbally with the theses of the Doctors, they would nevertheless differ in sense. Therefore it is so much the more confirmed and becomes perspicuous that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, whenever it is considered whole with all its parts, can be called, rather than common, contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors. Yet this was not said, as was observed in the Note, as any censure of that opinion, but only so that its own place and right may remain for historical truth and from this there may remain the faculty of using that canon which the same St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 460) praises, saying: I think that he by no means errs who directs himself according to opinions commonly received from Doctors of no humble reputation.

These things having been set forth beforehand, which pertain to the substance of the matter, let us come to the remaining parts of the Note, which are of lesser moment, since they present incidental little questions.

And as regards those things contained in no. 1, behold, the VV. (p. 660) do not hesitate to affirm that the thesis of St. Alphonsus, who says that a recidivist cannot be absolved, etc., is altogether the same as that of the Authors whose express words we reported in the Note to no. 621 and whom the Salmanticenses bring forward (treatise 17, chapter 2, no. 168) for the opinion which establishes that a recidivist of this kind can be absolved absolutely, although it is sometimes useful for him to defer absolution. The VV. handle this argument through twenty-four columns and contend (p. 680) that the Salmanticenses falsely alleged these authors for that opinion. Surely it was a most unhappy design by which they undertook to fight against the manifest evidence of fact; yet a reader who has already been able to observe very frequently that this is customary with them will not be astonished.

Let the testimonies brought forward above in the Note to no. 621 be read, I ask; they suppose a penitent sufficiently disposed and capable of absolution. Is such the penitent whom St. Alphonsus denies can be absolved? There we brought forward, for example, the express words of Suarez, where he says that it sometimes profits to defer absolution for a recidivist penitent of this kind. But the VV. object (p. 669) that the text of Suarez is brought forward there truncated, because these words were omitted: But if at length experience proves that these (remedies) do not suffice, the penitent will sometimes have to be compelled to remove the occasion, etc. But is the thesis of St. Alphonsus of which we speak this: that the confessor can and ought sometimes to intimate to the penitent the obligation of removing the occasion? Whoever abounds in leisure and patience may read these and other things of this kind, merely suitable for imposing upon readers who are accustomed to judge from the great mass of volumes.

With the context of the holy Doctor considered more diligently, another reason presents itself on account of which we may say that the holy Doctor alleged the Authors brought forward by the Salmanticenses in no. 168 not altogether beside the matter, however much their opinion is opposed to the opinion which the thesis of the holy Doctor defends. For let these words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 459) be considered: The first part (namely, of the thesis) is against the first opinion, which says that recidivists ought always to be absolved when they approach the Sacrament.

Let it now be omitted whether anyone in fact professed this most absurd doctrine. The VV. (p. 680) affirm that John Sanchez professes it in truth; and thus they openly make it evident that they did not read Sanchez, just as they themselves say that St. Alphonsus did not read other Authors whom he cites for the same opinion, but took the citations of them from the Salmanticenses. I said that the VV. did not read John Sanchez. For elsewhere, in the Note to no. 621, we already observed that this absurd opinion was wrongly ascribed even to John Sanchez, since he merely contends that absolution is not to be deferred for a penitent rightly disposed on account of the hope of greater fruit. Thus he says (Selected Disputations, disputation 9, no. 11): It is inferred that it will not be a most salutary counsel sometimes to deny absolution to one having a habit of sinning, however much Sayrus, Suarez,

Sanchez, Reginaldus, Toletus, Sa, and others counsel it. For if the confessor can LICITLY absolve the penitent, as they themselves admit, he will be bound to do so; for the penitent has a right that absolution not be denied to him, IF HE IS WORTHY, unless by his own consent. I certainly believe that the aforesaid authors, when they say that it will be a right counsel to deny absolution to a penitent having a habit of sinning, did not understand this absolutely, but with the penitent's consent first having been given. Yet I judge absolutely that it will never be a right counsel to deny absolution, however much the penitent may consent, supposing that it can be licitly imparted. For when it is denied, it ought to be done for this end, that the penitent may be rendered more cautious for preventing sins. Yet I do not understand that greater strength for avoiding sins will inhere in the penitent if he lacks sacramental grace and the other helps proceeding from the Sacrament than if he is clothed with it and them. And since counsel ought to concern the better good, surely I do not grasp that it is a better good for the penitent to lack the grace of the Sacrament for some time than to be clothed with it, etc. These are the words of Sanchez, which nearly return to that opinion of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 464): It is to be hoped more that he will be corrected through the help of grace received in the Sacrament than through deferral of absolution. Therefore, the holy Doctor judged that absolution is rarely to be deferred for these persons.

But how it happened that St. Alphonsus depicted the opinion of Sanchez in such different colors, as we explained, so that he even hurled against it the condemnation of proposition 60 among those proscribed by Innocent XI, can scarcely be understood: Although no hope of correction appears, absolution is not to be denied, provided that he declares orally that he is sorry and proposes correction. Indeed, the Salmanticenses, from whom the VV. (p. 680) say that the holy Doctor transcribed these things, treat of a sinner who approaches with sorrow and a stated purpose (loc. cit., no. 169); but they had said (ibid., no. 167), if he approaches with sorrow for past things and firmly proposes correction for the future, and again (no. 168), if the penitent approaches with sorrow and a firm purpose. Such, namely, is the penitent whom Sanchez, Bonacina, Sayrus, Palaus, Suarez, etc., alleged there, require so that then he can be absolved absolutely. Yet, against this opinion of theirs, it is surely marvelous that even the VV. (p. 677) do not hesitate to object the aforesaid condemnation of proposition 60, relying, namely, upon those most wretched later additions to the Salmanticenses.

But to return to the matter, whatever may be the case concerning these miseries, it is manifest from what has been said that the holy Doctor Alphonsus wished to establish his thesis even against this opinion which he reports in the first place, whatever opinion he may at length have fashioned for himself. Moreover, since this opinion, as he himself inexactly explains it, established that recidivists ought always to be absolved whenever they approach the Sacrament, the reason is now evident why he could oppose to this opinion not only the authors whom the Salmanticenses in no. 170 allege for the opinion which the holy Doctor himself followed, but also those whom the Salmanticenses allege in no. 168, who teach, namely, that it is sometimes useful to defer absolution for these sinners. For does not Sanchez also, as we saw, have these authors, namely, Suarez, Sanchez, Bonacina, Sayrus, etc., as opposed to himself?

