§ 1. On the Required Contrition

— Contrition, commonly understood, is sorrow and detestation for sin committed, with a purpose of amendment (Trid., s. XIV). Perfect contrition, which is called contrition absolutely, is elicited from a motive of charity on account of God loved above all things; and this already of itself alone restores grace, yet with the vow of confession which then is to be made. Imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, is conceived from an inferior motive, yet one referred to God.

As will be said in the treatise on the theological virtues, perfect contrition is not to be judged difficult for him who has efficaciously renounced sin, since the love of God above all things is itself in its own way natural to every creature, and experience teaches that men are often moved more by the goodness of God offended and contemned, or by the Passion of Christ, than by fear of punishments. The difficulty is that of triumphing over evil passions; after this victory has been won, conversion easily becomes perfect from imperfect.

But the proper reason of perfect contrition is explained in its own place, where we treat of charity.

— For the fruitful reception of the sacrament of Penance there suffices and is required at least attrition which is:

1. formal, because it is the sacrament of Penance; and because, if it is a question of necessary matter, true charity necessarily becomes formally penitent in him who is conscious of mortal sin not yet remitted. Therefore virtual attrition does not suffice. Yet Ballerini, V, 47-55, judges that virtual sorrow contained in an efficacious purpose can suffice. Before confession, let us not abandon the more common opinion; after the fact, let us not be anxious about the matter;

2. supernatural, that is, with the help of supernatural grace, on account of a motive which directly or indirectly says order to God: for the offense of God, which is sin, must be abhorred as such.

It is controverted whether or not it must be known by the light of faith. The necessity of that condition, posited by several, is not demonstrated.

Moreover, motives of conversion are accustomed to be apprehended by Christians by their faith. And since grace does not fail us from the mercy of God, we must be solicitous only about the quality of the motive, lest it be merely human.

Now good motives of attrition return to fear of punishments, to be inflicted or already inflicted by God, even in this life; and to the turpitude of sin contrary to the honesty of virtue which is regulated by the law of God. This turpitude itself can be common to every sin, or special to certain sins, for example lust, injustice in goods. Consideration of ingratitude toward God, indeed of divine goodness contemned, is reduced to the common deformity of sin.

When there is only fear of punishments of this life, care must be taken that attrition be efficacious; on that account it will be safer before confession to direct attention also to other punishments;

3. appreciatively supreme, in this way: that sin is estimated as a greater evil than every evil which must be undergone in order to avoid sin, and therefore excludes the will of sinning in every true or possible hypothesis.

Sometimes it is asked in vain whether we ought to be prepared to sustain the punishments of hell rather than offend God. For to love God and by hatred of hell to be separated from Him are repugnant to each other. These absurd things are not to be thought.

Nor even are improbable evils prudently proposed to the imagination as an argument of sincerity. It is enough that in a universal manner we conceive an absolute detestation of sin. If then God permits that we must remain in the way of virtue with heroic fortitude, He Himself will know how, "with the temptation, to make a way out,"⁽¹⁾ so that we easily perform the things which now seem to be above our strength. Therefore it suffices that, if such things come into mind, we repeat the word of Abraham: "God will provide,"⁽²⁾ and reject sin by the present will in every hypothesis.

⁽¹⁾ 1 Cor. 10:13. - ⁽²⁾ Gen. 22:8.

You ask, how can the attrition of one who remained in adulterous concubinage as long as the life of the spouse was an obstacle to legitimate marriage be above all things?

Certainly a more perfect attrition is required than that which was contained in the purpose of changing life after the difficulty had been removed. Yet it helps our psychology that, with the difficulty absent, we are less struck by it. Wherefore, with the confessor exhorting, and with the grace of the mercy of God assisting, such a penitent will be able, not with so much difficulty, to be led even to sincerely and absolutely detesting the former manner of acting.

But observe that, even for the remission of venial sin, absolute detestation, or detestation above all things, is necessary;

4. universal, as to mortal sins, because individual mortal sins cannot be remitted without the others, and none is pardoned without sorrow above all things. On the contrary, since venial sins can be remitted separately, attrition about these sins does not have to be universal.

