Almsgiving

89. Notion. Alms strictly so called is defined: a bodily work which from commiseration is exhibited to one in need in order to relieve his want; most strictly: a thing which is bestowed upon a poor man from commiseration in order to relieve his want.

Therefore three things are essentially required to constitute alms in the strictest sense: a. that something be given or donated, that is, that the ownership of the thing offered be transferred to the poor man; b. that it be given to one in need; c. that it be given from compassion in order to relieve his want.

90. On the precept of alms. 1. From the divine precept, both natural and positive, and indeed one grave of itself, we are bound to give alms.

The first is clear both from the general principle of charity of doing to another what we would want done to us (were we placed in the same condition), and from the nature of private dominion. For although man has a true right over his goods, nevertheless this right, as secondary, is connected with the obligation of contributing from his goods to those who by their own labor cannot obtain for themselves the necessities of life.¹ The second is clear from many testimonies of Scripture: I command you that you open your hand to your needy and poor brother who dwells with you in the land.² Break your bread for the hungry, and bring the needy and wandering into your house; when you see the naked, cover him, and do not despise your own flesh.³ He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother have necessity and shuts his bowels from him, how does the charity of God remain in him?⁴ The third is clear from this, that Christ announces that on the day of judgment eternal damnation is to be inflicted upon the impious because of the sole defect of alms: Depart from Me, cursed ones, into eternal fire ... for I was hungry and you did not give Me to eat, I was thirsty and you did not give Me drink.⁵

2. In order that this precept of alms oblige, two things are required: on the part of the neighbor, necessity; on the part of the giver, possibility or superfluous goods.

a. Necessity according to degree we divided above (n. 75); but according to origin necessity is distinguished as involuntary both in itself and in its cause, and this is misfortune; voluntary both in itself and in its cause, and this is virtue; involuntary in itself and voluntary in its cause, for example, in weariness of labor, and this is vice. But one in need must be succored not only from misfortune, but also from virtue: for he suffers true necessity, and that from an excellent cause.

b. It must be declared in how many ways goods are called necessary and superfluous.

a. Goods necessary for life are those without which one's own life and that of one's dependents cannot be preserved, so that if these were taken away, someone would cast himself or his dependents into extreme necessity. Therefore goods necessary for life are also those which are required for feeding and educating children, or for sustaining a maidservant who is necessary to the family. Therefore goods superfluous for life are goods without which someone can sustain himself and his dependents.

b. Goods necessary to the state itself are those without which the state of life cannot be preserved, so that if they were taken away, someone would fall from his state.

c. Goods necessary to the decency of state are those without which someone cannot live suitably to his condition, so that if they were taken away, he could not preserve his state decently. Therefore those goods also are called necessary to the decency of state which are required for the honorable support of himself and of his household servants, for the suitable education and dowry of children, for suitable donations, for honorable customary banquets, for receiving guests, etc.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 5 and ad 2.

² Deut. 15:11.

³ Isa. 58:7.

⁴ 1 John 3:17. Cf. Matt. 25:34-45; 1 Tim. 6:17-18.

⁵ Matt. 25:41-42.

91. More accurate determination of the precept. 1. The neighbor constituted in extreme necessity must be succored from goods necessary to the decency of state: for a neighbor constituted in such great necessity must be aided even with great inconvenience.

a. Although alms must be given to the neighbor in extreme necessity from goods necessary only to the decency of state, nevertheless the obligation of giving even from goods necessary to preserve the state itself cannot be demonstrated, so that one would be bound to fall from his proper state: for no one is bound to preserve his own life with the loss of his state, or through extraordinary means.

b. We are not bound to take care that a sick person, who would soon die in his own country, be sent into the more healthful air of a distant region. A physician is not bound to perform an extraordinary surgical operation for preserving the life of a poor man. No one is bound to spend a large sum of money to redeem the neighbor from danger of death or of harsh and perpetual captivity.

c. In extreme necessity only so much must be given to the neighbor as is required to relieve his necessity here and now, unless it is an extraordinary matter; and indeed, if he is absolutely poor, it must be given to him gratuitously; but if he needs only the use of the thing, it is sufficient to lend it.

2. The neighbor constituted in grave necessity must be succored from goods simply superfluous: for ordered charity demands that we succor the neighbor in grave necessity if we easily can. Nevertheless this precept does not oblige the rich to give to all who come, but to some; nor to provide for their want entirely, but in part: for ordinarily they can presume that there are others who also are willing to aid.

Therefore physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to spend their work on the poor gratuitously, if these are found in grave necessity and cannot be helped by others. In time of famine the rich are bound to succor the poor suffering hunger, insofar as they can do so without grave inconvenience.

3. Those constituted in common necessity must be succored here and there from goods simply superfluous. There is no obligation of succoring some determinate poor person, nor generally all the poor; but there is an obligation of sometimes aiding, according to one's means, some indeterminate persons among the poor constituted in common necessity: for if individual persons give something, the common necessity is sufficiently relieved.

How great an alms is to be distributed by the rich in common necessity cannot be accurately determined. According to the mind of St. Alphonsus (n. 32), the rich who distribute a fiftieth part (two percent) of their incomes which are truly superfluous satisfy the precept of alms. Although this determination of several authors seems to lack a solid foundation, so that the rich who have goods simply superfluous are bound to more abundant alms where a greater want of the poor exists, nevertheless from it this is gathered, that the rich who spend some goods on superfluous uses or set them aside for increasing riches are not to be accused of sin.

92. Gravity of the obligation. The neighbor constituted in extreme or grave necessity must be succored under grave obligation; but a grave obligation of giving alms to a neighbor constituted in common necessity cannot be demonstrated.

a. No one denies the grave obligation of succoring a neighbor suffering extreme necessity: for if the precept of alms is grave of itself, certainly in the extreme necessity of the neighbor it obliges under grave obligation.

b. The gravity of this obligation depends especially upon the necessity of the neighbor; hence in the grave necessity of the neighbor a grave obligation of succoring urges.

a. With regard to the neighbor constituted in grave necessity, a grave obligation seems to be established with St. Alphonsus (n. 31) and most others: for from Sacred Scripture many are excluded from the kingdom of heaven because of the sole defect of alms; but if the grave obligation were restricted to the rare case of extreme necessity, many could not be excluded. Moreover, for the holy Fathers the obligation of giving alms is grave, as their testimonies everywhere among authors attest; but it is incredible that those texts are to be understood only of extreme necessity. Finally, authors agree in establishing a grave obligation of averting from the neighbor, if it can conveniently be done, a grave evil, for example, of extinguishing a fire set to a house, of restraining grave defamation; therefore also in this matter a grave obligation must be established.

b. If some rich man who possesses superfluous goods has the intention of never giving alms except in extreme necessity, of itself this intention is gravely sinful; nevertheless in particular cases a rich man of this kind who sends the poor away without alms will not easily sin gravely, both because of the difficulty of judging concerning the superfluity of goods and concerning the necessity of the poor, and because of the presumption that others are willing to succor, and because perhaps he assists the needy in another way, for example, by providing them an occasion of earning something by labor, and finally because he can fear grave inconvenience for himself from giving.

c. Authors dispute whether the obligation of giving alms in the common necessity of neighbors is grave or light; nevertheless, since the opinion affirming a grave obligation is not certain, but only probable, it cannot be established.

Those who, with St. Antoninus¹ and St. Thomas,² deny a grave obligation, argue thus: the obligation of succoring is as great as the necessity and want of the poor man; therefore, since the necessity is not grave, neither can the obligation of aiding be grave.

Yet there are those who establish a twofold title of grave obligation, not only the necessity of the neighbor, but also superfluous goods, so that the superfluous goods themselves induce a grave obligation of giving alms in common necessity. But since the grave obligation arising from this head is not evident, it is not to be established.³

¹ Summa theologica, p. 2, tit. 1, c. 24, § 5.

² Summa, II-II, q. 32, a. 5.

³ Cf. Laymann, bk. 2, tr. 3, c. 6, n. 4 ff.

93. On the care to be expended upon the poor (Armenpflege). 1. In the present order of things the distinction between rich and poor, as having arisen from the natural diversity of the powers of soul and body and from the different care of Christian virtue, will never be eliminated: For the poor you have always with you.¹ To soften this distinction and to reconcile the poor with the rich, the precept of alms contributes very much, and the care of the poor through works of mercy which has its origin from it, provided it is exercised fittingly. In order that alms may attain this end, first it must be bestowed spontaneously, not by compulsion, and then in such a way that spiritual misery is cared for while bodily misery is warded off. For since poverty often arises from vices, alms together with want ought also to remedy moral defects. But if someone is in need without fault, alms bestowed should render the poor man content with his lot.

2. The poor are called those who neither have the means of sustaining life themselves nor can obtain them for themselves by their own labor.

Those who by their own fault have come into a state of poverty are not to be excluded from the number of the poor, provided they cannot obtain for themselves the necessities of life; but those are not counted poor to whom the necessities of life are lacking because of their idleness and weariness of labor; concerning these are the words of the Apostle: If anyone does not wish to work, neither let him eat.²

3. The care of the poor is committed in the first place to private men and to the Church.

a. The common good indeed demands the support of the poor, but public power ought not to take care of everything which is necessary or useful for the common good, if in the community there are others to whom the care of that thing has been committed, and who therefore can provide better and more efficaciously for the necessary good.

b. For the precept of love of neighbor (He commanded each one concerning his neighbor) especially demands this, that we succor the needy, which Christ the Lord effectively commended by teaching that what someone has done to "the least" he has done to Him. The Church teaches by word and example the precepts of Christ and imbues the faithful with that spirit of charity and humility by which works of mercy are exhibited to the poor.

4. Since the circumstances of the time are such that neither private persons nor the Church can provide sufficiently for the poor, public power also ought to take their care upon itself and to assist the provisions for the poor made by both private persons and the Church.

5. Therefore care of the poor is either private or public; public care is either ecclesiastical or civil. In the present order of things the care of the poor pertains to the duties of the state; nevertheless private and ecclesiastical care will never be able to cease at any time. For civil care of the poor by itself alone cannot sufficiently meet the necessities of the poor, but necessarily needs the help both of private care and especially of ecclesiastical care. For this reason it belongs to the state to assist the Church in relieving the poor, but in no way can it arrogate the whole care of the poor to itself. Civil care of the poor, as it is ordinarily exercised, labors under several defects which prevent it from fully attaining its end. And indeed:

a. The offerings of individuals are not spontaneous but compelled. Hence it happens that for the rich they have the character of a tax, while the poor consider them owed to themselves by right. Hence in the rich Christian mercy toward the poor is lacking, and in the poor the spirit of gratitude toward their benefactors.

b. In distributing alms: a. temporal want is almost exclusively regarded, but moral defects are less cared for; b. Christian charity and mercy are neglected, whence it happens that the poor do not cease to envy the rich and to bear their lot with difficulty.

6. Since public power, both in communities (Gemeinden) and in the state (Staat), takes the means of aiding the poor from taxes which are paid by citizens either for the common good universally or specifically for the poor, the question has arisen whether those paying the tax (of the poor) satisfy their obligation of giving alms. a. These taxes have the character of true alms: for the civil law by which they are imposed is considered to oblige the rich civilly to fulfill the obligation toward the poor which rests upon them from the law of nature. b. By the payment of this tax the obligation of giving alms is certainly diminished, because the necessity of the poor who are helped from those taxes is diminished; nevertheless the obligation does not entirely cease, just as the necessity of the poor is not extinguished by the help received from taxes. Therefore private men are bound to aid those whom they know to be in extreme or grave necessity.³

One feigning himself poor does not become owner of the alms: for the giving of alms is essentially a donation whose motive cause is the want of the recipient; therefore when made to a fictitious poor man it is a donation whose motive cause is lacking, and therefore an invalid donation. Wherefore the recipient is bound to restore it to the owner, or to the poor according to the reasonably presumed will of the owner.

Nevertheless alms which are of minimal value need not necessarily be restored to those who gave them, according to the presumed will of the givers: for it is rightly supposed that the primary motive of the donation in alms of this kind was not so much the want of the poor man as love of God and neighbor.

¹ John 12:8.

² 2 Thess. 3:10.

³ Cf. Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., "Armenpflege"; Krieg, Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Freiburg: Herder, 1904, § 321: "Die kirchliche Armenpflege"; Ratzinger, Geschichte der christlichen Armenpflege, 2nd ed., Freiburg: Herder, 1884; Ehrle, Beitrage zur Geschichte und Reform der Armenpflege, Freiburg: Herder, 1881; Forstl, Das Almosen, Paderborn: Schoningh, 1909.

424. The right of one in need. Extreme necessity in the temporal order is that by which life is endangered.

1. He who is constituted in extreme necessity can, and of himself ought to, take from the goods of another as much as is sufficient for freeing himself from such necessity, unless the other is in the same necessity. The reason for the first is that in extreme necessity all goods are common (n. 368). The reason for the second is that each one is bound to preserve his own life if he morally can. The reason for the third is that extreme necessity gives the right of taking away another's thing; when this ceases, that right also ceases. The reason for the fourth is that in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better; therefore it is not licit to deprive him of his own thing to whom the thing is equally necessary.

a. It makes no difference whether someone is in extreme necessity from natural causes or from the malice of men, as if robbers threaten someone with death or perpetual captivity unless he hands over a great sum of money.

b. In a fire it is not licit to seize another's ladder to save oneself if the other cannot escape danger of life without it. In shipwreck it is not licit, in order to save oneself, to seize a plank already seized by another, which he needs in order to escape.

c. What is licit in extreme necessity is also licit in quasi-extreme necessity, which commonly is equated with extreme necessity, as if someone is in moral danger of falling into a lethal disease, of losing liberty, etc.

d. Another's thing can also be taken to relieve the extreme necessity of the neighbor: for what someone can do by himself, it is also licit to do through another.

e. Even if the thing which is necessary to one in extreme need is of great value (a great sum of money), nevertheless he can take it for himself. For since in extreme necessity all things are common, he has the right of taking whatever here and now is necessary for preserving life, even if it is of great value. Nor therefore does the right of the poor man cease because the rich man is not bound to offer him a thing of great price spontaneously. For to the right of the needy man of taking the necessary thing there does not correspond an obligation of the rich man of giving it, because the obligation of assisting and the faculty of taking from created goods those things which are necessary for the preservation of life are derived from a different source: the former arises from charity, the latter from the right of preserving life from created goods. To this right of the poor man there corresponds in the rich man the obligation of not impeding him from taking the necessaries.¹ Nevertheless Lugo seems to restrict the faculty of the needy person to taking only that which pertains to the ordinary means of preserving life: for just as he does not have the obligation of preserving life by extraordinary means, so neither does he have the right of taking them against the owner's will. - But although he does not have the obligation, nevertheless he has the faculty and permission of preserving life from created goods, from which follows the power of taking those things which are necessary.

2. In grave or common necessity it is not licit to take away another's thing, because in grave necessity the matter ordinarily concerns goods which nature did not wish to be common to all; but for preserving goods of this kind nature did not wish the means to be common.² Yet if in grave or common necessity the matter concerns preserving goods which nature wished to be common to all, it is licit for a poor man to take from the goods of another, if he cannot receive them by asking, as much as is commonly accustomed to be employed for preserving them.

A poor man constituted in necessity of this kind must first ask for the thing which he needs, because the owner is reasonably unwilling if it is taken away without his knowledge. But if the owner were unwilling to give it, or if the poor man could not ask without inconvenience, he licitly takes for himself a thing not of great value, a greater one indeed if the necessity is grave, a lesser one if it is light.³ Moreover, in cases of this kind there will be necessity at least quasi-extreme.

¹ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 159.

² Proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI has: "It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity." Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 160; Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 283.

³ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 156.

425. Obligation of the needy person and of the owner. a. The poor man ought to ask for the thing which he needs if this can be done, unless a just cause excuses from asking. But if he takes the thing without asking, he does not sin gravely; for since one in extreme need has a right in the thing itself, the owner can be unwilling only as to the mode of taking.¹

b. If the thing taken away is still extant when the necessity ceases, it must be restored to the owner: for the one in extreme need has the right only to the use of the thing if this alone was necessary; the thing itself remains the owner's. But if the thing taken away is no longer extant, one must distinguish. If the one in extreme need is indeed poor in fact, but has probable hope of receiving something afterward, he can take another's thing only with the burden of restitution; for it is not licit for him to take more than is necessary for preserving life. But if he is poor both in fact and in hope, he is held to nothing, even if afterward he comes to a better condition: for he who in extreme necessity takes another's thing makes it his own; but he who consumes his own thing is not bound to restore.

c. The owner, alpha. from charity, not from justice, is bound to give his own thing to one in extreme need. Therefore he who neglects to assist one in extreme need or hides his own things is not bound to restitution when the necessity has ceased. beta. From justice he is bound not to impede the poor man from occupying the thing and not to take away the thing occupied.

¹ Cf. Lessius, l. 2, c. 12, n. 66.

ALMSGIVING is here taken in a wide sense for any of the corporal works of mercy by which our neighbour’s necessity is relieved. Inasmuch as the law of charity binds us to help all who are in need as far as we can, almsgiving is obligatory by the law of nature. The obligation is frequently inculcated in Holy Scripture: ‘‘ Defraud not the poor of alms,’’ we read in Ecclesiasticus.¹1 Our Lord in severe terms enjoined on his followers the exercise of the works of mercy.²

¹ Ecclus. iv 1.

² Matt. xxv 41.

In order to measure as precisely as possible the gravity of the obligation of almsgiving, we must consider the necessity in which our neighbour is placed and our ability to help him. We are only bound to help those who are in real need; we should be fostering idleness and hypocrisy, and squandering on unworthy objects what is sorely needed by others, if we distributed our alms to the unneedy.

Theologians commonly distinguish three degrees of necessity, as we saw in a former chapter. Extreme necessity is the condition of one who from want is in danger of death or some equally serious evil, and who can do nothing to help himself. If in similar circumstances he can, though with difficulty, do something to help himself, he is said to be in grave necessity. Beggars and the indigent poor generally are in common necessity. These distinctions cannot be applied with mathematical accuracy; they are necessarily somewhat loose and vague, but they represent real differences which, broadly speaking, are capable of being appreciated without much difficulty, With regard to the ability of him who is called upon to relieve the needy, theologians distinguish between what is necessary to support the lives of a man and his family, what is necessary to support one’s position, and what remains over and above and is superfluous.

Except in the case of extreme necessity, which in ordinary circumstances is rare, there is no obligation to give alms out of what is necessary either for the support of life or position. Charity, as we have seen, begins at home, and it rather forbids us to prefer the needs of outsiders to our own and to the needs of our family. We are, as a general rule, only bound to give alms out of our superfluity, ‘“‘’That which remaineth give alms.¹ Some theologians maintain that this precept imposes an obligation of giving all one’s superfluous wealth to the poor; but others hold that this is only of counsel, that the precept is a general one directed to all the rich, and that it will be fulfilled if each gives something of his superfluity so that the necessities of the poor may be relieved by the common contributions of all. How much must be given according to this opinion depends upon circumstances, and is better left to the judgement of a prudent man after due consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

¹ Luke xi 41.

When our neighbour is in extreme or almost extreme necessity we are under a grave obligation of helping him even out of what is necessary to support our position in life, provided that it can be done without impoverishing ourselves or being compelled to give up our reasonable and justly acquired style of living. We are not obliged to pay large sums of money to ransom a captive from the hands of bandits, or to send a sick pauper to the Riviera for the winter; we should not be obliged to take such extraordinary means even to preserve our own life.

We are also under a grave obligation, according to the common teaching of divines, of helping the poor who are in grave necessity out of our superfluity. It is difficult to reconcile the words of Holy Scripture with any more lenient doctrine on this point.¹ However, we should be slow to decide that in any particular case a rich man has sinned mortally by refusing to help one in grave necessity. For although there be a grave obligation occasionally to help the poor in serious want, it cannot be concluded that a grave obligation binds any one particular person to assist all such; that would be an impossible burden. Furthermore, in practice it is frequently difficult to decide when a man is in grave necessity, and whether he will not be more conveniently helped by someone else. Besides, there are not wanting theologians who teach a more lenient doctrine as to the gravity of the obligation of assisting those who are in grave need.

A rich man cannot be excused from sin who makes it a practice never to give anything in alms on the plea that the poor can go to the workhouse, and that he pays his poor rates. For cases of grave and sometimes of extreme necessity arise where it is practically impossible to seek relief in the workhouse; and wherever there is a case of true necessity there is an obligation to help as far as one can.

¹ Matt. xxv 41; 1 John iii 17.

The rich are also under an obligation of sometimes helping those who are in common necessity, for the texts of Holy Scripture seem to refer to cases of ordinary need such as are commonly met with, and if no one ever helped the poor, their lot would soon become desperate. A man, therefore, who makes it a rule never to give alms to ordinary beggars certainly commits sin; he is not obliged to help all who apply, but out of his superfluity he must help some. It is a disputed point among theologians whether this obligation binds under pain of mortal or venial sin only. The severer view is the more common, but the milder is defended by many approved authors, on the ground that the necessity of the common beggar is tolerable, and is not so irksome as to impose on others a grave obligation of helping him.

I. Notion. Almsgiving strictly so called is a bodily benefit given to another in need from compassion. It is disputed whether it is an act of charity, or of mercy as a special virtue (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 30, a. 3; q. 32, a. 1).

II. The obligation of almsgiving is clear both from Sacred Scripture,¹ and from this, "that since love of neighbor is in precept, it is necessary that all those things fall under precept without which love of neighbor is not preserved; but to love of neighbor it pertains that we not only will good to our neighbor, but also work it, according to that saying of 1 John 3:18: 'Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.' But in order that we will and work someone's good, it is required that we relieve his necessity; this is done through the largess of alms; and therefore the largess of alms is in precept" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 5).

¹ Cf. Matthew 25:41-46; Luke 11:41; 1 John 3:17; 1 Timothy 6:17, 18.

III. Further determination of the obligation must be established with attention both to the neighbor's need and to the faculty of helping him (St. Thomas, ibid.; St. Alphonsus, II, 31). Hence:

1. "No one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the poor person were such a person on whom the safety of the republic depended.... And the reason is clear from the order of charity" (St. Alphonsus, II, 31).

2. One who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity must be helped under grave obligation even from goods necessary to one's state; this should be understood thus, that the obligation is to help him with inconvenience or damage absolutely grave, but not with very grave inconvenience. Hence one is not bound, in order to help one in need of this sort, to suffer loss or grave detriment of state; nor to procure for him things altogether extraordinary or very costly, such as migration into another more healthful region, or a great sum of money (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

3. In grave necessity there certainly is an obligation of giving alms from superfluous goods; but it is disputed whether the obligation is grave. Now:

a) The obligation is clear from the things said under II.¹

b) The grave obligation is drawn from Sacred Scripture; for words, for example 1 John 3:17,² by which privation of the charity of God is denounced against those who do not alleviate the necessity of their neighbor, are undeservedly restricted to extreme and rare necessity.

Corollary I. There is at least a light obligation of helping an individual man constituted in grave necessity "with moderate detriment of one's own state: because by a small inconvenience of his own he is bound to prevent a great inconvenience of his neighbor" (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

Corollary II. If several are pressed at the same time by grave necessity, and there is no obligation of helping all, one can help one before the others, or several in part. But if one pressed by grave necessity concurs with those constituted in common necessity, the former seems to have to be preferred to the latter.

3. In common necessity likewise there is an obligation of helping from superfluous goods. Here, however, it is more sharply disputed whether the obligation is grave. With St. Alphonsus (II, 32), it seems one must answer affirmatively. For first, Sacred Scripture, which under grave obligation prescribes that the poor be helped, seems also to regard the poor as they commonly occur, that is, those constituted in common necessity. Then from alms refused in common necessity grave evils would threaten the community, namely several would fall into grave necessity. But the grave obligation which we defend should be understood thus: that a rich person would then only sin gravely if he proposed never, or scarcely ever, to give alms except to one constituted in grave necessity (St. Alphonsus, II, 32). In addition, there is a light obligation of occasionally dispensing something to the poor constituted in common necessity from goods in some way necessary to state; in other words, one who does not have superfluous goods, but nevertheless has goods suitable to state, sins venially if he for the most part sends away the poor constituted in common necessity without any help. Finally, the described obligation of helping the common poor persists, even if in some place there are public institutes erected for the poor and the public authority helps the poor; for by those the common necessity is not extinguished.

¹ Note also proposition 12 condemned by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among secular persons, even among kings, will you find what is superfluous to state; and thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to state" (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1162).

² "He who has had the substance of this world, and has seen his brother have necessity, and has closed his heart against him, how does the charity of God remain in him?"

IV. Quantity of almsgiving. 1. In extreme and in grave necessity, so much must be dispensed as is required for alleviating the necessity, yet with attention to the moral faculty of the one dispensing, according to what was said above (St. Alphonsus, II, 31).

2. With common necessity considered, the matter depends on many things, for example on the necessity of the poor and their number, on public institutes, on the faculty of the rich person, etc. St. Alphonsus, for the circumstances of his time, held as quite probable that, generally speaking, "the rich satisfy the obligation by dispensing among the common poor the fiftieth part of their income, or two gold coins out of one hundred; but not in the same proportion if the riches greatly exceed" (II, 32).

What about the opinion of those who teach that all things superfluous to state must be spent for the support of the poor, or at least on pious works?

Response. We judge that that doctrine is not sufficiently proved, so that we hold the opinion of others as practically safe; all the more because the practice even of the God-fearing does not seem to agree with that doctrine.

Objection 1. Christ says in Luke: "Nevertheless, give what remains as alms: and behold, all things are clean for you."¹

Response. It is not proved that by those words a precept is understood, and not merely a counsel, namely, that all things may be clean for someone.

Objection 2. Leo XIII states: "Man ought not to have external things as his own, but as common."² Therefore at least superfluous things must be spent on pious works.

Response. Leo XIII states this one thing: that external things are to be held as common in this sense, "namely that someone easily communicate them in the necessity of others"; and these words do not legitimate the conclusion of the adversaries. To this is added that the Supreme Pontiff adds: "But when what is sufficient for necessity and propriety has been given, it is a duty from what remains to favor those in need."

Objection 3. The division of goods or private dominion cannot be to the prejudice of the end of goods, which is that they serve the necessity and utility of men. Hence things truly superfluous to someone must be spent on the necessity of the poor.

Response. The division of goods also exists for the security of oneself and of one's own; and goods can also be used for honest delights, although they do not precisely pertain to the suitability of one's state. These things posited, it is not clear that superfluous goods cannot at least partly be retained, both for greater security regarding the future time, and for greater honest delights.

¹ Luke 11:41.

² Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

V. Mode of fulfilling the obligation. 1. The thing which the poor person needs can be given as a loan for use or as a loan for consumption: 1. if the poor person needs only the use of the thing; 2. if indeed he needs dominion over the thing, but is not simply poor. It is otherwise if he needs dominion over the thing and is simply poor, that is, he possesses nothing either in fact or in hope from which he may repay. For, if ever, at least in that case the precept of almsgiving, that is, of gratuitous donation, ought to urge (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 5).¹

2. Alms must be made from one's own goods, but not from another's, unless in extreme necessity, if then one's own are not at hand. Hence: 1. "It is not lawful for boys, children of families, male servants, female servants, or wives to give alms except slight alms, in which the will of parents and husbands is presumed. But for particular cases in which a wife can give, see in its own place.... 2. Tutors and curators, and those who have care of another's goods, can make moderate alms from the goods which they administer: namely such as those persons themselves, whose goods they are, would be bound to make" (St. Alphonsus, II, 33).

3. The obligation, insofar as it arises especially from common necessity, can partly be satisfied by paying taxes, insofar as these are imposed for relieving the necessities of the poor. Indeed, the aforesaid obligation can almost be fulfilled by contributing a certain sum to a beneficent association. I have said partly and almost, because one who acted thus could nevertheless not be excused from every fault if he were to send away all who beg from door to door, and all the more if he were to send away all constituted in grave necessity.

Corollary I. Physicians and advocates must help the poor gratuitously, unless provision has been made for them through public expenses. But if special physicians or advocates have been named for the poor, it is lawful to refer the poor to them.

Corollary II. Often there is no obligation of giving alms to poor persons begging in public ways: "although from nakedness, disease, etc., they may seem to show signs of extreme necessity, rarely is one bound by precept to help, even from superfluous goods: both because that necessity is commonly exaggerated for moving spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others" (St. Alphonsus, II, 32). But alms should be denied to those who are in need from laziness and idleness.

¹ Hence the doctrine seems to have to be rejected which generally teaches that there is no obligation of giving alms if, by the thing being given as a loan for use or for consumption, or sold, sufficient provision is made for the neighbor's necessity.

External Effects of Charity.—Three external effects of charity will now be considered-beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal correction. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts pertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding—like love, joy and peace—from the same motive of love of God. (a) Thus, beneficence naturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is to do good to one’s friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways in which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a species of spiritual almsgiving.

Almsgiving.—Almsgiving is defined: “Assistance to one who is in need, given out of compassion and for the love of God.” Hence, this act pertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy, which means that compassion for misery is the immediate principle which produces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity, which means that love of God is the remote principle or end of an alms, for, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I John, iii. 17). (c) Secondarily, it may also be commanded by other virtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he performs an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor God, he performs an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the loss of what he gives, he practises liberality.

Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.—(a) Alms should not be given ostentatiously (Matt, vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying that they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given cheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).

Forms of Almsgiving.—(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift made without any obligation of payment or return; (b) in a wide sense, almsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a loan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in securing employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by the use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.

Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a) Thus, assistance given the poor out of a bad motive (e.g., to lead them away from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b) assistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (e.g., pity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor., xiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of God.

Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessaries given freely in themselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there are bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink, clothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to those who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b) Special necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external (such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or assuaged by remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the body after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the memory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is numbered among the corporal alms.

Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i, ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57 sqq.).

Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These acts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of mercy.

(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral, include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment, and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.

(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its consequences—that is, the offense given and the burdens that result for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).

The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority in the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed; hence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of time, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the instruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is a defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not every person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the correction of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be used, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where possible (Prov., xxvii. 6).