Let us conclude two things from this. First, to give an account of why St. Alphonsus alleged Suarez, Sanchez, Palaus, etc., for his thesis, it is not necessary to suppose a slip of the eyes or memory. For the purpose he proposed to himself of attacking the opinion of Sanchez or of others, as he had fashioned it for himself, the Authors whom the Salmanticenses reported both in no. 168 and in no. 170 certainly pertained to the matter. And since this twofold citation contributed to the purpose of the holy Doctor, the correction was consequently not most wise which the VV.

confession, and has fallen in the same manner, with no effort employed and none of the means prescribed by the confessor fulfilled, say (p. 680, in the Note) was introduced into the Mechlin editions of 1845, Regensburg of 1846, and Turin of 1847, which deleted the citation of no. 168.

But secondly, it must altogether be retained that the authors brought forward by the Salmanticenses in no. 168 likewise do not stand for the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, not insofar as he refutes the opinion of Sanchez, but insofar as he establishes his own opinion, so that they can rightly be alleged for this, as was already shown above. Let the VV. have for themselves in this matter also the support of those who prepared the editions just mentioned, since they, not considering how that citation could conduce to the purpose of the holy Doctor, therefore judged that it was to be suppressed because they knew sufficiently well that those Authors were opposed to the opinion of the holy Doctor considered in itself.

We must now come to those things which are contained in the Note (no. 3) concerning extraordinary signs of sorrow; these, however, when the explanations of the VV. are added, scarcely have any difficulty. First, the VV. (p. 682) take care to remove the odium of a new term, namely, extraordinary signs; and according to that saying of the Poet, If it is lawful to use great examples in small matters, they bring forward those things which Benedict XIV writes in the work On the Beatification of the Servants of God, book 2, chapter 28, nos. 6 and 7: namely, that a doctrine cannot be qualified as new when some new word is employed, not so that a new thing may be signified, but so that the mysteries of our faith may be explained more easily and contrary heresies refuted.

Then the same VV. (p. 653, in the Note), to show that a new doctrine does not lie beneath the new term, and at the same time to soften whatever rigidity the term extraordinary sign may bear, first observe that those signs of sorrow which the holy Doctor calls extraordinary were taken from Authors wherever they mention some sign of the disposition of penitents. St. Alphonsus, they say, gathered the extraordinary signs which are had separately in individual Doctors and set them forth jointly.

They then add: From this exposition it is at the same time evident that St. Alphonsus in admitting extraordinary signs shows himself not more rigorous but rather most mild, since these signs are of the widest latitude. For it can scarcely be thought, at least according to those things which commonly and regularly occur, that a recidivist not lacking true sorrow and a sufficient purpose would not bring forward one or another of these signs, since even a smaller number of sins, or some continence after the last confession, or fulfillment of the means prescribed by the confessor, suffices. It is therefore evident that St. Alphonsus in no way exacts extraordinary contrition, but extraordinary signs of sincere ordinary contrition; indeed, he does not even exact extraordinary signs in the strict sense, or signs rare and scarcely possible, but requires only that a penitent who has relapsed in the same manner should bring forward, beyond the accustomed confession and the customary doubtful declarations (add: if, nevertheless, he brings forth even these somehow and does not merely add to the confession, I have nothing else) of sincere sorrow and firm purpose, some solid and proven sign from which a prudent confessor can form for himself a judgment concerning his disposition.

And surely we shall have the holy Doctor altogether mild in this matter, especially if, where he exacts an extraordinary sign, he ultimately wishes to exclude only the opinion against which, as we saw above, he opposes the first part of his thesis, namely, the opinion condemned in the aforesaid proposition 60 among those proscribed by Innocent XI. And indeed this also seems to intimate that the holy Doctor, among other reasons, objects this condemned proposition against that very opinion, as he himself, as we said, apprehends it; otherwise than that most inept addition to the Salmanticenses praised by the VV., which objects the condemned Proposition even against the first opinion among the Salmanticenses and its patrons, whom indeed the holy Doctor alleges for his thesis.

Hence, indeed, it is evident that it was not without cause that it was finally added in the Note (no. 5) that the opinion of St. Alphonsus can in some manner be drawn toward the common opinion; this was afterward done more fully in the following Note, where we reported the mind of the holy Doctor. And you have things corresponding to those where he says (book 6, no. 459): As often as the penitent brings true signs of sorrow and purpose, so often can he rightly be absolved. And after bringing forward the testimonies of Sts. Jerome and Chrysostom, he proceeds: Hence the Author of the book published at Rome, whose title is Instruction for New Confessors, part 1, chapter 15, no. 356, thus says: If the relapse arises from one's own frailty, without another voluntary extrinsic cause, it is almost rashness to say that every one who relapses is indisposed. And therefore in chapter 9, no. 213, he says that a sinner who has relapsed through the force of an evil habit is to be absolved immediately if he has a firm will to employ the means for correcting himself; and he adds: And we judge that to act otherwise would be excessive rigor, and that the Confessor, by acting thus, would depart from the true spirit of the Church and of the Lord, and from the nature of the Sacrament, which is not only a judgment but a salutary medicine.

To these, moreover, add the conclusion which the holy Doctor (book 6, no. 461) deduces from the doctrine of the Roman Catechism, saying: Therefore, whenever it is not known to the Confessor that sorrow was altogether lacking to the penitent, he can absolve him; and from this, when these principles have been weighed, you will readily infer that the mind of Blessed Alphonsus can most easily be reconciled at last with the common doctrine.

Finally, as regards those things which are said in the Note (no. 6) concerning the argument which Gury uses to establish his rule, the VV. complain most bitterly (p. 692), as though they displayed a grave injury against the holy Doctor; and all the more because in the same Note (no. 4) it is premised that the theory of Juvenin and those like him savors of that principle that a recidivist cannot be absolved, since he must be judged indisposed: as though, the VV. say (p. 693), it were not a reproach when it denounces the holy Doctor as a follower of the theory of Juvenin, whose Institutions were condemned, and of Ludovicus Habert, who came to an unhappy end.

