Article III: Procuring the Good Action of Neighbor

— Human society brings it about that we can help or impede the actions of others by words or admonition, by example, and by physical or moral participation.

According to the varied kind of action, charity will counsel or command one or the other. Hence we must treat, in order, of fraternal exhortation and correction; of edification and scandal; and of cooperation in the good and evil action of neighbor.

The Good and the Modes of Fraternal Exhortation. — Since we are all weak in performing a good work, a most suitable exercise of spiritual mercy consists in the pious exhortation by which neighbor is stimulated to good actions. Pious exhortation of this kind can be common and public, in sermons directed to the people or in addresses to some community; it is most usefully made privately, whether in the sacrament of penance or outside the sacrament. Charity will move the confessor not to neglect in the least the most favorable occasion of spiritual counsel which the spontaneous accusation of the penitent offers him, especially when there is question of those who, rarely approaching the sacraments, would scarcely ever otherwise hear the spiritual counsel of a friend. Yet even with pious persons that method is usually not to be omitted. It is wont to be pleasing to penitents, especially if the exhortation is not general and indefinite, but adapted to the proper soul. And even in merely private conversation, how often have prudently persuasive words been the fruitful beginning of great good! Indeed this kind of apostolate among men of the same condition is proclaimed as most efficacious. Further, with attention to the object, exhortation is of a twofold kind: one, directed to the intellect, rather teaches, instructs, indicates or recalls the opportunity of spiritual gain; while the other, acting upon the will, moves more and adds courage for doing good. With attention to time, one again precedes a good action, urging it on, while the other approves and praises it when it has been well done. By sincere and temperate encomium, alien from flattery, men are wonderfully stimulated to attempt better things, while many are gravely chilled by the silence of others and almost lose heart.

— Fraternal reproof or correction denotes an admonition by which someone, moved by fraternal charity, tries to call neighbor back from sin. It is an exercise of spiritual mercy attempted in a spiritual necessity of the common grade. And both by the person correcting and by its end it differs from admonition and from authoritative and judicial correction, which only a public person performs, whether secretly or publicly, for the public or in some way common good to be guarded after a delict has been avoided. In the canonical forum this is ordered by cc. 2307-2309. Its use is rarer in the civil forum, where for the most part only vindicative justice is exercised, and correction consists in the very imposition of the penalty.

Interpreters commonly read the precept of fraternal correction in the place of St. Matthew 18, 15: "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and reprove him, etc."

It is established by reason itself: we must from charity, apart from grave inconvenience, avert grave evil from neighbor. Nor is it an obstacle that no one sins unless willing, nor that alms are owed to him who labors under voluntary poverty. For the man whom an unhealthy desire agitates is to be compared with one raving, who without another's help will scarcely abstain from inflicting evil upon himself; and there are besides ignorances to be driven away, and also involuntary dangers to be removed.

Matter of Correction. — 1. Every mortal sin of neighbor is per se sufficient matter that this precept oblige under mortal sin. For that which takes away spiritual life induces a sufficient necessity of correction. Venial sin begets no grave obligation of correcting, nor even a light one unless you can do it most easily. And only venially does a private man sin who, on account of fear, shame, or pusillanimity, thinks that he is not so obligated, or is less fit for it. For to such a one, from an affection of this kind, there generally arises a grave inconvenience with which charity obliges less. But judgment must be made more severely concerning a Superior, to whom it pertains from office to correct. He, for guarding the strength of discipline, must easily correct even venial faults and transgressions of rules under grave obligation (not, however, in individual cases).

2. What has been said thus far holds also concerning sins already done or to be done from vincible ignorance, especially gravely culpable ignorance. But if the ignorance has been invincible, the very foundation of correction properly so called, that is, delict, is withdrawn. Yet correction more broadly so called enters in, which is imposed by the office of teaching the ignorant. This office is more proper to Superiors; yet the obligation also affects others because of the harm which an uncorrected defect may bring either to the ignorant person himself, whether there is question of points necessarily to be believed for salvation, or of lust which from custom would become tyrannical, or of other matters; or to others, whether they suffer scandal thence, or are harmed in goods of fortune, reputation, or body; or to the very honor of God.

On this matter these things are to be observed. Transgression of the natural law is always harmful; wherefore there is at least a light obligation of warning him who materially violates that law. - When there is question of goods of fortune which, by a correction made, merely change possessor, but not of harms which bring no equivalent profit to anyone, correction does not oblige under grave sin unless the legitimate possessor is pressed by grave want or, for another cause, ought to be preferred by you. For it matters little per se to the common good that exterior goods be detained by this one rather than by that one; and good faith per se takes away every scandal.

But if someone by accident, for instance from forgetfulness of the day, and without scandal, violates some human precept, for example of fasting or abstinence, no one contends that there is a grave obligation of warning; and not a few deny every obligation.

Persons Obligated. — Private persons are obligated from charity alone; parents also by piety; Superiors and Prelates from strict office. This office is of religion or quasi-piety, indeed of commutative justice, if it is part of an office undertaken.

And although piety obliges no less than justice, the common good to be cared for brings it about that Superiors are held with a graver inconvenience than parents themselves.

Conditions of the Obligation. — The conditions of the obligation are gathered from the necessity of correction, from the probability of effect, so that in doubt you are excused, and elsewhere from the inconvenience which correction brings with it. That these may be explained more fully:

1. Only a Superior must investigate. Nor must he do this indiscreetly, by inquiring curiously about individual matters, but only about those concerning which indications have been given. For a private man it is necessary that the neighbor's sin or danger of sin be certainly evident of itself; nor does a doubtful sign suffice. An inquiry which a private person would attempt would be odious and rather vicious.

2. Alms are to be given only to one in need. Therefore, that you be held to correct, it is necessary that it be at least probable that there has not been amendment, nor that there will be amendment without admonition.

3. A private person is not held, if another equally suitable person is present who is thought about to correct.

4. Without hope of fruit no obligation of correction presses at least a private man. For a Prelate sometimes, for avoiding scandal, must make even a correction immediately useless. It is necessary that a strong reprehension of vice confirm the good. - Where there has been a small hope of fruit, the grave obligation will cease, at least in a private person. Correction which perhaps would be harmful is no longer prescribed, unless a reason of a greater good concurs. In doubt, however, correction is to be presumed useful. And as long as there is hope of fruit, correction will have to be repeated.

5. Outside a suitable place and time, correction is not to be made. Nor is a private person held with grave harm to himself.

Corollary. - Therefore a grave obligation of correction in private persons (not likewise in Superiors or Confessors) will be present rather rarely. Regularly the scrupulous are excused from making it, since they are incapable of employing opportune counsel in this matter, and the obligation would be of very grave inconvenience to them. Finally, with those whose disposition he does not know, a private person will do better to omit correction. Cf. concerning one hearing detraction, St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 73, art. 4.

The Order to Be Observed in Correction. is indicated by Christ Himself: first that it be done entirely privately, then before witnesses, then that the matter be referred to the Prelate of the Church or to the Superior. For the words "Tell the Church" are commonly admitted to mean as much as "tell the Presidents of the Church." Cf. Knabenbauer on Matthew 18, 17. The reason is that reputation must be preserved.

A public sin, or one so notorious that it cannot be hidden by any evasion, can at once be corrected openly or referred to the Superior; this is per se manifest.

The utility of the delinquent himself (which is proportioned to the harm of revelation), an equal harm of an innocent person to be prevented, harm to the community, or the special or general consent of the delinquent himself, also permit that, with that order omitted, the matter be referred immediately to the Superior. And, as our customs are, although the Lord said that one or two should first be employed (St. Matthew 18, 16), it will not often happen that other witnesses besides the Superior, or before the Superior, must be called in.

Is it preferable to refer the matter at once to the Prelate? Let us receive these things from St. Thomas, Quodlib. 11, 9, 10: "This must be held as a rule, that in all these things charity must always be preserved, and that which seems better and more expedient; and if he intends this, namely the amendment of neighbor, and preserves as much as he can the good of charity, then by denouncing he does not sin."

But let Superiors themselves not give easy ears to spontaneous accusers who, under an appearance of the common good, often seek themselves. Nor let them hold one denounced as convicted or suspected before they have heard his explanations.

Denunciation. — Since fraternal correction is mixed with some denunciation, it seems worth the labor to hand down these few things concerning denunciation, especially since every denunciation is at last ultimately directed to warding off evil, whether one's own or that of neighbor.

A threefold denunciation is distinguished: evangelical, canonical, and judicial. The first is made to a Superior as to a father, and has as its end the good of the delinquent himself. - The second is received by a Superior as president of the community whose good he must provide for; and it tends to preserving the safety either of an innocent person or of the community. - The third is made, on account of the common good, to the public avenger of security, whether evils which the guilty are planning must be impeded, or at least by the punishment of the delict the guilty must be restrained and courage must be added to the good.

Judicial denunciation is per se lawful, to be made without any other consideration: because the office of the judge cannot be supplied by any private action, and the reputation of the delinquent can be neglected before the common utility which the punishment of delicts brings. Only by accident, in certain circumstances, on account of excessive harm either of a private person or of religion (as if a very Catholic person or a priest is denounced), will it have to be omitted from charity or religion. Where it becomes necessary for avoiding public harm, the same denunciation will be prescribed.

Canonical denunciation is subject to the same rules as fraternal correction itself, of which it is a certain extension. Here therefore the reputation of the guilty person will have to be spared where he can prudently remain unharmed. Therefore denunciation will per se have to be omitted if its end is obtained sufficiently by private correction. Provision must also be made for common charity, which is easily shaken by an imprudent denunciation. The very person of the Superior, more or less benign, discreet, and prudent, must be attended to. Yet in an equal cause of utility or detriment, the innocent person will have to be preferred to the guilty.

Evangelical denunciation is the very mode of fraternal correction which, after matters have been prudently weighed, seems to be preferred to immediate admonition. By evangelical denunciation the Superior can proceed only as a father, and therefore impose only a medicinal penalty. Yet nothing prevents him from forbidding certain things to the denounced subject in virtue of holy obedience or under penalty of excommunication, if that seems likely to profit the good of the same subject.

From canonical denunciation it is lawful for the Superior to take all sanctions which seem conducive to guarding or restoring common discipline, and this even if these sanctions are foreseen by accident to be harmful to the denounced person.

Judicial denunciation gives place to public vengeance.

If the matter bears it, the Superior can declare to one referring evangelically the obligation of canonical or judicial denunciation, and strictly command either to the same person. But as long as evangelical denunciation has not been legitimately changed into canonical or judicial denunciation, the Superior per se, by the general law of entrusted secrecy, is prohibited from acting canonically or judicially. I say per se, because the very obligation of entrusted secrecy is circumscribed by certain limits.

Corollary. — 1. The indication of hidden corrupters in colleges over which prudent Superiors preside is regularly to be strongly advised; yet the harm of him who is reported must be weighed, since perhaps, if he is expelled, spiritual ruin may threaten him. - 2. As long as there is question only of the harm of one or another, it does not seem, if the inconvenience of the one reporting is grave, to be imposed strictly. A grave inconvenience would exist if the one reporting would have to manifest his own delict thence, or if as an "informer" he would become hateful to others. - 3. But if corruption of many, infamy of the house, or another reason of common harm is feared, the delation will have to be made, with grave harm to oneself disregarded. Yet the confessor will be able to be silent about the matter, if the warning seems plainly about to be useless, or if there must be doubt concerning the efficacy of the denunciation made for preventing evil.

He is not yet a corrupter who has spoken less chastely. But it must be seen whether the occasion was extraordinary, or rather whether from some habit he mixes base conversations; such a one is per se to be reported.