Comparison of Corporal and Spiritual Alms.—(a) Spiritual alms are better, because their nature is higher and they are of greater benefit to the recipient, even though he appreciates them less. Thus, it is better to enjoy peace of mind than to feast sumptuously. (h) Corporal alms are sometimes more necessary in a particular case, and hence they should be attended to first. Thus, for one suffering from hunger food is more necessary than words of comfort (James, ii. 15, 16).

Though corporal alms are not spiritual in the assistance they give, they are spiritual in their effects. (a) Thus, they bless the recipient corporally, by relieving his hunger or other need; (b) they bless the giver spiritually, since God will reward his charity (Ecclus., xxiv, 13, 14), and the person helped will pray for his benefactor (ibid., 15).

The Duty of Giving Alms.—(a) The natural law requires that we do to others as we would be done by, and there is no one who does not wish that help be rendered him if he falls into need. Moreover, the common welfare requires that the rich assist the poor, for otherwise there will be discontent and disorder. Hence, even unbelievers are not exempt from the obligation of almsgiving. (b) The divine law, in both Old and New Testaments, commands almsgiving: “Give alms out of thy substance, and turn not away thy face from any poor person” (Tob., iv. 7); “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry, and you gave Me not to eat” (Matt., xxv. 41-42); “Let us love, not in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John, iii. 18). Tobias, Dorcas, Cornelius, and Zacheus are praised for their charitable gifts.

Almsgiving, being an affirmative commandment, does not oblige for every moment of time, but only when right reason calls for it on account of the state of the giver or of the receiver.

(a) The state of the giver requires him to give alms only when he has a superfluity of goods, for no one is bound to deprive himself of what is necessary for his own use (see 1164, 1169). John the Baptist said to the people: “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner” (Luke, iii. 11). “That which remaineth,” says our Lord, “give as alms” (Luke, xi. 41).

(b) The state of the receiver gives him a claim on charity, when he is in necessity and unable to help himself. Temporal goods, according to the will of God, are for the benefit of the whole human race; and, while the ownership of particular goods belongs to the rightful possessor, he should not withhold the use of them from those who are in need, when he has more than he needs for his own use. Neither is it necessary that one be asked for an alms; one is obliged to give it when one knows that one’s neighbor is in want, though unable or ashamed to beg for help.

It is not a precept, therefore, but only a counsel, that one give alms in other cases. (a) Thus, when one is in equal need oneself and has no superfluous goods, one may give to another; (b) when one’s neighbor is not in need, or is able to help himself, one may still give to him out of charity, if he is deserving (see 1169).

Superfluities are those goods that remain over and above what are necessary for life, or the maintenance of one’s state of life justly acquired and socially useful.

(a) Necessaries of life are the goods one must have to provide food, clothing and home for oneself and one’s family. Among necessaries of life we may include what one has to set aside for old age, sickness, increase of family, and the future sustenance of dependents who will need it (II Cor., xii. 14). But they should not be extended to include imaginary cases, or all the possible cases of personal need that may arise in the future; otherwise, one is guilty of that exaggerated solicitude for the morrow which our Lord forbids (Matt, vi. 34).

(b) Necessaries of state are the goods a person must have to keep up his position and that of his family according to the standard of living of his class. This includes provision for the education and advancement of one’s children, for hospitality, adornment of home, and the care and improvement of one’s business; but it does not include provision for excessive pleasures or luxuries, or improbable future opportunities of bettering one’s condition; otherwise, even the wealthiest person might say that all his money was tied up and that he had no superfluous goods.

What is necessary for the decency of particular stations in life? (a) This does not consist in any fixed amount, for, even when considerable additions to or subtractions from a person’s wealth have been made, he may retain and support the same social rank. (b) It consists, therefore, in the amount sufficient for him to maintain, according to the opinion of prudent men, what is becoming in one of his class. Thus, one’s position may require that one do much entertaining or keep up an expensive household, or it may require only that one live moderately.

The giving in alms of goods for which the giver himself has need is governed by the following rules:

(a) Necessaries of life should be given away to another, as a matter of precept, if the common good is bound up with the life of that other, but not with one’s own life; they may be given away to another, as a matter of counsel, when the common good does not require it, but the higher good of virtue invites one to sacrifice one’s life for one’s neighbor (probable opinion). Examples: One should give away one’s last loaf to save the life of a leader on whom the salvation of his people depends. One may make the same sacrifice, if one is single and without dependents, and another is married and has a dependent family. But one may not give away what is necessary for the life of one’s family (I Tim., v. 8).

(b) Necessaries of state, at least in part (see 1251), should be given away to another, as a matter of precept, if the public good or the life of a private individual are at stake, or if that which is given in alms can be easily recovered and will now prevent a very grave calamity; they may be given away, as a matter of counsel, if the higher good of virtue invites one to embrace voluntary poverty: “If thou wouldst be perfect, go sell all that thou hast and give to the poor” (Matt., xix. 21). Examples: One should offer one’s fortunes in support of one’s government, if in some crisis the nation cannot otherwise be saved. One may give up riches and become poor in order to follow Christ in the religious life.

Superfluities of one’s state are the goods from which the precept of almsgiving requires that assistance ordinarily be given. But the mere fact that one has a superfluity does not oblige one to give alms. As in every virtuous act, so also in almsgiving there must be not only an object according to reason, but also circumstances according to reason. Hence, one who has a superfluity is bound to give alms only when the proper conditions of time, place, person, etc., are present. (a) As regards time, a person is not obliged to devote to almsgiving the time that is needed for other duties. (b) As to persons, a person is not obliged to give alms, if there is no needy person known to him.

As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:

(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or misfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial aid (e.g., professional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind, since they take what would be given to the really poor and needy. Rather they should be exposed and punished.

(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they take to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it profitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being able to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in idleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those who are voluntarily poor for Christ’s sake, whether they belong to a religious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to assist them.

(c) Those who are in real need against their will, should be assisted; for, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they are in fact unable to help themselves now.

Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and the duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a person obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled, in great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give back the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor, since the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b) If one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty, some moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may be presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums; likewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does not seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect a certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional beggars.

What is one’s duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute inquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often unwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases where one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow, since it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a worthy one be refused.

There are three degrees of corporal need (cfr. 1165). (a) A person is said to be in extreme need, when he is in manifest danger of losing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean, however, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his last breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid. (b) A person is in grave need, when he is in probable danger of death, or is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as severe sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter imprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to poverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in common need, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being obliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes or to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.

Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One’s State.—(a) To those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given in each individual case, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need have a personal claim on one’s charity when this is the sole means of saving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus saved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his money and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the duty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.

(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given from time to time—now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates—but there is no obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not give to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing that any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.

Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.—(a) For cases of extreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave. There is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the loss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help indicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and the levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were guilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.

(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of almsgiving, as it appears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to assist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving is inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms in common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is only light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are numerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a rich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common necessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this point.

From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn about the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need, (b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if one is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one’s ability to give the alms or the other’s need), or if it seems that others will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that one will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.

Refusal of Alms and Restitution.—(a) The mere refusal of an alms does not oblige one to make restitution. For restitution is the giving back to another of what strictly belongs to him, and it cannot be said that a poor person has a strict right to a gift from another. A violation of charity may be gravely sinful, and yet not oblige to restitution. (b) The refusal of an alms, if joined with injustice, does oblige one to make restitution. Thus, if by threats or force one prevents a starving man from taking the food that has been denied him, injustice is committed; for in extreme necessity one has the strict right to take what is necessary, and reparation should be made if this is prevented.

Alms given from ill-gotten goods are sometimes lawful, sometimes unlawful.

(a) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because they belong to another and the present possessor has no right to keep them, it is not lawful to give them as alms, for they must be returned to the owner. An exception would have to be made, however, for the case of extreme necessity, for in such a case the person in danger of death would have a right prior to that of the owner not in need. Example: It is unlawful to give stolen money as an alms to the poor, when one is able to restore it to the rightful owner.

(b) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because both giver and receiver acted against law and forfeited their rights to possession, the former has no claim to restitution, nor the latter to retention, and the goods ought to be devoted to alms. Example: If a simoniacal transaction is forbidden under pain of loss of the price paid and received, the receiver is obliged to give the money to the poor.

(c) If the acquisition was not unlawful, but the manner through which it was made was unlawful, the gain is shameful, but still it belongs to the one who has earned it, and may be devoted to alms. Example: Titus hired Balbus to work on Sundays. The violation of the Sunday law was a sin, but the labor given was serviceable to Titus and difficult to Balbus. Hence, the latter is not bound to give back the money, but may keep it and use it for a good purpose.

Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be devoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be irreverent to religion. Thus, the chief priests would not accept the “blood money” of Judas for the use of the temple (Matt., xxvii. 6), because the law forbade the offering of gifts that were an abomination to the Lord (Deut., xxiii. 18; Ecclus., xxxiv. 23).

The Proceeds of Gambling and Almsgiving.—(a) Profits made from gambling may not be used for alms, when one is bound to restore them to the loser. Thus, according to natural law he who wins money at cards or similar games from a minor or other person who has not the right to dispose of money, or who wins through fraud, must give back the winnings. Likewise, restitution is due according to some, if the civil law makes such aleatory contracts null and void; but others deny this. (b) Profits made from gambling may be devoted to alms, when according to law one has a right to them, as when one has played for recreation, with moderation and with fairness to the loser.

Persons who may give alms are all those who have a right to dispose of goods as gifts. Others who have no such general right (e.g., religious, wives, children and servants), may also give alms as follows: (a) They may give alms from any goods that belong to them, and of which they have the control. Thus, a wife may give alms from money which is her own, by inheritance, earnings, etc. (b) They may give alms from such goods as are placed in their charge and dispensation. Thus, the procurator of a religious house has the right to give alms with permission of his superior and according to his Constitution (Canon 537). A religious who is a parish priest may administer and dispense parish alms (Canon 630, Sec.4). (c) They may give alms with express or implied permission. Thus, children may give articles of food to the poor, when their parents consent. (d) They may give alms without permission in a case of extreme need. Thus, a wife could make use of her husband’s money without his consent, if this should be necessary to save a life.

The right of a wife to give alms from her husband’s earnings is as follows: (a) from the money given her for the support of herself and the family, the wife may give reasonable alms; (b) from the common money of the family she may give alms with her husband’s express or presumed consent. But, if he is miserly and unwilling to give alms, she may nevertheless use what is reasonable according to the family resources for almsgiving (e.g., in helping her impoverished parents).

The right of servants to give alms from the goods of their employer is as follows: (a) the rule is that servants have no right to give away anything that belongs to their employer without his express permission, for, if permission could be presumed, the property of employers would not be safe; (b) an exception to the rule is made for such things as are to be thrown away (e.g., leavings of the table), since if they are given in alms the proprietor suffers no loss.

Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as strangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from the benefit of almsgiving (Matt, v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and hence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:

(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to oneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on one’s charity is greater. Charity begins at home.

(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on the side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order of preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between helping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible, and who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was not of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was most deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the community, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.

(c) In case of two strangers in equal poverty, one should help first the one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a person who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who gambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings of poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.

Is it permissible for one appointed to distribute alms to keep some himself, if he is really poor? (a) If the persons are designated to whom the alms are to be given, the distributor must give only to them; (b) if it is left to the discretion of the distributor, he may keep a reasonable alms for himself.

The amount that should be given in alms has to be measured according to the income of the giver and the need of the receiver.

(a) As to the income of the giver, he should give in proportion to his income: “According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly a little” (Tob., iv. 9). A rich man who spends more in the barber shop on cosmetics, etc., than he gives to the poor, and a poor man who gives more towards alms than to the feeding of his own family, are not giving according to their means.

(b) As to the need of the receiver, a person should give his share towards providing for the case before him. Thus, if there is no one else who can or will give, and a neighbor is in grave necessity, a charitable person will bear the whole expense, as was done by the good Samaritan. But if the necessity is ordinary (as in the case of street beggars), or there are others who will help, a smaller alms suffices. Steady employment is a better charity than temporary doles, inasmuch as it gives permanent assistance.

Hence, in the following cases alms are excessive: (a) When, outside the instances given in 1231, one gives away all the necessaries of one’s life or station. The poor widow who gave all her living (Luke, xxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain enough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one gives from one’s superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled and encouraged to do nothing for themselves, For the purpose of almsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others enabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering and the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).

Regarding the obligation of giving all the goods of one’s station in life or of one’s superfluities, the following points should be noted:

(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is bound to give all the goods necessary to one’s state of life, since a neighbor’s life is a more important good than one’s own position in life. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for preserving one’s own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and so lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting workingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order to prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not obliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed for his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for ransom by bandits.

(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all one’s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is not obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently relieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities. Moreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing national wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.

Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a benefice to give all that remains over and above from the returns of the benefice, after they have provided for their own decent maintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as grave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of the clergy.

Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be contributed to alms?

(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute enough, according to one’s ability, either in conjunction with others or alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor is about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of charge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable lawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary that one provide extraordinary remedies or helps—for example, that one pay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health would be benefitted by the travel.

(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should give two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the necessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically, and that only the general direction can be given that one should be generous according to one’s means, and regulate one’s yearly alms according to the prevalence of poverty.

Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in need? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in slight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If one has ten dollars to give in alms, it is better to buy an overcoat for Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar bills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is equal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is alleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty is avoided. Example: Caius has $30,000 to give in charity and there are three deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are in great need—a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to divide his money between the three.

What is alms? Alms, generally, is an act of charity and mercy by which the necessity of neighbor is relieved. One kind is spiritual, another corporal, according as that necessity is spiritual or corporal. We treat here only of corporal alms. The principal question is concerning its precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32. Alms strictly taken, about which the speech is properly here, is the largess of those things which are necessary for the sustenance of life. But taken more broadly, it embraces any help whatever for freeing neighbor from bodily evil. Seven works of corporal mercy are listed: to give food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to lodge travelers, to visit the sick, to visit those detained in prison, to bury the dead.

A true precept of alms is given. - Proof 1. Ecclus. 4:1: Defraud not the poor man of alms; Matt. 25:41, 42: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire... for I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave me not to drink. 2. Because charity commands loving neighbor, and therefore bringing help to him in necessity. Struggl, q. 4, n. 40; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; E. M. 397.

No one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the necessity were of such a person upon whom the safety of the republic depended. Goods necessary for life are called those without which someone, and those whose care he has, cannot be or live. Therefore goods necessary for life are also those which are necessary for feeding and educating children, for supporting a maidservant who watches over infants or attends the sick. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. "That without which," says S. Thomas, "someone cannot be or live, either himself, or those whose care he has, ought not to be spent in alms," 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 4, q. 1. - 2. Because the right order of charity demands this. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 41, 42; Suarez, d. 7, s. 4, n. 6; Valentia, t. 3, d. 3, q. 9, p. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6.

Alms is to be made only from one's own goods, and those of which one has free administration. - For charity must keep justice uninjured. Nevertheless it can be done from the goods of another when neighbor is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, and cannot be helped from elsewhere. Then all things are common. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 7; L. 33.

Note: "When several know the extreme necessity of neighbor, all are bound to help by equal parts; if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one wishes to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and have refused, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact from the others their rated parts, or to compensate." Sporer, in 4 Pr., c. 6, n. 50.

Resolves: It is not licit to give alms from goods liable to restitution, e.g., things taken by theft; nevertheless it is licit from things acquired by an illicit work, but not with injustice, e.g., from meretricious gain. It is not licit for children, children of a family, servants, maidservants, to give alms except slight alms, in which namely the will of parents and masters is presumed. For this same reason a wife can make ordinary and common alms according to the custom of her condition; but not extraordinary ones without the consent of her husband, unless from goods altogether her own, of which namely she has both ownership and administration, and receives the fruits. Tutors and curators, who have care of others' goods, can make modest alms from the goods which they administer, such namely as those whose goods they are ought themselves to make; for they act in their place, yet moderately, since they must render an account of expenses. L. 33; l. 3, n. 540; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 7, 8; Struggl, q. 4, n. 49.

In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped even from goods in some way necessary to one's state. Goods necessary to one's state are those which we need in order to live honorably or decently according to our state. But these are the things which are required, according to one's proper condition, for supporting servants, receiving guests, honorable gifts, banquets customarily to be furnished, moderate pomp, the limits of honorable liberality being observed, common events also being considered, future necessity, and attention also being paid to the improvement of an inferior state and honorable ascent to a higher one. Those things which are necessary to one's state do not consist in something indivisible, but have great breadth, and greater breadth for a greater state. In some way, because if you ought to fall out of your state, you are not bound. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians; 2. because the order of charity requires this. For the life of neighbor ought to prevail over a good of ours far inferior. But the extreme necessity of neighbor is regularly driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. - La-Croix 201; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 42, 47; S. Th. 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4; a. 4, q. 1; 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6; L. 31.

In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous to life and state; indeed also, probably, from goods necessary to state, yet with very slight detriment to one's state. Proof of the first part. For the order of charity demands that we will and procure the good of neighbor when on the one hand neighbor is constituted in grave necessity, and on the other hand either no inconvenience results to us, or only a small one. "That which remains, give alms." Luke 11:41. Proof of the second part, by the same reason, but less validly; for simply a slight inconvenience is not really had in the case, but one fairly grave, since the matter is not about extreme necessity, but about grave necessity, which, attention being paid to the conditions of persons, often cannot be driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. Hence St. Thomas says that it falls not under precept, but under counsel. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6. But if that grave necessity of neighbor is graver, and almost extreme, then an obligation is present of making alms almost as in extreme necessity, from which it is little distant. - L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6; 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4, a. 4, q. 1, 4 ad 4; Struggl, q. 4, n. 45.

Resolves: Both in extreme and in grave necessity, as much must be given as suffices here and now for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who wish to help him. If therefore neighbor needs only the use of a thing, it is enough to lend it, e.g., if you lend clothing to one stripped by enemies, or a horse to one wounded, until he returns home. Nevertheless no one is bound to spend a great sum of money for freeing a poor man from danger of death, or for procuring extraordinary and costly remedies for him. For no one, attention being paid to the condition of his state, is bound even for his own life to spend as much in procuring extraordinary medicine for himself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; L. 31; La-Croix 215; Struggl, q. 4, n. 48; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 16, nn. 167, 168.

In common necessity, he who has goods superfluous to life and state is sometimes bound to give alms. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. Proof 2. both because each one is bound to love neighbor as himself, and because otherwise those poor persons would fall into grave necessity. Proof 3. For the Lord "commands all superfluous things to be shown to the poor, according to that of Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 87, a. 1 ad 4; Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter of 15 May 1891, on the condition of workers. - This indeed is a positive and general precept; and therefore then certainly it urges when "right reason requires," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5, that is, that we assist the necessity of neighbor. S. Th. ibid. Therefore the obligation is not of giving everything superfluous to the poor who are in common necessity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 40, 41, 43; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, aa. 2, 7; Quodl. 8, a. 12; E. M. 405.

Note: "Nevertheless there is not present (for laypersons) an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluity; but it suffices if a fiftieth part of annual revenues which remain be given... and if the revenues are richer, less than a fiftieth part." But this precept does not oblige all in solidum, but commonly all the rich. And if individuals sometimes give something, the common necessities of all are sufficiently helped. L. 32; H. A. tr. 4, n. 19; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 6, 10.

Does the precept of alms oblige under grave sin? - R. Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all. For then certainly a grave precept of charity urges. But in grave necessity, some probably and commonly affirm it, because since in Scripture men are frequently condemned for neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity. But others deny it, and this opinion seems to many at least extrinsically not improbable. Indeed S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6, in which he treats expressly of the precept of alms, requires on the part of the giver superfluity according to his proper condition and state, and on the part of the recipient extreme necessity. "Since one person cannot help all those having necessity, not every necessity obliges to precept, but that alone without which he who suffers necessity cannot be sustained.... Thus therefore to give alms from the superfluous is in precept, and to give alms to him who is in extreme necessity." These things in a. 5 c. And ibid. ad 3 the Holy Doctor repeats the same: "It must be said that there is some time in which one sins mortally if he omits to give alms: on the part indeed of the recipient, when an evident and urgent necessity appears... but on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous things according to the present state."

But in common necessity, others also probably and commonly affirm it, as is gathered from the sentence which Christ is about to pronounce on the last day through those words: I was hungry, thirsty, etc. For Christ would not allege hardness toward the poor as a reason for condemning the wicked unless this vice were common and frequent among men, which it would not be if there were no obligation from superfluous things to spend alms on the poor who occur. Confirmation from 1 Tim. 6:17, 18: Command the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate..., where those words, command and easily, seem to indicate a precept even outside grave necessity. And Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms. But others hold either that there is no obligation, or that the obligation at least is not grave, but only light; nor is this opinion without all probability. For the obligation of alms does not arise from the sole superfluity of goods, on the part of the giver, but also simultaneously from necessity on the part of the recipient, which in poor persons commonly occurring is very small: their condition is sufficiently tolerable for them. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 43, 45-47; Suarez, d. 7, s. 3, nn. 7, 10; L. 31, 32; S. Th. Quodl. 8, a. 12; 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; q. 71, a. 1; E. M. 407.

The general precept of alms from what is superfluous to life and state, according as it shall have seemed opportune to each one, can be confirmed by the natural order of things itself. For "those things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or divine right. But according to the natural order, instituted from divine Providence, lower things are ordered to this, that from them human necessity may be helped. And therefore by the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human right, it is not impeded that human necessity must be helped from things of this sort. And therefore the things which some have superabundantly are owed by natural right for the support of the poor.... But because there are many suffering necessity, and all cannot be helped from the same thing, the dispensation of one's own things is committed to the judgment of each one, so that from them he may help those suffering necessity." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 7 c.; Quodl. 8, a. 12; L. 32.

From the superfluous. The obligation of giving alms is not had from superfluity if necessity is lacking, nor evidently from necessity if superfluity is lacking; but from the superfluity of the giver and at the same time from the necessity of the recipient. For on the part of the giver "first it is necessary that each one provide for himself and for those whose care is incumbent upon him, and afterward from the residue help the necessities of others.... But on the part of the recipient it is required that he have necessity, otherwise THERE WOULD BE NO REASON why alms should be given to him." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5. Whence it is evidently clear that the obligation of giving the whole superfluity precisely by reason of the superfluity itself is not present. 1 John 3:17.

From the superfluous. Those rich persons who do not retain their goods idle, but spend them in completing pious or profane works, whether for private or public utility, which consequently also supply necessary support and even profit to many workers, already from those things which they have superabundantly help the necessity of others, and much better, as is clear, than if they distributed them once among the poor.

Resolves: If someone rich and abundant, without any reasonable cause, were to repel all poor persons from himself, he is truly in a bad state. Nevertheless absolution is not easily to be denied to anyone, however rich, who repels all the poor without alms, both because of the disagreement of authors concerning this obligation, and because of the difficulty of judging concerning the superfluity of goods and the necessity of the poor, and because of the presumption that others wish to help, and also because in the present payment of taxes someone also concurs in relieving the poor, for whom public hospices are appointed, and other works of public beneficence are exercised for them. Laym., n. 5; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 44, 50, 51; Diana, t. 4, tr. 7, rr. 8, 42; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71, a. 1.

What has been said about alms must likewise be said about all other works of mercy. Hence physicians, advocates, etc., are bound, generally and speaking per se, to devote labor to the poor gratis, because they are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others. If some evil is imminent to neighbor which can be averted without grave inconvenience, it must be averted, e.g., by removing the cause of damage, for instance fire from buildings, by denouncing the author of damage to be inflicted, by opportunely forewarning him to whom damage is imminent.

Lucretia, pretending that she is poor, burdened by numerous offspring, and has an infirm husband, although she has neither children nor husband, obtains a monthly pension of 60 lire from a certain noble and pious man. Likewise, pretending that she is near childbirth, she obtains a notable sum of money from a certain rich and fervent matron. Using other arts, she obtains other alms from various confessors whom she approaches, and from other priests; indeed she has also obtained a legacy from her parish priest.

Q. 1. Is there a precept of almsgiving? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 396 seqq. To the second: Lucretia sins gravely. The reason is that, with grave fraud, she accepted another's property in grave quantity, the owners being reasonably unwilling. For if these had known Lucretia's fiction, certainly they would never have given alms, and in so notable a quantity. Therefore Lucretia must altogether abstain in the future from such fraud, and she can no longer receive the charitable pensions assigned to her, and other charitable subsidies. Besides, she is held to restitution. What she received in notable quantity must be restored to the proper owners; since surely these are entirely known to Lucretia, and they would not have given alms in so great a quantity to other common poor persons. The legacy must be restored to the heirs or to the new parish priest, so that it may be distributed to another true poor person, or to other poor persons, since the legacy is pious. But moderate alms are to be restored either to the owners themselves, or to other poor persons, especially if they cannot be restored to their proper owners, I. M. 493, from the presumed will of the owners, that, if they had not given to this feigned poor woman, they would have given to other poor persons. She must also restore altogether trifling alms in the same way. Yet there are not wanting those who say that these alms of the least moment are not necessarily to be bestowed upon others, because the owners are less unwilling about them, and because it is piously presumed that the owner wished to give them principally on account of love of God and neighbor, and only secondarily for relieving the need of this or that poor person. Indeed these small alms are more easily given without attention to the persons to whom they are given, and all know that among begging poor persons there are not lacking those who are not truly poor. Elbel 283-285; G. 221, 222.

227. • I say: There is truly a precept of bestowing alms upon the needy. This is clear 1º from the natural law, namely from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity. Recall above concerning Charity, n. 221. - It is clear 2º from Sacred Scripture. For thus Eccli. 4.1: Do not defraud the poor man of alms; and Matt. 25.42: Depart from me, accursed, into eternal fire... for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat; I was thirsty, and you did not give me drink.

Rules ¹. - In extreme necessity, the neighbor must be succored even from goods necessary to one's state ²; for thus the right order of Charity requires, since the life of the neighbor ought to prevail over our good, far inferior.

¹ St. Thomas hands down the general rule (2. 2. q. 32. art. 5.), that something be considered on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient of alms. On the part of the giver (he says) it must be considered that what is to be spent on alms be superfluous to him.... But on the part of the recipient it is required that he have necessity; otherwise there would be no reason why alms should be given to him.

² Things necessary to one's state or becomingness are to be distinguished from those things which are necessary to life. Thus St. Thomas (4. Dist. 15. q. 2. art. 4. q. 1.): Something is called necessary to us in two ways. In one way, that without which someone cannot be or live. In another way something is called necessary to us which we need for living honorably or decently according to our state, for example, in the manner of nobles.

And this distinction has place both with regard to oneself and with regard to those whose care is incumbent upon someone. Thus St. Thom. (l. c.): But in each of the said ways something can be necessary to someone in two ways, either by reason of himself..., or by reason of those whose care he ought to bear. Therefore some are beside the point when they refer to the necessity of mere becomingness those things which are necessary for feeding and educating children; indeed also the support of a maidservant who either guards infants or watches over the sick would wrongly be referred to mere becomingness.

Now since superfluous is said of what is not necessary, therefore superfluous also is said in two ways: in one way, what is superfluous to one's state, namely that by the removal of which nothing is lost to the becomingness of one's state; in another way, what is not necessary to life, although it seems necessary to the becomingness of one's state. And from this superfluous there presses the obligation of succoring the neighbor in extreme necessity, but not from things necessary to life. For as St. Thomas has (l. c.): That without which someone, either he himself or those whose care he has, cannot be or live, ought not to be spent in alms.

II. In grave necessity, according to some, on account of the same reason, the neighbor must be succored from goods in some way necessary to one's state, or with moderate detriment to one's state. But according to others, probably, he must be succored only from goods which are superfluous to one's state or becomingness ³.

³ In reality there was scarcely any disagreement about this among the doctors. For they were proposing the question whether in grave necessity alms were to be bestowed with detriment to one's own state. Now 1º some, such as, for example, Valentia (Tom. 3. Disp. 9. punct. 4.) and Bannez (In 2. 2. q. 32. art. 6. dub. 4.), therefore affirmed, because they were discoursing about a necessity of this kind which in reality could be aided without the loss of one's own state. For as they reasoned, since the becomingness of one's own state according to St. Thomas (4. Dist. 15. q. 2. art. 4. q. 1.) admits latitude, so that by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his state, and by many things also removed the condition of his state is decently preserved; for this reason alms bring either no detriment or hardly any appreciable detriment (as Laymann says, lib. 2. Tr. 3. Cap. 6. n. 4.) to one's own state. Others, on the contrary, therefore denied, because they were speaking about that necessity for driving away which it would have been necessary to lose or certainly diminish one's own state; but they rightly contended that no one is bound to the loss of his own state. 2º Those who affirmed were discoursing about a necessity so grave that it approached extreme, or was to be equated with it; but those denying understood grave necessity insofar as it is broadly distinguished from extreme. Wherefore by the best right Viva (at Prop. XII from those condemned by Innocent XI, n. VIII.) according to this diverse acceptance of grave necessity calls each opinion both the more common and to be followed. Yet Viva's doctrine as to some part must be rightly understood.

For another head of controversy occurs here, concerning which you have the Doctors' opinions in reality especially discrepant: namely, whether the reason of grave necessity which otherwise does not tend toward extreme necessity induces an obligation, and indeed a grave one, of succoring a needy person certainly determined from superfluous things.

St. Alphonsus embraces the affirmative opinion (Lib. 2. n. 31.), and adds that it is clearly inferred from Prop. XII among those condemned by Innocent XI: Scarcely among secular persons will you find, even among kings, what is superfluous to one's state. And so scarcely anyone is bound to alms, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to one's state. But a proposition of this kind is too vague for that conclusion to be able to be inferred from it; and from whatever side it is considered, it plainly permits also the opposite opinion, which obliges one who has things superfluous to his state or becomingness indeed to distribute alms even outside the occasion of extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, yet does not impose the burden of succoring this or that particular person suffering necessity even grave. Whence Duarte rightly (Brev. Exposit. Propp. damnatt. V. Eleemosyna n. 222.) denies that this latter opinion is wounded in any way by the force of that condemnation.

Moreover if you inquire about the weight of authority, many say that the first opinion is commonly handed down by the Doctors. But if you yourself consult those Doctors, here and there you will find examples of necessity proposed which exhibit quasi-extreme necessity.

