Co-operation in Another's Sin

116. Notion. 1. Cooperation, taken in a broader sense, signifies concurrence with another who is acting; but in a stricter sense it signifies physical concurrence toward the evil action of another acting principally.

Cooperation taken in a broader sense also comprehends scandal and induction; but if it is taken in the stricter sense, it differs both from scandal and from induction: for scandal and induction concur in determining a neighbor, who is not yet determined to sin, either as an occasion or as a cause; but cooperation already supposes in another a will determined to sin and helps him by a physical action in perpetrating an external sin. Yet it can happen that cooperation at the same time becomes scandal, namely if it increases or confirms the evil will of the neighbor.

2. In this place the discussion is of cooperation taken in the strict sense, which is always positive and physical. Through this cooperation someone helps the neighbor in committing sin, either by his action alone, as he who puts his shoulders under one wishing to steal, or by furnishing matter, as he who supplies wine to one wishing to become drunk. Cooperation is to be considered insofar as it is opposed to charity.

¹ Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie III (1879), p. 511 ff.

117. Division of cooperation. Cooperation is divided:

1. Into formal, if the one cooperating concurs both with the intention and with the evil action, and into material, if he concurs only with the evil action.

a. One who hands keys to a thief so that he can steal cooperates formally if he intends to help him in the sin of theft, and cooperates materially if he supplies the keys, which the other abuses for stealing, from another end, for example to preserve his own life.

b. Cooperation can be formal in a twofold way: a. explicitly, from the intention of the one cooperating, who expressly has the will of participating in the sin of another; b. implicitly, from the nature of the work which is furnished, namely when someone exercises a work which by its nature or with attention to the circumstances is directly ordered to an evil action: for then the contrary intention is by that very fact retracted, and the intention of the evil action is had implicitly; as if someone participates in the sacred function of heretics, he cooperates formally, although he says that he does not intend this.

2. Into immediate, if the cooperation concurs in the evil action itself, and into mediate, if it concurs in an action which serves the sin and prepares the way for it.

Therefore one who sells a sword or poison which another abuses for homicide does not cooperate immediately; but one who with another beats or wounds someone, who with another sets fire to a house, drives cattle from a stable, or carries off a chest filled with another's property, cooperates immediately.

3. Mediate cooperation is either proximate or remote, according as the one cooperating concurs in those things which more proximately or more remotely serve the evil action. Let the cooperation of one who hands a ladder to a thief, or holds it while he climbs, or supports him as he climbs, be an example.

St. Alphonsus (n. 63) presents another notion of formal cooperation, who calls that cooperation formal which concurs with the evil will of another, "namely by exciting it or otherwise positively influencing it," as Aertnys interprets. Hence it happens that several particular questions are not solved by the holy doctor in the same way as by other authors.

118. Principles concerning the liceity of cooperation. 1. Formal cooperation is never licit: for since it includes approval of the sin of another, it is always evil in itself.

Formal cooperation has a twofold malice, one against charity, the other against the virtue which is injured through the cooperation; therefore in confession the sin to which someone has formally cooperated must be declared.

2. Material cooperation is indeed illicit of itself, but sometimes, when the required conditions are present, becomes licit.

a. Material cooperation is opposed to the precept of charity: for we are bound to prevent the sin of the neighbor if we conveniently can; therefore a fortiori not to help him in committing sin.

b. The conditions under which material cooperation becomes licit are two: that the action be good, or at least indifferent; that there be a proportionately grave cause of permitting another's sin. But when these conditions have been posited, material cooperation becomes licit: for where from some action not evil a twofold effect follows, one good, the other evil, from a proportionately grave cause it is licit to place that action, although the evil effect is foreseen as going to follow.¹

c. The cause excusing cooperation must be proportionately grave. Now what cause is sufficient so that cooperation can be made must be determined by the judgment of prudent persons; but in forming this judgment attention must be paid to these four things:

a. To the gravity of the sin: for the graver the sin is to which someone cooperates, the greater the cause excusing cooperation must be.

Thus a greater cause is required for it to be licit to cooperate in homicide than in theft, and a greater cause for it to be licit to cooperate in a sin against justice than in other sins: for this cooperation brings spiritual damage to the sinner alone, but that one also harms an innocent and unwilling neighbor.

b. To the proximity of the cooperation: for a graver cause is required for proximate cooperation than for remote cooperation; thus a greater reason is required for it to be licit to cooperate in printing an evil book by setting the type than by preparing the paper.

c. To the necessity of the cooperation: for a greater cause is required where the cooperation is so necessary that without it the sin would not be committed; but a lesser cause where, if cooperation were denied, the sin would nevertheless be committed.

d. To the obligation of preventing the sin: therefore a greater cause is required in those who are bound to prevent the sin also from the office of piety or justice.

3. Immediate cooperation likewise is illicit, excepting certain cases in sins against justice. For immediate cooperation ordinarily is evil from the nature of the work, therefore in itself; therefore it is never licit to cooperate immediately in the killing of another. But in some actions which are opposed to justice, sometimes the character of evil ceases; thus from a very grave cause it is licit to cooperate immediately in bringing grave damage upon the neighbor in goods of fortune.

a. It is licit, for example, from fear of death to help another in burning the house of another: a. if the one cooperating is willing afterwards to repair the damage; b. if the damage would have been inflicted even without his cooperation; c. if through the cooperation a greater evil of the neighbor can be prevented: for in all these cases the owner cannot be reasonably unwilling.

b. Whether this is also licit when the damage would not be done without the cooperation and the one cooperating cannot repair it, authors dispute. Those who deny say that the action of the one cooperating is intrinsically evil, because he who is injured is reasonably unwilling, since he is not bound with so great damage to himself to save the life of another. Those who affirm say more truly that one constituted in extreme necessity may take from the goods of the neighbor (even by destroying) as much as is required for preserving life.

4. Cooperation in a sin which tends to the destruction of the Church or of the republic is never licit; wherefore no cause ever, not even fear of the gravest evil, indeed not even of death itself, excuses from cooperation of this kind: for this evil, as public, is so great that any private person is bound to prevent it even with danger of life.

¹ Cf. De principiis, n. 82. Of the four conditions which are there said to be required in order that it be licit to place a cause from which a good and evil effect follow, two in this question are fulfilled from the nature of the thing; hence only two are counted here.

119. On material cooperation. The theory just explained concerning material cooperation and its liceity is altogether plain; but a great and twofold difficulty arises in judging particular facts: for often it is hardly understood whether some action is evil in itself or indifferent; then, not without trouble, there is determined the quantity of the cause which excuses from material cooperation to be furnished. Therefore first the principles must be explained from which judgment is to be made concerning the indifference of the action of the one cooperating; then some norm will be assigned according to which the gravity of the excusing cause can be determined.

120. On the indifference of the action of the one cooperating. 1. It belongs to the nature of a thing or action intrinsically evil that it cannot have a good use; things or actions which can become good or evil from the end of the agent are indifferent in themselves. Therefore a thing or action is not intrinsically evil because in fact it serves only an evil end, but because it neither has nor can have an honorable end. Thus to paint an obscene image which serves only to excite lust is an action evil in itself, because the image is unfit to serve another end, and that an honorable or indifferent one. There are very few (artificial) things evil in themselves which cannot have a good use; of this kind are wholly obscene images, wholly obscene writings, books wholly contumelious against God and religion, instruments which are apt only for frustrating generation, and remedies which can serve only for procuring abortion.

a. To make or sell idols is of itself an indifferent action: for idols, besides a superstitious end, can also have another use, for example for adorning a palace, for preserving the image of them, etc.

b. To write or print heretical things is indifferent of itself: for they can also be written and printed so that they may be refuted.

c. To make or sell signs of Freemasons, speaking absolutely, is an indifferent thing, because these signs also admit another use and contain no impiety.

d. To ring a bell for a heretical sermon is a conventional sign; from its signification it depends whether it is an action evil in itself or indifferent. For if it designates an invitation and convocation to a heretical rite, the action is evil in itself; but if it indicates nothing other than that the time of the sermon or heretical rite is present, it is indifferent. Laymann¹ and Lehmkuhl (n. 654), with others, attribute the latter signification to the sound of the bell.

2. Cooperation does not become illicit by this, that the one cooperating knows his thing or action to serve proximately for sin, provided the thing or action is indifferent and a sufficiently grave cause of permitting another's sin is present. Yet because in these circumstances, in which others also know that the thing is being used for an evil use, cooperation of itself signifies consent to an evil end, protestation can be necessary by which the one cooperating, in order to prevent scandal, declares that he does not wish to concur in evil.

a. A priest who administers the Eucharist to a sinner cooperates proximately indeed, but materially, in sacrilege: for his action, by which he places the consecrated host from one place into another, is indifferent and does not become evil in itself from the knowledge which he has that another abuses it for committing sacrilege.

b. To make or sell idols to those who use them for superstitious worship can practically be called illicit, because rarely will there be a sufficiently grave cause which excuses this proximate cooperation; but in itself and by its nature it is not to be called illicit, because the thing is indifferent and the knowledge by which it is known that it will be used proximately for evil does not make it illicit; therefore, if a gravest cause exists, this cooperation could be permitted.²

3. Actions which are apt to increase or confirm the evil will of the sinner are not intrinsically evil. For this circumstance, that the action of the one cooperating in its own way influences the evil will of the sinner, indeed shows that it also contains the character of scandal, because another is confirmed by it in evil; but it does not show that it is intrinsically evil.

Therefore the following actions are not evil, but indifferent: to accompany someone to a duel; to indicate to a thief the time and place in which he can put a theft into execution without danger; to keep watch while theft or adultery is committed; to carry love letters to a prostitute. Wherefore a servant can furnish these and things of this kind, not indeed by reason of service, but from a truly grave cause.³

¹ Bk. 2, tr. 3, c. 13, n. 5.

² Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 657; Genicot, I, n. 238. In this sense the responses of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide which declare cooperations of this kind illicit seem to be understood, namely because of defect of a sufficient cause.

³ Cf. Tamburini, Explicatio decalogi, bk. 5, c. 1, § 4, n. 19; St. Alphonsus, nn. 65, 67; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 289.

121. On the gravity of the excusing cause. 1. In order that some norm may be determined, these things can be established:

a. Remote cooperation is excused because of a light inconvenience which the one cooperating would suffer because of omitted cooperation, therefore also from the mere subjection by which a son is subject to his father, a servant to his master, or from the profit alone which is received from the action or ceases when the action is omitted.

b. Proximate cooperation is excused because of a grave cause or grave inconvenience which would follow from omitted cooperation.

c. Most proximate cooperation, especially that without which the sin would not be committed, is excused only from a very grave or even gravest cause, or from a gravest damage which would follow from omitted cooperation.

2. But grave, very grave, and gravest damage, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus, can be determined thus:

a. Examples of grave damage or inconvenience are: fear of great pain, of suffering great indignation from husband, father, or master; fear of losing notable profit (about ten florins for a poor man, about twenty for a man of slender fortune); notable annoyance or repugnance; great shame.

b. Examples of very grave damage: fear of not easily finding another master except with notable detriment, with great loss in reputation, honor, or goods of fortune; fear of falling notably from one's state; fear of grave prison.

c. Examples of gravest damage: danger of incurring death, of losing a principal member or some sense, for example an eye; fear of perpetual captivity, greatest infamy, acute disease; loss of all or almost all goods.¹

¹ Cf. Villada, Casus conscientiae, 2nd ed., Brussels: Vromant, 1885, I, p. 85 ff.

a. Just as sins, so also cooperations in sins occur in every kind of life (religious, moral, political, social, economic, etc.) and are furnished by men of any condition; therefore the questions to be solved are most diverse and sometimes sufficiently difficult.

b. The following questions are considered only under the aspect of cooperation; but from the character of scandal and from the intention of the one cooperating, which could be evil, abstraction is made. It is clear that a greater cause is required for an action to become licit in which the character of cooperation and the character of scandal are joined, as in the printing of an evil book.

122. On cooperation in false rites. a. To build churches of heretics, unless labors of this kind are demanded in hatred of the Christian religion or for profession of false worship, is of itself material cooperation, and remote; yet it is not equal in all who concur in such a work. Wherefore it is not licit to cooperate in building or restoring a church of this kind in the office of architect or overseer of the building except from a grave cause; but in the office of a secondary worker it is licit from a lighter cause, yet not from the sole reason of the profit to be received from the wage paid.

a. Moreover, the circumstances of this cooperation must be considered. For if it concerns a recent sect, or a place where the sect has not hitherto been admitted, cooperation of this kind takes on the appearance of favor toward heresy, and therefore of formal cooperation; wherefore, at least for architects and overseers of the building, it would be licit only from a very grave cause, from which the cooperation itself would be understood to be only material. A similar judgment must be made concerning buildings which serve impious sects, such as Freemasons or socialists, for their meetings.

b. Although the Holy See has permitted cooperation in building Mohammedan temples from a grave cause,¹ nevertheless it has never permitted, not even for avoiding death, that Christians apply their labor to building temples of idols.² This seems to have been done because in individual cases it was established that the erection of the temple was held as a protestative fact of false worship; hence outside this case cooperation in building temples of idols seems to be permitted. Yet a much graver cause is required for cooperation in building temples of idols to become licit.³

b. To sell utensils necessary for a non-Catholic rite, for example benches, tables, cloths, lamps, etc., is remote cooperation, for which the mere reason of profit to be received from the sale excuses. But the more the use of these things is required for the false rite itself, such as vestments with which they are clothed in exercising rites, or bread which they use in the supper, the graver the cause required for their making and sale to become licit, because the cooperation is nearer.

c. To make works of art for the heretics themselves requesting them, for adorning a non-Catholic church, if the work itself is good or indifferent, for example an image of the crucified one, organs, bells, and things of this kind, is not licit from the sole reason of profit, because these things contribute to increasing the splendor of the rite and to promoting the sect. Since therefore in this case the character of scandal also is added, a greater cause is required in order that both cooperation and scandal can be permitted.

d. Whether it is licit to contribute money to idolatries. a. If money is contributed spontaneously, the cooperation is formal and illicit. b. If money is contributed under compulsion, and indeed as a tax offered to the community, which from it also contributes to heretical or superstitious worship, the difficulty is less, because the tax offered can also be applied to indifferent ends. c. If money is contributed under compulsion, and indeed immediately for superstitious worship or for building a temple, the contribution contains in itself external consent with the evil intention of heretics or unbelievers, and external favor furnished to heresy or idolatry. But if in some way it can be brought about that consent with heretics is excluded from the contribution, for example by a protestation made beforehand, the contribution can be licit.⁴ From the same cause and under the same conditions it is also licit to contribute money for building churches of heretics; for although it is known that the money is applied only to an evil use, nevertheless the action itself is not intrinsically evil, because it does not necessarily contain approval of the false sect.

a. Concerning this matter the response of the Sacred Penitentiary (1822) must be noted: that contributing money for building heretical churches is licit only if in this way Catholics, who celebrate worship in the same church with Protestants, can free themselves from this scandalous simultaneity. From this response two things are gathered: first indeed, that the very action of contributing money is not evil in itself; but then, that the Sacred Penitentiary indicated only a cause of common damage as sufficient for this cooperation to be excused. Nevertheless authors think that a grave cause of private damage can also excuse this cooperation.⁵

b. In places in which Catholics live mixed with Protestants, it is licit for Catholics to contribute money for building or sustaining schools or orphanages of Protestants: for the end of these buildings is not religious, but one of providing instruction or mercy. Yet a twofold condition is required: that scandal arising from this be absent, namely that the contribution of money not be considered as favor furnished to a false sect, and that it be established that the money is not applied to perverting Catholics who are received in these institutions.⁶

c. Whether it is a sin to give money to some socialist or liberal association depends on the end of the association. If the end is evil in every respect, as to attack the Catholic Church, to promote heresy, to help the election of a socialist candidate, the donation is intrinsically evil: for to give money to an association of this kind is the same as to promote its end. If the end of the association is honorable (care of the sick, support of the poor, education, etc.), nevertheless it is not licit without an excusing cause, because in pursuing the end the evil principles of the association supply the norm.

d. To summon a heretical minister to a dying person who asks that minister to administer to him the religious rite of his sect is illicit induction to evil; but if nothing else is said to the minister except that there is a sick person who asks for him, it is an indifferent thing, yet nevertheless proximate cooperation, which from the circumstances can easily be understood wrongly; therefore it seems to be excused only from a grave cause of necessity.⁷

Whether it is licit to take care that an illicit action to be furnished by office be furnished by another because of conscience. It is not licit to ask another that he himself furnish the illicit action in one's place: for this would be to induce another to sin, which is not licit even when the other commits only material sin. But it is licit to permit another to have to perform an illicit action in one's place. If Christian servants hire out their work to a community together with unbelievers, they can ask the prefect, indeed even make an agreement with him, that superstitious works not be assigned to them, although they foresee that pagans will perform them: in the case, they permit what they cannot prevent.

¹ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, November 21, 1837.

² Holy Office, January 8, 1851, and several other times.

³ Cf. Th. Gallo, Suppetiae missionariorum, Rome and Turin: Marietti, 1872, I, p. 197.

⁴ Holy Office, April 21, 1847.

⁵ Cf. Genicot, I, n. 237.

⁶ Lehmkuhl, I, n. 660.

⁷ Holy Office, December 26, 1898.

123. On the cooperation of craftsmen and merchants. a. Those who make or sell things evil in themselves, which neither have nor can have a good use, can never be excused from the sin of formal cooperation.

b. Those who make or sell indifferent things which buyers can abuse for evil, for example dice, cosmetics, swords, feminine ornaments, etc., are excused from sin, although they foresee that several (indeterminate) buyers will abuse them; for no greater cause is required to render this sale honorable than the ordinary profit which is received from their sale. Yet if it were certain that a determinate buyer was going to abuse that thing, the loss of the price to be received from it would not be a sufficient cause of making or selling the thing; but a greater cause would be required, yet not a grave one, where the matter concerns a thing saleable even otherwise, so that by denied sale the sin would not be prevented. But where the sin of the buyer can be prevented by denied sale, the sale is licit only because of a grave cause.

c. To make or sell things which are indeed indifferent in themselves but by their nature very rarely have a good use (as idols, ornaments which are used only for the worship of idolatry, signs of Freemasons, obscene images and statues, and things of this kind), and are manifestly sought or bought from an evil intention, is licit only from a gravest cause, and therefore commonly is altogether illicit (n. 120).

Merchants are not ordinarily bound to inquire for what use things indifferent in themselves are bought, since this burden would be too grave. Yet if some thing to be sold is accustomed to be applied to a harmful use (as certain poisons), it is not licit to sell it unless it is morally established that the buyer is not going to abuse it, or a gravest cause urges.

According to the same norms, the case which St. Alphonsus (n. 69) seems to solve more strictly will also have to be solved. For he judges that it is not licit to sell wine to one who will then sell wine mixed with water, except from a gravest cause, namely from fear of death or infamy. Other authors permit this if the wine cannot be sold to other buyers without great loss.¹

¹ Lehmkuhl, I, n. 673.

124. On cooperation in evil newspapers.¹ Several concur in publishing evil newspapers and in the sins which are committed by the reading of them.

a. Readers: some sometimes buy and read the paper; others are subscribers and by their subscription cooperate in preserving and propagating the newspaper. And the first indeed cooperate very remotely; therefore any light cause excuses them from sin on this side, scandal being excluded, for example the utility of reading, recreation, etc. Those who subscribe to the paper and sustain it with their money cooperate proximately; therefore only a grave cause excuses these from sin, for example great utility in managing their business.

One who from a reasonable cause can licitly subscribe to an evil paper ought to guard against two things: a. danger of perversion; wherefore, besides those things which pertain to his business, he can licitly read nothing except merely indifferent things; b. scandal, which household members and outsiders can take; wherefore on the one hand he ought to declare that he has a just cause for reading that paper, but that he rejects its principles, and on the other hand he ought to take care that the paper does not fall into the hands of household members.

b. Writers: some are editors, others collaborators, and these indeed are either ordinary or extraordinary, who only sometimes insert an article in an evil paper.

a. Editors and writers who acknowledge the principles defended by the paper and according to the same principles edit the paper or compose articles manifestly cooperate formally, and therefore cannot be excused from grave sin.

b. Ordinary writers who do not acknowledge the principles, and therefore cooperate materially and write articles indifferent and harmless of themselves, sin by cooperation more or less proximate according as by their articles the paper is commended and propagated more or less; wherefore only a more or less grave cause can excuse them from sin. Such certainly is not the greater profit which they receive from it, but only the profit which they need for the support of themselves or their dependents. But they must always take care that scandal be prevented, which can be prepared for those who have knowledge of the cooperation.

c. Extraordinary writers cooperate remotely; wherefore without a just cause it is not licit to insert one's productions in evil papers, yet a moderately grave cause excuses from this cooperation. Likewise to insert announcements of sales, rentals, and things of this kind (Inserate) in evil papers is not licit without a just cause excusing this cooperation. But the cause must be greater the more announcements of this kind cause the papers to be propagated more widely and sustained more easily. Wherefore, since the announcements of individual persons ordinarily do not contribute much to this, a light advantage received from it excuses from this cooperation.

It can happen that the circumstances of newspapers and of readers otherwise heretical are such that one who takes care that his good articles be inserted in them obtains an occasion of setting forth true and good principles to the readers. In these circumstances the cooperation is not illicit, provided the esteem of the evil newspaper and its number are not increased.²

c. Those who sell, distribute, etc., evil newspapers indeed cooperate proximately, yet not so proximately as those who print them; wherefore these also can licitly be occupied in this work only to avoid very grave inconvenience, until they have found another means of obtaining a livelihood.

¹ Cf. Villada, Casus conscientiae, 2nd ed., I, p. 95 ff.

² Cf. the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum of Leo XIII (January 25, 1897), n. 22: "Let no one of the Catholics, especially of ecclesiastical men, publish anything in newspapers, papers, or periodical booklets of this kind, unless a just and reasonable cause advises it."

125. On the cooperation of innkeepers. Innkeepers can cooperate in the sins of others chiefly in three ways:

1. By furnishing forbidden foods. a. It is not licit voluntarily to offer forbidden foods to guests: for this would be to invite them to sin.

b. It is licit to serve meats on prohibited days to those asking for them, because it would be too hard and dangerous to ask individuals whether they have a legitimate cause; but if it is established that they are not excused, meats can be supplied only from a grave reason of notable damage, as if otherwise the gathering of guests would be notably diminished.

c. Hence if they foresee that there will be guests who ask for prohibited foods, they can set the table with licit and illicit foods; and if they foresee that no one will ask for fasting foods, they can prepare only meat foods. But they are bound to admonish the guests that they can receive fasting foods, and they ought to serve such foods to those asking.

In a private family in which a table is provided for outsiders for a paid price, it is not licit without a special cause to cooperate in violating abstinence; therefore even to those asking, forbidden foods cannot so easily be supplied. Yet a moderately grave cause excuses this cooperation if the sin cannot be prevented by denied supplying.

2. By serving wine. a. It is never licit spontaneously to offer wine to one who is foreseen as going to become drunk from it; for this supplying would be formal cooperation.

b. It is licit from the sole cause of profit to serve wine to guests flowing in indiscriminately, although it is foreseen in a confused way that some of them will sin by drunkenness, quarrels, and blasphemies, both because the sins cannot be prevented (for wine will be supplied to them in other taverns), and because the innkeeper would undergo grave damage; for since sins of this kind ordinarily happen in taverns, he would suffer a great loss of guests.

c. But in a particular case it is not licit to serve wine which he asks for to a guest who will become drunk, from the sole cause of profit nor because of the guest's indignation; but for cooperation in a determinate and certain sin to be licit, a graver cause is required, for example fear of a quarrel, blasphemy, or notable damage from the diminution of guests.¹

3. By proposing evil newspapers. a. It is not licit to expose newspapers which are altogether evil, namely which almost always are opposed to faith or good morals, although they may be asked for by many who on that account will leave the inn; for the damage of the innkeeper, although grave, cannot be a sufficient cause for permitting the spiritual ruin of many which would follow from it. It is added that newspapers of this kind are also prohibited by ecclesiastical law.²

b. Newspapers which only more rarely contain something that is opposed to faith or good morals can be supplied to those asking in a separate place if otherwise they would suffer notable damage.

c. Only if it is established by experience that almost all guests ask for those papers and otherwise would leave the inn, can they be publicly proposed, provided good newspapers are also exposed at the same time. Thus in greater cities it can scarcely any longer be prevented that papers of this kind are now publicly exposed by innkeepers.

¹ Cf. Ethel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, 2nd ed., I, pr. 1, n. 17.

² Constitution Officiorum ac munerum, n. 21.

126. On the cooperation of a bookseller through evil books. a. To sell a prohibited book which is altogether evil or harmful to faith and good morals, so that it has no good use, is in no way licit.

b. To sell a prohibited book which is not evil in every respect, but also contains useful things, which nevertheless the buyer is going to abuse, is licit from a grave cause of necessity.

c. Booksellers are not bound to inquire for what end a book is bought, but they can sell it to all whom, with regard to their quality, they prudently think to ask for it licitly; otherwise a too grave burden would be imposed upon them. If they doubt concerning the good use of the book, they can sell it, because no one is to be presumed evil.¹

¹ Cf. Constitution Officiorum ac munerum, n. 46.

