Chapter II: On Piety Toward Parents

Offices. Species. Piety toward parents imposes on children love, which corresponds to conjunction and benefit; reverence, which corresponds to dignity and authority; and consequently obedience, which corresponds to the function of generating, since the generation of man is completed only by education perfected.

The two prior offices exist absolutely, are perpetual, and are defined by the divine natural law. The third has its root in the very necessity of children, exists of itself but less absolutely, insofar as parents are really set over the institution of children; it ceases when the necessity ceases; and, both as to the person to whom it is owed, and as to the acts which it embraces, and as to the space of time through which it remains, it is more determined by positive ecclesiastical and civil law.

The three offices are imposed by the virtue of piety, yet so that its own specific ratio is in each. Nevertheless love and reverence will very often be exercised or violated at the same time; and especially reverence will scarcely be able to be violated without an offense of love.

Besides, parents are neighbors toward whom, also by the common title, we must fulfill all the offices of charity and justice. And offices which pertain to personal relations will be commanded by a double title. Thus theft of a thing belonging to parents will of itself offend justice alone, but insult will be opposed at once to justice and to piety.

Finally, the intimate conjunction of persons, or the peculiar reverence to be preserved toward parents, brings it about that what would be light if committed against an external person becomes grave if done against parents.

Therefore some offices are proper to children; others are common offices of neighbor, and these are either separated from the former, or concur with the former, whether they remain in their own degree or, because of that admixture, they themselves are to be urged more severely.

I. Love. counsels unity and concord: concord in intellect, so that, with the right of truth preserved, children may incline to thinking the same as parents; concord in affection, so that the causes of rejoicing and grieving may be the same for both; concord of wills, so that children may strive to fulfill the wills of parents. It counsels besides efficacious benevolence, and obliges one to assist parents if they are in need to be relieved. As was said above, n. 85, parents who are in extreme necessity are to be preferred to all others; in another necessity, wife and children come first in order. Wherefore, to relieve the quasi-extreme necessity of parents, a child will have to make even great expenses: understand those which permit him to preserve his own state, and which, with account taken of his family, he can conveniently bear. Cf. Palm., Op. theol. II, n. 822. In this matter one can also sin by excess, as if a wife should despoil her husband too much in order to assist her parents.

A child sins gravely against the precept of love who gives parents a grave and reasonable cause of sadness, whether through hatred, or through actions which savor of hatred or aversion of mind, or through less good morals: by frequenting bad companions, neglecting studies, prolonging vigils outside the house, etc.

To the office of love it also belongs that children provide for parents when sick the timely use of the sacraments; that, according to their condition and the usages of the pious, they take care that suffrages be made for deceased parents; that they strive to fulfill their reasonable expressed wills, even after the funeral. They judge that a child sins gravely who by evil arts impedes parents from making a testament.

II. Reverence. demands esteem and honor. This is harmed by striking parents; and it is judged to be a grave offense if a child strikes a parent even lightly, or, even without the mind of striking, deliberately raises his hand to strike; it is harmed by disdain and contempt, through insults, reproaches, through even affected ignoring, if, because they are poor, they are not acknowledged. It would be otherwise if a child breaks off association with criminals because of a just cause, for example lest he himself be marked with infamy. And, except for the necessity of the common good, children cannot denounce even true crimes of their parents to a judge.

Which insults or reproaches are grave is to be estimated from the adjuncts: from adjuncts of education, morals, etc. A child will more easily be excused from grave sin who corrects parents acting less rightly or troublesome parents, who yields to impatience, but otherwise demonstrates himself well affected toward parents. And, although this is little to be praised, writers also think it tolerable that a child who has arrived at a very honored position dissembles knowing parents of humble condition, provided he sufficiently provides for their necessities.

III. Obedience. obliges children as long and insofar as they are under the power of parents. This power varies according to the matter and the age of the children.

As regards the salvation of the soul, children are always in their own right; insofar as they are conscious, they can always both embrace the true religion and practice piety in an approved manner. They must receive the counsels of parents reverently in this matter. Must they also follow them? This depends on the piety and prudence of the parents, and on one's own need, since a better counselor can be present or lacking.

As regards the election of a state, a definite state cannot be imposed by parents. Indeed, they themselves, with attention to their condition, must permit and procure for their children a sufficient possibility of choosing. But that children may embrace the state itself, parents must juridically consent: canonically certainly not up to the puberty of the children, which was the rule before the Code, and now perhaps, because of c. 89, up to majority or emancipation. From the very law of nature, when there is question of marriage, a child fails in reverence of itself if he does not ask the counsel of a parent; he fails in obedience if he enters upon nuptials to which, for a just cause, parents are unwilling to assent. Indeed, although it cannot be prescribed that children marry or contract a determined marriage, it sometimes happens that children are constrained by the office of love to make a marriage, because hatreds may be quieted or the poverty of parents relieved. "In the election of a state of perfection, it is often not expedient first to take counsel from parents, since flesh and blood do not grasp the things which are of the spirit; after the matter has been deliberated and firmly proposed, by accident it is often expedient to communicate the matter to parents, but not for changing the counsel" (Lehmk., I, n. 947). Also from the law of nature, those offices regard each parent, whether legitimate or only natural, yet so that of itself the will of the father is to be preferred to the will of the mother.