But if you inspect the force of the reasons, it must not be denied that each opinion is pressed by rather strong difficulties, so that at length it is lawful to conclude that this question is very obscure and most intricate. Concerning this matter, go to Vasquez (Opusc. De Eleemosyna Cap. 1. Dub. III.), who certainly ought to seem less suspect for this reason, that, inclining into the stricter doctrine, he does not hesitate to defend a grave obligation of alms in grave necessity of the neighbor even from things necessary to one's state, although the Jansenian treachery of Montaltius or Pascal did not hesitate to traduce him as the author of the aforesaid condemned thesis.

Therefore from these things you will infer that in this question that canon is finally to be summoned, that a certain obligation in so obscure and controverted a matter (see Sanchez, Consil. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Dub. 5. n. 39. 40.) can by no means be urged, all the more because St. Thomas also stands for the opposite opinion, as is plain also from the following Note, and Vasquez himself too (l. c. Dub. IV.), although against himself, is finally forced to confess.

III. In common necessity, although there is no obligation of giving alms to this or that person in particular, nevertheless, from the common opinion of the Doctors, he could not be excused from sin who, having goods even superfluous to his state, would never be willing to give any alms ⁴.

⁴ This is established against the opinion which in common necessity admits no obligation of giving even from things superfluous to one's state or becomingness; which opinion Bannez (In 2. 2. q. 32. art. 6. dub. 2.) attributes to Alensis, Gabriel, St. Antoninus, Turrecremata, and other Summists, and on account of their authority (ibid. Concl. 3.) calls it not improbable; but Peter Ledesma (Summ. Part. 2. Tr. 4. Cap. 3. Concl. 13.) calls it absolutely probable.

But what A. has here concerning common necessity, the same can be concluded concerning grave necessity with St. Thomas (Quodlib. 8. art. 12.): Supposing (he says) that someone has from the superfluous..., which he is bound to bestow upon the poor, either he sees in the poor person asking evident signs of extreme necessity, or not. If he sees them, it is certain that he is bound to give, and sins by not giving: for Ambrose speaks in this case: Feed the one dying from hunger; if you have not fed him, you have killed him. But if they do not appear, then he is not bound to give to the poor man asking: because although he is bound to give the superfluous to the poor, nevertheless he is not bound to give to all, nor to give to this one, but he is bound to distribute according as it shall seem opportune to himself. In these words it is plain that the obligation of giving alms on the part of the poor person is asserted only then, if his necessity appears extreme. But the superfluous from which the obligation of bestowing some alms generally is here drawn, must be understood of what is superfluous even to the becomingness of one's state, as St. Thomas clearly hands down both often elsewhere and in this place (In 4. Dist. 15. q. 2. art. 1. q. 2. ad 4.): The time to which the precept about making alms obliges is taken on the part of the recipient and on the part of the giver. But on the part of the recipient, because probable signs appear of extreme necessity to come, unless aid is given to him... But on the part of the giver, when a man has many things which he does not need either for the sustenance of his life and of his own, or for the decent preservation of his state, although the poor of extreme necessity do not appear.

228. Questions. - Q. 1º Does the precept of alms oblige under grave obligation?

Resp. 1º Affirm., in extreme necessity. - Thus all.

Resp. 2º Also affirm., in grave necessity which could soon turn into extreme. Otherwise, concerning grave sin, it is not clear, since the matter is subjected to controversy among the Doctors. But the precept of alms is in itself grave, and indeed also regards common necessity, since cases of grave necessity rarely occur. - Thus commonly with St. Lig. n. 32. ⁵, against Busemb. and many others.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 32.), as is plain, adheres to the opinion which stands for a grave obligation as if to the more common. But indeed, while he alleges thirteen authors for it, against the opposite, which admits either no obligation or only a light one in this, he himself enumerates seventeen, to whom others could also easily be added. Moreover, since from those thirteen whom he cites for himself, you have ten, namely Palaus (Tr. 6. Disp. 2. Punct. 2. n. 15.), the Salmanticenses (Tract. 21. Cap. 7. n. 17.), and eight others brought forward by them, who indeed fight for some obligation, but nowhere hand down that this is to be called grave; thence it is to be concluded that this opinion is not common, but that of certain few against the common.

Hence the same St. Alphonsus (l. c.) does not reject the opinion of Laymann, namely that a Confessor ought not easily to deny absolution to a rich man who wishes to give no alms in common necessities, since about this obligation, what sort it is, the doctors do not agree. And Sanchez, who otherwise (Consil. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Dub. 5. n. 37.) stands for grave obligation, at length (ibid. n. 41.) concludes that someone is not easily to be condemned, reporting these things from Medina: Because it is too difficult to judge to whom, and how much under mortal obligation we are bound to give; because it is uncertain by what necessary things can be distinguished from superfluous things; and what and how great necessity is required in the poor person; also how much is necessary to each one for nature and state; and whether the necessity of the poor person is true or simulated; and whether there are other rich persons who are willing to succor them; and many other things are uncertain, by ignorance of which they are not easily to be condemned. Compare Diana (Tom. 4. Tr. 7. Res. 8.), where, for the sake of a Confessor who was pressed by great straits in hearing the confessions of the rich, he excellently notes many things.

** Against this Note, VV. opposed not one or another, but altogether twenty columns (Pag. 152-161.). But to what end, it is scarcely possible to divine. For as to the hinge of the question, VV. could not deny those things which are contained in the Note, namely 1º that in St. Alphonsus himself are numbered seventeen (indeed in reality there are numbered twenty) who teach the contrary, and 2º that of thirteen brought forward for himself by St. Alphonsus, ten have not a word about the gravity of this obligation. Now is not even that one thing more than enough for establishing that the gravity of the obligation is not clear, and therefore from the common and certain canon it is not lawful for the Confessor to impose or intimate it? And although on account of the authority of St. Alphonsus we may wish to attribute probability to his opinion; but has not St. Alphonsus a hundred times inculcated that for imposing grave obligations a probable opinion is not sufficient?

But VV. are moved because in the Note it is said that St. Alphonsus's opinion should rather be called that of a few against the common opinion. We shall add some things about this also, which will be enough. And first of all, let it not be omitted what is to be judged about those three who remain from the thirteen alleged by St. Alphonsus for himself, and they are Holzmann, Collet, and Viva. Now 1º Holzmann (De Virt. Th. Tr. 1. §. 4. n. 177.) writes that the conclusion cannot be called simply certain. Therefore from here we have a mere probability of obligation. 2º Collet hands down things so enormous that even St. Alph. rejects them. For, considering the context, he indicates eternal punishment for one denying alms to a common poor person, unless by giving more to others you compensate what you denied to others (De Charit. art. 3.). 3º Finally Viva (Ad prop. XII. Innoc. XI. n. 10.) strengthens his thesis by four citations, of which three are certainly false, and perhaps even the fourth. Do authorities of this kind add weight to the thesis?

Let us come to the things which VV. oppose. And 1º they contend that those also are to be understood of a grave obligation who establish an obligation in any way, although they do not call it grave. The reason is that charity is a precept grave from its genus; and therefore only lightness of matter excuses from gravity of fault. - Resp. Perhaps these things could have force if authors had assigned no case of grave obligation concerning the same matter. But when, with various hypotheses made, some Author has already expressly established where grave obligation presses, and then moves a question about another hypothesis not against those who admit a light obligation, but against those who admit none (as in our case), and indeed asserts obligation, but, otherwise than he had previously been accustomed carefully to do, adds nothing about gravity, it is false that he is to be understood of a grave one; for he would not have omitted to note this also.

2º They note that in recounting those who teach the opinion of St. Alphonsus, St. Thomas was omitted, to whom they join Cajetan. - Resp. Let them produce, I ask, some words of St. Thomas or Cajetan where they assert a grave obligation in the common necessity of the poor. This surely they will never furnish.

3º Next they allege Suarez, Mastrius, Sporer, the Writers of the Society of Jesus as witness Croix, Reuter, Voit, Elbel, Charmes, Concina, Palaus, the Salmanticenses, Cajetan apud Gonet, Bannez, Peter de Ledesma, Tapia, Martinez, and finally Sanchez. - Resp. From all these, only five mention some grave obligation, namely Suarez, Sporer, Reuter, Voit, and Elbel; but the rest say that some obligation is present, by no means that it is grave. Moreover Suarez limits, unless someone should prefer to aid some grave necessity. Sporer (n. 66.) adds: The Doctors rightly warn with Laymann that a Confessor ought not easily or scarcely ever deny absolution to the rich who refuse to make alms in common necessity. Voit transcribes from Babenstuber, whom he alleges: but he omits that Babenstuber, no otherwise than Sporer, presently adopts the aforesaid warning of Laymann. Therefore altogether two remain, Elbel and Reuter, of whom the latter uses this magnificent (!) argument for his matter, that unless we are obliged under grave obligation in the common necessity of the poor, someone can easily slip from common necessity into grave necessity!

4º But, say VV., Sanchez alleges twenty Authors; Concina truly thirty-six; and finally Croix (n. 202.) confesses that the opinion of St. Alphonsus was commonly taught by the Writers of the Society of Jesus. - Resp. Sanchez (Cons. Lib. 1. c. 5. dub. 5. n. 36.) expressly says that the opposite opinion is quite probable; but the thesis for which (ibid. n. 37.) he alleges twenty Authors is this: The second, more probable opinion teaches that one is bound in common necessities: where there is nothing about a grave obligation. Likewise the thesis for which Concina (In Dec. diss. 6. c. 13. n. 6.) brings forward thirty-six Authors is of this kind: The rich are bound under precept to distribute superfluous things, both of nature and of person or state, among the poor: and here likewise you have not a word about the gravity of obligation. Finally, concerning the Authors of the Society of Jesus, Croix has these things (Lib. 2. n. 202.): Although the Authors of the Society commonly teach that the rich are bound in common necessity to give alms, etc., and again it is lawful to ask here: where in these is there a trace of grave obligation? Therefore let us conclude that from all that apparatus of twenty columns, which VV. elaborated with great zeal, scarcely two or three authors exist who can in any way be joined to the testimonies brought forward by St. Alphonsus, which are less firm of themselves.

5º Finally it pleased VV. to bring forward the things which Concina wrote on this argument against Antoninus Diana. - Resp. It is of no concern to us to dwell on these. For recently we saw that the thesis of Concina does not look to the gravity of obligation, but to some obligation or other. Therefore that dispute does not pertain to the present question.

Q. 2º What goods are judged necessary to one's state?

Resp. They are those which are required for sustaining servants, receiving guests, for honorable donations, for holding banquets according to custom, for moderate pomp according to condition, etc. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid. Q. 3º What quantity of goods is to be given to the poor?

Resp. 1º In extreme necessity, or necessity so grave that it can easily become extreme, as much must be given here and now as suffices for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who are willing to succor him. Yet no one is bound to pay out a great sum of money to free a poor man from danger of death, or to procure for him extraordinary and very expensive remedies ⁶. - St. Lig. n. 31.

⁶ Thence Palaus rightly says after others (Tr. 6. Disp. 2. Punct. 2. n. 6.) that although in extreme necessity of the neighbor you are bound to succor even from goods necessary to one's state, nevertheless you are not bound so far that you ought to fall from your state.

Resp. 2º In common necessity, a determinate quantity cannot be assigned. Yet more probably it seems to suffice to bestow the fiftieth part of those things which are superfluous to one's state. - Thus more commonly. - St. Lig. n. 32 and in Hom. apost. n. 19. ⁷. Yet certain persons contend that the twentieth or even the tenth part must be bestowed upon the poor. Thus Concina, etc.

⁷ Some, such as Roncaglia, Mazzotta, etc. apud St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 32.), express this measure as if the fiftieth part of annual revenues must be bestowed upon the poor; which rule, since it does not distinguish superfluous things from non-superfluous things, plainly sounds like something absurd. More clearly St. Alphonsus (Hom. Apost. Tr. 4. n. 19.) has it thus: Nevertheless there is not an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluous, but it suffices if the fiftieth part of annual revenues, WHICH REMAIN OVER, be given...; and if the revenues are richer... less than the fiftieth part. And the mind of the Doctors is plainly evident from the comparison of laymen with clerics, while they obligate the latter to bestow the whole superfluous from beneficial fruits, but laymen only to some portion.

Q. 4º Who ought, or are able, to make alms?

Resp. 1º Generally, only those who are true owners and administrators of their goods ⁸.

⁸ ** Yet alms can be made from another's goods when the neighbor is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, and cannot be succored otherwise. Thus with Busembaum St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 33.), who adds: But if you could have bestowed your own thing, and you gave another's, it seems that you are bound to restitution. Thus Croix (Lib. 3. p. 2. n. 434.) with Sporer. But in truth Sporer writes a little otherwise concerning this matter thus (In 4. Dec. Praec. Cap. 6. n. 50.): When several persons know the extreme necessity of the neighbor, all are bound to succor by equal parts: if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one should wish to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and refuse, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact proportionate parts from the others, or to compensate. Moreover, if at any time alms are made from another's goods in extreme necessity, one must beware 1º that these be superfluous to the life of the other; 2º that it not be that quantity which no one is bound to bestow even in the extreme necessity of another.

Resp. 2º Yet a wife can make ordinary and very common alms, according to the custom of her condition; but not extraordinary ones, without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has both ownership and administration and receives the fruits. - St. Lig. n. 33.

Resp. 3º Children can give nothing, except in very slight matters. Except unless they have their own goods, or goods permitted to their liberty from the consent of the father or by another title. But servants can give nothing without the express, or tacit, or prudently presumed consent of their masters. - St. Lig. ibid.

229. Resolves. - 1º The rich sin who always harshly repel the poor from themselves, and reserve all superfluous things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which has been mentioned above, cannot impede an honorable ascent to a higher state.

2º Foreigners or infidels who are in necessity are not to be excluded from alms, provided nevertheless the right order of Charity is preserved, and unless for a just cause a custom or statute has obtained somewhere of keeping traveling poor away from cities, so that namely they may be supported by their own citizens.

3º Yet there is no obligation of making alms to poor persons unwilling to labor, because they are not truly poor; indeed this would be illicit, as harmful to them.

4º Physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to devote their work to the poor gratis, because they are in true necessity, nor can they be helped by others. - St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 71. art. 1.

5º Those who live in cities where begging for alms is prohibited are not exempt from the precept of alms, because other means of satisfying the precept are not lacking, for example, by bestowing money upon collectors in Churches, etc., or upon Pastors or others placed over the care of the needy ⁹. But where the precept of succoring the neighbor in extreme necessity presses, the petition of the poor person is not to be awaited.

⁹ Where begging for alms is forbidden, the poor are accustomed to be supported by public stipends; and therefore whoever pays tributes has already contributed something to that end, which can more or less contribute to fulfilling the precept of alms.

790. Notion and obligation. (A) It is not enough to love all with affection, even enemies, but we ought to show dilection by effect and work through beneficence. This beneficence indeed, when exercised toward the wretched, is called mercy. Since the misery of the neighbor can be bodily and spiritual, some works of mercy are corporal, but others spiritual.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32; Suarez, concerning Charity, disp. VII; Billuart, disp. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 31-33; Bouquillon, n. 481-496; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 193-215; Bourdaloue, Sermon for the First Friday of Lent, on Almsgiving.

Here there is treatment of the former, while we shall soon speak concerning spiritual works, where we treat fraternal correction. Among the corporal works of mercy is counted especially almsgiving, concerning which there is a special precept, as has already been said; we must now treat it, in order to define how far it is commanded: concerning social works of charity we shall speak below. By the name of almsgiving, however, we understand any bodily benefit furnished to one in need from compassion, in order to relieve his want.

(B) That there is a precept of giving alms is clear from the preceding thesis; but how far it extends must now be determined. Now, in a general way, the precept obliges whenever these two things concur at the same time: true necessity on the part of the needy person, and moral possibility on the part of the giver, insofar as he possesses goods concerning which he can dispose: "There is some time in which he sins mortally if he omits giving alms; on the part of the receiver indeed, when evident and urgent necessity appears, and it does not appear that someone is at hand who may help him; but on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous things, which according to the present state are not necessary to him, as can probably be estimated."²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 5, ad 3.

791. In order that this may be understood better, a threefold necessity is usually distinguished: (a) extreme necessity, in which the necessities of life are lacking, or certain danger is imminent of losing goods more precious than goods of fortune, for example, danger of losing the integrity of members, health, liberty, chastity. To this approaches quasi-extreme necessity, when someone is in a very probable danger of losing life or one of the aforesaid goods. (b) Necessity is called grave in which the neighbor will very probably suffer notable loss of goods, or loss of state, unless he is helped by the aid of another. (c) Finally, that necessity is called common in which ordinary poor persons are found, who, unless they are helped, live a rather troublesome life, although they are able to provide the necessaries for themselves. - These things being posited, the following seem to be established.

792. Practical rules. (A) A neighbor constituted in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is to be aided under grave obligation, provided it can be done without truly great damage. For if charity at some time obliges under grave obligation, surely it does when the neighbor is in the aforesaid necessity. - Moreover, according to the order of divine Providence, the goods of the earth are primarily ordained to supplying the necessities of man; and therefore if the neighbor is in extreme necessity, he has a right to obtain whatever is necessary for his own support (De Justitia, n. 446).

Yet no one is bound to help his neighbor from goods necessary for his own life or that of his family: for there is no obligation of loving others more than oneself or one's own family.

Nor is there a strict obligation of using extraordinary means to help the neighbor; thus we are not bound, at our own expense, to send a sick man, who would die shortly in his homeland, into a far-off region, that he may find there a healthier air: for this is an extraordinary means to which generally no one is bound, even for the sake of saving his own life. - Nor is there an obligation of spending a great sum of money upon a poor man so that by an extraordinary surgical operation his life can be saved, both on account of the same motive and because today there are hospitals where these operations are performed gratuitously, or at least for a lesser price.

For those who are in the aforesaid necessity, strictly speaking, it suffices to give as much as is required to relieve their necessity here and now; hence if the use of a thing suffices, it is enough to lend it, without the thing itself being given: thus if the use of some vehicle or horse is necessary, there is no obligation of giving the things themselves. - When some family is found for a long time in quasi-extreme necessity, one and the same rich man is not bound to provide all necessaries to it, when there are others who can help the same; it suffices that he contribute a part proportioned to his resources. In reality, in present societies, there are many charitable institutions for alleviating these necessities.

793. (B) A neighbor constituted in grave or common necessity is sometimes to be aided from superfluous goods; and indeed under mortal sin when there is question of grave necessity.

The rich are not indeed bound to help all who are in grave or common necessity, but only some; nor to provide totally for their want when there are other rich persons who can help them; but they ought to bestow upon the poor, especially those constituted in grave necessity, a part of superfluous goods. "No one certainly," says Leo XIII,³ "is commanded to aid others from that which pertains to the necessary uses both of himself and of his own; indeed, not even to hand over to others that by which he himself needs to preserve what befits and what becomes his person: for no one ought to live unbecomingly.⁴ But when necessity and decorum have been satisfied, it is a duty to give to the needy from that which remains over: 'that which remains, give as alms.'"⁵

³ Encyclical Rerum Novarum, May 16, 1891.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 6.

⁵ Luke 11:41.

This obligation indeed is grave, since, according to the testimony of Christ, those are guilty of eternal damnation who refuse to give food, drink, clothing, and hospitality to the poor.⁶ - Therefore they sin mortally who never provide alms, or repel all poor indiscriminately.

⁶ Matt. 25:41-46.

794. But what comes under the name of superfluous things, and what part of the superfluous it is necessary to give, cannot easily be determined. Superfluous goods can be called those which are not necessary for the decent support of oneself and one's own.⁷ But everyone sees that these cannot be defined by a common rule: for many things are to be attended to in this matter: necessities not only present, but future, namely those which will probably occur, for example, from old age or incapacity for labor, from diminution of income, from increase of family, education and dowering of children, etc. He would indeed be imprudent who, for providing for future necessities, neglected moderately to increase his resources.

⁷ Theologians commonly distinguish goods necessary for life and necessary for state: the former are required for protecting oneself and one's own against extreme necessity, and what remains are called superfluous for life; the latter are called those without which someone cannot live decently and support his family according to his state, and what remains are called superfluous for state, or simply superfluous.

Besides, not all superfluous things are to be bestowed upon the poor; a certain part must be set aside so that industry, commerce, and agriculture may be promoted: for thus the progress of the whole nation is fostered, and the resources of the community are increased, and the poor are more easily relieved. Thus from the multiplication of railways famine becomes almost impossible in cultivated nations, because grain is easily transported from one region to another. - Today, moreover, there are many public works of beneficence instituted by private persons, the State, and the Church, in which provision is made for the necessities of the poor, orphans, the aged, and the sick; therefore those who pay taxes or contribute something in collections for pious works in some way fulfill the office of charity.

795. Practical conclusion. Therefore the faithful are altogether to be exhorted to bestow liberally a part of their superfluous goods upon the poor or upon pious works, without this part being mathematically defined: for exhortations of this kind, resting upon the words of Christ and the Fathers,⁸ have more force than a strict determination of a gravely incumbent duty, which often is impossible.

⁸ Besides the works of the Fathers cited above, cf. Bossuet, Sermon sur l'eminente dignite des pauvres, t. III, p. 117-136, ed. Lebarcq; Msgr. Pie, Inst. pastorales sur l'urgente necessite de l'aumone (Works, t. II and IV).

Moreover charity ought to be: (a) prudent, namely that it be done for one truly poor, but not for an idle man who simulates poverty,⁹ and that it tend to render the poor man capable, insofar as it can be done, of working and soon sufficing for himself; (b) and therefore sufficiently abundant that the poor may truly be relieved, and may be able to obtain not only the necessities for supporting themselves for the present day, but also the instruments of labor by which afterward they may be able to nourish themselves and their own; (c) swift, or prompt, that it may be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and desperation: "Say not to thy friend: go, and return; tomorrow I will give to thee; when thou canst give immediately";¹⁰ (d) as to intention, secret, humble, supernatural: "When therefore thou dost alms, sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be honored by men. Amen I say to you, they have received their reward. But when thou dost alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand does, that thy alms may be in secret; and thy Father, who sees in secret, will repay thee."¹¹

⁹ Today, in many regions, societies have been instituted to detect false poor, especially those who feign poverty in order to become rich; thus in France the society called Office central des Oeuvres de bienfaisance, 175 boulevard St-Germain, Paris.

¹⁰ Prov. 3:28.

¹¹ Matt. 6:2-4.

1. In speaking of alms in this Section we mean corporal almsdeeds. St. Thomas enumerates seven of these, namely: (1) to feed the hungry, (2) to give drink to the thirsty, (3) to clothe the naked, (4) to harbor the homeless, (5) to visit the sick, (6) to ransom the captive, and (7) to bury the dead. This division is based upon the various needs of men.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 32, art. 2: “There are set down seven corporal works of mercy, namely: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the stranger, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, and to bury the dead, which are contained in this verse: I visit, I give drink, I feed, I ransom, I cover, I gather in, I bury.”—Cfr. Franz, Drei deutsche Minoritenprediger, p. 30: “I gather in, I give drink, I feed, I ransom, I cover, I visit, I bury.”

That almsgiving is of precept the Angelic Doctor proves as follows: “As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our neighbor’s well-wishers, but also his well-doers, according to 1 John III, 18: ‘Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.’ Now in order to be a person’s well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs, and this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.”²

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 32, art. 5: “Since love of one’s neighbor is under precept, all those things without which love of one’s neighbor is not preserved must fall under precept. But it pertains to love of one’s neighbor that we not only wish good to our neighbor, but also do good (1 John iii, 18). Now, in order that we wish and do good to someone, it is required that we come to his aid in his necessity, which is done through the giving of alms; and therefore the giving of alms is under precept.”

Holy Scripture not only recommends almsgiving as “an acceptable sacrifice pleasing to God,”³ as a “religion clean and undefiled,”⁴ but emphatically stresses the duty of the rich to succor the poor.⁵ St. Paul traces this obligation to the teaching of Christ,⁶ who declared that all men will be judged according to the way in which they have performed the corporal works of mercy and that neglect of these works will entail eternal damnation.⁷

³ Phil. IV, 18; Heb. XIII, 16.

⁴ Jas. I, 27.

⁵ 2 Cor. VIII, 14 sq.; 1 Tim. VI, 17–19.

⁶ 2 Cor. IX, 13; cfr. Jas. II, 13; 1 Tim. V, 10; Tob. I, 20 sq.; IV, 17; XII, 12; 2 Kings II, 5.

⁷ Matt. XXV, 34–46.

To succor the needy is a duty of justice which man owes to God because He is the Father of all men and the proprietor of all temporal goods, whereas man is merely His steward. It is furthermore a duty of charity, because all men are brothers and children of God.⁸ “If you give to a poor man,” says St. Ambrose, “you do not share with him what belongs to you, but return to him what is his. For you have usurped what was given for the common use of all.”⁹ And St. Gregory the Great: “When we minister some necessary things to the needy, we do not give them what is ours, but we give them back what is theirs, thus complying with an obligation of justice rather than performing a work of mercy.”¹⁰

⁸ Mal. II, 10; John XV, 12; 1 John III, 17 sq.

⁹ De Nabuthe Iezrael, c. 12, n. 53: “You do not give to the poor from what is yours, but return to him what is his. For what was given for the common use of all you alone usurp. The earth belongs to all, not to the rich; but those who do not use their own are fewer than those who do. Therefore you return a debt; you do not bestow what is not owed.” (Migne, P. L., XIV, 747).

¹⁰ S. Greg. M., De Cura Past., c. 21: “When we minister any necessary things to the needy, we return to them what is theirs, not bestow what is ours; we discharge a debt of justice rather than perform works of mercy.” (P. L., LXXVII, 87).

The enumeration of seven temporal works of mercy given above goes farther back than the Middle Ages. It occurs in the writings of Lactantius¹¹ and St. Augustine,¹² though the latter omits visiting the sick.

¹¹ Epitome Div. Inst., c. 60 (65): “If anyone lacks food, let us impart it; if anyone naked comes upon us, let us clothe him; if anyone suffers injury from one more powerful, let us rescue him. Let our home be open either to strangers or to those in need of shelter. Let our defense not fail orphans, nor our protection widows. To ransom captives from the enemy is a great work of mercy, as is likewise to visit and refresh the sick [and] the poor. If needy persons or strangers die, let us not suffer them to lie unburied. These are the works, these the duties of mercy; if anyone performs them, he will offer a true and acceptable sacrifice to God.” (Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat., XIX, 746).

¹² De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, l. I, c. 27, n. 53 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1333).

a) Whoever has an abundance of material possessions (bona superflua statui), that is, more than he requires to live according to his station in life and to support those who depend upon him, is strictly bound to give alms according to his means.¹³ The exact amount which each one is obliged to give cannot be determined with mathematical accuracy. We may say, broadly, that every Christian is bound to administer his temporal possessions in such a way that his abundant wealth be employed for the benefit of his needy fellowmen, and actual want thus reduced to a minimum.¹⁴ If any man is in extreme necessity, i. e., in danger of perishing for want of the necessaries of life, every one who can is bound to give him food, drink, and shelter. This duty binds not only the well-to-do, but likewise the poor, even though its fulfilment may entail actual privation.¹⁵ The things required for one’s own immediate necessities, however, need not be given up to succor others.¹⁶

¹³ 2 Cor. VIII, 3, 14; IX, 8, 11; cfr. Acts XI, 29.—St. Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps., 147, n. 12: “We have many superfluous things if we keep only what is necessary, for if we seek empty things, nothing suffices. Brethren, seek what suffices for the work of God, not what suffices for your desire. Your desire is not the work of God. Your form, your body, your soul—this whole is the work of God. Seek the things that suffice, and you will see how few they are (Mk 12, 42). . . . Seek how much [God] has given you, and from it take what suffices; the remaining things that lie superfluous are necessary to others. The superfluous things of the rich are the necessary things of the poor. The property of others is possessed when superfluous things are possessed.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1922).

¹⁴ 2 Cor. VIII, 14.—Prop. damn. sub Innocentio XI, n. 12: “You will scarcely find among secular persons, even among kings, anything superfluous to their state. And thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving when he is bound to give from what is superfluous to his state.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1162).

¹⁵ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 32, art. 5 and 7.—V. supra, p. 164, note 3.

¹⁶ 2 Cor. VIII, 13.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 206: “In grave or extreme necessity, enough must be given here and now to relieve this necessity, unless there are others who are willing to come to their aid. No one, however, is bound to expend a large sum of money to free a poor person from danger of death or to procure costly remedies for him.”

He who refuses or neglects to give alms according to his means, when appealed to by persons in dire need, commits a grievous sin. The duty of almsgiving binds particularly the clergy, because their income is derived from the possessions of the Church, which, ideally, belong to the poor.¹⁷

¹⁷ 1 Tim. III, 2; Tit. I, 8 (φιλόξενος, hospitalis). Cfr. St. Jerome, Epist., 52 (al. 2), n. 6: “It is the glory of a bishop to provide [with resources] for the need of the poor. It is the disgrace of all priests to devote themselves to their own riches.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 533).