According to the quality of the Superior, the manner of acting can be changed. But the Superior is to be presumed prudent and discreet.

— In ascetical works, the word edification is customarily taken metaphorically to designate that positively beneficent action which even unconsciously a man sincerely devoted to cultivating piety and virtues exercises. The wonderful power of good example is expressed and confirmed by the proverb itself: "Words sound, examples draw." And nothing more excellent is to be adduced in praise of good example than these words of Christ: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven" (St. Matthew 5, 16).

Yet virtue is not therefore to be feigned or simulated, as we are also taught by Christ: "But thou when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face, that thou appear not to men to fast, but to thy Father who is in secret" (St. Matthew 6, 17. 18). For merit then perishes, if these things are done for human glory alone, and edification itself perishes, if suspicion of vain glory arises.

There are, therefore, actions which, as done openly, always edify, because they yield directly to the honor of God, and by the very manifestation virtue is exercised: for example, profession of faith, observance of an external law, for example of hearing Mass, of abstaining from meats. And there are good actions which, because they are in esteem among all, are easily mixed with a less right intention. These are rather to be hidden than displayed, and circumstances must be permitted to manifest them.

Moreover there is a certain exercise of virtue, either imperfect and partial, or incautious and inelegant, which excites aversion mixed with a certain envy. While, on the contrary, simple, humble, and modest virtue draws souls to God and to itself. Aptly did St. Paul proclaim charity to be kind (1 Cor. 13, 4).

That a man may acquire for himself the merit of edification he must sufficiently intend it. Cf. I, 130. This intention is manifest when someone deliberately goes before others by example, for example in confessing the faith, in undergoing danger for a noble cause, in performing an office of charity. But what must be said concerning that edification which is given by virtue that does not know itself and, from modesty, hides itself? Although distinct knowledge of that edification escapes the agent, nevertheless the humble man does not ignore the power of good example in general, and often says or does those things which manifest the intention of helping neighbor spiritually in every way the opportunity for which is given to him. Therefore an intention sufficient for merit does not seem lacking to him.

The Notion and Division of Scandal. — Scandal properly signifies a stumbling-block which, placed in the way, prepares a fall for him whose foot strikes against it. Metaphorically, it is a saying, deed, or omission on whose occasion neighbor easily sins. - Per se, an action of this kind is only something done less rightly, although by accident a very good action can give occasion to sin. Is not Christ Himself said to have been set for the ruin of many? When such a thing happens, scandal is called merely received or passive, but not actively given.

Therefore they are accustomed to define active scandal as a deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is less right insofar as it is evil in itself, or has the appearance of evil. - Active scandal is divided into direct, when something is done with this intention that another should sin, for example direct solicitation to sin. And if, from some hatred of God or of neighbor, the very character of sin is formally intended, scandal is called diabolical. It is indirect when the sin of neighbor is indeed foreseen and permitted, but not intended.

Passive scandal is the occasioned sin itself. If it is connected with active scandal, it is called scandal of the little ones or of the weak; if it has been merely received from the malice of the one scandalized, it is called pharisaic, because the Pharisees, from hatred and envy against Christ, on occasion of His good deeds, suffered such scandal.

What shall we call that which not a few poor, rude, and unlearned persons suffer on occasion of priests, religious, and their action, because, deceived by evil writings, they represent those persons and that action to themselves under a false color? It is rather scandal of the little ones; yet it arises less from the priest himself or from his action, than from the calumnies of those who hate religion.

But observe that not the sin of another itself, but only temptation, is the immediate effect of scandal given: no one sins unless willing.

Further, passive scandal is sometimes a sin of the same kind as the scandal given, such as is necessarily had among accomplices; and not rarely it is of an entirely different kind. Thus scurrility and the impurity of a priest induce contempt of the sacerdotal order and of religion. - It is also per se manifest that passive scandal can be had without active scandal, and conversely. Indeed an evil action, for instance blasphemy, can give beginning to good actions, such as holy protests and expiations. Nor is scandal the very wonder or horror of those seeing and hearing, which they are accustomed to call by the name of scandal. Therefore he who sins before others is not always at the same time actively scandalous, but only then when, after the circumstances of the sinner and of the witnesses have been considered, it is to be feared lest among the witnesses there are those who are drawn to a sin which otherwise they would not have committed. On account of the depravity or probity of the witnesses scandal can be absent: on account of depravity, as if someone blasphemes or violates chastity before others who, prepared to do the same, are in no way moved by that example; on account of probity, as if someone contends, quarrels, or strikes before the meek. Nor will scandal be given to witnesses so accustomed that they are in no way excited by the dangerous thing. Yet evil actions which are publicly committed are deservedly presumed scandalous, especially by persons of certain name or authority.

The Sin of Active Scandal. — 1. Concerning the sin of direct scandal, there is no room for doubt; and it is established that the species of the sin to which someone intends to lead another is contracted. - Diabolical scandal, since it contains formal hatred, denotes a special contrariety to charity, which must be opened in confession.

2. But the author of indirect scandal also sins per se. And his sin is contrary to the office of fraternal correction. For if charity obliges us to impede the sin, at least grave sin, of neighbor, much more does it impose upon us that we not be the cause by accident (that is, the occasion) of another's sin. - But contrary to what many and grave authors hold (for example Sanchez, Decal., l. 1, c. 6, n. 3), that sin is opposed only to the common obligation of charity, not to another virtue. For that which is outside the action and intention of the agent does not constitute the species (2, 2, q. 43, art. 3). But a sin merely occasioned is outside the intention, as is manifest, and also outside the action of the agent. For the sufficient cause of sin is the proper will of the one sinning (ibid., art. 1 ad 3). Wherefore the varied conditions of the persons who suffered that scandal are not to be declared, except the quality of parishioner, son, and the like, to whom the author of scandal owed spiritual edification by a special title; nor is he held to restitution who by example alone induced others to theft or damaging.

Permission of Scandal. — Scandal can be given by an evil act and by an act which has the appearance of evil. And it can be merely received, whether from weakness or from malice. Hence:

a) It is clear that he always sins who by an evil act is the author of scandal. And under grave obligation I must avoid inducing another by my evil deed into such danger of grave sin from which he may extricate himself with difficulty. For this is to cast another into spiritual necessity, which I ought to drive away unless I were excused by proportionate inconvenience. If another is tempted merely to venial sin, even directly, the author of scandal per se will sin only venially.

b) If the action merely has the appearance of evil, the author of scandal can be excused by proportionate inconvenience. And if there has been grave danger of many, grave inconvenience must be suffered by me to avoid it. Indeed if the whole Christian life, the very faith of many, is in danger, I shall be excused by no harm to myself.

c) Scandal merely received or passive per se cannot be permitted: because the sins of neighbor, if we can easily do so, we must impede. A proportionate cause of necessity or utility excuses the permission of scandal. These things are to be weighed: the inconvenience of abstaining from the action, the gravity of the evil which is feared in others, the proximity of the occasion of sin, the nature of the scandal, whether it is of the little ones or pharisaic. A greater cause is required that scandal of the little ones be permitted than pharisaic scandal; pharisaic scandal can be permitted for any cause whatever, unless from delay of the action a great fruit is hoped.

Indeed passive scandal sometimes must be permitted; for, to avoid it, it is not lawful to sin, or to expose one's own salvation to grave danger, or to harm others gravely, especially the community.

Reparation of Scandal. — He who by evil example has scandalized others must give them good example, insofar as the force of the evil example is thought to remain in some way. He must remove that force from charity; yet this is not true restitution, but rather a cessation from an evil action. This reparation will vary according to the nature of the scandal (public, occult, against one's proper office or not). - For the most part a general reparation which is contained in open conversion will be able to suffice. Cf. Aertnijs, I, 395. 396.

Some Applications. — 1. Two who commit sin simultaneously are necessarily scandalous to each other. For even if each conceived the evil intention by his own movement, nevertheless the execution, or exterior sin, required the complicity of the other, so that even the accomplice gave the instigator an occasion of sinning. Certainly he sins more who excited or induced another to sin. Yet because this is a merely aggravating circumstance, it need not be opened in confession, contrary to what some opine.

2. It is not lawful without cause to ask an honest work from him who will not perform it without sin, for example to ask an oath from someone who will perjure himself, or a sacrament from a minister whom you know to be living in a bad state. Yet this will be lawful on account of a reasonable cause: for the other sins from his own malice. Indeed, if, for example, the unworthy minister is already actually determined to sin, your petition merely anticipates the external sin, so that the petition does not seem to many to be gravely sinful, even if it is made without cause. Cf. Lugo, De Iure et Iustitia, d. 25, n. 234, against St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 47. (He argues from this, that external sin increases the malice of the internal will.) Hence they simply permit the faithful to ask sacraments from their bad priest. For they have a right to this administration. Likewise the wife of an onanist husband has a right to copulation. Therefore she will be able to ask this, unless by moderate abstinence she can draw her husband to better counsels.

3. On account of pharisaic scandal, no one ought to omit or defer good things not necessary, whether spiritual or even temporal, according to that saying of St. Matthew 15, 14: "Let them alone: they are blind and leaders of the blind." Except if from delay a notable fruit is hoped.

4. More easily and more often those good things are to be deferred or omitted on account of scandal of the little ones. Thus entrance into religion will have to be deferred on account of the scandal of parents, if their consent seems about to be obtained shortly.

5. When an explanation has been given which removes the appearance of evil, for example which shows a suspect action to be just, scandal of the little ones can easily be changed into pharisaic scandal, so that the obligation of avoiding it is greatly weakened.

6. Therefore scandal of the little ones excuses from fulfilling certain positive precepts of fasting, abstinence, etc., unless the omission would be more harmful to the one omitting. The case can be that of a wife whose husband would be gravely offended by abstinence on Friday; of a woman who in church would have before her a young man by whom she is basely desired. Some oblige, in such circumstances, that precepts sometimes be omitted, because the law of nature concerning avoiding scandal must be preferred to a positive law. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 51, thinks this opinion more probable. But the observance of a precept seems to others to be a just cause for permitting scandal. Therefore the obligation is not established, unless by office you ought to impede the sin of the person about to sin.

7. Ecclesiastical prelates, for avoiding disturbances, will sometimes have to omit certain sacred ceremonies; - they can, for avoiding greater evils, dissemble the sins of subjects which otherwise they would have to correct; - they neither must nor per se can omit lawsuits or those things which are necessary for guarding ecclesiastical goods, that scandals of Pharisees, or even of the little ones, may be avoided. Yet in a special case it will be better for them to yield their right; but unless the matter is of small moment, the assent of the Holy See will have to be sought.

8. A beautiful girl, decently adorned, need not be anxious concerning the temptations and sins of the men whom she will meet. Yet if she can easily avoid a man whom she knows to sin on her occasion, and can extinguish that lust by one or another flight, she must do this under grave obligation. (Aertnijs, 384, 4.)

9. On account of a just and proportionate cause, it seems lawful that you place an occasion, yet not a proximate occasion, of sin: thus a father who deservedly suspects his son to be prone to stealing can place an occasion of theft before him in order to detect and correct him. For detecting and expelling or punishing servants, the master will be able to do the same. Nor do they prohibit a husband from prudently and cautiously testing the fidelity of his wife. Indeed, on account of a very great cause, especially a public one, they say it is not repugnant that a woman, yet doing nothing immodest herself, permit a temptation to arise on her occasion, as Judith is narrated to have done in Sacred Scripture.

