§ 5. On the Accidental Obligation of Denouncing

— "According to the norm of the apostolic constitutions, and by name of the Constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum paenitentiae, June 1, 1741, the penitent must, within a month, denounce the guilty party of the delict of solicitation in confession to the local Ordinary or to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office; and the confessor must, with his conscience gravely burdened, warn the penitent about this burden" (c. 904).

Besides the obligation, which can flow from natural law, of denouncing certain guilty persons, there must be recalled in this place the peculiar obligation of positive law, to be interpreted from the monuments of the earlier law, of which we must hand down this brief summary.

Besides the Constitution of Benedict XIV, there must also be consulted the earlier Constitution of Gregory XV, Universi, August 30, 1622, which Benedict XIV almost carried over into his Constitution, but did not suppress. And in the Constitution Etsi Pastoralis, May 26, 1742, §9, n. 5, Benedict XIV declared that Latins and Greeks are equally bound by these laws. To the prior Constitution of Gregory XV there were added various responses of the Holy Office, especially the 16 responses of February 11, 1661, and the instruction to bishops, February 9, 1867. By the decree of Alexander VII, September 24, 1667, two propositions pertaining here, n. 6 and 7, were proscribed; this decree was also confirmed by Benedict XIV.

The guilty person to be denounced is the confessor as such, not the penitent, even if he were a priest, nor a lower cleric or layman, who cannot be confessors except fictitiously; but the confessor, even one deprived of jurisdiction, and of whatever grade or dignity, provided he abuses, in relation to the exercise of the sacrament of Penance, the power of order with which he truly is endowed.

For the Code abstained from the word "priest," which Benedict XIV used in his Constitution; and since, already before the Code, not a few wished bishops to be comprehended, the studied omission of that word "priest" in cc. 904, 2363, and 2368 furnishes us a certain argument of the mind by which the Legislator wishes no soliciting confessor to be excepted from his decrees. Besides, the reason which they brought forward for excepting bishops now has no force. They used to say that a bishop is not subject to inquisitors, to whom, if the bishop was lacking, denunciation had to be made. But now denunciation can easily be made to the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate and to the Holy Office.

Moreover the very practice of the Supreme Congregation stands against the more benign opinion of several: Noldin, III, 376 note; Arregui, 653; Ferreres, II, 692, etc., who even now judge that an obligation, at least positive, of denouncing a bishop is not established.

Therefore the words of c. 904, "according to the norm of the Apostolic Constitutions," are to be referred not to the person to be denounced, but to the delict which gives place to denunciation.

That guilty person must have solicited; but he is not excused by the mutual solicitation which the penitent made, indeed which the penitent began. Yet mere consent, given by an exterior sign, does not seem to be solicitation, although most respond more severely (cf. St. Alph., VI, 681; Bucceroni, Opusc. in C. Sacramentum Paen., n. 29, which Palm., V, 727 note, does not dare to disapprove). But mutual solicitation is had if both do the things which are forbidden, even if one does them after being invited.

— Solicitation can be made by words, signs, nods, touch (upon one's own or another's body), by writing itself either then or afterward to be read. Words which do not clearly contain solicitation will have to be estimated from the adjuncts or from the subsequent event. Thus words in praise of beauty, or these words said: "I shall come into your house; promise me that you will do what I wish," are already sufficiently suspect in themselves. But these other words: "Wait for me in such a place; I have business to treat with you," will be judged an inchoate solicitation if in that meeting no serious business to be done is shown, and the one inviting has solicited.

Nor does it matter, provided the other requisites are present, to distinguish whether the penitent was solicited immediately or mediately, or another person through the work of the penitent, or whether it is to sin with himself or with another.

Yet it is necessary that moral certitude be had concerning the depraved affection of the confessor.

— Although solicitation need not yet appear in itself a grave external sin, nevertheless, for the case to be had, it must be directed to grave, external sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue.

That sin can consist in actions, in dealings, in conversations. Here dealings are counsels, deliberations, pacts (delle trattative, des machinations) about a shameful matter to be done then or afterward, whether they are proposed by the confessor alone or by both.

Therefore he is to be denounced who mixes in, concerning the present, in the required adjuncts, even when provoked, shameful conversations, or words gravely illicit and contrary to chastity.

