§ 1. On almsgiving

588. Notion. Almsgiving is a Greek word (eleemosyne) and signifies mercy; commonly, however, it is usually taken for an act of mercy, and can be defined: "a work by which something is given to one in need from compassion on account of God." Thus the Angelic Doctor,⁴⁸ who aptly observes that almsgiving is not taken (as often happens) for the thing given, but for the very action of giving, which is done on account of God.

Almsgiving is an act of charity, yet through the mediation of mercy. The reason is that an exterior act pertains to that virtue to which the proximate motive of acting pertains. But the motive for giving alms is the misery of neighbor to be alleviated; and this indeed pertains to mercy, as has been said. Therefore to give alms is formally an act of mercy. But because mercy is an effect of charity, as was said above, consequently to give alms is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy;⁴⁹ or still more clearly: it is an act elicited by mercy and commanded by charity. Yet almsgiving can also be given from another honorable motive, e.g. for making satisfaction for sins, for divine worship, etc. Then almsgiving is commanded by the virtue of penance, or of religion, etc.^49a It is evident of itself that almsgiving is not an act of virtue if it is done from an evil sole or principal motive, e.g. to seduce a girl. Almsgiving can be taken for an act of both corporal and spiritual mercy. Now we speak only of corporal almsgiving.

⁴⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 1. The same Angelic Doctor (In IV dist. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1) explains this definition thus: "In the aforesaid definition all the things are touched which concur for the perfection of almsgiving, according as it is meritorious. For the very misery of another, which is the principle of mercy, is touched in this, that he says 'to one in need'; but mercy, which arises in us from another's misery, is touched in this, that he says 'from compassion'; but the effect of mercy in relieving another's misery as one's own is touched in this, that it is said 'a work in which something is given': for this is essential to almsgiving itself; but the intention directed to God, which gives it the character of meriting, is touched in this, that it is said 'on account of God.'" For other definitions see the learned work (§ 12) of Fr. Schaub, Die kath. Caritas und ihre Gegner, M.-Gladbach 1909.

⁴⁹ S. theol. l. c.

^49a Cf. Billuart, De carit. diss. 5, a. 1.

589. Principle 1. Both from natural law and from positive divine law there exists a true precept of distributing alms to the poor.

1. The natural law itself commands that alms be distributed sometimes. For a) effective charity toward neighbor is commanded by natural law. But sometimes this effective charity would clearly be violated unless alms were given to a poor man in need. Therefore the natural law itself commands that alms be given.

b) The necessity of almsgiving follows from the condition of private dominion. For although private dominion is licit, indeed necessary for the good of the whole of human society, nevertheless on the other hand any man, by the very fact that life is given to him by the Creator, also has a right to the necessary sustenance of life, which indeed he ought to procure for himself by his labors; but if this is impossible, he has the right that he be sustained from the goods of others, and accordingly in extreme necessity he can licitly take for himself those things which are necessary, lest he lose life. Hence a rich man is bound from his goods to assist a neighbor existing in necessity; and this is to give alms. To the point St. Thomas writes:⁵⁰ "Temporal goods, which are conferred upon man by God, are indeed his as to ownership, but as to use they ought to be not only his, but also those of others, who can be sustained from them from that which is superfluous to him. Hence Basil says: 'If you confess that these things [namely, temporal goods] have come to you from God, is God unjust, distributing things unequally to us? Why do you abound, but that man begs, unless that you may obtain the merits of good stewardship, but he may be adorned with the prizes of patience? It is the bread of the hungry which you hold; the tunic of the naked which you preserve in your closet; the shoe of the unshod which grows moldy in your possession; the silver of the needy which you possess buried. Wherefore you injure as many as you are able to give to.'" But if St. Basil and the other Holy Fathers seem to say that it is against justice if someone refuses to give alms, this is not to be understood as though the rich, transgressing the precept of giving alms, violated commutative justice and accordingly were bound to restitution; but the Holy Fathers intend only to say that such greedy persons sin gravely against the just divine precepts concerning the administration of goods and violate general justice, which obliges one to procure the common good. Therefore the obligation of giving alms is properly an obligation of charity and of general justice, but not of commutative justice.⁵¹ Hence the poor man to whom alms are unduly denied by a rich man cannot in the least secretly compensate himself. If, however, he is in extreme necessity, he can take for himself the things which are necessary, as has been said, nor can the rich man licitly impede this taking.

c) The necessity of giving alms also follows from peace to be preserved in human society. For if the rich refused suitable alms, the poor would make rebellion and disturb the peace of society.

