Chapter II: On Secrecy

I. The notion of secrecy and its varied character. A secret is a hidden thing, not to be divulged. Secrecy is distinguished:

a) Natural, which, if it remains alone, is also called merely natural, whose revelation is prohibited by the very law of nature concerning preserving either charity or justice, according as the other would conceive just sorrow from the revelation or receive injury. A secret of this kind already arises from those things which are communicated in conversations with a certain mutual trust. There things are said without sin which without sin would not be reported to him about whom they were said.

b) Promised, when an obligation either only of fidelity or also of justice arises from a promise following upon knowledge of the matter, whether this became known by chance or through another's communication.

c) Committed, when an agreement concerning preserving secrecy has been placed before the communication itself. The agreement can be explicit or tacit: as when someone approaches a confessor, advocate, or physician for the sake of seeking counsel. Secrecy from office obliges more strictly, so that it is called rigorous. It supposes a profession which induces secret communications. Therefore there is not true "professional" secrecy for drivers, although such is sometimes recognized even in the civil forum.

d) Sacramental, which flows from every sacramental confession and from sacramental confession alone, and alone admits neither exception nor light matter in direct revelation.

When parties agree concerning secrecy quasi of confession, they would attempt in vain to attribute the force of sacramental communication to their confidences. But by the greatest force by which they can, they intensify the obligation.

Revelation obtained by an unjust way induces a graver secret. The use of such knowledge is prohibited, unless another's injustice or public safety should permit you to extort the secret by force and fraud.

II. Obligation. 1. From merely natural secrecy, one must be silent as long as there is a cause of charity or justice; from a promise, one must be silent as long as, the promise set aside, it would be lawful to keep silent; from a committed secret, one must be silent as long as the other has a right of willing that the thing be concealed. But the one committing the secret justly exacts silence as long as he himself justly conceals the matter, unless the reason of the common good narrows or extends the obligation of keeping silence. Wherefore, not even in judgment is it lawful to reveal the hidden crime of the one committing the secret; but for preserving a rigorous secret, even the damage of an innocent person must be put after it, unless it threatens from the very deed of the one committing the secret: as if a pregnant girl wishes to procure abortion.

2. Nevertheless, with grave proportionate damage the obligation of the agreement ceases, and therefore also of the committed secret, even one rigorous per se: lest there be lacking those who are willing to give counsels. Yet the cause of the public good can sometimes require that you prefer death to revelation. On the contrary, if it is gravely important to religion or fatherland that it be revealed, even a rigorous secret can be disclosed.

Today they are accustomed to enlarge the force of rigorous secrecy beyond just limits. Then a new reason of the common good can intervene so that, for example, Catholic physicians could observe these norms, lest recourse be had to upright physicians with less confidence.

3. From all or grave guilt, consent prudently presumed of the one himself committing the secret will excuse a revealed committed secret, as if the revelation turns to his good, or if it is of little interest to him and the revelation has great utility. Nor is revelation made to one or another prudent man judged grave per se.

On Letters. 1. Secret matters which are communicated through letters, according to the nature of the matter and the mode of the writer, are protected by natural or committed secrecy and remain per se in the dominion of the writer.

2. To read letters destined for another, when they are closed or kept in a secret place, is per se grave, unless the danger is absent of finding grave matter there. There will be no sin if it is done on account of a just cause, or with the consent either of the owner of the secret, i. e. the writer, or of him who can prudently judge concerning the force of the secret, i. e. him who received the letters. It is lawful for him to open and read letters who probably thinks that they are injurious to himself, or that they contain such things from which he can avert grave and unjust damage from himself or from another or from the commonwealth.

3. Parents are permitted to read letters written and received by children. The same is permitted to religious Superiors according to the constitutions. Yet those letters which contain matters of conscience can be torn up by them, but cannot be read when the person writing is unwilling. But they can examine the letters sufficiently so that they know that matters of conscience are being treated seriously. What is lawful for a husband must be gathered from received customs, unless a founded suspicion gives a greater right. From letters read, the aforesaid Superiors are held by natural secrecy, by which, the consent given or reasonably presumed of him whose secret it is being set aside, no other use of the knowledge is permitted to them except that which is referred to the end on account of which the faculty was given.

4. He who casts letters into an open place, even when torn, admits the voluntary danger that the fragments be gathered by another. Therefore the collector can suppose that no matters are contained in them which the possessor of the letters could not expose to this danger. Wherefore the reader yields only to venial curiosity; indeed he does not sin if he has reasonably hoped for some utility for himself from it. More concerning these things, cf. Lugo, Iust. d. 14, nn. 145-151.

He who, against the other's will, furtively reads another's secret writings sins not only by curiosity, but also by a sin of injustice, since each one preserves dominion over his own writings. The sin can be grave if it is done with notable damage of the other, or if the owner is very unwilling. Except the rights of parents and Superiors and of those who have to protect themselves from injury, in the manner which was said concerning letters.

I. Secrecy is distinguished as natural, which is imposed by the very natural law concerning preserving charity or justice; promised, which arises from a promise that follows knowledge had from wherever, whether the promise was one of fidelity or also of justice; committed, which is owed from an agreement placed before the communication itself. A tacit agreement of this kind is had when someone, for the sake of seeking counsel, approaches a confessor, advocate, or physician; and there arises the secret which is called rigorous. Finally there is sacramental secrecy, flowing from every secret sacramental confession and from sacramental confession alone.

The parties intensify by the greatest force by which they can the obligation, though not sacramental, of preserving secrecy, when they agree concerning a secret quasi of confession.

II. Natural secrecy must be preserved as long as it is urged by the law of charity or justice; and that especially when the knowledge has been obtained by an unjust way: then only another's injustice or public safety, which would permit invasion of the secret, make its revelation honorable; promised secrecy holds as long as it would be lawful to be silent; committed secrecy, as long as the other preserves the right, i. e. as long as he himself justly conceals the matter. Rigorous secrecy must be preserved even with damage of an innocent person, unless the secret threatens from the deed of the one committing it. - Yet per se no secret, unless it is sacramental, must be preserved with one's own damage which would excuse from preserving an agreement. But the consent of the one committing the secret can prudently be presumed.

III. On letters. Matters communicated by letters preserve their nature of secrecy; and they remain per se in the dominion of the writer, so that it is per se grave to read the letters of others which are closed or kept in a secret place: for those which are found thrown away in an open place are judged to have been permitted for every use. Parents and religious Superiors, according to the Constitutions, are permitted to read letters sent and received by children or subjects. The right of a husband is to be estimated from received customs. Yet letters cannot be known by Superiors when it is sufficiently established to them that they treat of matters of conscience; whether there is question of another's conscience, or of the conscience of a subject who is not obligated to render an account of conscience; but those letters must either be handed over or torn up.