— Required adjuncts. Yet not every solicitation is touched by the positive obligation of denouncing, but only that which is made "in confession" (c. 904). These words, however, have received a broad signification from the confirmed constitutions. Therefore he is to be denounced who made or began the solicitation described above:

1. in the act of sacramental confession, and it does not matter that the sacrament was then interrupted or remained incomplete;

2. before or after confession, but, in either case, immediately. If some other thing truly intervened in the middle, the case is not had. Here, however, confession is supposed.

What if the penitent is solicited while he asks for confession or wishes to confess? If the formal or virtual petition is made while the penitent is in the act and state of confession, for example the confessor is seated, the penitent is not merely among those standing around his confessional, but is already kneeling at his feet, then confession is virtually begun, and the priest is to be denounced. This is much more established if the confessor assents to one thus seeking confession, although, on account of the solicitation itself, the penitent afterward now does not wish to confess. If he is not yet in the state and act of confession, he does not seem to have to be denounced by force of this clause.

3. On the occasion of confession, or when confession is the cause per accidens of soliciting the confessing person. The case is had properly when the confessor hands to a penitent whom he wishes to solicit a note to be read afterward by him, and which contains solicitation.

Yet the clause is extended to the case which we just solved, of a penitent who is solicited in the state of one confessing, while he was at the point of beginning the accusation.

Besides the fact that the matter is of most difficult use and proof, it is not established that a confessor is to be denounced who abuses knowledge drawn from confession, for example the fragility of the penitent, to solicit him. For the occasion is less strictly confession than knowledge had from confession (cf. Palm., note to V, 718).

N.B. But he is not, by positive law, to be denounced who hands to a servant confessing a note to be carried to another person, not a penitent, whom the confessor solicits, if the servant himself is in no way an accomplice. For then the penitent is solicited by no pact.

Is he to be denounced who, asked to hear confession, turns aside to other things and solicits, not yet sitting in the manner of a confessor nor having the person kneeling before him? St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 678, reports that this is commonly affirmed. But against that severity stands the fact that the solicitation was made rather on occasion of the petition of confession than on occasion of confession (cf. Ballerini, Op. Th., V, 717, and Palmieri in the note, where the more benign solution is confirmed by the very response and practice of the Holy Office).

4. Under pretext of confession, even when confession has not followed. To pretext confession is to give to solicitation the color of confession, to cover it with the veil of confession. But the confessor must pretext; and he will especially have done this who, led by a depraved intention, enters into shameful conversations in confession itself, as if these were useful or necessary for a complete accusation.

Yet it is not required that the penitent himself be deceived by the pretext. And since not only he who provokes to evil, but also he who actively consents to sin, is understood to solicit, he also solicits under pretext of confession who, while confession is pretexted, sins with another.

If you weigh these things, you will admit with Ballerini, V, 719-720, that solicitation is made under pretext of confession: a) whenever, by that pretext, bystanders are removed and sin is committed, whether the priest or the accomplice alleged the pretext, provided the priest, conscious of the alleged pretext, tacitly admitted the pretext; b) whenever a confessor sins with someone whom he knows to have been sent or to have entered his room under pretext of making confession.

Nevertheless, on account of the authority of St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 679, there can be excluded the case of the penitent who himself pretexts confession in order to solicit the confessor and sins with the confessor, because the author of the pretext was the penitent; and the case of both who from a previous agreement pretext confession in order to deceive others, because not the solicitation itself but only the execution of the sin is made under pretext of confession.

Yet in the same place, St. Alphonsus says that the confessor is to be denounced by whose counsel a woman who, fearing defamation, was refusing to sin, pretends that she is sick in order to call the confessor with whom she may sin.

A confessor is said to solicit under pretext of confession who, of his own accord or when asked, goes to the house of a sick person, and there, alleging that confession is to be heard, removes bystanders in order to solicit; or if he arranges that a boy be sent into a room and solicits him after he has entered, even with the end of confession proposed; or if a priest, either fictitiously or truly, invites a penitent to confess in order to solicit him. I say, invites to confess. For if, under pretext of confession, he invites a person to go into a church and there solicits that person outside the confessional seat, and consequently now not pretexting confession, the case of solicitation to be denounced is not had, since the invitation alone, not the solicitation itself, was made under pretext of confession.

You ask how that case differs from the preceding case of a person sent into a room under pretext of confession? We respond that a room is a place much narrower and is not furnished with a confessional properly so called, which would constitute a special place, so that in the preceding case the invitation is judged to have been made immediately for confessing.

