Article I: Usefulness, Notion, and Effects of a Matrimonial Promise

I. Usefulness of a promise. Matrimony can be promised honorably and usefully. Honorably, because it is a good thing and necessary to the human race, although the continent life of itself surpasses conjugal life. Usefully, because the security of a promise fosters peace of soul, and, if faith has been mutually given, gives place to an intercourse by which the betrothed can make mutual experience of qualities, affections, and propensities, so that the indissoluble covenant of matrimony may be contracted more prudently, and they may conceive and foster that nobler friendship which will strengthen the nuptial covenant and meanwhile renders a pure and chaste life easier for the young man. Wherefore the Church, although she does not require sponsals, nevertheless favors them.

II. Various nature of a promise. 1. As every promise, the promise of matrimony can be unilateral, and then, according to the obligation undertaken, be of mere fidelity, which of itself does not oblige under grave sin, or of justice, which obliges under grave sin from the time when it has been accepted by the other party.

A bilateral or mutual promise, made under grave obligation, between persons fit in law, effects sponsals. But all who are naturally capable are fit, therefore even, although some doubted, impubescent persons, provided they are bound by no bond either of present matrimony or of an incompossible promise, nor detained by an impediment of matrimony.

Unilateral promises are to be made less of, since they are often vain or are made for extorting acts that are less lawful.

2. Conditioned sponsals also are valid. By their nature, do sponsals made between impeded persons hold, under the condition: if the Pope dispenses? Before the Code, this was disputed, rather from positive law. Against this condition there could be objected a detriment brought to the authority of the Church, which will be able to judge less freely concerning the opportuneness of the dispensation. But, at least if there is question of impediments in which the Supreme Pontiff is wont to dispense, and causes for dispensing are present, that inconvenience is rather fictitious. Wherefore we judge that the condition restricted to these impediments is valid, since from present positive law nothing contrary can be gathered. (Concerning the law before the Code, cf. Wernz, t. 4, n. 95, 96).

3. Vitiated by grave and unjust fear, they are indeed valid, in our opinion, but they can be rescinded by him who has suffered the fear. Some think the same to be null: but for the party who has been injured by fear, the nullity of the contract favors and profits him less than the faculty of rescinding; for this takes every option away from him.

4. The general rules concerning error also are to be applied here. Therefore sponsal promises infected by substantial error, understood broadly concerning a very notable quality, are not valid. Accidental error, however, which gives cause to the contract, gives the right of withdrawing to the deceived party, especially if she has been deceived by the fraud of the other.

— You ask what bodily defects must be manifested opportunely by those about to marry.

Occult defects must be manifested which render nuptials pernicious or damaging, as is every contagious disease; or notably useless for the ends of matrimony, as sterility, physical incapacity for giving birth without danger of life, a weakness which would oblige the other spouse to perpetual or long-lasting continence. Among damaging defects is also placed the occult pregnancy of the woman, which exposes the man to the danger of nourishing offspring not his own.

Occult defects which render nuptials merely less desirable need not be manifested if they cannot be manifested without proportionate inconvenience: thus a girl cannot without infamy reveal herself to have been deflowered.

Nevertheless one must act prudently here, and the very disposition of the man is to be explored, who, if he is suspicious and irascible, could esteem himself gravely offended. Nor is the happiness of matrimony to be opposed to grave danger. Sometimes there will be cause for restoring, by the aid of a skilled physician, the external signs of virginity.

Defect of substantial form. Fictitious promise.

Made otherwise than by writing signed by the parties¹ and by the Ordinary or pastor or at least two witnesses, every matrimonial promise of Catholics lacks the substantial form prescribed by canon 1017, §1. And a formless promise, whether unilateral or bilateral, even sworn, as such, no more than a fictitious promise, begets any obligation of conscience.

Nor will the publication of this law be a little useful for avoiding many deceptions for incautious girls. Nevertheless each promise fraudulently made, as a damaging deed, begets the obligation of repairing damages.

Not rarely it happens that adequate reparation is only in matrimony. Suppose a girl deceived by the reasonable hope of matrimony to be pregnant from fornication. Then, if, with attention to the social condition of both parties, especially to civil culture itself, there is hope of a happy marriage, we shall persuade, as far as can be done, that this be done. But if such hope is not had, it is most grave to impose perpetual servitude on an unwilling party, nor is it useful even for the deceived girl that she be joined to such a marriage. Wherefore then it will be better that, besides support for the offspring to be born, she accept a dowry by which she can suitably contract nuptials.

