§ 4. On the Interpretation of Ecclesiastical Law

— I. General norms. Concerning the interpretation of ecclesiastical law in general, these proper points come to be observed.

Besides authentic interpretation, which the legislator himself gives by way of law, and any competent tribunal gives by way of sentence in the causes which it decides, interpretation also takes place by way of rescript in a particular matter.

While the first has the same force as the law itself, both of the latter exercise a force circumscribed to the persons for whom they were given, and that for the affairs alone with which the sentence or rescript dealt (c. 17).

What, then, shall we say about interpretations which appear under this title in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis: Romana. - Romana et aliarum. - Dubia.

The very insertion in the official commentary brings it about that concerning those responses there is authentic certainty also in the external forum.

And it is not doubted that by those responses a secure rule of acting is furnished to all the faithful whom it concerns. Yet the authenticity of the response does not suffice of itself to convert a rescript into a general law. Therefore it remains to be asked whether or not all the faithful are held to follow this interpretation. We think that this question must be answered by this distinction.

When, from the inscription itself, as in the first example, there are named, or at least in a less definite way there are indicated, the dioceses for which they have been given, those responses of themselves oblige those dioceses alone.

But when no person or region is indicated for whom the rescript has been given, the authentic solution of the doubt seems to be proposed to the whole Church, and consequently to oblige all in that matter.

Not rarely it happens that an interpretation, even given to a particular diocese, is so received by authors that it becomes usual, and soon obliges as a custom through connivance.

But if a response circulates outside the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, it is unknown in the external forum, so that, from the very mind of the one responding, the solution has been given as less definitive, and, excepting those to whom the rescript has been sent, others preserve the liberty of thinking differently.

— II. A particular rule concerning the Code of Canon Law. Authentic interpretation of universal laws was accustomed to be made by rescripts, in each one's own province, by the Sacred Congregations. Yet, when a doubt formally affects a canon of the Code, from the Motu Proprio Cum iuris, 15 Sept. 1917, authentic interpretation has been reserved to the proper Commission instituted by that diploma for authentically interpreting the canons of the Code. In matters, however, of greater moment, the Sacred Congregation whose proper matter it is, is heard.

— III. Necessity of promulgation. From c. 17 § 2, authentic interpretation by way of law, not only when it is extensive or restrictive, but also when it is comprehensive but explains a law truly doubtful, is not drawn back retroactively and must be promulgated.

— IV. Computation of time. The special question concerning the computation of time, of which frequent mention is made in laws, is now solved by a proper title of the new Code (l. I, t. 3), yet in such a way that liturgical laws remain untouched. Thus, in a liturgical matter, the day has a beginning other than midnight; and the Sunday which is assigned to a month as the first sometimes precedes the month itself. Furthermore, unless something else is expressly provided, the rules of computation seem able to be proposed and explained summarily in this way.

1. An hour, concerning whose quantity nothing is said, but which we know consists of 60 moments, according to the various constitution of a clock, begins or ends at the first or last stroke of the clock. And most clocks are judged to have been made so that the hour has elapsed when they give the first stroke of the hour.

But since there are various estimations of hours, of itself the common usage of the place is to be observed; yet for many private acts an option is given, whose force we shall weigh in the treatise on conscience.

2. A day, even in ecclesiastical matter, has its beginning from midnight, and consists of 24 hours to be computed continuously (c. 32). Hence, when from law computation is made by days, as v.g. concerning the time for which a novice can be absent, parts of days are to be disregarded which do not pertain to the continuous space of 24 hours which are to be computed from midnight to midnight. Wherefore a novice who has been absent twenty times for five or ten separate hours will not be judged to have been absent even for a day; nor is the day on which he sets out or on which he returns to be computed in the time of absence which is estimated by days. ¹ Yet continuity is to be understood morally: he has been absent for a day who has been absent morally for 24 hours, computed from midnight.