The question how large a percentage of one’s income should be devoted to alms, is decided by most theologians thus: We are not obliged to give to the poor more than the fiftieth portion, or two per cent., of what we have left over after defraying the requirements of life according to our particular station in life. Göpfert justly observes that, in view of the constantly increasing inequality of fortunes and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, under the capitalistic system, the traditional two per cent. can hardly be regarded as sufficient to-day.¹⁸ Moreover, as Linsenmann has pointed out, such mathematical calculations are unsatisfactory because the notion of superfluum, i. e., that portion of a man’s income which he does not need to support himself and his dependents according to his station in life, is extremely variable and therefore difficult to determine.¹⁹ “The amount of alms which each must give out of his superfluous means for the benefit of the poor,” says Schindler, “cannot be determined by any rigid formula. Attempts to fix the measure of assistance a man owes to the poor either by the total amount of his income or that which he has left over after defraying his living expenses, are unsatisfactory because they disregard the object of almsgiving, which is to help make the sufferings of the poor bearable. The poor we shall always have with us, but their number and the extent of their needs differ accord- ing to time and place. The larger their number and the greater their necessities, the greater will be the assistance required on the part of the wealthy. Hence it is impossible to lay down any more specific rule than: ‘The greater the need, the more alms we must give.’ Note that one is bound to give liberally only in case of extreme bodily necessity. In all other cases moderate almsgiving is sufficient. To oblige men to give liberally whenever and as often as they are appealed to by the poor, would be too onerous and impossible. For the same reason an individual, no matter how wealthy, is not bound to give to all the poor whom he has an opportunity to succor, but may, with due regard to the dictates of charity, help those whom he chooses, or contribute his share to public or private agencies that make it their business to alleviate want.”²⁰

¹⁸ Göpfert, Moraltheol., Vol. II, 7th ed., p. 40.—On the principle of “station in life” Fr. Ross says (Christian Ethics, pp. 212 sq.): “According to Noldin (II, p. 104), one is not obliged to lose one’s station in life in order to prolong the life of another. At first sight, this seems like a heartless doctrine. Why should not a rich banker whose station in life demands an expenditure of $10,000 a year, be obliged to help a poor laborer, even though the assistance does reduce him to the way of living of prosperous but small merchants? An analysis of the situation will show us why. If he would be obliged to, then logically those in a class below would be similarly bound, and the lowest class of self-respecting and self-supporting workmen would be so bound. This would mean, really, that no one had a right (in the face of a neighbor’s need) to more than what was necessary for his own life. But if that were so, there could be no progress among the working classes, their standard of living would always remain at the minimum. For only the recognition that, when a class has for a reasonable length of time actually attained a standard, that class has a right to this standard, makes us fix a minimum wage for an American laborer as greater than for a Chinese coolie. As far as bare existence goes, the American could probably get along on rice and fish if obliged to do so, but no minimum wage commission would ever say he had a right only to rice and fish. Yet we must admit that this principle can be abused. Extremely fashionable women, for instance, will think it necessary to spend $25,000 a year on dress in order to maintain their station. It is hard to fix a limit logically, yet limit there should be. I do not know of any better way of fixing it than by an application of the principle of social utility. As long as it is socially useful that there should be a station in life requiring a certain expenditure, so long is it justified. Thus a physician whose profession necessitates an office, a conveyance, a certain outlay for books, instruments, and so on; or a gentleman of leisure whose culture adds an invaluable element to a community, though at the same time it represents a certain outlay in money; these should feel no qualms of conscience because they do not give up this expenditure and with it their position in society in order to feed the hungry. In our nation, at least, the need of such sacrifices on their part indicates a social maladjustment for which they are not responsible, and which would not be remedied by these heroic methods. Mere social butterflies, however, have no justification, and they should be ruthlessly reduced—or elevated.”

¹⁹ F. X. Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 485.

²⁰ Schindler, Lehrbuch der Moraltheol., Vol. II, 2 (1910), p. 449; cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. II, n. 32 (ed. Gaudé, I, 328); Homo Apost., tr. IV, n. 19; Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 206.

b) Society, more particularly the State organized in conformity with the principles of the Christian religion, is in duty bound to make reasonable provision for the poor and needy of every class, the helpless sick, orphans, the mentally defective, the insane, etc., and has the right to impose taxes for public charity. Well-organized co-operation between Church and State would have these important advantages: (1) The means appropriated for charitable purposes could be more efficiently distributed and employed to better purpose; (2) It would be possible to exercise upon the poor and needy a wholesome moral influence by segregating the notoriously unworthy from the worthy and giving the slothful work instead of alms, thereby preventing idleness and vagabondage.

However, since the worthy poor often hide their needs, even a well-organized system of public charity must be supplemented by private charity, and each individual citizen is bound, with due regard to the public charity administered by Church and State, to participate in “ministering unto the saints,” as St. Paul puts it, by succoring the needy to the best of his ability. We must always remember that charity is not cabined within the limits of strict justice. Add to this the consideration that, in view of the existing class hatred between rich and poor, and in view also of the immense envy, indignation, wrath, and dissatisfaction that have accumulated among the so-called “disinherited,” it is, so to speak, a duty of self-preservation for the wealthy to pacify the needy by kindness and generosity, so that they do not join the radical proletariat.

2. Right reason demands that we give alms only from that which legitimately belongs to us. Hence a wife may, with her husband’s consent, give alms from their common property, and she should do so if the husband does not give in accordance with his means; but she may not give away anything that belongs exclusively to her husband.²¹ “A wife,” says St. Thomas, “who has other property besides her dowry which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms out of that property without asking her husband’s permission; yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much, she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of necessity. . . . For though the wife be her husband’s equal in the marriage act, yet in matters of housekeeping the head of the woman is the man, as the Apostle says.”²²

²¹ Cfr. Tob. IV, 7.—St. Augustine, Epist., 262 (al. 199), n. 7: “A married woman is not permitted to say: I do what I wish with what is mine, since she herself is not her own, but belongs to her head (Eph. 5, 23), that is, to her husband.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 1080).

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, q. 32, art. 8, ad 2: “If a wife has other property besides her dowry that is directed to sustaining the burdens of marriage, whether from her own earnings or from any other lawful source, she may give alms even without having asked her husband’s consent, but moderate alms, lest by their excess her husband be impoverished. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without her husband’s express or presumed consent, except in a case of necessity. For although a woman is equal to a man in the marriage act, nevertheless in matters pertaining to the ordering of the household, the man is the head of the woman.”—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 207.—On State philanthropy see Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 216 sqq.

Servants may not give away the property of their masters, nor religious the property of the institute to which they belong, without the consent of their superiors. Guardians or administrators of property belonging to others may give alms out of that property, but only to the extent to which the owner himself would or should do so.

With regard to the manner of giving alms note the following points:

a) Almsgiving, like every other act of charity, must be inspired by a pure motive, i. e., love of God and of one’s fellowmen,²³ not by ambition, vanity, or love of ostentation, nor yet by purely natural sympathy or commiseration, and least of all by the sole desire to rid oneself of beggars and their importunities. Purity of motive does not, however, forbid publicity, for Christ Himself performed charitable works in public, and demanded of His disciples that they follow His example. What He condemned was Pharisaic ostentation, inspired by the desire of gaining applause and praise. The motive of the giver should be so pure that, if it were possible, the heart would remain ignorant of what the hand was doing. “When thou dost an almsdeed, sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be honored by men. Amen I say to you, they have received their reward; but when thou dost alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth, that thy alms may be in secret, and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee.”²⁴

²³ Matt. IX, 36; XIV, 14; XV, 32; XVIII, 27; Luke VI, 36; 1 Cor. XIII, 3; Jas. II, 13.

²⁴ Matt. VI, 2 sq.; V, 16; 2 Cor. IX, 11, 13; cfr. 1 Pet. IV, 11.—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 147: “Nor is that liberality perfect if you give more for boasting’s sake than from mercy. Your disposition gives its name to your work; as it proceeds from you, so it is judged. You see what a moral judge you have. He considers how to receive your work; first he questions your mind. ‘Let your left hand not know,’ he says, ‘what your right hand does’ (Mt. 6, 3). He is not speaking about the body, but that even your kindred spirit, your brother may not know what you do, lest while you seek here the reward of boasting, there you lose the fruit of recompense. But liberality is perfect when one covers one’s work in silence and secretly relieves the needs of individuals: the mouth of the poor, and not one’s own lips, praises him.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 66).

The social conditions of our day render it particularly advisable that we do not hide our good works under a bushel. Our opponents proudly parade figures, and we must meet their attacks with statistics showing the good we do, thus confuting the enemy and at the same time encouraging our own in their charitable work.

b) We must give alms voluntarily and gladly, not reluctantly and because we are commanded to do so. We must furthermore give them in a spirit of genuine charity and not so as to make the poor ashamed of themselves or hurt their feelings. No act of mercy is pleasing to God and worthy of His blessing unless it is performed for His sake, freely, lovingly, and gladly, for it is the good will of the giver and not the size of the gift that merits celestial reward. A gift exacted by force is not an alms, but a tax or tribute.²⁵

²⁵ Ecclus. XVIII, 15–18; 2 Cor. VIII, 2, 8, 11 sq.; IX, 7; cfr. Mark XII, 42 sqq.—St. Augustine, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 143: “It is not enough to will well, but one must also do well; nor again is it enough to do well unless it proceeds from a good source, that is, a good will: For God loves a cheerful giver (2 Cor. ix, 7). For if you act unwillingly, what reward is yours?” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 65).

The only thing by which the free will of man can be influenced without the loss of liberty, is good example. Our Lord Jesus Christ became poor for our sake, in order that we might become rich. By giv- ing alms to the poor we honor Him who commanded us to be charitable for His sake.²⁶

²⁶ Matt. X, 42; XXV, 40; 2 Cor. VIII, 8 sq.; cfr. Ps. XL, 2.

c) Private as well as public almsgiving should be guided by a prudent economy, so that it may accomplish its object as effectively as possible. This is but another way of saying that alms should not be given haphazard, but with due regard to the needs of the poor and the fitness of the gifts distributed.²⁷

²⁷ St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 144: “It is noble to will well and to give with this intention, that you benefit, not harm. For if you think you should give to a luxurious man for the outpouring of luxury, or to an adulterer as the price of adultery, this is not beneficence, where there is no benevolence. For that is to harm another, not benefit him, if you give to one who conspires against the fatherland, who desires at your expense to gather ruined men to attack the Church. This liberality is not commendable if you aid one who prosecutes a grave lawsuit against a widow and orphans or tries by some force to wrest away their possession.” (P. L., XVI, 65).—Ibid., n. 149: “Disposition makes a contribution rich or poor and puts a price upon things. Moreover, God does not wish resources to be poured out all at once, but administered.” (P. L., XVI, 67).—St. Jerome, Epist., 58 (al. 13), n. 7: “What you possess is no longer yours, but an administration has been entrusted to you. Remember Ananias and Sapphira. They timidly kept their own goods; consider lest you imprudently pour out the substance of Christ, that is, lest by immoderate judgment you give the property of the poor to those who are not poor.” (P. L., XXII, 584).—Seneca, De Benefic., l. II, c. 16: “Let proportion be observed with regard to persons and ranks; and since virtue everywhere has a measure, that which exceeds sins just as much as that which falls short.”

The first rule is to give promptly, when the needy person can still be benefitted, for “he gives twice who gives quickly.”

The second rule is to give to the poor according to their actual wants,—much to him who needs much, little to him who needs but little,—food, clothing, or money according to what is most ur- gently required, and always with a view to relieve the spiritual wants of the poor together with their material necessities.²⁸ Quite often the most effective method of relief consists in procuring work for the unemployed, either directly or through public or private bureaus or agencies.

²⁸ Prov. III, 28; Ecclus. IV, 3; Jas. II, 13 sqq.—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 149: “God indeed is no respecter of persons, because He knows all things. But we owe mercy to all; yet because many seek it by fraud and feign distress, therefore, where the cause is manifest, the person is known, and time presses, mercy ought to pour itself out more abundantly.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 66).—Ibid., l., n. 158: “Age and debility must also be considered in giving, sometimes also modesty, which reveals noble birth, so that you give more to the aged, who can no longer seek sustenance for themselves by labor. Likewise bodily debility is to be helped, and that more promptly. Then if anyone has fallen from riches into want, and especially if he has lost what he had not by his own fault, but by robberies or proscription or calumnies.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 69).

Christian charity, be it further noted, comprises all men without exception, as God has mercy on all and “maketh his sun to rise upon the good and bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust.”²⁹ Yet it is not only licit, but advisable, to observe some sort of order in giving alms. Those who are most in need have the first claim upon our charity, and among them parents, children, relatives, friends, and those “who are of the household of the faith should be given preference.”³⁰ We may also make a distinction between those who are in need without their own fault, and those who suffer the penalty of sloth or negligence, so that the latter may be reminded of their guilt and thus benefitted, not only materially, but also spiritually and morally.³¹

²⁹ Matt. V, 45.

³⁰ Gal. VI, 10.

³¹ Gal. VI, 1–10; 2 Thess. III, 10–12.—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 148: “Perfect liberality is commended by faith, cause, place, and time, so that you work first among the household of the faith. It is a grave fault if, with your knowledge, a believer is in need; if you know that he is without resources, endures hunger and suffers distress, especially one who is ashamed to be in need; if he has fallen into a case involving the captivity of his family or calumny, and you do not help; if a just man is in prison and tormented by punishments and tortures because of some debt (for although mercy is owed to all, yet more to the just); if in the time of his affliction he obtains nothing from you; if at a time of danger, when he is being dragged to death, your money counts for more with you than the life of the dying man.”—Id., ibid., n. 150: “This liberality also is to be approved: that you do not disregard those close to you by kinship if you know them to be in need. For it is better that you yourself assist your own, who are ashamed to ask sustenance from others or to request aid from anyone for their need; not, however, so that they may wish to become richer by what you can bestow upon the needy, for the cause, not favor, takes precedence. Nor indeed have you dedicated yourself to the Lord for this reason, that you may make your own relatives rich, but that you may acquire everlasting life for yourself by the fruit of good work and redeem your sins by the price of mercy. Do they think they ask little? They seek your price, they strive to take away the fruit of your life, and they think they act justly. And he complains that you have not made him rich, although he wishes to defraud you of the reward of eternal life.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 66, 67).—Ibid., l. II, c. 16, n. 76: “It is clear that liberality ought to have a measure, lest largess become useless. Sobriety must be maintained, especially by priests, so that they dispense not for display but for justice. Nowhere is there greater greed in petitioning. The able-bodied come, those who have no reason save wandering come, and they wish to drain the resources of the poor, exhaust the fund, and, not content with little, seek greater things, catching the support of a request by the attractiveness of clothing and bidding up increases of gain by pretending noble birth. If anyone readily gives credence to these, he quickly exhausts the resources destined to benefit the nourishment of the poor. Let there be a measure of giving, so that they do not go away empty and yet the livelihood of the poor is not transferred into the spoils of frauds. Therefore let the measure be such that humanity is neither abandoned nor necessity left destitute.”—Ibid., n. 77: “Many pretend debts. Let there be an examination of the truth. They lament that they have been stripped by robberies: let either the injury establish credibility or knowledge of the person, so that they may be helped more readily. Support must be given to those banished from the Church if they lack the means of nourishment. Thus one who observes measure is miserly toward no one but generous toward all. For we ought to offer not only our ears to hear the voices of petitioners, but also our eyes to consider needs. Debility cries louder to a good benefactor than the voice of a poor person. Yet it cannot be that the importunity of those who cry aloud does not extort more; but there should not always be room for shamelessness [imprudence?]. He who does not see you must be seen; he who is ashamed to be seen must be sought out. Let him who is shut in prison also come before you; let him who is afflicted by sickness sound within your mind, though he cannot reach your ears.” (P. L., XVI, 123).

It is never permitted to give alms in such a way as to encourage idleness and beggary, for sloth is the beginning of all vice, and to support the vicious would be to foment crime and work injury to those really in need.³² Give to the innocent before you give to the guilty, but do not forget that the misery a man brings upon himself through his own fault is also a misfortune.³³

³² St. Basil, Hom. in Ps., I, XIV, n. 6 (Migne, P. G., XXIX, 264).

³³ Cfr. St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 159: “But perhaps someone may say: A blind man sits in one place and is passed by, while an able-bodied young man frequently receives. And it is true, because he steals in through importunity. That is not a matter of judgment but of weariness. For the Lord too says in the Gospel (Lk. xi, 8), concerning one who had already closed his door, that if anyone should knock at his door too insistently, he rises and gives to him because of his importunity.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 69).—Cfr. Weber, Armenwesen und Armenfürsorge, pp. 49 sqq.

That charity is often abused is undeniable; but this deplorable fact does not and cannot change the rule that wherever there is real need, we should hasten to give relief, regardless of whether the needy are suffering with or without their own fault. The frequently heard complaint that the poor are unworthy of assistance and ungrateful, quite often has its origin in a wrong method of almsgiving.³⁴ “If you wish those to whom you show favors to be thankful,” says Seneca, “you must not only give, but love.”³⁵ In our day charity has become a sport. Concerts, balls, bazaars, dances and theatrical entertainments are arranged for the ostensible purpose of helping the poor, but mainly for the sake of amusement. This sort of charity, as Ratzinger points out, does not reconcile the poor to their dour lot, but, on the contrary, embitters their minds and thus exercises a ruinous effect, instead of building up.³⁶ Christian charity is a sacred thing and should sanctify those on whose behalf it is exercised.³⁷

³⁴ Seneca, De Benefic., l. I, c. 1: “Nor is it surprising that among very many and very great vices none is more frequent than an ungrateful mind. I see that this happens from several causes. . . . We find many ungrateful people; we make more.”—Ibid., l. II, c. 17: “We generally make people ungrateful, and encourage them to be so.” (Opera Omnia, I, ed. I. Lipsius, Amsterdam, 1672, pp. 585, 586, 633.)

³⁵ Seneca, op. cit., l. II, c. 11: “If you wish to have those whom you oblige grateful, you must not only give, but love. Above all, as I have said, let us spare their ears: admonition causes weariness, reproach causes hatred. Nothing is so much to be avoided in giving a benefit as pride. What need is there of arrogance in one’s countenance? What need of swelling words? The thing itself exalts you. Empty boasting must be removed let the deeds speak while we are silent. A benefit given proudly is not only thankless but hateful.” (Ibid., 626).

³⁶ Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 477 sq.

³⁷ Cfr. 2 Cor. IX, 5; Jas. I, 27.

Entertainments and amusements held for charitable purposes, however, may serve a good end and, therefore, should not be unreservedly condemned as anti-social, much less as immoral. Amusements are not per se sinful, but may be ennobled by a good motive and the spirit of sacrifice. By arranging such entertainments for charitable purposes (provided they contain nothing objectionable on other grounds,) the rich show that they have a heart for the poor,³⁸ though it would be a mistake to think that they can acquit themselves of their duty towards the poor solely by attending “charity balls” and similar affairs.

³⁸ Cfr. Gal. II, 1.

It has been asserted³⁹ that the early Church encouraged, nay demanded, indiscriminate and uncritical almsgiving. This is not so. The Didache says: “Let thine alms sweat in thine hands until thou knowest to whom thou art giving,”⁴⁰ and this saying is quoted approvingly by St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, Cassiodorius, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Abélard, Cardinal Hugh a S.

³⁹ Harnack, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 130; E. Grimm, Die Ethik Jesu, Hamburg 1903, p. 104.

⁴⁰ Doctr. XII Apost., c. 1, 6: “Let your alms sweat into your hands until you know to whom you give.” (F. X. Funk, Patr. Apost., I, 2nd ed., 6, 7).

Chiara, and other theologians.⁴¹ Not a few ecclesiastical writers expressly warn the faithful against indiscriminate and thoughtless almsgiving and admonish them to exercise prudence and pay due attention to the necessity and worthiness of those whom they succor, and to the circumstances of each case. St. Basil, for example, says that it requires considerable experience to distinguish between greedy and worthy beggars, and that while a good Christian should lend a ready ear to requests for assistance, he should, on the other hand, prudently investigate whether those who ask for help really need it.⁴² St. Ambrose lays down definite rules for almsgiving, paying due consideration to age, capacity for work, position, guilt or innocence on the part of applicants.⁴³ St. Jerome seems to favor indiscriminate giving,⁴⁴ yet he expressly warns against foolish extravagance and praises St. Paula for prudently measuring her gifts and distributing her alms according to actual needs.⁴⁵

⁴¹ See the quotations in Funk, Patr. Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 6.—Cfr. Foerstl, Das Almosen, pp. 39 sqq.; F. Schaub, Die kath. Charitas und ihre Gegner, M. Gladbach 1909, pp. 142 sqq.

⁴² Epist., 150, n. 3: “For he said that discernment between the person truly in need and the one asking out of greed requires experience. And he who gives to the afflicted gives to the Lord and will receive the reward from Him; but he who provides for everyone who goes about begging has thrown his gift to every dog—burdensomely because of shamelessness, not pitiably because of need.” (Migne, P. G. XXXII, 605); Homil. in Ps., 14, n. 6: “He wishes you, because of love, to be open in simplicity toward those who ask, but again by reason to distinguish the need of each of those who approach.” (P. G., XXIX, 263 sq.).

⁴³ V. supra, p. 185, n. 27; p. 186, notes 28 and 31.

⁴⁴ In Eccle., c. 11: “He exhorts to almsgiving, because one must give to everyone who asks and do good without discrimination.” (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 1101).

⁴⁵ Epist., 58 (al. 13), n. 7 (v. supra, p. 184, note 27); Epist., 108 (al. 27), n. 16: “Most matrons are accustomed to bestow gifts upon their trumpeters and, having poured out largess upon a few, to withdraw their hand from the rest: that fault was altogether absent from her [St. Paula]. For she divided her money among individuals according as it was necessary for each, not for luxury, but for necessity. No poor person returned from her empty-handed. She achieved this not by the magnitude of her riches, but by prudence in dispensing.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 892).

The first clearly developed theory of public poor relief was developed by the famous Spanish humanist and pedagogue Juan Luis Vives (+ 1540), author of a famous treatise, “De Subventione Pauperum,” in which “he proscribes mendicancy, expels poor strangers from the city, obliges the natives to work, recommends apprenticeship for those who have no trade, advocates asylums for the insane, schools for foundlings from the age of six, and provides for the administration of all this by voluntary gifts, the sale of the products of the labor of the poor, the revenues of the hospitals, and taxes on rich ecclesiastical communities. Ypres put these ideas into practice. . . . Other cities followed this example.”⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XV, pp. 492 sq.

3. BLESSINGS AND FRUITS OF ALMSGIVING.—Regarding the matter from the purely economic point of view, it might be expected that almsgiving would diminish a man’s wealth, nay, if indulged in on too large a scale, would even make him poor. But this is not the case. “Almsgiving never yet made a man poor,” says an ancient proverb.⁴⁷ Holy Scripture in many passages both of the Old and the New Testament teaches that almsgiving brings down blessings upon the giver.⁴⁸ The true Catholic does not fear or or worry, for he knows from Divine Revelation that God rewards every act of mercy and kindness, and that almsgiving brings not only mediate but also immediate blessings. The poor pray for their benefactors.⁴⁹ Almsgiving, moreover, belongs to the good works par excellence and is an opus satisfactorium et meritorium, by which a man can make satisfaction to God for his sins,⁵⁰ and through which he can obtain remission of temporal penalties, innumerable graces, and, finally, a merciful judgment and eternal salvation.⁵¹ Nor does it make any difference how large or how small the alms are, for God rewards the cup of cold water given in His name, the mite of the poor widow, nay, even the good will that remains inoperative for lack of means. Thus even the poor can give alms if they but have a good will.⁵² “If thou have much, give abun- dantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly a little.”⁵³ Since, therefore, it is good and meritorious to give alms out of one’s superfluous wealth,⁵⁴ it is still more meritorious to give away all one’s possessions and become absolutely poor for Christ’s sake, that is, to practice the voluntary poverty recommended in the Gospel.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ C. F. O’Leary, Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases, St. Louis 1907, p. 45.

⁴⁸ Ps. XL, 2; Prov. XI, 24; XIX, 17; Eccles. XI, 1; Matt. V, 7; Luke VI, 35; Acts XX, 35.—St. Cyprian, De Opere et Eleemosyn., c. 9: “But you fear and are afraid that, if you begin to perform many works, when your patrimony has been exhausted by abundant working you may perhaps be reduced to want. In this matter be fearless; be secure. That from which expenditure is made for the uses of Christ, from which a heavenly work is celebrated, cannot be exhausted.” (Corp. Script. Eccl. Lat., III, Vienna 1868, P. 1, p. 380).—Ibid., c. 10: “You fear lest perhaps your patrimony fail if you begin —to work generously from it, and you do not know, wretched man, that while you fear lest your household property fail, life itself and salvation fail; and while you attend to the possibility that anything of your property might be diminished, you do not consider that you yourself are diminished, being a lover of mammon more than of your soul; and while you fear lest you lose your patrimony for your own sake, you yourself perish for the sake of your patrimony.” (C. S. E. L., III, 381).—Ibid., c. 11: “You fear lest perhaps your patrimony fail if you begin to work generously from it? For when has it happened that resources could fail a just man? Elias is fed in solitude by ministering ravens, and for Daniel, shut by the king’s command in the lions’ pit [as prey], a meal divinely appears; and do you fear lest nourishment be lacking to one who works and merits the Lord? . . . God feeds birds and daily nourishment is furnished to sparrows (Mt. vi, 26), and those who have no perception of a divine thing lack neither drink nor food: do you think that anything will be lacking to a Christian, to a servant of God, to one devoted to good works, to one dear to his Lord? Unless you think that one who feeds Christ is not himself fed by Christ, or that earthly things will be lacking to those to whom heavenly and divine things are given?” (C. S. E. L., III, 282).—Lactantius, Divin. Instit., l. VI, c. 12: “He who is rich before God can never be poor.” (P. L., XIX, 531).—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. I, c. 30, n. 151: “No one ought to be ashamed if he becomes poor from having been rich while he gives to a poor person, because Christ became poor when He was rich, that by His poverty He might make all rich.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 67).—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., XLVIII, s. 1, n. 12: “Do not fear: children place things in a treasury and are secure; you place something in the hand of Christ and are afraid? Be prudent and provide for yourself hereafter in heaven.” (P. L., XXXVI, 552).

⁴⁹ Ecclus. XXIX, 15; 2 Cor. IX, 6–14.—St. Cyprian, De Opere et Eleemosyn., c. 9: “When thanksgiving is directed to God for our alms and works through the prayer of the poor, the wealth of the one who works is increased by God’s recompense.” (C. S. E. L., III, 1, 380 sq.).

⁵⁰ Dan. IV, 24; Tob. IV, 11; XII, 8 sq.; Ecclus. III, 33.—Lactantius, Divin. Instit., c. 13: “Whenever you are asked, believe that you are being tested by God as to whether you are worthy to be heard. Examine your conscience and, as much as you can, heal its wounds. Yet do not suppose that because sins are removed by largess, license to sin is given to you. For they are abolished if you give generously to God because you have sinned; but if you sin in reliance upon giving generously, they are not abolished.” (Migne, P. L., VI, 684 B).—St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 75: “Certainly those who live most wickedly and do not care to correct such a life and habits, and who do not cease to give frequent alms amid their very crimes and outrages, flatter themselves in vain for that reason.”—Ibid., c. 76: “He who wishes to give alms in an orderly manner ought to begin with himself and give it first to himself. For almsgiving is a work of mercy, and it has most truly been said: Have mercy on your soul by pleasing God (Eccli. XXX, 24). For this reason we are reborn, that we may please God, to whom that which we contracted by being born is deservedly displeasing. This is the first alms that we gave ourselves, because we sought ourselves in our misery through the mercy of the merciful God, confessing His just judgment by which we were made miserable.”—Ibid., c. 77: “Therefore let those not deceive themselves who think that through alms, however abundant, from their produce or from any money, they buy for themselves impunity to remain in the enormity of crimes and the wickedness of outrages. For they not only do these things, but love them so that they always desire to continue in them, if only they can do so with impunity. But he who loves iniquity hates his own soul (Ps. X, 6), and he who hates his own soul is not merciful to it, but cruel; for by loving it according to the world he hates it according to God. If, therefore, he wished to give it alms through which all things would be clean for it (Lk. XI, 41), he would hate it according to the world and love it according to God.” (P. L., XL, 267 sqq.). On Luke XI, 41 see P. Schanz, Lukas-Evangelium, p. 333.—Th. Sommerlad, Wirtschaftslehre, pp. 8 sq.

⁵¹ Matt. XXV, 34–46; Luke VI, 38; XII, 33; XVI, 9; Heb. XIII, 16; Matt. V, 7; Jas. II, 13; cfr. Ps. CXI, 5.

⁵² Matt. X, 42; Mark XII, 42 sqq.; Luke XXI, 1–4.—St. Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps., 103, s. 1, n. 19: “Despise no suppliant, and do not despise the one to whom you cannot give what he asks; if you can give, give; if you cannot, show yourself affable. God crowns the inward will where He finds no means. Let no one say: I have nothing. Charity is not paid out from a purse.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1351).—Ibid., 36, s. 2, n. 13: “Behold want, behold riches. That man receives and will not repay; this man has mercy and lends: abundance belongs to him. What if he is poor? Even so he is rich—Only direct devout eyes to his riches. For you see an empty money-box; you do not see a conscience full of God. He has no means outwardly, but he has charity inwardly. How much he pays out from charity, and it is not exhausted. For if he has outward means, charity itself gives, but from what he has; if, however, he finds nothing outwardly to give, he gives goodwill, offers counsel if he can, offers help if he can; finally, if he can help neither by counsel nor assistance, he helps at least by his desire or prays for the afflicted person, and perhaps he himself is heard more than the one who holds out bread. He whose breast is full of charity always has something from which to give. It is charity itself that is also called good will. God requires no more from you than what He has given you within. For good will cannot be idle. For if you do not have a good will, though you have a coin to spare, you do not hold it out to the poor; the poor themselves furnish one another from good will; they are not unfruitful among themselves.” (P. L., XXXVI, 371).—IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 125 n. 11: “Sow as much as you can. But you have little—whence will you do so? You have the will? Just as what you have would be nothing if good will were not present, so, because you have nothing, do not be sad if you have good will. For what do you sow? Mercy. And what will you reap? Peace. Did the angels say: Peace on earth to rich men? But ‘peace on earth to men of good will’ (Lk. ii, 14). In Zacchaeus there was great will, in Zacchaeus great charity (Lk. xix, 6–9). . . . Great will; he gave much, he sowed much. Therefore did that widow who put in two mites (Lk. xxi, 1–4) sow little? Rather, as much as Zacchaeus. For she bore fewer means, but had an equal will. She put in two mites from as great a will as that from which Zacchaeus gave half his patrimony. If you attend to what they gave, you find different things; if you attend to that from which they gave, you find equal things: she gave whatever she had, and he gave what he had.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1664).

⁵³ Tob. IV, 9.

⁵⁴ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 31.—IDEM, Homo Apost., tr. IV, n. 19: “In our neighbor’s grave necessity we are bound to aid him from goods superfluous to our station, but in extreme necessity even from goods superfluous to life; indeed, in extreme necessity we may assist a poor person even from another’s goods, when we lack our own.”

