Article III: Cessation of a Vow

I. Cessation from within. The obligation of a vow is taken away from within, not only by execution, but also by the extinction of the condition on which it depended, and by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good, or impossible, absolutely or morally. Cf. c. 1311.

An equivalent but not specific fulfillment of a condition does not suffice for the obligation, unless the intention of the one vowing carried something else. When the determinate thing which was promised perishes, another thing is not to be supplied ¹. But when the thing has been sold, generally the price is owed, because the one vowing is judged to have promised the thing with all its utility. Yet if a peculiar use, now impossible, was intended, for example of a mitre to be used by a bishop in a certain first solemnity, the obligation is taken away by sale of the mitre. But by voluntary sale against the vow he will sin. He who vowed something to be done at a certain time, when that time has passed, owes nothing, unless the time was added for urging the obligation; for example in a fast of thanksgiving.

A vow of a thing partially impossible obliges to the possible part, if the thing can and usually does conveniently be divided; otherwise it does not oblige. And the one vowing owes nothing who intended the whole by indivisibility, for example a church with a tower. Nor, if the principal part has become impossible, will the accessory parts remain: he who had determined to make an impeded pilgrimage in a hair-shirt does not have to wear the hair-shirt.

The vow also ceases when the final cause ceases, as was said concerning an oath.

¹ What if the promise was disjunctive: I shall give this or that, and either has perished? Although a disjunctive obligation does not of itself cease when one of the two remains possible, nevertheless it will often happen in vows that the loss of one of the two things renders the execution of the vow much more onerous, so that the obligation is thought to be taken away. Indeed many with St. Alphonsus himself, III, 224, admit that the vow always ceases if you have not yet chosen one of the two parts. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 620 and 651.

II. Cessation from without. From without, or by the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, a vow ceases by irritation, dispensation, and commutation.

1. Irritation of a vow is an act by which, with legitimate use of a power or right over the will of the one vowing, the vow is made void. In irritation, that general principle is applied: that one who is subject to the power of another cannot oblige himself validly by a vow, except insofar as this is not prejudicial to the right of the one to whom he is subject. Therefore the right of irritation belongs: to the father, with respect to children who are minors and not emancipated; to the tutor and mother, with respect to minors who are not emancipated; and probably also to paternal grandparents with respect to grandchildren who, lacking parents, remain under their power ¹. It belongs also to Superiors of religious, as to vows made after religious profession, excepting vows which are part of the religious profession and found the very faculty of irritating, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion: because that matter is withdrawn from the universal subjection of religious.

This faculty is not had with respect to novices. For c. 561, by which a novice is said to be subject to the power of the Master and Superiors, does not suffice for attributing that firm dominion which is required for irritation; and power under a higher law was denied. Cf. Suarez, De relig. Tr. 6, L. 6, c. 7, n. 11 and c. 11, n. 8; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, 233. The reason is that the power of irritating belongs to the Superior from the vow of obedience, which the novice lacks (Suarez, l. c.); nor can the private vow of a novice have the force of a religious vow and create a true Superior with dominative power ².

Does it belong to the husband with respect to the wife? The matter was controverted, nor did the Code settle the controversy. It depended on the way in which c. Noluit, C. XXXIII, q. 5, was to be interpreted. - This power affects all and only vows which were made during the time of subjection. But the fact that the one irritating consented to the vow does not stand in the way. If there is a right over the matter of the vow, the one irritating can suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow brings prejudice to him (c. 1312). For the one vowing could not detract from the rights of another or strip himself of his own obligations. Wherefore this irritation can be used by a Superior and by the Master of novices with respect to novices.

¹ Why authors also mention the paternal grandfather we do not know. Cf. Arregui, n. 213; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 235.

² The case would be different of a religious passing over, who, from c. 635 §1, is bound to obey the Superiors and even the Master of novices also by reason of the vow of obedience. For although he can return to his former religion, this is in no way by a precarious title, such as that of other novices, but by the firm bond of obedience by which he is bound as a religious.

2. Dispensation of a vow. flows from the power which ecclesiastical authority has of relaxing, in the name of God, the debt on which is founded the application of the divine law which urges the fulfillment of a vow. This power is contained in the words: "Whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. 16, 19).

The faculty of dispensing non-reserved vows, provided that a right acquired by others is not injured, is conceded by canon 1313: 1) to local Ordinaries as to all their subjects, even pilgrims; 2) to the Superior (therefore also the local Superior) of an exempt clerical religion, as to professed religious, novices, or others equated in this matter by c. 514; 3) to others to whom the power of dispensing has been delegated by the Apostolic See.

Since dispensation is made in the name of God, it is always an act of an inferior, and therefore requires a just cause, such as, in this matter, besides the common good of the Church, of the state, of the family, the greater progress of the one vowing himself; danger of transgression, great difficulty of execution, great scruples in execution; the imperfection of the act which was effected inconsiderately.

