Article I: On Corporal Almsgiving

S. Th. II-II, q. 32.

926. Almsgiving (from the Greek: pity) is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God, that is, a work rendered to one in need from commiseration for relieving his want. In this definition it is not taken, as often is customary, for the thing given, but for the action of giving.

It is an act of mercy commanded by charity. It is proved:

An exterior act pertains to that virtue to which pertains the proximate motive on account of which the act is placed; but the proximate motive for giving alms is that assistance be given to one suffering necessity, which pertains to mercy; but mercy is an effect of charity; therefore almsgiving is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy, or an act of mercy commanded by charity; which is said in the definition: on account of God.

But if it is ordered to another end, and is done from another motive, for example, for satisfying for sins, or unto the worship of God, it will be an act commanded by penance or religion, etc.

927. There are seven spiritual alms, which are ordered to defects of the soul, and seven corporal alms, which are ordered to defects of the body. But spiritual alms simply excel corporal alms: a) by reason of the thing offered, namely, a spiritual gift, which is nobler than a corporal one; b) by reason of him to whom help is given, namely, the spirit, which is nobler than the body; c) as regards the very acts by which help is given to neighbor, because spiritual acts are nobler than corporal ones. Nevertheless, accidentally, in a particular case, corporal almsgiving is to be preferred, for example, one dying of hunger is to be fed rather than taught.

Among the corporal alms six are exercised toward the living (Mt. XXV, 35-36, 42-43): to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to receive the guest, to visit the sick, to redeem the captive; and one toward the dead (Tob. II, 3-10; XII, 12-13): to bury the dead.

928. From natural and divine law there is given a precept of doing corporal alms, which is grave from its genus. - It is proved:

1. Christ, in Mt. XXV, 41, says: "Go, accursed ones, into eternal fire...: for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat"; but no one is damned on account of the omission of something which is not commanded, and indeed under grave obligation; therefore to give alms is in precept, and indeed a grave one.

2. Since dilection of neighbor is in precept, all those things are precepts without which this dilection is not had. But dilection of neighbor demands not only that we will good to him but also that we procure it for him; for this it is required that we assist his necessity through almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is in precept. The minor is proved: The law of nature demands that we assist neighbor in necessity, just as we will that he should assist us in our necessity; whence I Jn. III, 18: "Let us not love in word and tongue, but in deed and truth" (Deut. XV, 11; Prov. XXV, 21; Is. LVIII, 7; Ezek. XVIII, 7; Lk. III, 9 sq.; I Tim. VI, 17 sq.; Jas. II, 15 sq.; I Jn. III, 17).

929. The precept of almsgiving arises from a twofold head: a) if there is present a moral faculty, or superfluity, on the part of the one giving; b) if there is present true necessity on the part of the one in need. For a fuller understanding of these things, in the order of charity, not only must the threefold temporal necessity be distinguished with respect to the one in need, concerning which it was said above, n. 905; but also the threefold genus of temporal goods with respect to him who is about to give alms:

The first genus is of goods which are necessary for sustaining the life of oneself and one's own, of whom one has care (parents, wife, children, etc.): food, clothing, and dwelling; and these are called necessary (absolutely) to nature or life.

The second genus is of goods which are necessary (conditionally) to one's state, namely, for preserving the decent state of oneself and one's own, regard being had not indeed to all things which can happen, but to those which can prudently be feared and expected. Whence theologians in this genus include those things which are required for feeding servants, or for the necessities probably occurring from the increase of a family, the dowries of children, illnesses, old age, wars, etc.; indeed, banquets and honorable gifts and moderate liberalities, according to one's state, but not those exaggerated by ostentation and pomp. "The terminus of the necessary of this kind," says St. Thomas, q. 32, a. 6, "is not constituted in an indivisible point, but, many things being added, it cannot be judged to be beyond such necessity; and, many things being subtracted, there still remains that whereby someone can conveniently pass his life according to his own state." Therefore this admits a latitude from things strictly necessary to one's state, without which the state is lost, up to becoming things without which one would not act so fittingly. Things necessary to one's state are superfluous to life.

The third genus is of goods which are superfluous to one's state.

930. Principles. From which goods alms must be given. - In this matter the following rules hold:1

A. In extreme necessity: 1. Alms are not to be given from things necessary to life, because our life and that of our own is to be preferred to the life of another, unless there were question of a person necessary to the commonwealth, because the common good is to be preferred to one's own.