127. On the cooperation of printers. All who are occupied in print shops help the publisher of a book in publishing an evil work, some remotely, others more or less proximately.

a. The printer himself, or owner of the print shop, can never licitly undertake the printing of an evil book: for to undertake to print a written book is to cooperate formally and to induce others to cooperate.

b. The cooperation of those who direct the print shop, set the type, and correct the pages is proximate; since their action is not evil in itself, it is licit for them to cooperate from a gravest cause (as if otherwise they would lack necessary support for themselves and their dependents), except in the case in which the book is so evil that it cannot have a good end.

Those correcting the printed pages are referred by all authors both to those reading an evil book and to those cooperating in its publication, but by some to those cooperating proximately, by others to those cooperating remotely.

c. The cooperation of those who place the paper on the types, prepare the ink and paper, arrange and bind the pages already printed, move the machines and take care of them, is rather proximate; from a grave cause it is licit for these to cooperate.

d. The cooperation of those who sell to the printer ink, paper, machines, and other things necessary for the printing of a book is remote; wherefore the price to be received from the sale already excuses this cooperation.

In a print shop in which almost exclusively perverse books and evil newspapers are printed, it is not licit to place one's work. Those who cooperate in a print shop of this kind are bound under grave obligation to leave it if they cooperate proximately in the evil; but if they cooperate only rather proximately or remotely, they can remain if they cannot withdraw without notable damage. In a print shop in which good and evil books are printed indiscriminately, it is licit to take work for a light cause or only for a grave cause according to the diversity of cooperation.

128. On cooperation through dances. a. Dances must be considered in a twofold way: insofar as they are an occasion of sinning for those taking part, and insofar as for those arranging them they contain cooperation in the sins of others. Of dances considered in the first way there is discussion elsewhere; concerning dances under this other aspect something must be said here. The matter concerns the arranging of dances (Veranstaltung einer Tanzunterhaltung), which several persons indeterminately abuse for sin.

b. Among those cooperating through dances, the first place is held by those arranging and inviting to them; the second, musicians; the third, those renting their houses or halls for this end.

c. Those arranging and inviting sin gravely if the dances are gravely dishonorable; they sin lightly if the dances are lightly dishonorable: for they induce to a thing gravely or lightly evil. If the dances are honorable, they do not indeed sin by inviting; but by arranging the dances they cooperate in the sins which are committed in them.

d. Musicians, if the dances are dishonorable, cannot licitly concur except from a graver cause, because the sounds directing dishonorable dances constitute part of the dishonorable dance itself and therefore proximate cooperation. If the dances are not dishonorable, it is licit to concur from a light cause.

e. Those renting halls cooperate remotely; wherefore already the cause of losing profit excuses them, even if the dances are dishonorable, when, if they do not rent, there are others who will rent their house for this end. But if the dances would be prevented by their not renting, a greater cause is required.

129. On the cooperation of servants in the sins of masters. a. Actions which concur only remotely in the sin of the master, which cannot be prevented by denied cooperation, are excused because of the mere reason of service. Therefore from this cause alone it is licit to set wine before a master about to become drunk, to prepare meats on a day of abstinence, to buy or bring evil books or evil papers, to drive the master by carriage to the house of a mistress, to carry gifts to a mistress, etc.

b. Actions which cooperate rather proximately or proximately in the sin of the master are not excused unless another proportionately grave cause is added to the reason of service. How great this must be should be determined in a particular case by prudent judgment, with all its circumstances considered. Therefore only for avoiding grave damage is it licit to carry love letters written by a master to a mistress, or to keep watch while the master is with a mistress.

It can be permitted to drivers that they furnish their service indiscriminately to all, both because they are not bound to ask individuals for what end they seek a determinate place, and because, even if they know the evil end, nevertheless they cannot prevent the sin, and finally because they incur grave damage unless they offer their office to all.

With this resolution agrees the response of the Holy Office that Christians are not to be disturbed who, by boats or sedan chairs by which all persons indiscriminately are customarily transferred from place to place, convey even those gentiles who go to the sepulchers of their ancestors to exercise superstitions there.¹

¹ Holy Office, July 12, 1854.

CLOSELY connected with scandal is the subject of co-operation or participation in the sin of another; indeed, they are often treated of together, but on account of the importance of the latter it seems desirable to devote a special chapter to it.

Co-operation, then, may be formal or material. Formal co-operation is concurrence in the bad action of another and in the bad intention with which it is performed. Material co-operation is the concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention with which it is done.

Co-operation is proximate or remote according as the action of the secondary agent is more closely connected with the action of the principal agent or less so.

One is said to co-operate positively when he does something which influences the action of the principal agent; one is said to co-operate negatively when he does not hinder a bad action which he is bound to prevent.

It is never lawful to co-operate formally with another’s sin, for it is obviously to wish evil, which is always sinful. Nor is it lawful to co-operate materially with the sin of another when the action of the secondary agent is itself wrong, as is also clear. But provided the action of the secondary agent is not itself wrong, but right, or at least indifferent, and he has no evil intention, and furthermore there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent, material co-operation in the sin of another is not wrong. In such circumstances, the secondary agent does nothing that is wrong in itself; he foresees, it is true, that another will take advantage of his action in order to commit sin, but the secondary agent is only bound to prevent this out of charity, which does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience, and this is present whenever there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent. This is merely the application of the principle of a double effect which was laid down in the Book on Human Acts.¹

The cases to which this doctrine may be applied are very 732) numerous, but the safe application is difficult and attended with risk. The chief difficulty lies in determining the gravity of the cause which will justify one in co-operating materially in another’s sin. No general rule can be laid down on the point beyond saying that a graver cause is required when there is question of a graver sin, when the co-operation is more proximate, and when it is more probable that the sin would not be committed at all if the co-operation were denied. The following examples taken from approved authors are given as illustrating the application of the doctrine, and they may be used to show what may be done in similar cases.

(a) I may lawfully ask for the sacraments from a bad priest, though he commits sin in administering them, for he need not sin thereby unless he likes, and his malice should not deprive me of the benefit of the sacraments to which I have a right.

(b) A dealer may sell to all buyers things which are in themselves indifferent, though they can be put to a bad use, as firearms, unless he is certain that they are required for a bad purpose. Even in the latter case a correspondingly serious inconvenience or loss will excuse his selling, especially if his refusal will not hinder the sin on account of the buyer being easily able to procure what he wants elsewhere.

(c) Intoxicating drink may not be sold to one who has already had too much. Many authors, however, allow this to be done when it cannot be refused without provoking to violence and quarrelling. This excuse would rarely avail in England at present, because the law forbids such sale, the strong arm of the law thus being on the side of morality.

(d) It is not lawful to sell things of which the use is ordinarily sinful, except when their lawful use is guaranteed. And so booksellers are not allowed to sell infidel or immoral books except to such as require them for good reasons and with the requisite permission. The same doctrine applies to drugs and instruments used for immoral purposes, as well as to poisons. Publishers, too, sin by publishing books which are dangerous to faith or morals. Compositors and others employed in printing should not work for firms which are known to publish bad books; as they are usually ignorant of the nature of the work which they help to bring out, their ignorance, the remoteness of their co-operation, and the ease with which other workmen can be found to supply their place, will ordinarily excuse them from sin if an odd bad book or two are published by an otherwise respectable firm.

(e) Dancing may be a perfectly innocent amusement and it may be a dangerous occasion of sin. No general rule, therefore, can be given as to when dancing must be avoided. Much depends upon the company who join in the dance, upon the way of dancing, and upon the subjective disposition of the dancers. If there be nothing objectionable in any of these respects, there is no reason why a young man or a young woman should not be allowed to dance with due caution. If there be ground for objection, and especially if sin has already been frequently committed in similar circumstances, there is an obligation to abstain, unless the occasion of sin is necessary and can be made remote by taking proper precautions. If sin only follows occasionally, there will be no strict obligation to abstain from dancing, provided due precautions be taken in future.

(f) The question of theatre-going is settled on similar grounds. There are all sorts of theatres and all sorts of plays represented in them, and.all sorts of actors and actresses. To go and listen to a bad and suggestive play arouses the passions, leads to sin, and encourages evil in many ways. It will, then, as a rule, be grievously sinful to go to the theatre to see such a play. The confessor will usually be able to judge best whether in any particular case it is lawful to go to the theatre by asking whether in the past it has frequently led to sin. If it has done so, it is a proximate occasion of sin, and must be avoided as far as possible. In other cases, unless the play or the theatre is known to be bad, there will be no strict obligation to refrain from going.

¹ St Alphonsus, lib. 2, tract. 3, n. 63.

THE question of restitution is complicated and beset with special difficulties when there are more agents of injustice working together than one. There will, indeed, be the same roots of restitution which we treated of above, but difficulties arise as to who among the co-operators is bound to make restitution, and who is primarily bound. One may help another, or co-operate with another, in inflicting an injury in various ways. Nine ways are commonly enumerated: by counsel, by command, by consent, by provocation, by praise or flattery, by being partner in the sin, by silence, by concealment, by defending the ill done. In the first six of these ways the co-operation is positive, in the last three it is negative, Something must be said about each (cf. Can. 2209).

One co-operates with another in injustice by counsel when, by giving advice or by urging motives, or by showing how it may be done, he causes that other to commit an act of injustice. Such a one is obviously the moral cause of the injury, and all the conditions required for imposing an obligation of making restitution are present. If the principal agent was already determined to commit the injury, this will in that case not be due to the counsellor, and he will not be bound to repair it. Nor will the counsellor be bound to make reparation to the principal agent for any loss which the latter suffered in consequence of inflicting the injury, unless he induced him to act by fraud or other unjust means. Moreover, if before the injustice was committed the counsellor efficaciously withdrew his advice, and proposed equally strong motives for desisting from the act, it would seem that he cannot be obliged to make restitution. If, however, he had showed the other how to commit the crime and thus made it possible, he must take means to prevent it being committed, otherwise he will be responsible. Confessors, lawyers, doctors, and others whose expert advice is asked are under a special obligation not to give advice which is injurious to their clients or to third parties. If they do this, they will be bound to make compensation to the injured party not only when they acted maliciously, but also when they gave injurious advice through gravely culpable ignorance or precipitancy. Others who do not specially hold themselves out as experts will not be bound to compensate those who ask their advice and suffer loss through following it. No injury was done by giving them what they asked for, no fraud was committed by the assumption of skill or knowledge which was not possessed; if they chose to follow the advice, they took the risk on themselves, and scienti et volenti non fit injuria.

He who follows unjust advice acts in his own behalf and in his own name, and so is the principal cause of the injury done. He is bound in the first place to make restitution, and if he fail to do so, the counsellor is bound.

We co-operate in injustice by command when by whatever means we induce another to do an injury in our name and on our behalf. It does not matter whether one of the parties is in a position of superiority with respect to the other or not, nor by what means he induces the other to perform the injurious action, whether by threats, or promises, or commands, or requests; it is sufficient if by any means he induces the other to do his unjust will. Henry II made himself guilty of the blood of St Thomas a Becket by complaining that none who ate his bread would avenge the insults offered him. Mere approval, however, of injustice which has already been done does not render him who approves liable to make restitution.

One who by command induces another to commit an injury is bound in the first place to make reparation for the injury — and for all the damage which was the necessary consequence. In his default the instrument of his injustice is bound to make restitution. The one who gave the command is not bound to compensate his agent for loss or damage which he suffers in executing the will of his principal, unless compulsion or other unjust means were used to procure his co-operation. Nor is he bound to make restitution for damage which his agent did in excess of the instructions given, Furthermore, if before the command is executed he recalls it and the recall is notified to the agent, he will not be responsible for what the agent may do on his own authority; he will be responsible, however, if by any chance the intimation that the command is recalled does not reach the agent.

One who co-operates in injustice by giving his consent or vote that the unjust action should be done is bound to make reparation if his consent was the moral cause of the injustice, And so members of legislative bodies who agree together to pass an unjust law are jointly and severally bound to make reparation for all the harm that the law does. Jurymen, too, whose vote is necessary for an unjust verdict are all responsible for the injustice if they give the verdict. Sometimes, however, when injury is inflicted by the unjust votes of many, the obligation of making restitution will depend on the manner of voting. If all acted conjointly, giving their votes in a body, each and all will be responsible for the harm done; if, however, the voting took place successively, those who voted first and whose votes were necessary and sufficient for passing the unjust measure will indeed be bound to make restitution; but those who voted subsequently, and whose votes were not required to make the measure law, may be excused from the obligation of making reparation except in the case of conspiracy, though they, too, sin against justice. Those who give an unjust vote when it is the only means of preventing a greater evil do not do wrong, and are not bound to make restitution. When one of two evils is necessary, we may lawfully choose the less.

Whoever by provocation or ridicule, or by praise or flattery, causes another to commit an injury, or is the cause why reparation is not made for injustice committed, is himself bound to make restitution in the same way as one who is the cause of injustice by counsel.

One may be a partner in the infliction of injuries in various ways. He who helps another to perform an unjust action is a partner in injustice in the strict sense. One, however, who receives stolen goods or affords protection to a wrongdoer, and so encourages him in committing injustice, is also a partner in his sin. A receiver of stolen goods is obviously bound to restore them to their owner, and if by holding himself out as ready to receive them, or by affording protection to the thief, he is the cause of injustice being committed, he will be responsible for that too. To what extent the partner in injustice is bound to make restitution will depend on circumstances. He will be responsible for the whole damage inflicted if it could not have been inflicted without his help, or if the partners conspired together to commit injustice. Otherwise it will be sufficient to make reparation for such part of the damage as each respectively caused, in the estimation of a prudent person.

When treating of charity we saw that it was never lawful to co-operate formally in another’s sin, but that according to the principle of a double effect it is sometimes allowed to co-operate materially in the sin of another.

This doctrine may be applied to the matter before us, and so though it is never lawful to help another to do what is always and intrinsically wrong, as to kill an innocent person, yet in other cases it is not sinful to co-operate materially with the unjust action of another. A servant who is threatened with instant death unless she gives up a key to a robber, or shows where her master’s money is kept, would act heroically if she died rather than betray her trust; she would not commit sin if she preferred her own life to her master’s property.

On account of one’s office, or in virtue of a special contract, there is sometimes a special obligation to prevent injury being done to others, and if the obligation be not fulfilled, there is negative co-operation in the injury inflicted. Apart from such special office or contract we are bound in charity to prevent injury to others as far as we can, but not in justice. This negative co-operation may be committed by concealment of injustice which has been done, as when a servant conceals thefts committed against his master’s property which has been entrusted to his care. It may be committed by silence, as when a policeman accepts hush money to say nothing about a robbery. It may also be committed if one whose duty it is to protect another’s rights or property neglects that duty and allows them to be injured. On account of defence of an unjust act which has already been done there will not arise an obligation to make restitution, unless such defence was the cause why restitution was not made for the crime defended. All approbation and defence of wrongdoing is nevertheless sinful. One who culpably neglects to prevent his animals from doing harm to his neighbour is bound to make restitution.

Sometimes these negative co-operators are excused from performing their strict duty on account of the very serious inconvenience to which it would subject them, and which they are not presumed to have obliged themselves to undergo. In such cases they will be excused from making restitution for injuries which they did not prevent.

I. Notion. Cooperation in sin, by the force of the word, is concurrence in the sin of another, whether of one already determined to sin or not yet determined. Here, however, it is taken chiefly for concurrence in the sin to which another is already determined; but concurrence in the sin of another not yet determined to sin we have called scandal¹ (n. 545).

¹ Nevertheless, occasionally we shall use the words scandal and cooperation interchangeably.

II. Division. Cooperation is distinguished as twofold, formal and material.

1. Formal cooperation is cooperation in the evil will of another; therefore it contains approval of the sin, and has place: 1. when someone cooperates with this intention, that the other sin, proceed more securely or more intensely, etc.; 2. when he places an action which either of itself or from the circumstances involves approval of the sin: of itself, as if you confirm the mind of the one sinning; from the circumstances, as if you spontaneously help another (St. Alphonsus, II, 63).

2. Material cooperation is cooperation in the execution of another's evil will. It is had when someone indeed concurs in the sin of another, but neither proceeds with the intention that the other sin, sin more securely, etc., nor places an action which of itself or from the circumstances involves approval of the sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Material cooperation is distinguished as twofold, immediate and mediate. Immediate cooperation is that by which someone participates in the depraved action or executes it with another, as if together with a thief you carry off the goods of a neighbor. Mediate cooperation is that by which someone supplies the means of executing the depraved action, as if you hand a key to a thief, by which he can open a house.

Mediate cooperation again is twofold, proximate and remote, according as the means supplied coheres more or less with the depraved action.

III. Morality; concerning this it must be investigated how far cooperation is a sin, what kind of sin it is, and how great a sin it is.

1. How far is it a sin? Sacred Scripture teaches that cooperation in evil is of itself a sin. Thus, for example: "Cleanse me, O Lord, from hidden things, and spare your servant from those of others";¹ likewise: "Impose hands quickly on no one, nor communicate in the sins of others."² The reason to be stated presently is added, where there is question specifically of formal and material cooperation. Namely:

a) Formal cooperation is always illicit; for it contains approval, at least external approval, of the sin (St. Alphonsus, II, 63).

b) Immediate material cooperation likewise is always illicit if there is question of an action intrinsically and absolutely evil; hence it is not lawful together with another, for example, to discharge a gun at someone. If there is question of another action, for example of carrying off another's property together with a thief, immediate cooperation can sometimes become lawful, as will be explained later.

c) Mediate material cooperation is illicit of itself; by accident it can become lawful (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I have said:

a) Mediate material cooperation is illicit of itself; for it is opposed to charity, which of itself requires that we hinder the evil of our neighbor, much less does it permit that we cooperate in it (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Whether it is also opposed to the virtue in whose violation someone cooperates, we shall see later. With regard to illicitness, it is pleasing to add these words of canon 2209: "Not only the one commanding, who is the principal author of the delict, but also those who induce to the consummation of the delict or concur in this in any way, contract, other things being equal, no less imputability than the executor of the delict himself, if the delict would not have been committed without their work (§ 3). But if their concurrence only rendered easier the delict which would have been committed even without their concurrence, it carries with it lesser imputability (§ 4)."

Objection 1. The act by which someone cooperates in evil - for example the placing of a ladder which a thief will use for stealing - is an indifferent act, so that it is enough that it be placed for an honorable end.

Response. The act by which someone cooperates in evil is, or rather can be, indifferent if considered in itself or according to itself, I concede; it is indifferent insofar as here and now it is cooperative in evil, I deny.

Objection 2. Material cooperation, strictly speaking, is not cooperation in evil, and therefore cannot be called evil. It is not cooperation in evil, because it is only cooperation in the external act. But the external act of itself does not increase malice.

Response. Material cooperation, as is asserted in the objection, is cooperation in the external act. But even the external act comes under the name of sin, and in reality is a moral evil. Cooperation in moral evil, however, is an act illicit of itself. There is added that the external act by accident increases the malice of the will (n. 548). But cooperation in an act which, even if only by accident, will increase the malice of the agent, is illicit of itself.

Objection 3. St. Thomas permits that someone borrow money from a usurer; likewise that one who has fallen among robbers manifest the goods which he has, although by acting thus he materially cooperates in the sin of the usurer and of the robbers. Therefore according to the opinion of St. Thomas material cooperation is indifferent of itself.

Response. St. Thomas permits the aforesaid acts of themselves, I deny; he permits them by accident, or if the evil to be avoided or the good to be obtained makes them honorable, I concede. And indeed the holy Doctor speaks thus: "In no way is it lawful to induce someone to lend at usury; yet it is lawful to receive a loan under usury from him who is prepared to do this and exercises usury, on account of some good which is the relief of one's own necessity or that of another: just as it is lawful for him who has fallen among robbers to manifest the goods which he has, which the robbers sin by snatching away, in order that he may not be killed, after the example of the ten men who said to Ishmael: Do not kill us, because we have treasures in the field, as is said in Jeremiah 41" (II-II, q. 78, a. 4). And in the same place, ad 3: "It must be said that if someone were to entrust his money to a usurer not having other means from which he might exercise usury, or were to entrust it with this intention, that he might thence profit more copiously through usury, he would give matter for sinning; whence he himself also would be a participant in the fault. But if someone entrusts his money to a usurer otherwise having means from which he may exercise usury, so that it may be preserved more safely, he does not sin, but uses a sinful man for good."

b) Mediate material cooperation can become lawful by accident; namely it is lawful if the action by which someone cooperates is not evil according to itself, and there is a cause which makes honorable the influence upon another's sin and the consequences annexed to it. The reason is that charity does not oblige with proportionate inconvenience (St. Alphonsus, II, 63). Now a graver cause is required:

1. The graver the sin is in which someone cooperates.

2. The more that sin yields to the spiritual or temporal harm, or both, of others.

3. The nearer the concurrence is to the sin of another and the consequences annexed to it.

4. The more probably the sin would not follow without the cooperation.

5. The more certainly, once cooperation is admitted, it will follow.

6. The less right the one cooperating has to place the act.

7. The more he is bound to hinder the sin (St. Alphonsus, II, 59).

It is said - and this one point needs proof - the nearer the concurrence is to the sin. For the obligation of avoiding concurrence or remote cooperation, which easily has place, carries with it a greater burden than the obligation of avoiding proximate cooperation, which does not occur so easily; so that, if there is question of remote cooperation, a lighter reason seems required, but if there is question of proximate cooperation, a graver reason seems required. In practice the following rules can be established:

First Rule. Cooperation, both proximate and remote, is lawful if by cooperating you will avert a greater evil than is going to follow from the cooperation being omitted.

Second Rule. Proximate cooperation in grave sin is lawful for a grave cause, provided it is neither necessary nor yields to the harm of a third party; for a graver cause, if it is necessary or yields to the harm of a third party: in each case fear of equal harm to oneself is required. If it yields to common harm, it is excused for no private cause, but only for averting greater common harm.

Third Rule. Remote cooperation in grave sin is lawful for a just cause, provided it is neither necessary nor yields to the harm of a third party. If it yields to common harm, make a distinction: if it is necessary, it is not lawful except for averting greater common harm; if it is not necessary, a grave cause seems to suffice.

Fourth Rule. That your cooperation is not necessary, this alone never involves a cause on account of which it is lawful to cooperate; in other words, that someone without you is going to place the evil act is not a reason why you can help him in placing the act: for by acting thus the act and its consequences are also imputed to you in some measure.

2. What kind of sin is it? Every illicit cooperation is opposed to charity; for this of itself demands that we hinder the evil of our neighbor, much less cooperate in it. Besides, formal cooperation is opposed to the virtue in whose violation someone cooperates; for it involves approval and therefore the very malice of the said violation. The same seems to have to be said of material cooperation, namely on account of the same reasons which were brought forward for occasional and merely permissive scandal (n. 548).

3. How great a sin is it? Cooperation is a grave sin from its genus; namely:

a) Formal cooperation is a grave or light sin according as it influences a grave or light sin.

b) Material cooperation:

a) It is a grave sin: 1. if it is proximate and regards a grave sin either of a single man or of many; 2. if indeed it is remote, but necessary, and regards the sins of many.

b) It is a light sin: 1. if it regards a light sin; 2. if it is remote and regards the sin of a single man; 3. if it is remote and not necessary, even if it regards the sins of many.

¹ Psalm 18:13, 14.

² 1 Timothy 5:22.

Cooperation in Sin.—Cooperation or participation in sin, strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.

(a) Hence, cooperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while cooperation supposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the cooperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.

(b) Cooperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that his conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some authority. This cooperation will act as an example or incitement to Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin to others.

Cooperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The cooperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is a cooperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coordinate agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at the time of “hold-ups,” or who fights a duel, or who carries on an obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the cooperator may be guiltless.

Kinds of Cooperation.—Divisions of Cooperation according to Different Kinds of Acts.—(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act, cooperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples: Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer’s office. Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal cooperator on account of his guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only a material cooperator, since he does not intend what the criminals intend.

(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is positive or negative, according as one does something to help the principal agent, or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a positive, Claudius a negative cooperator. Positive cooperation is given in a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or cheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows unfastened for the convenience of thieves.

Divisions of Cooperation according to its Degree of Influence.—(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, cooperation is either occasional or effective. By occasional cooperation is understood that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin, but does not assist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example, failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective cooperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506), there is question here only of effective cooperation.

(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal agent, cooperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one shares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away stolen goods is an immediate cooperator, while he who supplied the thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are mediate cooperators.

(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done, cooperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as the principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate. Titus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Sempronius can secure them elsewhere. Balbus’ cooperation is indispensable for Titus, but not for Sempronius.

Cooperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility or of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust cooperation and merely unlawful cooperation.

(a) Unjust cooperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done to a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict reparation. Thus, those who act as “fences” or receivers of stolen goods, cooperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the rightful owners.

(b) Unlawful cooperation is participation in a sin that contains no injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission to penalty. Thus, those who cooperate by marrying illegally, or by providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments prescribed in law. Cooperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are concerned with cooperation in general, and as it is a sin against charity.

Formal cooperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is explicit, when the end intended by the cooperator (finis operantis) is the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.

(b) Formal cooperation is implicit, when the cooperator does not directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal agent, but the end of the external act (finis operis), which for the sake of some advantage or interest the cooperator docs intend, includes from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he assists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on as a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot obtain in any other way.

Mediate cooperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote. (a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation. Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar cooperates in a remote preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up cooperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate cooperation is proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate cooperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal agent, while remote cooperation is an action that has no such moral connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder cooperates proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon cooperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a “jimmy,” a dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the cooperation is definite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes, the cooperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no attention in the homes of others.

The Sinfulness of Cooperation.—The Sinfulness of Formal Cooperation.—(a) Formal cooperation is always sinful, for it includes the approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the guilt of that sin.