⁵⁵ Matt. XIX, 21 sqq.—On the evangelical counsels see Vol. I of this Handbook, pp. 236 sqq.—On organised charity and professional charity workers see Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 215 sqq.

READINGS.—St. Cyprian, De Opere et Eleemosynis (Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat., Vol. III, 1, 373 sqq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 30–32 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, I, 381 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. II, n. 31–33 (ed. Gaudé, I, 326 sqq.).—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 483 sqq.—W. Roscher and Ch. J. Klumker, System der Armenpflege und Armenpolitik, 3rd ed., Stuttgart 1906.—J. G. Uhlhorn, Die christliche Liebestätigkeit, 3 vols., Stuttgart 1882 sqq., Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1895.—IDEM, Die kirchliche Armenpflege, Göttingen 1892, pp. 10 sqq.—G. Ratzinger, Geschichte der kirchlichen Armenpflege, 2nd ed., Freiburg i. B., 1884.—F. Schaub, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin, pp. 382 sqq.—J. Lachaud, La Civilisation ou les Bienfaits de l’Eglise, Paris 1890.—L. Lallemand, Histoire de la Charité, 4 vols., Paris 1902 sqq.—J. N., Foerstl, Das Almosen, Paderborn 1909.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 104 sqq.—H. Parkinson, A Primer of Social Science, pp. 231 sqq.—Leo XIII, Encyclical “Rerum Novarum” (The Pope and the People, pp. 192 sq.)

Principles. — 1. From the order of charity, each one can prefer himself to an individual neighbor in an equal cause of necessity. But when there is question of bodily and exterior goods, it is also lawful, as we said above, nn. 81, 84, to give the first place to neighbor from charity, which at the same time promises us the compensation of a better good.

2. But as long as there is question of individuals, he must prefer persons more joined to him to others toward whom he has no peculiar office of piety. The order to be observed among those persons was indicated above, n. 85.

3. The republic or perfect society can require from private persons that they postpone their temporal utility to the public cause. And it is also lawful to place the public cause before the private cause, even of neighbors, if elsewhere proportion of utility or necessity is had.

4. Never, for helping an individual neighbor in need, must anyone sustain that inconvenience or make that expense which, without sin against charity toward himself, he is permitted to deny to his own bodily or temporal safety.

5. Except for necessity morally extreme, no one is bound to succor the temporal need of neighbor with notable inconvenience of his own. To this pertains that saying: "Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience."

Hence these responses are understood:

— 1. To neglect one's bodily safety without cause and with grave harm (of death or grave illness) is per se a grave sin; yet often an excuse of ignorance is had: for in that cause, from self-love, we rather incline to excessive care. Yet the case occurs where someone, warned by a doctor concerning imminent danger, does not renounce a certain pleasure or recreation that is almost fatal.

The present life is not esteemed of such value that someone ought by long care, great expense, or extraordinary remedy to recover health.

— 2. We never owe that help to an individual neighbor which would cast us into the same necessity from which we wish to rescue the neighbor. Nor must we give a great sum of money to a poor man for buying costly medicine or for rescuing him from danger of death. Yet this must be received temperately where there is question not of a neighbor who is a stranger but of one closely joined.

On the Precept of Alms. — Already Aristotle (Politics, 2, c. 2) preferred to communism a regime of temporal goods by which, not indeed ownership, but the use of possessions would be made common by law or benevolence. By this opinion he so defended private property that at the same time he denied the power of fully withdrawing temporal things from the human race in general, to which, from the first intention of God, they have been assigned and must remain assigned. But riches already procure common utility by the very conveniences which they offer to possessors to be enjoyed: for thus they stimulate more intense and ingenious industriousness ¹, and permit more persons to serve the community by nobler studies; they also promote common utility by parsimony, by which, excessive consumption having been avoided, treasures are preserved for society, capital is prepared; finally, they benefit the common utility more immediately by the distribution among many of necessaries which accompanies and follows the expenses of riches and fruitful industries.

There remains then gratuitous distribution, which can be directed to temporal ends and also to moral and spiritual ends. Hence the twofold character of alms: one narrower, by which material want is succored; the other fuller, by which every genus of needs is succored.

The precept of alms by which the poor are fed is already inculcated in the open pages of both Testaments and in no few places of the Holy Fathers; today, however, it is especially to be urged that temporal riches effectively contribute to diminishing or removing the spiritual necessities of very many.

That precept seems able to be explained thus.

a) Distinction of goods. Goods are called necessary or superfluous; and this either with respect to someone's own life and that of his dependents (with whom he is morally held as one person), or with respect to state or condition. Those things are called simply necessary to one's state without which a man would be cast down from his condition: as if he would have to diminish notably his retinue of servants, his reception of guests, his manner of educating children, or would not have that from which he could provide for unexpected cases of infirmity, etc. Those things are called necessary to the decency of state, both goods without which, within the limits of honorable liberality, he could not continue the same in the accustomed way, and other goods which pertain to caring for a moderate ascent.

The remaining goods are held as relatively superfluous. Absolutely superfluous goods today morally are not had in our regions, where money is no longer accustomed to be laid away idly, but all things are usefully spent (excessive expenses of luxury excepted) in works and businesses by which public riches and even the resources of humble persons increase. But we can call superfluous those moderate goods which, whether they are present or not, morally do not affect the accustomed cultivation of life or increase of prosperity. Hence this proposition 12 was rightly condemned by Innocent XI: "You will scarcely find among secular persons, even kings, anything superfluous to their state. And thus scarcely anyone is bound to alms, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to his state" (Denz. 1162).

b) Obligation according to varied necessity. We must help a poor person in extreme or quasi-extreme need even from goods which in some way are necessary to state. But the case concerning an individual poor person will scarcely occur, since we are not bound by a great force of money to relieve the temporal need of neighbor. But the obligation of succoring a neighbor in extreme or nearly extreme need is grave.

c) If a poor person is gravely in need, this is controverted: whether you must relieve that necessity from superfluous goods, when no other will probably do it, or whether you can reserve your alms for another good work when you cannot conveniently do both. Many permit this option, because they judge it a grave inconvenience to be deprived of it. This seems consonant with the very mind of St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 32, art. 5.

Therefore you will be held under grave obligation if you propose no other pious use to yourself; if you can conveniently satisfy each intention; if there is question of help which has no other utility. Thus, for example, under grave obligation you must warn him whose house begins to burn, because your warning cannot per se, like money, be deputed to another good work.

He also sins gravely more probably who, having relatively superfluous goods, frequently repels poor persons laboring under grave want. For it seems little consonant with the Scriptures that we restrict their grave admonitions to the rare case of extreme necessity. Add scandal and social harm.

d) In common necessity, a grave obligation is not proved, although it is affirmed by many. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 32. And it is less established today, since by public subsidies to which all citizens contribute, temporal needs are provided for rather richly, and money fruitfully invested has a use which is not useless to the less fortunate. No one doubts that there is at least a venial obligation of sometimes giving alms, if you have goods superfluous to nature and state.

e) Private men are not bound to seek out the poor. Yet if they have a serious doubt concerning someone's extreme need, they must make themselves more certain about the matter. The usual assertions of beggars that they are fasting, without bread, are seen per se not to suffice for making a doubt.

¹ Cf. our Principes de morale sociale, n. 148 ff.

— Concerning the quantity of alms to be distributed in common necessity of the poor, there is no better and more expedient rule than that each one should accommodate himself to the uses of pious persons of his own condition. Writers propose this formal rule: that there is to be given that by which, once the alms of other rich persons have been brought together, the poor are not destitute of help. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 32, judged reasonable that more certain assessment, that someone should give the fiftieth part of his revenues, if that fiftieth part belongs to superfluous goods. (Some declare that one abounding in revenues can be content with a smaller proportional part.) Thus we explain, from the authors whom the Holy Doctor, l. c., seems to approve, the rather ambiguous place of Homo Apostolicus, Tr. 4, c. 2, n. 19: "It suffices if the fiftieth part of annual revenues which are left over is given." Several, for example, Aertnijs-Damen, I, 364, Q. 2, understand this place concerning the fiftieth part of the annual surplus. It is clear that here there is question only of alms more strictly so called, by which food is furnished. What seems to have to be said today, cf. below, n. 108.

Alms from the Goods of Others. — He who has his own goods must give alms from these, not from another's goods. Except the express or tacit consent of the owner. Thus faithful servants, especially those who, because of long-standing services, are shown as pertaining almost to the family properly so called, do not seem to be prohibited from presuming consent of this kind, and from helping the master honestly, prudently, and moderately in distributing an offering.

That goods taken by theft are not matter of alms but of restitution is manifest per se. But he who is burdened with debt is forbidden to make the condition of creditors worse by his gifts: yet he ought not for that reason abstain from moderate alms.

A wife, as such, can, in our regions, give moderate alms. For notable alms, unless she freely administers her own goods, she per se needs the consent of the husband. Yet she can presume that consent more easily than a son, and the latter more easily than a servant.

Those who by office care for the goods of others, such as tutors and curators, can make from the goods administered by them those alms which it would per se be becoming for the owner to make. In this matter, as in administration, they supply for the owner. The same is to be said of those who govern a community of persons.

General Conclusion on the Office of Alms. — 1. If you consider the controversies of moralists, you will be persuaded of this: that the positive precept of charity resists accurate definition; it is to be exercised not by perturbation of fear but by a freer and more generous impulse: "God loveth a cheerful giver" (2 Cor. 9, 7).

2. If you turn your mind to human customs, it will go well for the cause of the poor and of good works that the rich determine beforehand what proportional part they wish to distribute for pious ends. Even if it is very small, they will for the most part give more than if, when an occasion is given, they pay this or that liberal contribution. How many there are who think themselves to have been ample benefactors who, if they should calculate the annual sum liberally spent by them, would blush at their own parsimony!

3. If you look to our times, the form of manual alms given to street beggars, this intimate and more blind demonstration of mercy, is esteemed less day by day. But at the same time there succeed, as if in its place, many works of common and more prudent beneficence, which everywhere call forth the charity of the good: more spiritual necessities especially must be relieved by Catholic institutes; and from distant regions evangelical workers and the newspapers themselves, which narrate the sad fates of many peoples, implore mercy, so that there is no one who can think himself released from the office of temporal beneficence.

Material Estimation of Alms Understood in the Fuller Sense. If a man to whom all necessary or useful things are abundantly available is at the same time relieved of every family burden, no reason is seen why he should not assign all, at least, of the revenues which are left over to pious works. This must be said with stronger reason of sacred ministers, especially if revenues have proceeded from the sacred ministries themselves. Did not Ecclesiastes, 4, 7, already mock him who, without son and brother, bore eyes never satisfied with riches, and did not consider for whom he labored? Yet because "not all take this," as a reasonable norm, if no peculiar general necessity demands more, we propose this norm of acting: that from annual revenues which remain after all expenses, a proportional part be deputed to pious works; which proportional part could be:

But a norm more positively proved by ecclesiastical writers was this: that those who could do so without detriment to the family should divide their resources (annual resources, as we think) into three parts, so that the first be deputed to the poor; the second to religious worship; but the third be assigned to supporting the family. (Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, Rules to be observed in distributing alms.)

You will observe that by us the proportion itself is increased for a greater sum of revenues; whereas in the age of St. Alphonsus they rather diminished the same proportion for the same ratio. But, unless we are deceived, they established this concerning alms alone strictly understood and which then was more circumscribed by place: satisfaction was easily given to the common necessities of the poor by an absolutely greater sum. But if, as today we must, we take alms in a broader sense and extension, since the necessities are inexhaustible, there seems to us to be no reason why the rules of charity should be set forth according to another reason than the rules of taxes, that is, according to capacity, which, the greater the revenues are, does not decrease but relatively increases.

Scholion. On Alms by Word and Action. — Although, less than exterior things, the inborn and acquired endowments of talent are common in first origin, since from the beginning and from their very nature they are joined with the person, nevertheless they are not ordered by divine Providence to the utility of the learned or skillful man alone; but the law is to be observed which Leo XIII expressed in these magnificent words: "The summary is: whoever has received a greater abundance of goods by the gift of God, whether they are of the body and external, or of the soul, has received them for this cause, that he should use them for the perfection of himself, and likewise, as a minister of divine Providence, for the utilities of others" (Enc. Rerum Novarum, 15 May 1891).

Therefore the alms of counsel and of any beneficent action is laudable and commanded. Thus advocates, physicians, and surgeons must help poor persons in need by their art even gratuitously, by an obligation which is to be estimated from the necessity of the one in need and the inconvenience of the one succoring, and sometimes from the office assumed. All works of mercy, both corporal and spiritual, contain the character of alms.

588. Notion. Almsgiving is a Greek word (eleemosyne) and signifies mercy; commonly, however, it is usually taken for an act of mercy, and can be defined: "a work by which something is given to one in need from compassion on account of God." Thus the Angelic Doctor,⁴⁸ who aptly observes that almsgiving is not taken (as often happens) for the thing given, but for the very action of giving, which is done on account of God.

Almsgiving is an act of charity, yet through the mediation of mercy. The reason is that an exterior act pertains to that virtue to which the proximate motive of acting pertains. But the motive for giving alms is the misery of neighbor to be alleviated; and this indeed pertains to mercy, as has been said. Therefore to give alms is formally an act of mercy. But because mercy is an effect of charity, as was said above, consequently to give alms is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy;⁴⁹ or still more clearly: it is an act elicited by mercy and commanded by charity. Yet almsgiving can also be given from another honorable motive, e.g. for making satisfaction for sins, for divine worship, etc. Then almsgiving is commanded by the virtue of penance, or of religion, etc.^49a It is evident of itself that almsgiving is not an act of virtue if it is done from an evil sole or principal motive, e.g. to seduce a girl. Almsgiving can be taken for an act of both corporal and spiritual mercy. Now we speak only of corporal almsgiving.

⁴⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 1. The same Angelic Doctor (In IV dist. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1) explains this definition thus: "In the aforesaid definition all the things are touched which concur for the perfection of almsgiving, according as it is meritorious. For the very misery of another, which is the principle of mercy, is touched in this, that he says 'to one in need'; but mercy, which arises in us from another's misery, is touched in this, that he says 'from compassion'; but the effect of mercy in relieving another's misery as one's own is touched in this, that it is said 'a work in which something is given': for this is essential to almsgiving itself; but the intention directed to God, which gives it the character of meriting, is touched in this, that it is said 'on account of God.'" For other definitions see the learned work (§ 12) of Fr. Schaub, Die kath. Caritas und ihre Gegner, M.-Gladbach 1909.

⁴⁹ S. theol. l. c.

^49a Cf. Billuart, De carit. diss. 5, a. 1.

589. Principle 1. Both from natural law and from positive divine law there exists a true precept of distributing alms to the poor.

1. The natural law itself commands that alms be distributed sometimes. For a) effective charity toward neighbor is commanded by natural law. But sometimes this effective charity would clearly be violated unless alms were given to a poor man in need. Therefore the natural law itself commands that alms be given.

b) The necessity of almsgiving follows from the condition of private dominion. For although private dominion is licit, indeed necessary for the good of the whole of human society, nevertheless on the other hand any man, by the very fact that life is given to him by the Creator, also has a right to the necessary sustenance of life, which indeed he ought to procure for himself by his labors; but if this is impossible, he has the right that he be sustained from the goods of others, and accordingly in extreme necessity he can licitly take for himself those things which are necessary, lest he lose life. Hence a rich man is bound from his goods to assist a neighbor existing in necessity; and this is to give alms. To the point St. Thomas writes:⁵⁰ "Temporal goods, which are conferred upon man by God, are indeed his as to ownership, but as to use they ought to be not only his, but also those of others, who can be sustained from them from that which is superfluous to him. Hence Basil says: 'If you confess that these things [namely, temporal goods] have come to you from God, is God unjust, distributing things unequally to us? Why do you abound, but that man begs, unless that you may obtain the merits of good stewardship, but he may be adorned with the prizes of patience? It is the bread of the hungry which you hold; the tunic of the naked which you preserve in your closet; the shoe of the unshod which grows moldy in your possession; the silver of the needy which you possess buried. Wherefore you injure as many as you are able to give to.'" But if St. Basil and the other Holy Fathers seem to say that it is against justice if someone refuses to give alms, this is not to be understood as though the rich, transgressing the precept of giving alms, violated commutative justice and accordingly were bound to restitution; but the Holy Fathers intend only to say that such greedy persons sin gravely against the just divine precepts concerning the administration of goods and violate general justice, which obliges one to procure the common good. Therefore the obligation of giving alms is properly an obligation of charity and of general justice, but not of commutative justice.⁵¹ Hence the poor man to whom alms are unduly denied by a rich man cannot in the least secretly compensate himself. If, however, he is in extreme necessity, he can take for himself the things which are necessary, as has been said, nor can the rich man licitly impede this taking.

c) The necessity of giving alms also follows from peace to be preserved in human society. For if the rich refused suitable alms, the poor would make rebellion and disturb the peace of society.

2. Positive divine law inculcates the precept of giving alms both in the Old and in the New Testament. "I (God) command you that you open your hand to your needy and poor brother, who dwells with you in the land."⁵² "Son, do not defraud the poor man of alms and do not turn away your eyes from the poor man."⁵³ "Depart from Me, accursed ones, into eternal fire; for I was hungry, and you did not give Me to eat; I was thirsty, and you did not give Me drink."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ S. theol. l. c. a. 5 ad 2.

⁵¹ Leo XIII indeed says (Encycl. "Rerum novarum," May 15, 1891), speaking of the obligation of giving alms: "These offices are not of justice, except in extreme things, but of Christian charity." But the Supreme Pontiff seems to take the word justice not for commutative justice, from the violation of which arises the obligation of restitution, but for general or legal justice. In this sense already the Angelic Doctor (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 118, a. 4 ad 2) explained the words of St. Basil, saying: "Basil is speaking of that case in which someone is bound from a legal debt to distribute his goods to the poor, either on account of the danger of necessity or also on account of the superfluity of the things possessed." But St. Thomas himself always calls almsgiving an act of charity and never an act of justice.

⁵² Deut. 15, 11.

⁵³ Eccli. 4, 1; cf. also Tob. 4, 7; Is. 58, 7.

⁵⁴ Matth. 25, 41; cf. also 1 Jo. 3, 17; 1 Tim. 6, 17 sqq.

590. Principle 2. In a particular case the obligation of giving alms is to be measured from a twofold head: a) from the necessity of neighbor; b) from the proper ability of the giver.

Thus all theologians after St. Thomas, who says: "On the part of the giver, it must be considered that that which is to be expended in alms be superfluous to him.... But on the part of the recipient, it is required that he have necessity; otherwise there would not be a reason why alms should be given to him."⁵⁵ But the intrinsic reason of this principle is the order of charity to be observed. For well-ordered love begins from oneself. Therefore I am not bound to help a neighbor living in bodily necessity with great inconvenience to myself. - Those things are to be recalled which were said above, n. 579, concerning threefold necessity (extreme, grave, light). Moreover it is to be noted that goods of a threefold kind are distinguished:

1. Goods necessary for life, by which a man needs to be able to sustain his own life and that of his own, so that if they were taken away he would fall into grave or extreme necessity. Goods of this kind are revenues necessary for supporting himself and his own family entrusted to him.

2. Goods necessary for status, without which a man can indeed pass his life, but would have to descend from his legitimately obtained status. To goods of this kind belong, e.g., those things which a noble or rich man needs in order to lead life as other sensible men of the same condition and status living in the same region do. To goods necessary for status also belong certain moderate savings, by which provision is made for chance cases of infirmity, misfortune, etc., and indeed even a moderate augmentation of status. Hence parents are admonished to treasure up for their children.⁵⁶

3. Goods simply superfluous are those which are necessary neither for the sustenance of life nor for the decency of status. Thus, e.g., if the revenues of some man much exceed ordinary expenses, there are goods simply superfluous. Yet, as the Angelic Doctor⁵⁷ rightly notes, the decency of status does not consist in something indivisible: because by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his status; and by many things also subtracted the condition of his status is decently preserved. Hence in practice one must stand by the judgment of a prudent and sincere man. With these things set down, the following practical rules are worthy of being known:

⁵⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 5.

⁵⁶ Cf. 2 Cor. 12, 14.

⁵⁷ 4, dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1.

591. Rule 1. No one by reason of charity alone is bound to assist neighbor from goods necessary for life.

The reason is that each one is bound to place his own life and the life of his own before the life of another, unrelated, private person. Hence St. Thomas⁵⁸ says: "Necessary is said in two ways: in one way, that without which something cannot exist; and from such necessary goods alms ought not at all to be given: for example, if someone constituted in the article of necessity had only that from which he could sustain himself, and his children or others pertaining to him; for to give alms from this necessary good is to subtract life from oneself and one's own."⁵⁹ - I said: by reason of charity; for by reason of the necessary common good a man is bound not only to hand over those things which are necessary to him for sustaining life, but life itself. Hence, e.g., a soldier is bound to yield to the king the food which the king needs for sustaining life, even if the soldier himself should perish from hunger; at least thus, if otherwise the common good of the state would suffer great harm.

⁵⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 6.

⁵⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 6.

592. Rule 2. A neighbor living in extreme necessity is to be assisted 1. from goods simply superfluous; 2. also from goods necessary for the decency of status, provided that this can be done without great inconvenience.

The first part of this rule is evident of itself and is admitted by all. But as to the other part, authors indeed disagree as to the mode of speaking, but in the thing itself they agree.⁶⁰ The order of charity requires that we indeed love the life of neighbor more than our temporal goods, which are not absolutely necessary for living life; but, just as we are not bound to preserve our life by extraordinary means or with great inconvenience, so a fortiori there exists no strict obligation of giving a great sum of money for saving the life of neighbor. Hence a rich man is not bound to give, e.g., 1000 francs so that a sick poor man, shortly to die in his homeland, can go into the more healthful air of a distant region.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Thus, e.g., Billuart (De carit. diss. 5, a. 2, dico 2) asserts: "From things superfluous to nature, even if necessary to status, we are bound under mortal sin to make almsgiving to one suffering extreme necessity." But Noldin (De praec. n. 91) says: "Although alms ought to be given to a neighbor in extreme necessity from goods necessary only for the decency of status, nevertheless an obligation of giving also from goods necessary for preserving status itself cannot be demonstrated, so that someone would be bound to fall from his own status. For neither is someone bound to preserve his own life with the loss of his status, or by extraordinary means." Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 762; Gopfert, Moraltheol. II 28, and others, have similar things.

⁶¹ Cf. Billuart l. c. in fine.

593. Rule 3. A neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted from goods superfluous to status. Thus the opinion today is common.⁶²

It is proved from Sacred Scripture: "He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother have necessity, and closes his heart against him, how does the charity of God remain in him?"⁶³ It is altogether improbable that the holy Apostle speaks only of extreme necessity, which in practice is very rare. This opinion is confirmed from the proposition (12) condemned by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among seculars will you find, even among kings, what is superfluous to status. And thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to status."⁶⁴ - But the intrinsic reason is that it seems to be a grave disorder if a man loves his own superfluous goods more than the alleviation of neighbor living in truly grave necessity. - Certain theologians wish that neighbor in grave necessity is to be assisted even from goods in some way necessary to status, or with moderate detriment to one's status. In reality there is scarcely any disagreement between the two opinions. For the decency of status admits some latitude, so that "by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his status; by many things also subtracted the condition of his status is decently preserved."⁶⁵ Accordingly those authors who say that almsgiving is to be given in the grave necessity of neighbor even from things necessary for status are to be understood of goods in some way, but not wholly, necessary for the decency of status. Today no one teaches that a neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted even with the loss of one's own status. - Certain older authors, such as St. Antoninus,⁶⁶ Ioannes Medina,⁶⁷ not rightly understanding St. Thomas in this matter, thought that to give alms to a neighbor existing in grave necessity was not of precept, but only of counsel. This opinion today is obsolete.⁶⁸

⁶² Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 31.

⁶³ 1 Jo. 3, 17.

⁶⁴ Denz. n. 1103.

⁶⁵ S. Thom., 4, dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4.

⁶⁶ S. theol. pars 2, tit. 1, q. 24 (ed. Veronae II 334).

⁶⁷ Tract. 5 de eleem. q. 3, dub. 2, concl. 2.

⁶⁸ Cajetan, his most faithful Commentator, excellently explains the mind of St. Thomas in the little work "On the precept of almsgiving according to the mind of St. Thomas."

594. Rule 4. In the common necessity of neighbors there is indeed a) a grave obligation of sometimes giving alms from goods superfluous to status; but b) there is not an obligation of giving alms to this or that particular poor man.

The second part is admitted by all in our time, but concerning the first part it is astonishing how sharply authors have disputed and dispute, although perhaps their disagreements are verbal rather than real. St. Alphonsus⁶⁹ calls the proposed opinion the more common one, to which he himself adheres. St. Thomas (concerning whose mind, however, there is dispute) says simply: "Thus therefore to give alms from what is superfluous is in precept."⁷⁰ He does not indeed expressly say that this precept is grave, but since in the extreme necessity of neighbor the precept of almsgiving obliges under grave sin, equally under grave sin the precept of giving alms from superfluous goods obliges, as is clear from IV dist. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4. In Sacred Scripture it is said: "What remains over, give as alms: and behold, all things are clean to you."⁷¹ These words indeed are usually understood: alms are to be given from superfluous things; and if this has been done, you are clean from the vice of avarice. - But the intrinsic reason is that the rich are not absolute masters of temporal goods, but only as it were stewards or administrators, who ought to dispose of their goods according to the will of God. Moreover God has ordained that the rich ought to distribute to the poor from their superfluous goods. Hence He also condemns to hell those who have defrauded the poor of alms. "Depart from Me, accursed ones, into eternal fire, which has been prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give Me to eat; I was thirsty, and you did not give Me drink.... Amen I say to you: as long as you did not do it to one of these least ones, neither did you do it to Me."⁷² - On the contrary He promises a great reward, namely eternal life,⁷³ to those who give alms to the poor, and ample blessings on this earth: "Blessed is he who understands concerning the needy and the poor: in the evil day the Lord will deliver him. May the Lord preserve him, and give him life, and make him blessed on the earth: and may He not hand him over to the soul of his enemies. May the Lord bring him help upon the bed of his pain: his whole bed You have turned in his infirmity."⁷⁴ - All these things seem sufficiently openly to show a grave precept of giving alms from superfluous goods even in the common necessity of the poor, since the grave and extreme necessity of neighbor is very rare, especially because of defect of food and drink.⁷⁵

Nevertheless in practice the confessor, although he ought earnestly to exhort the rich to give alms to the poor, ought not to deny absolution to that rich man who refuses to distribute alms; for a) the opinion denying a grave obligation of giving alms to the poor living in common necessity is at least extrinsically probable, since very many and grave authors hold it;⁷⁶ b) in present times the rich are compelled by civil laws to assist the poor in various public institutes erected for the sustenance of the poor; and thus all give some alms.

Rule 5. Beneficed clerics are bound (from ecclesiastical law) to distribute to the poor or for pious uses all superfluous things which remain after their suitable sustenance from benefice revenues.

Concerning this obligation, which, with all agreeing, is grave, the discussion will return below, II 37, in the treatise on justice, where the goods of clerics will be treated.

⁶⁹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 32.

⁷⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 5. Cf. Cajetan in h. loc.

⁷¹ Luc. 11, 41.

⁷² Matth. 25, 41-45.

⁷³ Cf. Matth. 25, 34.

⁷⁴ Ps. 40, 1-3.

⁷⁵ Thus also Leo XIII, Const. "Rerum novarum," May 15, 1891: "It is a duty, from that which remains over, to give graciously to the needy."

⁷⁶ Cf. Ballerini in notes to Gury (Comp. Theol. mor. I n. 228) for the benign opinion, and Concina (Theol. christ. in Decal. l. 1, diss. 6, c. 13) for the contrary opinion.

595. Quantity of almsgiving to be given.

The grave obligation of giving alms having been admitted, the question immediately arises: how great a sum of goods is to be distributed to the poor? The answer is:

1. In the extreme necessity of neighbor so much must be given as suffices to rescue him from this necessity, unless nevertheless there are others who are willing to assist him. But it has already been said above that no one is bound to distribute a great sum of money in order to free a poor man from the danger of death.

2. In common necessity several theologians with St. Alphonsus teach that the rich are bound to give a fiftieth part of the annual revenues which are beyond status, or 2%.⁷⁷ If, however, the revenues were very enormous, a smaller proportion would be required. Nothing certain can be answered in this question; hence the faithful are indeed to be admonished to give large alms, but a definite sum to be distributed under grave precept cannot be imposed on them.

⁷⁷ Homo Ap. tr. 4, n. 19.

596. Who can licitly give alms? The answer is: all those who have their own goods and free administration of them. Yet in extreme necessity, just as each one can licitly take for himself the goods of another in order to remove this necessity, so then another also can assist from goods of which otherwise he does not have free dominion. Sometimes (but with great discretion) the faculty of giving moderate alms from another's goods can licitly be presumed. - There is a special difficulty concerning the power of wives, children subject to the family, and servants to bestow alms.

A wife can give alms not only from her own paraphernal or free goods, but also from other matrimonial goods whose administration is in the power of the husband. In this latter case, however, the consent of the husband is required, either expressed or presumed.⁷⁸ If the husband were too greedy and did not wish to give due alms, nevertheless the wife could make moderate alms according to the condition of her status, because then the husband would be unreasonably unwilling. Especially her poor parents the wife can and ought to help by moderate gifts taken from the common goods of the marriage.⁷⁹

Children subject to the family can indeed give alms from their own free goods, if they have any, but not from the goods of their parents, unless the express or tacit permission of the parents has been had.

Male and female servants can give no alms at all from the goods of their masters without their express permission; nor can such permission scarcely ever be rightly presumed, because masters are not accustomed to grant a general permission of this kind for very obvious reasons. Almost the only exception is if servants give to the poor those foods which remain over from the table of the masters and which otherwise would be thrown outside. For in this case the master suffers no harm at all, nor is he reasonably unwilling that those foods be given to the poor. Servants illicitly giving alms in a notable quantity from the goods of their masters are bound to restitution.

⁷⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 8 ad 2.