2. There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to life and from things necessary to one's state, even with great inconvenience, as much as is necessary for removing the necessity: the order of charity demands that we love the life of neighbor more than the decency of our own state, which is a far inferior good.2

3. Nevertheless no one is bound to do this with the greatest inconvenience, or to use extraordinary and choice means which men commonly are not accustomed to use, for example, with the greatest expenses for buying a very precious medicine, procuring an extraordinary surgical operation, sending to a distant region, redeeming from a proximate danger of death; because we are not bound to use those means for preserving our own life. Nor therefore is someone bound to fall from his state or to suffer great diminution in it, which otherwise is regarded as a most grave evil.

B. In grave necessity: There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to one's state, insofar as is necessary for removing the necessity (prop. 12 condemned by Innocent XI), indeed even from things necessary to one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience; because the order of charity demands that with slight inconvenience we relieve the great inconvenience of neighbor; indeed with great inconvenience, if there is question of a great necessity of the commonwealth.

C. In common necessity: 1. There is an obligation, from things superfluous to one's state, of sometimes during life giving something (Eccli. XIV, 13) to some poor persons, because we ought to love the decency of the state of neighbor more than our superfluity.

2. Nevertheless there is not an obligation of giving to all, nor precisely to this one or that one, nor of removing the necessity totally, because all the rich are obliged; and if all give something from their superfluity, enough assistance is given to necessities.3

3. Nor is there an obligation of seeking out the poor, unless there is a wholly grave doubt concerning extreme necessity, or unless someone is bound to this from office, as a parish priest: for this would be a grave burden, and otherwise it pertains to him who suffers necessity to expose the necessity.

1. The fundamental principles are stated by St. Thomas; but they are enunciated quite generally, so that among more recent scholastics they are found more determinately applied.

2. Goods are primarily ordered to the necessity of men, whence the private right of dominion cannot impede this primary end. - In the case all are bound in solidum; whence 1. someone can indicate extreme necessity, and then others also are bound; 2. if one gives assistance, the others are exempted; otherwise all not giving sin; 3. but if others do not give, each one alone is bound.

3. In the case not all are bound in solidum.

931. The obligation of almsgiving is grave from its genus; whence certainly it obliges under mortal sin in grave matter, namely, in grave necessity, of which at least Scripture speaks (Mt. XXV), and a fortiori in extreme necessity. Indeed also probably in common necessity, both because the expressions of Scripture and of the Fathers, indiscriminately and without restriction, inculcate a grave obligation of assisting the poor, which they suppose is often violated, although grave necessity is rather rare; - and because, if they were not helped, some would fall into grave necessity, and otherwise the slight necessities of the poor, aggregated, constitute a grave evil for society, to which a remedy must be furnished.

But how much is to be given depends on various circumstances, for necessities are not always the same. In ordinary circumstances, according to St. Alphonsus, it suffices to give the fiftieth part, or 2%, of income, if that part is superfluous, and a proportionally smaller part if the income is enormous; although that estimation can be regarded as rather benign. Therefore he who would determine to give no alms in common necessity, or would be notably negligent in them, seems to sin mortally; but if he did not give a small quantity owed, he would sin only venially from lightness of matter.

But although someone has strictly satisfied the precept of almsgiving toward the poor, there nevertheless always remains to him the obligation of using the remaining superfluous goods well and usefully; which pertains to the virtues of liberality and magnificence, or even to legal justice in view of the common good.

932. Corollaries. - Since by almsgiving there is a transfer of dominion:

A. Those alone can give alms who can dispose of things, namely, all who have dominion and free administration of goods, - and also those who, without dominion, possess administration: thus a husband from goods whose dominion or usufruct pertains to the community, indeed from the wife's own goods if he has administration of them; a superior as regards the goods of the monastery; likewise tutors and curators from the goods of the ward for moderate alms such as he himself would have to give; all others who are placed under power, for example, religious or servants, only in the extreme necessity of neighbor, or if there is present the explicit or tacit or reasonably presumed consent of the superior or master, which consent they do not have if he contradicts. Hence:

1. A wife can give alms from her own goods, if she has any of which she herself can dispose; - likewise from the goods of the husband or of the community, but with the consent of the husband; - indeed also, in our regions, without consent, she can give moderate, not extraordinary, alms from domestic things according to her condition, because this pertains to the honorable sustenance to which a wife among us has a right; unless, however, in a particular case the husband should prohibit giving to such or such a one. But if he should prohibit it altogether, sometimes perhaps it would be better to abstain, to avoid the indignation of the husband.