Positive laws concerning paternal power. define and complete more the indications of nature. By Roman law, paternal power belonged only to the father of the family, while more recent laws imitate natural law more. The Italian Code, title 8 of book 1, treats of paternal power; the French Code, title 9 of book 1.

Those laws at once sanction paternal power and surround with protection persons who, because of age, are weaker in mind. Today, among cultivated nations, paternal power, which formerly was so absolute that it was extended even to the right of killing children (at least immediately after birth), has become more directive than coercive, so that, except for the right of moderate correction, the father almost has to have recourse to the magistrate in order to inflict an afflictive penalty such as prison. And rather it obtains that unruly children are committed to certain special institutions which take care of their correction, with a sufficiently unequal success. Yet paternal power is customarily sanctioned by certain rights over the goods of children, and by a civil obligation by which capable children are bound to furnish support to needy parents.

The protection of weaker age consists especially in several incapacities which vary with age itself. In making juridical acts, they are either supplied by parents or tutors, or helped by a curator of goods. Usually, because this cause touches not only the contracting persons but also their families in the highest degree, full liberty of contracting marriage is customarily deferred longer.

With the explanation concerning the capacity for juridical acts which regard goods remitted to the treatise on justice, we shall briefly set forth what canon law, what the laws of Italy, France, and Belgium have established, noting besides the principal differences of other laws.

Canon law. The Code divides persons according to age into four classes: children, the impubes, pubescent minors, and majors. Children have not yet completed the seventh year: they are judged not capable of themselves, and, as such, from c. 12, are not bound by merely ecclesiastical laws, with the cases expressly excepted of annual confession and Paschal communion, if they have had the use of reason. Boys are judged impubes who have not yet completed fourteen years, and girls who have not yet completed twelve years. These, from c. 167, §1, n. 2, cannot cast a vote in canonical elections, nor, from can. 1224, choose burial for themselves; nor, from c. 1757, §1, give testimony properly so called in judgment (for they can be heard by force of c. 1758); nor, from c. 1795, §2, can they be assumed for the office of experts; and all who have not yet completed fourteen years are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and rather are to be corrected by educative punishments (cf. I, 282, 283, and c. 2230). Minors, before twenty-one years have been completed, who are exempt from fasting, remain in the exercise of their rights subject to the power of parents or tutors, except those acts in which law regards minors as exempt from paternal power. Thus c. 89, which in this way recognizes the principle of paternal power. That paternal power is sanctioned by legal domicile, which, from c. 93, a minor has with him to whose power he is subject; by the faculty of parents or tutor to choose burial for an impubes (c. 1224); of exercising, if they are Catholic, the right of patronage for the minor (c. 1456); of acting and responding in judgment for minors (c. 1648). The excepted cases are spiritual causes and causes connected with spiritual things (c. 1648, §3); entrance into religion, which lies open to those who have completed fifteen years of age (c. 555); marriage, which young men of sixteen years and girls of fourteen completed years can contract, although a greater age (c. 1067), besides a will concordant with parents (c. 1034), is counseled; quasi-domicile, which a minor who has passed infancy can obtain; burial, which pubescent minors can choose for themselves (c. 1223); and the right of active voice in elections, from which only the impubes are excluded.

If, in judgment, there is conflict between the utilities of minors and of parents or tutors or curators, the judge assigns to them a curator through whom they may stand in judgment (c. 1648, §2). Those who have completed twenty-one years have the full exercise of rights; they are subject to all laws, at least general laws, except the law of fasting, from which, from c. 1254, §2, those who have reached the sixtieth year are exempt.