— You will ask whether it is right to ask from another an action honorable in itself, which he, on account of an erroneous conscience, cannot perform without sin? Suppose an attendant of false worship (Jewish, Mohammedan) to serve you, who must abstain on the Sabbath from servile works or must observe certain fasts; or suppose someone to be unjustly detained in prison, the injustice however being unknown to the guard, or to be prevented by hostile dominion from going out from the borders of the fatherland.

Resp. Without a grave cause it would be unlawful thus to induce another to subjective sin. On account of a grave cause, as if the work is urgent and you cannot seek it from another, or if you vindicate your right, this will be lawful. For the intention of the one asking is borne toward an action objectively good; the sin, which must be attributed to false conscience, is accidental: this is merely permitted by the one asking, on account of a just cause. But, if the one asking the action has this opportunity, after an explanation has been given concerning the objective honesty of the act, he must try to spare the other the subjective sin itself.

Nor should money perhaps to be paid to a guard or soldier cause scruple: for it is paid in order to redeem oneself from an objectively unjust vexation.

On Womanly Adornment. — a) Garments can derogate from the rules of decency in two ways: insofar as they excite lust, and insofar as they manifest a certain boldness contrary to modesty. Of the former character are the too-short garments of theaters and circuses; there are also garments too thin or too few, which have begun to be used in worldly dances; there are also garments which are fitted so artfully to the body that they either display every form of the body or exaggerate the sexual marks; finally there are - and this must not be disregarded - shorter garments of boys and girls: many are tempted on their occasion. Rather of the other character are indecorous uncoverings of the neck. And note that lust is excited more by mysterious veils than by complete nudity.

b) Those who introduce adornments that are not very decent, as well as the women who first wear them, sin gravely: they are the cause of innumerable sins, nor is their fault weakened by any excuse.

c) Those who merely accommodate themselves to accepted customs are rarely to be blamed gravely, especially since the manner of wearing garments has much force for diminishing, as also for increasing, indecency.

d) Those who increase indecency, according to the graver or less grave mode, will sin gravely or lightly.

e) The remote cooperation of a maker who, when asked, makes garments a la mode, practically will be excused by necessity or a grave cause.

f) A woman who foresees that it will happen that many in general are scandalized by her vain and superfluous adornment (yet not base), is not bound under grave obligation to lay it aside. For the occasion is in itself remote; moreover it is universal and perpetual, which beautiful women necessarily furnish when they go out of doors, and it would be too grave for the same women to abstain from adornment.

N. B. The rules concerning womanly adornment gathered from St. Thomas are proposed by Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, n. 269.

But Catholic and pious women accept an excessive servitude to usages which the less pious, indeed prostitutes, introduce. Wherefore an effort must be made that, a league having been formed, they vindicate their liberty, I say the liberty of elegant modesty. Nor can the cultivation of modesty be sufficiently urged upon all, both for themselves and for the family which they have to rule.

And because this is the head matter for amendment, as much as is in our power, we must procure for the common people that solid instruction turn the souls of girls away from futile matters toward fulfilling their grave offices, both familial and social.

On Dances. — a) No modern dances seem positively to be approved, if perhaps you except certain innocent dances which in some villages or Catholic regions are celebrated rarely, for example on the feast of the patron of the place. Berardi testifies that he has known such dances. On the contrary, there are also popular dances which end in true Bacchanalia.

b) While a few years ago the question was raised about certain modes of dancing, especially about that which is called the "waltz," today more attention must now be given to dances which figure a certain action.

Although certain modes of dancing are less pleasing, there is none which, where it has been introduced, we can condemn absolutely. But dances of the latter kind, unless they represent a sacred procession or a warlike action, are accustomed to express or imitate amorous deeds, for example the pursuit by which the male follows after the female; to express or imitate them in such a way that the very mode of execution casts the actors into an occasion scarcely not proximate of lust. Therefore it has happened that some, for example the "tango," have sometimes been reproved by ecclesiastical authority (*).

(*) Yet that you may respond prudently, this also must be observed: it sometimes happens that, with the name retained, the vices of certain dances are corrected, almost as corrected editions of evil writers are customarily published. - But again the license, neo-pagan and increasing day by day, makes matters worse and exaggerates the incentives of passions. What is to be said of the fact that in the very art of learning dances, under a futile pretext, dress wholly immodest has begun to be used? Nor only immodesty of dress, but several other, more recent, "worldly" usages seem as it were to declare war on virtue. Cf. Josue Germain, Dangereuses? Enquete sur les danses modernes, Paris, 1923; and, concerning that work, Doncoeur, Etudes, April 1923, t. 160, p. 193 ss.; or Hocedez, Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1924, t. 51, p. 32 ss.

c) Yet it can happen that for certain richer young men the intercourse of persons with whom they must observe the laws of civility, even if they mingle with honorable dances, is to be preferred to the vulgar intercourse of taverns to which otherwise they would be addicted.

d) If any wish or ought to go to dances, they must at least take care that they have honorable company. Masked dances are more dangerous, since they render the lustful more audacious and more impudent.

e) Penitents will have to be judged according to their case. Absolution is not to be denied to those who have not sinned. For those who are accustomed to sin in dances, dances will have to be prohibited, if the dances themselves, and not the weakness which is found in every association with women, are the proximate occasion of sin, and the occasion is not morally necessary, as it can be, for example, for a wife accompanying her husband.

— You will ask whether it is lawful, for avoiding a greater evil, to counsel a lesser evil, or whether that counsel is to be accused of active scandal.

The matter is controverted. Some deny that this is lawful, because the counselor of a lesser evil still remains a counselor of evil; others think it lawful, because the counsel merely affects the note of the lesser evil, and the evil which remains is neither intended nor has its cause in the counsel but in the evil will of the other. Or, if you prefer, the counsel, because conditional, is reasonable. For it is rendered in these words: since you want the greater evil, do rather the lesser. Thus Lugo, Iust., d. 19, n. 42 ss. Yet others think that this reason is valid only when the lesser evil is contained in the greater, or when there is question of evil to be inflicted on the same person. In this opinion, it will be lawful to counsel the mutilation of a person whom the other intended to kill; or in general theft or fornication to him who had determined to commit killing or adultery. But it will not be lawful to counsel him who intended by theft to despoil a poor man that, leaving such a one, he should take money from a rich man, because the rich man is reasonably unwilling with respect to that counsel. Therefore make an exception if, on account of the small quantity, the rich man cannot reasonably be unwilling. But since a prostitute is not unwilling, the designation of a prostitute to be chosen before a married woman does not seem to be reproved if it has been made by the counselor with the intention of diminishing the evil.

We judge this third opinion to be truer. Yet one must beware of the scandal which the counsel can bring with it. For which cause, unless we are deceived, on 22-23 Nov. 1922, the Holy Office denied that it was lawful that a confessor counsel dimidiate copulation to an onanist husband. For the Bishops of the Netherlands, in the preface of their petitionary booklet, had indicated why, in the concrete circumstances, that counsel would be scandalous, insofar as it would offend pious ears and pave the way for propagating Malthusian arts. Cf. Per. XII, p. 33-37.

On this matter cf. Lugo, Iust., d. 19, n. 13 ss. He also, nn. 50-54, discusses and benignly solves the question concerning him who counsels an equal evil, because that counsel also is purified by this condition having been placed: "If you are determined to this, do that other." And he even concedes that to one hesitating between two determinate men, which he would harm, he can be counseled that he damage Titius rather than Caius, at least insofar as he wishes to avert evil from Caius.

— Cooperation, by the force of the word, denotes the simultaneous action or operation of two or more. Thus in every good action we cooperate with the grace of God. Cooperators can either all assume principal parts for themselves, or some principal parts and others secondary parts. These latter are more strictly called cooperators: yet in such a way that the distinction regards rather the exterior execution than the whole action. Therefore, although, as the Code itself teaches in can. 2209 §3, one commanding or ordering is the principal author, apart from the executor or executors he is numbered among cooperators.

Cooperation is distinguished as formal and material. Formal cooperation is chiefly had when the intentions themselves are joined, or when concurrence is offered to the intention of the agent, or the matter is done and aided by common counsel. - Material cooperation is offered when one acts with a different intention, and another concurs. But that cooperation also is called formal which in itself, whether by its nature or by its necessary signification, contains goodness or malice of the same kind as the principal action. Others call this immediate material cooperation.

Therefore material cooperation in evil is done without the intention of the evil intended by the principal agent, through an action good in itself or indifferent, or at least wholly extraneous to the malice of the principal action which is considered: the principal agent himself then abuses your action for his depraved plans; he himself joins his evil will with your action. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 63.

According to its distance from the principal action it is called proximate or remote.

The Utility, Value, and Merit of Cooperation. — Alone we have power for few things. Therefore charity counsels prompt and manifold cooperation, both physical and moral, toward good, by counsel, exterior help, approval and praise, communication of knowledge, or furnishing of strength.

Aid of this kind, since it often prepares applause and success for others, frequently contains an exercise of humility and is very remote from envy. Therefore the same cooperation is commended by the very purity of affection. And it reaches the highest praise when the cooperator chooses labor for himself, and procures honor for another. On account of the communion of saints, all our prayers and good works can cooperate with all pious undertakings which are attempted everywhere on earth.

Formal or "intentional" cooperation communicates the merit of the principal action; not so material cooperation, unless it is conscious and, as cooperation, approved or intended.

— Superiors of religious institutes are accustomed to admit friends and benefactors to the society of merits and good works. Those who are given that communication are now ascribed among those for whom not a few sacrifices and suffrages are offered in the religious institute, whether from the appointment of the Superiors or from the spontaneous prayers which religious are accustomed to pour out according to the mind of the Superiors; and besides, as joined in a special way with the religious institute, in a mode analogous to that by which those themselves who are enrolled in the institute are joined, they can thence expect for themselves manifold supernatural help and divine mercy. Cf. concerning this matter St. Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 45, q. 2, art. 1; Tamburini Ascan., De iure abbatum, t. 2, d. 9, quaesit. 3; Bucceroni, Theol. mor., tom. IV, p. 428, Altera affiliatio, where he treats this argument more fully.

— 1. Strictly formal cooperation necessarily participates in the malice of the principal action. Therefore, if this is intrinsically evil, the cooperation itself never becomes lawful. The same must be said of formal cooperation which others call immediate material cooperation, if you except only injustice in material goods. For, on account of the right of necessity, it is sometimes lawful to cooperate materially, even immediately, in such injustice.

2. Material cooperation itself is per se illicit. For with respect to the agent it is opposed to the office of fraternal correction, by which we ought from charity to impede or correct his evil action; and often besides another effect is connected with it, derogating from the honor of God, or harmful or damaging to others.

Thence a not small question arises, whether material cooperation, when it is illicit, wounds the virtue of charity alone, or also the diverse other virtues to which, according to the diversity of the case, the principal action is opposed. Cardinal d'Annibale, I, n. 174, judged that charity alone is wounded, unless besides you bear a special office of parent, judge, minister of the sacraments, which imposes upon you the opposite care, because the material cooperator effects nothing evil in itself. Sanchez thinks otherwise, Decal., l. 1, c. 7, nn. 10, 12; but he says this consistently with his opinion concerning the malice of indirect scandal, which we rejected. Others (cf. concerning prop. 51 of Innocent XI, Cardenas, diss. 31, nn. 10, 11) hold the same conclusion, because cooperation, joined with the principal action, participates in this action's malice. But this must be denied, since the connection is not intrinsic but extrinsic, from the evil will of another. And, if this reason were admitted, the cooperation itself would become intrinsically evil, so that it would never be excused: which is very commonly rejected. There are those who distinguish injustice from other sins, because then, besides the reason of impeding from charity the sin of the agent, "there is present the reason of impeding the damage of a third party who has a right that another should not concur to his damage." Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, n. 297. But Cardinal d'Annibale objects, l. c., why should justice bind more than the other virtues? There are not lacking those who, concerned only about the gravity of the sin, omit the question of species, although other virtues oblige in one way, charity alone in another; or those who propose the matter very briefly and rather confusedly. Thus Lehmkuhl, I, 786, has these few words: "the wounding of charity is not the only, indeed often not even the principal, reason why some cooperation is illicit." Yet by these words, with the common opinion, he dissents from the view of d'Annibale.