2. Children of a family can give moderate alms from goods which are handed over to them by their parents absolutely and not for a determined use, unless, however, the father should expressly prohibit it.

3. Servants cannot give without certain permission; and this, because masters are not accustomed to grant it, cannot easily be presumed, unless perhaps as regards foods which are left over and otherwise would be thrown outside, or as regards bread for a true poor person. But if they nevertheless do it, in itself they are bound to restitution.

B. Almsgiving a) from goods unjustly acquired is illicit, unless they cannot be returned to the owner, or the poor person is in extreme necessity and assistance cannot otherwise be given to him;

b) likewise from goods acquired simoniacally, because every simoniacal contract is invalid from the beginning (can. 729); whence those goods must be restored;

c) but it can be done from goods lawfully acquired, but through sin or from something illicit, for example, on account of a homicide perpetrated or prostitution practiced; yet it is not commanded.

C. Fictitious poor persons sin in a threefold way: 1. against truth; 2. against charity, because they subtract alms from true poor persons; 3. against justice, because they deceive by deceit and fraud; whence the donation is invalid, and therefore they are bound to restore either to the owner or to the poor with the presumed consent of the owner, unless there is question of purest gifts whose primary motive is not poverty but love of God and neighbor.

933. Observations. - 1. The precept of assisting neighbor in necessity is sufficiently satisfied by giving a loan, by lending, for example, a horse until he returns home, by selling with deferred payment, etc., if by such modes the necessity is removed, for example, if neighbor only needs the use of a thing, or if he is not so absolutely poor that he has nothing either in fact or in hope. Nevertheless, the precept of giving alms from superfluity is not thus satisfied; but that precept can also be fulfilled in other circumstances, by giving to others.

2. Physicians, advocates, and others performing a public office are bound to spend their work gratis for the poor, if it does not appear how otherwise help can be given to them.

3. To the poor publicly exposed, who seem to show signs of extreme necessity (for example, from nakedness, illness, etc.) or who assert it (for example, by saying that they have fasted for three days), one is rarely bound from precept to give assistance even from superfluities, both because perhaps that necessity is exaggerated to move the spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others.

4. No one is obliged (indeed sometimes it is illicit) to give alms to poor persons unwilling to work; nevertheless, let not those be numbered with these who, on account of lack of work, have fallen into misery. For these it would be more advisable to procure or supply work from which they might live.

5. In alms, those more proximate are to be preferred; nevertheless no one can be systematically excluded (neither unbelievers, nor pilgrims, nor enemies), whether they are poor from misfortune, or from virtue on account of Christ, or even from previous fault (if almsgiving is the only means of giving assistance), but not if from actual fault (Mt. V, 45; Prov. XXV, 21; Rom. XII, 20).

6. From superfluities it is licit to reserve certain things for acquiring a somewhat higher state, provided that not all are reserved: decency indeed can demand that we ascend moderately and gradually to a higher state, but not that we reserve all things for this; indeed it demands that we give certain things from magnificence in alms (prop. 12 condemned by Innocent XI).

7. A prohibition of begging made by the civil magistrate does not free from the obligation of giving alms, because other means are not lacking for satisfying the precept, for example, by distributing money to those who have care of the needy, or to good institutes or works of beneficence.

8. Similarly, payment of a tax from which the poor are helped diminishes the obligation of giving alms, but does not wholly extinguish it, if the tax does not suffice to extinguish the necessities of the poor.

9. Damage also must be averted from neighbor, if it can be averted without grave inconvenience, for example, by warning him to whom it is imminent, or by removing the cause.

934. Practical counsels. - 1. Let almsgiving be a) prudent, to true poor persons, not to the idle (II Thess. III, 10; Eccli. XII, 4); b) willing, that is, cheerful and kindly (II Cor. IX, 7); c) abundant, so that poor persons, even many, are truly relieved (Tob. IV, 9); d) prompt, so that it may be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and into desperation (Prov. III, 28); e) secret and humble (Mt. VI, 1-4); f) just; g) in right order; h) helping all.

2. Let the confessor not easily deny absolution on account of omission of almsgiving, because penitents easily think themselves excused, and because there are few who give absolutely nothing to the poor or to good works, and because a grave obligation in common necessity is not certainly present.