Reply. Did St. Alphonsus not often elsewhere allege Juvenin and Ludovicus Habert in support of some opinion approved by himself? Is not this very thing seen in this same paragraph, where he writes: See Juvenin, Theological Institutions, book 7, p. 408, and the Salmanticenses, etc.? Is anyone who therefore says that St. Alphonsus adopted the opinion of Juvenin to be thought to reproach the holy Doctor as a follower of Juvenin's condemned Theological Institutions? Let that be so if it were affirmed in the Note that Juvenin's Institutions were proscribed because he said that an habitual sinner, whenever he approaches confession, is never to be judged disposed for absolution. But this is not affirmed in the Note.

For the rest, the words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 459) are of this kind: When he himself (the penitent) has already been admonished in another confession, and has fallen in the same manner, with no effort employed and none of the means prescribed by the Confessor fulfilled, that frequent relapse furnishes a sign, or at least gives a prudent suspicion, that his repentance is not true. And Gury, after St. Alphonsus, adds the reason: For one who firmly proposes to avoid sin does not so easily forget his purpose, but perseveres at least for some time and falls with greater difficulty or less frequently; these are in fact the words of De Lugo (disputation 14, no. 160), and the words of De Lugo are brought forward there by St. Alphonsus.

But there is no small difference between the opinion of De Lugo and the opinion of St. Alphonsus. First, De Lugo disputes about one who is situated in a proximate occasion of sinning; St. Alphonsus and Gury do not. Then De Lugo (ibid., no. 156) speaks of one who, having been absolved more frequently, always relapses in the same manner; but St. Alphonsus speaks of one who has once been admonished and absolved. Moreover, De Lugo (ibid., no. 160) says that a suspicion of this kind can SOMETIMES have place per accidens, just as Sporer (On Penance, no. 330) and Laymann (On Penance, chapter 5, no. 10) say that this can happen AT TIMES; but St. Alphonsus hands it down as a general norm never to be omitted in judging recidivists.

And indeed, to establish his opinion, St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) brings forward the words of Isidore: He worthily performs penance who so bewails past evils that he does not commit future ones again; from whom the holy Doctor copied these words here does not appear. For Faure (Theological Doubts, doubt 3, section 4) shrewdly warns that the moderns copied this and other propositions of this kind from the impious Arnauld, and he shows that the ancient Doctors had formerly objected these propositions to themselves and explained them. And surely Peter Lombard (book 4, distinction 14) had thus replied to this objection: The aforesaid words, To repent is to bewail what was done before and not to commit things to be bewailed, can rightly be taken thus: that they are referred not to different times but to the same time; namely, that at the time when he bewails the evils committed, he does not by his will commit deeds to be bewailed. St. Raymond also has things corresponding to these (book 4, distinction 14).

And after Raymond, St. Thomas employed the same reply thus (III, question 84, article 10, reply to objection 4): It must be said that to repent is to bewail what was done before and not to commit things to be bewailed, namely, while one weeps, either in act or in purpose. For he is a mocker and not a penitent who, at the same time as he repents, does that of which he repents, or proposes that he will again do what he has done, or even actually sins in the same or another kind of sin. But that someone afterward sins either in act or in purpose does not exclude that his repentance was previously true. For the truth of a prior act is never excluded by a subsequent contrary act. For just as one who afterward sits truly ran, so one who afterward sins truly repented.

And in these things you have the reason why it was said in the Note that the rule of judgment proposed by Gury after St. Alphonsus is not free from a logical fault. A relapse, St. Alphonsus says, furnishes a sign, or at least gives a prudent suspicion, that his repentance is not true.

If the holy Doctor had said, that his repentance was not true, namely, in the preceding confession, even thus that saying of St. Thomas would meet him: One who afterward sins truly repented. For, as he says elsewhere (On IV Sentences, distinction 14, question 1, article 4, minor question 2), however much efficacy some virtue may have, it does not remove flexibility from free choice while one is in the state of the way. Likewise, that which is future cannot belong to the substance or integrity of any virtue except insofar as it is present in apprehension or in the will, because virtue as regards the habit does not await something in the future.... Hence, since penance is a virtue, and insofar as it is a Sacrament does not extend beyond the act of virtue, future continuation will not belong to the essential integrity of penance except insofar as it is in the purpose; and therefore repentance can be true, and nevertheless someone can afterward fall away from it. To this indeed pertains what St. Alphonsus also has (book 6, no. 459): De Lugo, disputation 14, no. 166, teaches well with Suarez, Sanchez, Reginaldus, Henriquez, and others commonly, that sufficient disposition is present sorrow and purpose, not future correction; and thus the penitent can be absolved even though he is judged likely to relapse.

But if the inference from a relapse into sins does not hold for excluding true preceding repentance, then a fortiori a relapse furnishes no argument for judging the present disposition of one who now approaches.

Hence St. Alphonsus afterward also tempers his aforesaid opinion thus (loc. cit.): Although a relapse furnishes some suspicion, it nevertheless does not exhibit a certain sign of indisposition; for it can well happen that the penitent truly had a firm will not to relapse and yet relapsed through the force of a depraved habit. These words surely import that the holy Doctor intimates that, from true preceding repentance, it can be argued that disposition is not lacking in the present either. And in fact, as the holy Doctor himself had premised, on the one hand the penitent is not to be presumed evil, so that he would wish to approach the Sacrament indisposed; on the other hand, he is presumed disposed while he confesses his sins, since spontaneous confession itself is a sign of contrition, unless some positive presumption to the contrary stands in the way, namely, as he adds (ibid., no. 460), unless it appears that the penitent approaches confession merely from the obligation of the paschal precept, or impelled by parents, a tutor, a master, etc. But if relapse in the same manner furnishes some suspicion of indisposition, namely, of a will not so firm and efficacious for employing remedies, nevertheless, as the holy Doctor himself adds (ibid., no. 459), whenever the penitent brings extraordinary signs of sorrow, that suspicion of indisposition is removed by them; and then the Confessor will be able prudently to judge that his penitent is sufficiently disposed. Moreover, since those sufficient signs of disposition which the holy Doctor calls extraordinary, if perhaps they are lacking when the preceding habit of life is considered, can, according to the teaching of St. Alphonsus himself, appear in and from the confession itself, as is handed down in the following Note, it again becomes clear how the opinion of St. Alphonsus can be reconciled with the common doctrine of others, however harsh the things which he had premised may appear. Yet those things will not appear harsh if the suspicion which a relapse repeated more frequently into the same sins without any correction casts upon him moves the Confessor, not indeed to decide a priori that the penitent is indisposed and to be dismissed without absolution, but to inquire more accurately, according to his office, into the penitent's present disposition.