Lest excessive scruples arise, authors judge valid the dispensation which is conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. The difficulty and inconveniences of retraction seem to complete the cause. Something else would have to be said if no cause had truly existed.

An acquired right, which an inferior to the Pope cannot take away, is had in vows in which a certain ratio of onerous contract intervenes, as in vows which are made in religion; it is had also in vows accepted by a third party and made principally for his utility. For if the honor of God was the principal cause of the obligation, the other did not acquire a right except dependently on God to whom the promise is to be kept. (Cf. St. Alphonsus, L. 3, 255; Lehmkuhl, I, 622.)

As c. 1309 itself insinuates, reservation is to be understood strictly. And therefore, in order that vows of chastity and of entering religion be reserved, they must be perfect by reason of the end, insofar as they are made from love of the work itself or virtue, and by reason of the object, insofar as the matter is had perfectly. The end is imperfect in vows made under a condition concerning the future (and this even after the condition has been fulfilled); in penal vows; in vows made from fear, even light fear.

Matter is lacking in vows under a light obligation, under a disjunctive obligation, unless each vow was reserved; in a vow of not marrying, of preserving virginity, if these are conceived as distinct from the vow of chastity, in a vow of temporary chastity.

By the new disposition of law, no vow is reserved of him who has not yet completed the eighteenth year of age.

Among those who are accustomed to be delegated by the Holy See are numbered confessors of mendicant Orders or of those similarly privileged, according to the concession and moderation of their Superiors; and the power can be exercised outside the Sacrament (St. Alphonsus, De privil., n. 109).

3. Commutation. is not, as dispensation is, an absolute condonation of a vow, but is the substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow.

"A work promised by a non-reserved vow can be commuted by the one vowing himself into a better or equal good; but into a lesser good by him to whom there is the power of dispensing according to the norm of c. 1313." These last words are added in order that they indicate the necessity of a just cause when a lesser work is substituted, and the caution to be observed of not injuring an acquired right. Commutation into a better work demands no cause. A light cause suffices that commutation be made into an equal work. Indeed, when this is done by authority of a Superior, a greater inclination to that work, a lesser danger of transgressing, suffice. And in doubt concerning equality, notable trouble in fulfilling the work suffices. That one may act more prudently, it is to be advised that commutation by one's own authority be done with the counsel of a confessor. "A better or equal good is that which, the circumstances having been considered, especially the condition of the one vowing, appears more or equally to conduce to the glory of God" (Arregui, n. 217). Therefore the absolute excellence of the work is not a sufficient criterion.

A faculty given of dispensing-commuting extends the faculty of commuting to some dispensation; a faculty of commuting-dispensing restricts the faculty of dispensing, since some work must be substituted.

Reserved vows, however, are excepted from the faculty of commuting just as from the faculty of dispensing.

For him whose vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work, since the commutation was made in his favor. But he does not have to return to it if the work commuted by authority has become impossible or useless.

When the cause does not seem sufficient for dispensing, the promised work can be partly dispensed, partly commuted.

N. B. If the obligation of the heir to the very real vow has passed and is of religion alone, whoever can dispense or commute the vow will be able to relax it; but if, from the testament of the one vowing, an obligation of justice has arisen, he alone will be able to take away the obligation who can condone pious legacies.

From c. 1315, by every religious profession vows emitted before are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion. Before the Code, all prior vows were taken away by solemn religious profession. Concerning simple profession nothing had been established in law. Therefore the present law is of greater extension but of milder efficacy.

But, just as before the Code, now also the religious will be able to commute all prior non-reserved vows into the profession, at least perpetual, or to obtain that they be authoritatively commuted into it.

Counsels concerning dispensation and commutation. 1. In the internal forum, it generally is better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation. 2. In prescribing commutations, care must be taken, without anxiety, that we preserve the intention of the one vowing and the spiritual utility of the prior work promised. Wherefore: 3. Although a work which the one vowing was already accustomed to do can juridically be imposed, this is regularly not to be done, because the intention of the one vowing was that he add something to his accustomed works. Except perhaps a vow, such as not marrying, by which mere permanence in a state already admitted is promised. Wherefore, binding to monthly confession already customarily being made will well supply such a vow. - 5. Commutation can be made into a work of a similar ratio, or into a work of a better ratio, according to the hierarchy of virtues, of which charity is queen. Thus more frequent Communion of itself surpasses simple abstinence. - 6. If the work has the ratio of remedy, a medicinal work is to be prescribed. Let fasting be converted, for example, into abstinence; - abstinence from meats into abstinence from wine, cider, use of tobacco, sweetmeats, with some prayer; - exterior penance, assumed for chastity, into suppression of dangerous reading (for example, of a love story), or of some worldly festivity. - 7. The difficulty to be avoided must also be attended to. If a distant pilgrimage has been promised, business or expenses can at times stand in the way of execution. If business, it will best be commuted into a nearer pilgrimage, with the monies that will be spared being given to the poor or to a pious work. If costs stand in the way, let a nearer pilgrimage be substituted, with a lesser alms or visitation of the poor added. - 8. Where a work has been promised merely as one of devotion, then these are almost commuted among themselves: a rosary, confession, communion, Mass, abstinence, fasting.

