Chapter III: On Venial Sin

It will chiefly be necessary to treat of actual sin; for only a few things must be added concerning habitual sin.

Order of speaking. First we shall confirm that there are venial sins. There will follow a psychological analysis and definition of venial sin, with certain explanations added concerning the analogy and the evil of this sin. Then we shall give criteria of venial sin; then concerning the modes by which acts venial of themselves can become mortal. And, by way of complement, two cases will be solved.

— There are venial sins. We call venial sin a sin which, as it is committed, does not constitute man turned away from God, or an enemy of God, nor is worthy of eternal punishment, but is of itself remissible.

But that there are such sins must be held by faith, from the Council of Milevis, c. 7; Trent, s. VI, c. 11 and 12, and can. 23, 25; and s. XIV, c. 5 and can. 7.

And it is certain that there are also sins which are such by their nature, and not merely from the mercy of God, who would punish beneath the merit of the cause.

But this third question is disputed among theologians: whether or not God, by supplying sufficient helps, could have prohibited all deliberate disorders under mortal guilt.

— Psychological explanation and definition.

I. In our present condition, just as indeliberate movements anticipate the use of reason, so also it happens that we have semi-deliberate acts, or acts not fully human, concerning which we spoke in the treatise on human acts. But it repugns human nature itself that man should be judged to have determined concerning his end by a semi-deliberate act. Therefore, already on account of this cause, we make acts short of aversion from God or from the ultimate end, which nevertheless are disordered.

Furthermore, even deliberately a weak man can, while he practically acknowledges and reveres God the ultimate end, act as if inconsequently in those things which, because they are not according to the order of reason, cannot be referred to God; and nevertheless, because they allow charity toward God and the threefold order (toward God, toward neighbor, in oneself) to be substantially untouched, they do not bring about aversion of the agent himself from God. Therefore the agent remains turned toward God, but his action is referred neither to God nor to another end simply and positively ultimate. Hence again there are had disordered acts without aversion from God.

II. And this is venial sin, which therefore can be defined: a voluntary disorder concerning a creature, without aversion from God. And at once it is also seen to be of twofold notion, since sin can be venial because of the imperfection of the act and because of the lightness of the object.

Sin which because of the very notion of the matter is venial, is such from its genus. Wherefore, when we are moving in a mortal genus of sin, yet in such a way that smallness of matter excuses from grave guilt, the cause of excuse is rather the imperfection of the act than the lightness of the object. That is, injury to another man is grave from its genus. But the small quantity which is taken away secretly, the small insult or detraction which is committed, cause the injury reasonably not to be judged perfect. Therefore the very quality of the action has been changed because of the modest measure of the thing. Therefore observe that the excuse is not formally quantitative but qualitative.

— Analogy of venial sin. Venial sin signifies another disorder, offense, and punishment than mortal sin; and therefore it is sin only analogically. It signifies another disorder, since it removes no essential order, so that it repugns God the ultimate end neither immediately nor mediately. It signifies another offense: for it does not constitute God an enemy; nor does one sinning venially prefer a creature to God, but only fixes for his will an immediate term diverse from the term which, God willing, it ought to have. Yet the command of God is not urged in the case under threat of enmity. It signifies another punishment, that is, a temporal one.

Wishing to express this, St. Thomas says that venial sin is not against the law but beside the law; but Scotus says that venial sin is opposed to counsel, not to precept. Scotus seems by the name of counsel to understand a norm whose observance is not necessary for salvation. St. Thomas, however, by his manner of speaking avoided every opposition with the definition by which St. Augustine defined mortal sin as something done against the law. In itself, the words can be explained in this way. If you consider the law of God all at once and as a whole, as the ordination by which man is directed to his end, venial sin, since it is not done according to an opposite direction, cannot be called contrary to it (cf. Cajetan in this place), but at the same time it is not according to the law; wherefore it is said to be beside the law: the sin is in the very mode of observing the law. St. Thomas himself explains his mind thus: "Venial sin is so called according to an imperfect notion and in order to mortal sin, just as accident is called being in order to substance, according to an imperfect notion of being; for it is not against the law, because one sinning venially does not do what the law prohibits, nor omit that to which the law obligates by precept; but he acts beside the law, because he does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends" (1, 2, q. 87, art. 1 ad 1). Hence the things we said above, n. 404 and 413, are confirmed.