⁷⁹ Cf. below II, 16.

597. Mode of giving alms. In order that the bestowal of alms be truly morally good, it is required that it be done not only to due persons according to due quantity, but also in a due manner. This manner indeed includes 1. the circumstances to be observed in every almsgiving; 2. the question whether alms are to be given rather through private persons than through public authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil.

1. The circumstances of almsgiving to be observed are expressed in these little verses:

Let it be just and prudent, swift, secret, and willing, Proceeding in order, helping all.

a) Almsgiving ought to be just, i.e. it cannot be given except by him who has true free dominion of the thing.

b) Alms should be given prudently, i.e. to those only who are truly needy; but not to those who from laziness do not wish to work. For "if anyone does not wish to work, neither let him eat."⁸⁰ Almsgiving imprudently given fosters vices.

c) Almsgiving should be swift according to that saying: "He gives twice who gives quickly; he gives nothing who delays gifts."

d) Almsgiving should be secret according to that saying: "When therefore you give alms, do not sound a trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be honored by men. Amen, I say to you, they have received their reward. But when you give alms, let not your left hand know what your right hand does."⁸¹

e) Almsgiving is to be given willingly according to the words of St. Paul: "Not from sadness or from necessity: for God loves a cheerful giver."⁸²

f) Almsgiving is to be given in right order, i.e. the order of charity (explained above) is to be observed.

g) Almsgiving should be a help to all, i.e. no one is to be excluded from our alms. Therefore we ought also to assist strangers, sinners, and unbelievers living in necessity. But in equal necessity the faithful, the pious, fellow citizens, and generally those more joined to us are to be helped before the rest. Indeed someone who is truly needy can make alms to himself if he is appointed distributor of alms.⁸³

2. Are alms to be given rather through private persons than through public authority (whether ecclesiastical or civil)?

The solution of this question depends chiefly on the end of almsgiving. This end indeed is in no way restricted to the material relief of the need under which the poor man labors, but also comprehends his spiritual good; equally it comprehends the social good and the spiritual good of the one bestowing alms. Since the condition of the times is such that neither private nor even ecclesiastical care of the poor is sufficiently able to alleviate all needs, the civil government also ought to help the poor. Yet this care of the poor instituted by civil government is exposed to grave dangers. For then it often happens a) that fictitious poor persons receive large alms, but the true and especially the bashful poor acquire nothing; b) that indeed material want is alleviated, but spiritual misery, i.e. the immoral life from which want has arisen, is not healed; c) that there arises a great schism between rich and poor; for the rich complain concerning the forced grave tax to be paid for the poor, while the poor demand goods too abundantly possessed by the rich. Since these things are so, effort must be made that the care of the poor be entrusted to ecclesiastical or pious persons, who strive not only to alleviate their material poverty, but also bring them to a morally good life. Already from its beginnings the Church always had solicitous care for the poor. Thus the Apostles themselves instituted seven deacons for the care of widows and the poor. Later deaconesses were instituted, and today innumerable congregations approved by the Church exercise works of every kind of mercy.

⁸⁰ 2 Thess. 3, 10.

⁸¹ Matth. 6, 2 sqq.

⁸² 2 Cor. 9, 7.

⁸³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 9 ad 3.

598. Scholion. On fictitious poor persons. Fictitious poor persons, i.e. those who, not pressed by true want, feign great misery and thereby hunt for alms, sin in three ways: namely, a) against truth, because their manner of acting is a pure and foul lie; b) against charity, because they subtract from other true poor persons the alms otherwise to be received; c) against commutative justice, because by deceit and fraud they deceive merciful men, who are reasonably and gravely unwilling about such deception. Hence false poor persons of this kind are bound to restore the alms fraudulently obtained. This restitution in itself indeed would have to be made to those from whom alms were obtained. Since, however, this is often impossible, then these usurped alms are to be given to true poor persons or are to be distributed to pious causes.⁸⁴ In practice it will often be impossible to carry out restitution of this kind, because such false poor persons are accustomed quickly to squander the alms obtained.

⁸⁴ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 622. On this matter the Roman Catechism says: "Those seem to commit theft who by fictitious and simulated words or by deceitful beggary extort money; whose sin is the graver because they heap theft together with a lie" (pars 3, c. 8, q. 7). But the poor who feign themselves poorer than they truly are, so that they may receive alms more easily or more abundantly, do not seem to be obliged to restitution of the alms thus obtained, because commonly all the poor are accustomed to exaggerate their poverty, and those giving also know this.

486. DEFINITION. Almsgiving is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God. Thus defined, almsgiving is an act of mercy, commanded by charity. It can also be commanded by another virtue.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept, grave of itself, of bestowing alms. It is established both from reason, which commands us to do for another what we would wish to be done for ourselves, if we were placed in the same condition; and from the words of Christ (Matt. 25:41): Depart from me, ye cursed...; for I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat...; and from 1 John 3:17: He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother have need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?

487. II. In order that the precept of almsgiving may urge, two things are required: necessity on the part of the one receiving, and superfluity of goods on the part of the one giving. The first is established from the definition itself; the second from the order of charity. For he who has only things necessary for life cannot distribute them without preferring another's life to his own. The words of the Lord Savior are consonant: That which remaineth, give alms (Luke 11:41). Cf. 2.2, q. 32, a. 1; Bouquillon, de Carit., n. 483-90.

Moreover, just as the NECESSITY of one in need is distinguished as THREEFOLD, as was said above (n. 480, 3), so also, on the part of the giver, GOODS are of three kinds: a) things necessary for life, that is, goods without which we cannot preserve our own life, or that of our people; b) goods superfluous for life, but necessary for one's state, that is, goods without which indeed we can preserve life, but cannot live in that manner which befits our state; c) finally, goods simply superfluous, that is, which are necessary neither for life nor for state. And here it must be noted that, by things necessary for the decency of state, generally are to be understood all those things which are required, not only for sustaining children and servants and guests, but also for making honorable donations, banquets, and moderate displays of magnificence (II, 31; confer Kon., n. 484).

488. But in what way, according to the diversity either of necessity or of the superfluity of goods, alms is to be given, will be established by the following RULES, with the things always to be posited being posited, that is: a) that the use alone of the thing does not suffice; b) that the required means are not extraordinary, which men commonly are not accustomed to employ; c) that the common or public good of the community is not brought into danger (II, 31, resp. 3 and 4; Gen., I, 222).

RULE 1. In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for life, even though necessary for state. The reason is clear from the order of charity (n. 483, Rule 2).

Whence no one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the poor man were such that the safety of the republic depended upon him.

RULE 2. In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for state, but with only middling inconvenience. Thus commonly; and the reason is again clear from the order of charity.

But the obligation urges under grave sin, unless it is prudently judged that another will come to his aid; for, "since in Scripture men are frequently condemned on account of neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity" (II, 31). And it seems clearly inferred from the condemnation of the twelfth proposition by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among secular persons will you find what is superfluous to state, even among kings; and thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to state."

RULE 3. In common or middling necessity, neighbor must be aided from goods superfluous for state, but with only light inconvenience. This also the order of charity requires. But whether under mortal sin? Many deny it with St. Antoninus; for the common misery of the poor is usually light and tolerable. But St. Alphonsus affirms, with the more common opinion (II, 32; l. El. qq. ref., n. 4), if it is a question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor person. The principal reason is that, if the rich did not have an absolute obligation of commonly aiding beggars, they could be left by all in their necessity, and thus their necessity would become grave. Therefore, by the words of the Lord (Luke 11:41): That which remaineth, give alms, there is expressed a precept grave of itself, as the Holy Fathers commonly interpret (Sylvius, 2.2, q. 32; Bellarmine, de Bonis Oper., l. 3, c. 7).

The rich are indeed not bound to distribute the whole of what is superfluous; but neither does it suffice to distribute so little, in proportion to the quantity of one's substance, that, if other rich men used the same parsimony, help would be lacking to the poor. - Commonly the rich are judged to satisfy by distributing to the common poor the fiftieth part of the revenues which remain over (or 2 gold-pieces out of 100); but not in the same proportion, if the riches greatly exceed.¹ Except beneficed persons, who are bound to distribute the whole superfluity to the poor or to pious places, as will be seen in its own place (n. 2249).

But, "if some rich and abounding person for a long time refuses all alms, with the intention of giving in a better and more suitable place and time, or to persons in greater need, or of converting it to another pious use, he does not sin, since he has a just cause for refusing. But if such a person, without reasonable cause, inhumanly repels all poor persons from himself, Laymann says that he is in a bad state." Cf. II, 32; H. Ap., IV, 19; Conf. dir., IV, 11; Istr., IV, 19.

From these things you will deduce: 1. Except in the case in which the poor are fed from public stipends, a rich man sins mortally who determines to give no alms in common necessities, or who in this is notably negligent, and accumulates all superfluities for attaining a higher state. Indeed, even in the case in which many things are assigned from public stipends for relieving the poor, the rich man does not act rightly who, by fixed intention, would wish to give nothing further. For in not a few matters the solicitude of the State fails in practice; whence such a rich man's denial would tend to the detriment of many. Nor certainly do modest alms impede anyone from ascending honorably to a higher state.

2. Physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to expend their labor for the poor gratuitously, when these are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others (2.2, q. 71, a. 1).

3. "Private men are not bound to seek out the poor. Yet if they doubt concerning someone's extreme need, they are bound to inquire into the truth" (II, 31, resp. 4, ad 1).

489. Questions. Q. 1. To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. It must be given to all who are truly in need, whether they are faithful or unbelievers, natives or foreigners; yet so that, other things being equal, an old man is preferred to a young man, a noble to an ignoble, an invalid to a strong person, a faithful person to an unbeliever, a Catholic to a heretic, a good man to a bad man, a native to a stranger, etc. For this is what the order of charity requires.

There is no obligation of giving alms, and sometimes it would be illicit to give it, to poor persons unwilling to work. Yet one must beware lest those be numbered among the voluntarily idle who have fallen into misery because of lack of work. Moreover, it would be more advisable to furnish work to these, from which they may live (II, 32, ad 5).

Q. 2. From which goods must, or can, alms be given?

Resp. 1. From one's own goods, of which one has free administration.

We say: from one's own. Therefore it is not licit from goods liable to restitution; nor is it licit with harm to creditors; nor is it licit for children from the goods of parents; for servants from the goods of masters. We say: of which one has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods, according to the custom of wives of her condition; and this even if the husband were unwilling, because custom grants her this right (II, 33; III, 540).

2. From another's goods, if either the poor man is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own; or the owner consents, or is reasonably presumed to consent.

Hence children can bestow small alms, and servants bread and similar things. Likewise tutors and curators can, from goods committed to them, give those modest alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person (II, 33, 2, 3).

Note. 1. Let the confessor of the rich remember the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17): Charge the rich of this world... to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on true life.

2. Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man refusing alms to common beggars: both because of the doubt and dissent of the Doctors; and because the rich, almost always, bring forward excusing reasons which, in practice, the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty (II, 32, 3).

S. Th. II-II, q. 32.

926. Almsgiving (from the Greek: pity) is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God, that is, a work rendered to one in need from commiseration for relieving his want. In this definition it is not taken, as often is customary, for the thing given, but for the action of giving.

It is an act of mercy commanded by charity. It is proved:

An exterior act pertains to that virtue to which pertains the proximate motive on account of which the act is placed; but the proximate motive for giving alms is that assistance be given to one suffering necessity, which pertains to mercy; but mercy is an effect of charity; therefore almsgiving is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy, or an act of mercy commanded by charity; which is said in the definition: on account of God.

But if it is ordered to another end, and is done from another motive, for example, for satisfying for sins, or unto the worship of God, it will be an act commanded by penance or religion, etc.

927. There are seven spiritual alms, which are ordered to defects of the soul, and seven corporal alms, which are ordered to defects of the body. But spiritual alms simply excel corporal alms: a) by reason of the thing offered, namely, a spiritual gift, which is nobler than a corporal one; b) by reason of him to whom help is given, namely, the spirit, which is nobler than the body; c) as regards the very acts by which help is given to neighbor, because spiritual acts are nobler than corporal ones. Nevertheless, accidentally, in a particular case, corporal almsgiving is to be preferred, for example, one dying of hunger is to be fed rather than taught.

Among the corporal alms six are exercised toward the living (Mt. XXV, 35-36, 42-43): to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to receive the guest, to visit the sick, to redeem the captive; and one toward the dead (Tob. II, 3-10; XII, 12-13): to bury the dead.

932. Corollaries. - Since by almsgiving there is a transfer of dominion:

A. Those alone can give alms who can dispose of things, namely, all who have dominion and free administration of goods, - and also those who, without dominion, possess administration: thus a husband from goods whose dominion or usufruct pertains to the community, indeed from the wife's own goods if he has administration of them; a superior as regards the goods of the monastery; likewise tutors and curators from the goods of the ward for moderate alms such as he himself would have to give; all others who are placed under power, for example, religious or servants, only in the extreme necessity of neighbor, or if there is present the explicit or tacit or reasonably presumed consent of the superior or master, which consent they do not have if he contradicts. Hence:

1. A wife can give alms from her own goods, if she has any of which she herself can dispose; - likewise from the goods of the husband or of the community, but with the consent of the husband; - indeed also, in our regions, without consent, she can give moderate, not extraordinary, alms from domestic things according to her condition, because this pertains to the honorable sustenance to which a wife among us has a right; unless, however, in a particular case the husband should prohibit giving to such or such a one. But if he should prohibit it altogether, sometimes perhaps it would be better to abstain, to avoid the indignation of the husband.

2. Children of a family can give moderate alms from goods which are handed over to them by their parents absolutely and not for a determined use, unless, however, the father should expressly prohibit it.

3. Servants cannot give without certain permission; and this, because masters are not accustomed to grant it, cannot easily be presumed, unless perhaps as regards foods which are left over and otherwise would be thrown outside, or as regards bread for a true poor person. But if they nevertheless do it, in itself they are bound to restitution.

B. Almsgiving a) from goods unjustly acquired is illicit, unless they cannot be returned to the owner, or the poor person is in extreme necessity and assistance cannot otherwise be given to him;

b) likewise from goods acquired simoniacally, because every simoniacal contract is invalid from the beginning (can. 729); whence those goods must be restored;

c) but it can be done from goods lawfully acquired, but through sin or from something illicit, for example, on account of a homicide perpetrated or prostitution practiced; yet it is not commanded.

C. Fictitious poor persons sin in a threefold way: 1. against truth; 2. against charity, because they subtract alms from true poor persons; 3. against justice, because they deceive by deceit and fraud; whence the donation is invalid, and therefore they are bound to restore either to the owner or to the poor with the presumed consent of the owner, unless there is question of purest gifts whose primary motive is not poverty but love of God and neighbor.

933. Observations. - 1. The precept of assisting neighbor in necessity is sufficiently satisfied by giving a loan, by lending, for example, a horse until he returns home, by selling with deferred payment, etc., if by such modes the necessity is removed, for example, if neighbor only needs the use of a thing, or if he is not so absolutely poor that he has nothing either in fact or in hope. Nevertheless, the precept of giving alms from superfluity is not thus satisfied; but that precept can also be fulfilled in other circumstances, by giving to others.

2. Physicians, advocates, and others performing a public office are bound to spend their work gratis for the poor, if it does not appear how otherwise help can be given to them.

3. To the poor publicly exposed, who seem to show signs of extreme necessity (for example, from nakedness, illness, etc.) or who assert it (for example, by saying that they have fasted for three days), one is rarely bound from precept to give assistance even from superfluities, both because perhaps that necessity is exaggerated to move the spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others.

4. No one is obliged (indeed sometimes it is illicit) to give alms to poor persons unwilling to work; nevertheless, let not those be numbered with these who, on account of lack of work, have fallen into misery. For these it would be more advisable to procure or supply work from which they might live.

5. In alms, those more proximate are to be preferred; nevertheless no one can be systematically excluded (neither unbelievers, nor pilgrims, nor enemies), whether they are poor from misfortune, or from virtue on account of Christ, or even from previous fault (if almsgiving is the only means of giving assistance), but not if from actual fault (Mt. V, 45; Prov. XXV, 21; Rom. XII, 20).

6. From superfluities it is licit to reserve certain things for acquiring a somewhat higher state, provided that not all are reserved: decency indeed can demand that we ascend moderately and gradually to a higher state, but not that we reserve all things for this; indeed it demands that we give certain things from magnificence in alms (prop. 12 condemned by Innocent XI).

7. A prohibition of begging made by the civil magistrate does not free from the obligation of giving alms, because other means are not lacking for satisfying the precept, for example, by distributing money to those who have care of the needy, or to good institutes or works of beneficence.

8. Similarly, payment of a tax from which the poor are helped diminishes the obligation of giving alms, but does not wholly extinguish it, if the tax does not suffice to extinguish the necessities of the poor.

9. Damage also must be averted from neighbor, if it can be averted without grave inconvenience, for example, by warning him to whom it is imminent, or by removing the cause.

934. Practical counsels. - 1. Let almsgiving be a) prudent, to true poor persons, not to the idle (II Thess. III, 10; Eccli. XII, 4); b) willing, that is, cheerful and kindly (II Cor. IX, 7); c) abundant, so that poor persons, even many, are truly relieved (Tob. IV, 9); d) prompt, so that it may be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and into desperation (Prov. III, 28); e) secret and humble (Mt. VI, 1-4); f) just; g) in right order; h) helping all.

2. Let the confessor not easily deny absolution on account of omission of almsgiving, because penitents easily think themselves excused, and because there are few who give absolutely nothing to the poor or to good works, and because a grave obligation in common necessity is not certainly present.

Works of mercy are some corporal, as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; and others spiritual, as to correct those sinning, to teach the ignorant, to console the sorrowful, etc. We shall speak about only two, because they have special difficulties, namely 1st, concerning alms, 2nd, concerning fraternal correction.

I Say 1st. There exists a true precept of dispensing alms to the needy. This is clear both from the general law of charity, by which we are obliged to love our neighbor, and consequently to bring him help in necessity; and from Sacred Scripture, because it is said, Ecclus. iv, 1: "Defraud not the poor of alms"; and Matt. xxv, 42: "Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire ... for I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave me not to drink."

I Say 2nd. This precept is hypothetic in two ways, because it supposes not only indigence or necessity in the one receiving alms, but also superfluity in the one giving. Now just as a threefold necessity is assigned by theologians, namely extreme, grave, and common, as was explained above, so a twofold superfluity is distinguished. For some goods of fortune are superfluous to life or nature, because without them some persons, and those whose care they have, can exist or live; others are superfluous to state or decency, when some persons, and those whose care they have, do not need them in order to live honestly or decently according to their state, for example, by supporting servants, receiving guests, and establishing banquets according to custom. - Cf. St. Thom. in 4, dist. 15, q. 2, art. 4, q. 1; and 2-2, q. 32, art. 5. - Baller., note (a), p. 194.

But so that you may apply this doctrine practically, attention must be given to the following rules:

Rule I. In extreme necessity one's neighbor must be succored even and only from goods necessary to one's state; even indeed, because the right order of charity requires that the life of one's neighbor prevail over our good that is far inferior; but only, because our life is nearer to us than the life of one's neighbor.

Rule II. In grave necessity which approaches extreme necessity, one's neighbor must be succored from goods in some way necessary to one's state, or with moderate detriment to one's state. But in that necessity which is not so great, it is enough that he be succored from goods which are superfluous to state or decency. - Cf. Viva, on proposition 12 condemned by Innocent XI, n. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 31.

Rule III. In common necessity, although there is no obligation of giving alms to this or that person in particular, nevertheless, by the common opinion of the Doctors, he cannot be excused from sin who, having goods even superfluous to his state, would never wish to bestow any alms. - Cf. Suarez, disp. 7, sect. 3, n. 7.

Question 1. Does the precept of alms oblige under grave sin?

Response. The precept of giving alms is indeed grave of itself, like the very precept of charity; but it must not be said that it always presses under grave sin in every necessity. In extreme necessity indeed, and in grave necessity which approaches extreme necessity, or can soon turn into it, it is commonly taught that it presses under grave sin. But it is controverted among the Doctors not only whether there is a grave obligation of giving alms to some poor man in particular who asks it while he labors under simply grave necessity, but also whether someone is bound under grave sin to relieve the poor in general who are in common necessity. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 194, note (a), p. 195, and note (a), p. 196.

Question 2. What quantity of goods must be given to the poor?

Response. In extreme necessity, or one so grave that it can easily become extreme, as much must be given as suffices here and now for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who are willing to assist him. Yet no one is bound to dispense a great sum of money to free a poor man from danger of death, or to procure extraordinary and costly remedies for him. But in common necessity a determined quantity cannot be assigned, but it seems more probable that it is enough to dispense the fiftieth part of those things which remain over one's state. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 31 and 32; and Hom. Ap., n. 19.

Fraternal correction, or rather reproof, is an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults, fraternal, proceeding from charity.

I said 1st, rather reproof, because the amendment of a brother is procured not through fear of what is sorrowful, but through hatred and fear of what is disgraceful. I said 2nd, fraternal, because even when it is done by a prelate, it is done outside the order of prelacy. I said 3rd, of faults, and not of sins, because it regards more and properly the omission which is in transgression than the perversity of the transgression. - Cf. St. Thom. in 4, dist. 19, q. 2, art. 1. Baller., note (a), p. 200.

I Say 1st. There exists a true precept of fraternal correction. This is clear both from the law of charity, by which we are obliged to remove the evils of our neighbor, and from Sacred Scripture, for example, Ecclus. xix, 14: "Correct thy neighbor ... lest perhaps he repeat it"; and Matt. xviii, 15: "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and correct him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother."

I Say 2nd. For the strict obligation of this precept there is required: 1st, that there be certainty concerning the transgression or fault of one's neighbor; 2nd, that there shine forth some hope, indeed a greater probability, of amendment; 3rd, that there not be another equally suitable person who is believed likely to correct; 4th, that the correction can be made without grave inconvenience of the one correcting; 5th, that it is judged necessary for the amendment of the delinquent, and that there be at least no probable hope that he will amend himself of his own accord. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 38 and following.

Question 1. Does the precept of fraternal correction oblige under grave sin?

Response. Affirmatively, if the required conditions are present, and it is a matter of grave matter. Hence he can sin gravely who, from vain fear that his neighbor may be offended somewhat, or that he himself may suffer a slight detriment from it, omits correction in a grave matter, where he thinks that it would truly be useful. Indeed, sometimes it can happen that in religious orders there is a grave obligation, although the matter is light, when namely venial transgressions are of such a kind that they dissolve or even greatly diminish the vigor of discipline. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 33, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 37. - Baller., note (p), p. 200.

Question 2. Does the precept of correction have place where someone sins from ignorance?

Response. Affirmatively, if it is a question of vincible ignorance, because this does not excuse from sin. But if the ignorance is invincible, it is not so much a question of fraternal correction as of warning by which one's neighbor is taught the truth. Now in the case charity can impel in many ways, namely: 1st, on account of harm to a third party; 2nd, on account of harm to the ignorant person himself; 3rd, on account of scandal; 4th, on account of the honor of God; 5th, on account of irreverence toward religion. But if no harm or inconvenience would follow, there will be almost no obligation of giving warning, except as regards those who by their office ought to teach others, among whom there is also the confessor. But they are to be taught, both because ignorance is an evil of the ignorant person himself, and because other inconveniences can and usually do flow from it.

Question 3. What order must be observed in fraternal correction?

Response. The order assigned by Christ himself is to be observed, unless circumstances advise otherwise. Hence 1st, correct secretly; 2nd, before witnesses, if the first admonition does not suffice; 3rd, refer the matter to the superior. - Sometimes that order can and must be inverted, namely: 1st, if the sin is public or soon to be made public; 2nd, if it is gravely harmful to another; 3rd, if secret admonition is not judged likely to profit; 4th, if it is better to manifest the matter at once to the superior; 5th, if the delinquent has yielded his right, as happens in various religious orders. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 40.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Fraternal correction is to be made with true charity, even as to the manner; therefore it ought to be paternal toward inferiors, kind among equals, and reverential toward superiors.

2nd. Private persons among themselves are rarely bound to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are joined among themselves familiarly; because rarely are all the required conditions found; still more rarely toward superiors.

3rd. For the most part prudence advises that correction be omitted toward those whose disposition is wholly unknown, lest by receiving correction with an evil spirit they become worse.

4th. The scrupulous are ordinarily excused from the office of fraternal correction, because either they are wearied too much by it, or they are entirely unsuited for it; for, disturbed by scruples and anxieties, they lack the necessary discretion for correcting, and are unable to attend to excusing causes.

5th. In communities living under rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc., it is for the most part expedient that correction be made by way of denunciation to the superior, either by oneself or through another; nor can members or fellow residents be absolved who do not consent to denunciation of this kind, where it is a question of grave harm to the community or to religion. Likewise, by natural law, corrupting priests who inflict great spiritual harm on the faithful, or are certainly foreseen as going to inflict it, must be denounced to ecclesiastical superiors.

6th. Yet the denunciation which is made to the superior as to a father, and which is called evangelical, must be carefully distinguished from the other which is made to him as to a judge, and is called judicial. The former, which properly pertains to fraternal correction, regards the good of the one denounced; the latter tends to the good of others, especially the common good, or of the denouncer himself. - Now where a denunciation is made to a superior merely as to a father, he can in no way proceed as judge. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 203.

7th. With relation to those who have yielded their right, let the following things be noted. If it is certain that a brother has amended an occult sin, and there is no need to fear danger of relapse or harm to himself or another, it is not licit, unless he consents, to denounce him to a superior. For although justice would not be injured, charity would certainly be injured, which obliges us to succor our neighbor with the least harm to him, and not to do to another what you do not want done to yourself. Besides, if an immediate superior by himself alone can amend the delinquent so that no danger of relapse or harm to himself or the community threatens, it does not seem licit to manifest the fault to a mediate superior. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 42.

8th. Whenever there is fear that some grave harm will follow from a brother's vice, let the matter be referred to the superior, as to a father, sincerely, from a pure intention, with prayer having been premised; let the bare fact be narrated, without exaggeration, in the manner in which you would wish a similar fact of yours to be narrated. In this way you will often gain your brother for Christ, while on the contrary, if this fraternal disclosure is neglected, it can happen that your brother becomes worse day by day.

9th. It must be noted 1st, that there is in no way an obligation of investigating; for this is the duty only of superiors; 2nd, nor is it lawful for anyone to investigate the deeds of others, Prov. xxiv, 15: "Seek not wickedness in the house of the just and waste not his rest"; 3rd, that such inquiry is vicious, for it generates many harms.

10th. Voluntary accusers not only are not easily to be heard, but rather to be guarded against and even warned that, taking care of themselves, they should forget others. Often such persons are enemies of domestic peace.

(St. Thomas, q. 32.)

Eleemosyna in Greek is the same as misericordia in Latin; in common usage, however, mercy is taken for the virtue or habit, and alms for the act: It can be defined¹⁷¹ as « the work by which something is given to one in need out of compassion, on account of God. » In which definition alms is not taken, as it often is, for the thing given, but for the act of giving. It is said, « on account of God, » because here we are dealing with Christian almsgiving, as distinguished from philosophical almsgiving, which is done by a pagan or anyone else without order to God. ¹⁷¹ Hic q. 32, a. 1, o.

It is an act elicited by mercy¹⁷²; for mercy is « the virtue inclining the will to compassion for and relief of another's misery, » and it is commanded by charity; for mercy is an effect of charity and is born, so to speak, from its innermost parts, since from love of neighbor there is born the will to relieve his misery, which we regard as our own. But if alms be done from another motive, say to make satisfaction for sins, it will be an act commanded by religion. ¹⁷² Ibid.

Alms are of two kinds¹⁷³ , corporal and spiritual, according to the twofold misery or defect of man, namely of body and soul. ¹⁷³ Ibid., a. 2, o.

There are seven corporal works of mercy¹⁷⁴ , namely to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, and to bury the dead, which are contained in this verse. ¹⁷⁴ Ibid. in arg. 1.

I visit, I give drink, I feed, I ransom, I cover, I gather up, I entomb.

There are also seven spiritual works of mercy¹⁷⁵ , namely to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to correct the sinner, to forgive offenses, to bear burdensome and heavy burdens, and to pray for all, which are also contained in this verse. ¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

Counsel, correct, console, forgive, bear, pray.

Yet so that under τὸ consule both counsel and doctrine are understood.

You will ask 1° whether one satisfies the precept of almsgiving by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit to a poor man.

Before the answer, note that someone can be doubly poor: simply and secundum quid. I call poor simply he who neither in act, here or elsewhere, has goods, nor is in proximate potency to have them; poor secundum quid, who, although he does not have here goods by which he can now be helped, nevertheless has them elsewhere, or is in proximate potency to have them, whether through skill and industry, or through an expected inheritance.

I answer. 1°. The precept of almsgiving is not satisfied by relieving him who is simply poor by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit.

It is proved. 1° Because it is certain that alms is of precept. Now to lend money, lend goods, sell on credit, is not to give alms; for alms is given gratis, nor do those who ask a loan, a loan of goods, or buy on credit, said to be asking alms. Therefore. 2° It would be inhuman and ridiculous to give to a poor man who has nothing, neither in fact nor in hope, under the condition of restoring later. Therefore.

I answer. 2°. The precept of almsgiving is satisfied by relieving the poor man secundum quid by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit; because the poor man secundum quid is not truly poor, and his present necessity is removed by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit. Understand this of greater alms, not of small ones; for it is unusual, and would be inhuman, to bind beggars to repayment.

[You will ask 2° how much the rich are held to disburse to the poor.

Answer. They are not held to expend all their superfluity thus; but neither does it suffice to disburse so moderate a part, relative to the amount of their substance, that, if other rich men used the same frugality, relief would be lacking to the poor. But commonly it is judged that the rich satisfy this obligation by giving to the poor placed in common need a fiftieth part of their revenues; which proportion can be diminished when riches greatly exceed¹⁸⁶. Except beneficed clerics, who are held to distribute all their superfluous goods to the poor or to pious works and places, as will be seen in its place. ¹⁸⁶ St. Lig., lib. III, n. 32.

You will ask 3° from what goods alms ought or can be given.

Answer. 1° From one's own, of which one has free administration^{187 187} Ibid., n. 33.