We think it must be said briefly thus. The only cooperation which comes here to be considered is that which is positive, or by action. This alone truly concurs. Negative cooperation merely does not impede. Therefore, unless you have a different obligation from office, this can wound charity alone.

Positive material cooperation itself is no more than scandal a per se cause of the evil thing. Yet this difference exists between scandal and this cooperation: from no physical operation of the scandalous person, as such, does the effect depend; whereas, apart indeed from the intention of the one operating, his causality is assumed for an evil effecting, which is thus actively permitted. But various virtues impose upon us an unequal positive care, lest our action, even unwillingly on our part, harm their cause or good. Therefore material cooperation is not forbidden by a negative precept of the virtue, because one cooperating materially in truth does nothing contrary to the virtue himself (and thus the second opinion is rejected); but it can be forbidden by a positive office, insofar as the cooperator has wrongly permitted an efficacy opposed to various virtues. And this seems to have escaped Cardinal d'Annibale.

3. Material cooperation is not intrinsically illicit, but becomes lawful insofar as it is joined with sufficient care of virtue. The same thing is said in other words: material cooperation is excused by a proportionate inconvenience.

Principles Concerning Lawful and Unlawful Material Cooperation. — 1. Insofar as cooperation is forbidden by charity, the rules handed down above concerning indirect scandal recur. Insofar as it is forbidden also by another virtue to which the principal action is opposed, the very proximity of the cooperation to be avoided creates a formally graver obligation, and the rigor of that virtue also must be attended to.

2. Furthermore, this formula can be handed down. Material cooperation must be purged from affection toward the evil, from the vice of scandal, from a further evil effect. Therefore the cause excusing it ought to be such: a) that it can be joined with a mind wholly averse from the evil; b) that by an explanation of the cause scandal is removed, or because of the gravity of the cause scandal can be disregarded; c) that it compensates for the other damages which will follow from the cooperation.

Difficulty of Estimation. — The estimation of lawful and unlawful cooperation is impeded by difficulty: a) of considering adequately the matter with its circumstances. Now, if the business were completed between only the agent and the cooperator, the scandal which is often mixed with cooperation complicates the solutions. Thus Titius indeed wishes to read a bad work, but at the same time to preserve faith. If you foresee that from the reading he will lose the faith, by cooperating with the reading you give scandal of lost faith. - But the execution of an evil thing easily brings further effects damaging to religion, virtue, other persons, and society itself; b) of distinguishing an action intrinsically or always illicit from an action which in certain circumstances can be made honest. Now in that estimation writers do not agree, although per se it does not seem too arduous; c) of distinguishing the reasons of scandal and cooperation which occur in the case.

But the difficulty increases: a) because many writers propose the principles confusedly; b) because they do not agree concerning the reason why cooperation is illicit; c) because not a few circumstances have changed since the classic authors contemplated the various cases of cooperation, whose authority nevertheless is so great that modern authors retreat with difficulty from their literal responses.

The Prudent Mode of Examining a Case. — a) First of all it must be defined accurately what, in the proposed case, is intrinsically illicit.

b) Then the various respects of the proposed case must be considered: the respect of the proper danger to which the cooperator is exposed in the cooperation itself, and of the damage which is to be feared from denied cooperation; - with respect to the principal agent, the connection between him and the cooperator, the damage which seems about to accrue to him in relation to the common character of sin; - the respect of others who will suffer either scandal from the cooperation, or damage from the action to which cooperation is given; - the respect of the virtue to which the principal action will be at least materially contrary: this consideration can reveal a direct obligation of positively impeding the principal action; - the respect of the action which preceded and of the action or effect which follows: thus one who sells a bad sheet helps the publisher and harms the readers.

c) These things having been considered, as by a simple intuition you should see whether the cooperation appears to be a rational mode of acting, or the contrary. This intuition of a prudent man contains no small presumption of truth.

d) If the importance of the matter requires it, the various parts of the case must be weighed separately.

e) That you may suitably add counsel to the response, you will examine the very utility sought from the cooperation. We shall not favor cooperation which brings merely temporal gain; we shall be easier if damage is to be avoided; if a nobler end is intended, with a more inclined mind we shall indulge the matter. For if the casuist inclines toward the more benign things, the spiritual director suggests the better things.

Helps for Right Estimation. — It is useful to recall these things which are generally admitted:

1. He who gives an occasion of sinning to a man prepared to sin, or whose will is already evil, does not thence gravely harm him. Lugo, Iust. et Iur., d. 25, n. 235.

2. Per se, or with scandal excluded, remote cooperations which are not removens prohibens, i.e. which would be supplied by another, are excused from grave sin. Sanchez, Decal., l. 1, c. 7, n. 16.

3. Every cooperation toward grave evil which either is proximate or, if remote, is removens prohibens, can be excused only by grave damage. If at the same time it is proximate and removens prohibens, or if there follows the gravest evil of one person, or the grave evil of several or many, cooperation is excused only by gravest damage.

4. For rescuing someone from extreme spiritual necessity, every damage must be borne, whereas damage of life or state or fortunes is not to be undergone for freeing neighbor from temporal necessity, even extreme.

Grave spiritual necessity imposes a grave inconvenience, at least on those who have a positive office of caring for the good, or unless the necessity has been general; then damage of life itself must be undergone. Cf. n. 99.

For avoiding formal sin for someone, grave inconvenience is not to be suffered.

5. But we are forbidden more severely lest we cause such evil. Wherefore it happens that of the same evil from which you ought not to free neighbor with grave detriment, you cannot be a positive and proximate cause,[^017-1] even by accident,[^017-2] unless you are excused by morally extreme damage of your own.

6. Causes excusing cooperation are distinguished as very slight, light but reasonable, rather grave, grave, very grave, and gravest. It is useful to declare these by examples.

A very slight excuse is brought by ordinary profit: this scarcely ever suffices.

A light but reasonable excuse is brought by service, the condition of a subject: it is always considered damaging that you should have to deny what seems to pertain to an office. - Extraordinary profit also induces such a reason, as does the inconvenience of not selling one's goods equally well.

A rather grave excuse is sought from fear of losing good service, a good client, indeed notable profit, if there is question of a man of slender fortune.

A grave excuse is present in the true difficulty of finding another service, another office; - in lack of things, whether this present lack is to be removed, or a future one is feared; - in infamy before one discreet man; - in secret expulsion from a college; - in the desertion of several clients; - indeed in great indignation of a husband, father, or master.

A very grave excuse is shown by the loss of state or civil condition; by defamation before several; - by notorious expulsion from a college; - by the danger of falling notably from one's state.

A gravest excuse is had when a good equivalent to life is placed in danger.

And observe in general that a graver excuse proceeds from positive damage than from cessation of profit.

But when, to excuse a servant, they demand a reason which is added to service, the servant ought to decline that cooperation by seeking another service, unless the very loss of such service induces sufficient inconvenience.

— You will ask whether or not you can cast illicit cooperation upon another already prepared: as if a magistrate or soldier should ask others to indicate causes or execute things which, conscience forbidding, cannot be indicated or done by you?

It is not lawful to ask illicit things. Therefore a Catholic magistrate or soldier cannot formally and honestly ask from another an action illicit in itself and illicit for the other. But no one is forbidden simply to refuse his own cooperation, to ask from him who distributes causes or commanded actions that these things not be imposed on him to be indicated or done. Nor does the foreseen substitution of another stand in the way. He who refuses his own action merely permits that future substitution. Therefore it is not repugnant that in an unbelieving region Christian servants pay money to the master of works, lest they be compelled to perform or participate in superstitious things. Lehmkuhl, I, 820; Noldin, Praec., 122.

It is very useful, by reading approved authors, to acquire for oneself a right judgment, so that afterwards you can more easily apply the principles to various cases, by weighing the connection with sin and the character of this sin, the fruit of refused cooperation, and the damage to be sustained.

Wherefore we adduce various examples, warning at the same time that there is not one opinion concerning all.

— A parish priest, minister of a sacrament, confessor, lest they violate secrecy, lest they make someone infamous, etc., not rarely must, in the public or even private administration of a sacrament, cooperate in sacrilege. Just as a bride lawfully cooperates in the same when she contracts marriage with a bridegroom living in the state of mortal sin.

Cooperation of Religious Sisters in Clinical Hospitals. — Since today there easily occur physicians and surgeons who, in exercising their art, in a conscious or unconscious manner sin against the natural divine law, as it is declared by the Holy See, a question of grave moment arises concerning the cooperation of Sisters. The chief cases are: the administration of morphine, not for alleviating present pain, but for procuring alienation of mind in the agony of death; then the direct procurement of abortion and feticide.

Furthermore, hospitals to which Sisters are assigned are of three kinds: some are public; others are private hospitals of physicians; others belong to the Sisters themselves.

In no hospital, as is clear, can Sisters formally cooperate in an illicit action; but material cooperation can be excused less with difficulty in public hospitals than in private ones. For it pertains to the common good of religion and to the salvation of very many souls that Sisters rather than lay women minister to the sick in public hospitals. Wherefore, with the exception of formal cooperation or the execution of the illicit operation itself, such as an infusion of morphine certainly illicit, which they must wholly refuse, material cooperation, even that of cleaning and arranging the instruments, washing and preparing the body for the operation, and the transfer of the sick person to the place of operation, will not be able to be condemned, with scandal excluded, which will be removed rather conveniently, for example by a declaration.

But if there is question of the private hospital of a physician, first, before they promise their own labor and that of the Sisters, the Superiors must take cautions, lest anything against the conscience of the Sisters ever be asked; and every cooperation, even material, must be denied, unless perhaps very remote, as is the very reception of a person laboring under an evil into a room adorned by the Sisters.

Finally, if the ownership of the hospital belongs to the Sisters themselves, they must take care in the contract with the physician lest any physician be called or admitted who attempts anything illicit. And only in an extraordinary, unforeseen case will there be room for tolerating the action of the physician, illicit in itself, and for cooperating materially, in order to avoid worse evils.

Finally, in doubt, when the act is invincible, the Sisters can in any hospital permit the matter to the conscience of the physician, otherwise upright. If, however, a firm presumption cannot be drawn from the very religion of the physician, concerning a case which is foreseen to be going to occur several times, afterwards they will have to procure fuller security for themselves.

Concerning the difficulty which the false worship of a non-Catholic sick person can bring, cf. below, 147, 6 and 7.

— In what way a spouse can or even ought to have carnal commerce with an onanist spouse, or one who is bound by a vow, is explained in the tract On Chastity and the Opposite Vices. Cf. nn. 255, 265-268.

A Servant. — 1. On account of the reason of service alone he can per se render services which are accustomed to be demanded from servants and concur remotely in sin: for example, to dress the master, to saddle a horse, to open the door for a concubine and prepare her bed, to set wine before a master making himself drunk, to prepare meats on a forbidden day, to buy a liberal newspaper or a book not so obscene, etc.; indeed even to accompany the master or convey him by carriage to the house of a mistress, or to carry letters which he suspects to be amatory. For it would be intolerable that, while he performs these customary offices, the servant should carry out a censorious inquiry concerning the end, or should look to the master's intentions. Yet for permitting the later actions (those enumerated after the word "indeed") many require that a reason of notable damage be added, which will scarcely be absent. All require this reason that he may lead the prostitute herself to the master.