The Italian Code. After the perpetual obligation of honor and reverence has been laid down, a child, from the Italian Code, until majority at twenty-one years or emancipation, is subjected to the paternal power of parents. During marriage, this is exercised by the father; when the father is impeded, it belongs to the mother; when the marriage is dissolved, it pertains to the surviving spouse (art. 220). That power is sanctioned: a) by the right of assigning a residence to the child, indeed, of placing an unruly child, with the president of the tribunal assenting, in a house of education or correction; b) by the right of representing, in civil acts, children born or to be born, and of administering their goods. To remove errors or abuses, several things are provided: where the utilities of the children and of the administrator are contrary to one another, a special curator is put in charge of such business; for more dangerous acts, the solemnities of license, whether of the tribunal or of the praetor, are necessary; inheritances are not accepted except with benefit of inventory (coi benefizio dell'inventario); c) by the legal usufruct of the goods of a child, if you except certain things, especially those which the child acquires in military service or separate industry, or which are bequeathed or donated with a clause excluding usufruct (cf. 229). That usufruct is burdened with the charge of feeding, instituting, and instructing the children (230). This usufruct belongs to him who exercises paternal power; yet the mother acquires the same if, because of causes personal to him, the father has been deprived of the usufruct. The usufruct lasts until emancipation or the greater age of the child. But it ceases by the death of the child or by new nuptials of the surviving parent. To the father, however, it is intact that either by testament or by authentic act he impose on the surviving mother conditions to be observed in the education (even religious) of the children and the administration of goods; yet so that the mother can be dispensed from those conditions by the family council which the praetor (i.e., elsewhere, judge of peace) shall have assembled. Paternal power is dissolved, leaving aside here the case of abuse or of certain penalties, by greater age or emancipation of the children. But a child is emancipated either by marriage, or by a distinct act of him who has paternal power or, this failing, of the family council, provided he has completed eighteen years. Nevertheless, for marriage, the consent of parents or at least of the father is necessary for a son up to twenty-five completed years, for a daughter up to the age of twenty-one years. Parents failing, sons and daughters up to the age of twenty-one years need the consent of ascendants (if they dissent, the assent of the grandfather suffices) or of the family council. Yet recourse can be had to the court of appeal if the dissent of ascendants or of the family council is destitute of a just cause (cf. art. 67). That paternal power is conceded over legitimate children and over acknowledged natural children. Civil effects are generated by civil marriage alone. Contrary, however, to France and regularly to Belgium, civil law does not sanction an obligation of contracting first before a civil magistrate.

France and Belgium use almost the same regime. Yet, in both regions, children already fifteen years old can be emancipated by parents (but not by the family council); the legal usufruct ceases when the children are eighteen years old. In France (law of June 21, 1907), those older than twenty-one years no longer need any consent for celebrating nuptials. Yet they must seek the consent of parents up to twenty-five completed years. But, that not having been obtained, it is enough that through a notary they give notice concerning their future marriage. If parents dissent, the consent of the father suffices. Parents failing, consent devolves upon the nearer ascendants of each line, so that in the same line the will of the grandfather prevails; but if each line dissents, the dissent is held for consent. But those older by birth must notify nothing to ascendants. Ascendants failing, consent is to be furnished by the family council (Conseil de famille). If the child is illegitimate, consent must be furnished by the parent by whom he was acknowledged. If he has been acknowledged by each parent and these dissent, the consent of him who exercises paternal power suffices.

In Belgium, the consent of parents is required up to twenty-five completed years. Yet those older than twenty-one years can bring the cause to the tribunal, which will pronounce concerning the reasons of the parents. After that age, counsel must be sought; and when consent has been denied, they must, by a "respectful" act (acte respectueux) which the notary presents, insist on obtaining consent. Yet when consent has again been denied, the marriage can be celebrated without consent after a month has elapsed.

The principal varieties of other laws to be observed:

1. Concerning the age of majority. This is not everywhere twenty-one years. By the common law of Spain it is twenty-three years (in Aragon it is twenty completed years; in Catalonia and the territory of Navarre, it is twenty-five years). In the Argentine republic there are distinguished minors of fourteen years (who are all judged impubes), and adult minors (or pubescent minors) up to twenty-two completed years. In England, and also in the U.S.A. from common law, it is twenty-one years; yet in eleven States, daughters after eighteen years are of greater age.

2. Concerning the modes and age of emancipation. In Germany, not even through marriage is there emancipation properly so called; but a minor who has completed eighteen years can, with his consent and other conditions fulfilled, be declared greater by the tribunal of guardianships; by which declaration he is juridically assimilated to a major. In the Argentine republic, if you except emancipation for exercising commerce, which is done by consent of father or mother and public inscription in the commercial tribunal, the sole mode of emancipation is marriage. In England it is done by marriage or also by leaving the paternal house because of entrance into religion, military service, or domestic service; in the U.S.A. by valid marriage and consent of parents, if these no longer support the child.

A family council, which supplies the parents, at least through assistance furnished to the tutor in graver acts, is not had everywhere. Thus, in Germany, the province of the family council is entrusted to the tribunal of guardianships, so that only extraordinarily is a family council constituted (art. 1858 ff., Civil Code). But no mention of a family council is had in English or U.S.A. law; none exists in the Argentine republic, where it is supplied by the Ministry of minors.