2. Positive divine law inculcates the precept of giving alms both in the Old and in the New Testament. "I (God) command you that you open your hand to your needy and poor brother, who dwells with you in the land."⁵² "Son, do not defraud the poor man of alms and do not turn away your eyes from the poor man."⁵³ "Depart from Me, accursed ones, into eternal fire; for I was hungry, and you did not give Me to eat; I was thirsty, and you did not give Me drink."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ S. theol. l. c. a. 5 ad 2.

⁵¹ Leo XIII indeed says (Encycl. "Rerum novarum," May 15, 1891), speaking of the obligation of giving alms: "These offices are not of justice, except in extreme things, but of Christian charity." But the Supreme Pontiff seems to take the word justice not for commutative justice, from the violation of which arises the obligation of restitution, but for general or legal justice. In this sense already the Angelic Doctor (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 118, a. 4 ad 2) explained the words of St. Basil, saying: "Basil is speaking of that case in which someone is bound from a legal debt to distribute his goods to the poor, either on account of the danger of necessity or also on account of the superfluity of the things possessed." But St. Thomas himself always calls almsgiving an act of charity and never an act of justice.

⁵² Deut. 15, 11.

⁵³ Eccli. 4, 1; cf. also Tob. 4, 7; Is. 58, 7.

⁵⁴ Matth. 25, 41; cf. also 1 Jo. 3, 17; 1 Tim. 6, 17 sqq.

590. Principle 2. In a particular case the obligation of giving alms is to be measured from a twofold head: a) from the necessity of neighbor; b) from the proper ability of the giver.

Thus all theologians after St. Thomas, who says: "On the part of the giver, it must be considered that that which is to be expended in alms be superfluous to him.... But on the part of the recipient, it is required that he have necessity; otherwise there would not be a reason why alms should be given to him."⁵⁵ But the intrinsic reason of this principle is the order of charity to be observed. For well-ordered love begins from oneself. Therefore I am not bound to help a neighbor living in bodily necessity with great inconvenience to myself. - Those things are to be recalled which were said above, n. 579, concerning threefold necessity (extreme, grave, light). Moreover it is to be noted that goods of a threefold kind are distinguished:

1. Goods necessary for life, by which a man needs to be able to sustain his own life and that of his own, so that if they were taken away he would fall into grave or extreme necessity. Goods of this kind are revenues necessary for supporting himself and his own family entrusted to him.

2. Goods necessary for status, without which a man can indeed pass his life, but would have to descend from his legitimately obtained status. To goods of this kind belong, e.g., those things which a noble or rich man needs in order to lead life as other sensible men of the same condition and status living in the same region do. To goods necessary for status also belong certain moderate savings, by which provision is made for chance cases of infirmity, misfortune, etc., and indeed even a moderate augmentation of status. Hence parents are admonished to treasure up for their children.⁵⁶

3. Goods simply superfluous are those which are necessary neither for the sustenance of life nor for the decency of status. Thus, e.g., if the revenues of some man much exceed ordinary expenses, there are goods simply superfluous. Yet, as the Angelic Doctor⁵⁷ rightly notes, the decency of status does not consist in something indivisible: because by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his status; and by many things also subtracted the condition of his status is decently preserved. Hence in practice one must stand by the judgment of a prudent and sincere man. With these things set down, the following practical rules are worthy of being known:

⁵⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 5.

⁵⁶ Cf. 2 Cor. 12, 14.

⁵⁷ 4, dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1.

591. Rule 1. No one by reason of charity alone is bound to assist neighbor from goods necessary for life.

The reason is that each one is bound to place his own life and the life of his own before the life of another, unrelated, private person. Hence St. Thomas⁵⁸ says: "Necessary is said in two ways: in one way, that without which something cannot exist; and from such necessary goods alms ought not at all to be given: for example, if someone constituted in the article of necessity had only that from which he could sustain himself, and his children or others pertaining to him; for to give alms from this necessary good is to subtract life from oneself and one's own."⁵⁹ - I said: by reason of charity; for by reason of the necessary common good a man is bound not only to hand over those things which are necessary to him for sustaining life, but life itself. Hence, e.g., a soldier is bound to yield to the king the food which the king needs for sustaining life, even if the soldier himself should perish from hunger; at least thus, if otherwise the common good of the state would suffer great harm.

⁵⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 6.

⁵⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 6.

592. Rule 2. A neighbor living in extreme necessity is to be assisted 1. from goods simply superfluous; 2. also from goods necessary for the decency of status, provided that this can be done without great inconvenience.

The first part of this rule is evident of itself and is admitted by all. But as to the other part, authors indeed disagree as to the mode of speaking, but in the thing itself they agree.⁶⁰ The order of charity requires that we indeed love the life of neighbor more than our temporal goods, which are not absolutely necessary for living life; but, just as we are not bound to preserve our life by extraordinary means or with great inconvenience, so a fortiori there exists no strict obligation of giving a great sum of money for saving the life of neighbor. Hence a rich man is not bound to give, e.g., 1000 francs so that a sick poor man, shortly to die in his homeland, can go into the more healthful air of a distant region.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Thus, e.g., Billuart (De carit. diss. 5, a. 2, dico 2) asserts: "From things superfluous to nature, even if necessary to status, we are bound under mortal sin to make almsgiving to one suffering extreme necessity." But Noldin (De praec. n. 91) says: "Although alms ought to be given to a neighbor in extreme necessity from goods necessary only for the decency of status, nevertheless an obligation of giving also from goods necessary for preserving status itself cannot be demonstrated, so that someone would be bound to fall from his own status. For neither is someone bound to preserve his own life with the loss of his status, or by extraordinary means." Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 762; Gopfert, Moraltheol. II 28, and others, have similar things.

⁶¹ Cf. Billuart l. c. in fine.

593. Rule 3. A neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted from goods superfluous to status. Thus the opinion today is common.⁶²

It is proved from Sacred Scripture: "He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother have necessity, and closes his heart against him, how does the charity of God remain in him?"⁶³ It is altogether improbable that the holy Apostle speaks only of extreme necessity, which in practice is very rare. This opinion is confirmed from the proposition (12) condemned by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among seculars will you find, even among kings, what is superfluous to status. And thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to status."⁶⁴ - But the intrinsic reason is that it seems to be a grave disorder if a man loves his own superfluous goods more than the alleviation of neighbor living in truly grave necessity. - Certain theologians wish that neighbor in grave necessity is to be assisted even from goods in some way necessary to status, or with moderate detriment to one's status. In reality there is scarcely any disagreement between the two opinions. For the decency of status admits some latitude, so that "by many things added a man does not exceed the condition of his status; by many things also subtracted the condition of his status is decently preserved."⁶⁵ Accordingly those authors who say that almsgiving is to be given in the grave necessity of neighbor even from things necessary for status are to be understood of goods in some way, but not wholly, necessary for the decency of status. Today no one teaches that a neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted even with the loss of one's own status. - Certain older authors, such as St. Antoninus,⁶⁶ Ioannes Medina,⁶⁷ not rightly understanding St. Thomas in this matter, thought that to give alms to a neighbor existing in grave necessity was not of precept, but only of counsel. This opinion today is obsolete.⁶⁸

⁶² Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 31.

⁶³ 1 Jo. 3, 17.

⁶⁴ Denz. n. 1103.

⁶⁵ S. Thom., 4, dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4.

⁶⁶ S. theol. pars 2, tit. 1, q. 24 (ed. Veronae II 334).

⁶⁷ Tract. 5 de eleem. q. 3, dub. 2, concl. 2.

⁶⁸ Cajetan, his most faithful Commentator, excellently explains the mind of St. Thomas in the little work "On the precept of almsgiving according to the mind of St. Thomas."

594. Rule 4. In the common necessity of neighbors there is indeed a) a grave obligation of sometimes giving alms from goods superfluous to status; but b) there is not an obligation of giving alms to this or that particular poor man.

The second part is admitted by all in our time, but concerning the first part it is astonishing how sharply authors have disputed and dispute, although perhaps their disagreements are verbal rather than real. St. Alphonsus⁶⁹ calls the proposed opinion the more common one, to which he himself adheres. St. Thomas (concerning whose mind, however, there is dispute) says simply: "Thus therefore to give alms from what is superfluous is in precept."⁷⁰ He does not indeed expressly say that this precept is grave, but since in the extreme necessity of neighbor the precept of almsgiving obliges under grave sin, equally under grave sin the precept of giving alms from superfluous goods obliges, as is clear from IV dist. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4. In Sacred Scripture it is said: "What remains over, give as alms: and behold, all things are clean to you."⁷¹ These words indeed are usually understood: alms are to be given from superfluous things; and if this has been done, you are clean from the vice of avarice. - But the intrinsic reason is that the rich are not absolute masters of temporal goods, but only as it were stewards or administrators, who ought to dispose of their goods according to the will of God. Moreover God has ordained that the rich ought to distribute to the poor from their superfluous goods. Hence He also condemns to hell those who have defrauded the poor of alms. "Depart from Me, accursed ones, into eternal fire, which has been prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give Me to eat; I was thirsty, and you did not give Me drink.... Amen I say to you: as long as you did not do it to one of these least ones, neither did you do it to Me."⁷² - On the contrary He promises a great reward, namely eternal life,⁷³ to those who give alms to the poor, and ample blessings on this earth: "Blessed is he who understands concerning the needy and the poor: in the evil day the Lord will deliver him. May the Lord preserve him, and give him life, and make him blessed on the earth: and may He not hand him over to the soul of his enemies. May the Lord bring him help upon the bed of his pain: his whole bed You have turned in his infirmity."⁷⁴ - All these things seem sufficiently openly to show a grave precept of giving alms from superfluous goods even in the common necessity of the poor, since the grave and extreme necessity of neighbor is very rare, especially because of defect of food and drink.⁷⁵

