§ 3. On Vain Observances

1. By the name vain observance we understand usages, both negative and positive, of themselves inept for the intended end.

2. Morality. Those vain usages can be employed as sacred rites by which gods are worshiped or magical power is obtained or exercised: then a grave sin of idolatry or of express or tacit invocation of the devil is necessarily committed ¹. It can also happen that they are employed outside every sacred rite, without firm faith, but on account of a certain light fear lest it be so, or lest what is predicted happen. Concerning that use theologians are accustomed to answer more benignly, so that, scandal being set aside, they hold it for merely venial, unless someone wished to direct as it were his whole life by dreams and signs of this sort. But in order that they may answer thus, it is necessary that they deny that in those circumstances there is a tacit pact with the devil or implicit invocation of him, since every pact with the devil, or every invocation of him, cannot but be objectively a grave sin.

But what, in reality, does the psychological analysis of those who thus abstain from a gathering where they would be thirteen in number, or from a journey to be undertaken on Friday, or who do certain indifferent things, as when they pour out prayers in a certain number, neither more nor less, or complete the recitation in such a position or gesture, demonstrate to us? That they avoid those things or do these with this mind: because, if perhaps what was feared should happen, they would not wish the misfortune or adverse things to be imputed to some negligence of their own; because, before the possible event, they desire to free themselves from some anxiety; because, after the wondrous inventions of this century, for example telepathy, they suspect perhaps some hidden natural power. Thus, if future contingents are known only to God, do not the mysterious preparations of facts seem to be demonstrated by many prior apprehensions (presentimenti)? And, however the matter may be, since by no precept are they compelled to sit at table with thirteen in number, or to make a journey on the sixth feria, or to abstain from such a gesture, they think they derive a certain greater security from observance, which moreover they will easily admit to be little reasonable. Therefore they are far distant from those who, conscious of the natural disproportion, will absolutely to produce some effect through observances of this sort: these indeed are guilty of a tacit pact with the devil, but not those others, for they manifest a fearful rather than strictly superstitious mind. Yet in their action is discerned a certain defect of trust in divine Providence, which venially derogates from divine worship. And greater is the disorder of him who positively employs certain things than of him who omits certain things from that fear. Indeed, constant use of those means, or of vain observance, would betray grave distrust, on account of which he is deservedly charged with grave sin. Hence he will not be gravely guilty who deliberately avoids those things which an augur gathered from the lines of his hand would be harmful to him.

Those are to be more gravely censured who positively, as happened in the recent war, carry certain ridiculous amulets. Although even these, if they yield to a certain timidity, are not to be said guilty mortally.

¹ Prat, art. cit., notes that idolatry is joined with a special ritual art.

A protestation by which someone excludes commerce with the devil is indeed ineffective if someone employs means which he certainly knows cannot be obtained without diabolical power in concrete circumstances, or if someone, suspecting such a power, nevertheless pursues the effect with absolute will. For he wills the effect, even if it is diabolical. But he who, in doubt concerning the nature of the cause, by a prevailing will rejects every diabolical participation, and does not cooperate, by formal or materially unexcused cooperation, with those who expressly or tacitly recur to the devil, cannot be guilty of tacit invocation of the devil.

Yet when there is grave suspicion of diabolical intervention, a grave cause, such as teachers of theology or of the sciences can have, is required that someone, even with a protestation premised, which must be made, licitly exercise such things. For if even ritual exorcisms do not have infallible efficacy for expelling the devil, much less will private prayer certainly prohibit the devil from intervention. Therefore in that exercise there is contained a certain active permission of diabolical intervention, which, from the motive of religion and for avoiding the danger of harm from probable commerce with a wicked and most cunning enemy, is forbidden to us without cause. Cf. d'Annibale, II, 54 fine.

A just and proportionate cause is also required for cooperation, even if it is merely material, with those who at least subjectively are guilty of superstition.

Corollaries. 1. It is not licit to exercise the art of pythons, even if no dishonorable means are employed and conjectures concerning future things are made without firm faith, for example from the lines of the right hand, unless the whole intention of joking is manifested externally. For not a few suffer scandal of superstition from this; not a few are harmfully deceived in their affairs, or, struck by fears, truly give cause why they undergo the feared evils.

But he who, without firm faith and scandal, from a certain curiosity or for raising laughter, goes to consult persons of this sort, does not sin, unless perhaps venially. Cf. Sanchez, Dec. L. 2, c. 38, n. 20; c. 10, n. 13; Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. Theol., II, 347.

