Title II: The Moral Specification of Sins

The usefulness of this title is both doctrinal, since a distinct notion of specification helps the understanding concerning sins not a little, and practical, since for the penitent and confessor some knowledge of moral specification is necessary for defining the obligation of sacramental accusation.

— I. Moral specification of venial sin. The question concerning the specification of venial sin cannot be doubtful. For in venial sin there is nothing except an undue conversion to a creature. Therefore specification will necessarily be made from the side of that undue conversion. Whether you say: specification is made from the object to which the conversion is made, or whether you say: specification is made from the disorder of that conversion, the matter falls back into the same thing: you only change what is said in the direct case or in the oblique. Suppose immoderate eating. If you specify by appetite for food, since the object is affected by privation, in estimating the object one will advert to the privation by which it is affected, or to the note of intemperance; if you specify by contrariety to the virtue of temperance, in estimating that privation, one will attend to that which remains of order in that appetite, that is, to the relation of food to the man for whom it is destined. Besides, every privation receives its quasi-species from the opposite form. That form is revealed by the object itself. Wherefore practically one comes to the same conclusions. St. Thomas himself admits this: if you prefer to distinguish sins according to the opposed virtues, "it would return to the same thing; for virtues are distinguished in species according to objects" (1, 2, q. 72, art. 1 ad 2).

Yet because disorder is not voluntary according to itself, while conversion to the object is voluntary, for the sinner intends to exercise an act of the will in such matter, it is better said that sins are specified according to objects. For a species is constituted according to that which is of itself, and not according to that which is per accidens, "because those things which are per accidens are outside the notion of the species." And therefore sins are distinguished in species from the side of voluntary acts, rather than from the side of the disorder existing in sin. Therefore, if we wish to speak accurately, we shall say that the species of venial sins are distinguished, more than by departure from the order which deforms the act, by the deficient goodness of the object.

And add this. If you specify by the object, from the beginning you exclude that error by which you might think that from the virtue to which the sin is opposed the ultimate specification is already taken; whereas several sins diverse in species are opposed to the same virtue, for example, justice. Thus homicide and theft are both opposed to commutative justice, and nevertheless are separated by no slight diversity of species.

— II. Moral specification of mortal sin.

When mortal sin is being treated, beyond the privation of rectitude which is detected in the object itself and participated by the agent, another privation is had, that is, aversion from the end, which follows in the agent upon conversion to a commutable object and is proper to him. For the ultimate end belongs to the agent, but not to the object as such. Now, if this privation specified mortal sin, mortal sin could not pertain to the same species as venial sin (cf. n. 393). Furthermore, since that privation is total, all mortal sins would be of the same gravity. But now, from the reason given above, mortal sins also are specified from the object to which the sinner turns himself. Hence they differ among themselves in gravity. And because they agree in the notion of undue conversion but do not differ infinitely, mortal and venial sins can occur in the same moral species (1, 2, q. 72, art. 5 ad 1).

The doctrine handed down is confirmed by the very names of sins in Sacred Scripture: those names designate positive acts. For example, St. Matt. 19, 19: "Evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies." Acts, however, borrow their species from the moral object.

— Rule. Therefore as many as are the morally diverse objects at which evil acts are terminated, so many are the species of sins. But they are morally diverse when they have a diverse repugnance with right reason and divine law; or when there is a diverse reason why they do not befit a rational creature. Cf. Vasquez on 1, 2, q. 72, art. 1, n. 14; Billot, De peccato, th. 2.

This rule is adequate; the others which are proposed either illustrate or apply it.

[Supplementary note to n. 428.] Nevertheless, it must not be passed over that complete acts and incomplete acts pertain to one perfect species of sin; but incomplete acts, as such, differ specifically from complete acts. Cf. S. Th. 1, 2, q. 72, art. 7, c. and ad 3.

— III. Practical investigation. Therefore practically it must be asked why the action is evil, or why it disagrees with the rule of morals. If the reason is positive law, one must further investigate for what end the law commands; if it concerns a particular precept, one must see by what title it has been given; if the obligation has been voluntarily assumed by vow, oath, promise, covenant, one must inquire of what genus the obligation assumed is. For actions which are not evil except because they are prohibited do not directly reveal their relation to the rule of morals. This is manifested by the end of the law or precept, if this flows from jurisdiction; by the title of the one commanding, if the Superior has only the domestic authority of a father or prefect of a community; by the moral intention of one voluntarily obligating himself.

Once this reason has been found, the ultimate species is not always yet reached, because, in moral estimation, the rule of morals is violated in diverse ways by action, by omission, by excess, by defect; and goods of grace, of life, of honor, of external possessions are related diversely to the person. Wherefore, certainly, sins which are opposed to diverse virtues vary at least specifically, but acts diverse among themselves in species are also opposed to one and the same virtue. Hence this insufficient rule must be used cautiously: "As many as are the violated virtues, so many are the species of sins." Thus idolatry, atheism, superstition differ from one another in species, although all three are opposed to the virtue of religion.

— Diversity of legislator does not change the species. Because laws do not obligate to formal obedience (by which one obeying wills to execute the precept because it is a precept), diversity of legislator (unless diversity of motive comes upon it) does not induce a special malice: thus sin against an ecclesiastical precept by which the divine precept is determined is of one species (say annual confession, paschal communion). In the same way, he is guilty of one sacrilege who violates the vow which he has as a subdeacon and as solemnly professed.

But several specific malices can deform one sin. Thus he who from the law of the Church, from a vow, from an oath, ought to assist at the same sacred service, fails by omission against a threefold specific obligation: for law intends worship to be offered to God; vow obligates lest you be unfaithful to God; oath, lest you invoke God as witness of falsity. This threefold malice of one sin is opposed to the one virtue of religion.

— I. The moral specification of sin, not only of venial sin, which is clear, but also of mortal sin, is made from the object to which the sinner turns himself inordinately, because from this side alone the act is voluntary of itself; therefore, when mortal sin is being treated, it is not made from aversion from God, the ultimate end, which is the same in every grave sin.

II. Therefore as many as are the morally diverse objects at which evil acts are terminated, so many are the species of sins.

Wherefore one must see why the action is evil. And furthermore it must be attended that violation of order by action and excess differs morally from the same violation by omission and defect. And according to the diverse relation to the person, the sins vary by which the person is violated either in soul, or in body, or in reputation, or in honor, or in exterior goods.

But diversity of legislator does not change the species, since no obligation of formal obedience is imposed.