(b) Formal cooperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them, while formal cooperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the sins of others.

(c) Formal cooperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the sin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the cooperator delights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.

(d) Formal cooperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue violated by the cooperator, when the external act has a malice of its own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by cooperating with sin, one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that one has cooperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and the necessary circumstances.

The Sinfulness of Material Cooperation.—(a) Material cooperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material cooperation, in case of great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to cooperate by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater evil than the evil he has in mind. He who cooperates materially through necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).

Lawfulness of Material Cooperation.—The conditions necessary in order that material cooperation be lawful are the same as for any other act that has a double result (see 104); for from the cooperation follow two results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and one that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly assured by the very fact that the cooperation is merely material. (a) Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through the evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other party as a means to the good end, cooperation is formal. Hence, if Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to confession the sooner, the cooperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not intended is also verified; for the very definition of material cooperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other party.

Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that material cooperation is lawful when and if the act of the cooperator is itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the sin of the other party.

The first condition of material cooperation is that the act of the cooperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is evil, the cooperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often difficult to determine in particular instances whether cooperation is intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature and circumstances of the act.

(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of cooperation is intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any immediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.

(b) According to its circumstances, an act of cooperation is evil, if by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the cooperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one’s car; but it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the circumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see 983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools afford other examples of cooperation lawful in one set of circumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance, scandal, danger, etc.

But the circumstance that the cooperator knows for certain that the principal agent will use the cooperation for sinful purposes, or will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil designs by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make cooperation evil.

(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done, but he certainly does not approve of it.

(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the cooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of some anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of sympathy for the principles of the deceased.

The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the cooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on permission of an evil effect (see 105).

(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for cooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.

(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the publisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or reads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason is necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.

(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one’s cooperation, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants or other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not of itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.

(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals. Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to Balbus.

(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for cooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful cooperation by those who are bound ex officio, from piety or justice, to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen) than on the part of those who are not so bound.

Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).

(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain, great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.

(b) A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable percentage of the goods of one’s station in life should be considered as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment on the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to one’s honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very great evils.

(c) Graver reasons for cooperation are those that surpass the very grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one’s station in life, incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or perpetual imprisonment.

(d) Most grave reasons for cooperation are the public safety of Church or State, loss of all one’s property, death, extreme disgrace, and the like.

When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for cooperation need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is justified in order to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more quickly.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and indispensable cooperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently. One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the drunkard.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified even by avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.

When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave injustice to a private party, the reasons for cooperation need not be so serious as when the sin is against the public good.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is permissible, if without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain papers, and deliver them to a burglar.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and indispensable cooperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure. Sempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the assistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of Sempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as the robbery would do to the owner of the house.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified by the avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party, but in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today he is going out to “fleece” a number of unsuspecting victims, and he gives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place. Titus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus’ plans, but no proofs. If they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the swindling will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.

When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still greater reasons are necessary for cooperation than those given above. (a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is allowed to avoid a greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public tranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and indispensable cooperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time, if the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be able to refuse it to another company that is worse.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation may be allowed when there is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented except by cooperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being shown is not morally unobjectionable.

When the sin committed by another is directed against the necessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or State), one may not cooperate, but should resist. In this case: (a) cooperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify it, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the Church or of the State.

In giving reasons sufficient for cooperation with sins injurious to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to cooperate. But the good of others may also suffice for cooperation.

(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in cooperating, as when one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil. It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.

(b) The good of a third party may justify cooperation, as when one assists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.

(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve, in order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.

Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.—(a) If one cannot cooperate immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see 1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all immediate cooperation is sinful.

Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate Cooperation.—(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate cooperation argue that immediate cooperation does not differ from complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said likewise of other species of sin.

(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate cooperation in certain cases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of assistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against the reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable if he were unwilling that one should cooperate in removing his goods, if one had to do so in order to protect one’s life, at least if one had not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one’s life in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a loaf of bread without the owner’s consent, why may not one save one’s life by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by conferring it; that is, one may cooperate immediately with the unworthy administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of the circumstances.

Special Cases of Cooperation.—The cases of cooperation, like those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of cooperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of the cooperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and workingmen. Cooperation in sins against faith and sins against justice are treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak of these other special kinds of cooperation, since they offer many difficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the general principles on cooperation just given. However, the following points should be noted:

(a) The application of the definitions and rules about cooperation to particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology, and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among theologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some of the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but whose opposites are also likely.

(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of cooperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of material cooperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be circumstances of danger or disedification which would make it unlawful—a thing that often happens.

Formal Cooperation with Evil Reading Matter.—(a) Cases of formal cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of the managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of periodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed ex professo to faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct and select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are creating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except evil.

(b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention to do harm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publishing firms and their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written matter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell it; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in question is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.

Cooperation with evil newspapers and other reading matter is material and lawful if the matter itself is not entirely evil, that is, if it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for cooperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of cooperation. The following are examples of cooperation that may be merely material and lawful:

(a) Moral cooperation is given by writers of good matter who assist as collaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertisements; by readers who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good matter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute in a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation, and ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or volume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize. Reasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are the following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such as the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other way; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the opportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see Canon 1386, Sec. 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave, such as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot be found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as entertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small advertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by laudatory descriptions in advertisements or book reviews urge others to buy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than cooperation (see 1495).

(b) Financial cooperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a publication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers, etc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for the original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the buyers of much stock or advertising space, only a very grave reason; for subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual reading.

(c) Material assistance is given by those who produce or distribute a publication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the producers, the proximate cooperators are, first, the managers of the printing company, and, secondly, the printers, the “readers” and the correctors; the remote cooperators are the typesetters, arrangers of ink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate cooperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a printer cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote cooperation a grave reason is needed. Among the distributors, there are degrees of proximity in cooperation as follows: first, those who put the reading matter into the hands of others (e.g., by keeping it on the tables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for purchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as keepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason sufficient to excuse the first kind of cooperation, since there is no lack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc,, can provide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind of cooperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by a poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular books or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of cooperation, a grave reason suffices.

Among the suppliers are those who sell to the printer his ink, type, machinery, etc. These cooperate only remotely, and it is held that profit is a sufficient reason for their cooperation. This we admit, if the cooperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit alone would uniformly justify voluntary cooperation upon which depended the publication of pernicious matter.

Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.—(a) Cooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with which they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a formal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get away by driving him through dark streets.

(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the cooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: “Famulus qui submissis humeris scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur” (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the acts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically evil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.

Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.—(a) If cooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned to himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor or food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read, giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval of it, and they can go just as well without him.

(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is not sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one’s employer to the place where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called on habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another position, if possible.

The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the difference of circumstances.

(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in cooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order was given the wife.

(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called “dirty work”), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can secure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation without serious consequences to themselves.

Duties of Confessors.—Instruction should be given to penitents who are guilty of sinful cooperation. (a) The confessor should instruct ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation, when there is a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be instructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness of the cooperation in question is known to many persons, or the penitents by reason of cooperation are giving great scandal or are in serious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation—at least, not for a time—if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from the instruction than from silence.

Obligations to be Imposed on Penitents on Account of Sinful cooperation.—(a) Some cases of cooperation cause the culprit to fall under ecclesiastical penalties, for example, those who act as seconds or spectators at duels (Canon 2351). (b) Some cases entail a duty of reparation for scandal given, as when one has aided the diffusion of irreligious or obscene literature or whisperings among the people. (c) Some kinds of cooperation include dangerous occasions of sin which one is bound to avoid, as when one works for a man who produces adulterated wares or gets money under false pretenses.

Cooperation in Defamation.—Not only the defamer sins, but also those who cooperate with him. Among the cooperators with defamation are those who give orders for defamation, those who show how it can be done, those who protect defamers, and those who participate in defamation by directing the conversation to a certain subject or by joining in the criticisms. The most ordinary form of participation in defamation is that of the listener, for no one defames successfully unless he has a sympathetic listener. Those who listen to detraction in such a way as to consent to what is said share in the guilt of the detraction. This happens as follows:

(a) the listener consents directly to defamation when he spurs the speaker on (e.g., by saying, “Tell us about So-and-So,” by insincerely praising an absent person in order to excite dispraise, by nodding approvingly, cheering, or smiling, by showing great marks of favor to those who bring him news against others or of disfavor to those who refuse to do this), or when he rejoices internally at the defamation he hears, because he hates the victim:

(b) the listener consents indirectly to defamation when he does not spur the speaker on nor approve of what is said, but omits to stop the defamation or to protest against it, when he could and should do one or the other of these things.

Sinfulness of Direct Consent to Defamation.—The listener who consents directly shares in the guilt of the defamer according to the words of St. Paul: “They who do such things (detractors, etc.) are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them” (Rom., i. 32), Indeed, St. Bernard says that it is not easy to say which is more deserving of condemnation, to defame or to listen to defamation. But we may distinguish as follows:

(a) he who spurs the defamer on is more guilty than the defamer. This listener sins against the detractor whom he scandalizes by inducing to sin, against the detracted whom he deprives of his good name. Thus, he is both uncharitable to the detractor and unjust to the detracted, and is the moving cause of all the harm that is done (cfr. 2065);

(b) he who hears the defamer willingly may be more guilty internally than the defamer, since his hatred of his neighbor and his love of injustice may be more intense; but externally his sin is less, since, as is supposed, he is not bound to resist the defamation and he does not give any cooperation to the external injustice. He sins against justice affectively (i.e., in wish), but not effectively (i.e., in word or deed).

Persons Who Listen from Curiosity.—What of those listeners who hear defamation willingly, not because they approve of the harm or evil that is being done, but because they are unusually curious or the speaker is unusually interesting?

(a) If these listeners could and should stop the defamation, they consent to it indirectly by their silence and thus are guilty (cfr. 2079).

(b) If these listeners are not able or are not bound to stop the defamation, some would nevertheless hold them guilty of grave sin, since they wish to hear something only because the knowledge will give them pleasure, knowing all the while that this knowledge cannot be had except at the expense of the good opinion they have of a neighbor. But the general view is that in this case there is no grave sin; for the listener does not approve of the moral evil (he is interested only in the graceful or eloquent or witty manner of the speaker, or the strangeness of the things related, or he is only concerned to hear the latest news, cfr. 234), and what he hears does not cause the lowering of his neighbor in his own opinion. But here it is supposed that the listener in no way encourages the defamation and that he is not bound to stop it. Curiosity about things that do not concern one is, however, a venial sin.

Sinfulness of Indirect Consent to Defamation.—The listener who consents indirectly to defamation by not impeding it as he should is also guilty of sin, and in Scripture his conduct is strongly forbidden: “Have nothing to do with detractors” (Prov., xxiv. 21); “Hedge in thy ears with thorns, hear not a wicked tongue” (Ecclus., xxviii. 28).

(a) It is commonly admitted that the listener in question sins doubly against charity, and grievously if the defamation is seriously harmful; for he sins against the detractor by refusing to give a brotherly correction (see 1258 sqq.), and he sins also against the one detracted by refusing to raise his voice in behalf of the absent who cannot defend himself.

(b) It is also commonly admitted that, if the listener is the superior of the defamer or of the person defamed, he sins more gravely, since he is specially bound to correct his subject who is detracting in his presence, or to defend his absent subject who is being defamed. If the listener is a private person not responsible for the defamed person’s reputation, he does not sin against justice by his indirect consent to the defamation. Indeed, the inferiors or equals of the defamer rarely sin gravely by their neglecting to oppose his defamatory remarks.

Guilt of Superior Who Consents to Defamation.—Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a non-subject by a subject guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) As regards the spiritual injury (i.e., the guilt of sin incurred by the defamer), the superior is guilty of injustice towards his subject, if by reason of his office or contract he is bound to correct faults and neglects to do so. Thus, a bishop or pastor is supported by his people, and there is at least an implied agreement that he will direct them in spiritual matters and reprove their faults. Hence, it seems that a spiritual superior of this kind is unjust, if he fails to correct a subordinate who carries defamatory tales to his ears.

(b) As regards the temporary injury (i.e., the detriment to fame incurred by the person maligned), all depends on whether the superior is bound by reason of his office or contract to prevent injury to non-subjects by those who are his subjects. If the superior exercises his authority in the temporal order and has an agreement with those not subject to him to protect them against defamation by his subjects, he is bound in justice to abide by his agreement. But the common opinion is that a superior in the spiritual order is not responsible ex officio for the fame or other temporal welfare of those not subject to him.

Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a subject guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) If the superior has authority in the temporal order, he is unjust by his inaction, in so far as law, custom or agreement hold him to prevent the defamation of his subject. Thus, a guardian entrusted with the care of his ward’s reputation is unjust if he makes no effort to prevent defamation of the latter.

(b) If the superior is in the spiritual order, some believe that he is unjust by inaction, since fame is closely connected with spiritual goods, being necessary for moral influence over others and useful for personal perseverance in virtue. But others—and it seems more commonly—deny this, and state that the relation between fame and spiritual goods is only accidental.

Circumstances Which Lessen Guilt of Indirect Consent.—Indirect consent to defamation is often only a venial sin. (a) Thus, by reason of the lightness of the matter, as when only trivial defects are mentioned by the defamer; (b) by reason of insufficient reflection, as when the listener is distracted in mind and does not clearly advert to the sinfulness of the words he hears; (c) by reason of insufficient consent, as when the failure to stop or protest against the defamation is due to slight laziness, to bashfulness, or to fear of the speaker, at least when the defamation is not extremely harmful to fame or other good, or gravely slanderous.

Inaction in the Face of Defamation.—Inaction in the face of defamation of a third party is sometimes no sin at all.

(a) Thus, there is no sin when one is unable to act (e.g., when a slanderous speech is being delivered by a person in authority who will not suffer any interruption to be made), or is unable to act with any success (e.g., when the attempt to correct would provoke worse defamation, when the listener is too unskilled to refute or remonstrate). Scrupulous persons should not attempt to correct, since they are not suited for this. Their attempts to defend an absent person would generally make them ridiculous, and would often be unjust to the person whom they suspected of defamation.

(b) There is no sin when one is not obliged to act (e.g., when interference will expose one to very serious evils, when the defamation is not grave or is not taken very seriously, when the listener is uncertain whether the speaker is really guilty of defamation or whether he himself is bound to intervene). It is sometimes unwise to interrupt a defamatory story, for many such story seems to promise dire disclosures at its beginning, but when heard to the end is seen to be an affair of no importance or to contain little that is new or startling or credible.

Ways of Opposing Defamation Made in One’s Presence.—(a) Positive resistance is made by a command to the defamer to be silent, or by refutation of his words if they are false, or by a rebuke if his words are true. This mode of correction is generally required if the listener is the superior of the defamer, and is sometimes suitable if he is the latter’s equal.

(b) Negative resistance is made by leaving the company, by having no share in the conversation, by changing the subject, by showing displeasure or at least gravity in one’s looks or acts: “The north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue” (Prov., xxv. 23). This mode of resistance is usually the proper one for an inferior, and as a rule is found more satisfactory even between equals (see 1267).

Cooperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.—(a) Cooperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem ipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor quae suis quaeremoniis de molestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanisticum, vel quae nec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice congrediendi, vel quae active adjuvat abruptionem copulae, vel quae interne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).

(b) Cooperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu fundato rixarum, molestae cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam actio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque causa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515 sqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus diu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii cum periculo incontinentiae, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam cum tanto incommodo.

(c) Cooperatio mere materialis ad contraceptionem, non videtur possibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala (1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec passive se habere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin autem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis, eam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa (2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See Irish Ecclesiastical Record, June, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)

1. Marcellinus the missionary proposes the following doubts:

1. Is it licit for Christians to rent houses and workshops to gentiles? The reason for doubting is that the gentiles, in the nobler place of those houses, burn incense, exhibit reverence to an idol, and exercise other superstitious things.

R. "It is licit, if it is established that the houses are sought for inhabiting and the workshops for an indifferent use; yet it is not licit if they are expressly sought for constructing a shrine." S. C. de P. F., 8 Feb. 1806.

2. Is it licit for Christians to lease farms belonging to a temple?

R. Here is in summary the instruction given by the S. C. de P. F., 15 Jan. 1807. 1. It is licit to lease farms belonging to a temple; especially if a cause consonant with reason for contracting concurs; for the thing is of its own nature indifferent. 2. To pay the lease price is a debt of justice, even if the lessee thinks it will be expended for the sake of the temple. 3. Scandal which perhaps arises for Christians from a thing of this sort, insofar as it is born from ignorance, or is scandal of the little ones, must be restrained by protestation and instruction; insofar as it is produced by the malice of the wicked, or is pharisaic, it must be contemned. 4. The lessee is to be exhorted to abstain from the lease if from this some danger of perversion or occasion of scandal is feared.

2. Christians buy territories on which there are idols or oratories of idols. Can they admonish the gentiles, to whom the territory previously belonged, to remove them from the territory?

R. "They cannot, if the ownership of these idols or oratories is annexed to the territory, and passes with the dominion of the land to the buyer, who is held to remove and destroy them, or so change their form that every occasion of superstitious worship is removed, and no appearance of an oratory consecrated to idols appears any longer. But if such idols or oratories are of public right and under the power of the prince, it is not licit for Christians to remove or destroy them, but rather they should abstain from buying those territories in which these profane images and oratories are found." Holy Office, month of May, year 1781.

3. Gentiles who preserve the tablets of the progenitors of the family are converted to the faith. Can they hand over tablets of this sort to pagan relatives, to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them from their house, or hide them, to be handed over afterwards if they are demanded by relatives or by prefects, and they are compelled to this? Likewise, to what are proselytes held who have with themselves the idols of other pagans, which they preserve by way of deposit?

R. "If those superstitious tablets by special dominion belong to the converted gentile, he cannot preserve them at home, nor hand them over to other pagans of the family, but must altogether destroy them; and thus it is to be taught and enjoined by the missionaries. But if these tablets belong jointly to others of the family, the Christian is held to remove them from his house; but he can hand them over to others of the family to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them and take them for themselves; for thus he will confess his faith, and will render to another his own right. By equal right, the idols of pagans which the proselyte preserves for the sake of deposit are to be restored to their owners." Holy Office, 20 Aug. 1778.

4. The bishop of Sergiopolis, Apostolic Vicar of Kiang-nan, proposed a case to the S. C. de P. F.: "Whether Catholics can be permitted, with boats and carrying-chairs, by which they are accustomed indiscriminately to transfer all persons from place to place, also to convey those gentiles who, bringing with themselves incense, idols, and other superstitious things, approach the sepulchers of their ancestors, or other places, so that there they may exercise superstitions."

The S. C. de P. F., 14 Sept. 1868, transmitted the response of the Holy Office, July 1854, given to a similar question:

"Since the actions of which there is discussion are in themselves licit, or at least indifferent, and do not directly influence superstition, provided that scandal is not present, and grave damage is imminent, those Catholics are not to be disturbed; and provided that it is not in contempt of religion, and a protestation is made by the Christian sailors, insofar as it can conveniently be done, that they do not intend toward superstition." Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2195.

5. Marcellus, a missionary, proposes the following doubts:

1. In order to avoid some tumults against Christians, is it licit for Christians to contribute money which is demanded, to be spent in the new year on idolatries of demons, and at the same time on other indifferent demonstrations of the people's joy?

R. "The Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this sort they do not intend to concur in superstitious acts, the cause which is narrated being supposed, especially a protestation having been premised, if it can conveniently be done, that they furnish the taxes imposed only in order to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F., 12 Sept. 1645.

2. Is it lawful for Christians to contribute money which, if one is unwilling to give it, he is prohibited from entry into the market of goods; which money partly falls to the leading men, partly to repairing the market, and partly to burning incense to a false deity?

R. "The payment of the tax can be permitted to Christians, especially with a protestation premised." S. C. de P. F., year 1816; Holy Office, 21 Apr. 1849.

3. What if the tax to be paid is imposed solely for a superstitious end, for constructing pagodas, for making sacrifices to idols, etc.?

R. That indeed is not licit, even with any protestation premised. For this contribution bears before itself at least external consent with the superstition of the gentiles, which is altogether illicit. Holy Office, 16 Nov. 1769.

4. By the edict of the king Christians are now compelled to erect shrines to idols and to progenitors. Moreover, in very many places where pagans and Christians are mixed, Christians make an agreement with pagans that they themselves will sustain, according to their choice and as they can, a greater and some special part of public and licit works in the village, provided that the pagans do not disturb them concerning superstitions nor betray and accuse them before the Mandarins, and furthermore handle the superstitious business before the Mandarin for the whole village according to their choice and as they can. By acting thus, the Christians do not intend that the pagans perform superstitious things in their place, but only to free themselves from doing superstitions, and to hide themselves from the Mandarins. Moreover, the pagans do not do more superstitions, either greater or more in number, than they do according to their custom. - Q. Is such an agreement between Christians and pagans licit, with attention to the things said above, with attention also to the reason that, unless Christians make an agreement with pagans in such a way, they will either perform superstitions, or will be compelled to sustain innumerable vexations?"

R. "As it is explained, it can be tolerated, or they are not to be disturbed." S. C. de P. F., 10 Aug. 1841, Vicar Apostolic of Western Tonkin.

6. "Christians, few in number, cannot avoid using the society of gentiles: they find themselves daily at their tables and banquets; but because pagans have it as a custom that they offer to idols foods prepared not only directly for the worship of idols, but for the ordinary eating of the family, and place them indifferently on the table, Christians who sit there, timid, likewise eat indifferently, because it would be shame to themselves and injury to the gentiles if they refused to use the foods placed there."

"Q. Can those Christians eat of these, when scandal is not given?"

R. "It is licit to eat feasts placed indifferently, although offered to idols, provided that it is not in a temple, nor in a place sacred to idols, and provided that every appearance of worship or veneration of idols and of superstition is absent, and no danger is present of scandalizing the faithful or infidels." Holy Office, 15 Dec. 1768. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1703.

7. The wives, daughters, and maidservants of pagans are compelled to cook foods for the common meal of the family. But some part of these foods will afterwards be offered to an idol.

Q. In the case, can the aforesaid persons licitly cook foods?

R. "It is generally licit to cook and prepare foods if there is question of ordinary servants and cooks, who through the whole time of the year are assigned to a ministry of this sort; if extraordinary banquets of this sort are made primarily for the joy of the family, for guests, and for other occasions by no means superstitious, although it is not unknown that some part of them is to be offered to idols; if the dishes are not distinguished, so that some are made for a superstitious offering, others for the food of the guests, but the destination depends on the judgment of the father of the family; if no dishes are specially directed and prepared for the idol; if in the division of the feasts, nor in their exposition at the place of sacrifice, or at the table of the idol, they do not cooperate.

"It is not licit for maidservants and children of the family to buy, cook, or in any way prepare extraordinary foods accustomed to be deputed to sacrifice or superstitious offering, when they well know that such foods are destined by masters, husbands, or parents for sacrifice or offering to be made to their deceased. Nor is this licit for the same persons because of grave fear or damage which probably or certainly threatens themselves, even if a protestation is premised, that their mind is altogether alien from superstition. Likewise this is not licit for the same persons even when those extraordinary foods are bought, cooked, etc., in a greater quantity than is necessary for furnishing the said table serving superstition, when the primary end of the said preparation is to make the aforesaid superstitious table, although the part of the foods which remains over serves occasionally and accessorily for licit eating." S. C. de P. F., 13 Jan. 1793.

1. Franciscus, destitute of all work and not having from which he might live and honorably sustain his numerous family, after he had tried other means, with an ample wage offered to him, accepts the office of typographer, of compositor of type, in a Protestant workshop, in which Bibles and other books of Protestants treating of Religion are continually published, to be disseminated here in Rome among the people even gratuitously. At Easter time Franciscus approaches confession, and the confessor commands him that, notwithstanding whatever grave inconvenience, he depart from that workshop. Franciscus obeys, and since he does not find work in a Catholic workshop, he sells newspapers through the public streets, La Tribuna, il Messaggero, L'Osservatore Romano, La Voce della Verità, and others, good and bad mixed together.

Q. 1. Could Franciscus licitly remain in that workshop? - 2. Can he now licitly sell good and bad newspapers indiscriminately?

R. To the first, negatively. The reason is, 1. because his cooperation in disseminating those depraved books against the Catholic religion is proximate, and in fact a sufficient cause to excuse him is lacking. For when that workshop has been left, it is very difficult that he not find another, at least not so bad and perverse; or at least that he exercise another office from which he can live honorably and sustain his family, although perhaps not without some inconvenience to him, which is proved by daily fact here in Rome and in almost all great cities. Nevertheless, in the case of true most grave detriment, he could remain for the briefest time, until he should find another workshop, or find another office to be exercised, if scandal and contempt of religion are absent. Since to set a heretical writing in type, just as also to transcribe it, is not evil in itself from its intrinsic nature, since it can be done both for an evil end and for a good end, for example to refute that writing, and then it is evidently not prohibited. Aptly Laymann, l. 2, t. 3, c. 13, n. 5: "In a very grave necessity, however, if other scandals also and contempt of the Catholic religion are absent, such a thing could be furnished for a brief time, for example, if the son of a heretical typographer should be converted to the Catholic faith, who could not so quickly desert his father without very grave detriment to himself. Since to set in type a writing of heretics, just as also to transcribe it, is not evil per se, if it is not done for an evil end; nor does an ecclesiastical law prohibiting this oblige in so grave a necessity." The same is taught by Gury, Comp., v. 1, n. 253, q. 5; Frassinetti, Comp., 6th ed., Genoa, 1875, v. 1, tract. 4, dissert. 5, n. 21; D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 3, n. 142; and other more recent authors commonly.