Nevertheless in practice the confessor, although he ought earnestly to exhort the rich to give alms to the poor, ought not to deny absolution to that rich man who refuses to distribute alms; for a) the opinion denying a grave obligation of giving alms to the poor living in common necessity is at least extrinsically probable, since very many and grave authors hold it;⁷⁶ b) in present times the rich are compelled by civil laws to assist the poor in various public institutes erected for the sustenance of the poor; and thus all give some alms.

Rule 5. Beneficed clerics are bound (from ecclesiastical law) to distribute to the poor or for pious uses all superfluous things which remain after their suitable sustenance from benefice revenues.

Concerning this obligation, which, with all agreeing, is grave, the discussion will return below, II 37, in the treatise on justice, where the goods of clerics will be treated.

⁶⁹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 32.

⁷⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 5. Cf. Cajetan in h. loc.

⁷¹ Luc. 11, 41.

⁷² Matth. 25, 41-45.

⁷³ Cf. Matth. 25, 34.

⁷⁴ Ps. 40, 1-3.

⁷⁵ Thus also Leo XIII, Const. "Rerum novarum," May 15, 1891: "It is a duty, from that which remains over, to give graciously to the needy."

⁷⁶ Cf. Ballerini in notes to Gury (Comp. Theol. mor. I n. 228) for the benign opinion, and Concina (Theol. christ. in Decal. l. 1, diss. 6, c. 13) for the contrary opinion.

595. Quantity of almsgiving to be given.

The grave obligation of giving alms having been admitted, the question immediately arises: how great a sum of goods is to be distributed to the poor? The answer is:

1. In the extreme necessity of neighbor so much must be given as suffices to rescue him from this necessity, unless nevertheless there are others who are willing to assist him. But it has already been said above that no one is bound to distribute a great sum of money in order to free a poor man from the danger of death.

2. In common necessity several theologians with St. Alphonsus teach that the rich are bound to give a fiftieth part of the annual revenues which are beyond status, or 2%.⁷⁷ If, however, the revenues were very enormous, a smaller proportion would be required. Nothing certain can be answered in this question; hence the faithful are indeed to be admonished to give large alms, but a definite sum to be distributed under grave precept cannot be imposed on them.

⁷⁷ Homo Ap. tr. 4, n. 19.

596. Who can licitly give alms? The answer is: all those who have their own goods and free administration of them. Yet in extreme necessity, just as each one can licitly take for himself the goods of another in order to remove this necessity, so then another also can assist from goods of which otherwise he does not have free dominion. Sometimes (but with great discretion) the faculty of giving moderate alms from another's goods can licitly be presumed. - There is a special difficulty concerning the power of wives, children subject to the family, and servants to bestow alms.

A wife can give alms not only from her own paraphernal or free goods, but also from other matrimonial goods whose administration is in the power of the husband. In this latter case, however, the consent of the husband is required, either expressed or presumed.⁷⁸ If the husband were too greedy and did not wish to give due alms, nevertheless the wife could make moderate alms according to the condition of her status, because then the husband would be unreasonably unwilling. Especially her poor parents the wife can and ought to help by moderate gifts taken from the common goods of the marriage.⁷⁹

Children subject to the family can indeed give alms from their own free goods, if they have any, but not from the goods of their parents, unless the express or tacit permission of the parents has been had.

Male and female servants can give no alms at all from the goods of their masters without their express permission; nor can such permission scarcely ever be rightly presumed, because masters are not accustomed to grant a general permission of this kind for very obvious reasons. Almost the only exception is if servants give to the poor those foods which remain over from the table of the masters and which otherwise would be thrown outside. For in this case the master suffers no harm at all, nor is he reasonably unwilling that those foods be given to the poor. Servants illicitly giving alms in a notable quantity from the goods of their masters are bound to restitution.