N. B. Public drivers, since without very grave inconvenience they cannot publicly refuse an office to one asking, nor are they accustomed to be solicitous concerning the reason of the journey, can render these things more easily. Certainly they will be praised who industriously avoid these things.

Yet we think that a stricter answer must be given concerning those who, beyond the boundaries of a region in which a duel is forbidden, convey those who ask for the journey with a manifest intention of duel. Not every cause then seems sufficient.

2. Another proportionately grave cause is required besides, that a servant may be able to render to a master inviting or ordering him those things which approach more nearly to sin, as for example, to put his shoulders under, to move ladders near, for the master climbing through a window to a concubine; to carry letters certainly amatory to a prostitute; to accompany to a duel; to write, at the dictation of the master, letters which indeed contain only signs of civility but are foreseen to be going to increase base love; to buy an image not so base that it is properly obscene, or not such that it can serve for nothing except lust.

3. A gravest cause is required when an action is demanded which at the same time approaches more nearly to sin and will effect grave damage to an innocent person, or which contains proximate cooperation: for example, to put his shoulders under a master climbing up to violate a virgin; to keep watch to defend the master if perhaps, while he is with a mistress, arriving rivals attack him (Sanchez, l. 1, c. 7, n. 23); to carry letters which certainly contain a base invitation, etc.

4. For no cause would it be lawful both to write and to carry letters containing base things or a base invitation, or to invite a person in the name of another to meet for the sake of sin, with the depraved end indicated. With the depraved end kept silent, cooperation by invitation can be excused by a gravest cause.

Therefore it is not lawful for those Black servants, who are commonly called "boys," to obey Europeans who order them to seek a concubine for them from among Black women.

According to the things said in n. 3, if in that meeting a girl is to be deceived, fear of death alone would excuse from the invitation; or the girl would have to be notified that snares have been laid for her.

— A judge or magistrate does not merely declare an existing law, but, as a Superior, authentically intimates it to the parties, so that by sentences passed the law is practically confirmed and received into morals. Yet he does not command of his own accord, but ordered by the law, compelled by office, and as it were the legislator's mandatory. It is besides of the highest interest that Catholic and upright judges can remain in office. Therefore the cooperation of a judge with an unjust law, which cannot be declined except by resignation of office, is demanded by a grave reason of the common good. The object and circumstances of the cooperation must now be considered.

With voluntary cooperation excluded, which, as quasi-formal, cannot be excused, a judge can never directly command things which are intrinsically illicit: for example, incense to be offered to an idol, cohabitation with an illegitimate spouse. But if there is question of a penalty to be imposed, and the same is not grave, the solution seems to be sought from the consideration of the prevailing public good. As long as one must strive in every way against a law, whether because it is openly impious, or because it is recent, or if this is the manifest will of the Superiors of the Church who define or declare moral obligations, office will rather have to be yielded than that it would be lawful to offer cooperation of this kind to the unjust law; on the contrary, scandal having been removed and hope of accomplishing something having been taken away, the innocent person to be fined is not judged reasonably unwilling that he be condemned to pay a moderate sum of money. Moreover, it is sometimes lawful to cooperate immediately in unjust damage in goods which one can licitly renounce; and the public utility of preserving good judges can make this renunciation of his right necessary for the innocent person from charity. Thus, for example, in Belgium the case seems to be that of a judge who imposes a fine on a priest who has imparted the nuptial blessing before the civil marriage ceremony. Lehmkuhl indeed, I, 962, raises this grave difficulty, that to affect an innocent person with a penalty, to declare him worthy of penalty, is intrinsically evil. But Noldin, De praeceptis, n. 726, thinks that this malice can be removed by the consent of the innocent person. We think that the distinction must be made thus: - that condemnation harms the innocent person and contains per se a disapproval of the action. Insofar as it harms, if there is question of those goods which can be directly taken away on account of public utility, the sentence is not intrinsically evil. But the note of disapproval can be removed by common interpretation, so that it is known merely to be a literal application of the law, which must be tolerated to avoid greater evils. And then nothing intrinsically evil is now shown in that sentence.

If the law is unjust for this reason, that it contains usurpation of the ecclesiastical forum, in certain regions custom itself has removed at least the positive sanctions of that immunity, as was declared by the Cardinal Secretary of State in the year 1911. Cf. Periodica, t. 6, p. 190. Therefore regard must then be had to the natural obligation of consulting for the honor of the Church. And, in a graver or unusual case, a license or declaration sought from the Ordinary or, through the Ordinary, from the Holy See, will make the magistrate more certain concerning his office. In this matter civil causes and criminal causes of minor clerics must be distinguished from criminal causes of Bishops. Concerning the former, either Concordats or custom in several regions indicate what must be done; elsewhere the license to be requested will not be denied. Concerning the latter causes, as graver, the matter will have to be arranged mediately or immediately with the Holy See.

Nor, by applying the law of divorce, does a judge command anything intrinsically dishonorable, but he removes civil protection from marriage and concedes to the parties the faculty of a new civil marriage. In this matter nothing intrinsically dishonorable is discerned, but something which, according to the circumstances, will either be scandalous and to be inhibited, or to be tolerated. And the responses of the Holy See have varied according to time and place. Cf. the writings on chastity, n. 286.

While concerning the application of an unjust law Lehmkuhl, I, 962, speaks more severely than Bucceroni, Theol. mor., nn. 19, 20, the former, II, 921 note, solves more benignly than the latter, l. c., the case of one pronouncing divorce.

— In speaking about judges, we have already spoken about jurors, whose case is similar, except that these can more easily, by denying condemnation, impede a sentence against the rights of the Church. Yet it is not per se expedient that a convicted accused person be absolved. Therefore it will be more satisfactory that, where there is need, after the faculty has been sought, they answer according to the things alleged and proved. Nor is it per se to be advised that Catholic jurors refuse that office, since there is danger lest ministers of the Church be judged by enemies.

N. B. Jurors, according to their conscience, pronounce merely concerning guilt, by responding affirmatively or negatively to the questions proposed by the president of the court.

Innkeepers. — 1. They cannot favor the violation of the laws of the Church or render them difficult to observe; yet they themselves, again, because Catholics and non-Catholics, the pious and impious, the healthy and the weaker are mixed, today experience great difficulty in serving on days of abstinence foods forbidden by law to those alone for whom they would be permitted to prepare them. Thence there are not lacking regions where a general dispensation of the law has been conceded in lodging houses and inns. And, except in places plainly Catholic, where the offering of forbidden food would be scandalous, today innkeepers will satisfy their office if they supply clients every convenience for observing the law, and do not by various pretexts or even by a lesser quality of foods increase the reasons why clients may decline the observance of ecclesiastical discipline as too grave. It is never lawful to supply meats requested in contempt of religion.

2. Dances are the occasion of many sins. Therefore those innkeepers cannot be excused who introduce them or alone retain them. Those who merely, according to received custom, furnish a place for dances, otherwise not dishonorable, are not to be blamed, at least gravely. But that there should be held there dances of that more recent kind, which even among persons select by their condition are to be criticized not lightly, can in no way be tolerated either by a pastor of souls or by a confessor.

3. They are forbidden to buy newspapers wholly opposed to faith and morals, or obscene ones, even if they are deserted by many clients. On the contrary, they must take care that good newspapers be ready for those same clients. Concerning other newspapers, they should strive to give the least occasion of reading things which are less becoming, whether you regard faith or morals; let them lessen the evil which they cannot extinguish.

They themselves do not draw clients by less good newspapers, which would be unlawful; but they impede being deserted by clients. Therefore this can be lawful.

4. They can never furnish a place for sinning to those asking in such a way that they seem to consent to the sin. Indeed, a notable necessity, which alone would excuse, is for the most part not present. Lodging houses which admit persons of this kind are often marked by a certain infamy, whereas others from which they are severely excluded are commended by that very good name. Yet it is clear that inquiries are not to be made concerning persons who present themselves as spouses.

— Artisans cannot spontaneously make things which, whether in themselves or with attention to the region where they are made, have no use except a depraved one: images wholly base and without scientific use, abortive drugs, "condoms" in our region, idols in an idolatrous region. For a general and spontaneous making of this kind contains manifest favor offered without necessity to an evil thing, so that it must be marked with the note of formal cooperation. - But what if you make them under compulsion? Here the things and the makers must be distinguished. The very making of certain things can scarcely be had without sin: for example, a truly obscene painting or photograph; to perform these things will never be lawful unless perhaps to avoid a gravest evil. The making of other things is indifferent in itself, but their use will be evil. For example, instruments of the neo-Malthusian art, and the idol itself. The kind of evil must be attended to. Since idolatry is gravely injurious to God, to offer work in making or adorning a statue which is destined for idolatry will for the most part not be lawful, and cooperation of this kind can be made honest only from a gravest cause. Cf. Noldin, II, 123, c.

As to condoms, in certain regions, as they report, these same things serve for children's games; and in moderate quantity, just like abortive drugs themselves, they should be ready for men who study the medical sciences. Again, the cooperation of a hired worker in a workshop is remote, and he ought not to be solicitous concerning the special destination of the things. Therefore, if only a few are to be made, a worker who is prohibited from seeking an explanation will be able to cooperate, lest otherwise he be dismissed from the workshop. But if a great quantity of these things must be prepared in our regions, so grave a common evil is propagated through them that a worker who cannot otherwise refuse his cooperation must under grave obligation seek another master, nor can he remain in that workshop except for a short time. - In a typography, individual workers can and must be solicitous only concerning the kind of printing establishment; nor, where a better occasion is lacking, are they forbidden to hire out their work where, although obscene or truly impious works are not published, they have books to be printed, some good, others less good.

Even insufficient garments can always be completed by those wearing them. Therefore the work of an individual worker can be admitted with less difficulty.

2. Managers or masters of a workshop, since they preside over many things to be made and care for the diffusion itself of the things made, can never administer the making of things which can scarcely have an innocent use. For they would be the cause of many sins which otherwise would not be committed.

Yet here also attention must be paid to the varied nature of the things.

Books or newspapers which are not given over to obscene matters are accustomed, besides their less approvable parts, to contain things innocent and useful. Therefore they are not to be put among things whose good use is almost none. Therefore, when there is not question of an obscene or truly impious book, a hired manager, on account of a grave cause, for example if otherwise he would be deprived of a sufficient amount of works, is permitted to print a less good work, unless, because he is known as very Catholic, his cooperation would be scandalous. Yet he will not be able formally to publish such a book, since the publisher must care for its diffusion, so that his cooperation must be held as formal.

Those who by their own device invent and make dishonorable or less honorable women's garments cannot be excused from grave sin. On the contrary, a moderate or grave cause will excuse those who adorn such garments when asked: a moderate cause will suffice if the garments are a little freer; a graver cause will be required if they have been notably dishonorable. But today the conscience of managers who equip their large shops with no other ready-made garments except less honorable ones is burdened more gravely. For since they are sold at a lower price than garments adorned according to the desire of the client, they are bought by women of more obscure place, so that the less modest clothing of plebeian women and girls must be imputed at least in part to those managers.

A moderate cause seems sufficient, with scandal excluded, that you make garments, not strictly sacred, for a heretical or schismatic minister, by which his usurped dignity is recognized, as if you prepare the violet habit of bishops for a Jansenist bishop.