The second reason is drawn from the Instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar for parish priests of Rome: "they sin gravely..... and typographers, even secondary ministers, who, lest they be cast out by superiors, collect letters for printing the books of heretics; nay indeed, if there is question of books of heretics by which heresy is taught and upheld, even secondary ministers of the typographer incur the major excommunication reserved in a special way to the Pontiff." Enchir. Moral., n. 367.

To the second, negatively again. The reason is that still sufficiently proximate cooperation is had in spreading among the people those depraved and prohibited newspapers. Nor in fact is there a sufficient reason to excuse Franciscus. For just as, when the Protestant printing workshop had been left, he found this new office, so assuredly there is not lacking another office which he can exercise in a Christian manner, as we have already observed; especially since he himself is endowed with so good a will that, to avoid sin, he is prepared, in place of the nobler office of typographer-compositor, to exercise even the lowest office of public crier through the streets. Besides, there is no necessity of selling good and depraved newspapers; indeed let him sell only good ones, and he will conciliate to himself the favor of the good, who without doubt will be at hand for him and his family in necessity. Nevertheless, since also in this case the cooperation is material and less proximate, especially since there are many others who do this, he will be able meanwhile to exercise that office for some very brief time, until he finds another office, to avoid most grave harm; for example, if he should be compelled to beg and scarcely have from which he himself might live and sustain his family, yet scandal and contempt of religion always being excluded. Frassinetti, l. c.

2. "... In the city M. there exists a hospital... in which nuns take care of the sick.... But since in this hospital followers of a non-Catholic religion are sometimes received, and they from time to time ask for a heretical minister, from whom they may receive the aids and consolations of religion, it is asked whether it is licit for the aforesaid nuns to call a minister of false religion? It is asked besides whether the same solution is to be given where a heretical sick person dwells in the private home of a certain Catholic; namely, whether then the Catholic can licitly call a heretical minister?

The Fathers responded: According to the things set forth, it is not licit; and they added: Let them behave passively." Holy Office, 15 Mar. 1848. - G. 202; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1845, to 7.

3. "1. Whether it is licit to minister the sacraments of the dying to the faithful who indeed do not adhere to the Masonic sect, nor are led by its principles, but, moved by other reasons, have ordered their bodies to be cremated after death, if they are unwilling to retract this command?

2. Whether it is licit for the faithful whose bodies have been cremated, not without their own fault, publicly to offer the sacrifice of the Mass or even privately to apply it, and likewise to accept foundations for this end?

3. Whether it is licit to cooperate in the cremation of corpses, either by command and counsel, or by furnished work, as for physicians, officials, and workers serving in the crematory? And whether this is licit at least if it is done in some necessity or to avoid great harm?

4. Whether it is licit to minister the sacraments to those cooperating in such a way, if they are unwilling to desist from this cooperation, or affirm that they cannot desist?

R. To the first. If, admonished, they refuse, negatively. But that admonition may be made or omitted, let the rules handed down by approved authors be observed, having regard especially to avoiding scandal.

To number 446, at the end. ON COOPERATION

"Some Ordinaries of Italy having asked whether priests can undertake the office of councillor in administrative matters either of municipalities or of civil provinces, and to this end accept being proposed as candidates in elections, the S. C. Consist., ... judged that it should be answered that it is not lawful, unless by the previous consent both of the proper Ordinary of each priest and of the Ordinary of the place in which the administrative mandate is to be exercised; notwithstanding anything to the contrary." S. C. Consist., 8 June 1914. The same response was given for France by the S. Congr. NN. EE. EE., 2 Apr. 1906, S. C. Consistor., 19 May 1913. "From several dioceses of Italy, especially northern Italy, serious complaints have reached the Apostolic See concerning the harms which that institution or association, which is called syndicalism, inflicts even upon the class itself of workers and farmers, since, among other things, in act and in reality it defects into social conflict. Wherefore, to forestall, as far as is lawful, so great an evil, our Most Holy Lord, Pope Pius X, commanded this sacred Congregation to make known to the aforesaid Ordinaries of Italy his mind and firm judgment, that priests, with every exception of persons and places removed, cannot give their name to these syndicalist associations, or once given keep it in them, exercise any office in them, and give speeches or exhortations in their aid: from all of which all priests are to be prohibited, lest they themselves seem to be participants in the evils which often flow from that institution. "That I may carry out the commands of the Most Holy Lord, I communicate these things with the Ordinaries whom it concerns, that they may provide opportunely according to the variety of cases. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary. "Given at Rome, from the Secretariat of the sacred Consistorial Congregation, on the day 20 June 1914. -

C. Card. De Lai, Bishop of Sabina, Secretary.

I. Bapt. Rosa, Substitute."

248. • DEFINITION. Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. - But insofar as it can be opposed to Charity, it is a certain participation in the depraved action of another ¹.

¹ Cooperation can be opposed to charity, insofar as this virtue requires that we impede the sins of others, and accordingly that we not assist others in sinning by our works.

DIVISION. Cooperation is distinguished:

1º Immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator acts with the sinner in the very act of sin, or places other actions having some connection with the sin of another.

2º Proximate or remote, according as the action of the cooperator is connected more nearly or more remotely with the depraved action of another.

3º Positive or negative, according as the cooperator either places some action influencing the sin of another, for example by helping him, or omits a due act, for example if he does not obstruct, when he ought to obstruct.

4º Formal, which concurs with the evil will of another, and cannot be without sin; or material, which concurs only with the evil action of another without the intention of cooperating with sin.

There is also direct or indirect, physical or moral cooperation, as was said where voluntary in itself and in its cause was discussed: De Act. hum. n. 5. and 7.

Cooperation is made chiefly in nine ways, namely by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising, providing recourse, participating in action or profit, being silent, not obstructing, not manifesting. Hence the verses

Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse,
Participant, mute, not obstructing, not manifesting.

See the things to be said in the Treatise on Justice.

Principles. - I. It is certain that formal cooperation is never lawful, since this morally influences the sin of another, and consequently is a moral cause of it. - St. Lig. n. 63.

II. Material cooperation is lawful, provided the action is per se good or at least indifferent, and there is present a just and proportionate cause relative to the gravity of the sin of another, and to the proximity of the concurrence to the execution of the sin. The reason is, because when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if another should wish to abuse it for executing sin, you are bound to impede that only from Charity; and since Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore by placing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin; for his sin does not arise from your cooperation, but from the malice of the one who abuses your action. - St. Lig. ibid. - See On Human Acts, n. 9.

III. The greater the reason required for cooperating, the nearer and greater the cooperation is, - the more probable and worse the effect that is to follow is, - the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin, - the more the sin is repugnant to justice or Charity.

249. Resolves. - 1º What cannot be granted without sin can never be asked ², such as the violation of some obligation, for example from a notary something opposed to his office.

² Understand this when the malice holds itself on the part of the act, but not if merely on the part of the agent, as is clear from Resol. 3.

2º It is not lawful to paint obscene things; nor is it lawful to guard the rear for a thief, because it is to influence the depraved will of the thief ³. - St. Lig. n. 571.

³ Recall the first example rather to the general doctrine on scandal; and then except, if something of this kind must be painted, for example for the aid of anatomical or obstetrical science. The other example supposes a common design with the thief; for otherwise to watch for another and to warn him are acts indifferent per se, and consequently they could be recalled to material cooperation.

3º It is lawful to ask a loan from a usurer, Sacraments from an unworthy minister, an oath from him who perhaps will perjure himself, provided there is a just cause. - St. Lig. n. 77. 79.

Namely chiefly 1º with regard to servants; 2º with regard to workers; 3º with regard to merchants; 4º with regard to innkeepers.

From the principles posited above it can for the most part be gathered when servants and others can or cannot cooperate with the sins of masters, associates, or others. Nevertheless several doubts are to be solved for the greater clarity of matters. Hence:

250. Questions. - Q. 1º Can a servant, from fear of death or mutilation, place his shoulders under his master ascending to fornicate?

Resp. Affirm. more probably, because he does not place an action intrinsically evil. - St. Lig. n. 66. 68. But afterward he is bound to leave the house of his master, if he fears anything else of this kind. - Scavini. Resolve the same in similar cases.

Q. 2º Is it lawful for a servant to open the door of the house to a prostitute?

Resp. The more common affirm, provided there is another who, if he himself did not open, would open. - St. Lig. n. 66. For this circumstance makes the cooperation sufficiently remote.

Nevertheless several contend that it is never lawful to open the door to a prostitute, and they rely on the following proposition 51, condemned by Innocent XI: A servant who, with shoulders lowered, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to deflower a virgin, and serves him many times, by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally, if he does this from fear of notable detriment, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house. - But these words opening a door manifestly must be understood of opening by force another's house, as is clear from the context. Besides, this proposition is damnable because it permitted cooperation even for the lightest cause, namely lest the servant be looked upon even with stern eyes.

In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, usurers or prostitutes are permitted to dwell, it is lawful to rent a house to them, especially if other tenants are lacking, or if it would be easy for them to rent other buildings; unless nevertheless the prostitutes gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the situation of the dwelling they furnish a greater occasion for sinning. - St. Lig. n. 70.

251. • Q. 3º Can a servant, by reason of service, saddle the horse of a master about to set out for sinning, or accompany him?

Resp. Indeed it does not seem illicit if the servant only saddles the horse, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more with the sin of the master than by opening the door to a prostitute ⁴. But unless grave harm threatens, it would not be permitted to him to accompany the master to the place where the sin is to be committed, because the cooperation is nearer. - St. Lig. n. 64, and in Retract. n. 10. ⁵.

⁴ To saddle the horse for a master seems to bear itself toward his sin in the same way as to hand him shoes or a hat when he is about to leave the house.

⁵ St. Alphonsus affirms this not absolutely, but only as more probable, saying: More probably the reason of service alone does not suffice for this, even if without the servant's help the master would go; at least fear that is grave is required. Thus Sanchez Dec. Lib. 1. Cap. 7. n. 22., Viva in Prop. 51., Innoc. XI., n. 5., Salmant. Tract. 21. Cap. 8. n. 72. For the rest, neither Sanchez nor the Salmanticenses actually have the doctrine which St. Alphonsus here hands down in their name; but they suppose that the sin of the master, if the servant did not accompany him, was to be avoided. Thus Sanchez (l. c.): It is deduced that servants can saddle the horse, accompany and wait for the master (when not for the sake of keeping watch, as we shall say in the following number), although they know that he goes away to fornicate. Because these services are indifferent of themselves, nor are they exhibited by servants so that they may connive at the depraved intention of the master, but by an urgent necessity of obeying a master commanding an indifferent thing. Thus Angles, Navarr., Manuel... But the common reason of service

I judge not to excuse servants when that master would avoid the sin, if the servant did not saddle the horse or did not accompany him. For then a more ample cause would be required, such as that this service could not conveniently be denied to the master, and that it would be troublesome and harmful to the servant to leave the master on this account. - But the Salmanticenses (l. c.): It is lawful for servants... to accompany the master to the house of a concubine, when even if the servant were not his companion, the master would go, nor is he rendered bolder from this, because then it is mere accompaniment. But if the master were employing the servant as companion so that he might sin more safely and freely, ... it would be altogether illicit; because then it would already influence the sin proximately. See Sanch. and Diana... Therefore neither reason nor the authority of A. supports the doctrine; for Viva too, alleged by St. Alphonsus, relies only on a fallacious citation of Sanchez.

** VV. undertook to attack this Note in altogether sixteen columns (Pages 165-172.); whether by useful labor or by vain labor, let the equitable reader judge.

1º For could they bring forward anything by which they would show that that is false which shines forth evidently from the texts premised, namely that both Sanchez and the Salmanticenses teach the opposite opinion to that which St. Alphonsus attributed to them, who otherwise confirms his opinion by no argument other than by the authority of these? By no means indeed.

2º VV. heaped up many things from many Authors through those sixteen columns. But could they produce even one testimony of anyone, Viva excepted, in which the opinion of St. Alphonsus is contained, namely that even when without the help of the servant the master would go, the reason of service does not suffice so that he can licitly saddle the horse or accompany the master? By no means indeed. For the rest, what is said in the Note, that Viva relies only on a fallacious citation of Sanchez, is indeed less exact: namely it ought to have been written that Viva relies on a fallacious citation both of Sanchez and of Navarrus. For that Viva wrongly alleged also Navarrus is clear from the words which even VV. themselves (Page 169. in the Note) describe; since in them Navarrus speaks of servants when, if they themselves did not accompany, the master would not go; whereas Viva speaks (l. c.) of a servant who merely materially accompanies the master, and therefore is in no way a cause that the master goes out to sin.

Since these things are so, and since nothing else occurs in those sixteen columns which pertains to this question, there is no need that anything further be added here. It is useful to remember this one thing, also with regard to this question, that probabilities do not furnish a foundation by which the Confessor can impose obligations.

Q. 4º Is it lawful for a servant to carry gifts to a prostitute?

Resp. Neg. at least without a very grave cause, because since these gifts are apt for fostering lust, the cooperation is proximate ⁶. - Thus commonly. Indeed St. Lig. n. 65 judges this intrinsically evil; because per se they foster shameful love. But more probably Viva contradicts this with others.

⁶ Sporer, on the contrary, excuses these servants (de V. Praecepto Cap. 1. n. 99.), because (he says) on the one hand they by their office and condition are bound to serve and obey their masters; but on the other hand cooperation with sin is merely material, and only remote. Nor is that true which A. intimates, that the opposite opinion is commonly taught. For St. Alphonsus alleges no one for it except Concina, and the reason which the latter brings forward is rejected by all.

** There are two things which we must prove concerning this Note against the objections of VV. (Pages 173-175.). First, that no one, Concina excepted, favors the opinion of St. Alphonsus; second, that the reason brought forward by him, namely that carrying gifts is intrinsically evil, is rejected by all.

And as to the first, the matter is clear from this, that VV. were able to allege no one except Concina. For Amort and Cardenas, whom they invoke, do not have this question.

But the second becomes manifest from this, that even the Authors alleged by VV. (but not fully) acknowledge that this is lawful, at least if a grave cause is at hand. But if the thing is intrinsically evil, for no cause, and even if otherwise death is threatened, does it ever become lawful. Therefore.

With regard to this latter point, VV. acknowledge (Page 174.) that the reason of Concina, adopted by St. Alphonsus, is opposed to the common opinion of the Doctors; nevertheless they warn (ibid. p. 173.) that it could not have been rejected by all Authors, since Concina is later than they. - Resp. In order that the Doctors should reject Concina's reason, it was by no means necessary that they should foresee that someday Concina would employ it. But the Doctors more than sufficiently rejected that reason, when all, and even Cardenas, unanimously either supposed, or established as undoubted and evident, that the action about which the question is, or others of this kind, are per se indifferent. For to say that one and the same thing is per se indifferent, and at the same time intrinsically evil, is to speak contradictory things.

Q. 5º Is it lawful for a servant to carry amorous letters to the concubine of his master?

Resp. Neg., unless there is present a very grave reason. Indeed according to St. Lig. n. 68, it is never lawful, even when a most grave cause has been posited, because (as he says) this is intrinsically evil ⁷; nevertheless Vogler teaches the opposite with others. For the rest, a servant is not bound to inquire what is contained in the letters.

⁷ As sometimes at other times, so also here, it happened to St. Alphonsus that he was led away by fallacious allegations which he found among the Salmanticenses and Dominic Viva. For not even one of the doctors whom the Salmanticenses and Viva bring forward actually hands down a doctrine circumscribed by those limits. Thus, for example, Sanchez, whom all these allege, after many things concludes (Dec. Lib. 1. Cap. 7. n. 26.): Wherefore then these servants are judged to be, and truly are, pimps, when, helping the depraved intention of the master, they exhibit these services, as commonly happens; otherwise, when compelled by a good intention and by necessity of avoiding their own notable harm.

** VV. contend that St. Alphonsus was not indeed led away by fallacious allegations, as is said in this Note, but rather that readers are led into error by fallacious assertions from the author of the Note. Thus VV., who then through ten columns (Pages 175-180.) try to prove that the opinion of Sanchez, Bonacina, Laymann, Tamburini, Croix, etc., is the same as that of St. Alphonsus.

But VV. do not seem to have sufficiently inspected the thesis of St. Alphonsus. For how does that saying of St. Alphonsus, never lawful, cohere with the words of Sanchez, described in the Note, saying that one is excused by fear of notable harm? VV. also (Page 176.) wished to bring forward for themselves certain words of Sanchez; but they ought not to have cut off from that text also these words: For since these things (namely, by writing or by a messenger to agree with the concubine that she come at such an hour, or to such a place, or await the master), although in themselves indifferent, come very near to sin, and seem to cooperate with it almost directly, the common reason of service will not excuse, but notable detriment of the servant will. Now the never lawful of St. Alphonsus and the notable detriment excuses of Sanchez are mutually in conflict.

VV. bring forward for themselves the text of Bonacina. But they truncate these words: The same must be said (namely, that one can be excused when it is not lawful to desist from things of this kind... without grave harm) concerning a servant who... carries gifts or a letter, or acts as a messenger, or who writes letters, in which it is contained that a prostitute come to him at such a time... Now do perhaps that saying of Bonacina, one can be excused etc., and that saying of St. Alphonsus, never lawful, cohere?

Then VV. describe in the aforesaid aim certain words of Tamburini. But the things which followed there, and stand in this way, were not to be omitted by them (In Dec. Lib. 5. c. 1. §. 4. n. 19.): Besides, a subject will be excused not from the reason of service alone, but by fear of notable detriment... if he reports to the adulteress..., that at such an hour she should come to the house of the master, or to the appointed place...; for these things and similar things, since they are somewhat nearer to the sin of the one abusing, need a cause somewhat graver than is the reason of service. But that he will be excused of Tamburini, and that never lawful of St. Alphonsus, are far distant from each other.

VV. pluck out some words from Laymann (Lib. 2. Tr. 3. C. 13. n. 5.). But three things ought to have been noted. 1º Laymann speaks only doubtingly or by way of opinion: It does not seem, he says, to be permitted. 2º Laymann alleges for this opinion Angles against Navarrus, who (Laymann continues) says that services of this kind also of servants, if they are done by command without depraved affection, can be excused from mortal sin: and Rodriguez and Azor in part followed him: in whom you see opinions reported on both sides. 3º The reason is brought forward by Laymann, that these things contain a certain species of pimping; but in these things you have a hypothesis different from the hypothesis of Navarrus; whence it happens that on account of the diversity of hypotheses the two conclusions, otherwise opposite in appearance, are very well reconciled, as you can discern them reconciled in the text of Sanchez described in the Note, and as Rodriguez also reconciles them (Sum. P. 1. Cap. 205. n. 3.) saying: And thus they seem to me able to be reconciled with Navarrus who rise up against him, among whom is Angles: yet that absolute saying of St. Alphonsus, never lawful, does not admit this reconciliation.

VV. report certain words also from Mazzotta (Tr. 2. Disp. 2. Q. 1. c. 3. §. 4.). But they do not well omit the preceding things, in which, when he also reviews to carry messages or writings... containing the appointment of place or hour; these he enumerates among those things: for which the reason of service does not suffice, but a more urgent cause is required..., because they are actions, however indifferent according to themselves, yet nearer to the sin of another. These indeed, as is clear, are wholly repugnant to the absolute opinion of St. Alphonsus, never lawful.

For the rest, both from Mazzotta and also from others, the reason can be detected why VV. could seize upon some words from the cited Doctors which seem to harmonize with the opinion of St. Alphonsus, although nevertheless the things which we have brought forward up to this point plainly show that the opinion of St. Alphonsus is one thing, and the opinion of those Doctors another. For Mazzotta (l. c.) excepts shameful writings; and below he excepts knowingly carrying shameful messages or writings, or writing them. Sanchez (Dec. Lib. 1. c. 7. n. 26.) condemns if the writing contains shameful and amorous words or signs, and dishonorable things. Likewise Tamburini (l. c.) reproves if they contain shameful and amorous things, or things directly provoking to sin. And Laymann (l. c.) discusses letters inciting to shameful things and the induction of a woman to sin. Therefore the Doctors distinguish when writings or messages contain a direct provocation to shameful things and to sinning, and when otherwise. And Croix indeed (Lib. 2. n. 273.) touches only the other hypothesis, namely concerning letters or messages tending directly to sin, and likewise Viva (In Prop. 51. Innoc. XI. n. 5.) concerning letters provoking to sin. Rebellus, on the contrary, touches only the other hypothesis, concerning which the Doctors above; (P. I. Lib. 2. Q. 14. n. 53.).

Now since St. Alphonsus distinguishes nothing, and therefore when he alleges Rebellus as contrary to himself, he manifestly pronounces that never lawful concerning any hypothesis whatever; it is plain that the Holy Doctor departed from the authors whom he brings forward for himself after the Salmanticenses and Viva.

Now the things which have been said concerning servants are to be applied almost to other inferiors or subjects, for example to children, wives, etc.

252. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it lawful for workers to build theaters, adorn them, etc.?

Resp. 1º As to building, it seems generally to be lawful, even if another grave reason is lacking; the reason is that it is lawful for Princes to permit spectacles.

Resp. 2º As to ornaments and other actions to be furnished by workers, it likewise seems lawful, if these are honorable in themselves, because the cooperation seems so remote that it is not sinful.

Q. 2º Is it lawful for workers to build temples of heretics?

Resp. 1º Neg. absolutely, if this is sought by heretics out of hatred of Religion.

Resp. 2º Affirm. in another hypothesis, when a grave cause urges, scandal and any contempt of Religion nevertheless being excluded ⁸.

⁸ Concerning this matter Laymann (Lib. 2. Cap. 13. n. 4.): It is right to restore or build synagogues of Jews, temples of heretics, when the legitimate magistrate permits: concerning which Navarrus can be seen Lib. 5. Consil. 1. De Judaeis. And St. Alphonsus seems to have followed him (Lib. 2. n. 72.), as also Croix (Lib. 2. n. 250.), since they add no observation to Busembaum bringing forward the same doctrine from Laymann.

Q. 3º Is it lawful to make statues of false gods?

Resp. 1º Affirm., if these ought not to be employed for false worship, but for the ornament of streets, buildings, etc.

Resp. 2º Neg. altogether, if they are to be handed over to a pagan..., etc. - St. Lig. n. 69.

“In relation to cooperation with superstitious rites, this rule is to be held. If the cooperation has been part of the superstitious rite, then it is to be judged formal, intrinsically evil, and can never be done licitly. On the contrary, it is to be judged material if it was not part of the superstitious rite. Some grave harm which would arise to the cooperator if he wished to abstain from this material cooperation will make it lawful, even if scandal is present—what is called scandal of the little ones by theologians—because by the law of charity no one is bound to remove that scandal with grave harm to himself.” S. C. de P. F., 2 July 1827.

“All direct cooperation of Christians with superstitious things is forbidden, and those acts are furthermore prohibited which, according to the common estimation of the people, are referred to worship being exhibited to idols. Nor can acts of this kind be excused because of the intention of the one acting or ministering, on the ground that they direct their mind not toward the superstitious worship of idols but toward some other indifferent service; for the private intention of the one acting does not avail to cleanse from guilt an act which among unbelievers is regarded as directed toward superstitious worship. Likewise, the fact that Christians concur in superstitious things only by slight labor and by remote ministry cannot furnish a sufficiently suitable excuse. For whatever the labor may be that is expended directly for superstitious things, and whatever ministry, however remote, is furnished for worship being exhibited to idols, if in the common estimation it cannot be referred to an indifferent cause, is always illicit and vicious.” S. C. de P. F., 5 April 1785; C. 1713.

"In relation to cooperation with superstitious rites, this rule is to be held. If the cooperation has been part of the superstitious rite, then it will be judged formal, intrinsically evil, and can never lawfully be done. On the contrary it will be judged material if it was not part of the superstitious rite. Some grave harm which would arise to the cooperator, if he wished to abstain from this material cooperation, will make it lawful, even if scandal is present, that which is called scandal of the little ones by Theologians, because by the law of charity no one is bound to remove that scandal with grave harm to himself." S. C. de P. F. 2 July 1827.

183. State of the question. (A) To cooperate in general is to operate with another; and therefore, if there is question of an evil matter, cooperation is the concurrence furnished to the depraved action of another. But someone can cooperate with the sin of another in two ways: by influencing the will itself through counsels, examples, flatteries, etc.; this kind of cooperation is properly called scandal, concerning which we shall treat where we treat concerning charity; by helping another, already determined to sin, in the perpetration of the sin: and this is cooperation properly so called, about which we must say something.

² Most theologians treat this matter where they treat concerning charity; thus St. Alphonsus, lib. III, n. 59-80; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, p. 11, n. 361-464; Bouquillon, De virt. theologicis, n. 545-555; cf. Waffelaert, La coopération au mal, 2nd ed., Bruges, 1892; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, XXIII, 1901, pp. 721, 785, 961, 1025, 1073 sq.