— On a valid and unformed sacrament. If someone, unconscious of the defect, approaches without attrition above all things, yet not without some lesser attrition which excludes the will of sinning in some way, even if not absolutely, he is not proximately disposed to receiving grace; yet he seems validly to receive the sacrament, which therefore will be unformed, but will confer grace as soon as the fiction has departed, that is, after the disposition, for example in Holy Communion itself, has become more perfect. The reason is that attrition enters the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible, since the sacrament is a sensible sign. But by the sincere accusation and protestation of the penitent there is revealed of itself a true detestation, but not the supreme degree of attrition. Moreover, if attrition appreciatively supreme were required for the very validity of the sacrament: a) the usage of absolving at Easter sinners who scarcely confess once in the year, provided they are shown to be sincere in affirming their attrition, and of not then demanding a repeated accusation of faults absolved in this way, would not be so easily explained; b) the confessor who, after hearing the accusation, tries to bring the penitent to more intense contrition would have to be solicitous about the degree of contrition obtained, and would have to seek a new manifestation of sorrow.

That the sacrament can be unformed is admitted by Cajetan, who thus interprets St. Thomas, Suppl. 3 p., q. 9, art. 1; St. Antoninus, several Thomists; Ballerini, V, 41, 42, 45, on account of the things he has about supposed attrition; and especially C. Billot, De Sacramentis, II, th. 16. Yet several, after Suarez, Paen., d. 20, 15; Lugo, d. 14, s. 6; Lehmk., II, 401, 402, defend the opposite parts. These do not admit that this sacrament can be valid and unformed, unless when sufficient sorrow, elicited from a particular motive of some sin, has lacked universality. This case alone also is proved by St. Alph., l. 6, n. 441.

Nor are there lacking those who, with D'Ann., III, 210 (18), deny that appreciatively supreme attrition can remain particular, so that they contend that the sacrament is always received either fruitfully or invalidly. From this they also argue that sorrow is required which excludes the will of sinning. But even if someone demands that the purpose be virtually universal, detestation of committed sin can be of less extension than the purpose concerning future sins to be avoided. For someone can have a firm will of not repeating an act concerning which nevertheless he is not sorry at all.

Therefore penitents who have confessed in good faith, provided they have conceived some true sorrow, are not to be compelled to repeat confessions.

— The relation of sorrow to the sacrament. 1. According to the more common opinion, sorrow for accused sins must by the will of the penitent itself in some way be directed to the sacrament. Thus Suarez, d. 20, s. 4, n. 29. Yet this can be doubted, since the penitent is not the minister of this sacrament; but it seems enough that the minister find apt matter (Lugo, d. 14, n. 41 ff.); and thus we absolve at least conditionally heretics who are sorry for sins and are ignorant that Penance is a sacrament.

2. But it is in no way required that sorrow itself have been conceived from intention of the sacrament. For without a preceding intention of this kind, attrition has all the qualities which the Council of Trent, s. XIV, c. 14, requires: it can be a true detestation, excluding the will of sinning with hope of pardon, having joined to it the vow of furnishing the other things which are required for the due reception of this sacrament. And by the very fact that it accompanies confession, sorrow enters the sacrament sufficiently.

Wherefore he who, in making an examination of conscience, has stirred up contrition, and after several hours, indeed after an entire day, accuses sins, must in no way be anxious about his contrition, although he has not renewed this act and has confessed coldly. For affliction shared by the senses is not demanded; but in the sincere accusation itself there is virtually contained and expressed sorrow which has persevered in the habitual will, which we suppose meanwhile not to have been changed.

And he who, after receiving absolution, remembers an omitted sin and accuses it, is fruitfully absolved, even though the formal act of contrition has not been renewed: it was virtually included in the accusation itself (cf. Ball.-Palm., t. V, n. 76-80).

— The distance of absolution from the acts of the penitent, and the perseverance of attrition. 1. After sufficient attrition has existed in the sacrament itself, the absolution of the priest will be able to be distant even for a long time from the acts of the penitent, provided the dispositions of the penitent have habitually persevered. The reason is that a sentence can be separated by a long time from knowledge of the cause, and the sacrament was instituted after the manner of a judgment. Moreover, in a new approach to confession, sorrow is almost necessarily renewed.

2. Attrition, at least that which is required for fruitful reception of the sacrament, does not habitually persevere but is retracted by every new mortal sin; but when it is a question of venial sins alone, or of venial sins together with a mortal sin accused, sufficient attrition is not retracted as to all sins by a new fault committed, even if it was conceived from a universal motive. For sins, according to their different gravity, are opposed unequally even to a universal motive: God is offended more by an enormous sin than by a less grave one; mortal and venial sin are opposed to the love of God in different ways. Then a man, even by a universal motive, is rarely moved according to the full force of that motive; often we detest sin because it is such, so grave, so fruitless an offense of God. And even when the motive exercises its full power upon us, nevertheless we detest the opposed sins unequally, but abhor more the things which fight more against such a motive. Finally, our act, subjectively one, becomes virtually multiple on account of the several motives to which it is terminated. Wherefore a partial retraction of the act is well conceived. Therefore nothing demonstrates a universal retraction of attrition on account of a new sin committed (cf. Lugo, Resp. mor., I, 29).