2. The Sacred Scriptures themselves warn us that men are rightly taught certain things through dreams. But prudent discernment of spirits must be made here. Therefore, in order that you ascribe a preternatural and good origin to a dream, it is necessary that the thing in itself not be unworthy of God; that it impel to a good work; that it bring final peace at least to the soul and raise it to heavenly things. - But in order that someone fully trust a dream, he ought to be almost certain of its divine origin. For, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 9, God, while He sends such things, at the same time furnishes this certitude. - And with this case excluded, he who follows certain indifferent indications of a dream not sought without full faith, for example so that he buys those "numbers" of the lottery which he dreamed, or avoids a journey which was shown to him as dangerous, is not to be charged with certain sin, especially since there are sometimes at least confused mysterious previsions of future or distant things.

3. For a just cause, when other means of evacuating doubt are lacking, it is right, with humble prayer premised, to employ consultory lots, provided that the judgment is expected from God alone. As if someone placed at a crossroads does not know which way must be taken, and it somewhat matters that a good one be entered.

4. Certain usages of devotion, for example going around an altar or shrine three times, sowing or planting on the feast of such a Saint, are not superstitious, but are means of imploring the help of the Blessed Virgin Mary or of a Saint, unless those circumstances are thought to be infallible, or plainly necessary, or efficacious of themselves. Nor are novendial devotions to be disapproved, insofar as they are founded on some revelation, or honor some mystery, for example the months in which Christ was in the womb, or imitate the example of the apostles in preparation for Pentecost, or fulfill the condition of an indulgence; yet it would be superstitious to believe that those prayers are not profitable in a greater or lesser number.

5. As Cajetan already warned, in 2, 2, q. 96 art. 2, formal superstition is absent where, from ignorance, a natural or divine power is thought to be in certain remedies or usages. Thus the S. C. de P. F. itself pronounced exempt from superstition the Chinese custom of exploding a cannon during an eclipse, lest the dragon devour the moon. Wherefore missionaries, when they detect certain inept remedies employed by barbarians, for example certain objects hung around the neck, must not immediately think that they are superstitious, but must explore the genus of power which is thought to be in them.

Indeed, from the opinion of Cajetan, in art. 4, they generally either do not sin or sin only venially who with a simple heart observe certain rites not received by the Church, by which, especially if they have been taught by ancestors, they hope that some effects will follow by divine power: as those who against a definite disease carry the first coin offered to Christ on Good Friday. These things therefore should rather be held as foolish things not to be propagated, than scruples concerning grave guilt are to be thrown in.

6. It is plain of itself that no illicit divination is exercised by those who probably conjecture from the face, the disposition of members, the lines and parts of the hand, marks of writing, the temperament of the body, indeed even the propensities and affections of the soul.

Nor can the use of a divining rod be charged with superstition, which, by a certain inclination or agitation of itself, is judged to reveal where metals are to be dug or where a source of water lies hidden. For the effect is expected from a merely attractive natural power, whether it is truly present or falsely thought to be present.

In doubt concerning the quality of a power, an effect, provided that, because of analogy with effects certainly natural, it permits the natural causality to be probable, should rather be ascribed to natural powers. And the things which today have been discovered or even observed, for example concerning natural telepathy, are such as confirm the presumption of a natural power. Yet in a general ratio, a prudent conclusion by which all things would be declared natural cannot rest upon an unknown natural power. Cf. also what was said at n. 243.

On malefices. A malefice is a power of harming others acquired from a pact and cooperation of the devil. One is called amatory, or a philtre, whose use is for exciting carnal love or hatred, the devil moving man's phantasy, yet in such a way that liberty is not taken away: for the devil can do nothing upon the will. Another is a poisoning, by which harm is brought upon the person of another or upon his goods.

Although, not even today, the use of malefices seems to be altogether absent, and, in certain occult assemblies, horrible arts seem sometimes to be exercised; yet because these things are hidden from most, and because popular credulity is too inclined to suspicions of malefice, pastors and confessors ought rather to restrain those who by a rash accusation of malefice bring grave injury upon the innocent. Nor should they themselves be prompt to recognize supernatural effects. How often a preternatural explanation was demanded solely by an enlarged narration of the facts, so that serious inquiry detected either some fraud or nothing very wondrous! At the same time, let them prudently dissuade the rude from recurring to vain and superstitious arts in diseases, especially of animals, but let them require counsels from those skilled in medicine.