(B) But this cooperation can be intentional or formal, or only material: the former is present when the one cooperating knowingly and willingly concurs in the action insofar as it is evil, and therefore truly intends its malice, whether explicitly, or implicitly by exercising a work which is directly ordered to a depraved action; for example, by writing and selling a book which of itself is ordered to corrupting morals. For then he proposes to himself an evil end, and consequently sins,¹ according to the principles given above, n. 150. - It is material when he concurs in the action of another insofar as it is physical, without the intention of cooperating in the sin. Thus he who hands over the keys of a house to a thief, so that the thief can more easily steal, cooperates formally and culpably; but materially, if he does this only for the end of avoiding his own harm, for example death, in no way intending to cooperate in the theft. Here we do not treat of formal cooperation, which is evidently directly evil; but only of material cooperation, which, as is clear from the notion given, falls back into the case of the indirect voluntary. For the one cooperating directly wills his own utility, for example to preserve life, and only indirectly wills the evil action, for example the theft which he foresees as going to follow from the handing over of the key.

¹ That sin has a double malice: one against charity, by inducing one's neighbor to sin; the other against the special virtue which is harmed by the cooperation.

184. (C) This material cooperation can be immediate, if someone has a part in the depraved action itself, for example by helping a thief to carry off a chest in which another's money is contained; or mediate, if the one cooperating concurs only in those acts which precede or follow the sin itself, for example by opening the door of the house to the thief, so that he may be able to enter or leave. - Again mediate cooperation can be more or less proximate, according as by its own nature or from circumstances it is more or less connected with the sin of another; for example, a servant who on Friday cooks meat cooperates less proximately toward the violation of the law of abstinence than an innkeeper who provides the same meats to be eaten by guests.

185. Principles. (A) He who cooperates only materially and mediately, even proximately, in an evil action does not sin, provided the act which he performs is not intrinsically evil and, besides, there is had a proportionate reason for cooperating.

For he who cooperates in this way does not will the evil effect except indirectly and permissively; but, from what was said above, n. 175, this is lawful when a proportionately grave reason is present. - Besides, when a sufficient reason is lacking, it is not lawful to cooperate with sin, even materially; for something inordinate is found in the act by which one concurs toward sin.¹

¹ Wherefore the following proposition (51) was condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "A servant who, with shoulders submitted, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in this by carrying a ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable harm, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." (Denzing., n. 1068; Viva, on this proposition.) For since in this case the cooperation is proximate, a very grave reason is required, which is lacking; for the servant here is supposed to have been able to find another master; he ought at least to have sought another, lest he be forced many times to cooperate in a depraved action.

186. (B) Immediate cooperation is not always and necessarily illicit, but sometimes it is permitted, provided there is present a proportionately grave reason. Thus more probably.

Certain theologians deny this, with Billuart,² because immediate cooperation is intrinsically evil; for does not he who helps a thief to carry off another's money himself steal? - Yet that argument does not hold in all cases. (a) Let the case of theft, concerning which Billuart treats, be taken; if someone cannot avoid death except by helping thieves in carrying off another's money, the taking away of another's thing in these adjuncts is not morally theft. For no one is bound, apart from a special pact, to lose his own life for protecting the goods of fortune of another; for the owner of the thing taken away would be unreasonably unwilling if he demanded this, at least when the one cooperating is not bound by a special pact to guard the thing. (b) Again, when someone asks for the sacraments, on account of a grave reason, from an unworthy minister, he by no means sins, according to the common opinion of theologians, although he is truly and immediately a participant in the action by which the minister sins; the reason is that the whole malice of the act holds itself on the part of the minister, who can, if he wishes, recover the state of grace by an act of contrition; and therefore the cooperation of the one asking in those adjuncts is not illicit.

² Billuart, De Justitia, diss. VIII, art. 13, § 6.

Therefore it cannot be said that in every case immediate cooperation is illicit. - Yet there are many cases in which immediate cooperation is sin; thus it is never lawful to participate immediately in the unjust killing of an innocent person, since such an action taken concretely is intrinsically evil.

The matter, therefore, is to be judged from the very nature of the evil act toward which one concurs, or from the circumstances; namely, if such an act, considered in the concrete, is so intrinsically evil that someone cannot cooperate in its physical perpetration without at least implicitly intending its malice, the cooperation is illicit.

187. (C) To judge whether the reason is proportionately grave, attention must be paid to the gravity of the sin with which one cooperates, to the propinquity and influence of the cooperation, and also to the obligation of impeding the sin.

(a) To the gravity of the sin: the graver the sin toward which someone cooperates is, the greater the excusing reason must be; thus a greater cause is required for someone to cooperate toward homicide than toward theft.

(b) To the propinquity of the cooperation: the more proximate the cooperation is, the greater reason is required; thus remote cooperation is excused on account of a light inconvenience; nearby cooperation, on account of a grave inconvenience; proximate cooperation, from a very grave cause; immediate cooperation, from a most grave cause. Thus he who sells paper to a publisher printing depraved books cooperates only remotely, and is excused from the mere motive of earning money; the worker who moves the machines cooperates nearby, and is excused only on account of a grave inconvenience, for example the loss of notable profit; but he who sets the type cooperates proximately, and is not excused except on account of a very grave cause, for example the greatest difficulty of finding another employer.

188. (c) To the influence of the cooperation; namely if the cooperation so influences the evil effect that, without it, the sin would not happen, a greater cause is required than if the sin would be committed without that cooperation; for example, a lesser reason is required for selling arms to him who is foreseen as going to abuse them, if there are present many other merchants who sell arms in this place.

(d) To the obligation of impeding sin; thus if someone by office of piety, as a father, or of justice, as a magistrate, is bound to impede some sin, a much greater cause is required for him to permit it.

Concerning special cases of cooperation as regards religion, charity, justice, temperance, etc., we shall treat in the course of the work.

Against the duties described in the foregoing Section we may sin either directly or indirectly.

I. We sin directly against the spiritual welfare of our fellowman: a) By commanding or compelling him to do wrong ; b) By seducing him to sin, either through inciting his passions by praise or flattery, censure or fear, or by abusing such influence as we may wield over him on account of higher social position or personal superiority; c) By co-operating in sinful acts through accidental or planned meetings (conspiracy), and d) By becoming accessory to anther's sin through silence or concealment, furnishing opportunities for evil, enticing women or girls to places of prostitution or sending them to foreign lands for immoral purposes (white slave traffic), or through the positive furnishing of means for the perpetration of acts of injustice.¹

¹ See this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 62 sqq.; A. Sleumer, Die Mitwirkung zur Sünde, Bonn 1907.

There is no such thing as compelling a man to sin, because the human will is free and cannot be coerced by physical force. But the organs of the body may be influenced in such a way as to make compliance almost irresistible, as in the case of rape. Grave authors say that a woman is usually able to resist physical violence when an attack is made upon her chastity; but physical violence is generally accompanied by the dread of being killed, maimed, or exposed to public disgrace, etc. Imagine the case of a good wife and mother who debates with herself whether she shall resist an attack upon her honor by risking death, and you have a concrete case of conflicting duties. To the same class belong cases in which parents force their children to steal or cheat. Here there is a collision between the respect due to parental authority on the one side, and justice and honesty on the other.

A person may become the prey of temptation without being conscious of any outside influence swaying his interior affections. A powerful means of seduction, which scarcely ever fails to attain its end, is flattery. The strongest of all in our day is the public press, when it combats the truth and caters to the base passions of the multitude.²

² Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, pp. 4 London 28 sq.; H. Belloc, The Free Press, 1918.

When there is question of co-operating in the sins of others, we must distinguish (α) between formal and material and (β) between immediate and mediate co-operation. α) Formal co-operation (cooperatio formalis) is that in which the sin itself is willed. It is always illicit, because it involves sharing the sinful intention of the other (cooperatio in malam voluntatem).

Material co-operation (cooperatio materialis) takes place when a man participates in a wicked deed without sharing the evil intention (cooperatio ad malam actionem) of the principal. Such co-operation is permitted if the act co-operated in is in itself good, or at least objectively indifferent, or when it is dictated by a just cause, e. g., necessity, great utility, avoidance of a serious inconvenience, etc.

β) Immediate co-operation (cooperatio immediata) is a participation in the evil deed itself, not merely in some act preparatory to its commission, which latter would be merely cooperatio mediata.

Immediate co-operation in sin is illicit because it involves conscious assent to the sin itself and therefore is equivalent to formal co-operation. Mediate co-operation may be perfectly licit.

Thus a servant is allowed to perform acts for which he is hired, even though he knows that he is furnishing his master a remote occasion of sin or assists materially in carrying out a sinful plan. But he is never permitted to furnish a proximate occasion of sin, not even for the purpose of avoiding great harm to himself.³ To render a licit service to another may amount to formal co-operation in sin, as, e. g., loaning or selling a gun to a notorious poacher or "boot-legger." If there is no reason for suspecting the intention of the purchaser, it is permissible to sell him dangerous weapons, poison, etc., unless there is a statutory law to the contrary.

³ Prop. Damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 51: “A servant who with lowered shoulders knowingly helps his master climb to the windows to violate a virgin, and repeatedly serves him by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally if he does this through fear of notable harm, for instance lest he be badly treated by his master, looked upon with stern eyes, or expelled from the house.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1201).

A priest may give holy Communion to a secret sinner if the latter demands it publicly.

It is forbidden to make images which one knows to be intended for idolatrous worship, except for a very grave cause.⁴

⁴ S. C. Offic. d. d. Ian. 14, 1818: “Those who build temples of heretics or synagogues of Jews are not to be disturbed, provided scandal is absent and it is not done in contempt of religion.”

A Catholic is never allowed to play the organ, to sing or to direct the choir at religious services in a heretical church,⁵ or to call in a non-Catholic minister to give the "Lord's Supper" to a sick man.⁶ But to advise the minister that some one desires his services or to prepare the table for him is an indifferent act.⁷

⁵ S. C. Officii, d. d. 19 Iunii 1889.—Cfr. the Theol.-praktische Quartalschrift, of Linz, Austria, 1900, pp. 842 sqq.

⁶ S. C. Officii, d. d. 15 Mart. 1848: “Is it lawful for nuns caring for the sick in a hospital to summon a heretical minister who is requested for reasons of religion by a sick heretic? Resp.: According to the points set forth, it is not lawful; let them conduct themselves passively.”

⁷ C. S. Officii, d. d. 31 Ian. 1872; 14. Dec. 1898.

In deciding whether and to what extent Catholic officials are permitted to co-operate in the enforcement of unjust laws, for instance, a law compelling Catholic children to attend irreligious schools or assisting in a divorce case, we must first of all consider the question whether the act under consideration is one of tolerance or of positive command, and, secondly, whether or not the object directly aimed at is intrinsically evil. If it is evil, official or authoritative co-operation can not be permitted.⁸

⁸ Lehmkuhl in the Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift, 1898, pp. 89 sqq.; P. Schnitzer, Kath. Eherecht, 5th ed., pp. 78 sqq.

There is one kind of cooperatio in malum which deserves special attention in our days, and that is what Fr. Noldin calls the cooperatio ad pravas ephemerides—co-operating with an evil press. This sin is incurred not only by the publishers, editors, and printers of wicked and scandalous newspapers and magazines, but also by their readers. Those who occasionally buy and read such a publication co-operate with the publishers only in a remote manner and may therefore be excused if the offense is not too frequently repeated and there is no danger of scandal. Those, on the other hand, who subscribe to such publications, are guilty of proximate co-operation, and their conduct can be excused only by some grave cause, such as business necessity. If any one has to subscribe to a bad newspaper or magazine for some reasonable cause, let him take due precautions: (a) against the danger of perversion, and therefore read only what he needs to know; (b) against giving scandal to the members of his household or to outsiders. This he can do by letting it be known that he has just reason for keeping the publication in question, but that he disap- proves its general tendency, and by keeping it away from those entrusted to his care.

The publishers and editors of such sheets are, of course, guilty of formal co-operation in evil. Regular contributors, who do not approve of the publication's tendency, and write only indifferent and harmless articles, can hardly be excused from more or less proximate co-operation, while occasional contributors co-operate only in a remote way, and may therefore be excused more easily.

Catholics must also refrain from supporting anti-Christian and immoral publications by advertising in them.

Those who sell or distribute such publications co-operate proximately in the evil done by them, though less proximately than those who print them; those engaged in such work should try to obtain other employment if they can.⁹

⁹ Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 141 sq.

— Human society brings it about that we can help or impede the actions of others by words or admonition, by example, and by physical or moral participation.

According to the varied kind of action, charity will counsel or command one or the other. Hence we must treat, in order, of fraternal exhortation and correction; of edification and scandal; and of cooperation in the good and evil action of neighbor.

The Good and the Modes of Fraternal Exhortation. — Since we are all weak in performing a good work, a most suitable exercise of spiritual mercy consists in the pious exhortation by which neighbor is stimulated to good actions. Pious exhortation of this kind can be common and public, in sermons directed to the people or in addresses to some community; it is most usefully made privately, whether in the sacrament of penance or outside the sacrament. Charity will move the confessor not to neglect in the least the most favorable occasion of spiritual counsel which the spontaneous accusation of the penitent offers him, especially when there is question of those who, rarely approaching the sacraments, would scarcely ever otherwise hear the spiritual counsel of a friend. Yet even with pious persons that method is usually not to be omitted. It is wont to be pleasing to penitents, especially if the exhortation is not general and indefinite, but adapted to the proper soul. And even in merely private conversation, how often have prudently persuasive words been the fruitful beginning of great good! Indeed this kind of apostolate among men of the same condition is proclaimed as most efficacious. Further, with attention to the object, exhortation is of a twofold kind: one, directed to the intellect, rather teaches, instructs, indicates or recalls the opportunity of spiritual gain; while the other, acting upon the will, moves more and adds courage for doing good. With attention to time, one again precedes a good action, urging it on, while the other approves and praises it when it has been well done. By sincere and temperate encomium, alien from flattery, men are wonderfully stimulated to attempt better things, while many are gravely chilled by the silence of others and almost lose heart.

— Fraternal reproof or correction denotes an admonition by which someone, moved by fraternal charity, tries to call neighbor back from sin. It is an exercise of spiritual mercy attempted in a spiritual necessity of the common grade. And both by the person correcting and by its end it differs from admonition and from authoritative and judicial correction, which only a public person performs, whether secretly or publicly, for the public or in some way common good to be guarded after a delict has been avoided. In the canonical forum this is ordered by cc. 2307-2309. Its use is rarer in the civil forum, where for the most part only vindicative justice is exercised, and correction consists in the very imposition of the penalty.

Interpreters commonly read the precept of fraternal correction in the place of St. Matthew 18, 15: "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and reprove him, etc."

It is established by reason itself: we must from charity, apart from grave inconvenience, avert grave evil from neighbor. Nor is it an obstacle that no one sins unless willing, nor that alms are owed to him who labors under voluntary poverty. For the man whom an unhealthy desire agitates is to be compared with one raving, who without another's help will scarcely abstain from inflicting evil upon himself; and there are besides ignorances to be driven away, and also involuntary dangers to be removed.

Matter of Correction. — 1. Every mortal sin of neighbor is per se sufficient matter that this precept oblige under mortal sin. For that which takes away spiritual life induces a sufficient necessity of correction. Venial sin begets no grave obligation of correcting, nor even a light one unless you can do it most easily. And only venially does a private man sin who, on account of fear, shame, or pusillanimity, thinks that he is not so obligated, or is less fit for it. For to such a one, from an affection of this kind, there generally arises a grave inconvenience with which charity obliges less. But judgment must be made more severely concerning a Superior, to whom it pertains from office to correct. He, for guarding the strength of discipline, must easily correct even venial faults and transgressions of rules under grave obligation (not, however, in individual cases).

2. What has been said thus far holds also concerning sins already done or to be done from vincible ignorance, especially gravely culpable ignorance. But if the ignorance has been invincible, the very foundation of correction properly so called, that is, delict, is withdrawn. Yet correction more broadly so called enters in, which is imposed by the office of teaching the ignorant. This office is more proper to Superiors; yet the obligation also affects others because of the harm which an uncorrected defect may bring either to the ignorant person himself, whether there is question of points necessarily to be believed for salvation, or of lust which from custom would become tyrannical, or of other matters; or to others, whether they suffer scandal thence, or are harmed in goods of fortune, reputation, or body; or to the very honor of God.

On this matter these things are to be observed. Transgression of the natural law is always harmful; wherefore there is at least a light obligation of warning him who materially violates that law. - When there is question of goods of fortune which, by a correction made, merely change possessor, but not of harms which bring no equivalent profit to anyone, correction does not oblige under grave sin unless the legitimate possessor is pressed by grave want or, for another cause, ought to be preferred by you. For it matters little per se to the common good that exterior goods be detained by this one rather than by that one; and good faith per se takes away every scandal.

But if someone by accident, for instance from forgetfulness of the day, and without scandal, violates some human precept, for example of fasting or abstinence, no one contends that there is a grave obligation of warning; and not a few deny every obligation.

Persons Obligated. — Private persons are obligated from charity alone; parents also by piety; Superiors and Prelates from strict office. This office is of religion or quasi-piety, indeed of commutative justice, if it is part of an office undertaken.

And although piety obliges no less than justice, the common good to be cared for brings it about that Superiors are held with a graver inconvenience than parents themselves.

Conditions of the Obligation. — The conditions of the obligation are gathered from the necessity of correction, from the probability of effect, so that in doubt you are excused, and elsewhere from the inconvenience which correction brings with it. That these may be explained more fully:

1. Only a Superior must investigate. Nor must he do this indiscreetly, by inquiring curiously about individual matters, but only about those concerning which indications have been given. For a private man it is necessary that the neighbor's sin or danger of sin be certainly evident of itself; nor does a doubtful sign suffice. An inquiry which a private person would attempt would be odious and rather vicious.

2. Alms are to be given only to one in need. Therefore, that you be held to correct, it is necessary that it be at least probable that there has not been amendment, nor that there will be amendment without admonition.

3. A private person is not held, if another equally suitable person is present who is thought about to correct.

4. Without hope of fruit no obligation of correction presses at least a private man. For a Prelate sometimes, for avoiding scandal, must make even a correction immediately useless. It is necessary that a strong reprehension of vice confirm the good. - Where there has been a small hope of fruit, the grave obligation will cease, at least in a private person. Correction which perhaps would be harmful is no longer prescribed, unless a reason of a greater good concurs. In doubt, however, correction is to be presumed useful. And as long as there is hope of fruit, correction will have to be repeated.

5. Outside a suitable place and time, correction is not to be made. Nor is a private person held with grave harm to himself.

Corollary. - Therefore a grave obligation of correction in private persons (not likewise in Superiors or Confessors) will be present rather rarely. Regularly the scrupulous are excused from making it, since they are incapable of employing opportune counsel in this matter, and the obligation would be of very grave inconvenience to them. Finally, with those whose disposition he does not know, a private person will do better to omit correction. Cf. concerning one hearing detraction, St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 73, art. 4.

The Order to Be Observed in Correction. is indicated by Christ Himself: first that it be done entirely privately, then before witnesses, then that the matter be referred to the Prelate of the Church or to the Superior. For the words "Tell the Church" are commonly admitted to mean as much as "tell the Presidents of the Church." Cf. Knabenbauer on Matthew 18, 17. The reason is that reputation must be preserved.

A public sin, or one so notorious that it cannot be hidden by any evasion, can at once be corrected openly or referred to the Superior; this is per se manifest.

The utility of the delinquent himself (which is proportioned to the harm of revelation), an equal harm of an innocent person to be prevented, harm to the community, or the special or general consent of the delinquent himself, also permit that, with that order omitted, the matter be referred immediately to the Superior. And, as our customs are, although the Lord said that one or two should first be employed (St. Matthew 18, 16), it will not often happen that other witnesses besides the Superior, or before the Superior, must be called in.

Is it preferable to refer the matter at once to the Prelate? Let us receive these things from St. Thomas, Quodlib. 11, 9, 10: "This must be held as a rule, that in all these things charity must always be preserved, and that which seems better and more expedient; and if he intends this, namely the amendment of neighbor, and preserves as much as he can the good of charity, then by denouncing he does not sin."

But let Superiors themselves not give easy ears to spontaneous accusers who, under an appearance of the common good, often seek themselves. Nor let them hold one denounced as convicted or suspected before they have heard his explanations.

Denunciation. — Since fraternal correction is mixed with some denunciation, it seems worth the labor to hand down these few things concerning denunciation, especially since every denunciation is at last ultimately directed to warding off evil, whether one's own or that of neighbor.

A threefold denunciation is distinguished: evangelical, canonical, and judicial. The first is made to a Superior as to a father, and has as its end the good of the delinquent himself. - The second is received by a Superior as president of the community whose good he must provide for; and it tends to preserving the safety either of an innocent person or of the community. - The third is made, on account of the common good, to the public avenger of security, whether evils which the guilty are planning must be impeded, or at least by the punishment of the delict the guilty must be restrained and courage must be added to the good.

Judicial denunciation is per se lawful, to be made without any other consideration: because the office of the judge cannot be supplied by any private action, and the reputation of the delinquent can be neglected before the common utility which the punishment of delicts brings. Only by accident, in certain circumstances, on account of excessive harm either of a private person or of religion (as if a very Catholic person or a priest is denounced), will it have to be omitted from charity or religion. Where it becomes necessary for avoiding public harm, the same denunciation will be prescribed.

Canonical denunciation is subject to the same rules as fraternal correction itself, of which it is a certain extension. Here therefore the reputation of the guilty person will have to be spared where he can prudently remain unharmed. Therefore denunciation will per se have to be omitted if its end is obtained sufficiently by private correction. Provision must also be made for common charity, which is easily shaken by an imprudent denunciation. The very person of the Superior, more or less benign, discreet, and prudent, must be attended to. Yet in an equal cause of utility or detriment, the innocent person will have to be preferred to the guilty.

Evangelical denunciation is the very mode of fraternal correction which, after matters have been prudently weighed, seems to be preferred to immediate admonition. By evangelical denunciation the Superior can proceed only as a father, and therefore impose only a medicinal penalty. Yet nothing prevents him from forbidding certain things to the denounced subject in virtue of holy obedience or under penalty of excommunication, if that seems likely to profit the good of the same subject.

From canonical denunciation it is lawful for the Superior to take all sanctions which seem conducive to guarding or restoring common discipline, and this even if these sanctions are foreseen by accident to be harmful to the denounced person.

Judicial denunciation gives place to public vengeance.

If the matter bears it, the Superior can declare to one referring evangelically the obligation of canonical or judicial denunciation, and strictly command either to the same person. But as long as evangelical denunciation has not been legitimately changed into canonical or judicial denunciation, the Superior per se, by the general law of entrusted secrecy, is prohibited from acting canonically or judicially. I say per se, because the very obligation of entrusted secrecy is circumscribed by certain limits.

Corollary. — 1. The indication of hidden corrupters in colleges over which prudent Superiors preside is regularly to be strongly advised; yet the harm of him who is reported must be weighed, since perhaps, if he is expelled, spiritual ruin may threaten him. - 2. As long as there is question only of the harm of one or another, it does not seem, if the inconvenience of the one reporting is grave, to be imposed strictly. A grave inconvenience would exist if the one reporting would have to manifest his own delict thence, or if as an "informer" he would become hateful to others. - 3. But if corruption of many, infamy of the house, or another reason of common harm is feared, the delation will have to be made, with grave harm to oneself disregarded. Yet the confessor will be able to be silent about the matter, if the warning seems plainly about to be useless, or if there must be doubt concerning the efficacy of the denunciation made for preventing evil.

He is not yet a corrupter who has spoken less chastely. But it must be seen whether the occasion was extraordinary, or rather whether from some habit he mixes base conversations; such a one is per se to be reported.

According to the quality of the Superior, the manner of acting can be changed. But the Superior is to be presumed prudent and discreet.

— In ascetical works, the word edification is customarily taken metaphorically to designate that positively beneficent action which even unconsciously a man sincerely devoted to cultivating piety and virtues exercises. The wonderful power of good example is expressed and confirmed by the proverb itself: "Words sound, examples draw." And nothing more excellent is to be adduced in praise of good example than these words of Christ: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven" (St. Matthew 5, 16).

Yet virtue is not therefore to be feigned or simulated, as we are also taught by Christ: "But thou when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face, that thou appear not to men to fast, but to thy Father who is in secret" (St. Matthew 6, 17. 18). For merit then perishes, if these things are done for human glory alone, and edification itself perishes, if suspicion of vain glory arises.

There are, therefore, actions which, as done openly, always edify, because they yield directly to the honor of God, and by the very manifestation virtue is exercised: for example, profession of faith, observance of an external law, for example of hearing Mass, of abstaining from meats. And there are good actions which, because they are in esteem among all, are easily mixed with a less right intention. These are rather to be hidden than displayed, and circumstances must be permitted to manifest them.

Moreover there is a certain exercise of virtue, either imperfect and partial, or incautious and inelegant, which excites aversion mixed with a certain envy. While, on the contrary, simple, humble, and modest virtue draws souls to God and to itself. Aptly did St. Paul proclaim charity to be kind (1 Cor. 13, 4).

That a man may acquire for himself the merit of edification he must sufficiently intend it. Cf. I, 130. This intention is manifest when someone deliberately goes before others by example, for example in confessing the faith, in undergoing danger for a noble cause, in performing an office of charity. But what must be said concerning that edification which is given by virtue that does not know itself and, from modesty, hides itself? Although distinct knowledge of that edification escapes the agent, nevertheless the humble man does not ignore the power of good example in general, and often says or does those things which manifest the intention of helping neighbor spiritually in every way the opportunity for which is given to him. Therefore an intention sufficient for merit does not seem lacking to him.

The Notion and Division of Scandal. — Scandal properly signifies a stumbling-block which, placed in the way, prepares a fall for him whose foot strikes against it. Metaphorically, it is a saying, deed, or omission on whose occasion neighbor easily sins. - Per se, an action of this kind is only something done less rightly, although by accident a very good action can give occasion to sin. Is not Christ Himself said to have been set for the ruin of many? When such a thing happens, scandal is called merely received or passive, but not actively given.