I. A vow,. 1. is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good" (c. 1307). A promise supposes the will of obligation; deliberation is necessary at least that which is required for sinning mortally, besides a capacity of estimation proportioned to the gravity of the thing. In order that it be wholly free, it must be immune from unjust fear and from error. And a vow vitiated by grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself, at least from c. 1307 §2. Probably null also is a vow which has been emitted from light but unjust fear alone. Error concerning the substance of the thing promised, concerning a condition so supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted, concerning the final cause: makes the vow null. Indeed, in a merely individual vow, any error giving cause takes away the obligation; but a public vow is weakened only by substantial error. - A vow is made properly to God, but can be made in honor of the saints, when it has a cause in the honor rendered or desired for the saints. Besides, promises, approaching the obligation of a vow, can be made to the Blessed Virgin and to saints. - A vow can be made concerning only a good and one at least physically possible. And the good must be better, insofar as it is to be preferred to the voluntary omission of it, nor can the vow impede the faculty of doing what is better.

2. A vow is distinguished as absolute and conditioned, to which the penal is ascribed; real, personal, mixed; public and private; solemn and simple; private reserved and non-reserved. The relaxation of a public vow is defined by the legal regime. Reserved to the Holy See are private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entering a religion of solemn vows, which were emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age.

3. The reason for vowing proceeds from our inconstancy or mutability. Certain medicinal vows are to be advised, which, generally momentary, fortify petitions made to God; and vows which are fruitful seeds of good works.

By the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God.

II. 1. The nature of the obligation is of religion, by which we are forbidden to revoke an oblation made to God; its extension is gathered from the reasonable understanding of the formula applied, always inclining to more benign things; its force is demonstrated by the matter, unless someone, in private vows, has wished to lessen the obligation. According to the intention of the one vowing, matters coalesce or not. In a promised singular action, grave matter is thought to be that which, for the intended end, would be urged under grave obligation by divine or human law. But when a series of performances or actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; and several things must be distinguished according to that supreme rule of considering the gravity of the object from its intrinsic end, and of the parts from their relation to that end as to a whole. - He who doubts whether he has made a vow is presumed free; but he who, in a vow certainly emitted, doubts whether he was in possession of himself, is presumed to have been conscious. Yet if a positive reason makes probable a defect of deliberation, by a probable opinion he is excused from executing the vow.

2. Execution: a) When. A vow without a day must be fulfilled as soon as it conveniently can, yet in such a way that illicit delay does not become grave except because of danger of forgetfulness, inability, or notable diminution of the matter.

b) Through whom. A vow, as such, is always a strictly personal act. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow can also be fulfilled through another. A real vow, from c. 1310 §2, passes to heirs, who nevertheless, without a testament of the author or a right acquired by another, seem to be held by religion alone, not otherwise than the one vowing himself; cf. Quaest. de religione, n. 138. A vow of a community strictly and immediately obliges the Superior or those who vowed.

3. The violation of a vow differs specifically from sacrilege, and is graver than sacrilege or perjury, insofar as it more directly touches God. - Inconstancy itself in good purposes is not immune from light fault.

III. Cessation. A vow ceases from within by execution, by the removal of the condition or final cause, by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good or impossible. - From without it ceases: a) by irritation, or the use of a contrary right, which, with respect to a non-emancipated minor, the father, tutor, or mother has; the religious Superior has with respect to subjects for vows made after profession, and probably the husband with respect to the wife. These have a right over the person; wherefore they can validly irritate all vows, even internal and for future time, which were made during the time of subjection: this irritation is called direct. If the right falls upon the matter alone, the one irritating can merely suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow would harm his right; - b) by dispensation, or full condonation, which, divinely conceded by the words "whatever you shall loose," always demands a just cause, whether of the public or private order, yet is judged valid if it was conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. However, an acquired right of a third party, only the Pope can take away, on account of a public cause. Non-reserved vows, by canon 1313 itself, can be dispensed by local Ordinaries, by the Superior of an exempt clerical religion, by others (for example confessors of mendicant Orders) to whom the Apostolic See has delegated the power. This also is not rarely extended to reserved vows; - c) by commutation, or substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow. A non-reserved vow can be commuted into a better or also equal work by the one vowing himself; into a lesser good, by him to whom the faculty of dispensing belongs. For him to whom the vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work. - Moreover, by religious profession all vows previously emitted are suspended, as long as the one vowing remains in religion (c. 1315); he can also commute the same into religious profession, at least perpetual. It is generally better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation.