Article I. On Almsgiving

I. Notion. Almsgiving strictly so called is a bodily benefit given to another in need from compassion. It is disputed whether it is an act of charity, or of mercy as a special virtue (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 30, a. 3; q. 32, a. 1).

II. The obligation of almsgiving is clear both from Sacred Scripture,¹ and from this, "that since love of neighbor is in precept, it is necessary that all those things fall under precept without which love of neighbor is not preserved; but to love of neighbor it pertains that we not only will good to our neighbor, but also work it, according to that saying of 1 John 3:18: 'Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.' But in order that we will and work someone's good, it is required that we relieve his necessity; this is done through the largess of alms; and therefore the largess of alms is in precept" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 5).

¹ Cf. Matthew 25:41-46; Luke 11:41; 1 John 3:17; 1 Timothy 6:17, 18.

III. Further determination of the obligation must be established with attention both to the neighbor's need and to the faculty of helping him (St. Thomas, ibid.; St. Alphonsus, II, 31). Hence:

1. "No one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the poor person were such a person on whom the safety of the republic depended.... And the reason is clear from the order of charity" (St. Alphonsus, II, 31).

2. One who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity must be helped under grave obligation even from goods necessary to one's state; this should be understood thus, that the obligation is to help him with inconvenience or damage absolutely grave, but not with very grave inconvenience. Hence one is not bound, in order to help one in need of this sort, to suffer loss or grave detriment of state; nor to procure for him things altogether extraordinary or very costly, such as migration into another more healthful region, or a great sum of money (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

3. In grave necessity there certainly is an obligation of giving alms from superfluous goods; but it is disputed whether the obligation is grave. Now:

a) The obligation is clear from the things said under II.¹

b) The grave obligation is drawn from Sacred Scripture; for words, for example 1 John 3:17,² by which privation of the charity of God is denounced against those who do not alleviate the necessity of their neighbor, are undeservedly restricted to extreme and rare necessity.

Corollary I. There is at least a light obligation of helping an individual man constituted in grave necessity "with moderate detriment of one's own state: because by a small inconvenience of his own he is bound to prevent a great inconvenience of his neighbor" (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

Corollary II. If several are pressed at the same time by grave necessity, and there is no obligation of helping all, one can help one before the others, or several in part. But if one pressed by grave necessity concurs with those constituted in common necessity, the former seems to have to be preferred to the latter.

3. In common necessity likewise there is an obligation of helping from superfluous goods. Here, however, it is more sharply disputed whether the obligation is grave. With St. Alphonsus (II, 32), it seems one must answer affirmatively. For first, Sacred Scripture, which under grave obligation prescribes that the poor be helped, seems also to regard the poor as they commonly occur, that is, those constituted in common necessity. Then from alms refused in common necessity grave evils would threaten the community, namely several would fall into grave necessity. But the grave obligation which we defend should be understood thus: that a rich person would then only sin gravely if he proposed never, or scarcely ever, to give alms except to one constituted in grave necessity (St. Alphonsus, II, 32). In addition, there is a light obligation of occasionally dispensing something to the poor constituted in common necessity from goods in some way necessary to state; in other words, one who does not have superfluous goods, but nevertheless has goods suitable to state, sins venially if he for the most part sends away the poor constituted in common necessity without any help. Finally, the described obligation of helping the common poor persists, even if in some place there are public institutes erected for the poor and the public authority helps the poor; for by those the common necessity is not extinguished.

¹ Note also proposition 12 condemned by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among secular persons, even among kings, will you find what is superfluous to state; and thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to state" (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1162).

² "He who has had the substance of this world, and has seen his brother have necessity, and has closed his heart against him, how does the charity of God remain in him?"

IV. Quantity of almsgiving. 1. In extreme and in grave necessity, so much must be dispensed as is required for alleviating the necessity, yet with attention to the moral faculty of the one dispensing, according to what was said above (St. Alphonsus, II, 31).