Observe that the counselor must act circumspectly. For if there are young seducers, there are also malicious women who, either spontaneously or at the instigation of the mother, set snares so that they may obtain either a husband or money. Nor must immediate belief be given to a girl who, after fornication has been admitted, says that she is pregnant by someone; but it must be accurately seen whether perhaps she has also sinned with others, and without sufficient cause names as father a young man from whom she has expectation of more abundant money.

Moreover, even aside from cunning, if too great a distance of persons or other circumstances demonstrate that the promise could not have been anything except prodigal or fictitious, the girl's error is to be imputed rather to her own imprudence than to the fraud of another, so that the obligation of reparation is lesser. Although equitable compensation is always to be commended.

¹ If either party or both parties do not know how to write, or cannot do so on account of a physical impediment, that must be noted for validity, and another witness must be used, who with those named above signs the promise.

Parents to be consulted. By the very affection of reverence, also by confidence in their experience and love, and by the importance which there is in matrimony for the name and prosperity of the family, sons and daughters will be moved, before they promise nuptials or allow matters to be brought to the point where they are changed with difficulty, to seek counsel from their parents. To omit this of itself is grave. The sin can become light or even none, if the negligence of the parents, or the excellence of the occasion, or the difficulty of asking, has not made them seriously unwilling. Indeed it can happen that such is the disposition of the parents that it counsels silence concerning these negotiations.

A promise illicit from the object, or of a matrimony to which the parents justly are opposed, is invalid by the natural law itself; a promise illicit only from the mode, or of a matrimony to be approved, but with the consultation of the parents omitted or their authority neglected, is not therefore invalid.

III. The effect of a valid promise is that of itself it obliges to contracting nuptials. And furthermore, after true sponsals, common sense dictates that the betrothed are held by mutual obligation not only of refusing another matrimony, but also of abstaining from every other carnal commerce, so that those who sin luxuriously with others may be considered unjust in some way. And especially the bride cannot, by admitted fornication, render herself notably less desirable. Wherefore most think that fornication of the bride with another adds to the sin a grave species to be accused. Nevertheless the matter is disputed, so that the confessor can lay aside solicitude, not indeed concerning the counsel to be given of fidelity, but concerning that accusation.

Yet canonically, as we have seen, and this also for sponsals which were celebrated before the Code, an action is not given except for repairing damages. Nevertheless the obligation of conscience subsists even after the sentence of the judge, unless the other party has accepted the sum set by the judge in such a way that she must be said to have renounced her right. But he who withdraws without cause sins gravely, although he validly contracts another matrimony, and thereafter licitly uses it.

Just causes for withdrawing from promises. The common good itself, to which it pertains that happy marriages be contracted, demands that sponsals and promises of matrimony be able to be dissolved for grave causes. And first it must be noted that sponsals do not impede the choice of a better state, sacerdotal or religious. The best cause for dissolving a promise will be the renunciation of the promisee or mutual consent.

But grave causes are enumerated: 1. error giving cause; 2. unjust fear; 3. a too notable change of condition: this according to many is had after matrimony contracted with another person, or after entrance into religion, even if the matrimony has been dissolved or the novice or professed person has deserted religion. And it is certain that it is entire for the party who has not changed state to break off the sponsals. The condition itself is not sufficiently changed by acquired or lost riches, so that of itself there is thereby place for dissolving the sponsals. But circumstances can permit more; 4. fornication of the bride, and also of the bridegroom, especially if there is question of an honorable girl who desires a truly Christian matrimony, permits that the innocent party withdraw from the sponsals; 5. the departure of the bridegroom into a region too distant or diverse; 6. the dissent of the parents, not indeed directly, but indirectly, on account of consequences in the marriage, will often give sufficient cause of withdrawing, especially if it was not foreseen. If it was foreseen, he who nevertheless deliberately promised matrimony seems at least from equity to be induced to compensate the damage; 7. finally, whenever, all things considered, the marriage is foreseen to be going to be unhappy, a just reason will be present for withdrawing from the sponsals.