— The evil of venial sin. Nevertheless venial sin is held in hatred by God, as something which repugns his infinite goodness; and, as long as it is not removed, it impedes the sight of God. It is an evil which, in its own order, transcends every physical evil, so that it cannot be committed for avoiding any punishment. It is opposed to the fervor of charity, because a man in whom charity perfectly dominates will do nothing which is not referred to the beloved God.

— The subject of venial sin. Venial sin, since it says an election not in agreement with the intention of the higher appetite, demonstrates an imperfect subordination of the lower appetite to higher reason. In innocent man, movements little deliberated would not have existed; and all things consequently would have been composed according to the deliberation of higher reason. Wherefore man, in the state of preternatural integrity, could not have sinned venially. Similarly the Blessed Virgin, because of the moral gift of integrity, must be said to be immune from venial stain. Where there is no discursive process, but all things are apprehended and sought in the principles themselves, venial sin cannot exist. For only a discursive process permits something to be proposed as good without order to the intended end simply ultimate. Therefore, not because light matter was lacking, but because of the angelic perfection of nature, an angel could not sin venially (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 89, art. 3 and 4).

— Criteria of venial sin. Let us distinguish venial sins which can be such although they are deliberate, from actions which are not venial except because of imperfect deliberation.

1. According to the things which we explained above, n. 413, deliberate venial actions will be violations of order which we can call accidental, because they allow the order of essences to be substantially untouched, or because they are opposed to positive law only in a light matter.

Those accidental violations of the essential order will be, in our relation of subjection to God, various negligences in fulfilling duties of religion which neither arise from formal contempt nor are so notable that they contain virtual contempt; in our relation to neighbor, they will be faults which harm him little, and do not reasonably remove the notion of friendship. Observe that these acts turn upon a thing which from its genus is grave, so that they are not light except because they are objectively imperfect.

In ourselves, on the contrary, there also occur acts venial from their genus: dissipations of things of which we have perfect dominion, which will not become grave unless for that reason a grave duty now cannot be fulfilled; so also useless and vain concupiscence (not however in a venereal matter), vain enjoyment, curiosity, superfluity of adornment and dress, trifles, idleness, excess in food, drink, sleep, use of marriage, fear, sadness, appetite of money, praise, etc. So also lies. For whether you consider the harm of error and of deception of the neighbor concerning my mind, since it concerns contingent truth, it is light by its nature; or whether you consider the denied communication of my mind, this of itself was not due; or whether you consider the abuse of the faculty of speech, since speech is immediately ordered to the good of the speaker, a lie does not break through the immediate order of the whole faculty, but badly refers to the good of the speaker the act or use of a faculty which is immediately ordered to that good; whereas in the abuse of the venereal faculty outside marriage, the sinner uses, against the immediate end of the faculty, for his own satisfaction, a faculty which is immediately for the good of the species; or finally whether you consider the social effect of lying, circumscribed by the false communication of my mind, which is not necessary, even by frequent falsity of this sort mutual communication and mutual trust are not notably harmed.

Yet the things said return concerning the necessity of recurring to external criteria.

2. Criteria of imperfect deliberation or imperfect consent.

Those criteria are taken: a) from presumption: if one is accustomed to be so disposed that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally; b) from the conscience of the agent: if, from habitual disposition, you judge that you would not have done it if you had fully apprehended the matter; if a God-fearing man doubts concerning his assent; if the spontaneous sentence immediately was "I did not consent"; c) from the state in which the agent was: he was half-asleep, very distracted, agitated by vehement passion, disturbed; d) from the mode of action: it was done with a very timid and as it were perplexed mind; while you wished to deliberate, the words had already slipped out of your mouth, the thing had already been done; e) from the incomplete action: he who could conveniently have executed the sin (for example, solitary sin), notwithstanding temptation, did not execute it. A certain distraction easily happens in fantasies less chaste, in detractions, and especially in sins in the cause, where effects, harms, dangers of others, fled the mind. "Recall here forgetfulnesses, ignorances lightly culpable, erroneous consciences from light negligence" (Ball.-Palm. I, tr. 4, n. 685).

