Chapter II: On Imperfect Lust

I. On the Malice of Imperfect Lust

To Be Observed Beforehand. 1. Imperfect acts of lust which are materially conjoined with a perfect act constitute one sin both in species and in number. For the whole reason of specific distinction rested upon separation from the complete act. Therefore we are treating here of those acts in which one stops either in reality or in intention.

2. Nor in exterior acts does the distinction according to nature and against nature recur. The affection indeed can follow nature or be opposed to it; but an imperfect exterior act says nothing of this kind.

All interior lust is imperfect, which is retained in the mind or will; but exterior imperfect lust means any venereal movement, not of itself satiating, effected or accepted by an unmarried person.

Here there must be recalled what we said in volume I concerning the numerical distinction of sins and concerning internal sins, nn. 432-440 and 458-465.

— The intrinsic malice of all venereal pleasure directly sought or admitted outside matrimony is not controverted: every movement of this kind is outside the mean of chastity.

Concerning the gravity of the sin of lust, the first opinion holds some movements grave, others light, according to their distance from perfect satisfaction. That opinion rather belongs to an earlier age. - A second opinion teaches that venereal pleasures are grave from the whole genus. - A third, middle opinion, is defended thus by De Moya (Cf. 6, Miscellanea, d. 2, De peccatis, q. 2, § 2): "In venereal matters there is not given, morally and practically, smallness of matter; but physically and speculatively speaking, it cannot be denied."

Although no opinion has been condemned, nevertheless the first today must be held as improbable. For the second opinion, they argue chiefly from this: a) that, on account of insolent concupiscence, whose degree we cannot define, all direct lust carries with itself the permission of a grave movement, and this without any just cause; b) that, on account of our fragility, the will which deliberately embraces a lustful pleasure of lesser degree is in proximate danger of desiring complete pleasure, by means of an imperfect but grave act. By this kind of arguing one comes rather to defending the third opinion.

For us, in favor of the second opinion, this easy argument is at hand: in any venereal pleasure whatever, deliberately sought or admitted, there is found a substantial violation of the essential order which effects mortal sin. For in any delight of this kind, use is made, for an individual good and against relation to the species, of a faculty which is wholly immediately on account of the species.

For estimating sins as grave or light, consideration of quantity is useful then, when, on account of a modest quantity or intensity, the very quality of the action is so changed that it is no longer a substantial violation of the essential order. Thus modest violations of office allow the order of piety and friendship to remain substantially intact. But in any use whatever of venereal things outside matrimony, the same inversion of the essential order is detected. This manner of reasoning seems confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas, who, II-II, q. 154, art. 4, says that all lustful kisses, as such, are mortal, because they contain consent to the pleasure of perfect lust, that is, if we are not mistaken, to pleasure specifically the same, and therefore vitiated by a similar perversion of order. (Cf. what was said concerning the theological distinction of sins, I, n. 404 and 417.)

II. On Exterior Acts

Principles. 1. There is one formal reason common to all lustful acts: they mean a use, indeed incomplete, of venereal things. Therefore, according to themselves, looks, touches, words, do not vary in species: they are reprehended as lustful. But the distinction between sins by efficiency and by assent remains, as we said in n. 96 concerning pollution. Wherefore, he who has sinned alone, whether by a look, or by touch upon himself, or by lustful reading, sufficiently accuses his sins by saying: so many times I had voluntary carnal movements; so many times I accepted movements arising.

Yet he will not be able to be silent about a vow by which he was bound, or a special affection by which he was led.

2. As often as culpable complicity has intervened, another's sin will have to be accused; and besides, exterior acts which, according to themselves, begin or prepare a complete act with another person participate in the specific malices of that complete act.

Corollaries. 1. The so-called distillation, or production, from other glands, before the expulsion of seed, of a thinner liquid, since it is nothing but a certain notion of imperfect lust, induces no new species, and therefore ought not to obtain special mention in moral theology.

2. Lustful touches, embraces, kisses are so terminated to other persons that their sex and special marks (of married persons, sacred persons) must be indicated. Done to an unwilling person, they are at the same time opposed to justice. Not likewise looks, unless desires or pleasures concerning sin with the person seen have acceded. Yet on account of complicity, the circumstance of vow by which the accomplice person was bound will have to be indicated.