637. Rule VI. - A doubtfully disposed recidivist is to have absolution deferred for some time, until a prudent sign of disposition appears. - St. Ligorius, Practice of the Confessor, nos. 71 and 72; Apostolic Man, last treatise, nos. 9 and 10 ⁸.

⁸ That, except in a case of necessity, a doubtfully disposed penitent cannot licitly be absolved, namely, one whom no prudent reason persuades to be sufficiently disposed to receive grace in the Sacrament, ought to be beyond controversy. And from this is to be sought the reason why Theologians sometimes admonish that one should act thus with those recidivists who display either no indication, or certainly an ambiguous indication, of a good will, so that a not imprudent suspicion arises that they may here and now lack the suitable dispositions. But it is one thing that a penitent in that condition cannot be absolved, and another that he ought to be dismissed to be absolved at another time; as though either that delay had the power of procuring disposition, or patience in returning were a more certain indication of a better disposition in the penitent, or, on the contrary, it were not more expedient, indeed the office of the Confessor, then to employ every care so that, as far as it can be done with the grace of God, he may dispose the penitent to receive rightly the benefit of absolution.

Would that the words with which His Holiness Pope Leo XII, in announcing the Jubilee to the whole world (Constitution Charitate Christi, December 25, 1825, section 5), admonished Confessors were fixed in the minds of all priests: Many indeed (he says) present themselves altogether unprepared to the ministers of the Sacrament of Penance, but very often they are of such a kind that from unprepared they can be made prepared, provided that the priest, clothed with the bowels of the mercy of Christ Jesus, who came not to call the just but sinners, knows how to deal with them diligently, patiently, and gently. But that those, and those alone, are here called unprepared who lack an essential disposition is evident from what follows: For those alone are to be judged unprepared, not those who have committed even the gravest crimes, or who have been absent from confession even for very many years,

for the mercy of the Lord is without number and the treasure of his goodness is infinite; nor those who, being uncultivated in condition or slow in understanding, have not sufficiently examined themselves, since by almost no diligence of their own would they accomplish this without the assistance of the priest himself; but those who, after the necessary diligence has been employed by him in questioning them, yet not so as to burden them beyond measure, and after every effort of charity has been exhausted in exciting them to detestation of their sins..., are nevertheless prudently judged to lack the sense of sorrow and repentance by which they may at least be disposed to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament (these are the words of the Council of Trent concerning attrition). From these things it is evident that even those who not merely are doubtfully disposed but manifestly approach indisposed can be absolved, since the patience, gentleness, and industrious charity of the priest can then and there obtain this: that from unprepared they become prepared, and that the Confessor can prudently judge this.

Therefore, the Supreme Pontiff further does not omit to censure those who, rather than undertake this care so that with solicitous charity they may reconcile sinners to God, enter upon an easy way of freeing themselves from this burden by sending penitents away to be absolved at another time. Therefore, after he indicated who are to be judged incapable of the benefit of absolution, such (he says) are those who give NO signs of sorrow, who are unwilling to lay aside hatreds and enmities, or to restore the goods of others if they can, or to abandon the proximate occasion of sinning, or in some other manner to forsake sins and amend their life for the better; or those who have given public scandal, unless they make public satisfaction and remove the scandal; he immediately gravely warns how far the conduct of those who, as soon as they hear some graver sin or perceive someone infected with a manifold kind of sins, at once declare that they cannot absolve, departs from the manner of an experienced physician who likewise pours wine and oil into the wounds of the injured man. They refuse to heal those very persons (the Supreme Pontiff proceeds) for whose care they were especially appointed by him who says: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are ill. Wherefore he deservedly declares that a priest of this kind is more indisposed to hear confessions than a sinner approaches confession unprepared: But if he (the priest) neglects to perform this, surely he is no more to be called prepared to hear than the others are to approach confession.

From these things this also is gathered: it is not to be feared that a sufficient sign of disposition cannot be had even if no delay of absolution is employed, which otherwise is very often a fallacious test of disposition. St. Alphonsus also warned of this very thing (book 6, no. 459), where he writes: Nor is it true that a test of time alone is the sole sign of a changed will; for a change of will depends upon divine grace, which does not need time but operates in an instant, and therefore can be manifested not only through a trial of time but also through certain other signs. Indeed, sometimes other signs of present disposition manifest a change of will much better than experience of time; for those signs directly indicate the disposition of the penitent, but experience only indirectly: so much so that it can NOT RARELY happen that someone restrains himself from vices even for a long time for the respectability of this world (for example, that he may obtain absolution or be admitted to paschal Communion) ..., and nevertheless is not rightly disposed. Therefore, as often as the penitent brings true signs of sorrow and purpose, so often can he rightly be absolved. As regards these words, take care to observe that there are indeed some sins into which one falls from affection and with an affection tenaciously adhering to some unlawful object, for example, when from hatred and a desire for revenge someone detracts from his neighbor, wishes or even inflicts evils upon him, or when one ruinously coveting riches pursues unlawful gains, or desperately loves some woman with whom he has an adulterous relationship, etc.; and with these surely a discourse about a change of will fittingly occurs, since it ought to detest what it ardently loved.

