Book II: On the Moral Virtues

Observation Concerning the Order. - What the moral virtues are and how they are divided, we said in I, nn. 495, 496. Moral theologians are not accustomed to prepare a place for the individual virtues. But, according to their practical intention, when they treat of the first three precepts, they are accustomed to weigh acts which pertain to the virtue of religion; they explain the virtue of piety under the fourth and fifth precepts; they refer the virtue of chastity to the sixth and ninth precepts; they ascribe the virtue of justice to the seventh and tenth precepts. Yet in the exposition of the fifth precept fortitude and justice itself claim certain parts for themselves. Furthermore the virtue of chastity is a subjective part of temperance; its exposition completes the things which were said in I, 475-484 concerning gluttony and drunkenness, concerning the virtue for which the name of temperance is reserved as proper; to restrain anger and to shake off sloth are also parts of fortitude.

We, imitating St. Thomas in 2, 2, shall formally refer to the virtues the things which we have to propose. And after prudence, to which, as directive, we shall assign the first place, in order we shall treat first of religion, of piety, to which observance comes nearest; then of justice, of which the virtues just named are potential parts; then of truth and sincerity, which are also placed under the cardinal virtue of justice; finally of temperance and humility, and of the cardinal virtue of fortitude. The treatise on chastity and the opposite vices is reserved to Tome IV.

We have already warned that the distribution of virtues into cardinal and potential is not of an ontological but of a logical order, so that logical subordination prejudices no excellence of virtue. Indeed, on account of honor to be rendered to the nobler virtue, we shall treat of religion and piety before the cardinal virtue of justice, to which both are logically referred.