3. A week (c. 32) is said to consist of 7 days, that is, therefore, of 7 spaces of 24 hours to be computed continuously. But it is not required that the days themselves be continuous among themselves, or that a certain day, say Sunday, be considered as the first. Hence, unless the law establishes that the week is to be taken as in the calendar, any seven full days - i.e. seven intervals of 24 continuous hours from midnight to midnight - even not continuous, will make a week.

4. Month and year either are taken as in the calendar or not. In the latter case, a month designates a space of 30 days; but a year, a space of 365 days.

Furthermore, they are taken as in the calendar:

a) When they are designated by their proper name, v.g. in the month of March, or when an equivalent designation is used. Thus, by saying "in the next coming year," you equivalently designate the year 1923;

b) When continuous time is assigned, as v.g. in suspension for three months.

Thirty or 365 days are taken when the time is designated as interrupted, as when an absence of three months is permitted to a canonical beneficiary.

5. As to the beginning and end of time: either the term a quo is assigned neither explicitly nor implicitly (suspension from divine things for a month; three months of vacations in a year), and then it is computed from moment to moment. Or the term a quo of time is assigned; then (excluding the special case of acts which are renewed at fixed times, as vows, election): if the term a quo coincides with the beginning of the day, the first day is computed, and the time is ended when the last day of the same number begins: v.g. two months from 15 January are judged to have elapsed when the 15th day of March begins (at midnight). If it does not coincide with the beginning of the day: the fourteenth year of age, the ten-day period for appealing (the beginning of these is birth, the sentence of first instance), the first day is not computed, and the time is ended when the last day of the same number has been completed. Therefore one born 15 March 1900 will have fourteen years, when the day 15 March 1914 has been completed (at midnight).

The day of the same number is taken differently when there is question of several months or years, and when there is speech of several days. In the former case, it is the day which in another month has the same number, v.g. the 20th, the 25th. Yet because some months number 30 days, others 31 days, and February alone has 28 or 29, the day of the same number can fail at the end of the month. But then the last day, v.g. 28 February, is had for the day of the same number as the final days (v.g. 28, 29, 30, 31 Jan.) of the month which has more. But when the time is shorter than a month, the day of the same number is that on which the number indicated by the very space is repeated: v.g. the eighth day, the tenth, if there is question of an eight-day period, of a ten-day period.

Finally, if there is question of acts which recur after fixed intervals, v.g. of vows which after one or two years must be renewed or are converted into perpetual vows, of an election which returns to be made every sixth year, the time is ended on the same recurring day on which it began, but, the consideration of the hour of the act having been neglected, it can be done through that whole same day. Hence, although first vows are not made on the same recurring day on which someone entered the novitiate, but on the next day, nevertheless the vows emitted, ¹ an election made on 15 August, will be renewed on the recurring day 15 August.

6. As to the obligations of contracts, for example money borrowed to be repaid, unless those making the agreement have defined something else, canon law accommodates itself to the civil law having force in the territory (c. 33 § 2).

7. Canon 35 distinguishes continuous time from useful time. Continuous time admits no interruption; useful time does not run for one who is ignorant or impeded. V.g. if ten useful days are granted for appealing, the days on which someone has been impeded are not computed in them. Time of itself is judged continuous; the express or tacit concession of useful time is to be demonstrated.

¹ But for those who must reside insofar as they have certain offices to be performed in a definite place, that rule is to be applied prudently and cautiously. Let us suppose a canon who has been present at Matins but not at the other hours in choir. On that day, on which he has fulfilled his office only in part, he is not judged to have resided. Wherefore, if he has already fully consumed his lawful vacations, on that day he loses, for the proportional part, not only the daily distributions, but also, for the proportional part, the fruits of his prebend or benefice, and can be punished as a violator of the law of residence.

¹ And even if one who was professed at the sixth hour repeats the vows only at the eleventh hour, nevertheless, on 15 Aug. from the sixth hour to the eleventh he will not be released from vows.