I say, « from one's own, » because it is not licit out of goods subject to restitution; nor licit for those burdened with debt, to the damage of creditors; nor licit for sons out of the goods of parents, nor servants out of the goods of heirs, unless pardon be duly granted them. I say, « of which one has free administration. » Whence a wife ought not bestow extraordinary alms without the consent of her husband, except from her own goods, namely those whose dominion and full administration she herself enjoys and whose fruits she receives. Yet she can make ordinary and common alms from domestic goods, according to the custom of wives of her condition; and this even while the husband forbids it, since he does not reasonably oppose it, and custom grants this right to wives.

Answer. 2° From the goods of another, if either the poor man be in extreme necessity, and alms cannot be given him from his own; or the owner consents, or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence it is licit for sons to bestow small alms, and for servants bread and the like¹⁸⁸. ¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 2°.

Likewise tutors can give from the goods committed to them those modest alms which they would owe to give, since they hold the person of the pupils¹⁸⁹] ¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 3°

You will ask 4° whether alms can be made from things illicitly acquired.

Answer. If the acquisition itself is illicit and unjust, as in theft and rapine, it is not licit; because those things are subject to restitution, unless perhaps the poor man were in extreme necessity, who could not otherwise be relieved.

But if the acquisition itself is not illicit, yet that from which one acquires is illicit, as when a woman acquires through prostitution, it is licit; because, although she practices prostitution disgracefully, nevertheless in what she receives she does not act unjustly. You have this matter disputed at length in the treatise on Contracts, dissertation I, article 8.

You will ask 5° who can give alms.

Answer. Speaking per se, he and only he can give alms who has free administration of his own goods¹⁹⁰. For this see dissertation II on Contracts, article 2, § 2, where we discuss who can donate, and resolve many questions concerning minors, sons of families, wives, and religious, which pertain to the present question. Compare also dissertation II on Justice, article 3. ¹⁹⁰ Ibid., a. 8, o.

You will ask 6° whether clerics are more strictly bound than laymen to alms.

Answer. Affirmatively, especially from ecclesiastical goods superfluous to suitable support. For this see more in dissertation III on Justice, article 3, conclusion 2.

You will ask 7° whether a feigned poor man sins by begging and receiving alms, and whether he is bound to restore them.

Answer. Affirmatively; because givers are not judged to give except to a poor man, and under that tacit condition that he be poor. Whence this donation is null, and the reception theft, according to the Roman Catechism, part III, on the 7th precept of the Decalogue, n. 17, 5°: « Theft, he says, moreover, they seem also to commit who make promises with simulated words, or extort money by deceitful begging; whose sin is the graver because they heap falsehood upon theft. » Therefore they must restore to true poor men, because donors are judged to have renounced the dominion of these alms in favor of the poor.

Some except small and ordinary alms; because, they say, these are presumed to be given absolutely. But that presumption does not seem to us sufficiently founded. Yet if someone were truly poor, but feigned himself poorer, that he might obtain an alms more easily or larger, he does not seem bound to restitution; because it is common opinion that the poor ordinarily exaggerate their poverty, and donors presuppose it.

[You will ask 8° whether one appointed to the distribution of alms can retain a part for himself, if he be truly poor.

Answer. Affirmatively, since he is not in a worse condition than the other poor¹⁹¹. Except, however, unless designated poor persons be given the alms, to the exclusion of any others. ¹⁹¹ Hic q. 32, a. 9, ad 3.

You will ask 9° whether magistrates can hinder foreign poor from begging in their places.

Answer. That they cannot hinder all altogether; because there are many poor who are forced to go into exile from their native places, whether by sentence of a judge, or because they have enemies there or have suffered disgrace, or because cities and villages have been devastated either by incursion of enemies or by fire; and these must still live. Whence then shall they live, if repelled by all? Hence it is clear that magistrates who absolutely and indiscriminately forbid the poor to beg in their territories impede the lawful use of charity and injure the right of the poor.

You will ask 10° whether alms should be given voluntarily to poor men who, if they wished, would not be in need.

Answer. Alms ought to be given to those who are voluntarily poor on account of Christ and from love of virtue, whether in religion or outside it, as were St. Benedict Joseph Labre; because they abase themselves into this state for a just cause and from divine vocation, and in them is found the object of mercy. See the Angelic Doctor, below q. 187, a. 3, 4 and 5, and the Opuscule Against Those Who Attack Religion. But alms is not to be given to those who are poor from laziness, love of idleness, and greed for gain: partly because it is not licit for them to beg, partly because charity exercised thus toward them would nourish their idleness and greed. Yet one ought not inquire too curiously about the condition of beggars, lest perhaps true poor men be defrauded of aid necessary to them. For there are many who do not dare declare themselves poor out of shame; but less is the inconvenience of giving to one not in need, than of denying one in need.]

I. Question I. What is almsgiving? Answer. It is a work by which something is given to one in need, out of compassion, for God's sake; or it is the relieving of another's misery for God's sake. This act is elicited by the virtue of mercy, and commanded by charity, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 32, art. 1. In almsgiving there is a twofold respect: one to God, the other to the Neighbor. Insofar as it regards God, it pertains to legal justice, because God imposes upon all the riches which he grants to men a tribute to be paid to the poor. According as it regards the relieving of the Neighbor's misery, it is a work of mercy, commanded and directed by charity, as has been said. For what to the Latins is misericordia, to the Greeks is eleemosyna.

II. Now there are seven offices of corporal mercy: 1. to visit the sick and those detained in prison; 2. to give drink to the thirsty; 3. to feed the hungry; 4. to redeem captives; 5. to clothe the naked; 6. to receive pilgrims with hospitality; 7. to bury the dead — all of which are enclosed in this verse:

I visit, give drink, feed, redeem, clothe, gather in, and bury.

III. There are likewise seven offices of spiritual mercy, namely: 1. to give counsel to the doubting; 2. to teach the ignorant; 3. to correct offenders; 4. to console the afflicted; 5. to remit offenses; 6. to bear patiently the injuries inflicted and the defects of one's neighbor; 7. to pray for all — all of which are comprehended in this other verse:

Counsel, reprove, teach, console, forgive, bear, and pray.

All these things St. Thomas teaches at greater length, II-II, q. 32, art. 2, and we shall expound them below.

IV. Question II. Is almsgiving commanded by natural and divine law? Answer. It is affirmed. The poor man and the rich are two contraries, but two things most necessary. If all abounded in the same riches, or all were in need, there would be no bond of necessity among them, no society: no one would need another's help, nor would one be subject to another; no one a servant, no one a master; the occasion of exercising charity and mercy would be wanting, and the patience of need and poverty would be absent. Wherefore it must be that some are rich and others poor, that all may live bound together by a strong and perpetual bond of love.

I. The concupiscence of the flesh and the cupidity of riches are the most frequent and most deadly reefs, upon which the rich above all dash their souls. For either they squander the riches granted them by God — burdened with the charge of laying out what is over and above upon the poor — in glutting concupiscence and satisfying lust, in fattening harlots and fostering luxury and pomps; or they retain and heap them up in the strongbox, that they may indulge an insatiable avarice. Wherefore, just as the holy Scriptures and the Fathers, so also Pastors and Confessors ought to press the rich with every kind of argument and force of eloquence to fulfill this most grave precept. Hence it is by no means to be turned to my fault, if even in this compendium I have inculcated at some length a truth of the highest moment.

II. St. Basil, homily 6, from the various homilies: Let almsgiving and faith not forsake thee. Likewise: Break thy bread to the hungry. But his barns, weighed down with the multitude of fruits, were bursting, while his sparing and tenacious heart was by no means satisfied ... What shall I do? he says ... Acknowledge, O man, him who gave ... by what grace thou hast been set over so many. Thou art a minister of the most good God, a dispenser to thy fellow-servants. Think not that all which thou hast in thy hands is prepared for thy belly; esteem them as another's: for a little while they will gladden thee, then, flowing away, they will pass by; and an account of them will be sharply exacted of thee ... Plainly thou usest imprudent counsel. "What shall I do?" The answer was ready for thee: I will fill the souls of the hungry, I will open my barns, and I will call all the needy, I will imitate Joseph, etc. And a little below: Imitate, O man, at least the earth: bring forth fruits as it does, that thou be not seen to be worse than that which is without a soul. For surely it strives to minister not to its own use or advantage, but to thine ... Then he adds a beautiful likeness: Wells continually drawn from flow with more copious and far more beautiful water, but if left alone and quiet they easily grow foul: so also riches hoarded and at rest are useless; but when they are moved and transferred, they bring forth public advantage and fruit ... Thou wilt say: Whom do I injure, if I keep what is mine? What things are thine, tell me? Whence didst thou bring these in, when thou camest to pass through this present life? ... Didst thou not come forth naked from thy mother's womb, and naked wilt thou return again to the earth? ... Why art thou rich, and he poor? Assuredly for no other cause than that thou mayest receive the reward of benignity and of faithful administration ... It is the bread of the hungry which thou retainest; it is the garment of the naked which thou guardest in thy chest; the shoe of the unshod which molders with thee; the silver of the needy which thou possessest buried in the earth. Likewise in homily VII against the rich, discoursing of that young man who, hearing from Christ the Lord, Matthew 19, Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, went away sad, Basil writes as follows: It seems to me that what befell this young man, or those like him, is what is wont to befall one who makes a journey desirous of seeing the spectacle of some city, and hastens as far as the walls: there, finding an inn, he rests, and out of sloth and idleness refuses to go the little that remains of the way — at once rendering vain the labor of the journey he had endured, and shutting himself out from the spectacles of the good things he might have seen in the city. Such also are those men who observe the other commandments, but limp when it comes to the laying out of their goods. I have seen many fasting, praying, sighing in penance for things past — showing, in fine, every piety that costs nothing, but giving not so much as an obol to the needy. What does the rest of their diligence in the virtues profit them? Not for that will they attain the kingdom of God. Therefore, says the Lord, it is more difficult for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle ... What wilt thou, wretch, answer the judge? Thou clothest thy walls, and clothest not a man? Thou adornest thy horses with trappings, and despisest thy brother clad in torn rags? Thou destroyest thy grain by hoarding it, and lookest not upon the hungry?

III. St. John Chrysostom, above the other Fathers, most eloquently sets forth and amplifies the duty, the force, the merit, and the reward of almsgiving. In homily 35 on Genesis he has these words: Let us spend the abundance of our money upon the salvation of souls, and lay out what is superfluous upon the needy. For why, tell me, dost thou permit thy son to squander the gold and silver which ought to have been emptied into the bellies of the poor, by storing it up in a safe storehouse, that at the time when thou hast most need of their aid thou mayest find consolation; and that those who have been fed by thee here may elsewhere open the doors of confidence to thee, and receive thee into their eternal tabernacles? Let us also not suffer our garments to be gnawed by worms and to rot unused in our chests, when there are so many who are in need and walk about naked. But let us venerate and give honor to Christ naked rather than to moths; and let us clothe him who for our salvation wills to walk about naked, that when we have clothed him we may hear on that day: I was naked, and you clothed me. Are the precepts burdensome? Those things, he says, which perish, which are gnawed by worms, which are consumed without use or fruit — dispense these, that they may become useful to thee, and that thou mayest escape the harm of loss, and that from them thou mayest gain for thyself the greatest profit.

IV. The same, homily VII on Luke: It is robbery not to impart of one's own means to the poor. And perhaps what I say seems strange to you. But wonder not; I will bring you a testimony from the divine Scriptures. Thus the Lord, accusing the Jews through the Prophet, says: The earth hath brought forth her increase, and you have not brought in the tithes; but the robbery of the poor is in your houses. Because, he says, you did not give the accustomed oblations, you have robbed the things that are the poor's. And this he says declaring that they possess the goods of the poor, even if they have come to them by paternal inheritance.

V. The same, homily IV on Genesis: Let us see how great a force of abundance liberal almsgiving possesses, that, when thou hast learned the gain which is born of it, thou mayest do it eagerly. For perhaps its power is so great that it can not only purge sins, but even put death to flight. And who, someone will say, giving alms has been made superior to death? Surely we have all seen them come under the power of death. Be not troubled, beloved; but learn how the force of almsgiving has conquered even the tyranny of death. Tabitha clothed widows, and furnished them other expenses. And it came to pass that, falling ill, she died. But those whom she cared for, and whom she clothed, stood about the Apostle, showed him the garments which Dorcas made for them, and moved the Apostle to compassion: who, kneeling down and praying, said: Tabitha, arise. And she opened her eyes, and seeing Peter, sat up; and giving her his hand, he lifted her up, and calling the saints and widows, presented her alive. Hast thou seen how great is the retribution of beneficence toward widows, even in this present life?

VI. St. Augustine, in book 1 of the homilies, in the homily on exhorting to almsgiving, homily XIX, inculcates these things: That reading, brethren, which we have just now heard from the holy Gospel, exhorts us to give alms; and it exhorts us in such a way that in his judgment the Lord imputes to those on the right hand these alms alone as done, and to those on the left these alone as undone — not that the other deeds of men, whether good or evil, do not come into judgment, for it is written that all things shall come to judgment; and yet our Lord Jesus Christ, foretelling to us his future judgment, chose nothing whereby to admonish us but alms alone. Shall it not be said to those on the right hand: because you lived chastely, because you did not seize the goods of others, because you confessed my faith even unto blood? For all these good deeds must needs be honored in the judgment of Jesus Christ. Again, do you think it will not be said to those on the left: because you were unchaste, because you fornicated, because you seized the goods of others, because by your pride and evil morals you caused my name to be blasphemed? And he enumerates all these other things; yet our Lord, foretelling to us his judgment, keeps silence about all the other right deeds of the just, and has deigned to commemorate alms alone. He kept silence about all the evils of his enemies, and judged that the barrenness of almsgiving alone was to be rebuked — for no other reason than to admonish us. Why is this? Because all crimes are redeemed by almsgiving. Therefore he praised that fruitfulness, and blamed and condemned this dryness. But you hear that all evil deeds are redeemed by alms. Do not understand it as certain men perversely understand it. For alms can profit you for blotting out past sins, if you change your ways. But if you persevere in the same evils, you will not corrupt the judgment of God by your alms. Likewise sermon 42, On the season: Surely you see that in the evangelical reading the Lord named nothing of all the virtues but almsgiving alone, which works with charity. Of the branches he kept silence; he named the root only, saying thus: Come, ye blessed, receive the kingdom. For I was hungry, etc. Likewise in his exposition on Psalm 44: Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth, where the moth and rust destroy, and where thieves dig through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven. Come with gifts, give alms, and all things are clean unto you. Come with gifts to him who says: "I will have mercy rather than sacrifice." Likewise sermon 62, On the season: Yet in return for the fact that he cannot fast, he ought to lay out the more upon the poor, so that the sins which he cannot cure by fasting he may be able to redeem by giving alms. It is good to fast, brethren; but it is better to give alms. If there be no possibility of fasting, almsgiving suffices thee without fasting; but fasting without almsgiving does not suffice at all.

VII. Tremendous are the testimonies of the Fathers; but most tremendous are the oracles and threats of Christ. Woe to you that are rich: woe to you, because you have your consolation: woe to you, for you shall mourn and weep. How hardly (it is Christ who exclaims, not a Rigorist, nor a Jansenist) shall they that have money enter into the kingdom of God! For it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire: for I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc. Who does not tremble, who is not aghast, at these formidable oracles of Christ?

VIII. The rich excuse themselves as lacking superfluous riches. Which pretext St. Augustine routs in this fashion, on Psalm 147: But we have many superfluous things, if we keep only what is necessary. For if we seek empty things, nothing suffices. Brethren, seek what suffices for the work of God, not what suffices for your cupidity. Your cupidity is not the work of God ... Seek the things that suffice, and you will see how few they are. Two small coins sufficed the widow for doing mercy; two coins sufficed for buying the kingdom of God ... Therefore see how much he has given you, and take from it what suffices. The rest, which lies superfluous, is the necessity of others. The superfluities of the rich are the necessities of the poor. The goods of others are possessed when superfluities are possessed. Where the rich keep stored that superfluity which they deny they have, St. John Chrysostom shows, homily XI on Paul's epistle to the Romans: Thou appliest thyself to robbery and avarice, not pressed by poverty, nor driven to it by hunger, but that the bridle of thy horse, the roof of thy house, the capitals of thy columns may be lavishly gilded. But this very thing — how great a hell does it deserve, when thou drivest thy brother headlong into infinite calamities (thy brother who has been made a partaker with thee of the hidden goods, and has been so far honored by his Lord), in order that thou mayest adorn stones and the pavement of thy house, and the bodies of animals lacking reason? That thou shouldst be so solicitous in taking care to feed dogs, while a man — or rather, let me say, Christ himself — is driven for a dog's sake to the utmost hunger? What is more pestilential than this confusion? What more deadly than this iniquity? How many rivers of fire, in the end, can suffice to feed upon a soul of this kind? Behold, he who was fashioned to the likeness of God lies ragged and unseemly through thy inhumanity; while the mules that carry thy wife, and the hides and timbers of which that roof is woven, glitter with much gold; and if a seat or a footstool is to be made, everywhere gold, everywhere silver. But the member of Christ, he for whom God came down from heaven to us and poured out his precious blood, has not through thy avarice even the necessary food? And the little couches are girt about on all sides with silver, adorned on all sides; while the bodies of the saints lack even a necessary covering; and Christ himself is of less account to thee than thy mules, than thy couch, than thy seat, than thy footstool.

IX. Another pretext of the rich is a certain fictitious will of bestowing upon the poor at the time of death. Which illusion St. Basil thus explodes in homily VII against the rich: But, thou sayest, I wish indeed to enjoy my goods while I live; but after death I shall inscribe the poor in my testament as heirs and lords of my means. Alas, wretch! Then wilt thou be benign and liberal to men, when thou art no longer among men? When I look upon thee a corpse, then shall I call thee a lover of thy brother? Doubtless thou wilt be worthy of great praise for liberality; great honor or thanks will be owed thee, if, lying in the tomb and turned to earth, thou appearest magnificent and lavish. Tell me, for what time above all wilt thou demand the reward — for life, or for death? For if, having consumed in pleasures the time which is given for earning merit, thou hast by no means looked upon the poor, what action or work wilt thou, being dead, seek reward for? ... Dost thou study to perform fair and commendable works with ink and tablets? Who will announce to thee the time of thy departure? Who is surety for the manner of thy death? How many do we see extinguished suddenly, by violence and by accident, who through the anguish of pain and of breath could not so much as utter a word? How many has fever put beside their senses? Why then dost thou await a time in which thou wilt often not be master of thy own reason? For indeed the night is deep, the sickness grave, no helper at hand: nay rather, he who lies in wait for the inheritance will be present and ready, urging on only all the things that make for his own advantage, and seeking to frustrate thy counsels ... And if nevertheless it happen that thy goods be openly disposed of both by word and in writing, one letter transposed, one sign not rightly placed, will be able to change the whole sentence and make it void. Likewise two or three dishonest witnesses will turn the whole inheritance over to others.

X. The third excuse of the rich is love of their children, for whose advantage they believe it licit to lay up treasure for themselves. Which empty invention St. Augustine thus disapproves in his book On the ten strings, chapter 12: Do not, under the image of piety, increase your money. I am keeping it, you say, for my children. A great excuse: I am keeping it for my children. Let us see. Your father keeps it for you; you keep it for your children; your children for their children, and so through them all; and no one will be doing the precepts of God. Why do you not rather lay out all upon him who made you from nothing? He who made you, he feeds you; from these things which he made, he himself feeds your children too. For you do not commit your patrimony better to your son than to your Creator. And men do indeed lie. Avarice is evil, they say. They wish to cloak and whitewash themselves with the name of piety, so that men may seem to keep for their children's sake what they keep out of avarice. For that you may know that this often happens, it is said of someone: Why does he not give alms? Because he keeps it for his children. It happens that he loses one of them. If he kept it for his children's sake, let him send after that one his portion. Why does he keep it in his purse, and let it go from his heart? Give him what is his; give what you were keeping for him. He is dead, you say. But he has gone on ahead to God: his portion is owed to the poor; it is owed to him to whom he has gone; it is owed to Christ, for to him he has gone; and he said: What you did to one of the least of mine, you did to me; and what you did not do to one of these least, you did not do to me. But what do you say? I keep it for his brothers. If he were alive, was he not going to divide with his brothers? O dead faith! For your son is dead. Whatever you say, you owe to him dead what you were keeping for him alive. My son is dead; but nevertheless I keep my son's portion for his brothers. If you believe that he is dead — if Christ did not die for him, then he himself is dead. But if faith is in you, your son lives. He lives assuredly; he has not departed, but gone before. With what face will you come to your son who has gone before, when to him going before you send not his portion into heaven? Or can it not be sent into heaven? It can, assuredly. Hear the Lord himself saying: Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven. If, then, that treasure is better guarded in heaven, is it then to be sent to your son when, if it were sent, it would not perish? Is it held here, where it can perish, and not sent thither, where Christ is the keeper? ... You see, brethren, that it is a lie: my brethren, it is a lie: men are avaricious ... How much do you give to hunters, how much to base persons, how much do you give to those who kill you?

XI. The fourth illusion of the rich is excessive thought about tomorrow; which deception St. Augustine refutes in sermon 43, On various matters: Avarice says: Take counsel for the future — to a man who will perhaps not live even until tomorrow. But behold, let him live as long as avarice thinks; not as long as she shows, not as long as she teaches, not as long as she trusts, but as long as she thinks — let him have lived, let him have grown old, let him have made an end: still the old man, bent, leaning on his staff, seeks gain, and hears avarice saying: Take counsel for the future. For what future? Now, already expiring, he says: For your children, she says. Would that we might find at least those old men not avaricious who have no children. To them also, even to such men, even to those who excuse their iniquity by no image of piety, avarice does not cease to say: Take counsel for the future. St. Jerome, epistle 139: Nothing so deceives the human race as that, while men know not the spaces of life, they promise themselves a longer possession of this world. Whence also that excellent saying, that no one is so old, and of so decrepit an age, that he does not still suppose he will live one year more.

XII. Lastly, the rich are wont to object the craftiness of the poor, their frauds and wiles, by which they counterfeit wounds and infirmities. This cruelty of the rich St. John Chrysostom routs in these words, homily 37 to the people: For if he feigns from want and necessity, he feigns because of thy cruelty and inhumanity, which needs the feignings of such persons, and is moved by no mercy. And so his feigning is the herald of thy inhumanity. For when, entreating and supplicating, with pitiable words, anxious and weeping, going about begging the whole day, he cannot procure even necessary food, perhaps he has found out this art, which brings not so much shame and blame upon him as upon thee. For if we were easily moved, never surely would he choose to endure such things. And why do I mention nakedness and shivering? I will say what is far more horrible: that some have been driven to blind their own sons in the flower of their age ... For since, while enjoying the sense of sight, and begging about naked, they moved neither by their age nor by their calamity men inhuman and unmerciful, to so many evils they added another calamity, and that a greater; and, that they might soften their hunger, they judged it would be the lighter thing to be deprived of this common light and of the sun's rays, granted to all mankind, than to fight perpetually with hunger, and to perish by a most wretched death ... Some walk without shoes, others fix sharp nails in their heads, others beg in the very frost with naked body, others, bearing things graver still, offer of themselves a pitiable spectacle ... But how dost thou say: Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy — when thou hast mercy not according to great mercy, and perhaps not even according to small?

I. When I consider the oracles of Christ, and the doctrine of all the Fathers and of the graver Theologians, I tremble in every limb over the salvation of the rich; nor do the benign blandishments of certain men soothe my grief and dread. Extremes indeed must be avoided. Care must be taken lest the yoke of Christ be weighted down more than is right in this cause — which rarely happens. Care must be taken lest we relax it more than is right — which, as is well known, most easily happens from the proscribed opinions, and from others more benign than is fair. Let the Confessors of the rich, then, keep before their eyes the Gospel of Christ Jesus and the doctrine of the holy Fathers.

II. Confessors must beware of flattering the rich. Let them inculcate more deeply the doctrine of Christ concerning their difficult salvation. Let them beware lest the fear of alienating the rich from themselves, and of displeasing them, cause them to soothe and temper the severity of the evangelical doctrine with excessive sweetness. A certain and precise rule cannot be designated, either concerning the acquiring of a higher state, or concerning the increasing of a patrimony within the sphere of the same state. The superfluity of goods, too, is not fixed at any individual point. The rich can keep more things for the future, for dowering their daughters, for providing for their children, for sustaining the burdens of the City or of the Commonwealth, and for repairing other inconveniences which are wont probably to occur. But under these titles avaricious cupidity, ambition, and self-love feign very many things which reduce a most grave precept to nothing.

III. This is certain: that the rich abound in superfluities, when all their burdens, whether present or future, have been weighed. Vain and lying, then, is the excuse of very many rich men who say that they lack superfluities. Against these let Confessors hurl what St. Gregory Nazianzen writes in oration 14 [recte]: Those who have resolved to live softly and delicately are necessarily enticed to devising magnificent apparatus of buildings. In constructing and adorning these, the greatest force of money is poured out. To these they gladly summon and invite assemblies of men; they zealously procure splendid and varied furniture, innumerable kinds of cups, buffoons, mimes, harpers, singers male and female, dancers male and female — in short, the whole sport of wantonness. And while these things are carried on within, there sit at the doors of the vestibule innumerable ragged men, some full of grievous ulcers, some bereft of eyes, some maimed in their feet; they cry out together, and yet are not heard. If God beholds these things — as assuredly he does — what end do you think there will be, O enemies of the poor? Do you not know that it is for the sake of these that all the horrendous and terrible examples are set down and commemorated in the holy Gospel?

IV. In defining the quantity of the alms to be distributed one sticks fast. Christ commands, and the Fathers inculcate, that all superfluities be distributed. But since these superfluities are enclosed within no certain limit, they are not subject to a certain and precise measure. Some of the Theologians assign a tenth part of the revenues, whether coming from landed estates or from industry. Others prescribe a narrower, others an ampler measure.

V. Adriaan Reland, in his On the Mahometan Religion, from page 99, narrates that the Turks burden gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, raisins, camels, oxen, sheep, and plants with a fixed yearly payment of alms, with many conditions added; which payment comes to about five in the hundred. This I note in passing, lest Christian rich men show themselves difficult in laying out alms. But since I cannot myself designate a precise measure, I shall set down what the holy Doctors suggest.

VI. St. Thomas of Villanova, sermon 2 on St. Martin, furnishes this answer: Hear John: He that hath two coats, let him give one to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner. You will say perhaps: To give the half is much. I have a wife and a household to feed. For all these the remaining half would not suffice. To which I say: Zacchaeus had all these; yet, with the Lord approving, he laid out half of his goods upon the poor. Oh, you will say, Zacchaeus was a publican: what wonder if he gave all who had first plundered? Give, then, all that is over. But you will say: If indeed my children did not increase, neither would I increase my inheritance and patrimony; but as children come, the patrimony too must be increased. Well, let it be so: reckon up all these things; give what is over. You will say: I gladly accept; if I reckon all things, much is wanting. Truly it is so: to your cupidity much is wanting, and much would be wanting even if you alone, without a partner, possessed the whole world. I do not wish, then, to bring you to a reckoning. Do as Tobias counseled his son, chapter 4: According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly a little. I do not disapprove if you set aside a certain portion of money, at the judgment of a good man and according to your revenues, to be laid out upon the poor each year. Since, therefore, a certain and precise quantity of alms cannot be prescribed, let us say at least those things which seem to approach nearest to the evangelical doctrine. And first it is certain that those rich men do not keep the precept of almsgiving who out of ample riches impart some worthless leavings and a few pennies to the poor, with no regard had to the abundance of their riches; who feed their dogs more sumptuously than the poor; who pour out money with a lavish hand upon luxury, pomps, banquets, games, and other amusements, but succor the poor only moderately. The rule of holy Tobias, therefore, must be kept before the eyes. Let him who possesses much lay out much; and let those whose patrimonies are slender give slender aids to the poor, which they may impart with the desire of giving more, if they had it. Let the rich behold Christ in the poor; let them reckon themselves as brothers of the poor; let them distribute to them not the worthless scraps of their table and of their riches, but a just portion. Besides the crumbs of the table, then, and those pennies which are wont to be distributed to the beggars they meet, let the rich assign a certain portion of their revenues — greater or less, according to the abundance of their riches — to be imparted to the poor each year.

VII. The rich are wont to object the number of their children, and the dowry of their daughters. To whom Augustine furnishes this answer, sermon 43, On various matters: Make room for Christ along with your children; let your Lord be added to your family, let your Creator be added to your offspring, let your brother be added to the number of your children ... You have two children: reckon him the third. You have three: let Christ be numbered the fourth. You have five: let him be called the sixth. You have ten: let him be the eleventh. I do not wish to say more. Keep for your Lord the place of one child. For what you shall give to your Lord will profit both you and your children. But what you keep ill for your children will harm both you and them. You shall give one portion, which you have allotted to one child.

Most excellently does the Seraphic Doctor in the Diaeta, tit. 2, cap. 7 compare Almsgiving to a radiant light, which ought to be carried not behind, but before a man walking; for Almsgiving is not to be done after death, but before death, more fruitfully, as the wise man says Eccles. 14: before death do good to your friend. But he who does otherwise is like one carrying a light behind him; see there also other splendid similitudes.

I assert that it is an act of Charity.

IT IS PROVED by S. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 14, p. 2, dub. 5, litt. and Book 6 of the Compendium of Theology, cap. 31, and D. Thom. art. 1. External acts pertain to that virtue to which pertains what is the motive of such an act; but the motive for giving Alms is mercy, of which dist. 9, sect. 3 — for in Greek Eleemosyna is named from mercy; and mercy is an effect of Charity, as I showed in the place cited.

Next it is proved by D. Bonavent. in the Diaeta, tit. 2, at the end, because this motive is for the love of God, who ascribes it as given to himself Matthew 25.

Seven kinds of corporal alms are set forth in this verse:

I visit, I give drink, I feed, I redeem, I shelter, I clothe, I bury.

That is, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to receive in the stranger (harbor the harborless), to visit the sick, to redeem the captive, and to bury the dead.