More manifestly immune from denounced solicitation is he who alleges confession in order to obtain license to go to another's house in which he is going to sin with an accomplice.

5. With simulation of hearing confession, solicitation made, even outside the occasion of confession and therefore even if both came there for a plainly different end, in a confessional, or in another place destined or chosen for hearing confessions.

A confessional is that little structure of peculiar form placed in a church for the use of the sacrament of Penance. A place destined for confessions is not the whole sacristy, but, for example, there or in a parlor a kneeler with a seat placed for hearing confessions. Such, from the response itself of the Holy Office in Acta Sanctae Sedis, t. 9, p. 530, is the place where the confessions of nuns are heard. A place chosen for confession is any other place, for example the room of a sick person, where at least one of the two sincerely wished either to confess or to hear confession. For if each merely pretended to choose the place for confessing, the place cannot be called chosen for making confession, nor is simulation of confession made in a place truly chosen.

But simulation in the two prior places is had already in reality if penitent and confessor place themselves there in the usual manner, unless from laughter it is perceived that another matter is being done; while in the third place, the external figure of confession must be studiously imitated for confession to be simulated. For simulation is said to be figure without the thing. Witnesses actually present are not necessary. It is enough that they could be present.

— 1. The obligation of denouncing holds: a) the solicited person himself; b) any other person, even an impubes, provided he was possessed of reason, who, either as an immediate witness or from trustworthy persons, has known that solicitation was made. Indeed the words of the Code, as Noldin, III, 377, observes, seem to oblige only the penitent, that is, the solicited person, to denounce; but the preceding interpretation of the law is indirectly confirmed by the very words, "According to the norm of the Constitution of Benedict XIV." Thus we say with most, against Cerato, De delicto sollicitationis, n. 89. Yet you should except him to whom the matter was manifested for asking counsel. And one who merely heard the matter is no longer obliged if the person narrating satisfied his own obligation. Thus Lehmk., II, 126, §5; and rightly indeed if, at the time when he narrated, he morally denounced at the same time. For if he deferred denunciation, it will be useful that, with the denunciation made by the hearer, it be established that the crime had already been narrated at a time not suspect.

Neither a long interval of time, nor defect of proofs, nor denunciation already made of another case, nor the proper fault of the solicited person who consented to the sin, indeed who first solicited, excuses him from making denunciation. But he will not have to manifest his own consent; nor, if he reveals this, is it to be reported in the acts.

Yet excuse of grave damage to be feared in life, reputation, or temporal goods, as long as the danger lasts, excuses from this law as positive. For common damage can increase the obligation from natural law. The obligation is also suspended in regions where, without grave inconvenience, not even by letters, the Ordinary or the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate or the Holy Office can be approached.

Likewise a person will be excused who can neither personally approach the Ordinary nor write to him, unless the confessor, which of itself is not to be advised, on account of danger of error and detraction, should wish to transact the matter for the person.

Probably a confessor who was led to shameful acts by grave fear alone is not to be denounced, since grave fear is accustomed to excuse guilty persons from ecclesiastical penalties (cf. St. Alph., VI, 687; D'Ann., III, 376 [8]); nor, as some think, a priest concerning whose amendment it is altogether established. But by the death of the guilty person the obligation ceases, since the end of the law has fully ceased.

2. The soliciting confessor himself does not have to denounce himself. But if nevertheless he has done so of his own accord, and has sincerely opened all things, he will be immune from vindicative penalty, though not always from medicinal penalty, even if he is afterward accused.

3. Denunciation must be made within a month from the obligation of denouncing having been known.

4. Denunciation is to be made either to the Holy Office, the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate, or the Ordinary of the place in which the solicitation was made, even if the confessor was of another diocese or an exempt religious. But religious Superiors are strictly prohibited from involving themselves in this cause (c. 501).

— Denunciation is to be made judicial, and therefore before the Holy Office or the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate or the local Ordinary or their delegate, with the intervention of an ecclesiastical man who acts as notary.

— The confessor must warn the penitent about his obligation of denouncing, with his conscience gravely burdened (c. 904).

