§ 4. On the Use of Probabilism

— The proper place of probabilism. I. Probabilism has its proper seat where there is question of the liceity of the action alone, with consideration given to the law by which the action can be commanded, forbidden, or permitted. Then, according to the very order most wisely pre-established by God, the principles must be applied: a doubtful law does not oblige; no one is bound except through knowledge of the law ¹; and therefore, he who acts probably acts prudently, because he exposes himself to no danger of offending against an obliging law. Wherefore even then the use of probabilism is always licit or legitimate: it is confined by no exception.

But when there is question of probability of fact, no doubt of men can remove the danger of fact, as the danger of violating law is eliminated by a doubt of law. By what norms doubts of fact are ruled will soon be said below.

Therefore the exceptions sometimes brought against probabilism are only apparent, arisen from this, that probabilism is appealed to outside its proper seat.

¹ Cf. d'Annibale, I, 162.

— What is better to do. The use of the safer opinion is not always morally more perfect. It is more perfect of itself where, in order to do what is safer, one's own utility or convenience alone would have to be abandoned, but not where the less safe part is chosen for other reasons. If the obligation of restoring a sum to a man who will abuse it is uncertain, and you wish to give the same sum to an apostolic work, what prudent arbiter will estimate restitution as morally more perfect?

Indeed the use of the less probable opinion can be commanded. For obedience must be given to a Superior commanding according to a probable opinion, even if another opinion is more probable to the subject. Thus a Superior prohibits the fast by which you think yourself more probably bound: you are forbidden to fast.

— 1. Use of an extrinsically probable opinion. An extrinsically probable opinion cannot be useful to him for whom its falsity has been looked through. For presumption yields to truth. Nor does extrinsic authority have force except insofar as it founds a presumption of valid reasons. Therefore he himself is forbidden to use such an opinion. But it will scarcely happen to a prudent and not pertinacious man that he certainly judges false an opinion which commonly is held as probable.

2. Thus we say: and this concerning obligations of natural or divine law. But when there is question of human laws, it is reasonably judged that the legislator does not urge his law beyond what approved authors understand it to mean.

Wherefore, if I judge as wholly false some benign interpretation of a canon, which is sufficiently received, I myself am not prohibited from acting according to it. Thus, if we consider principles, an excuse from reservation sought from ignorance seems altogether vain. Yet in places where the bishop has not removed the controversy by formal decree, any penitent or confessor will be able to allege that excuse and admit it. For the very well-known controversy permits us to interpret the silence of the Code thus far as a toleration of the more benign opinion.

3. A confessor or another learned man can respond to one consulting him according to the probable opinion of others, with his own opinion omitted, even if this latter was more probable. Indeed he can indicate to him an opinion which other learned men defend as probable, although he himself judges it false. And a penitent who wishes to follow such an opinion has a right to absolution ¹. And even if the opinion to which the penitent adheres is only apparently probable, provided the penitent is in good faith, he will be able to be absolved: for he is disposed.

¹ This obligation of the confessor confirms probabilism. Cf. De Bock, Theol. fund. n. 231.