Article II: On the Human Act as Free

I. The conjunction of the voluntary and of liberty. In the present condition of man as wayfarer, a voluntary act is at the same time psychologically free. Only the appetite for beatitude is necessary for him "as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can be unwilling then to think about beatitude, because even the acts themselves of intellect and will are particular" ¹.

Nor in Aristotle does a word occur by which the free is distinguished from the voluntary. Whence, in this article, we consider the voluntary act merely under another respect, and we can proceed from this principle: as much as the voluntary is deficient, so much liberty is deficient; and every defect of liberty declares an act imperfectly voluntary.

We must treat of the conditions and impediments of liberty.

¹ St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 6, art. un.; cf. in 1, 2, d. 25, q. 1, art. 2.

II. Conditions of liberty. The use of free choice requires:

1. That reason, habitually and actually, have the ability of judging concerning the good formally taken, and concerning the proportion by which a particular good fits the subject and his inclination or appetite. Otherwise, the object cannot be proposed as indifferent, that is, as such a thing as is at the same time appetible and incapable of satisfying the appetite. Now in that indifference of judgment the first root of liberty consists.

2. That reason be unimpeded for following the direction of the will, under whose direction things are considered under various aspects and diverse practical judgments are effected. For since the will is a rational appetite, man wills or prefers nothing which at the same time he does not judge to be to-be-willed or to-be-preferred: wherefore between our willing and our final practical judging there is a necessary concord. And so, unless the judgment itself is in the power of the will, neither will the proper act of willing be in its power.

3. That reflex knowledge of the object and of the acts be had. For without conscious possession, the use of dominion cannot be had.

To say the same thing more briefly: free choice requires an intellect developed and unimpeded for representing, docile for obeying, and reflex consciousness. And so:

a) whatever conquers the intellect;

b) whatever carries away the will, impedes the use of free choice;

c) nor can that be free which does not proceed from our will.

Those impediments and limits of free choice are now to be considered by us, first in the healthy man, then in the sick or badly affected man.

I. The voluntary, or "that whose principle is within with the addition of knowledge," is divided under various respects.

II. According as end and means are objectively proposed to the will, the will can love the end by simple complacency, intend the same, and, when it is obtained, enjoy it; but the means it either, by consenting, merely accepts as they are proposed, or by consulting among several chooses the better; finally it uses the powers for applying the means.

III. According to the mode of attaining objects: already, without bodily mutation, it has the eleven prosecutive or aversive movements of the sensitive appetite; moreover, as rational appetite, it wills certain things in themselves, or directly, certain things in another, or indirectly. And an effect foreseen with an action or omission and yet not loved is called permitted (actively or passively).

IV. From external species, the voluntary is distinguished positively, by action, and negatively, by omission: which some call the indirect voluntary.

Then there is the explicit voluntary, and the implicit, which is contained in the former.

V. From its manifestation, the voluntary can be formally expressed, or tacitly signified in some deed or omission, or be presumed for the present, that is, conjectured from an inclination of the mind.

From this is gathered the prudent use of the adage: He who is silent seems to consent.

VI. According to its varied perfection, there is distinguished the perfect voluntary, to which neither knowledge nor deliberation is lacking, and the imperfectly deliberated voluntary; then the voluntary simply, which embraces the object as it is in the concrete, and according to something, which embraces the same under a definite note to which attention is given. There is also the formal or true voluntary, and the interpretative voluntary, which is not, but would be if the object were proposed: it is called presumed for the future. Finally there is the actual voluntary, in present act; the virtual, in a series efficaciously commanded; and the habitual, which once was and has not been retracted: this voluntary can have force for no physical effect, but indeed for juridical effects.

VII. From the voluntary we know what, and of how many kinds, the involuntary is.

VIII. Psychological liberty, which is now had in every human act, requires as conditions an intellect developed and unimpeded for representing, docile for obeying, and reflex consciousness.