Every confessor, yet not the solicitor himself, for this would be too hard, must give this warning. Yet when death is imminent, the penitent is not to be exposed by this warning to eternal ruin. - If from the warning made, public divulgation of the whole matter is to be feared, there seems to be place for epikeia. - And the warning can be deferred to a more opportune time, if it is foreseen to be useless now but efficacious afterward. But if the penitent is not going to return, let the confessor at least warn him about the obligation of speaking about that matter with another confessor, on account of the difficulty still to be untied, and of obeying the confessor. By the same reason he can conduct himself who judges himself unequal to solving the case. Yet without a just cause it is not lawful for the confessor to transfer the burden to another. - Nor is a person to be warned who, on account of his simplicity, did not understand the solicitation: for his scandal is to be avoided.

— Questions. What if the confessor has already been convicted and punished because of solicitation?

If because of the same solicitation numerically, this also will hold here: not twice for the same thing. But if because of another delict numerically, without doubt he is again to be reported.

What if he appeared of his own accord? He is to be denounced, so that in the trial it may be established that all things were declared by him (Holy Office instruction, 1867).

What in doubt?

a) If the words signify solicitation, and there is doubt only about the intention of the confessor, the end consonant with the words is presumed to have been present.

b) If the delict itself is truly doubtful, the more benign parts can be preferred (St. Alph., VI, 702).

c) If there is doubt about the person who solicited, the matter is to be indicated if there is probable hope that the judge by his diligence will be able to detect the guilty person. But he who hesitates in doubt between two persons ought to indicate neither, lest he harm the reputation of an innocent person (D'Ann., III, 368 [19]).

— Persons who, conscious of this obligation, refuse to make that denunciation cannot be absolved, not even by the solicitor himself. And to urge execution, it will sometimes be better not to absolve them before they have fulfilled the obligation.

Yet one who is pressed by grave difficulty of appearing personally before the ordinary or delegated judge can send letters either to the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate, or to the local Ordinary, or to the Holy Office, in which, the guilty person or species of the fact not yet being designated, he simply declares that he is held to making denunciation, and asks that he may be able to complete it before the confessor alone. But the letters must be signed: blind or anonymous letters are destitute of all value.

Then the confessor, unless he already has it, will obtain from the episcopal curia the formula of questions to be put. He will note the responses of the person, omitting those things which would manifest this person's complicity or fault. Finally, with his name signed, he will have to confirm that the relation is genuine or faithful.

Yet the confessor is not of himself obliged to receive the denunciation. But if he refuses to do this, the person who with difficulty approaches the Ordinary can wait for the occasion of a confessor who is willing to perform that ministry.

Finally, if he is delayed by excessive repugnance, and the utility of the denunciation does not seem so great, the confessor can, with the name kept silent, propose the difficulty to the Sacred Penitentiary and obtain from it for the penitent a dispensation from undergoing the too grave burden.

— Sanction of the obligation. The solicited faithful person who within a month knowingly has not completed the denunciation prescribed by c. 904 contracts an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to no one, from which nevertheless he cannot be absolved unless after he has satisfied his obligation, or has seriously promised that he will satisfy it. He escapes this penalty who had to denounce but was not himself solicited.

But he who has written to the local Ordinary or to the Holy Office can wait for the response even longer; but if he has opened the difficulty of denunciation, silence seems able to be interpreted legitimately as a dispensation from the obligation (c. 2368, §2).

— Penalties against solicitors who have not betrayed themselves of their own accord or not in due time⁽¹⁾ are established as most grave by c. 2368, §1, but all are ferendae sententiae. Nor is the local Ordinary, where the custom is that he himself act, or the Holy Office accustomed, scarcely after the denunciation has been received, to proceed at once. A first or second denunciation is accustomed to be followed by a warning, whether paternal or judicial;⁽²⁾ after the third, the cause is instructed.

⁽¹⁾ Wherefore to a priest now well disposed to whom denunciation seems to be feared, prudent counsel can sometimes be given that he accuse himself of his own accord.

⁽²⁾ Formerly, but no longer today, after a second denunciation the Holy Office used to command that the bishop observe the priest.

— Innocent confessors must be protected from false denunciations. Wherefore he who by himself or through others, as for instance through a confessor, falsely denounces to Superiors a confessor concerning the crime of solicitation, by the fact itself commits an excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Apostolic See, from which he cannot in any case be absolved unless he has formally retracted the false denunciation, and has repaired according to his powers the damages, if any followed therefrom, with a grave and long-lasting penance imposed besides.

Before the Code the crime of false denunciation was, without censure, reserved most specially to the Holy See. That reservation was judged penal, so that it was not incurred by one ignorant.