To avoid a necessity quasi-extreme, Lehmkuhl, I, 815, permits that emblems of Freemasons or of a condemned sect be made, because they do not contain superstition in themselves and are directed only by sectarians to depraved ends. And a very grave excuse seems to us sufficient, with special scandal from the quality of the maker excluded.

He exercises no superstition who, in preparing foods, avoids those things from which others think one must superstitiously abstain. Therefore it is lawful to consent to one asking these things for a very slight cause. And he who spontaneously announces that chocolate made by him is pure from elements which Jews do not want mixed in, today will seem to all to wish to gain profit, not to approve the Jewish sect. Therefore a moderate cause, for example a notable increase of profit, will excuse that cooperation. (Yet it is necessary that the rite itself be decorated with no honorary title.)

— A merchant holds a middle place between the maker and the user. His cooperation is more proximate; besides, one who proposes things for sale (at least spontaneously) seems to recommend them and is stimulated by the very zeal of profit to seek buyers. Therefore his cooperation approaches more to formal cooperation and is spiritually dangerous to him. But again the merchant presupposes the maker, so that the thing-making person sometimes, by his action, brings forth a necessity to which the merchant conforms while he has those things for sale.

Thence writers speak in a similar way concerning artisans and merchants, yet so that they estimate the cooperation of merchants a little more benignly. Hence the following norms are established:

1. Morally it is never lawful to sell things which have no use except a depraved one. Yet they excuse him who, in a special case, compelled by the gravest necessity of avoiding death, has done it.

2. Things which are subject to immense danger of abuse regularly cannot be sold unless the future good use is morally certain. Thus most poisons, excepting however those which, because they have a frequent good use, are now accustomed to be offered to all.

3. Things indifferent are sold without fault, which many use well although very many abuse them: dice, cosmetics, swords, guns, alcohol, as long as the intention of abuse is not certain. For the order to sin is remote; and those businesses cannot be impeded.

But if the abuse is morally certain, a proportionately grave reason, to be estimated from the principles prudently considered, must be added. Hence if the abuse is toward idolatrous worship, a very urgent cause is demanded; a graver one is likewise required if an innocent person is going to suffer unjust damage; indeed proximate cooperation which at the same time is necessary to the effect is excused only by a gravest cause. Therefore you could not sell a sword to one going to kill a man unless to avoid an evil equivalent to death. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 571, where he corrects what he had written more severely in l. 2, n. 66.

Is it lawful, absolutely or without condition, to sell good merchandise, for example pure wine, to another who afterwards, under his own name, will sell it adulterated? St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 69, does not permit this except on account of fear of death or infamy; others, for example Lehmkuhl, I, 832, require a grave cause, while others, better, are content with a moderate one. The cooperation of the seller is very remote; there is no public scandal; and the cooperation is refused in vain. Indeed, from usage, from diminished price, etc., often the very injustice of the one adulterating will be doubtful. Yet a gravest cause will be required if the adulteration has been harmful and consequently notably damaging to the public good.

Concerning selling women's garments or ornaments that are not very modest, the things said about making them recur, n. 145.

There is a special difficulty concerning books and newspapers. Catholic booksellers are given the faculty that they procure prohibited books for selected persons who are helped in studies or profession by them. But it is not lawful for the same booksellers to have those books promiscuously for sale.

Concerning newspapers these things are to be observed especially: a) The spontaneous sale of newspapers which are opposed to faith or morals brings proximate cooperation to not a few sins. Therefore, even when formal recommendation is avoided, this cannot be tolerated except on account of the gravest cause of poverty and for a short time; b) far less grave is the cooperation of him who, with obscene and very impious newspapers excluded, has newspapers of various kinds for sale. His work can be indirectly useful, if he recommends or displays the less Christian newspapers less than another who would sell such in his place. Therefore, with scandal removed, this in certain circumstances could simply be permitted; c) it sometimes happens that from the public or general administration there is bought the right or monopoly of selling newspapers in "stations" of railways or streets, on this law, that newspapers of all political parties be sold equally. This sale-distribution of newspapers can be compared with the distribution of all letters, newspapers, and books which is done through postal offices. Therefore nothing prevents a Catholic man or Catholic society from acquiring such a right for itself. No scandal of connivance with evil will be given; and indirectly there will be an occasion of impeding not a few evils.

[^017-1]: Insofar as we can be the cause of another's sin.

[^017-2]: By accident, i.e. apart from intention.

Cooperation Toward False Worship. Present circumstances warn us that the danger of a certain indifferentism must be carefully removed, which honors or neglects various religions in almost an equal way; yet at the same time, indeed more, irreligion must be fought, which surely is worse and more false than erroneous worship. Besides, in most places at least, the profession of false worship offends Catholic worship less directly than formerly. Finally, in our mixed societies, material cooperation is judged less to be a favor furnished to a false sect.

1. Therefore this general rule can be established concerning that cooperation: that, with a positive prohibition of law excluded, it is rather easily called lawful when it savors of no indifferentism, but can be joined with aversion from the false sect, creates no danger for the cooperator, and scandal is absent or is excused by grave inconvenience.

2. To give one's work in constructing a non-Catholic temple, whether pagan, Mohammedan, Jewish, or heretical, will never be lawful if it is sought in contempt of the Catholic religion, or if it is held as a kind of protestative sign of false worship. In this way the most severe decrees given by the authority of the Holy Office, by the S. C. of the Propagation of the Faith, e.g. January 8, 1851, concerning cooperation in building temples of idols, must be explained. Cf. Ball.-Palm., t. 2, tr. 5, n. 300. Although a graver necessity must be present for you to be excused from cooperation toward a pagan temple than toward the very "mosque," on account of the greater distance from true worship.

But hired simple workers can, from their very condition, cooperate in constructing a temple which, permitted by law, is erected with no offense to the Catholic religion. But contractors for works (entrepreneurs, appellatori, intraprenditori), insofar as they merely execute the model of the architect, will be excused with more difficulty than workers, more easily than architects. Where a different custom has not already prevailed, on account of merely sufficiently grave damage the contractor for the work seems able to be excused: the scandal of indifferentism stands in the way. But a wholly grave damage must be required for you to excuse the architect: for he adds splendor, and thus favors false worship. Yet I would answer more mildly if he rather seems, against irreligion, to favor divine worship under a common aspect. Nevertheless one must guard against the scandal of indifferentism.

Because the constructions of heretical temples in the City were judged especially scandalous, the Instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of June 12, 1878, declared architects, contractors, masters of workers, "who undertake care and work for constructing and adorning some Protestant temple," guilty of mortal sin.

3. To contribute money for the building of a temple is not intrinsically illicit, because the building itself is not yet the exercise of false worship, nor does the contribution necessarily contain approval of error. Yet if it immediately helps the very plan of building a temple, as Noldin says, Praec. n. 122, "in itself it contains external consent with the depraved intention of heretics or unbelievers, and an external favor furnished to heresy or idolatry." Yet that note can be removed either by protestation or by the circumstances themselves, as if Catholics can in this way free themselves from the simultaneity - scandalous in itself - by which they are forced to have one church in common with heterodox persons. Cf. N. Paeii. 1822. With circumstances of this kind excluded, it is better to avoid this as much as opportunity is had, and rather to offer money to a lodging-house or to a profane good of Protestants. Where the contribution cannot be avoided, it will be excused by grave inconvenience, if by common interpretation no favor is judged to be given to heretical worship, but benevolence merely has been signified.

Thus also it is tolerated that Catholic deputies approve subsidies which customarily are paid from the treasury to various sects: they grant these not to non-Catholics as such, but to fellow-citizens, and for avoiding grave damage to the Catholic religion. Lehmk. I, 818.

4. To sell indifferent furniture for adorning a non-Catholic temple (benches, seats, a table, lamps) is so remote a cooperation that the excuse of profit to be received therefrom suffices. A graver cause is required for things of this kind to be made expressly for that temple, because these help the formal exercise of worship; and the more immediately they serve a non-Catholic rite, the graver cause is required. Cf. Noldin, Praec. n. 122. Today nevertheless they permit that simply, on account of the profit to be received from it, a lamb to be sacrificed be sold to Jews: that cooperation is very remote ¹. But a grave cause is required so that sacred vestments can be sold to them, and scarcely except for averting gravest damages will it have been lawful to sell sacred vestments which contain superstitious signs. But simply it will be lawful to sell our liturgical books for a price to non-Catholics who use them, since these at the same time commend our faith.

5. To ring a bell is not to exercise a rite, but it is either formally to invite to a sacred ceremony or to give a sign of a future ceremony. Where, from the circumstances, it seems to be an invitation, this is intrinsically illicit; but if, as per se it is to be understood, it is held for a mere announcement, this material but rather proximate cooperation will be lawful from a very grave cause. Lehmk. I, 812; Noldin, Praec. 120. That for a profane solemnity, e.g. as a sign of joy for the victory of the fatherland, Catholic and non-Catholic bells should be rung together even by agreement, nothing prevents; but lest the scandal of indifferentism be given, it is not to be approved that at an appointed hour all should be rung for this end, so that they give to the faithful and to non-Catholics at the same time the sign of a sacred function. Cf. Lehmk. I, 812.

6. To prepare things necessary for exercising a superstitious or non-Catholic rite, e.g. to spread a table and place there the things which come into use for the minister in assisting the sick person, is to exercise proximate cooperation, material however, which will be excused by a grave cause. But ambiguity of intention, if any is present, must be removed by protestation. Cf. Lehmk. I, 811.

7. Formally to invite a non-Catholic minister to exercise his ministry with a dying person is formally to ask from him an illicit action, which is unlawful. Cf. S. Off. March 15, 1848, apud Lehmk. I, 810. Merely to warn him that there is a sick person of his sect there is only to furnish material cooperation, which will be lawful from a cause wholly grave. Lay persons set over prisons or hospitals, for example, will be able to do this. With attention to their quality, let Sisters not do this of themselves per se.

8. To play the organ for ritual chant seems hardly not to be formal cooperation. Wherefore only from very grave necessity can that proximate cooperation be admitted. But one who, in a certain concert, is compelled to perform his musical part on some instrument will be excused a little more easily. And the case is different of a concert which, on account of a profane reason, e.g. for honoring a prince, celebrating a victory, is set during a sacred function. In circumstances of this kind this commonly will be lawful per se.

9. That in the heretical temple itself Catholics assisting together with non-Catholics should sing a sacred canticle of thanksgiving, e.g. the Te Deum, as a sign of common joy rather than for carrying out a sacred function, this does not seem lawful except to avoid scandal: lest they seem destitute of patriotic affection. If it is rather considered as a sacred thing, one must abstain more from that communication, which nevertheless is not yet intrinsically illicit. Wherefore care must be taken, as much as opportunity is given, that demonstrations of this kind be made separately by Catholics and by non-Catholics.

10. When a heretical minister recites prayers before or after the table, it will be unlawful to respond to him if he recites them as a heretical minister. If as an elderly man devoted to sacred things, where custom was to entrust this to the elder, the thing does not seem to be prohibited, since no authority is then added to him as minister. If custom is lacking, let us reverently abstain.

On English ships, the captain, from office, must on Sunday recite in common prayers taken from the book called the "Prayer Book." Provided that he chooses prayers free from error, a Catholic captain seems able to fulfill those parts. His action is explained by the office to which he is bound, and a religious demonstration today is rather to be desired.