3. Concerning the subject of paternal power. Sometimes paternal power is possessed by each parent, so that in case of dissent the opinion of the father prevails: thus in Germany, in the Argentine republic; elsewhere, as in Spain, it pertains to the father and, he failing, to the mother; elsewhere it is lost by a widow if she enters a second marriage (either simply, or unless by the former husband before death it is continued to the widow even for this case); while elsewhere, for example in Venezuela, it is preserved even then, with the administration of goods excepted, unless this is confirmed to her by the tribunal; in the Mexican republic, paternal power is exercised also, in their order, by paternal and maternal grandfathers and grandmothers; while in the Chilean republic the rights of paternal power do not pertain to the mother. In England, the right of paternal power indeed passes to the widow, yet so that the will of the father concerning the religion of his offspring remains to be executed. Yet the tribunal has and exercises broad power of ordering matters otherwise for the better utility of descendants.

4. Concerning the amplitude of paternal power. Usually, besides direction of the person, paternal power also embraces administration of the goods of children. Yet not so in the U.S.A. and England, where the curator of the person and the curator of the patrimony are distinguished. Yet regularly the father, or, he failing, the mother, will be deputed by the magistrate to administer goods.

The legal usufruct of parents exists neither in the U.S.A. nor in England.

5. Concerning liberty of marriage. There are regions where, at least for Catholics, the canonical regime of marriage is acknowledged by civil law. Thus the Spanish Civil Code, which therefore reserves civil marriage to those who do not profess the Catholic faith. Besides, other regions are ignorant of the artificial institution of civil marriage, so that, in whatever form mutual consent is expressed, it validly joins spouses also in the civil forum, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Thus, in the U.S.A., civil law of itself requires in the bridegroom the age of twenty-one completed years, in the bride, eighteen completed years. In several States, however, marriage between the pubescent is already civilly valid if consent is completed by cohabitation or by manifest undertaking of the offices of husband and wife. But other regions have imposed by law the juridical necessity of marriage called "civil." Thus in Germany, where it is required that the man be of greater age or declared greater, and that the woman have completed sixteen years. Other regions besides prescribe, not always under penal sanction, that civil marriage be celebrated before religious marriage. Thus in the Chilean republic; thus in Argentina, where nevertheless no penalty strikes priests who have blessed nuptials not yet civilly celebrated.

At the same time, however, art. 1588 declares that the religious obligations concerning marriage are preserved untouched by the civil law concerning marriage.

Usually, up to a certain age, the consent of parents or even of the tutor must be obtained. Yet often this is not a condition of validity.

In some States of the U.S.A., but not in all, the consent of the father, or, he being dead, of the mother, or, if both have died, of the tutor of the person, is to be obtained for validity by a bridegroom who has not yet completed twenty-one years and by a bride who has not yet completed eighteen years. Nuptials celebrated before twenty-one years without the consent of the father (if the child is legitimate) or of the mother (if illegitimate) are merely prohibited in Germany; and in Spain, nuptials made by a minor without the consent of the father, or mother, or paternal or maternal grandfather, or family council; in the Argentine republic, consent of the father or, the father failing, of the mother, is prescribed to be obtained by minors of twenty years; in the Chilean republic consent is prescribed up to the age of twenty-five years. In the Venezuelan republic no consent is to be sought from a man who has completed twenty-one years and from a woman who has completed eighteen years.

Sometimes the consent of parents can be supplied by the tribunal. Thus, in Germany, if the son or daughter have been declared of greater age, the tribunal of guardianships can supply consent. In England also broad power is possessed and exercised by the tribunal.

Finally, even after the age at which consent must be obtained, it happens that counsel must be sought for lawfulness. Thus, in Spain, the counsel of the father, or, the father failing, of the mother, must be sought.

Piety toward parents imposes on children two absolute offices, perpetual and defined by the natural law itself: love and reverence; from the very necessity of children there arises for them the office of obedience, which supposes parents set over the institution of children, ceases when the necessity ceases, and is more determined by positive human law. In those three offices its own specific ratio is in each; although they are often exercised together.

Nor do they destroy the common offices of justice and charity; indeed, when they concur with them, they urge the same more gravely. Love induces concord, effective benevolence (in the necessity of parents); and under grave obligation forbids a child to inflict grave and reasonable sadness on parents. Reverence demands an internal affection of esteem and an external signification of honor: it is harmed by disdain, contempt, shame, striking; gravity is to be weighed from the adjuncts. Obedience is to be furnished within the limits of the power of parents, yet so that the disobedient, as such, violate no title other than that of piety. Conscious children, as regards the salvation of the soul, are in their own right, so that they can always embrace the true religion and practice piety in an approved manner. Nor can a definite state be imposed by parents. Yet of itself parents are to be consulted concerning marriage; and a child sins against obedience who enters nuptials against a reasonable prohibition of parents.

There exists besides the civil institution of paternal power, which today is sufficiently similar almost everywhere, yet varies in various nations as to the faculty of contracting nuptials, the age and mode of emancipation, and rights concerning the goods of children.