⁷⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 8 ad 2.

⁷⁹ Cf. below II, 16.

597. Mode of giving alms. In order that the bestowal of alms be truly morally good, it is required that it be done not only to due persons according to due quantity, but also in a due manner. This manner indeed includes 1. the circumstances to be observed in every almsgiving; 2. the question whether alms are to be given rather through private persons than through public authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil.

1. The circumstances of almsgiving to be observed are expressed in these little verses:

Let it be just and prudent, swift, secret, and willing, Proceeding in order, helping all.

a) Almsgiving ought to be just, i.e. it cannot be given except by him who has true free dominion of the thing.

b) Alms should be given prudently, i.e. to those only who are truly needy; but not to those who from laziness do not wish to work. For "if anyone does not wish to work, neither let him eat."⁸⁰ Almsgiving imprudently given fosters vices.

c) Almsgiving should be swift according to that saying: "He gives twice who gives quickly; he gives nothing who delays gifts."

d) Almsgiving should be secret according to that saying: "When therefore you give alms, do not sound a trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be honored by men. Amen, I say to you, they have received their reward. But when you give alms, let not your left hand know what your right hand does."⁸¹

e) Almsgiving is to be given willingly according to the words of St. Paul: "Not from sadness or from necessity: for God loves a cheerful giver."⁸²

f) Almsgiving is to be given in right order, i.e. the order of charity (explained above) is to be observed.

g) Almsgiving should be a help to all, i.e. no one is to be excluded from our alms. Therefore we ought also to assist strangers, sinners, and unbelievers living in necessity. But in equal necessity the faithful, the pious, fellow citizens, and generally those more joined to us are to be helped before the rest. Indeed someone who is truly needy can make alms to himself if he is appointed distributor of alms.⁸³

2. Are alms to be given rather through private persons than through public authority (whether ecclesiastical or civil)?

The solution of this question depends chiefly on the end of almsgiving. This end indeed is in no way restricted to the material relief of the need under which the poor man labors, but also comprehends his spiritual good; equally it comprehends the social good and the spiritual good of the one bestowing alms. Since the condition of the times is such that neither private nor even ecclesiastical care of the poor is sufficiently able to alleviate all needs, the civil government also ought to help the poor. Yet this care of the poor instituted by civil government is exposed to grave dangers. For then it often happens a) that fictitious poor persons receive large alms, but the true and especially the bashful poor acquire nothing; b) that indeed material want is alleviated, but spiritual misery, i.e. the immoral life from which want has arisen, is not healed; c) that there arises a great schism between rich and poor; for the rich complain concerning the forced grave tax to be paid for the poor, while the poor demand goods too abundantly possessed by the rich. Since these things are so, effort must be made that the care of the poor be entrusted to ecclesiastical or pious persons, who strive not only to alleviate their material poverty, but also bring them to a morally good life. Already from its beginnings the Church always had solicitous care for the poor. Thus the Apostles themselves instituted seven deacons for the care of widows and the poor. Later deaconesses were instituted, and today innumerable congregations approved by the Church exercise works of every kind of mercy.

⁸⁰ 2 Thess. 3, 10.

⁸¹ Matth. 6, 2 sqq.

⁸² 2 Cor. 9, 7.

⁸³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 32, a. 9 ad 3.

598. Scholion. On fictitious poor persons. Fictitious poor persons, i.e. those who, not pressed by true want, feign great misery and thereby hunt for alms, sin in three ways: namely, a) against truth, because their manner of acting is a pure and foul lie; b) against charity, because they subtract from other true poor persons the alms otherwise to be received; c) against commutative justice, because by deceit and fraud they deceive merciful men, who are reasonably and gravely unwilling about such deception. Hence false poor persons of this kind are bound to restore the alms fraudulently obtained. This restitution in itself indeed would have to be made to those from whom alms were obtained. Since, however, this is often impossible, then these usurped alms are to be given to true poor persons or are to be distributed to pious causes.⁸⁴ In practice it will often be impossible to carry out restitution of this kind, because such false poor persons are accustomed quickly to squander the alms obtained.

⁸⁴ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 622. On this matter the Roman Catechism says: "Those seem to commit theft who by fictitious and simulated words or by deceitful beggary extort money; whose sin is the graver because they heap theft together with a lie" (pars 3, c. 8, q. 7). But the poor who feign themselves poorer than they truly are, so that they may receive alms more easily or more abundantly, do not seem to be obliged to restitution of the alms thus obtained, because commonly all the poor are accustomed to exaggerate their poverty, and those giving also know this.