But in many other sins, even if they are perpetrated from a certain habit, you would wrongly seek this affection toward the object of sin, as, for example, very often happens in sins of the tongue and frequently also in impurity. Hence it happens that a man indeed relapses again and again, yet not as though giving himself wholly to sin, but rather overcome by a certain sloth and frailty, at the same time accusing himself and soon repenting of the deed, now struggling against the vice, now succumbing to it through weakness, and always bearing the yoke of the vice in some manner unwillingly. Moreover, with one of this kind, as is evident, the matter concerns a will not so much to be changed as to be strengthened, so that he may become accustomed to watch more attentively if sins of the tongue are at issue, to resist more strongly if other vices are at issue, and to use suitable safeguards more diligently.

For the rest, since St. Alphonsus, when he requires extraordinary signs of disposition, appears finally to understand nothing other than what he has in the cited text, namely, some true sign of sorrow and purpose, so that he thinks one lacking some extraordinary sign (Practice of the Confessor, no. 71) to be designated in proposition 60 condemned by Innocent XI as one who merely declares orally that he is sorry and proposes correction, he will not with difficulty be reconciled in this respect with the common opinion of the Doctors and with the practice which the Supreme Pontiff and teacher of teachers, Leo XII, commends in the cited Constitution. For no one of the Doctors taught that one should be absolved who, as the Pontiff says, is prudently judged to lack the sense of sorrow and repentance by which he may be disposed to obtain grace in the Sacrament. Nor, again, does St. Alphonsus, as is evident from the cited text, contend that a delay of absolution is necessary so that the disposition even of a recidivist may either become sufficiently known if at first it appears doubtful, or may even be acquired if perhaps it appears altogether lacking to the penitent as he approaches. Indeed (loc. cit., no. 460), among the signs which he himself calls extraordinary, he also enumerates this: If the penitent, at the admonition of the Confessor, signifies that he has attained a new knowledge of his iniquity or of the danger of his damnation.

The method by which this end can be attained without the trial of deferred absolution, and at the same time the practice commended by the Supreme Pontiff Leo XII retained, you have set forth as clearly as briefly by Philip Mary Salvatori in the opuscule published several times at Rome with the title Practical Instruction for New Confessors; concerning this, however, see what we noted above at no. 519, p. 405. He deservedly affirms that, just as this method cannot be observed without labor, so it cannot be omitted by the Confessor without fault where it is needed; and the things which we brought forward above from the Constitution of Leo XII confirm this. Thus, as that pious and learned Author, most practiced in the ministry of hearing the confessions of men of this kind, observes (part 2, section 1), even if the penitent, either at first encounter or even during confession, furnishes no other indication among those which others have called extraordinary by which the Confessor may judge sufficiently concerning his disposition, nevertheless, when the confession has been completed not without the suitable assistance of a patient and gentle priest, if the latter undertakes efficaciously to place before the eyes of the penitent the gravity, deformity, and baseness of his sins and vices; then the most evil effects of sins, the harms, the detriment to the soul, the danger to eternal salvation, and the treasure of wrath accumulated by a disordered life, as well as the vain hope of consulting for himself when the hour of death is already at hand and the judgment of God is imminent; and then also if he suggests an easy way by which he can both meet these evils and enter upon the right way of salvation; if, moreover, he adds to these things that every penitent must seriously weigh that sacramental absolution obtains an effect corresponding to the dispositions of those confessing, and accordingly, just as it looses and cleanses one who sincerely repents, so it binds more tightly those who lack the sense of true repentance and heaps sacrilege upon their other sins; if, I say, the Confessor proposes all these and other things of this kind, and does so not with the zeal of one indignant but rather with the great charity of one who has compassion and solicitously desires the salvation of penitents, the praised Author deservedly concludes that it cannot happen that the penitent does not exhibit some sufficient sign of his mind. Therefore, to one who affirms that he acts sincerely and that he wishes to perform those things which the Confessor requires, the Confessor can with a safe conscience impart absolution, even if the penitent has previously given no other sign of his conversion.

The reason is that, since in these circumstances that testimony of the penitent cannot reasonably be attributed either to ignorance or to fraud, that which is like an axiom among all Theologians now avails: the penitent is to be believed both for himself and against himself. I said, not from fraud, because in the present case deceit has no end or cause, since it would merely turn to the destruction of the liar. Hence the distinction which St. Thomas notes between one speaking in confession about himself and about others (Opuscule 7, otherwise 12, question 6): In confession, the sinner confessing is to be believed both for himself and against himself; but he is in no way to be believed against another; otherwise an occasion of feigned confession and fraudulent defamation would be given to many. But, on the contrary, when the penitent speaks about himself, the holy Doctor thus intimates the reason (On IV Sentences, distinction 17, question 3, article 3, minor question 5, reply to objection 2): As regards this knowledge (namely, through the manifestation of confession), the priest cannot receive greater certainty than by believing the subject, BECAUSE THIS IS FOR THE RELIEF OF HIS OWN CONSCIENCE; hence in the forum of confession a man is believed both for himself and against himself.

And diligently observe those most weighty words of the holy Doctor: He cannot receive greater certainty than by believing the subject. And surely, does not the fact that Confessors with a safe conscience absolve penitents as though they had confessed integrally rest upon this one canon, although experience teaches that those who sacrilegiously conceal sins approach not infrequently? And even if someone wishes to follow the theory of extraordinary signs, can these not also be simulated? Indeed, is not the complaint frequent that Confessors are very often deceived by an appearance of piety and devotion fabricated by some for other ends? And yet who would for that reason rightly reproach Confessors? Or who will require Confessors, in order to guard against deceptions, to have faith in no one even when no prudent reason for denying faith is present? Would not the economy by which, according to the testimony of St. Thomas with all Theologians, the whole administration of this Sacrament is governed thus be overturned from its foundation?

Hence the Supreme Pontiff Leo XII, while commending the aforesaid practice in the cited Constitution, does not omit to censure those morose Confessors to whom (as he says) scarcely any signification of sorrow and purpose seems sufficient for them to think that they can absolve; and they think that they have at last adopted a safe counsel if they send men away to be absolved at another time.