Therefore let the confessor prudently ask the penitent, according to his capacity, whether he acted fully awake, whether after observing the malice of the thing he elicited no act against the temptation; but once the response "I remain doubtful," "I do not know," has been received, he will not insist too much, lest he become troublesome, but let him recur to presumptions; nor rarely will he have to commit the matter to the divine judgment (Genicot, I, 161).

— Passage to mortal sin. On the contrary, they say that venial sin or even an indifferent act passes into mortal, because of the depraved affection of the will or the effect of the action, by reason of the ultimate end, of an adjoined end, of contempt, scandal, danger, accumulated matter. With what truth these things are said will appear after an examination has been made.

1. By reason of the ultimate end: if one fosters affection for a venial or even indifferent thing (say a game, a person), not only intense but such that actually or virtually he would rather violate a grave precept than be deprived of those things.

Observe that habitual disposition according to itself does not suffice, because that to the committing of which he is prepared by habit alone is not imputed as anyone's fault. Otherwise, how many would actually sin who are so disposed that for a small cause they would neglect duties, commit shameful things!

If that affection betrays itself in grave guilt of commission or omission of which it was the occasion, it will be enough to accuse that grave guilt. If in no guilt, the sin is by affection alone.

2. By reason of an adjoined end: as if one lies lightly in order to extort copulation. Again, however, not the lie itself, which remains light in itself, but only the desire or contrivance of fornication must be accused.

3. By reason of absolute and formal contempt, whether of the Superior or of the precept as such: as if you refuse to be subject to the precept or to the Superior, which is the sin of consummated pride; if you are unwilling to do it because it is prescribed, which is the sin of formal disobedience: both gravely repugn the charity due to the Superior.

But contempt according to some respect is not grave of itself, when, the authority being admitted, one contemns only execution; when one habitually indeed wishes to be subject, but here and now in a small matter shakes off the yoke; when one contemns the Superior merely as unlearned, imprudent, imperfect; nor interpretative contempt, when the precept is violated because of another cause: anger, a depraved custom. And if the matter which gave occasion to contempt is light, contempt alone must be confessed.

4. By reason of scandal: if you cause a mortal ruin of the neighbor. Only the superadded malice, which is gravely opposed to charity, must be manifested in confession.

5. By reason of danger of falling into mortal sin, if proximate danger of grave sin is induced. The notion of proximate danger will be explained below, where the flight of sin is treated. In venereal matter, interior or exterior sensualities, venial according to themselves, can produce such danger.

6. By reason of accumulated matter. For if several small matters are morally joined, all are morally reputed as one, and grave matter arises. But they can be joined according to themselves, or according to the effects produced. According to themselves, as if you often steal a little and do not restore; if by intervals you omit several psalms of the same office; if on the same day of fast you eat a little rather often. But he does not sin gravely who on diverse feast days has worked a little, who daily in Lent has eaten a little or has determined to eat: these are not morally united among themselves. Nor does he sin gravely who on diverse days has violated a vow of praying a little something every day, or of giving a small alms. It would have to be answered otherwise if by small daily distributions he had wished to fulfill the execution of a vow of a great sum to be given. Nor are several vows which are to be fulfilled on the same day united among themselves. Hence he who, on one day, has violated one hundred vows of light matter, has not for that reason sinned gravely. - According to effect, as if, by repeated detractions, you render a person utterly hated.

— You ask whether or not matter, grave in itself, can become light, considered as a small part of a sum or of a total quantity.

This can indeed happen, but the cases must be prudently weighed. In the first place it is necessary that it concern a thing which is estimated quantitatively, as money, as prayers to be said. Furthermore, it is necessary that this matter belong as a part to the whole or to a certain universality. Hence, he who has vowed 100,000 is not judged, with one hundred notes omitted, to have sinned gravely against the vow or promise. In dividing a large patrimony, the largeness will cause things notable in themselves to be judged light by a certain tacit consent. Lehmkuhl, II, 269, thinks the same can be said of the omission of one Mass from one hundred owed for the same intention; but others do not admit this. Nor in strictly commutative contracts, as buying, selling, borrowing, do they concede that he who does not pay a sum grave in itself is excused from grave sin.