Seven other kinds are of spiritual alms, which are expressed in this verse:

Counsel, rebuke, console, forgive, bear, pray.

To teach the ignorant, to counsel the doubting, to console the sorrowful, to correct the sinner, to forgive offenses, to bear the burdensome and the heavy, and to pray for all.

These are reported by S. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 15, part. 2, dub. 2, litt. and on the seven Gifts, on the Gift of Piety, cap. 1, and in the Diaeta, tit. 7, cap. 4, and Book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, cap. 52, and on Luke 11 in these words: That which remains over, give as alms. D. Thom. here, and the Theologians commonly.

IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctors from the defects of one's neighbors, by whom one can be helped; of which some are on the part of the body; some on the part of the soul, which needs are easily gathered, and among the holy Doctors are clear.

But spiritual alms are intrinsically the greater; nevertheless in some case corporal alms can be the greater; whence in extreme necessity the person failing is rather to be fed than another ignorant one taught, as the holy Doctors teach, Thom. art. 4, and Bonavent. dist. cit. dub 4.

OBSERVES S. Doct. that goods can be, or manifestly another's, or common, or one's own; and that these last can be acquired, either honestly, or disgracefully.

I ASSERT first, that alms cannot be made of another's goods.

IT IS PROVED by D. Bonav. first from all the laws, which enjoin that donations not be made of another's goods, because, he who does not have dominion of a thing, cannot transfer it.

SECONDLY from the Scriptures, Prov. 30. Honor God of thy substance. Ecclus. 34. The oblation of him who sacrificeth from unjust gain is spotted. He that offereth sacrifice of the substance of the poor, is as one that sacrificeth a son in the sight of his father. And below: The Most High approveth not the gifts of the wicked. S. Doct. adds to 11. Eccles. this: Cast thy bread, etc. thine, not another's (says S. Doctor.)

THIRDLY from D. Gregory in the Register, lib. 7. epist. 110. signifying this.

NEITHER let them say, that they wish to make satisfaction for the avaricious owner of those goods, who does not give alms: For it does not pertain to us to compel anyone to that to which he himself is bound, as D. August. says homil. 7. and 50. and it is reported in the Decretis 14. quaest. 5. can. Forte.

But the ASSERTION is understood, when it is done without the consent, at least presumed, of the Owner: for thus a son can give of his Father's goods, a wife of her Husband's, a servant of his Master's, because they can presume the consent of all of them. Yet Valentia adds with D. Bonav. and D. Thom. that in the case of the extreme necessity of one's neighbor, one can give of another's, because then all things are common. So Tanner. disp. 2 quaest. 5. dub. 1. num. 21.

Second assertion. As to common goods, the consent is necessary, either of the community, or of the Prelate, to whom it pertains, as is had in cap. Cum in cunctis, extra de iis, quae fiunt a maiori parte Capituli. And 12. quaest. 1. can. Certum est. As Medina well notes Tract. de eleemosyna, quaest. 4. Valentia disp. 3. quaest. 9. p. 5. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 5. dub. 2. num. 28.

Third assertion. If anyone does not have the administration of goods, he cannot give in alms, as the mentally incapacitated, and minors, as even those already cited note.

Fourth assertion. Those things which are disgracefully acquired, through some unjust business, as usury, a deceitful game, theft, rapine, cannot be given in alms; but they ought to be restored.

It is proved by S. Bonav. to 4. because dominion of these is not had by him who possesses them. As to things gained at dice, if they are acquired from someone who does not have the administration, as from a son, a minor, etc. they ought to be restored. Similarly, if someone led others to an illicit game, such as dice, or another which depends more on fortune than on skill. But truly, if he himself was induced by another, and he won, he is not bound; nevertheless he is called a possessor in bad faith by the laws, as Valentia reports disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5. Nauarr. Manual. cap. 29. and it is had in an. Episcopus, dist. 35. and cap. Clerici 2. Extra de vita, et honest. clericorum, and L. solent, ff. de alea lusu. And Auth. Alearum usus, C. de Relig. et sumpt.

Tannerus adds, that of evilly acquired things, which are not to be restored in specie, alms can be made, the obligation of restitution remaining; but who is ignorant of this?

Fifth assertion, that things acquired in a disgraceful way, which is not against justice, as by meretricious means, can be given in alms. So S. Doct. to 4. D. Thom. art. 7. whom others follow. For that thing belongs to the very acquirer. See Tannetum num. 12.

I add first with D. Bonau. D. Thom. art. 7. and Valentia, that what is acquired through a game, to which he compelled another out of greed for gain, is illegitimately acquired. It is proved, because thus dominion was not transferred with full will.

I add second with D. Bonau. to 4. D. Thom. Valentia, Tanner, that on account of scandal, it is not to be offered to God from meretricious gain, nor accepted; whence it is said Deut. 23. Thou shalt not offer the hire of a harlot into the house of the Lord thy God; which was prohibited only on account of scandal, and irreverence.

S. Doct. adds third, that alms are not commonly to be given from that which is simply necessary for human sustenance, unless we wish to follow the state of perfection, according to the counsel of the Gospel, Matth. 19. If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor.

He notes also, that penitents are not to be compelled to those alms.

From all these you have, with D. Bonau. at the end of the body of the quaest. that all, and only those, can make alms, who have legitimate dominion, and administration. Therefore a married woman cannot make alms from the goods of her husband, but only from her own, as S. August. says epist. 199. So of gained revenues, at least the twentieth part she can give. So Bannes art. 8. Malderus there, Cenedo, Ledefma, Vega, and others, whom Diana reports p. 1. tract. 1. Miscel. resol. 33. Caspensis disp. 6. sect. 3. Tanner. num. 24. But of her own Paraphernal goods she can give generously. Similarly also a son of the Castrense, or quasi-castrense goods; See Valentia p. 6. Diana p. 5. tract. 8. resol. 25. Azorium t. 2. lib. 12. cap. 10. quaestio 1. Hurtadum 2. 2. disp. 159. sect. 6. §. 139. who adds, that a son can pilfer something for honest uses.

Circa those receiving alms, feigning poverty, they are bound to restitution. So commonly the Doctors at Diana 5. p. tract. 8. resol. 21. Fabrum in 4. dist. 50. num. 120. who adds Scotus, Gabriel, Alensis, and others. To these add D. Bonau. Tract. de paupertate, and on the rule of the Minors. Diana adds as to those begging door to door, that they are excused, because in few things the reason is had not of poverty, but of mercy. The restitution of these, however, some say must be made to the giver; others, to the poor. See Diana loc. cit. resol. 22.

Note further, as we said of charity, and its intrinsic order; so must we speak of the extrinsic, as to making alms; that it first be made to those more nearly related, and as S. Doct. taught there, that even sinners, as partners of nature, are to be loved, so I say that alms are also to be bestowed upon them, against Vuiclephus at Vualdensis Tom. 3. lib. 2. doctrinalis fidei antiquae, cap. 81. let it be not to the sinner, as the sinner is obstinate, and in this sense is understood Ecclus. 12. Give to the merciful, and uphold not the sinner, as S. Thom. also has it art. 9. ad 1.

To all of whom alms must be made, S. Doct. teaches to 11. Eccles. Cast thy bread upon the passing waters. The waters are the nations. Apoc. 17. and tribulations Psal. 68. Therefore Luke 14. When thou makest a feast, call the poor, and the feeble, the blind, and the lame.

You will object first, against the first assertion, Luke 16. Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity.

S. Doct. answers that this is to be understood of that which is gained unjustly by accident, not of the unjust against justice; for this ought to be restored.

Or they are called iniquities, because they are the origins of iniquities, as S. Thom. here, and S. Bonau. at that place expound. See the SS. Doctores, alleging other expositions.

You will object secondly. The Hebrews offered for the Sanctuary gold, and silver, stolen from the Egyptians.

S. Doct. answers that God transferred dominion to them; and by the right of wages, those things were owed to them, others note.

As to the quantity of alms of Ecclesiastics, Diana reports resol. 27. that he has devoured all the authors, and that the broadest opinion is, that they give the fourth part of revenues, as Bannes, and Tanner say, or the half of what remains after suitable sustentation.

Titius, a workman who lived in a certain town, had sought in vain for several weeks for work by which he might support himself and his family. The money which he had was already spent, and the family lived on food given by a certain good woman. Yet for several weeks no rent due to the landlord on account of the letting of the house had been paid, and unless it is paid this Saturday, the house will have to be left. Since Titius knew that other housing could scarcely be obtained by a poor man, he went to Caius, a sufficiently wealthy Catholic to whom he was known, and asked him to help toward paying the rent. Caius, however, refused, on the ground that the poor rates were already sufficiently heavy and because he had determined with himself that he would never give alms unless it were necessary for saving someone’s life, since it is established that most beggars are pretended poor persons. But afterward, touched by a scruple because he knew that Titius was placed in true necessity, Caius asked his confessor whether in such a case he was bound to give alms. Hence it is asked:

1. To what does charity oblige in general?

2. What is the obligation of giving alms, and of what kind is it?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. To what in general does charity oblige us? Charity, in general, obliges us to love God above all things, for His own sake, and our neighbor as ourselves, for the sake of God. Love here does not designate a feeling, but an act of the will by which we are determined to cling to God and not to be separated from Him by sin, because we esteem Him above all other things whatever. The first material object of charity is God Himself; the second is our neighbor. Charity for our neighbor obliges us to both internal and external acts. Internally we are bound by the law of charity to wish well to all, to pray for all, and never to allow ourselves any thought, word, or deed, to the injury of any one. This internal love shows itself in deed by helping our neighbor in his necessities as far as we can.

2. Of what sort is the obligation to give alms?

Alms is help given to the indigent in their necessity, and that there is an obligation to help the indigent as far as we can follows from the nature of charity, and from the express words of Holy Scripture in many places.¹ In order to measure the gravity of this obligation, we must consider the necessity in which he who is to be helped is placed, and the capacity of helping him of the person who is to be bound by the obligation. Theologians distinguish three degrees of necessity. A poor man is in extreme necessity when he is in danger of dying from starvation, and can do nothing to help himself. If one is in the same danger, but can, with difficulty, do something to help himself, he is in grave necessity. Ordinary beggars are in common necessity. The goods out of which alms can be given are either necessary for the support of one’s own life and the lives of those who are dependent on us, or are necessary to live in the style suitable to one’s condition in life, or they are superfluous. As a general rule, we are bound to give alms only out of our superfluity. This obligation is grave when we find a neighbor in extreme, or in grave necessity; in the common necessity of another it is probably only light.

1 Compare 1 John iii. 16.

3. The case. Titius was a workman in a certain town, but he had been out of work for several weeks. All his savings had been spent, and his family lived on food given them by a good neighbor. The rent for his house was in arrears and the landlord gave him notice to quit unless the rent was paid by the end of the week. He knew that there was little chance of getting other lodgings in the circumstances, so he went to Caius, a well-to-do Catholic to whom he was known, and asked him for help toward paying his rent. Caius refused on the ground that the poor rates were heavy and because he had made a resolution never to give alms unless to one in extreme necessity. However, Caius was afterward uneasy about what he had done and asked his confessor whether there was an obligation to give alms in such a case.

His confessor will doubtless tell Caius that there is a grave obligation to give alms in such a case as is here given. Titius and his family were in grave necessity, as they were in danger of being thrust out of their home without the prospect of being able to find lodgings elsewhere. Caius knew that this case at any rate was genuine. There was no indication of the help required being obtainable from some other source. Caius could afford what would have been sufficient to relieve the distress of Titius. Under these circumstances Caius was strictly bound by a grave obligation to help a poor fellow-Catholic.¹ The reasons why some theologians allow that grave sin may not be committed by refusing alms in such cases are excluded by the circumstances of this case. It is no excuse to say that the man and his family might have gone to the workhouse. A respectable workman would not unfrequently rather die than subject himself and his family to such a disgrace and moral danger, and such feelings claim our respect and consideration.

1 Compare Matt. xxv. 42.

To Our Venerable Brethren, All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in Peace and Communion With the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics, and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals, and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population ; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension ; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes ; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes,—all are occupied with it, and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions, when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interest of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters on Political Power, on Human Liberty, on the Christian Constitution of the State, and on similar subjects, so now We have thought it useful to speak on the CONDITION OF LABOR. It is a matter on which We have touched once or twice already. But in this Letter the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it free from danger. It is not easy to define the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men’s judgments and to stir up the people to sedition.

But all agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen’s Guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that Working Men have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is, nevertheless, under a different form, but with the same guilt, still practised by avaricious and grasping men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.

To remedy these evils the Socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that, by thus transferring property from private persons to the community, the present evil state of things will be set to rights, because each citizen will then have his equal share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their proposals are so clearly futile for all practical purposes, that if they were carried out the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. Moreover they are emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the State into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession. If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in land, the land in such a case is only his wages in another form; and, consequently, a working man’s little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in this power of disposal that ownership consists, whether the property be land or movable goods. The Socialists, therefore, in endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, for they deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.

What is of still greater importance, however, is that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. For the brute has no power of selfdirection, but is governed by two chief instincts, which keep his powers alert, move him to use his strength, and determine him to action without the power of choice. These instincts are self-preservation and the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which are close at hand ; beyond their surroundings the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by sensibility alone, and by the things which sense perceives. But with man it is different indeed. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of animal nature, and therefore he enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal race, the fruition of the things of the body. But animality, however perfect, is far from being the whole of humanity, and is, indeed, humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and obey. It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings ; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future.

This becomes still more clearly evident if we consider man’s nature a little more deeply. For man, comprehending by the power of his reason things innumerable, and joining the future with the present—being, moreover, the master of his own acts—governs himself by the foresight of his counsel, under the eternal law and the power of God whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice, not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself; for of the products of the earth he can make provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State ; and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State. And to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal human race is not to deny that there can be private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general; not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of individual peoples. Moreover, the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does not live on what the land brings forth. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labor ; so that it may be truly said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one’s own land, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have another proof that private ownership is according to nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life’s well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality ; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.

These arguments are so strong and convincing that it seems surprising that certain obsolete opinions should now be revived in opposition to what is here laid down. We are told that it is right for private persons to have the use the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for any one to possess as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated. But those who assert this do not perceive that they are robbing man of what his own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, it is now fruitful, it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved it becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a man’s sweat and labor should be enjoyed by another? As effects follow their cause, so it is just and right that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.

With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of Nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being preëminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing, in the most unmistakable manner, to the peace and tranquillity of human life. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws,—laws which, as long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority of the Divine Law adds its sanction, forbidding us, in the gravest terms, even to covet that which is another’s: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.^*

^* Deuteronomy v. 21.

The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in a much stronger light if they are considered in relation to man’s social and domestic obligations.

In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning. Increase and multiply.^† Thus we have the Family; the “society” of a man’s own household; a society limited, indeed, in numbers, but a true “ society,” anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth.

^† Genesis i. 28.

That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties. For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. A family, no less than a State, is, as We have said, a true society, governed by a power within itself, that is to say, by the father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the Family has, at least, equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty.

We say, at least, equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State—that is to say, the Families—on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after.

The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here. Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State, nor absorbed; for it has the same source as human life itself. “The child belongs to the father,” and is, as it were, the continuation of the father’s personality; and, to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is begotten. And it is for the very reason that “the child belongs to the father,” that, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, “ before it attains the use of free will, it is in the power and care of its parents.”^* The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and introducing the providence of the State, act against natural justice, and threaten the very existence of family life.

^* St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2æ Q. x. Art. 12.

And such interference is not only unjust, but is quite certain to harass and disturb all classes of citizens, and to subject them to odious and intolerable slavery. It would open the door to envy, to evil-speaking, and to quarrelling ; the sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal equality of which so much is said would, in reality, be the levelling down of all to the same condition of misery and dishonor.

Thus it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be utterly rejected; for it would injure those whom it is intended to benefit, it would be contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and it would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonwealth. Our first and most fundamental principle, therefore, when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This laid down, We go on to show where we must find the remedy that we seek.

We approach the subject with confidence, and in the exercise of the rights which belong to Us. For no practical solution of this question will ever be found without the assistance of Religion and of the Church. It is We who are the chief guardian of Religion, and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the Church, and We must not by silence neglect the duty which lies upon Us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides Ourselves—of the rulers of States, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves for whom We plead. But We affirm without hesitation, that all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church. It is the Church that proclaims from the Gospel those teachings by which the conflict can be put an end to, or at the least made far less bitter; the Church uses its efforts not only to enlighten the mind, but to direct by its precepts the life and conduct of men; the Church improves and ameliorates the condition of the working man by numerous useful organizations; does its best to enlist the services of all ranks in discussing and endeavoring to meet, in the most practical way, the claims of the working classes; and acts on the decided view that for these purposes recourse should be had, in due measure and degree, to the help of the law and of State authority.

Let it be laid down, in the first place, that humanity must remain as it is. It is impossible to reduce human society to a level. The Socialists may do their utmost, but all striving against nature is vain. There naturally exist among mankind innumerable differences of the most important kind; people differ in capability, in diligence, in health, and in strength; an unequal fortune is a necessary result of inequality in condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his case. As regards bodily labor, even had man never fallen from the state of innocence, he would not have been wholly unoccupied ; but that which would then have been his free choice and his delight, became afterwards compulsory, and the painful expiation of his sin. Cursed be the earth in thy work; in thy labor thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.^* In like manner, the other pains and hardships of life will have no end or cessation on this earth; for the consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must be with man as long as life lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let men try as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hardpressed people freedom from pain and trouble, undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they cheat the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only make the evil worse than before. There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is—and at the same time to look elsewhere for a remedy to its troubles.

^* Genesis iii. 17.

The great mistake that is made in the matter now under consideration, is to possess oneself of the idea that class is naturally hostile to class; that rich and poor are intended by nature to live at war with one another. So irrational and so false is this view, that the exact contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the members of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that these two classes should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and outrage. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in making it impossible, the efficacy of Christianity is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is nothing more powerful than Religion (of which the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing rich and poor together, by reminding each class of its duties to the other, and especially of the duties of justice. Thus Religion teaches the laboring man and the workman to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made; never to injure capital, or to outrage the person of an employer; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, or to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their slaves; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to right reason, and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power. Thus, again, Religion teaches that, as among the workman’s concerns are Religion herself and things spiritual and mental, the employer is bound to see that he has time for the duties of piety; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just. Doubtless before we can decide whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but rich men and masters should remember this—that to exercise pressure for the sake of gain, upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold the hire of the laborers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.^* Finally, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workman’s earnings, either by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing ; and with the more reason because the poor man is weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness.

^* St. James v. 4.

Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed, would not strife die out and cease ?

But the Church, with Jesus Christ for its Master and Guide, aims higher still. It lays down precepts yet more perfect, and tries to bind class to class in friendliness and good understanding. The things of this earth cannot be understood or valued rightly without taking into consideration the life to come, the life that will last forever. Exclude the idea of futurity, and the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay, the whole system of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its base—that when we have done with this present life, then we shall really begin to live. God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but for things heavenly and everlasting; He has given us this world as a place of exile, and not as our true country. Money, and the other things which men call good and desirable—we may have them in abundance, or we may want them altogether ; as far as eternal happiness is concerned, it is no matter; the only thing that is important is to use them aright. Jesus Christ, when He redeemed us with plentiful redemption, took not away the pains and sorrows which in such large proportion make up the texture of our mortal life; He transformed them into motives of virtue and occasions of merit: and no man can hope for eternal reward unless he follow in the blood-stained footprints of his Saviour. If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign with Him.^* His labors and His sufferings, accepted by His own free will, have marvellously sweetened all suffering and all labor. And not only by His example, but by His grace and by the hope of everlasting recompense, He has made pain and grief more easy to endure ; for that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.^†

^* II. Timothy ii. 12.

^† II. Corinthians iv. 17.

Therefore those whom fortune favors are warned that freedom from sorrow, and abundance of earthly riches, are no guarantee of the beatitude that shall never end, but rather the contrary ;^* that the rich should tremble at the threatenings of Jesus Christ—threatenings so strange in the mouth of Our Lord ;^† and that a most strict account must be given to the Supreme Judge for all that we possess. The chiefest and most excellent rule for the right use of money is one which the heathen philosophers indicated, but which the Church has traced out clearly, and has not only made known to men’s minds but has impressed upon their lives. It rests on the principle that it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money, and another to have a right to use money as one pleases. Private ownership, as we have seen, is the natural right of man; and to exercise that right, especially as members of society, is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary. It is lawful, says St. Thomas of Aquin, for a man to hold private property ; and it is also necessary for the carrying on of human life.^‡ But if the question be asked, How must one’s possessions be used? the Church replies without hesitation in the words of the same holy Doctor: Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need. Whence the Apostle saith, Command the rich of this world... to give with ease, to communicate.§ True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own necessities and those of his household; nor even to give away what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life; for no one ought to live unbecomingly.|| But when necessity has been supplied, and one’s position fairly considered, it is a duty to give to the indigent out of that which is over. That which remaineth, give alms.¶ It is a duty, not of justice (except in extreme cases), but of Christian charity —a duty which is not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must give place to the laws and judgments of Christ the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving—It is more blessed to give than to receive ;^* and Who will count a kindness done or refused to the poor as done or refused to Himself—as long as you did it to one of My least brethren, you did it to Me.^† Thus to sum up what has been said: Whoever has received from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they be external and corporeal or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the minister of God’s providence, for the benefit of others. He that hath a talent, says St. Gregory the Great, let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him arouse himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and the utility thereof with his neighbor.^‡

^* St. Matthew xix. 23, 24.

^† St. Luke vi. 24, 25.

^‡ 2a 2æ Q. lxvi. Art. 2. § Ibid. Q. lxv. Art. 2. || Ibid. Q. xxxii. Art. 6. ¶ St. Luke xi. 41.

^* Acts xx. 35.

^† St. Matthew xxv. 40.

^‡ St. Gregory the Great. Hom. ix. in Evangel. n. 7.

§ II. Corinthians viii. 9. || St. Mark vi. 3.

¶ St. Matthew v. 3: “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” ** Ibid. xi. 28. “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you.”

As for those who do not possess the gifts of fortune, they are taught by the Church that in God's sight poverty is no disgrace, and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor. This is strengthened by what we see in Christ Himself, Who whereas He was rich, for our sakes became poor ;§ and Who, being the Son of God, and God Himself, chose to seem and to be considered the son of a carpenter—nay, did not disdain to spend a great part of His life as a carpenter Himself. Is not this the carpenter, the Son of Mary?|| From the contemplation of this Divine example it is easy to understand that the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and poor; and that virtue, and virtue alone, wherever found, will be followed by the rewards of everlasting happiness. Nay, God Himself seems to incline more to those who suffer evil; for Jesus Christ calls the poor blessed;¶ He lovingly invites those in labor and grief to come to Him for solace;** and He displays the tenderest charity to the lowly and the oppressed. These reflections cannot fail to keep down the pride of those who are well off, and to cheer the spirit of the afflicted ; to incline the former to generosity and the latter to tranquil resignation. Thus the separation which pride would make tends to disappear, nor will it be difficult to make rich and poor join hands in friendly concord.

But if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also in those of brotherly love. For they will understand and feel that all men are the children of the common Father, that is, of God; that all have the same last end, which is God Himself, Who alone can make either men or angels absolutely and perfectly happy; that all and each are redeemed by Jesus Christ and raised to the dignity of children of God, and are thus united in brotherly ties both with each other and with Jesus Christ, the first-born among many brethren; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to the whole human race, and that to all, except to those who are unworthy, is promised the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven. If sons, heirs also, heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ.^*

^* Romans viii. 17.

Such is the scheme of duties and of rights which is put forth to the world by the Gospel. Would it not seem that strife must quickly cease were society penetrated with ideas like these ?

But the Church, not content with pointing out the remedy, also applies it. For the Church does its utmost to teach and to train men, and to educate them; and by means of its Bishops and clergy it diffuses its salutary teachings far and wide. It strives to influence the mind and heart so that all may willingly yield themselves to be formed and guided by the commandments of God. It is precisely in this fundamental and principal matter, on which everything depends, that the Church has a power peculiar to itself. The agencies which it employs are given it for the very purpose of reaching the hearts of men, by Jesus Christ Himself, and derive their efficiency from God. They alone can touch the innermost heart and conscience, and bring men to act from a motive of duty, to resist their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow-men with a love that is unique and supreme, and courageously to break down every barrier which stands in the way of a virtuous life.

On this subject We need only recall, for one moment, the examples written down in history. Of these things there cannot be the shadow of doubt; for instance, that civil society was renovated in every part by the teachings of Christianity ; that in the strength of that renewal the human race was lifted up to better things,—nay, that it was brought back from death to life, and to so excellent a life that nothing more perfect had been known before, or will come to pass in the ages that have yet to be. Of this beneficent transformation, Jesus Christ was at once the first cause and the final purpose; as from Him all came, so to Him all was to be referred. For when, by the light of the Gospel message, the human race came to know the grand mystery of the Incarnation of the Word and the redemption of man, the life of Jesus Christ, God and Man, penetrated every race and nation, and impregnated them with His faith, His precepts, and His laws. And if Society is to be cured now, in no other way can it be cured but by a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions. When a Society is perishing, the true advice to give to those who would restore it is to recall it to the principles from which it sprung; for the purpose and perfection of an association is to aim at and to attain that for which it was formed; and its operation should be put in motion and inspired by the end and object which originally gave it its being. So that to fall away from its primal constitution is disease; to go back to it is recovery. And this may be asserted with the utmost truth both of the State in general and of that body of its citizens—by far the greater number— who sustain life by labor.

Neither must it be supposed that the solicitude of the Church is so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor, for example, should rise above poverty and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life; and for this it strives. By the very fact that it calls men to virtue and forms them to its practice, it promotes this in no slight degree. Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity, for it merits the blessing of that God Who is the source of all blessings; it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure—twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abundance ;^* it makes men supply by economy for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance.

^* “The root of all evils is cupidity.”—I. Tim. vi. 10.

Moreover, the Church intervenes directly in the interest of the poor, by setting on foot and keeping up many things which it sees to be efficacious in the relief of poverty. Here, again, it has always succeeded so well that it has even extorted the praise of its enemies. Such was the ardor of brotherly love among the earliest Christians that numbers of those who were better off deprived themselves of their possessions in order to relieve their brethren; whence neither was there any one needy among them.^† To the order of Deacons, instituted for that very purpose, was committed by the Apostles the charge of the daily distributions; and the Apostle Paul, though burdened with the solicitude of all the churches, hesitated not to undertake laborious journeys in order to carry the alms of the Faithful to the poorer Christians. Tertullian calls these contributions, given voluntarily by Christians in their assemblies, deposits of piety ; because, to cite his words, they were employed in feeding the needy, in burying them, in the support of boys and girls destitute of means and deprived of their parents, in the care of the aged, and in relief of the shipwrecked.^‡

^† Acts iv. 34.

^‡ Apologia Secunda, xxxix.

Thus by degrees came into existence the patrimony which the Church has guarded with religious care as the inheritance of the poor. Nay, to spare them the shame of begging, the common Mother of rich and poor has exerted herself to gather together funds for the support of the needy. The Church has stirred up everywhere the heroism of charity, and has established Congregations of Religious and many other useful institutions for help and mercy, so that there might be hardly any kind of suffering which was not visited and relieved. At the present day there are many who, like the heathen of old, blame and condemn the Church for this beautiful charity. They would substitute in its place a system of State-organized relief. But no human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Charity, as a virtue, belongs to the Church; for it is no virtue unless it is drawn from the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ; and he who turns his back on the Church cannot be near to Christ.

It cannot, however, be doubted that to attain the purpose of which We treat, not only the Church but all human means must conspire. All who are concerned in the matter must be of one mind and must act together. It is in this as in the Providence which governs the world: results do not happen save where all the causes co-operate.

Let us now, therefore, inquire what part the State should play in the work of remedy and relief.

By the State We here understand, not the particular form of government which prevails in this or that nation, but the State, as rightly understood ; that is to say, any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the Divine wisdom which We have expounded in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of the State. The first duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper office of wise statesmanship and the work of the heads of the State. Now a State chiefly prospers and flourishes by morality, by well-regulated family life, by respect for religion and justice, by the moderation and equal distribution of public burdens, by the progress of the arts and of trade, by the abundant yield of the land—by everything which makes the citizens better and happier. Here, then, it is in the power of a ruler to benefit every order of the State, and amongst the rest to promote in the highest degree the interests of the poor, and this by virtue of his office, and without being exposed to any suspicion of undue interference; for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the common good. And the more that is done for the working population by the general laws of the country, the less need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve them.

There is another and a deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. To the State the interests of all are equal, whether high or low. The poor are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are real component parts, living parts, which make up, through the family, the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are by far the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and to favor another; and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working people, or else that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas of Aquin: As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in some sense claim what belongs to the whole.** Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called in the school distributive—towards each and every class.

But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so profitably to themselves, yet it is not to be supposed that all can contribute in the same way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may be made in forms of government, there will always be differences and inequalities of condition in the State: Society cannot exist or be conceived without them. Some there must be who dedicate themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who

• 2a 2æ Q. lxi. Art. 1 ad 2. make the laws, who administer justice, whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in the foremost estimation, for their work touches most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such a fashion as this; but they do in the most important way benefit the nation, though less directly. We have insisted that, since it is the end of Society to make men better, the chief good that Society can be possessed of is Virtue. Nevertheless, in all well-constituted States it is a by no means unimportant matter to provide those bodily and external commodities the use of which is necessary to virtuous action.^* And in the provision of material well-being, the labor of the poor— the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength in the culture of the land and the workshops of trade—is most efficacious and altogether indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation in this respect is so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of the working man that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the Administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to be conducive to the well-being of those who work should receive favorable consideration. Let it not be feared that solicitude of this kind will injure any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all; for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to secure from misery those on whom it so largely depends. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the community and all its parts; the community, because the conservation of the community is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a Government’s whole reason of existence; and the parts, because both philosophy and the Gospel agree in laying down that the object of the administration of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he rules. The gift of authority is from God, and is, as it were, a participation of the highest of all sovereignties; and it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised— with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches to details as well.

^* St. Thomas of Aquin. De Regimine Principum, I. cap. 15.