Nor is St. Alphonsus to be said to dissent from these things or to require anything more; from him it will be useful to copy these words (book 6, no. 461): As regards our proposition, it suffices that the Confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent and that, on the other hand, no prudent suspicion of indisposition stands in the way; otherwise scarcely anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs penitents give furnish only a probability of disposition, as Suarez rightly teaches, On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, no. 1, where he says that it is necessary and sufficient that the Confessor prudently and probably judge that the penitent is disposed. And this seems sufficiently expressed in the Roman Catechism, On Penance, no. 60, where it is said: If, after hearing the confession, the priest judges that neither diligence in enumerating the sins nor sorrow in detesting them was altogether lacking to the penitent, he can be absolved. Therefore, whenever it is not positively known to the Confessor that sorrow was altogether lacking to the penitent, he can absolve him. Hence the Author cited above, Instruction for New Confessors (namely, Giordanini), part 1, chapter 15, no. 360, speaks thus with Esparza: Whence we finally establish here the conclusion which is the key of this whole matter: nothing else is required for administering penance than a prudent probable judgment concerning the disposition of the penitent. Hence, if the circumstances do not found a prudent doubt that he is not sufficiently disposed, the Confessor ought not trouble himself or the penitent to have evidence of it, which is impossible. And to this conduces the text in chapter A nobis 2, On the Sentence of Excommunication, where it is said: The judgment of the Church sometimes follows an opinion which can both deceive and be deceived. Thus far St. Alphonsus.

Some are accustomed to be moved by this: that the facility of absolving which is introduced through this practice may produce a facility of relapsing into the same sins. To this objection a reply could indeed be made with the praised Salvatori (loc. cit.), whose words are these: I reply first: I too had heard it said thus and in speculation believed it, but practice undeceived me. I have not yet found one person of ruined life who cast himself headlong into wickedness because of ease found in Confessors; but I have found many who did so because of excessive harshness and difficulty in absolving. But then it must be altogether denied that there is a facility of absolving and a consequent facility of relapse when the Confessor, rather than freeing himself in a convenient manner by saying that he cannot absolve, whereby the penitent departs in the same and perhaps a worse state, as being indignant against both the priest and the Sacrament, undertakes immense labor himself and brings it about that the penitent is then absolved when, exhibiting sufficient signs of sincere and serious repentance, he furnishes a prudent hope that sacramental absolution will be salutary for him.

For the rest, it is not excluded by these things that absolution can sometimes be deferred, where the matter requires it, according to those things which we already noted above (at no. 621). Yet as regards this also, that which the Supreme Pontiff Leo XII warns in the cited Constitution is to be kept before the eyes: With whatever mind those who approach the Sacrament of Penance may come, nothing is more to be guarded against by him (the Confessor) than that anyone... depart hostile to the Sacrament of reconciliation.... Wherefore, if there is a just cause why absolution is to be deferred, let him persuade those confessing in words as humane as he can that both his office and duty and their own salvation altogether require this, and let him most gently allure them to return as soon as possible, so that, when those things which were salutarily prescribed have been faithfully performed, they may be loosed from the bonds of sins and refreshed by the sweetness of heavenly grace. And surely, whoever has any experience in receiving confessions will confess that what the praised Salvatori affirmed (loc. cit.) is most true; it is better to report it in his own words: And here I cannot refrain from saying something which, every time I remember it, makes my spirit shudder. Among the very many whom I encountered while hearing confessions in hospitals, or who had altogether withdrawn for many years from confession, or had made them incomplete and sacrilegious for many years,

I found in the greater part (and other Confessors told me they had observed the same) that the origin of this arose from the bad reception encountered with some Confessor.

** It has seemed proper here to satisfy certain doubts which the distinguished priest Aemilius Berardi raised concerning the things said above about Recidivists in the opuscule On Recidivists, Faenza, 1873.

1. The distinguished Berardi writes (pp. 6-7): Ballerini, Frassinetti, and Gury said some things pertinent to the matter so that they might open an easier way. But... concerning recidivists they do not determine the new facilities sufficiently openly, clearly, and precisely.

Reply. Setting aside for now the cause both of Frassinetti and of Gury, especially since the latter in this Compendium followed St. Alphonsus almost exactly as regards Recidivists, I would confidently say that it was never my intention to bring forward new facilities of this kind, both because I never held anything more important than to follow the well-worn ways of approved Doctors, and because, after the most exact studies of so many Doctors, it will indeed seem sufficiently difficult to bring forward anything new. But if anything in these Notes seemed new to some, you may say that this occurred per accidens, insofar as something was again brought to light from the most abundant treasury of our teachers which could seem new to some, especially after, from the past century, even in our Italy, many schools had been invaded by the works and doctrines, for example, of Gennetti, Witasse, Merbesius, Collet, Juvenin, Ludovicus Habert, Antoine, and others of this flour. To remedy these evils also, indeed especially, divine providence raised up Blessed Doctor Alphonsus.

2. The distinguished Berardi adds (p. 7): But what he (Ballerini) thinks concerning the benign opinion, which indeed concedes that recidivists can be absolved several times but afterward obliges absolution to be deferred for them unless they furnish some extraordinary sign, he does not declare sufficiently openly. On the one hand, he seems to exclude even then the obligation of deferring absolution, to deny the necessity of any extraordinary sign, and to reject the theory of extraordinary signs.... On the other hand, it seems altogether that he requires some extraordinary sign, namely, insofar as the penitent displays more manifest sorrow on account of a certain special admonition of the Confessor.

Reply. Ballerini thinks that which all think, or at least ought to think, namely: 1. that one who is not disposed cannot be absolved, and that one who appears disposed can be absolved; 2. that it is the office of the Confessor to discern whether or not the penitent brings disposition, that is, as the Council of Trent says, sorrow of mind and detestation of the sin committed with the purpose of not sinning for the future; this office is necessary both if the penitent is habitual and a recidivist and if he is not such; 3. that it is to be gathered from the circumstances in what manner the Confessor may become sufficiently certain concerning this disposition. For sometimes this disposition appears sufficiently from the character and state of the penitent or other circumstances; sometimes the Confessor will remain uncertain about it; sometimes he will discover that it is altogether lacking. In the first case, there is no reason why the Confessor should be further solicitous; in the second, he will employ means to dispel the doubt; in the third, he will undertake the care of rendering the indisposed penitent disposed, if it can be done, with divine grace.