Therefore they are accustomed to define active scandal as a deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is less right insofar as it is evil in itself, or has the appearance of evil. - Active scandal is divided into direct, when something is done with this intention that another should sin, for example direct solicitation to sin. And if, from some hatred of God or of neighbor, the very character of sin is formally intended, scandal is called diabolical. It is indirect when the sin of neighbor is indeed foreseen and permitted, but not intended.

Passive scandal is the occasioned sin itself. If it is connected with active scandal, it is called scandal of the little ones or of the weak; if it has been merely received from the malice of the one scandalized, it is called pharisaic, because the Pharisees, from hatred and envy against Christ, on occasion of His good deeds, suffered such scandal.

What shall we call that which not a few poor, rude, and unlearned persons suffer on occasion of priests, religious, and their action, because, deceived by evil writings, they represent those persons and that action to themselves under a false color? It is rather scandal of the little ones; yet it arises less from the priest himself or from his action, than from the calumnies of those who hate religion.

But observe that not the sin of another itself, but only temptation, is the immediate effect of scandal given: no one sins unless willing.

Further, passive scandal is sometimes a sin of the same kind as the scandal given, such as is necessarily had among accomplices; and not rarely it is of an entirely different kind. Thus scurrility and the impurity of a priest induce contempt of the sacerdotal order and of religion. - It is also per se manifest that passive scandal can be had without active scandal, and conversely. Indeed an evil action, for instance blasphemy, can give beginning to good actions, such as holy protests and expiations. Nor is scandal the very wonder or horror of those seeing and hearing, which they are accustomed to call by the name of scandal. Therefore he who sins before others is not always at the same time actively scandalous, but only then when, after the circumstances of the sinner and of the witnesses have been considered, it is to be feared lest among the witnesses there are those who are drawn to a sin which otherwise they would not have committed. On account of the depravity or probity of the witnesses scandal can be absent: on account of depravity, as if someone blasphemes or violates chastity before others who, prepared to do the same, are in no way moved by that example; on account of probity, as if someone contends, quarrels, or strikes before the meek. Nor will scandal be given to witnesses so accustomed that they are in no way excited by the dangerous thing. Yet evil actions which are publicly committed are deservedly presumed scandalous, especially by persons of certain name or authority.

The Sin of Active Scandal. — 1. Concerning the sin of direct scandal, there is no room for doubt; and it is established that the species of the sin to which someone intends to lead another is contracted. - Diabolical scandal, since it contains formal hatred, denotes a special contrariety to charity, which must be opened in confession.

2. But the author of indirect scandal also sins per se. And his sin is contrary to the office of fraternal correction. For if charity obliges us to impede the sin, at least grave sin, of neighbor, much more does it impose upon us that we not be the cause by accident (that is, the occasion) of another's sin. - But contrary to what many and grave authors hold (for example Sanchez, Decal., l. 1, c. 6, n. 3), that sin is opposed only to the common obligation of charity, not to another virtue. For that which is outside the action and intention of the agent does not constitute the species (2, 2, q. 43, art. 3). But a sin merely occasioned is outside the intention, as is manifest, and also outside the action of the agent. For the sufficient cause of sin is the proper will of the one sinning (ibid., art. 1 ad 3). Wherefore the varied conditions of the persons who suffered that scandal are not to be declared, except the quality of parishioner, son, and the like, to whom the author of scandal owed spiritual edification by a special title; nor is he held to restitution who by example alone induced others to theft or damaging.

Permission of Scandal. — Scandal can be given by an evil act and by an act which has the appearance of evil. And it can be merely received, whether from weakness or from malice. Hence:

a) It is clear that he always sins who by an evil act is the author of scandal. And under grave obligation I must avoid inducing another by my evil deed into such danger of grave sin from which he may extricate himself with difficulty. For this is to cast another into spiritual necessity, which I ought to drive away unless I were excused by proportionate inconvenience. If another is tempted merely to venial sin, even directly, the author of scandal per se will sin only venially.

b) If the action merely has the appearance of evil, the author of scandal can be excused by proportionate inconvenience. And if there has been grave danger of many, grave inconvenience must be suffered by me to avoid it. Indeed if the whole Christian life, the very faith of many, is in danger, I shall be excused by no harm to myself.

c) Scandal merely received or passive per se cannot be permitted: because the sins of neighbor, if we can easily do so, we must impede. A proportionate cause of necessity or utility excuses the permission of scandal. These things are to be weighed: the inconvenience of abstaining from the action, the gravity of the evil which is feared in others, the proximity of the occasion of sin, the nature of the scandal, whether it is of the little ones or pharisaic. A greater cause is required that scandal of the little ones be permitted than pharisaic scandal; pharisaic scandal can be permitted for any cause whatever, unless from delay of the action a great fruit is hoped.

Indeed passive scandal sometimes must be permitted; for, to avoid it, it is not lawful to sin, or to expose one's own salvation to grave danger, or to harm others gravely, especially the community.

Reparation of Scandal. — He who by evil example has scandalized others must give them good example, insofar as the force of the evil example is thought to remain in some way. He must remove that force from charity; yet this is not true restitution, but rather a cessation from an evil action. This reparation will vary according to the nature of the scandal (public, occult, against one's proper office or not). - For the most part a general reparation which is contained in open conversion will be able to suffice. Cf. Aertnijs, I, 395. 396.

Some Applications. — 1. Two who commit sin simultaneously are necessarily scandalous to each other. For even if each conceived the evil intention by his own movement, nevertheless the execution, or exterior sin, required the complicity of the other, so that even the accomplice gave the instigator an occasion of sinning. Certainly he sins more who excited or induced another to sin. Yet because this is a merely aggravating circumstance, it need not be opened in confession, contrary to what some opine.

2. It is not lawful without cause to ask an honest work from him who will not perform it without sin, for example to ask an oath from someone who will perjure himself, or a sacrament from a minister whom you know to be living in a bad state. Yet this will be lawful on account of a reasonable cause: for the other sins from his own malice. Indeed, if, for example, the unworthy minister is already actually determined to sin, your petition merely anticipates the external sin, so that the petition does not seem to many to be gravely sinful, even if it is made without cause. Cf. Lugo, De Iure et Iustitia, d. 25, n. 234, against St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 47. (He argues from this, that external sin increases the malice of the internal will.) Hence they simply permit the faithful to ask sacraments from their bad priest. For they have a right to this administration. Likewise the wife of an onanist husband has a right to copulation. Therefore she will be able to ask this, unless by moderate abstinence she can draw her husband to better counsels.

3. On account of pharisaic scandal, no one ought to omit or defer good things not necessary, whether spiritual or even temporal, according to that saying of St. Matthew 15, 14: "Let them alone: they are blind and leaders of the blind." Except if from delay a notable fruit is hoped.

4. More easily and more often those good things are to be deferred or omitted on account of scandal of the little ones. Thus entrance into religion will have to be deferred on account of the scandal of parents, if their consent seems about to be obtained shortly.

5. When an explanation has been given which removes the appearance of evil, for example which shows a suspect action to be just, scandal of the little ones can easily be changed into pharisaic scandal, so that the obligation of avoiding it is greatly weakened.

6. Therefore scandal of the little ones excuses from fulfilling certain positive precepts of fasting, abstinence, etc., unless the omission would be more harmful to the one omitting. The case can be that of a wife whose husband would be gravely offended by abstinence on Friday; of a woman who in church would have before her a young man by whom she is basely desired. Some oblige, in such circumstances, that precepts sometimes be omitted, because the law of nature concerning avoiding scandal must be preferred to a positive law. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 51, thinks this opinion more probable. But the observance of a precept seems to others to be a just cause for permitting scandal. Therefore the obligation is not established, unless by office you ought to impede the sin of the person about to sin.

7. Ecclesiastical prelates, for avoiding disturbances, will sometimes have to omit certain sacred ceremonies; - they can, for avoiding greater evils, dissemble the sins of subjects which otherwise they would have to correct; - they neither must nor per se can omit lawsuits or those things which are necessary for guarding ecclesiastical goods, that scandals of Pharisees, or even of the little ones, may be avoided. Yet in a special case it will be better for them to yield their right; but unless the matter is of small moment, the assent of the Holy See will have to be sought.

8. A beautiful girl, decently adorned, need not be anxious concerning the temptations and sins of the men whom she will meet. Yet if she can easily avoid a man whom she knows to sin on her occasion, and can extinguish that lust by one or another flight, she must do this under grave obligation. (Aertnijs, 384, 4.)

9. On account of a just and proportionate cause, it seems lawful that you place an occasion, yet not a proximate occasion, of sin: thus a father who deservedly suspects his son to be prone to stealing can place an occasion of theft before him in order to detect and correct him. For detecting and expelling or punishing servants, the master will be able to do the same. Nor do they prohibit a husband from prudently and cautiously testing the fidelity of his wife. Indeed, on account of a very great cause, especially a public one, they say it is not repugnant that a woman, yet doing nothing immodest herself, permit a temptation to arise on her occasion, as Judith is narrated to have done in Sacred Scripture.

— You will ask whether it is right to ask from another an action honorable in itself, which he, on account of an erroneous conscience, cannot perform without sin? Suppose an attendant of false worship (Jewish, Mohammedan) to serve you, who must abstain on the Sabbath from servile works or must observe certain fasts; or suppose someone to be unjustly detained in prison, the injustice however being unknown to the guard, or to be prevented by hostile dominion from going out from the borders of the fatherland.

Resp. Without a grave cause it would be unlawful thus to induce another to subjective sin. On account of a grave cause, as if the work is urgent and you cannot seek it from another, or if you vindicate your right, this will be lawful. For the intention of the one asking is borne toward an action objectively good; the sin, which must be attributed to false conscience, is accidental: this is merely permitted by the one asking, on account of a just cause. But, if the one asking the action has this opportunity, after an explanation has been given concerning the objective honesty of the act, he must try to spare the other the subjective sin itself.

Nor should money perhaps to be paid to a guard or soldier cause scruple: for it is paid in order to redeem oneself from an objectively unjust vexation.

On Womanly Adornment. — a) Garments can derogate from the rules of decency in two ways: insofar as they excite lust, and insofar as they manifest a certain boldness contrary to modesty. Of the former character are the too-short garments of theaters and circuses; there are also garments too thin or too few, which have begun to be used in worldly dances; there are also garments which are fitted so artfully to the body that they either display every form of the body or exaggerate the sexual marks; finally there are - and this must not be disregarded - shorter garments of boys and girls: many are tempted on their occasion. Rather of the other character are indecorous uncoverings of the neck. And note that lust is excited more by mysterious veils than by complete nudity.

b) Those who introduce adornments that are not very decent, as well as the women who first wear them, sin gravely: they are the cause of innumerable sins, nor is their fault weakened by any excuse.

c) Those who merely accommodate themselves to accepted customs are rarely to be blamed gravely, especially since the manner of wearing garments has much force for diminishing, as also for increasing, indecency.

d) Those who increase indecency, according to the graver or less grave mode, will sin gravely or lightly.

e) The remote cooperation of a maker who, when asked, makes garments a la mode, practically will be excused by necessity or a grave cause.

f) A woman who foresees that it will happen that many in general are scandalized by her vain and superfluous adornment (yet not base), is not bound under grave obligation to lay it aside. For the occasion is in itself remote; moreover it is universal and perpetual, which beautiful women necessarily furnish when they go out of doors, and it would be too grave for the same women to abstain from adornment.

N. B. The rules concerning womanly adornment gathered from St. Thomas are proposed by Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, n. 269.

But Catholic and pious women accept an excessive servitude to usages which the less pious, indeed prostitutes, introduce. Wherefore an effort must be made that, a league having been formed, they vindicate their liberty, I say the liberty of elegant modesty. Nor can the cultivation of modesty be sufficiently urged upon all, both for themselves and for the family which they have to rule.

And because this is the head matter for amendment, as much as is in our power, we must procure for the common people that solid instruction turn the souls of girls away from futile matters toward fulfilling their grave offices, both familial and social.

On Dances. — a) No modern dances seem positively to be approved, if perhaps you except certain innocent dances which in some villages or Catholic regions are celebrated rarely, for example on the feast of the patron of the place. Berardi testifies that he has known such dances. On the contrary, there are also popular dances which end in true Bacchanalia.

b) While a few years ago the question was raised about certain modes of dancing, especially about that which is called the "waltz," today more attention must now be given to dances which figure a certain action.

Although certain modes of dancing are less pleasing, there is none which, where it has been introduced, we can condemn absolutely. But dances of the latter kind, unless they represent a sacred procession or a warlike action, are accustomed to express or imitate amorous deeds, for example the pursuit by which the male follows after the female; to express or imitate them in such a way that the very mode of execution casts the actors into an occasion scarcely not proximate of lust. Therefore it has happened that some, for example the "tango," have sometimes been reproved by ecclesiastical authority (*).

(*) Yet that you may respond prudently, this also must be observed: it sometimes happens that, with the name retained, the vices of certain dances are corrected, almost as corrected editions of evil writers are customarily published. - But again the license, neo-pagan and increasing day by day, makes matters worse and exaggerates the incentives of passions. What is to be said of the fact that in the very art of learning dances, under a futile pretext, dress wholly immodest has begun to be used? Nor only immodesty of dress, but several other, more recent, "worldly" usages seem as it were to declare war on virtue. Cf. Josue Germain, Dangereuses? Enquete sur les danses modernes, Paris, 1923; and, concerning that work, Doncoeur, Etudes, April 1923, t. 160, p. 193 ss.; or Hocedez, Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1924, t. 51, p. 32 ss.

c) Yet it can happen that for certain richer young men the intercourse of persons with whom they must observe the laws of civility, even if they mingle with honorable dances, is to be preferred to the vulgar intercourse of taverns to which otherwise they would be addicted.

d) If any wish or ought to go to dances, they must at least take care that they have honorable company. Masked dances are more dangerous, since they render the lustful more audacious and more impudent.

e) Penitents will have to be judged according to their case. Absolution is not to be denied to those who have not sinned. For those who are accustomed to sin in dances, dances will have to be prohibited, if the dances themselves, and not the weakness which is found in every association with women, are the proximate occasion of sin, and the occasion is not morally necessary, as it can be, for example, for a wife accompanying her husband.

— You will ask whether it is lawful, for avoiding a greater evil, to counsel a lesser evil, or whether that counsel is to be accused of active scandal.

The matter is controverted. Some deny that this is lawful, because the counselor of a lesser evil still remains a counselor of evil; others think it lawful, because the counsel merely affects the note of the lesser evil, and the evil which remains is neither intended nor has its cause in the counsel but in the evil will of the other. Or, if you prefer, the counsel, because conditional, is reasonable. For it is rendered in these words: since you want the greater evil, do rather the lesser. Thus Lugo, Iust., d. 19, n. 42 ss. Yet others think that this reason is valid only when the lesser evil is contained in the greater, or when there is question of evil to be inflicted on the same person. In this opinion, it will be lawful to counsel the mutilation of a person whom the other intended to kill; or in general theft or fornication to him who had determined to commit killing or adultery. But it will not be lawful to counsel him who intended by theft to despoil a poor man that, leaving such a one, he should take money from a rich man, because the rich man is reasonably unwilling with respect to that counsel. Therefore make an exception if, on account of the small quantity, the rich man cannot reasonably be unwilling. But since a prostitute is not unwilling, the designation of a prostitute to be chosen before a married woman does not seem to be reproved if it has been made by the counselor with the intention of diminishing the evil.

We judge this third opinion to be truer. Yet one must beware of the scandal which the counsel can bring with it. For which cause, unless we are deceived, on 22-23 Nov. 1922, the Holy Office denied that it was lawful that a confessor counsel dimidiate copulation to an onanist husband. For the Bishops of the Netherlands, in the preface of their petitionary booklet, had indicated why, in the concrete circumstances, that counsel would be scandalous, insofar as it would offend pious ears and pave the way for propagating Malthusian arts. Cf. Per. XII, p. 33-37.

On this matter cf. Lugo, Iust., d. 19, n. 13 ss. He also, nn. 50-54, discusses and benignly solves the question concerning him who counsels an equal evil, because that counsel also is purified by this condition having been placed: "If you are determined to this, do that other." And he even concedes that to one hesitating between two determinate men, which he would harm, he can be counseled that he damage Titius rather than Caius, at least insofar as he wishes to avert evil from Caius.

— Cooperation, by the force of the word, denotes the simultaneous action or operation of two or more. Thus in every good action we cooperate with the grace of God. Cooperators can either all assume principal parts for themselves, or some principal parts and others secondary parts. These latter are more strictly called cooperators: yet in such a way that the distinction regards rather the exterior execution than the whole action. Therefore, although, as the Code itself teaches in can. 2209 §3, one commanding or ordering is the principal author, apart from the executor or executors he is numbered among cooperators.

Cooperation is distinguished as formal and material. Formal cooperation is chiefly had when the intentions themselves are joined, or when concurrence is offered to the intention of the agent, or the matter is done and aided by common counsel. - Material cooperation is offered when one acts with a different intention, and another concurs. But that cooperation also is called formal which in itself, whether by its nature or by its necessary signification, contains goodness or malice of the same kind as the principal action. Others call this immediate material cooperation.

Therefore material cooperation in evil is done without the intention of the evil intended by the principal agent, through an action good in itself or indifferent, or at least wholly extraneous to the malice of the principal action which is considered: the principal agent himself then abuses your action for his depraved plans; he himself joins his evil will with your action. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 63.

According to its distance from the principal action it is called proximate or remote.

The Utility, Value, and Merit of Cooperation. — Alone we have power for few things. Therefore charity counsels prompt and manifold cooperation, both physical and moral, toward good, by counsel, exterior help, approval and praise, communication of knowledge, or furnishing of strength.

Aid of this kind, since it often prepares applause and success for others, frequently contains an exercise of humility and is very remote from envy. Therefore the same cooperation is commended by the very purity of affection. And it reaches the highest praise when the cooperator chooses labor for himself, and procures honor for another. On account of the communion of saints, all our prayers and good works can cooperate with all pious undertakings which are attempted everywhere on earth.

Formal or "intentional" cooperation communicates the merit of the principal action; not so material cooperation, unless it is conscious and, as cooperation, approved or intended.

— Superiors of religious institutes are accustomed to admit friends and benefactors to the society of merits and good works. Those who are given that communication are now ascribed among those for whom not a few sacrifices and suffrages are offered in the religious institute, whether from the appointment of the Superiors or from the spontaneous prayers which religious are accustomed to pour out according to the mind of the Superiors; and besides, as joined in a special way with the religious institute, in a mode analogous to that by which those themselves who are enrolled in the institute are joined, they can thence expect for themselves manifold supernatural help and divine mercy. Cf. concerning this matter St. Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 45, q. 2, art. 1; Tamburini Ascan., De iure abbatum, t. 2, d. 9, quaesit. 3; Bucceroni, Theol. mor., tom. IV, p. 428, Altera affiliatio, where he treats this argument more fully.

— 1. Strictly formal cooperation necessarily participates in the malice of the principal action. Therefore, if this is intrinsically evil, the cooperation itself never becomes lawful. The same must be said of formal cooperation which others call immediate material cooperation, if you except only injustice in material goods. For, on account of the right of necessity, it is sometimes lawful to cooperate materially, even immediately, in such injustice.

2. Material cooperation itself is per se illicit. For with respect to the agent it is opposed to the office of fraternal correction, by which we ought from charity to impede or correct his evil action; and often besides another effect is connected with it, derogating from the honor of God, or harmful or damaging to others.

Thence a not small question arises, whether material cooperation, when it is illicit, wounds the virtue of charity alone, or also the diverse other virtues to which, according to the diversity of the case, the principal action is opposed. Cardinal d'Annibale, I, n. 174, judged that charity alone is wounded, unless besides you bear a special office of parent, judge, minister of the sacraments, which imposes upon you the opposite care, because the material cooperator effects nothing evil in itself. Sanchez thinks otherwise, Decal., l. 1, c. 7, nn. 10, 12; but he says this consistently with his opinion concerning the malice of indirect scandal, which we rejected. Others (cf. concerning prop. 51 of Innocent XI, Cardenas, diss. 31, nn. 10, 11) hold the same conclusion, because cooperation, joined with the principal action, participates in this action's malice. But this must be denied, since the connection is not intrinsic but extrinsic, from the evil will of another. And, if this reason were admitted, the cooperation itself would become intrinsically evil, so that it would never be excused: which is very commonly rejected. There are those who distinguish injustice from other sins, because then, besides the reason of impeding from charity the sin of the agent, "there is present the reason of impeding the damage of a third party who has a right that another should not concur to his damage." Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, n. 297. But Cardinal d'Annibale objects, l. c., why should justice bind more than the other virtues? There are not lacking those who, concerned only about the gravity of the sin, omit the question of species, although other virtues oblige in one way, charity alone in another; or those who propose the matter very briefly and rather confusedly. Thus Lehmkuhl, I, 786, has these few words: "the wounding of charity is not the only, indeed often not even the principal, reason why some cooperation is illicit." Yet by these words, with the common opinion, he dissents from the view of d'Annibale.

We think it must be said briefly thus. The only cooperation which comes here to be considered is that which is positive, or by action. This alone truly concurs. Negative cooperation merely does not impede. Therefore, unless you have a different obligation from office, this can wound charity alone.

Positive material cooperation itself is no more than scandal a per se cause of the evil thing. Yet this difference exists between scandal and this cooperation: from no physical operation of the scandalous person, as such, does the effect depend; whereas, apart indeed from the intention of the one operating, his causality is assumed for an evil effecting, which is thus actively permitted. But various virtues impose upon us an unequal positive care, lest our action, even unwillingly on our part, harm their cause or good. Therefore material cooperation is not forbidden by a negative precept of the virtue, because one cooperating materially in truth does nothing contrary to the virtue himself (and thus the second opinion is rejected); but it can be forbidden by a positive office, insofar as the cooperator has wrongly permitted an efficacy opposed to various virtues. And this seems to have escaped Cardinal d'Annibale.

3. Material cooperation is not intrinsically illicit, but becomes lawful insofar as it is joined with sufficient care of virtue. The same thing is said in other words: material cooperation is excused by a proportionate inconvenience.

Principles Concerning Lawful and Unlawful Material Cooperation. — 1. Insofar as cooperation is forbidden by charity, the rules handed down above concerning indirect scandal recur. Insofar as it is forbidden also by another virtue to which the principal action is opposed, the very proximity of the cooperation to be avoided creates a formally graver obligation, and the rigor of that virtue also must be attended to.

2. Furthermore, this formula can be handed down. Material cooperation must be purged from affection toward the evil, from the vice of scandal, from a further evil effect. Therefore the cause excusing it ought to be such: a) that it can be joined with a mind wholly averse from the evil; b) that by an explanation of the cause scandal is removed, or because of the gravity of the cause scandal can be disregarded; c) that it compensates for the other damages which will follow from the cooperation.

Difficulty of Estimation. — The estimation of lawful and unlawful cooperation is impeded by difficulty: a) of considering adequately the matter with its circumstances. Now, if the business were completed between only the agent and the cooperator, the scandal which is often mixed with cooperation complicates the solutions. Thus Titius indeed wishes to read a bad work, but at the same time to preserve faith. If you foresee that from the reading he will lose the faith, by cooperating with the reading you give scandal of lost faith. - But the execution of an evil thing easily brings further effects damaging to religion, virtue, other persons, and society itself; b) of distinguishing an action intrinsically or always illicit from an action which in certain circumstances can be made honest. Now in that estimation writers do not agree, although per se it does not seem too arduous; c) of distinguishing the reasons of scandal and cooperation which occur in the case.

But the difficulty increases: a) because many writers propose the principles confusedly; b) because they do not agree concerning the reason why cooperation is illicit; c) because not a few circumstances have changed since the classic authors contemplated the various cases of cooperation, whose authority nevertheless is so great that modern authors retreat with difficulty from their literal responses.

The Prudent Mode of Examining a Case. — a) First of all it must be defined accurately what, in the proposed case, is intrinsically illicit.

b) Then the various respects of the proposed case must be considered: the respect of the proper danger to which the cooperator is exposed in the cooperation itself, and of the damage which is to be feared from denied cooperation; - with respect to the principal agent, the connection between him and the cooperator, the damage which seems about to accrue to him in relation to the common character of sin; - the respect of others who will suffer either scandal from the cooperation, or damage from the action to which cooperation is given; - the respect of the virtue to which the principal action will be at least materially contrary: this consideration can reveal a direct obligation of positively impeding the principal action; - the respect of the action which preceded and of the action or effect which follows: thus one who sells a bad sheet helps the publisher and harms the readers.

c) These things having been considered, as by a simple intuition you should see whether the cooperation appears to be a rational mode of acting, or the contrary. This intuition of a prudent man contains no small presumption of truth.

d) If the importance of the matter requires it, the various parts of the case must be weighed separately.

e) That you may suitably add counsel to the response, you will examine the very utility sought from the cooperation. We shall not favor cooperation which brings merely temporal gain; we shall be easier if damage is to be avoided; if a nobler end is intended, with a more inclined mind we shall indulge the matter. For if the casuist inclines toward the more benign things, the spiritual director suggests the better things.

Helps for Right Estimation. — It is useful to recall these things which are generally admitted:

1. He who gives an occasion of sinning to a man prepared to sin, or whose will is already evil, does not thence gravely harm him. Lugo, Iust. et Iur., d. 25, n. 235.