Observe that, in contracts concerning Masses, when one Mass is being treated, the obligation of paying one stipend is not grave, while grave is the obligation of celebration to which such a stipend is joined.

— What is called the will of committing all venial sins practically signifies nothing except a general remissness in avoiding venial sins. Remissness of this sort, negligence, although dangerous and very harmful in itself, for the most part is only venial, because toward mortal sin "it is only a remote disposition, unless some peculiar circumstances come upon it, which in some matter consummate a proximate occasion." Suarez, De Relig., tr. 8, l. 1, c. 4. So also Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 50; St. Alphonsus 4, 12 (as more probable), against Sanchez, In Decal. I, 5, 4.

— Deliberation concerning committing a mortal sin will be mortal, if it has been perfect, that is, if, fully adverting to the grave malice of the proposed act, you deliberately choose to remain wavering: for then you virtually judge that it can happen that a created good is reasonably preferred to divine friendship. But often it is only a certain negligence in expelling contrary thoughts and affections, which is venial. Lehmkuhl I, n. 347, 5.

— Venial sin itself perseveres morally until it is retracted. Wherefore there is also habitual venial sin. But in a just man there remains the principle of charity by which venial fault can be repaired; and habitual venial fault is contained by no real privation. Certainly, repeated venial acts easily generate a certain difficulty of acting perfectly; but that difficulty, which remains after the fault has been destroyed, is a certain punishment concomitant to sin, but constitutes no habitual sin. Moreover no stain properly so called follows venial sin. For venial sin indeed impedes the splendor which the soul obtains from acts of virtues; but, since it removes or diminishes no infused habit, and since stain signifies a habitual rather than an actual detriment, the soul is stained by venial sin only according to some respect, not properly.

— I. From the definition of the Councils, it must be held by faith that there are venial sins, which, as they are committed, do not constitute man an enemy of God, but are remissible. And it is certain that such sins are such by their nature, and not from the mere mercy of God. But it is disputed whether or not God could by positive will have made all disorders mortal. Venial sins are explained psychologically, both because we have semi-deliberate acts, and because we can deliberately act not consequentially to our preserved voluntary ordination toward God, the ultimate end, in things which allow the substance of the order to be untouched.

Therefore venial sin is a voluntary disorder concerning a creature, without aversion from God. That which because of the notion of the matter is venial is such from its genus. Because of imperfection, acts are venial, even in grave matter, when they are semi-deliberate acts, and those which, because of the slight quantity of this matter, are excused from grave sin.

II. Venial sin is analogically sin, since it signifies another disorder and offense than mortal sin, and brings in another punishment. It is said to be beside the law, not against it, insofar as it is not done according to the direction opposite to the law, that is, to ordination to the end.

III. Yet it is an evil above every physical evil, and is held in hatred by God, and impedes his sight.

IV. The subject is only man, who has a discursive process and imperfectly subject lower powers.

V. The criteria of venial sin will be: 1. Objectively accidental violations of order, concerning the mode of worshiping God and of preserving justice and charity toward neighbor. In acts which are not referred to others, sins venial from their genus are chiefly found, such as lying itself. 2. Signs of imperfect deliberation, to be taken from presumption, from the spontaneous dictate of conscience, from the state of the agent, from the mode of action, and from its incomplete notion.

VI. Venial sin properly does not pass into mortal. But things gravely culpable can come upon it: affection, an extrinsic end, contempt, scandal, danger of mortal sin, and sometimes accumulated matter.

On the contrary, a quantity which, separated, would be grave, can, as a small part of the whole, be held as light. Nor does the will of committing all venial sins seem grave. Deliberation concerning committing mortal sin is not always perfect, and therefore not subjectively mortal.

VII. There is morally habitual venial sin; nevertheless it consists in no real privation; nor is a stain properly so called produced by venial sin.