Sins of Speech. 1. Conversations can be shameful in two ways: either because by a shameful mode of narration they excite lust in the present, and these are more strictly called obscene; or because they approve shameful deeds or prepare future ones, as if you have had a discussion concerning a dishonorable action to be perpetrated afterwards.

Conversations from lust concerning shameful matters do not begin a complete sin with those conversing. Wherefore, excluding complicity with a sacred person whom you have thus induced to violate a vow, and excluding also a violated office of piety toward a person committed to your cares, these conversations are sufficiently accused by saying: I spoke shamefully with one or several (adding, where there will have been need, consent to depraved pleasure). - Yet he who seriously approves a lustful work perpetrated by himself or by another, or expresses desire for it, will have to accuse that depraved affection. - He who only fictitiously approves these things offends chastity insofar as he derogates from the honor owed to virtue; but, excluding grave scandal, this is not judged grave. And the same must be said of him who takes glory from fictitious sins, especially when glory is sought, more than from the malice of the sin, from another circumstance of cleverness, boldness, etc. (Cf. t. I, n. 464 and 469.)

N. B. Observe that here we are treating of touches and words which in a conscious mode proceed from lust. Concerning others, treatment will be given below.

III. On Interior Acts

I. Depraved Thoughts. Morose Pleasure. Some interior acts excite the commotion of the flesh and, as such, are sought or admitted, for example obscene phantasms. This is the more frequent species of the sin which they accuse who accuse depraved thoughts or morose pleasure. And since these are not accustomed to please except as a cause of present pleasure, this rule has customarily been handed down: Those who, excluding desire, have shameful thoughts to accuse, ought to declare neither the object nor the shameful movement, unless there has been pollution. Not the object, since the affection is not toward the object but toward subjective pleasure, and therefore the variety of objects does not change the species; not the shameful movement: once the thought has been indicated, it is already sufficiently manifested, unless there has been pollution.

Rather than interior acts, they should be called acts of perfect or imperfect lust excited by an interior act.

II. More intellectual acts can be:

1. Simple complacencies in an object thought of, without desire or intention of execution. And then only the evil marks which please will compose and specify the sin. Here note that there is not necessarily a shameful complacency concerning the thought of a shameful thing, which thought can be good: such a thought is had by him who meditates a sermon against impurity; and also that complacency concerning the marvelous, rare mode by which an evil thing was performed is in itself indifferent (although easily dangerous).

2. They can be inefficacious or conditioned desires: these must be indicated according to the very nature of the conditions, which can remove every malice, or only some malice, or none. And note that when there is question of a thing intrinsically evil, it is unlawful that someone, as though grieving over the prohibition, should foster affection toward an evil thing, for example toward fornication.

3. They can be absolute or efficacious desires, which necessarily embrace all known marks of the concrete object. (Cf. what was said t. I, n. 46.)

— Concerning joy, which, as distinct from desire, contains approval of a past act, what has been said concerning desire returns. It is lawful to rejoice not over an evil thing, but over the good effect of an evil thing. But nocturnal pollution is not an evil thing, not even materially, provided it has been natural, and therefore has been excited by no masturbation (even involuntary). Yet it is certainly not lawful to foster by joy the carnal pleasure of pollution.

— Penitents, except for efficacious desire, are not accustomed to notice many species. Wherefore practically, if those who accuse thoughts are found culpable, let them be questioned concerning desires. Then, besides the number, and perhaps a general question whether they have anything to add or not, there does not appear of itself a reason why anything else should be asked.

SUMMARY

I. All imperfect lust, morally separated from the complete act, is intrinsically and gravely evil, because in any venereal pleasure whatever deliberately sought or admitted, use is made, for the individual good and against relation to the species, of a faculty which is wholly immediately for the good of the species, so that the essential order is substantially violated.

2. In all lustful acts there is one formal reason of malice: they all mean the incomplete use of venereal things. Yet the distinction between sins by efficiency and by assent remains. But the circumstance of complicity, and of the quality of the sinning person, and of scandal, can add species. Yet observe that conversations are not among the acts which are judged to begin a complete sin with another person.

3. By the name of depraved thought they most often accuse venereal pleasure sought or admitted through phantasms. More intellectual acts can be: simple complacencies, conditioned or absolute desires, joys concerning past acts.