2. Per se, or with scandal excluded, remote cooperations which are not removens prohibens, i.e. which would be supplied by another, are excused from grave sin. Sanchez, Decal., l. 1, c. 7, n. 16.

3. Every cooperation toward grave evil which either is proximate or, if remote, is removens prohibens, can be excused only by grave damage. If at the same time it is proximate and removens prohibens, or if there follows the gravest evil of one person, or the grave evil of several or many, cooperation is excused only by gravest damage.

4. For rescuing someone from extreme spiritual necessity, every damage must be borne, whereas damage of life or state or fortunes is not to be undergone for freeing neighbor from temporal necessity, even extreme.

Grave spiritual necessity imposes a grave inconvenience, at least on those who have a positive office of caring for the good, or unless the necessity has been general; then damage of life itself must be undergone. Cf. n. 99.

For avoiding formal sin for someone, grave inconvenience is not to be suffered.

5. But we are forbidden more severely lest we cause such evil. Wherefore it happens that of the same evil from which you ought not to free neighbor with grave detriment, you cannot be a positive and proximate cause,[^017-1] even by accident,[^017-2] unless you are excused by morally extreme damage of your own.

6. Causes excusing cooperation are distinguished as very slight, light but reasonable, rather grave, grave, very grave, and gravest. It is useful to declare these by examples.

A very slight excuse is brought by ordinary profit: this scarcely ever suffices.

A light but reasonable excuse is brought by service, the condition of a subject: it is always considered damaging that you should have to deny what seems to pertain to an office. - Extraordinary profit also induces such a reason, as does the inconvenience of not selling one's goods equally well.

A rather grave excuse is sought from fear of losing good service, a good client, indeed notable profit, if there is question of a man of slender fortune.

A grave excuse is present in the true difficulty of finding another service, another office; - in lack of things, whether this present lack is to be removed, or a future one is feared; - in infamy before one discreet man; - in secret expulsion from a college; - in the desertion of several clients; - indeed in great indignation of a husband, father, or master.

A very grave excuse is shown by the loss of state or civil condition; by defamation before several; - by notorious expulsion from a college; - by the danger of falling notably from one's state.

A gravest excuse is had when a good equivalent to life is placed in danger.

And observe in general that a graver excuse proceeds from positive damage than from cessation of profit.

But when, to excuse a servant, they demand a reason which is added to service, the servant ought to decline that cooperation by seeking another service, unless the very loss of such service induces sufficient inconvenience.

— You will ask whether or not you can cast illicit cooperation upon another already prepared: as if a magistrate or soldier should ask others to indicate causes or execute things which, conscience forbidding, cannot be indicated or done by you?

It is not lawful to ask illicit things. Therefore a Catholic magistrate or soldier cannot formally and honestly ask from another an action illicit in itself and illicit for the other. But no one is forbidden simply to refuse his own cooperation, to ask from him who distributes causes or commanded actions that these things not be imposed on him to be indicated or done. Nor does the foreseen substitution of another stand in the way. He who refuses his own action merely permits that future substitution. Therefore it is not repugnant that in an unbelieving region Christian servants pay money to the master of works, lest they be compelled to perform or participate in superstitious things. Lehmkuhl, I, 820; Noldin, Praec., 122.

It is very useful, by reading approved authors, to acquire for oneself a right judgment, so that afterwards you can more easily apply the principles to various cases, by weighing the connection with sin and the character of this sin, the fruit of refused cooperation, and the damage to be sustained.

Wherefore we adduce various examples, warning at the same time that there is not one opinion concerning all.

— A parish priest, minister of a sacrament, confessor, lest they violate secrecy, lest they make someone infamous, etc., not rarely must, in the public or even private administration of a sacrament, cooperate in sacrilege. Just as a bride lawfully cooperates in the same when she contracts marriage with a bridegroom living in the state of mortal sin.

Cooperation of Religious Sisters in Clinical Hospitals. — Since today there easily occur physicians and surgeons who, in exercising their art, in a conscious or unconscious manner sin against the natural divine law, as it is declared by the Holy See, a question of grave moment arises concerning the cooperation of Sisters. The chief cases are: the administration of morphine, not for alleviating present pain, but for procuring alienation of mind in the agony of death; then the direct procurement of abortion and feticide.

Furthermore, hospitals to which Sisters are assigned are of three kinds: some are public; others are private hospitals of physicians; others belong to the Sisters themselves.

In no hospital, as is clear, can Sisters formally cooperate in an illicit action; but material cooperation can be excused less with difficulty in public hospitals than in private ones. For it pertains to the common good of religion and to the salvation of very many souls that Sisters rather than lay women minister to the sick in public hospitals. Wherefore, with the exception of formal cooperation or the execution of the illicit operation itself, such as an infusion of morphine certainly illicit, which they must wholly refuse, material cooperation, even that of cleaning and arranging the instruments, washing and preparing the body for the operation, and the transfer of the sick person to the place of operation, will not be able to be condemned, with scandal excluded, which will be removed rather conveniently, for example by a declaration.

But if there is question of the private hospital of a physician, first, before they promise their own labor and that of the Sisters, the Superiors must take cautions, lest anything against the conscience of the Sisters ever be asked; and every cooperation, even material, must be denied, unless perhaps very remote, as is the very reception of a person laboring under an evil into a room adorned by the Sisters.

Finally, if the ownership of the hospital belongs to the Sisters themselves, they must take care in the contract with the physician lest any physician be called or admitted who attempts anything illicit. And only in an extraordinary, unforeseen case will there be room for tolerating the action of the physician, illicit in itself, and for cooperating materially, in order to avoid worse evils.

Finally, in doubt, when the act is invincible, the Sisters can in any hospital permit the matter to the conscience of the physician, otherwise upright. If, however, a firm presumption cannot be drawn from the very religion of the physician, concerning a case which is foreseen to be going to occur several times, afterwards they will have to procure fuller security for themselves.

Concerning the difficulty which the false worship of a non-Catholic sick person can bring, cf. below, 147, 6 and 7.

— In what way a spouse can or even ought to have carnal commerce with an onanist spouse, or one who is bound by a vow, is explained in the tract On Chastity and the Opposite Vices. Cf. nn. 255, 265-268.

A Servant. — 1. On account of the reason of service alone he can per se render services which are accustomed to be demanded from servants and concur remotely in sin: for example, to dress the master, to saddle a horse, to open the door for a concubine and prepare her bed, to set wine before a master making himself drunk, to prepare meats on a forbidden day, to buy a liberal newspaper or a book not so obscene, etc.; indeed even to accompany the master or convey him by carriage to the house of a mistress, or to carry letters which he suspects to be amatory. For it would be intolerable that, while he performs these customary offices, the servant should carry out a censorious inquiry concerning the end, or should look to the master's intentions. Yet for permitting the later actions (those enumerated after the word "indeed") many require that a reason of notable damage be added, which will scarcely be absent. All require this reason that he may lead the prostitute herself to the master.

N. B. Public drivers, since without very grave inconvenience they cannot publicly refuse an office to one asking, nor are they accustomed to be solicitous concerning the reason of the journey, can render these things more easily. Certainly they will be praised who industriously avoid these things.

Yet we think that a stricter answer must be given concerning those who, beyond the boundaries of a region in which a duel is forbidden, convey those who ask for the journey with a manifest intention of duel. Not every cause then seems sufficient.

2. Another proportionately grave cause is required besides, that a servant may be able to render to a master inviting or ordering him those things which approach more nearly to sin, as for example, to put his shoulders under, to move ladders near, for the master climbing through a window to a concubine; to carry letters certainly amatory to a prostitute; to accompany to a duel; to write, at the dictation of the master, letters which indeed contain only signs of civility but are foreseen to be going to increase base love; to buy an image not so base that it is properly obscene, or not such that it can serve for nothing except lust.

3. A gravest cause is required when an action is demanded which at the same time approaches more nearly to sin and will effect grave damage to an innocent person, or which contains proximate cooperation: for example, to put his shoulders under a master climbing up to violate a virgin; to keep watch to defend the master if perhaps, while he is with a mistress, arriving rivals attack him (Sanchez, l. 1, c. 7, n. 23); to carry letters which certainly contain a base invitation, etc.

4. For no cause would it be lawful both to write and to carry letters containing base things or a base invitation, or to invite a person in the name of another to meet for the sake of sin, with the depraved end indicated. With the depraved end kept silent, cooperation by invitation can be excused by a gravest cause.

Therefore it is not lawful for those Black servants, who are commonly called "boys," to obey Europeans who order them to seek a concubine for them from among Black women.

According to the things said in n. 3, if in that meeting a girl is to be deceived, fear of death alone would excuse from the invitation; or the girl would have to be notified that snares have been laid for her.

— A judge or magistrate does not merely declare an existing law, but, as a Superior, authentically intimates it to the parties, so that by sentences passed the law is practically confirmed and received into morals. Yet he does not command of his own accord, but ordered by the law, compelled by office, and as it were the legislator's mandatory. It is besides of the highest interest that Catholic and upright judges can remain in office. Therefore the cooperation of a judge with an unjust law, which cannot be declined except by resignation of office, is demanded by a grave reason of the common good. The object and circumstances of the cooperation must now be considered.

With voluntary cooperation excluded, which, as quasi-formal, cannot be excused, a judge can never directly command things which are intrinsically illicit: for example, incense to be offered to an idol, cohabitation with an illegitimate spouse. But if there is question of a penalty to be imposed, and the same is not grave, the solution seems to be sought from the consideration of the prevailing public good. As long as one must strive in every way against a law, whether because it is openly impious, or because it is recent, or if this is the manifest will of the Superiors of the Church who define or declare moral obligations, office will rather have to be yielded than that it would be lawful to offer cooperation of this kind to the unjust law; on the contrary, scandal having been removed and hope of accomplishing something having been taken away, the innocent person to be fined is not judged reasonably unwilling that he be condemned to pay a moderate sum of money. Moreover, it is sometimes lawful to cooperate immediately in unjust damage in goods which one can licitly renounce; and the public utility of preserving good judges can make this renunciation of his right necessary for the innocent person from charity. Thus, for example, in Belgium the case seems to be that of a judge who imposes a fine on a priest who has imparted the nuptial blessing before the civil marriage ceremony. Lehmkuhl indeed, I, 962, raises this grave difficulty, that to affect an innocent person with a penalty, to declare him worthy of penalty, is intrinsically evil. But Noldin, De praeceptis, n. 726, thinks that this malice can be removed by the consent of the innocent person. We think that the distinction must be made thus: - that condemnation harms the innocent person and contains per se a disapproval of the action. Insofar as it harms, if there is question of those goods which can be directly taken away on account of public utility, the sentence is not intrinsically evil. But the note of disapproval can be removed by common interpretation, so that it is known merely to be a literal application of the law, which must be tolerated to avoid greater evils. And then nothing intrinsically evil is now shown in that sentence.

If the law is unjust for this reason, that it contains usurpation of the ecclesiastical forum, in certain regions custom itself has removed at least the positive sanctions of that immunity, as was declared by the Cardinal Secretary of State in the year 1911. Cf. Periodica, t. 6, p. 190. Therefore regard must then be had to the natural obligation of consulting for the honor of the Church. And, in a graver or unusual case, a license or declaration sought from the Ordinary or, through the Ordinary, from the Holy See, will make the magistrate more certain concerning his office. In this matter civil causes and criminal causes of minor clerics must be distinguished from criminal causes of Bishops. Concerning the former, either Concordats or custom in several regions indicate what must be done; elsewhere the license to be requested will not be denied. Concerning the latter causes, as graver, the matter will have to be arranged mediately or immediately with the Holy See.

Nor, by applying the law of divorce, does a judge command anything intrinsically dishonorable, but he removes civil protection from marriage and concedes to the parties the faculty of a new civil marriage. In this matter nothing intrinsically dishonorable is discerned, but something which, according to the circumstances, will either be scandalous and to be inhibited, or to be tolerated. And the responses of the Holy See have varied according to time and place. Cf. the writings on chastity, n. 286.

While concerning the application of an unjust law Lehmkuhl, I, 962, speaks more severely than Bucceroni, Theol. mor., nn. 19, 20, the former, II, 921 note, solves more benignly than the latter, l. c., the case of one pronouncing divorce.

— In speaking about judges, we have already spoken about jurors, whose case is similar, except that these can more easily, by denying condemnation, impede a sentence against the rights of the Church. Yet it is not per se expedient that a convicted accused person be absolved. Therefore it will be more satisfactory that, where there is need, after the faculty has been sought, they answer according to the things alleged and proved. Nor is it per se to be advised that Catholic jurors refuse that office, since there is danger lest ministers of the Church be judged by enemies.

N. B. Jurors, according to their conscience, pronounce merely concerning guilt, by responding affirmatively or negatively to the questions proposed by the president of the court.

Innkeepers. — 1. They cannot favor the violation of the laws of the Church or render them difficult to observe; yet they themselves, again, because Catholics and non-Catholics, the pious and impious, the healthy and the weaker are mixed, today experience great difficulty in serving on days of abstinence foods forbidden by law to those alone for whom they would be permitted to prepare them. Thence there are not lacking regions where a general dispensation of the law has been conceded in lodging houses and inns. And, except in places plainly Catholic, where the offering of forbidden food would be scandalous, today innkeepers will satisfy their office if they supply clients every convenience for observing the law, and do not by various pretexts or even by a lesser quality of foods increase the reasons why clients may decline the observance of ecclesiastical discipline as too grave. It is never lawful to supply meats requested in contempt of religion.

2. Dances are the occasion of many sins. Therefore those innkeepers cannot be excused who introduce them or alone retain them. Those who merely, according to received custom, furnish a place for dances, otherwise not dishonorable, are not to be blamed, at least gravely. But that there should be held there dances of that more recent kind, which even among persons select by their condition are to be criticized not lightly, can in no way be tolerated either by a pastor of souls or by a confessor.

3. They are forbidden to buy newspapers wholly opposed to faith and morals, or obscene ones, even if they are deserted by many clients. On the contrary, they must take care that good newspapers be ready for those same clients. Concerning other newspapers, they should strive to give the least occasion of reading things which are less becoming, whether you regard faith or morals; let them lessen the evil which they cannot extinguish.

They themselves do not draw clients by less good newspapers, which would be unlawful; but they impede being deserted by clients. Therefore this can be lawful.

4. They can never furnish a place for sinning to those asking in such a way that they seem to consent to the sin. Indeed, a notable necessity, which alone would excuse, is for the most part not present. Lodging houses which admit persons of this kind are often marked by a certain infamy, whereas others from which they are severely excluded are commended by that very good name. Yet it is clear that inquiries are not to be made concerning persons who present themselves as spouses.

— Artisans cannot spontaneously make things which, whether in themselves or with attention to the region where they are made, have no use except a depraved one: images wholly base and without scientific use, abortive drugs, "condoms" in our region, idols in an idolatrous region. For a general and spontaneous making of this kind contains manifest favor offered without necessity to an evil thing, so that it must be marked with the note of formal cooperation. - But what if you make them under compulsion? Here the things and the makers must be distinguished. The very making of certain things can scarcely be had without sin: for example, a truly obscene painting or photograph; to perform these things will never be lawful unless perhaps to avoid a gravest evil. The making of other things is indifferent in itself, but their use will be evil. For example, instruments of the neo-Malthusian art, and the idol itself. The kind of evil must be attended to. Since idolatry is gravely injurious to God, to offer work in making or adorning a statue which is destined for idolatry will for the most part not be lawful, and cooperation of this kind can be made honest only from a gravest cause. Cf. Noldin, II, 123, c.

As to condoms, in certain regions, as they report, these same things serve for children's games; and in moderate quantity, just like abortive drugs themselves, they should be ready for men who study the medical sciences. Again, the cooperation of a hired worker in a workshop is remote, and he ought not to be solicitous concerning the special destination of the things. Therefore, if only a few are to be made, a worker who is prohibited from seeking an explanation will be able to cooperate, lest otherwise he be dismissed from the workshop. But if a great quantity of these things must be prepared in our regions, so grave a common evil is propagated through them that a worker who cannot otherwise refuse his cooperation must under grave obligation seek another master, nor can he remain in that workshop except for a short time. - In a typography, individual workers can and must be solicitous only concerning the kind of printing establishment; nor, where a better occasion is lacking, are they forbidden to hire out their work where, although obscene or truly impious works are not published, they have books to be printed, some good, others less good.

Even insufficient garments can always be completed by those wearing them. Therefore the work of an individual worker can be admitted with less difficulty.

2. Managers or masters of a workshop, since they preside over many things to be made and care for the diffusion itself of the things made, can never administer the making of things which can scarcely have an innocent use. For they would be the cause of many sins which otherwise would not be committed.

Yet here also attention must be paid to the varied nature of the things.

Books or newspapers which are not given over to obscene matters are accustomed, besides their less approvable parts, to contain things innocent and useful. Therefore they are not to be put among things whose good use is almost none. Therefore, when there is not question of an obscene or truly impious book, a hired manager, on account of a grave cause, for example if otherwise he would be deprived of a sufficient amount of works, is permitted to print a less good work, unless, because he is known as very Catholic, his cooperation would be scandalous. Yet he will not be able formally to publish such a book, since the publisher must care for its diffusion, so that his cooperation must be held as formal.

Those who by their own device invent and make dishonorable or less honorable women's garments cannot be excused from grave sin. On the contrary, a moderate or grave cause will excuse those who adorn such garments when asked: a moderate cause will suffice if the garments are a little freer; a graver cause will be required if they have been notably dishonorable. But today the conscience of managers who equip their large shops with no other ready-made garments except less honorable ones is burdened more gravely. For since they are sold at a lower price than garments adorned according to the desire of the client, they are bought by women of more obscure place, so that the less modest clothing of plebeian women and girls must be imputed at least in part to those managers.

A moderate cause seems sufficient, with scandal excluded, that you make garments, not strictly sacred, for a heretical or schismatic minister, by which his usurped dignity is recognized, as if you prepare the violet habit of bishops for a Jansenist bishop.

To avoid a necessity quasi-extreme, Lehmkuhl, I, 815, permits that emblems of Freemasons or of a condemned sect be made, because they do not contain superstition in themselves and are directed only by sectarians to depraved ends. And a very grave excuse seems to us sufficient, with special scandal from the quality of the maker excluded.

He exercises no superstition who, in preparing foods, avoids those things from which others think one must superstitiously abstain. Therefore it is lawful to consent to one asking these things for a very slight cause. And he who spontaneously announces that chocolate made by him is pure from elements which Jews do not want mixed in, today will seem to all to wish to gain profit, not to approve the Jewish sect. Therefore a moderate cause, for example a notable increase of profit, will excuse that cooperation. (Yet it is necessary that the rite itself be decorated with no honorary title.)

— A merchant holds a middle place between the maker and the user. His cooperation is more proximate; besides, one who proposes things for sale (at least spontaneously) seems to recommend them and is stimulated by the very zeal of profit to seek buyers. Therefore his cooperation approaches more to formal cooperation and is spiritually dangerous to him. But again the merchant presupposes the maker, so that the thing-making person sometimes, by his action, brings forth a necessity to which the merchant conforms while he has those things for sale.

Thence writers speak in a similar way concerning artisans and merchants, yet so that they estimate the cooperation of merchants a little more benignly. Hence the following norms are established:

1. Morally it is never lawful to sell things which have no use except a depraved one. Yet they excuse him who, in a special case, compelled by the gravest necessity of avoiding death, has done it.

2. Things which are subject to immense danger of abuse regularly cannot be sold unless the future good use is morally certain. Thus most poisons, excepting however those which, because they have a frequent good use, are now accustomed to be offered to all.

3. Things indifferent are sold without fault, which many use well although very many abuse them: dice, cosmetics, swords, guns, alcohol, as long as the intention of abuse is not certain. For the order to sin is remote; and those businesses cannot be impeded.

But if the abuse is morally certain, a proportionately grave reason, to be estimated from the principles prudently considered, must be added. Hence if the abuse is toward idolatrous worship, a very urgent cause is demanded; a graver one is likewise required if an innocent person is going to suffer unjust damage; indeed proximate cooperation which at the same time is necessary to the effect is excused only by a gravest cause. Therefore you could not sell a sword to one going to kill a man unless to avoid an evil equivalent to death. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 571, where he corrects what he had written more severely in l. 2, n. 66.

Is it lawful, absolutely or without condition, to sell good merchandise, for example pure wine, to another who afterwards, under his own name, will sell it adulterated? St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 69, does not permit this except on account of fear of death or infamy; others, for example Lehmkuhl, I, 832, require a grave cause, while others, better, are content with a moderate one. The cooperation of the seller is very remote; there is no public scandal; and the cooperation is refused in vain. Indeed, from usage, from diminished price, etc., often the very injustice of the one adulterating will be doubtful. Yet a gravest cause will be required if the adulteration has been harmful and consequently notably damaging to the public good.

Concerning selling women's garments or ornaments that are not very modest, the things said about making them recur, n. 145.

There is a special difficulty concerning books and newspapers. Catholic booksellers are given the faculty that they procure prohibited books for selected persons who are helped in studies or profession by them. But it is not lawful for the same booksellers to have those books promiscuously for sale.

Concerning newspapers these things are to be observed especially: a) The spontaneous sale of newspapers which are opposed to faith or morals brings proximate cooperation to not a few sins. Therefore, even when formal recommendation is avoided, this cannot be tolerated except on account of the gravest cause of poverty and for a short time; b) far less grave is the cooperation of him who, with obscene and very impious newspapers excluded, has newspapers of various kinds for sale. His work can be indirectly useful, if he recommends or displays the less Christian newspapers less than another who would sell such in his place. Therefore, with scandal removed, this in certain circumstances could simply be permitted; c) it sometimes happens that from the public or general administration there is bought the right or monopoly of selling newspapers in "stations" of railways or streets, on this law, that newspapers of all political parties be sold equally. This sale-distribution of newspapers can be compared with the distribution of all letters, newspapers, and books which is done through postal offices. Therefore nothing prevents a Catholic man or Catholic society from acquiring such a right for itself. No scandal of connivance with evil will be given; and indirectly there will be an occasion of impeding not a few evils.

[^017-1]: Insofar as we can be the cause of another's sin.

[^017-2]: By accident, i.e. apart from intention.

Cooperation Toward False Worship. Present circumstances warn us that the danger of a certain indifferentism must be carefully removed, which honors or neglects various religions in almost an equal way; yet at the same time, indeed more, irreligion must be fought, which surely is worse and more false than erroneous worship. Besides, in most places at least, the profession of false worship offends Catholic worship less directly than formerly. Finally, in our mixed societies, material cooperation is judged less to be a favor furnished to a false sect.

1. Therefore this general rule can be established concerning that cooperation: that, with a positive prohibition of law excluded, it is rather easily called lawful when it savors of no indifferentism, but can be joined with aversion from the false sect, creates no danger for the cooperator, and scandal is absent or is excused by grave inconvenience.

2. To give one's work in constructing a non-Catholic temple, whether pagan, Mohammedan, Jewish, or heretical, will never be lawful if it is sought in contempt of the Catholic religion, or if it is held as a kind of protestative sign of false worship. In this way the most severe decrees given by the authority of the Holy Office, by the S. C. of the Propagation of the Faith, e.g. January 8, 1851, concerning cooperation in building temples of idols, must be explained. Cf. Ball.-Palm., t. 2, tr. 5, n. 300. Although a graver necessity must be present for you to be excused from cooperation toward a pagan temple than toward the very "mosque," on account of the greater distance from true worship.

But hired simple workers can, from their very condition, cooperate in constructing a temple which, permitted by law, is erected with no offense to the Catholic religion. But contractors for works (entrepreneurs, appellatori, intraprenditori), insofar as they merely execute the model of the architect, will be excused with more difficulty than workers, more easily than architects. Where a different custom has not already prevailed, on account of merely sufficiently grave damage the contractor for the work seems able to be excused: the scandal of indifferentism stands in the way. But a wholly grave damage must be required for you to excuse the architect: for he adds splendor, and thus favors false worship. Yet I would answer more mildly if he rather seems, against irreligion, to favor divine worship under a common aspect. Nevertheless one must guard against the scandal of indifferentism.

Because the constructions of heretical temples in the City were judged especially scandalous, the Instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of June 12, 1878, declared architects, contractors, masters of workers, "who undertake care and work for constructing and adorning some Protestant temple," guilty of mortal sin.

3. To contribute money for the building of a temple is not intrinsically illicit, because the building itself is not yet the exercise of false worship, nor does the contribution necessarily contain approval of error. Yet if it immediately helps the very plan of building a temple, as Noldin says, Praec. n. 122, "in itself it contains external consent with the depraved intention of heretics or unbelievers, and an external favor furnished to heresy or idolatry." Yet that note can be removed either by protestation or by the circumstances themselves, as if Catholics can in this way free themselves from the simultaneity - scandalous in itself - by which they are forced to have one church in common with heterodox persons. Cf. N. Paeii. 1822. With circumstances of this kind excluded, it is better to avoid this as much as opportunity is had, and rather to offer money to a lodging-house or to a profane good of Protestants. Where the contribution cannot be avoided, it will be excused by grave inconvenience, if by common interpretation no favor is judged to be given to heretical worship, but benevolence merely has been signified.

Thus also it is tolerated that Catholic deputies approve subsidies which customarily are paid from the treasury to various sects: they grant these not to non-Catholics as such, but to fellow-citizens, and for avoiding grave damage to the Catholic religion. Lehmk. I, 818.