But that some, for the sake of a certain clarity, have distinguished the indications from which disposition is inferred into ordinary and extraordinary, or into common and special, let it be so, provided that they propose the matter sufficiently clearly; for Gury, for example, Gury calls certain signs ordinary which St. Alphonsus judges extraordinary; and again, that which is ordinary in Peter will seem extraordinary in John; indeed, according to the diverse judgment of Confessors, that will happen to be extraordinary for one which will not even be approved as ordinary by another. The Constitution of Leo XII, concerning which above in the Note, censures morose Confessors of this kind. For the rest, the substance of the matter resides in this: that the Confessor, from wherever he finally draws the arguments for judgment, form that prudent judgment concerning the disposition of the penitent which St. Alphonsus also, as we intimated in this and the preceding Note, judged sufficient for absolving rightly. Whether these arguments or indications of disposition are to be called ordinary or extraordinary according to the theories of some may seem a question of lesser moment.

3. The distinguished Berardi asks (p. 8): What if, either on account of a defect of fervor in this admonition (of the Confessor), or however fervent it may be, the penitent never furnishes any special sign? Can he nevertheless always be absolved, or is there then a true obligation to dismiss him without absolution? What Ballerini thought is not sufficiently clear.

Reply. The solution of this doubt is easily gathered both from the text of Gury and from the appended Notes; namely, whenever the sufficient disposition of the penitent cannot be established, the norm which the most common doctrine hands down as to be observed with a doubtfully disposed penitent is at hand.

4. The distinguished Berardi adds (p. 29): All say, or manifestly suppose, that the Confessor not merely can by counsel, but is bound to defer absolution for recidivists unless they furnish some extraordinary sign. Therefore, the opinion of Ballerini does not seem accurate when he writes: You will find only the Salmanticenses who hand down as more probable that then it will be not only a salutary counsel to defer absolution, but the Confessor will be bound to it.

And on the same matter the distinguished man writes (p. 43): Father Ballerini makes another objection as follows: Ten theologians, that is, De Lugo, Sayrus, Bonacina, Toletus, etc., establish no obligation of deferring absolution for recidivists; indeed, they openly suppose that they can always be absolved. Then, after many things, he concludes (p. 48): Therefore, for manifold reason this objection of Father Ballerini also seems to fall.

And concerning the same matter the distinguished man had already premised (p. 10): Ballerini says that, if you except the Salmanticenses alone..., the other earlier theologians expressly affirm or manifestly suppose that the penitent can be absolved, and they propose the delay of absolution as merely useful, and therefore as to be admitted only from salutary counsel and only sometimes.

Reply. Those ten theologians are not brought forward by Ballerini against the practice of deferring absolution for recidivists who lack an extraordinary sign of sorrow, and much less to prove that recidivists of this kind can always be absolved. And, to speak plainly, it is somewhat difficult to understand how the distinguished Berardi or anyone else could persuade himself that this monstrosity of doctrine was handed down or defended by us. Indeed, according to them, if a recidivist bringing no extraordinary sign is not to be held as positively indisposed, he is at least to be judged one concerning whom it is not established whether he is disposed. But what reason do they bring forward that they do not hesitate to affirm that, according to the opinion of Ballerini, a recidivist concerning whom it is in no way established whether he is disposed can always be absolved? Indeed, who among theologians ever brought forward this prodigy of opinion? For we know indeed that this opinion was attributed to John Sanchez; but it was observed in the preceding Note that this was done erroneously, not to say through mere calumny.

For the rest, the purpose for which those ten theologians were brought forward is manifestly evident from the scope of that Note (Note to no. 621). There the discourse is expressly about a penitent rightly disposed; that the remedy of deferred absolution can usefully be employed with him so that he may be impelled to correct a depraved habit is confirmed by the authority of those ten theologians. Indeed, that the testimonies of the Doctors alleged there concern a rightly disposed penitent is proved there from the fact that they call the delay of absolution merely useful, not necessary. But that those Doctors, as the Note says in such express words, discuss A DISPOSED PENITENT is manifest from this: that they suggest a delay of absolution not as necessary but as merely useful, and from mere counsel, and as to be employed only sometimes. These words surely indicate sufficiently of themselves that according to us also a delay of absolution is necessary whenever the penitent is found less disposed or his disposition is not sufficiently established. But because the phrase extraordinary signs is not employed there to indicate a rightly disposed penitent, let the distinguished Berardi pardon us. First, this was not the place; second, let whoever wishes hold this phrase as necessary, so far as we are concerned. But let indulgence in turn be granted us, so that, since this manner of speaking did not seem necessary for so many centuries, no one be bound by this new theological law, much less understood wrongly if he uses another manner of speaking in accordance with the received custom of theologians.

5. Here perhaps the distinguished Berardi will observe that these ten theologians are brought into the discussion also in the Note immediately preceding this one, where the discourse concerns Recidivists.

Reply. This is most true. But at the same time it is true that those Doctors are alleged there, not indeed so that their opinion may be expounded concerning the manner of acting with recidivists or of judging their disposition, but only so that it may be shown that the holy Doctor Alphonsus alleged less pertinently these Doctors and those passages of theirs which had been brought forward by us in the Note to no. 621. Therefore, when the distinguished Berardi says, Ballerini says that, if you except the Salmanticenses alone..., the other earlier theologians expressly affirm or manifestly suppose that the penitent can be absolved, etc., this indeed expresses the sense which he seemed to himself able to attribute to Ballerini, but not the sense which either the words or the context of Ballerini's Notes bear.