— Must confession itself be joined with sorrow, or can these exist separately in the sacrament?

Indeed a sacramental accusation is required, that is, one made for the purpose of obtaining absolution. A confession of this kind will always be informed by at least some true attrition. Yet let us suppose someone first confessing with sacrilegious intention, then afterward being brought by the exhortation of the confessor to perfect repentance before absolution. Must the accusation be repeated? This is not established. The accusation gave the confessor sufficient knowledge of the cause; the subsequent attrition makes the penitent disposed. But before absolution this can become sensible by another sign besides confession, at least "by humbling himself before the priest and seeking or awaiting absolution." Laymann, De Paen., c. 4, n. 4. Wherefore, says Ball., t. V, n. 90, "there is no reason why sorrow should have to be joined more with confession than confession with absolution."

— Attrition about venial sins does not have to be universal even virtually. Therefore it suffices that you be sorry from a particular motive, for example on account of the special turpitude or gravity of certain of them, or that you be sorry for the frequency or collection of these sins. This sorrow will fall indirectly upon the sins which are affected by this circumstance. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 449. Yet it will be better to be sorry about certain sins definitely, or at least about sins deliberately committed, if there were any (cf. Lehmk., II, 393).

— One conscious of insufficient sorrow for the fruitful reception of the sacrament, or who knows that he does not possess sufficient attrition about all the grave sins which he has to accuse, or about any venial sin, will be guilty of grave sacrilege, even if he has committed only venial sins. The opinion of certain men, otherwise rigorous, who thought it a light irreverence to frustrate the sacrament in a light matter, is altogether false (Ball., V, n. 58).

But he who is sorry for one thing will not sin gravely if he confesses other venial sins without attrition.

Nor will he sin at all who warns the confessor about the matter, or who simply declares all things so that he may be better directed, and does not positively affirm that he wishes to be efficaciously absolved from each thing.

— Putative contrition is not required for fruitful reception of the sacrament, nor does putative attrition or a velleity of not sinning suffice. Nor does it suffice to be sorry that you are not sorry. For these things of themselves allow affection for sin to subsist. Yet for the most part, with that act by which "he is sorry that he is not sorry," the penitent joins true sorrow for his sins, which he does not discern; or in that accusation he merely reveals that he lacks sensible sadness, which is not necessary.

— Formal acts of faith and hope are not required, but in the very approach to the sacrament of Penance, so that salutary pardon may be obtained ex opere operato, they are necessarily included and sufficiently exercised, since no argument demonstrates that more is to be demanded.

Nor even in a man who seeks reconciliation with God, or wills divine friendship restored, is there wanting that beginning of this love which Trent declares to precede perfect justification,⁽¹⁾ whether you place that beginning in the love of hope, as some say, or better in charity not yet perfect (cf. Lehmk., II, 391).

⁽¹⁾ "But they are disposed to justice itself when... and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, from the fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, by turning themselves to considering the mercy of God, they are raised into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ, and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all justice; and on that account they are moved against sins through a certain hatred and detestation" (Trid., s. 6, c. 6, On Justification). In s. 14, c. 4, there is speech only about hope of pardon, with exclusion of the will of sinning.

— Counsels about this matter. Several things just said pertain to this, that they may cut off an occasion of anxiety and repel the long-sought difficulties which theologians, more subtly than usefully, have begun to raise about this sacrament to be used very frequently.

But by our counsels we shall strive to obtain better and more perfect things. Wherefore we shall advise that a formal excitation to contrition, and indeed perfect contrition, be joined to the discussion of conscience; we shall exhort the penitent that, while he receives absolution, he renew the act of contrition; by a few words we shall try that he do the same if, after absolution has already been received, he wishes to complete the accusation. Yet here always observe that in an accusation so made attrition is virtually contained and sufficiently signified.

N.B. If it is a question of one gravely sick who is absolved several times, care must be taken that to each absolution, according as opportunity is present, there be prefixed a general sorrowful accusation which is as it were the matter of the sacrament.