11. If in a non-Catholic region an oath must be taken by touching sacred Bibles edited or translated by heretics, and there is no opportunity of using a Catholic edition, the thing does not seem illicit, since per se it is manifest that these are used only insofar as they contain the word of God, but not insofar as they are not perfectly conformed to the Catholic edition. If it can be done, this mind should be declared. Cf. Lehmk. I, 552 note. - Concerning cooperation toward false worship, Sanchez, Dec., l. 2, c. 9, n. 7; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 13; Lugo, De Fide, d. 14, s. 5; d. 22, s. 1, nn. 10, 11; Lehmk. I, 800-823; Noldin, Praec. 122, are read usefully.

¹ But the cases are sufficiently different of a lay man who sells to Jews some lamb from among lambs which are offered for sale in various places, and of an ecclesiastical man who sells to a schismatic priest flour expressly requested for making hosts for Mass, and which no one else can sell. A very grave cause, especially of public order, alone seems able to excuse that cooperation.

— Concerning the construction of buildings of Freemasons, the things said concerning temples apply. They are connected more remotely with the evil use than the sacred buildings of heretics. Cf. Lehmk. I, 816. Yet again the sect is usually more actually hostile to the Catholic faith and religion than a non-Catholic sect, especially an ancient one. Wherefore it is worse to favor their impiety than the false piety of these latter.

The same must be said of favor furnished to societies of socialists, such as they are commonly known. Therefore to procure money for these, so that they can have buildings proper to themselves, cannot be excused from objectively grave guilt.

Yet it is not intrinsically illicit, but on account of a proportionate cause it will be lawful to contribute money to a society of socialists whose immediate end is honorable. Noldin, Praec. 122.

Cooperation Toward Political Parties in Public Life. — Briefly, on this occasion, we shall speak about the office of those who participate in political rights. Charity and piety toward the fatherland oblige citizens, as much as it is of interest to the republic, to exercise their political rights. Wherefore:

I. Concerning the right of suffrage. Since the obligation of casting a vote is not from an office undertaken, the sin of one omitting a vote will never be opposed to commutative justice. Yet a damaging omission, or one depriving of a great good, or a scandalous example of indifference, will be sins whose gravity must be measured from the probability or gravity of the damage, compared with the inconveniences of casting a vote.

Practically: a) Where an upright and pious candidate is opposed to a depraved one, to abstain from voting without cause does not seem, in present circumstances, regularly able to be excused from venial sin. Where from the omitted vote the fortunes of the election are not foreseen to be changed, to abstain from voting will not be grave of itself. If grave private damage of fortunes, health, etc., is seriously feared from the vote given, the positive grave obligation of concurring will be most rare.

b) To concur by a positive vote in electing an unworthy man as such, or from a bad intention, is opposed to commutative justice itself, since society has a strict right not to be ruled by the unworthy. With this intention excluded, it will be grave if the vote seems to have notable influence toward a rather proximate danger of grave evil. Yet the thing does not seem intrinsically illicit: all are elected so that they may administer the republic well. Wherefore a proportionately grave reason will be able to excuse someone from every sin, or at least from grave sin.

Therefore per se it is not lawful to give votes to a candidate who professes depraved principles. - Where there is no opportunity of choosing for another, it is right to give one's vote to him by whose election worse evils are removed, at least if the vote is usefully cast for this end. - But the signification of that vote ought to appear, either by open declaration, or from the fact that in the previous scrutiny you voted for an upright and Catholic man.

Citizens placed under a usurper, not in favor of him but for the common good, will not rarely have to use political rights.

II. Concerning Elected Deputies. a) They themselves have the public good to be procured from office. Wherefore, even by abstaining, they can violate commutative justice.

They cannot cooperate in a depraved law except insofar as it is less evil than that which otherwise would be proposed: for example, a law which, by sanctioning divorce, in part corrects a previous law concerning divorce. Scandal must be removed by a declaration.

b) One who alone seems capable is forbidden to decline public offices. Wherefore, "he who is suitable and is sought by common votes, unless he has a probable reason for desisting, is bound to acquiesce in the election, so long as the public good cannot otherwise be provided for." Ball.-Palm., Opus theol., t. 4, tr. 9, n. 640, 7.

Concerning Shareholders of Societies. 1. It is unlawful to favor by money a society which pursues an illicit end, for example, publishing a depraved newspaper. Wherefore morally you can never have a part in a society of this kind to be constituted. But, with scandal and a depraved intention excluded, a proportionate cause will be able to be present for buying "shares" of a society already constituted. Indeed this can be a means of suppressing the evil. - But one who already possesses "shares," or titles, or has acquired them by inheritance, since their destruction or alienation profits nothing, seems able to keep them or even to sell them to another honorable and prudent man from whom abuse is not to be feared. Cf. writings by Ill. D. Waffelaert, De Cooper. - Nouv. Rev. Theol. t. 13, p. 366 sq., where several other cases are proposed.

2. But if the end is honorable or indifferent, but illicit means are sometimes employed, reasons can more easily be present why you may remain in societies of this kind, with the intention of removing the evils according to your powers.

For this reason workers also can be excused who cannot refuse their name to societies of "socialists" without grave, indeed without gravest inconveniences, especially if economic ends alone are expressly intended.

But money received is not to be restored, unless there has been damaging sin against commutative justice.

3. But to all shareholders of a society their offices must be strongly inculcated, lest they shrink from burdens while they desire to receive profit.

Furthermore, not rarely, in an industrial society, supreme power belongs to the general assembly of shareholders, to be convoked each year, and in which, by common votes, agents are elected who are called administrators, because they are judged to exercise the business itself. And shareholders have the faculty that they be represented in that assembly by another shareholder, or that they join their "shares" with others, if a definite number of "shares" is necessary for casting a vote. These things therefore being posited:

a) With respect to the society itself or the other associates, the right of shareholders is a privilege, which, with commutative justice at least unharmed, they can fail to use.

b) But they are held by a graver obligation with respect to outsiders and workers. For they ought to decree this, that the business be managed honorably for them. Wherefore administrators upright and honorable, who put care and labor into observing the moral laws, must be constituted by them; and every year they ought to inquire into the manner in which business has been conducted. Otherwise, according to the rules concerning cooperation toward injustice, foreseen evils of injustice will deservedly be imputed to them, which, by presenting themselves, they would have impeded. One who, whether by positive vote, by silence itself, or by absence from the meeting, has explicitly or implicitly approved unjust things, will be guilty of injury as one commanding.

Yet the solution is less obvious when, on account of other qualities, an administrator seems to be placed over the business who at the same time will commit injustices which cannot be impeded by any vote in the annual meeting. Those who elected such a one under another respect gave him an honorable mandate, which he abuses; yet at the same time they conferred on him the faculty of abusing. This cooperation will be able to be excused by a proportionate cause.

Practically therefore, according to the grave or light efficacy which they have in these assemblies from the number of "shares," shareholders are held by a grave or light obligation of charity or justice that by themselves or by a suitable proxy they be present at the assemblies and fulfill their offices, unless the administrators have been such that they can plainly trust them. And often by the example of a few others are drawn, so that the excuse of uselessness is not easily to be admitted. Cf. Lugo, Iust. et Iur. d. 19, n. 68.

And if perhaps, on account of a different usage of examining nothing, questioning nothing, it is very difficult and troublesome to obtain anything in those assemblies, indeed to propose anything: upright shareholders ought to strive that this usage itself be changed.

In the Genus of Lust. We have already said several things where we were treating of scandal and of the cooperation of servants and artisans. These things remain to be said.

Concerning theatrical spectacles. a) Present-day theatres are accustomed to corrupt good morals in two ways. For the plays recited there accustom hearers to free loves, adulteries, divorces, whether these are approved or are represented as something obvious and consonant with nature; and by immodest garments and gestures they excite lust. The depraved effect of these is more immediate; direct or indirect doctrinal attack generates a more profound corruption. This is damaging to the married equally as to the unmarried, while lustful excitation is less grave in the state of marriage than among the unmarried. Finally, those who frequent theatres find there occasions of sin, whether on account of the players or on account of the others assisting.

Therefore, just as dances, so theatres, as much as the decency of one's state permits, are rather to be fled by the truly Catholic.

b) Those composing plays which are less honorable sin gravely, nor can they be excused. Nor in any way does he seem to be excused who, alone, does not refuse to say or sing obscene things, since he is compelled to utter these things in such a way that by these indecent things he produces laughter or applause: that cooperation is formal. One who himself has no lust to be provoked can be excused for a brief time if, on account of gravest inconvenience, he has a part in these exhibitions. He who has something to do in the chorus or musical concert can be excused more easily. As Gen. I, 242, says, common sense itself is accustomed to estimate their cooperation more benignly. Wherefore, where the things are not made extraordinarily scandalous, "they do not seem to be disturbed from good faith who think such cooperation lawful for themselves for making greater profit, acquiring reputation, etc." (Gen. l. c.).

c) Those who by their presence give no special scandal, unless they approach for themselves a proximate occasion of sin, are not to be accused of grave sin. Indeed they are to be dissuaded, especially young persons, from the constant frequenting of the theatre.

The cooperation of one who sometimes buys with money the right of seeing a spectacle is estimated as light. It becomes graver in proportion to the greater frequency of the acts. And they judge more severely one who pays an annual subscription. For he, so they say, is judged to approve and help all exhibitions, even disgraceful ones. But another interpretation underlies the matter, if by an annual subscription he spares his own money, in keeping with his attendance. Wherefore the thing must be estimated from the name or reputation of the theatre. And since, if the subscription were denied, the theatre would morally enjoy the same fortune, for the same reason both assiduity and subscription are to be condemned or can be excused, at least from grave sin.

d) The same must be said of circus shows, which not rarely excite lust more than theatrical plays, and of "cinematographic" exhibitions.

e) For avoiding companionship dangerous to the husband, let a pious wife - unless the thing is too indecent - not hesitate to join herself as companion to her husband.

Cooperation Toward Depraved Writings. 1. It is never lawful to write things which are evil, dishonorable. - 2. That you insert indifferent narratives in newspapers which are not good, a grave reason will excuse you; a grave reason is required lest the cooperation of a Catholic be scandalous. But if, on account of elegance of speech, your cooperation increases the diffusion of the newspaper, a gravest excusing cause is required, and an effort must be made to remove that necessity. - 3. One who inserts commercial notices is excused by the damage which the omission of the notice would bring. Certainly it is of great importance for a newspaper that it collect many notices; but the will and utility of insertion are accustomed to be posterior to the diffusion of the newspaper already made, so that the omission of some notice little affects the prosperity of the newspaper. Besides, notaries and others who manage public auctions must, as if from contract, take care that sales be announced everywhere. But they deserve well of the Catholic faith who, through newspapers either good or even of indifferent argument, will have procured such diffusion of notices that to insert notices in depraved sheets becomes less useful or necessary. - 4. Apart from positive prohibitions of law in the purchase and reading of newspapers which are not good, each one must guard against damage to his own soul, which is accustomed to arise chiefly from habitual reading, against cooperation, which per se is light, and against scandal. Not rarely, where there has been cause for reading these sheets, it is expedient that a Catholic man, especially a priest, obtain them for himself through another person, more obscure.

N. B. Concerning printers and sellers, it was treated above.

§ 1. I. Concerning Spiritual Goods to Be Procured. One's own spiritual salvation can be neglected by no one without sin; yet this sin, by accusing other sins, is already accused implicitly by him who does not wish formally to lose his salvation. But never, for obtaining any good or procuring it for another, is it lawful to sin venially. And in a proximate occasion of sinning gravely no one per se ought to remain on account of the utility or necessity of other individuals or of a community. Yet, when the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor urges, one can trust in a greater grace by which the proximate occasion is converted into a remote one. For honorable causes he will not sin who omits a spiritual good which more probably is greater; but what is better must be estimated from various considerations.