Today, of itself, there is contracted a censure reserved only specially to the Holy See. At the same time, however, conditions are imposed on absolution which only the Holy See in the particular case will be able to dispense: that is, formal retraction, namely in judicial form, or before a judge; reparation of damages, if any followed, and in this matter the law of nature is almost confirmed; and besides, a grave and long-lasting penance to be imposed. A grave penance is that which is given in the sacrament for grave fault; long-lasting, according to Cerato, De censuris, n. 61, whom Gen., II, 400, follows, is one which lasts for three years; according to Cappello, De censuris, n. 103, it is one which is to be observed for six months.

The reason of estimations of this kind escapes us. And we judge that this notion must be weighed relatively, with attention paid to the quality of the person, the gravity of the delict, and also the frequency of the imposed action. In a shorter interval an action becomes long-lasting if it must be done often. Thus the following seems to us to be a long-lasting penance: daily recitation of the Rosary for three months; weekly approach to the sacraments for six months; monthly approach for a year; approach four times in the year for three years; annual spiritual exercises for five or six years.

Ignorance, but not crass ignorance, excuses from that censure.

But if because of ignorance the censure was not contracted, the sin then by reason of itself will remain reserved, though not specially or most specially. Retraction at least according to the requisites of the natural law will have to be demanded.

But they judge that the delict is not committed except by a denunciation properly judicial, so that the excommunication does not affect a person who has sent a calumnious letter to the bishop or to the Holy Office.

From the common opinion of the Doctors, in this matter faith is not easily to be given to women, since not rarely they are deceived either by their own imagination, or from hatred, envy, jealousy, they calumniate innocent priests. Therefore, before it is prescribed that a denunciation be made, one must carefully consider whether perhaps the accusing person is unworthy of being believed, whether the malice of the priest is sufficiently established, especially of one who enjoys the best reputation. Yet it can happen that a wolf is disguised in sheep's clothing; nor does it pertain to the confessor to inquire into persons.

— I. On Contrition. 1. For the fruitful reception of the sacrament there suffices and is required at least attrition, which is formal, and is not contained only virtually in an act of charity, for it is the sacrament of Penance; supernatural, that is, one which, with the help of supernatural grace, has been conceived on account of a motive which is referred to God directly or indirectly, for the offense of God must be detested as such.

Motives return to fear of punishments and to the turpitude or deformity of sin, to which ingratitude toward God and contempt itself of divine goodness are reduced; appreciatively supreme, so that sin is estimated as a greater evil than every evil which must be undergone in order to avoid sin, and therefore, in every true or possible hypothesis, excludes the will of sinning. Although the offense of God is not to be preferred to the punishments of hell, that absurd comparison is in no way to be instituted; universal, as to all mortal sins.

2. Although several deny this, the sacrament of Penance seems able to be valid and unformed, not only if attrition is not universal, but also if, though true, it does not reach the supreme degree. Wherefore penitents who have confessed in good faith, provided they have conceived some true sorrow, ought not to be compelled to repeat confessions.

3. It is in no way required that attrition be conceived from intention of the sacrament; nor is it established that it must be directed to the sacrament by the will itself of the penitent; but it is enough that the minister of the sacrament find apt matter. Wherefore the conceived sorrow has persevered sufficiently in the habitual will and is sufficiently expressed in sincere accusation, so that one who has not renewed an act of contrition conceived several hours before and has approached the sacrament coldly ought not to be anxious about his contrition. Nor is a new formal act of contrition required from him who, after absolution has been received, immediately seeks to be absolved from an omitted sin.

4. Provided the disposition of the penitent has habitually persevered, absolution will be able to be distant even for a long time from the acts of the penitent, since the sacrament was instituted after the manner of a judgment.

5. Since sins are opposed unequally even to a universal motive, since a man is rarely moved by the full force of such a motive, and detests more what is more repugnant to that motive, and since our act, subjectively one, becomes virtually multiple on account of the several motives to which it is terminated, sufficient attrition is not retracted as to all sins by a new fault; but partial retraction is well understood. Yet by every new mortal sin attrition perishes, insofar as universality is required.

6. Sorrow which merely follows sacramental confession, provided it is rendered sensible, seems to suffice for fruitful absolution.

7. Sorrow concerning venial sins does not have to be universal even virtually; but he who consciously accuses only venial sins and is sufficiently sorry for no venial sin will be guilty of grave sacrilege. But he who is sorry for one will not sin gravely even if he is not sorry for all which he accused; indeed he will not sin at all who simply accuses all things and does not positively affirm universal sorrow.

8. Putative attrition does not suffice; putative contrition is not required.

9. The things which have been said for cutting off anxieties do not prohibit counsels of formal excitation to perfect contrition, joined with discussion of conscience and accusation, and renewed if a new absolution is sought.

II. Formal acts of faith and hope are not necessary, but those suffice which are necessarily contained in a pious approach to the sacrament. Nor is there lacking the beginning of love which, from the Tridentine Council, prepares the way for perfect justification.

III. On Purpose. 1. An absolute purpose of not sinning any more, or, from the present affection, of never sinning, is required for the remission of every sin, and therefore for fruitful use of the sacrament is necessary at least concerning one accused sin. And because no mortal sin is remitted without the others, the purpose must be universal about all committed mortal sins, indeed about others too, at least insofar as an explicit purpose concerning the committed sins confirms a good will concerning the rest.

2. Attrition above all things contains a virtual purpose; and indeed a universal one, if it was conceived from a universal motive. This virtual purpose suffices, although not a few require a formal one. Indeed several wish that to attrition conceived from a particular motive there be added a positively universal purpose concerning mortal sins.

3. Concerning venial sins a purpose concerning one of the accused suffices, or concerning deliberate ones, or concerning lessening indeliberate ones, or concerning avoiding them as far as there is power. For in these modes there is contained an absolute purpose concerning at least one venial sin.

4. The efficacy of purpose is distinguished as principiative, or immediate, which affects the will at the moment of conversion to God or of use of the sacrament, and connotes the sincerity of purpose; and subsequent, effective, in constant execution, which connotes the virtue of the will.

An efficacious will embraces the means, both negative and positive, necessary for attaining the end. How far it must be extended to flight from occasion, we saw in Fundamental Theology, n. 452-456, where the notions concerning proximate occasion are also handed down.

Relapse into sins, even frequent relapse, demonstrates a changed will, but not necessarily a defect of the preceding will. Nor does founded fear, indeed certain foresight of relapse, argue a defect of present purpose. This defect can sometimes be demonstrated by uniform perseverance of sin in a certain occasion, since apt remedies are not lacking.

IV. On Confession. 1. Confession is required to be at least formally integral. Material integrity is furnished by him who confesses all mortal sins of which, after diligent examination, he has consciousness, with the circumstances which change the species. He satisfies the obligation of material integrity.

Material integrity, taken more strictly, supposes a truly complete accusation of all grave sins which, committed after Baptism, have not yet been remitted by force of the keys.

Formal integrity is furnished by him who makes the accusation by which he is here and now bound; and such an accusation especially is called formal which, on account of a just cause, is not made complete.

2. Material integrity is prescribed of itself. This: a) requires an examination made according to the capacity of the penitent, according to the distance from the last confession, and according to the other adjuncts, with the moderate care which a prudent man applies in serious affairs, or such as the learned and timorous are accustomed to have in this matter, even if someone knows that with greater diligence he would find more. Today we require from no one an examination through several days; but we judge that an examination made for an hour suffices for accusing sins even for those who have not confessed for many years; b) after the examination has been made, the lowest theological and moral species of grave sins must be declared spontaneously, so that the whole substance of the sin is accused. Unknown species are not contracted and therefore are not to be accused. When reasonably questioned by the judge, the penitent will also have to declare aggravating circumstances. Besides, the certain number, if possible, or the probable number, with "more" or "less" added, must be declared. Unless a notably greater number afterward becomes known, the certain number does not have to be supplied by him who indicated the probable one. The greater the difficulty, the less a definite indication is required. Sometimes it will be enough to indicate the time; c) one who has forgotten a grave sin has to accuse it in the next confession, but meanwhile he can communicate. Yet after diligent examination a new formal examination of the same period is not required, and because of the presumption of an integrally made confession, the penitent is dispensed from accusing a sin which merely seems to have been passed over. Nor is a confused confession incomplete. Wherefore, after a confused manifestation has been made which could be made, distinct memory afterward had does not oblige to a new distinct accusation, unless the sin is altogether alien to the things confusedly set forth; d) a confession which, because of mortally culpable negligence or ignorance, was not integral is sacrilegious. Negligence subjectively not grave allows the confession to be valid, but does not dispense from a better examination; e) neither things doubtfully committed, nor doubtfully grave, nor certainly grave but probably accused, must certainly be accused. In practice the penitent will have to be directed from presumptions.

3. Since excessive difficulty excuses from the positive precept of material integrity, formal integrity suffices: for those who labor under physical impotence of confessing integrally, at least by ordinary means; for those who are impeded from material integrity by moral impotence, as when the destruction of many is imminent or also sometimes in a mission among unbelievers; for those who from integral confession have grave damage to be feared, either to themselves, or to the confessor, or to another, per accidens and not of itself joined with such confession. To moral impotence is referred the case of a scrupulous person concerning past life, of a penitent who before confession has been finished is absolved by an impatient confessor, of him who cannot be absolved directly from a certain sin, which today can happen only in absolving an accomplice. Yet that someone may confess incompletely, there is required some necessity or great utility of confession, and lack of a confessor to whom integral confession can be made. And when there is occasion, the confession will have to be completed. And in an incomplete confession, grave sins are to be accused before light ones.

Infamy, whether of an accomplice or of another person, before the confessor does not seem to permit incomplete confession, unless there is a special cause why the revelation of sin made to such a one is hateful. Yet there is a more benign opinion as well as a more severe one.

4. Free matter, such as sins already pardoned or venial sins, is usefully subjected to the keys, both on account of sacramental grace and on account of the remission of punishments.

5. Sufficient matter is to be subjected to the keys; such is not a doubtful sin or positive imperfection, if any exists; but a sin already directly remitted is such. The general formula "the sins of the whole life," added to the present accusation, indeed suffices; but so that attrition may be more certain, it is better that the penitent, especially an uneducated one, indicate some species. Outside necessity, a confession which is simply about the sins of the whole life, without any specification, is not to be admitted.

6. The obligation of vocal confession, which several inferred from the usage of the Church, is pressed in silence in the Code. And certainly it is enough that, after a written confession has been handed over, the penitent, if he can, say: "I accuse these things."

To make confession secret is the right of the penitent, not an obligation.

A true confession is demanded. Grave in confession would be not every lie, but a lie committed in necessary accusation or with deception of the confessor in a notable matter. He cannot be reprehended gravely who, in a general confession, deliberately mixes past and recent things. One who positively declares grave recent matter to pertain to past matter seems to us, as the author of a grave deception, guilty of sacrilege. Some respond more benignly when it does not matter for knowing custom or relapse.

7. A whole confession which was invalid is to be repeated, as one which is made in bad faith to a half-asleep or unaware priest. A confession which, without fault of the penitent, was not wholly heard must be repeated in part, as to mortal faults.

Yet if in a long confession the penitent does not know which things were not heard, it will be enough that he state a few species among which he hesitates in doubt, or if he cannot even do this, that he declare generically that certain things were not perceived. But he who spoke clearly should presume that all things were perceived.

Nothing therefore must be repeated because the confessor judged light what was grave.

8. At the moment of absolution, a confused memory of the accusation, whether preserved or then resumed, suffices for the confessor, so that it is plainly enough if he knows that absolution is to be given, that a connected obligation, if there is any, exists, and that this ought to be the mode of penance. Wherefore, if a confession wholly null or sacrilegious is repeated to the same confessor, it seems to suffice that the confessor ratify the preceding confession, if it was sacramental, after a generic repetition has been made by the penitent.

But confession is not to be repeated unless it is morally established that it was null. Nor for the most part are those to be disturbed who in good faith think that they have confessed rightly.

9. General confession is useful and to be commended: for removing a grave doubt about the value of past confessions; for the more perfect expiation of past faults; for better adapting oneself to grace to be received before acts of greater moment.

Wherefore, in the principal periods of life, confession of the whole life can prudently be advised; this counsel is confirmed by the Code for those entering religion. That greater fruit may be gathered, let it be made as if the last.

Yet confession of the whole life does not seem to have to be repeated more often, nor does approach to a new confessor furnish cause for repeating it. But it is better after stated intervals, for example after individual years, to make a general confession from the last general confession.

A general confession will be harmful if it would be for a penitent prone to anxiety a cause of disturbances or scruples, or if it would nourish the passions of one tempted.

Asked for counsel, let the confessor ask why it is wished to be made, and inquire whether disturbance of soul is to be feared.