2. With common necessity considered, the matter depends on many things, for example on the necessity of the poor and their number, on public institutes, on the faculty of the rich person, etc. St. Alphonsus, for the circumstances of his time, held as quite probable that, generally speaking, "the rich satisfy the obligation by dispensing among the common poor the fiftieth part of their income, or two gold coins out of one hundred; but not in the same proportion if the riches greatly exceed" (II, 32).

What about the opinion of those who teach that all things superfluous to state must be spent for the support of the poor, or at least on pious works?

Response. We judge that that doctrine is not sufficiently proved, so that we hold the opinion of others as practically safe; all the more because the practice even of the God-fearing does not seem to agree with that doctrine.

Objection 1. Christ says in Luke: "Nevertheless, give what remains as alms: and behold, all things are clean for you."¹

Response. It is not proved that by those words a precept is understood, and not merely a counsel, namely, that all things may be clean for someone.

Objection 2. Leo XIII states: "Man ought not to have external things as his own, but as common."² Therefore at least superfluous things must be spent on pious works.

Response. Leo XIII states this one thing: that external things are to be held as common in this sense, "namely that someone easily communicate them in the necessity of others"; and these words do not legitimate the conclusion of the adversaries. To this is added that the Supreme Pontiff adds: "But when what is sufficient for necessity and propriety has been given, it is a duty from what remains to favor those in need."

Objection 3. The division of goods or private dominion cannot be to the prejudice of the end of goods, which is that they serve the necessity and utility of men. Hence things truly superfluous to someone must be spent on the necessity of the poor.

Response. The division of goods also exists for the security of oneself and of one's own; and goods can also be used for honest delights, although they do not precisely pertain to the suitability of one's state. These things posited, it is not clear that superfluous goods cannot at least partly be retained, both for greater security regarding the future time, and for greater honest delights.

¹ Luke 11:41.

² Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

V. Mode of fulfilling the obligation. 1. The thing which the poor person needs can be given as a loan for use or as a loan for consumption: 1. if the poor person needs only the use of the thing; 2. if indeed he needs dominion over the thing, but is not simply poor. It is otherwise if he needs dominion over the thing and is simply poor, that is, he possesses nothing either in fact or in hope from which he may repay. For, if ever, at least in that case the precept of almsgiving, that is, of gratuitous donation, ought to urge (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 5).¹

2. Alms must be made from one's own goods, but not from another's, unless in extreme necessity, if then one's own are not at hand. Hence: 1. "It is not lawful for boys, children of families, male servants, female servants, or wives to give alms except slight alms, in which the will of parents and husbands is presumed. But for particular cases in which a wife can give, see in its own place.... 2. Tutors and curators, and those who have care of another's goods, can make moderate alms from the goods which they administer: namely such as those persons themselves, whose goods they are, would be bound to make" (St. Alphonsus, II, 33).

3. The obligation, insofar as it arises especially from common necessity, can partly be satisfied by paying taxes, insofar as these are imposed for relieving the necessities of the poor. Indeed, the aforesaid obligation can almost be fulfilled by contributing a certain sum to a beneficent association. I have said partly and almost, because one who acted thus could nevertheless not be excused from every fault if he were to send away all who beg from door to door, and all the more if he were to send away all constituted in grave necessity.

Corollary I. Physicians and advocates must help the poor gratuitously, unless provision has been made for them through public expenses. But if special physicians or advocates have been named for the poor, it is lawful to refer the poor to them.

Corollary II. Often there is no obligation of giving alms to poor persons begging in public ways: "although from nakedness, disease, etc., they may seem to show signs of extreme necessity, rarely is one bound by precept to help, even from superfluous goods: both because that necessity is commonly exaggerated for moving spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others" (St. Alphonsus, II, 32). But alms should be denied to those who are in need from laziness and idleness.

¹ Hence the doctrine seems to have to be rejected which generally teaches that there is no obligation of giving alms if, by the thing being given as a loan for use or for consumption, or sold, sufficient provision is made for the neighbor's necessity.