Neighbor laboring in extreme spiritual necessity must be aided even with certain danger to one's own life, provided that the hope of helping him is equally certain, and no graver evil thence, e.g. to the community or to the Church, is imminent. - A common grave necessity, i.e. a general one, they are accustomed to equate with an individual extreme necessity. But in the grave spiritual necessity of a particular neighbor, grave inconvenience must be borne by him alone who must care for the salvation of another from office.

II. Concerning bodily and temporal goods to be procured, a) Principles to be kept before one's eyes. Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; and hence, except for morally extreme necessity, we ought not to relieve the temporal need of neighbor with notable inconvenience of our own. - Whatever we can deny to ourselves, to our own bodily or temporal safety, without sin against charity, that also we are permitted not to give to neighbor. - It is right to prefer a public cause to a private one, even that of those joined to us; public authority can even require this.

Scholion. To neglect one's own bodily health without cause, with grave detriment, is grave per se; but we are not bound to use great expense or long care, or an extraordinary remedy, for recovering health.

b) Concerning alms. In the stricter sense, it is the largess of an exterior temporal good for a temporal end; but in the fuller sense, it is the gift of the same temporal good for ends either temporal or spiritual; finally, in the fullest sense, it is the communication of every good and talent and faculty of a thing made for relieving necessities of whatever kind.

Material goods are distinguished: some are necessary, whether with respect to one's own life and that of one's own people, or with respect to state or condition, and this either simply or by attending to the decency of state; others are relatively superfluous.

We must aid one who is extremely or quasi-extremely needy under grave obligation; and this even from goods in some way necessary to one's state, if nevertheless the moderate amount of money, which alone in another private person's temporal want is to be contributed, can become necessary to the state of the one giving. In grave temporal necessity of neighbor, the grave obligation remains in such a way that nevertheless it does not remove the choice of a different good work.

In common material necessity, finally, a grave obligation, especially today, is not proved. One who has superfluous goods must sometimes give alms under venial obligation. To seek out the poor is highly praiseworthy, but per se it is not commanded. The quantity of commanded alms is found more by the usages of pious persons than by mathematical estimation. It is useful to designate some fixed part of revenues for alms.

Moderate alms from common goods or from the goods of the husband are permitted to a wife; and also, but more cautiously, to faithful servants. Tutors and curators supply or help the protected person; prelates bestow alms for the community.

But today alms of a more prudent method must be cultivated rather than trivial money given to a poor person; and especially spiritual needs must be aided. Besides, in place of local or regional alms, today national or international alms has succeeded: this does not allow us simply to confirm the norms once admitted concerning the quantity of alms.

§ 2. I. Concerning Fraternal Exhortation and Correction. 1. Pious exhortation, whether merely instructive, persuasive, instigating, or approving a deed, is to be commended as the best stimulus to acting well. - 2. But fraternal correction, i.e. a private admonition which, from charity, attempts to call neighbor back from sin, with grave inconvenience excluded, is imposed by charity: under grave obligation, when mortal sin can thus be avoided; under light obligation, if you very easily can, when there is question of venial sin. Yet a Superior is bound under grave obligation to prevent the nerve of discipline from being relaxed even in lesser matters. If sin is excused by invincible ignorance, the obligation depends on the office of teaching, which is more proper to Superiors; yet it also urges others for damage to be avoided, either to the ignorant person or also to others.

The title of obligation is charity in private persons, piety in parents, religion or quasi-piety and sometimes justice in Superiors and Prelates; but the conditions are gathered by comparing, with the inconvenience of the one correcting, the necessity of the correction and the probability of effect, so that in doubt you are excused. Only the Superior must investigate, and that discreetly. Grave obligation will be rare in private persons; and the scrupulous are regularly excused from making correction. Although per se it is first to be made privately, various reasons permit that recourse be had immediately to the work of the Superior, unless the good itself of charity stand in the way.

II. Denunciation can be evangelical, or to the Superior as to a father, and it has for its end the good of the delinquent himself; canonical, or to the Superior as President of the community, for protecting this or for protecting an innocent person; judicial, as to the vindicator of public security. Judicial denunciation is lawful per se; canonical, as an extension of fraternal correction, and evangelical, which is a mode of this correction, are ruled by the norms of fraternal correction. Evangelical denunciation permits only medicinal punishment; canonical gives place to sanctions which protect the common good or that of the innocent person; judicial brings in public vindication. Unless the conversion of evangelical denunciation into canonical or judicial can be obtained or commanded, the Superior per se is prohibited by the general law of the secret committed from acting canonically or judicially.

The denunciation of a hidden corrupter in colleges is regularly to be advised, sometimes strictly to be imposed. Yet the qualities of the Superior, hope of fruitful admonition, damage of the one denounced, and inconveniences of the one denouncing must be weighed.

III. Spiritual edification is procured by good acts of simple, humble, and modest virtue, which, even if it ignores and hides itself, sufficiently wills the effect of good example so that the intention necessary for merit is by no means lacking in it.

IV. Concerning scandal. 1. Notions. Scandal completely taken, or with passive scandal, can be called a word, deed, or omission, on the occasion of which neighbor is so tempted that he sins. Per se, an action of this kind is only something which either is evil or at least has the appearance of evil. And such a deed, which generates for neighbor a temptation or danger of sin (cf. 2, 2, q. 43, art. 1), is called active scandal: either merely direct, when it is done with that intention that neighbor sin; or diabolical, if the very character of sin as such is intended; or indirect, when the sin of neighbor is indeed foreseen and permitted, but not intended. Passive scandal is the sin occasioned: either of the weak, when it has been received from fragility, or pharisaic, when from malice. The immediate effect of active scandal is the temptation of neighbor to sin, either under the same aspect as the scandalous thing, or under a different aspect. Wonder or horror of spectators properly is not scandal. As the malice of a witness brings it about that there is passive scandal without active, so either the uprightness or even the wickedness of witnesses removes the character of scandal, if for that reason serious efficacy toward temptation or danger of sinning ceases. Yet an evil action which is committed publicly is deservedly presumed to be going to be scandalous.

2. One directly scandalous sins in that species of sin to which he intends to lead another; and it is grave, unless it is terminated in venial sin; one diabolically scandalous is, besides, guilty of a grave sin specially contrary to the charity of God and neighbor. One indirectly scandalous, when he sins, violates the office of fraternal correction by a contrary act; but he wounds charity alone (unless also by another title, as a pastor or father, he owed spiritual edification), because the sin of neighbor is outside his intention and action.

3. The scandal of little ones cannot be permitted without a proportionate cause, which is required graver when there is scandal of the weak, or of several, or certain, than if it is uncertain, or of one, or pharisaic. From a cause of necessity or sufficient utility the scandal of the weak can be permitted; indeed sometimes it must be, if otherwise you would sin, or your salvation would be endangered, or you would gravely harm others. Any cause per se suffices for permitting pharisaic scandal. Indeed, for a grave cause, e.g. of testing virtue, it is right, through an action not evil in itself, deliberately to give another an occasion of sin.

4. He who has scandalized others must act in such a way that the force of the evil example is morally extinguished.

5. Applications. On account of a proportionate cause, we are not forbidden to ask an action, even with money paid, from one who, on account of his own malice, indeed on account of an erroneous conscience, will sin subjectively: because only a good is intended and nothing objectively evil is chosen. If it can be done, the false conscience of the other must be corrected, with an explanation given. For the other applications, cf. the text.

6. Concerning women's adornment, dances, images, cf. T. IV, De Castitate.

7. To one who has determined to do evil, it will be lawful to suggest a lesser evil (with a graver reason of scandal excluded) of the same kind, provided that by your counsel you do not harm a third person who is reasonably unwilling. Nor does counsel concerning an equal evil seem per se to be condemned, or counsel by which you avert from Titius an evil which another had decreed to inflict disjunctively either on Titius or on Caius.

V. Concerning Cooperation. 1. Cooperation signifies the simultaneous action of two or more persons. Cooperators, more strictly, are called all besides the principal executor.

Formal cooperation, strictly so called, joins the intentions themselves, to which then every other cooperation is opposed as material. But cooperation is also called formal, a little more broadly, when in itself, whether by its nature or by its necessary signification, it contains goodness or malice of the same kind as the principal action. Others call this immediate material cooperation. It is distinguished from mediate material cooperation, which, when it is toward evil, is done through an action wholly extraneous to the malice of the principal action which is considered. According to distance from the principal action, cooperation is called proximate or remote.

2. Manifold cooperation toward good, which not rarely contains the merit of humility, and which can also be furnished by prayers and every good work, in order that it may participate in the merit of the principal action, must be formal, or at least conscious, and, as such, approved.

Those who are admitted by Superiors of religious institutes to the society of merits and good works, besides the utility of prayers and sacrifices which are offered for them, as joined with the religious institute in a special way, derive from its merits and good works a fruit analogous to that which accrues to those themselves who have been enrolled in the religious institute.

3. Formal cooperation toward evil, and also immediate material cooperation, with the exception of injustice in material goods - participation in which is sometimes excused by the right of necessity - is necessarily contaminated by the malice of the principal action, so that it is intrinsically evil if the principal action itself has been such. Even mediate cooperation is illicit per se, since it is opposed to the office of fraternal correction, besides the dishonoring of God or damage to another, which are often added.

And illicit material cooperation, if it is positive, wounds not charity alone, but various virtues which can require that our action, even against our will, not have an efficacy opposed to them. - Material cooperation becomes lawful when it is combined with sufficient care of virtue, or is excused by a proportionate inconvenience.

The estimation of proportionate excuse is laborious because of the difficulty of adequate investigation, of the certain distinction by which an action intrinsically or always illicit is discerned from an action not yet evil in itself, and of attention to concurrent reasons of scandal and cooperation; because of disagreements among writers and an excessively servile or literal dependence on classic authors, who, although they are most useful counselors for us, nevertheless were writing in circumstances other than ours.

Furthermore, material cooperation will then be lawful if it betrays no affection toward evil, if scandal is removed or can be permitted, if the damages of cooperation are compensated by an excusing cause.

For estimating these things, it must be kept before the eyes what charity, and what the other virtue to which the principal action is opposed, prohibit or command.

In the examination of a cause, first let what is intrinsically illicit in it be defined; then let the various respects be considered, both of the cooperator, of the principal agent, of others, of the virtue to be wounded, of the preceding evil action which perhaps is helped, and of the following effects.

After these things have been considered, the simple intuition of a prudent man will give a certain presumption of a right response; yet according to the importance of the matter it will have to be confirmed by a distinct inspection. Finally, counsels must be added to the response.

But excusing causes are distinguished as very slight: loss of ordinary profit; light but reasonable: service, extraordinary profit; rather grave: fear of losing good service, infamy before one discreet man, great indignation of a husband, father, or master; very grave: loss of state, infamy before several, danger of falling notably from one's state; gravest: danger of a good to be compared with life. Other things being equal, a graver excuse is sought from positive damage than from gain ceasing.

Illicit cooperation in another who is prepared to furnish it cannot honorably be rejected by direct petition; but it is lawful to refuse one's own cooperation with foresight of another's substitution, indeed to ask the distributor that these things not be imposed on us.

Applications: with attention to the condition of persons, they are made to priests, religious women, servants, innkeepers, artisans, merchants; with attention to various objects, cooperation is examined toward false worship, toward exhibitions or recitations of theatres that are less honorable; toward depraved writings; toward political parties; toward illicit things of societies. Concerning these things, cf. the treatise itself, and T. IV, De Castitate.