10. Concerning the dying person. If he is in possession of himself, let him be treated according to his disposition. A non-Catholic who cannot prudently be warned about the error of his sect should be stirred up to perfect contrition; then let him declare himself a sinner before God and the priest. If then he admits that the priest help him as far as he can, he will be able to be absolved conditionally.

One deprived of the senses, whose express will of absolution others can testify to, has confessed as it were through an interpreter, so that he can be absolved absolutely. From present usage all other Catholics must be absolved conditionally. Even those who rejected the sacraments, or baptized non-Catholics, can be absolved conditionally. Yet non-Catholics will be helped more by Extreme Unction.

V. On Satisfaction. 1. One guilty of grave sin, in approaching the tribunal of Penance, must under mortal obligation be prepared to fulfill the fitting penance which is imposed on him, saving his right of asking commutation from the same or from a different confessor. One guilty of venial sin has the same obligation under light obligation. If two penances have been given by different confessors for the same accusation, it is enough that the penitent fulfill whichever one he has preferred.

2. A grave penance which has been imposed for grave sin must of itself be executed under grave obligation. Satisfaction can be made even in the state of sin; nor is a special intention of satisfying required. It suffices that the work be done in the mode by which it would have to be done if it were a common precept of the Church. Unless the confessor has permitted more, penance must be fulfilled by the penitent himself, within the time expressly or tacitly established by the confessor. If none has been established, then at least in such a way that danger of forgetfulness is met.

3. He who has perfectly forgotten the imposed penance is relieved of every obligation, unless the confessor, who prudently is thought to remember the penance imposed by him, can conveniently be approached again.

VI. On the accidental obligation of denouncing. Besides the obligation of natural law, from the Constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, which later decrees have interpreted, a positive obligation of denouncing is imposed on the penitent and certain other persons. Therefore:

1. the confessor is to be denounced as such, not if a penitent has solicited another;

2. the guilty person of solicitation to shameful things, even mutual or mediate solicitation to sin with another. The modes of solicitation can be words, signs, nods, touch, writing to be read now or afterward. Solicitation, although it need not itself appear a grave sin, nevertheless must be directed to grave external sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, whether it is an action, or a dealing, namely deliberation or pact, or conversation;

3. solicitation is understood in confession, that is: in the act of sacramental confession, which has its beginning from the moment when the penitent has begun to declare his sins, indeed when in the manner of penitents he presents himself to the confessor; immediately before or immediately after confession which truly has taken place or at least has been begun in the way which we stated; on the occasion of confession, or when the confession itself, not knowledge of it, is per accidens the cause of soliciting the penitent. He solicits on the occasion of confession who hands to the penitent a little note to be read afterward by which he himself is solicited. If the note is to be carried to another, the case will be had if the penitent was conscious, but not if he was ignorant of the things contained; under pretext of confession, even when confession has not followed, as if he solicits one whom he invited to confess or, after confession has been alleged, removes bystanders in order to solicit; with simulation of confession, in a confessional or in another place destined or chosen for hearing confessions. A destined place is not the whole room or sacristy, but, for example, a kneeler placed there with a seat for hearing confessions. Simulation there, as also in a confessional, will be had of itself from the fact that both present themselves there in the customary way; in a chosen place, the external manner of confession must be imitated for simulation to be had;

4. the obligation holds the solicited person and anyone possessed of reason who, either as an immediate witness or from trustworthy persons, has known that solicitation was made. Yet one who merely heard the matter is not held if the one narrating morally satisfied his obligation immediately, or if he knew the matter as one consulted.

The obligation is not removed by interval of time, defect of proof, another denunciation already made, consent into sin; but it is excused by danger of grave damage, in life, reputation, or goods;

5. denunciation is to be made within a month from the known obligation, and indeed judicially, either to the Holy Office, or the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate, or the Ordinary of the place in which the solicitation was made, every mingling-in of a religious Superior being excluded;

6. the confessor must warn the penitent about his obligation. In certain cases, as of a dying person, from epikeia the warning will be able to be omitted or deferred;

7. those who do not wish to denounce cannot be absolved and, if they themselves were solicited, they are struck by excommunication latae sententiae reserved to no one. But it can be asked that, because of grave difficulty, denunciation be made before the confessor alone;

8. he who has made a false judicial denunciation is struck by excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See, and from which he will not be able to be absolved unless formal judicial retraction has been made, damage repaired, and a grave and long-lasting penance accepted which must be imposed on him. If the excommunication was not contracted, the sin remains reserved to the Holy See by reason of itself.