Chapter III: On Lying

Notion and malice. 1. A lie is a false signification against the mind. The common people sense this, and the age-old authority of the Catholic school approves it. It is intrinsically dishonorable, because it contains an abuse of speech or of the faculty of signifying against the primary end of that faculty. Therefore, because the primary reason of dishonorableness is repeated neither from the right of the hearer nor from social detriment, the distinction cannot be admitted between lies socially useful and socially harmful, as though the latter alone were illicit, or between false-sayings, by which no truth owed to another is denied, so that they can be honorable, and lies, which deny the truth owed to another.

Yet a lie neither removes in the speaker the subordination of the faculties, nor of itself deprives the hearer of necessary truth; wherefore it is not in itself a grave sin, but contains a malice venial in its kind; so that gravity can come only from an added injury or violated religion.

2. That a lie be had, there is required a) formal speech, or that you reasonably be judged to will to communicate your mind, i. e. that in exercise you say that you are speaking. Thus while you recite a fable, while you write a poem, and while, compelled, you answer without a positive obligation of saying the truth, as such you do not speak formally; - b) speech against the mind, or by which you knowingly say things which are false, so that between the expressed judgment and the mental judgment there is discrepancy.

3. A lie is distinguished as jocose, which is ordered to delight; officious, by which one's own utility or another's is sought; and pernicious, by which another's damage is chosen or intended. The last can become grave from the damage inflicted.

To use words in a restricted signification which either is intended by the one interrogating himself or appears from the circumstances is not a lie. For then, as such, they enter the conversation, and there is no discord between the concept and the expressed thing. Thus a confessor, or a public person, when interrogated, is not judged except concerning the knowledge which he has acquired under another title; a merchant, as such, is interrogated about the goods which he has for sale. - There are also formulae which from custom have acquired a new force of signifying. Thus the words: "I do not know, he is not at home" are civil formulae for denying an answer, a visit.

But mental studiousness in narrowing, completing, or changing the obvious signification of a sentence uttered is ineffective for avoiding a lie. For what is kept silent in the mind, or is pronounced so low that it cannot be heard, is not part of external or significative speech. Cf. Laymann, L. 4, tr. 3, c. 13, n. 7.

But a lie ceases:

1. If the circumstances take away the formal signification of the words; as if in jest you say openly false things, or merely use formulae of courtesy, of consolation for the sick, or in our secular forum, you deny guilt or narrate a devised "system" of defense: the accused is not judged, in that artificial defense, to open his mind in exercise through the words which he utters, but to use, as it were, a military stratagem.

Yet this cannot be transferred to boys or adolescents who, while they are being instructed, ought to confess their moderate faults to those interrogating them. For it is necessary that they consent to the correction of defects which is directed to their own good. And noble sincerity itself, made superior to inconveniences, is part of right instruction, while this would be gravely harmed through false excuses.

2. If you use a sentence truly amphibological: for this either signifies nothing or signifies also a true sense. Speech, however, is not made equivocal on account of the diverse senses which one word can have. Thus he who, to one clearly asking about the presence of Peter, responds: "Peter is not here," uses no amphibology because est also signifies "he eats."

3. If against another's unjust aggression, when another resource is lacking, you defend your silence or secret by a false statement. For just as another's unjust aggression effects that an action, which otherwise would be homicidal, is not, as an action, anything except defense of oneself, so also it will be the cause why words which, uttered outside aggression, would be lies, now at the same time are defensive of a secret and as such only are intended and chosen. Nor is it required that the aggressor be conscious of his unjust aggression. For what is materially unjust can also be repelled by force.

As Genicot-Salsmans says, I, 416, all admit that manner of responding can be chosen which seems necessary for preserving a secret. They differ only in explanation.

Some, not a few today, therefore pervert the definition of a lie, which they say is a denial of truth owed;

Others therefore deny that a lie is so intrinsically evil that it can never become lawful;

Others call it a broadly mental restriction, although it does not appear how the use of a word according to a sense of which the known circumstances permit no suspicion can be called broadly mental.

It has seemed preferable to us, according to the example of St. Thomas in the question concerning the killing of an unjust aggressor, which they also attempted to solve either through a conflict of rights, or through a restricted statement of the intrinsic malice of homicide, simply to use the principle of double effect, concerning which see I, 131.

Genicot-Salsmans also concedes that the right of legitimate defense of truth to be concealed can be invoked here.

We have treated the matter broadly in the periodical Gregorianum, vol. I, fasc. 1 and 3.

This opinion brings this advantage, that it restrains abuses, since just defense supposes present aggression, while what others concede can find a proportionate excuse even in spontaneous speech.

4. He who uses amphibology never lies; but he can sin, insofar as either he intends another's deception or permits it without a proportionate cause. Only the immediate proportionate utility which is procured by ambiguity can be intended.

5. With deplorable ease officious lies are multiplied today, so that human commerce is full of falsities and deceptions. By these arts childish instruction is corrupted and the sense of one's own dignity is diminished. Zeal for simple sincerity must be restored by words and examples.

A lie is defined: speech against the mind; and it is intrinsically dishonorable, since it contains an abuse of speech against the primary end of the faculty of speaking. Yet because it allows the order of man in himself and toward others to remain substantially intact, its malice is not of itself except venial.

That formal speech be had, it is necessary and of itself sufficient that, the circumstances being considered, you be judged to will to communicate your mind. If then, between the word of the mouth and the word of the mind, discrepancy is had, a lie is committed, which, whether it is directed to delight, as jocose, or to the utility of the speaker or hearer, as officious, or to causing damage, as pernicious, is cleansed from fault by no mental studiousness of changing the obvious signification of the words, or mental restriction. But amphibological words, although they can be illicit from another source, nevertheless are not a lie; and if you intend only the necessary defense of secrecy, it is lawful to defend silence or a secret against an aggression objectively unjust, even if not conscious, by a false statement.

But a boy or adolescent ought to confess his faults that are not so grave to a parent or teacher who interrogates him.