Likewise, it is true, as the distinguished man has it, that when the contexts of the Notes are compared, the praised Doctors appear as opposed to the Salmanticenses. Indeed, because of the evidence of the fact, the matter could not be otherwise; for the Salmanticenses themselves (treatise 17, chapter 2, no. 170) openly profess that they depart from the opinion of those Doctors, which otherwise they call probable. Nevertheless, lest a sense less consonant with the truth be affixed to this opposition, the purpose on account of which mention is made in the preceding Note both of the aforesaid Doctors (no. 1) and of the Salmanticenses (no. 3) must be kept before the eyes. Namely, just as the sole end of bringing those Doctors upon the scene (no. 1) was to show that the opinion of the holy Doctor Alphonsus was one thing, but that of those Doctors whose allegations he himself indicated that he had taken from no. 168 of the cited passage of the Salmanticenses was another, so also the reason for discussing the Salmanticenses (no. 3) was that it might become manifest that the opinion of the holy Doctor differed also from the judgments of the Salmanticenses, from whom nevertheless he seems to have drawn his opinion. Moreover, from the fact that there seems to be exhibited there a different cause on account of which the doctrine of St. Alphonsus differs now from that of the praised Doctors and now from the opinion of the Salmanticenses, it surely does not follow that the reason for the opposition between those Doctors and the Salmanticenses is that which the distinguished man assigns. Indeed, there was no concern in the Note to add anything more about the question as the Salmanticenses treat it, since it in no way pertained to the purpose of the Note. But if it is examined, there will appear without difficulty both another reason for the aforesaid opposition and also the reason why the opinion of the Salmanticenses can be called altogether singular.

They namely institute the question (loc. cit., no. 167) concerning one who has the habit of perjuring or blaspheming, who approaches confession with sorrow for past things and FIRMLY PROPOSES correction for the future. Then (no. 168) they bring forward the first opinion, which is probable to them, that although it is a salutary counsel to defer absolution when such a delay is believed likely to profit, yet if the penitent approaches with sorrow and a FIRM PURPOSE, the Confessor can absolve him. In bringing forward the second opinion they add that the penitent not only can but ought to be absolved if he approaches with sorrow and the AFORESAID PURPOSE..., unless from some circumstance he judges that he does not have true sorrow.

But do not these things display that state of the penitent which, as we have seen, St. Alphonsus also judged sufficient so that he can be absolved? Does not the allegation of Suarez, Sanchez, Palaus, etc., who are brought forward as judging that the penitent is sufficiently disposed so that he can be absolved, confirm this very thing? Does not the allegation of the second opinion also persuade this, where John Sanchez is brought forward as contending against the authors of the first opinion that absolution is never to be deferred, because the grace of the Sacrament profits more than a delay of absolution? Finally, do not the Salmanticenses themselves concede that this penitent can be absolved if some extrinsic reason seems to require it? Therefore, the opposition between the Salmanticenses and the Authors from whom they depart is not to be understood in such a sense as though the latter were judged to have thought that even a penitent whose sufficient disposition is not established can be absolved. Rather, when the whole context is considered, it is easy to conclude that the Salmanticenses declined somewhat toward a doctrine more severe than even that of St. Alphonsus himself, insofar as they required singular signs of sorrow where the penitent could already be recognized as sufficiently disposed. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that certain elements are mingled there, which is not new in this work, and these leave complete coherence in that accumulation of matters to be desired.

For the rest, the greater good of the penitent must always be considered; thus very well St. Ligorius, no. 459. Concina (chapter 10, no. 24) says: That you may avoid the sin of erring, if you see that by two or three absolutions you can cure the sick person, be rich in mercy. The correction of the sinner is a safer norm than all rules for either imparting or denying absolution.

638. Questions. - QUESTION 1. When is a habit judged to have been contracted?

Reply 1. This cannot be determined by a general rule, because some contract a greater facility toward a certain sin by a few acts, for example, three or four, than others do by committing it more frequently; hence neither is one who has sinned many times in a certain kind always to be held habitual, nor is one who has begun to sin three or four times always to be held non-habitual. Reply 2. Generally speaking, a sin repeated more frequently in a short time more easily induces a habit of it than if it were repeated the same number of times over a longer interval of time. - St. Ligorius, Practice of the Confessor, no. 70.

639. • QUESTION 2. What are the extraordinary signs of sorrow?

Reply. The following are commonly listed: 1. if the penitent has employed a much greater effort than before to correct himself, or if he has been notably corrected; a fortiori, if he has now wholly changed his life for the better; 2. if he confesses with great shame a sin long concealed; 3. if he has used more diligently the remedies prescribed by the Confessor;

4. if he has undertaken a long journey in order to make confession properly; 5. if he urgently requests to make a general confession or wishes to repeat the greater part of the sins of his past life; 6. if he was induced to confess by an extraordinary motive, namely, by a sermon heard, the death of some friend, etc.; 7. if he confesses with great humility and with words redolent of compunction of heart, at least ordinarily; 8. if he spontaneously asserts that he wishes altogether to avoid sin despite every inconvenience; a fortiori, if he says that he would rather die than sin; 9. if he gives forth sighs or groans, or sheds tears, at least ordinarily; 10. not rarely even spontaneous confession can be held as an extraordinary sign of sorrow, especially in those young men and men who must overcome themselves and human fear in order to approach confession.

640. • QUESTION 3. Can absolution be denied to an habitual sinner who refuses to confess several times in the year?

Reply. No, per se, if he appears sufficiently disposed from another source; because there is no precept of confessing several times in the year, and there are other means which can be enjoined for conquering the habit. Such persons are rather to be induced gently and firmly to approach more frequently, for example, on the feast of Pentecost, of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the Nativity of the Lord, etc.

QUESTION 4. What is to be done with those who confess immediately before contracting matrimony and who hitherto have been addicted to a depraved habit?

Reply 1. If they have been accustomed to sin with each other, they can be absolved more easily; for the occasion will cease through matrimony.

Reply 2. The difficulty is greater if the depraved habit arises from another source; nevertheless, it is more expedient to absolve such persons, at least conditionally, than to dismiss them unabsolved, unless their indisposition is certainly established ⁹.

⁹ A question of this kind and the solution added savor of the theory which not even the Author himself approves, namely, of those who define every habitual sinner a priori as indisposed and incapable of absolution. Those things which the Author premised above (from no. 633) also conflict with this theory. The certain doctrine of the Catholic schools is that any penitent, whether habitual or not, cannot be absolved if he does not appear disposed, but can be absolved if he furnishes sufficient indications of true repentance. And since in the case a delay of absolution induces grave inconvenience, when he appears sufficiently disposed he not only can but ought to be absolved without delay.