4. To sell indifferent furniture for adorning a non-Catholic temple (benches, seats, a table, lamps) is so remote a cooperation that the excuse of profit to be received therefrom suffices. A graver cause is required for things of this kind to be made expressly for that temple, because these help the formal exercise of worship; and the more immediately they serve a non-Catholic rite, the graver cause is required. Cf. Noldin, Praec. n. 122. Today nevertheless they permit that simply, on account of the profit to be received from it, a lamb to be sacrificed be sold to Jews: that cooperation is very remote ¹. But a grave cause is required so that sacred vestments can be sold to them, and scarcely except for averting gravest damages will it have been lawful to sell sacred vestments which contain superstitious signs. But simply it will be lawful to sell our liturgical books for a price to non-Catholics who use them, since these at the same time commend our faith.

5. To ring a bell is not to exercise a rite, but it is either formally to invite to a sacred ceremony or to give a sign of a future ceremony. Where, from the circumstances, it seems to be an invitation, this is intrinsically illicit; but if, as per se it is to be understood, it is held for a mere announcement, this material but rather proximate cooperation will be lawful from a very grave cause. Lehmk. I, 812; Noldin, Praec. 120. That for a profane solemnity, e.g. as a sign of joy for the victory of the fatherland, Catholic and non-Catholic bells should be rung together even by agreement, nothing prevents; but lest the scandal of indifferentism be given, it is not to be approved that at an appointed hour all should be rung for this end, so that they give to the faithful and to non-Catholics at the same time the sign of a sacred function. Cf. Lehmk. I, 812.

6. To prepare things necessary for exercising a superstitious or non-Catholic rite, e.g. to spread a table and place there the things which come into use for the minister in assisting the sick person, is to exercise proximate cooperation, material however, which will be excused by a grave cause. But ambiguity of intention, if any is present, must be removed by protestation. Cf. Lehmk. I, 811.

7. Formally to invite a non-Catholic minister to exercise his ministry with a dying person is formally to ask from him an illicit action, which is unlawful. Cf. S. Off. March 15, 1848, apud Lehmk. I, 810. Merely to warn him that there is a sick person of his sect there is only to furnish material cooperation, which will be lawful from a cause wholly grave. Lay persons set over prisons or hospitals, for example, will be able to do this. With attention to their quality, let Sisters not do this of themselves per se.

8. To play the organ for ritual chant seems hardly not to be formal cooperation. Wherefore only from very grave necessity can that proximate cooperation be admitted. But one who, in a certain concert, is compelled to perform his musical part on some instrument will be excused a little more easily. And the case is different of a concert which, on account of a profane reason, e.g. for honoring a prince, celebrating a victory, is set during a sacred function. In circumstances of this kind this commonly will be lawful per se.

9. That in the heretical temple itself Catholics assisting together with non-Catholics should sing a sacred canticle of thanksgiving, e.g. the Te Deum, as a sign of common joy rather than for carrying out a sacred function, this does not seem lawful except to avoid scandal: lest they seem destitute of patriotic affection. If it is rather considered as a sacred thing, one must abstain more from that communication, which nevertheless is not yet intrinsically illicit. Wherefore care must be taken, as much as opportunity is given, that demonstrations of this kind be made separately by Catholics and by non-Catholics.

10. When a heretical minister recites prayers before or after the table, it will be unlawful to respond to him if he recites them as a heretical minister. If as an elderly man devoted to sacred things, where custom was to entrust this to the elder, the thing does not seem to be prohibited, since no authority is then added to him as minister. If custom is lacking, let us reverently abstain.

On English ships, the captain, from office, must on Sunday recite in common prayers taken from the book called the "Prayer Book." Provided that he chooses prayers free from error, a Catholic captain seems able to fulfill those parts. His action is explained by the office to which he is bound, and a religious demonstration today is rather to be desired.

11. If in a non-Catholic region an oath must be taken by touching sacred Bibles edited or translated by heretics, and there is no opportunity of using a Catholic edition, the thing does not seem illicit, since per se it is manifest that these are used only insofar as they contain the word of God, but not insofar as they are not perfectly conformed to the Catholic edition. If it can be done, this mind should be declared. Cf. Lehmk. I, 552 note. - Concerning cooperation toward false worship, Sanchez, Dec., l. 2, c. 9, n. 7; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 13; Lugo, De Fide, d. 14, s. 5; d. 22, s. 1, nn. 10, 11; Lehmk. I, 800-823; Noldin, Praec. 122, are read usefully.

¹ But the cases are sufficiently different of a lay man who sells to Jews some lamb from among lambs which are offered for sale in various places, and of an ecclesiastical man who sells to a schismatic priest flour expressly requested for making hosts for Mass, and which no one else can sell. A very grave cause, especially of public order, alone seems able to excuse that cooperation.

— Concerning the construction of buildings of Freemasons, the things said concerning temples apply. They are connected more remotely with the evil use than the sacred buildings of heretics. Cf. Lehmk. I, 816. Yet again the sect is usually more actually hostile to the Catholic faith and religion than a non-Catholic sect, especially an ancient one. Wherefore it is worse to favor their impiety than the false piety of these latter.

The same must be said of favor furnished to societies of socialists, such as they are commonly known. Therefore to procure money for these, so that they can have buildings proper to themselves, cannot be excused from objectively grave guilt.

Yet it is not intrinsically illicit, but on account of a proportionate cause it will be lawful to contribute money to a society of socialists whose immediate end is honorable. Noldin, Praec. 122.

As the Holy Father has no intention of coming down to details of practical morality, we must evidently have recourse to approved authorities and to former declarations of the Holy See. According to this teaching, there is question of cooperation in an act which was begun in the right way, and which the other party alone interrupts in such a way as to violate nature.

We are therefore, for our part, unable to agree with the passage in which Reverend John Ryan of Washington, in his notes on the moral teaching of the Encyclical, insinuates that the Encyclical may extend the field of permissible material cooperation in the face of the common opinion now existing on the subject.¹ The distinctions which the moralists make are founded on a certain principle and are confirmed by the replies of the Sacred Penitentiary of April 3 and June 3, 1916.²

¹ “The Moral Teaching of the Encyclical,” Ecclesiastical Review (1931), p. 266.

² Cf. Vermeersch, De Castitate, n. 253.

617. Notions. To cooperate in general is to work with another; therefore to cooperate in evil is a concurrence furnished to the wicked action of another. This concurrence, however, can be furnished in a threefold way: a) By an influence upon the will of the agent who executes the wicked action; in this way those cooperate who command, counsel, flatter, etc. This cooperation does not differ essentially from scandal, concerning which enough has been said in the preceding paragraph, and concerning it there will be treatment again below II, n. 100, where there will be speech about cooperative damaging. b) By participation in the very wicked action; in this way, e.g., those cooperate who by combined strength execute a theft. c) By the presentation of matter or a faculty necessary for acting; in this way, e.g., those cooperate who furnish wine for drunkenness, weapons for killing, etc.

The first mode of cooperation is reduced to scandal, as has already been said, and is a cause of sin; the second mode is immediate cooperation; the third mode, however, is mediate cooperation, and is either proximate, when the matter or faculty furnished proximately influences the wicked action of another, as if someone sells poison to a man prepared to kill another; or it is remote, when the matter furnished influences the wicked action only remotely, as if someone sells a lamb to a Jew, which he perhaps will slaughter as a paschal lamb. From what has been said thus far it follows that scandal and cooperation are intimately connected. But the principal difference between the two is that scandal causes the evil will of the sinner, whether by counsel, or command, or persuasion, or example, etc.; cooperation, however, supposes the evil will of the sinner and serves only as an instrument for completing that evil will by an external work.

Division. Besides the distinctions of cooperation already given into mediate and immediate, and into proximate and remote, there is given the principal distinction into formal and material cooperation.

Formal cooperation is that which helps another toward the formal element of sin, i.e. toward sin as it is sin; and this indeed happens if formal cooperation is sinful in itself, i.e. whether from the moral object itself or end of the work, or from the end of the one operating, e.g. if someone helps another to perpetrate homicide.

Material cooperation is to help toward the material element of sin, i.e. toward the action of another, not as it is sin, but as it is a physical action;¹⁴⁰ and therefore cooperation is an action honorable in itself or at least indifferent, which nevertheless another abuses for sin; e.g. if a wife from a good intention renders the conjugal debt to a husband abusing it for onanism. - It must be confessed that not rarely it is most difficult to discern whether formal cooperation is present or not; nor do different theologians always agree in this matter.

¹⁴⁰ Authors do not agree in the description of material and formal cooperation. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 63) writes: "Some say that cooperation is then material when it of itself by accident and remotely conduces to the sin of another; but then formal when through itself, or on account of some joined circumstance, it proximately conduces to the execution of sin, although of itself it would be indifferent. - But it must better be said with others that that cooperation is formal which concurs only toward the evil will of another and cannot be without sin; but that that cooperation is material which concurs only toward the evil action of another besides the intention of the one operating." - Formal cooperation arises 1. from an intrinsically evil action, e.g. to print things against religion; 2. from the depraved intention of the agent, e.g. to help a maidservant so that she may more easily be able to sin with her paramour, as was said above.

618. Principle 1. Formal cooperation in the sin of another is intrinsically evil and therefore is never licit.

Thus all theologians teach. But the intrinsic reason for this principle is that formal cooperation includes the consent of the will in another's sin; and this, certainly, is never licit.

Formal cooperation has a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the particular virtue, e.g. justice, which is wounded through the sin of both cooperating persons; and therefore in confession that sin to which someone has formally cooperated must be declared with all its circumstances.

619. Principle 2. Material cooperation in the sin of another is sometimes licit, provided that a sufficient cause and a right intention are present.

St. Alphonsus proves this principle, admitted by almost all, in this way: "The reason is that, when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if another wishes to abuse it in order to execute his sin, you are not bound except from charity to prevent it; and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, placing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin. For then his sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him himself, who abuses your action. Nor is it valid to say that your action, although indifferent, yet joined with the circumstance of the depraved intention of another, becomes evil; for in truth your action is not through itself joined with that evil will of his, but he joins his evil will with your action; whence your action will not then be a cause through itself influencing sin, but only an occasion which he abuses for sinning."¹⁴¹

For discerning, however, when in individual cases this cooperation is licit, the rules are to be applied which above, n. 57, were given concerning the indirectly voluntary, namely if three conditions are present, i.e.: 1. if the action of the cooperator is good in itself or at least indifferent; 2. if the intention of the cooperator is right; and 3. if there is present a just cause, and indeed one proportioned both to the gravity of the sin of another and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.

Application in practice. The principle concerning material cooperation is clear and certain; but its application in individual cases that occur is often most difficult. Now difficulty in practice can occur 1. whether such an action is intrinsically evil or not; 2. even if it is certain that the action is not intrinsically evil, whether there is present an excusing cause sufficiently grave. As to the first,¹⁴² the action is not to be considered only abstractly, but with all circumstances and adjuncts. Hence, e.g., that a public driver (commonly Lohnkutscher, cocher) conveys in his carriage one asking to some determined place is an indifferent action; but if someone were to ask from that driver that he should conduct him to a brothel, this would not be licit and the action of conveying would become intrinsically evil. But in the case in which someone approaches such a driver now not asking that he wish to conduct him to a brothel, but to a determined house in a determined street, then even if that house designated is a brothel and the driver knows this, the action of conveying remains an indifferent action and therefore licit, if there is a sufficient cause. The reason is that a public driver is bound to convey all men asking to the places determined by them, nor does it belong to him to care what those asking are going to do in those places.

But as to the second, namely when there is present a proportionately grave cause, this depends upon the judgment of prudent men. St. Alphonsus¹⁴³ assigns the following rules from Busenbaum: "A cause is required that is the graver, 1. in proportion as the sin, for which an occasion is given, is graver; 2. in proportion as it is more probable that, without your cooperating, the other would not sin, or in proportion as the effect of the sin is more certain; 3. in proportion as your cooperation touches the sin more nearly; 4. in proportion as you have less right to such a work; 5. finally, in proportion as the sin is more opposed to justice, and this on account of the damage of a third party."

From what has been said thus far it follows that not only formal cooperation, but sometimes (and that not rarely) even material cooperation is gravely illicit on account of defect of a sufficient cause. But that it may appear more clearly in what way the principles given are to be applied in practice, we solve the following practical cases:

¹⁴¹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 63.

¹⁴² Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 120.

¹⁴³ L. c. n. 59.

620. Resolves. 1. Cooperation in religious and political matters. Today almost everywhere there exists so-called "liberty of worship." This liberty of worship of itself is something wholly illicit; nevertheless, on account of greater evils to be avoided, Catholics can accept it, and therefore Catholic deputies can from a grave cause give a vote in Parliaments that from the public treasury subsidies be given for non-Catholic worship.¹⁴⁴ But it is not licit to elect as deputy for parliamentary or municipal assemblies one who wishes to defend Liberalism or something else against the Catholic religion; for this would be cooperation against the good of religion. It is not licit positively to adhere to Socialists who plot against religion and legitimate civil authority; but if there is a just cause, it is licit together with Socialists to employ legitimate means for obtaining a just wage, or for repelling unjust oppressions of the rich. Proximate cooperation in an action which is gravely harmful to the common good, whether of religion or of the republic, is licit on account of no private temporal damage. Hence in Rome, where once great damage was being brought upon the Catholic religion from any help whatever furnished to Protestantism, the construction of Protestant temples was gravely prohibited by the Cardinal Vicar through the Instruction of July 12, 1878: "Nor are exempt from mortal sin the architects, contractors of workmen, masters, who undertake care and labor for building and adorning some Protestant temple. But as regards the masons themselves and other subordinate workmen, they can be excused from sin, provided scandal is absent, and that the things they are ordered to do are not done in contempt of religion."

In other regions, however, where many Protestants live with Catholics, and no grave scandal arises, if a Catholic architect builds a Protestant temple, there being a grave reason, it can be permitted that he undertake such a work.¹⁴⁵ The same must be said of those who adorn Protestant temples with paintings or statues, who sell utensils necessary for a non-Catholic rite. Marc-Raus¹⁴⁶ writes to the point: "Catholics are not to be disquieted who, in order to avoid grave damage, build or restore synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, provided scandal is not present and it is not in contempt of religion. On account of the defect of this condition they are bound to abstain from the work, a) where a work of this kind is commonly held as a sign protesting for a false religion; or b) something is contained in it which through itself directly and uniquely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; or c) it is certain that Catholic artisans are driven or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion." - The S. Penitentiary, having been asked whether it is licit for Catholics to contribute money for building a heretical temple, in the year 1822 responded: "Affirmatively, but only for freeing themselves and their temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants."

¹⁴⁴ Thus also Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 818.

¹⁴⁵ Thus also S. Off. July 7, 1864, ad 10 (Collectan. de Prop. Fid. n. 1257).

¹⁴⁶ Instit. mor. I, n. 523 (3).

621. 2. Cooperation of servants is judged to be material and licit: a) To prepare forbidden foods on days of fast. For they can form for themselves the conscience that the master has a dispensation for eating those foods. b) To open the door to visitors, although they come for an evil end, provided the danger of perversion is absent, which indeed will rarely be absent in that case. c) To accompany the master to a Protestant temple or to a synagogue, if this is required by them by reason of service and not in hatred of the faith. It is required, however, that such accompaniment not appear as a protestation of false religion, nor that the servants actively participate in the false worship.¹⁴⁷ d) To carry letters or other things to some person with whom the master has illicit intercourse.¹⁴⁸ The reason is that the servant by force of office is bound to perform works of this kind, nor does it belong to him to investigate what is contained in those letters or for what end such things are sent by the master.

Nor is St. Alphonsus opposed to this solution except apparently; for he seems to suppose that the servant has full confidence, as they say, of his master, and proximately and positively helps him by his works toward an evil end; and this indeed is certainly not licit. But in our times and in our regions servants are not accustomed to have the confidence of their masters in this way, but works are enjoined upon them simply, and it does not pertain to them to care what in particular the master intended by some enjoined work. Certainly it would be illicit cooperation if a male or female servant were to hide or help the evil actions of the sons of the family, lest they be detected by the parents. The proposition condemned by Innocent XI also seems to have to be understood of such proximate and positive cooperation in the evil action itself: "A servant who, with shoulders bent down, knowingly helps his master to ascend through a window to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in the same thing by carrying the ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally if he does this through fear of notable detriment, for instance lest he be badly treated by the master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house."¹⁴⁹ For although such cooperation is not intrinsically evil, as St. Alphonsus rightly teaches,¹⁵⁰ nevertheless the excusing causes brought forward do not suffice to render it licit.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. what was said above n. 525 sq. concerning active communication in false worship.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 129; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 828.

¹⁴⁹ Dens, n. 1201; cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 830.

¹⁵⁰ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.

622. 3. Cooperation of innkeepers. a) Toward drunkenness. It is material cooperation indeed, but often illicit, if an innkeeper serves intoxicating drink to someone who is already drunk, or who in a short time will be drunk if he takes more drink. The reason is that intoxicating drink is a proximate cause of some sin against the natural law, and therefore loss of profit alone on account of such a quantity of wine not sold is an insufficient excusing cause. But if from drink denied great inconveniences would arise, e.g. great quarrels and disturbances in the inn, then in order to avoid a greater evil the innkeeper could licitly serve drink even with drunkenness foreseen.

b) Toward the violation of abstinence. As to forbidden foods, a milder practice can be permitted today, because the positive law of forbidden foods does not oblige with great inconvenience, and because in present times there exist, at least in some regions, many dispensations for those who eat in public taverns. Generally speaking, an innkeeper can serve meats to anyone asking, even on forbidden days, unless it is openly certain that scandal arises from this or that this is done in hatred of religion; but he ought suitably to warn or instruct guests that fasting foods are also available to them.

c) As to wicked gatherings which perhaps are held in his house, those principles seem to have to be employed which are established concerning the leasing of a house for prostitutes. If by such a leasing the sins and seductions of those women become more numerous and therefore more harmful, it is not licit to lease houses to them; but if that would not happen, and if great damage would arise for the lessor from not leasing, he could lease his house to prostitutes. St. Alphonsus¹⁵¹ writes to the point: "In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is permitted, it is licit to lease a house to a usurer and to prostitutes; especially if other tenants are lacking, unless however the prostitutes would gravely harm honest neighbors, or on account of the location would give greater occasion to sins." The Holy Doctor cites for this opinion several theologians, among whom are Sanchez, Suarez, Azor, and the Salmanticenses. Nevertheless in our times he would be condemned and would have ill repute among all upright persons who, while he could lease a house to persons of good name, leased it to prostitutes; whence in practice today all the conditions which render licit a leasing of this kind are present very rarely. - The same holds concerning openly evil gatherings, to which an innkeeper can almost never open his house; e.g. it would not be licit to grant some room to Freemasons. But if such gatherings are not evidently evil, or if only two suspect persons wish to rent a room (as, alas, frequently happens), then an excusing cause can more easily be present.

d) Toward depraved readings. Innkeepers cannot licitly set out to be read papers which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to religion or morals. Other papers, although not so good, they can indeed set out from a grave cause; let them take care, however, that good papers also are always available.

¹⁵¹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 70.

623. 4. Cooperation of merchants. a) It is never licit to sell things which by their very nature have no use except an evil use. Hence, e.g., it is not licit to sell those instruments which serve for the abuse of marriage; likewise it is not licit to sell obscene images. b) It is licit from a reasonable cause to sell other things, in themselves indifferent, which perhaps from the malice of the buyer are employed for an evil end; for this is only material cooperation. And this excusing cause ought to be the graver in proportion as the abuse of the thing sold is foreseen to be graver. Hence it is licit from a proportionate cause to sell poison, weapons, organs and a pulpit also for the temples of Protestants, etc. c) It is not licit in newspapers which are wholly bad, i.e. openly fighting against religion or good morals, to advertise one's things to be rented or sold; for this would be cooperation toward sustaining those worst papers. But if the newspapers are not so manifestly bad, it would be licit, there being a just and grave cause, to advertise things pertaining to commerce; whence Leo XIII established in the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum: "Let no one from Catholics, especially from ecclesiastical men, publish anything in newspapers, or papers, or periodical booklets of this kind, unless a just and reasonable cause urges it." Likewise it is not licit, except from a reasonable cause, to sell or buy those newspapers, especially habitually by the so-called subscription. But one must always guard against both one's own perversion and the scandal of others. Those newspapers and periodicals are accustomed to pay a great salary to those who write well for them. Nevertheless, for the sake of profit alone, a Catholic seems unable to write in them. For the Code of Canon Law establishes, c. 1386, § 2: "In newspapers, papers, or periodical booklets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, let Catholic laymen also write nothing unless a just and reasonable cause urges it, approved by the Ordinary of the place."

Scholion. There are still almost innumerable cases of cooperation. But all can be rightly solved if attention is given to the principles concerning the indirectly voluntary and if the circumstances of different places, times, and persons are kept before one's eyes. It is also to be noted that in present times not all the resolutions of the old theologians have force any longer, since times and circumstances have been much changed.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 809-838.

We shall treat: 1. of cooperation in general; 2. of the various modes of cooperating, or of the cases which are accustomed to occur more frequently.

517. DEFINITION. To cooperate, in general and by force of the word, is the same as to work with another.

But someone can work with another both by inducing him to act, and by furnishing help to him, already determined to act, by which he may be able to accomplish his work.

Concerning the first mode of cooperating, which is done by induction and which is compared to SCANDAL, we treated in the preceding disputation. Therefore it remains that we discuss also the second mode, which is done by furnished help.

Therefore, properly COOPERATION is named and can be defined: concurrence with the depraved action of another principally acting.

DIVISION. Cooperation is distinguished as manifold, according to the various modes by which the cooperator concurs with the depraved action of another:

I. By reason of the evil act, it is formal or material: 1. FORMAL cooperation is that which concurs even with the evil will of the one principally acting, or is the concurrence which someone furnishes with that intention (whether explicit or implicit) that it may be a help to the one principally acting in executing the evil work.

This can be done in two ways, namely: a) through work which, taken concretely, by its very nature, that is, from the end of the work, is ordered to the depraved action, for example, in a scenic work by which religion is derided, to act the parts of an actor; b) or through indifferent work, which indeed not from itself, but from the special intention of the cooperator, that is, from the end of the one acting, is directed to a depraved action of this kind: for example, if someone furnishes money to another, collected for spreading errors; or if someone accompanies another to a place of filthiness, so as thereby to render him more bold for sin.

2. MATERIAL cooperation is that which furnishes the material of sin; which therefore, apart from the intention and with the mere permission of the cooperator, concurs with the evil action of another. It is furnished through work which neither of itself nor from the determination of the cooperator is ordered to this evil action, and which the one principally acting can use without sin; although, on account of his malice, he abuses it for sinning. Cooperation of this kind would be, for example, the furnishing of wine to one who wishes to make himself drunk; the handing over of keys to one who enters in order to steal (II, 63; H. Ap., IV, 31; cf. III, 571; Conf. dir., IV, 16).

II. Material cooperation can be subdivided:

1. By reason of the help furnished, it is immediate or mediate. - It is called immediate when the cooperator acts with the one principally acting in the evil act itself, for example by helping a thief carrying off another's thing; but mediate when the cooperator furnishes something which serves the one principally acting for executing the depraved work, for example by handing over a ladder to a thief about to invade a house.

2. By reason of connection with the depraved act, it is proximate or remote: namely, according as, from its nature or from the circumstances, it is judged to have or not to have a moral connection with the sin of the one principally acting. Thus, for example, proximate cooperation is to give a sword to one about to kill; but remote cooperation is to furnish the material from which the sword is to be made (cf. n. 313, 2).

Note. 1. Concerning cooperation which becomes formal from the intention of the cooperator, there can scarcely ever be difficulty; because one cooperating in such a way directly intends the sinful action and evidently becomes a participant in the malice of the one principally acting. But whether and when this depraved intention must be MANIFESTED to the one principally acting, in order that the cooperator may also be held to reparation of harm, is a question which will be weighed in the treatise on the seventh Precept (cf. n. 976 seqq.).

2. But concerning cooperation which is formal from its nature, and objectively can never be reputed material, dispute frequently occurs; because, in order to define whether some work is ordered of itself and from the intrinsic end of the work to the depraved action of another or not, there is often need of most attentive consideration and much sagacity.

To elucidate this matter, it helps to add the following:

a) An action ordered of itself to a depraved end is to be considered in such a way that it neither has nor can have a good end. This can be verified either concerning an action taken speculatively, or concerning an action apprehended concretely, that is, clothed with such circumstances. Thus to paint, in a temple of heretics, an image of the founder of the sect with an aureole; to discharge a gun with another against someone, are actions of themselves ordered only to an evil end.

b) An action which, for the one principally acting, is a condition without which he could not act does not by that very fact become an action ordered solely to an evil end; for example, to place one's shoulders under, says St. Alphonsus (III, 571), to furnish a ladder to a master wishing to ascend for fulfilling lust, is not cooperation of itself ordered to sin.

c) From the fact that the one principally acting becomes more bold for the attainment of the intended end, it cannot always by that very fact be said that the cooperation of another is formal; for example, in the example of one placing his shoulders under, these things are verified; and nevertheless he who places his shoulders under furnishes merely material cooperation. But if the cooperator who renders the one principally acting more bold, by his action, as it were acts his person and receives in himself a part of the evil work, he becomes guilty of formal cooperation: for example, one who for his master writes truly amorous letters containing filthy things; one who to a thief prepared for sinning indicates, at his request, the time and mode so that he can commit his crime more securely; one who, while someone indulges lust in a bedroom, acts as watchman, formally cooperate in the sin.

d) Formal cooperation is not synonymous with illicit cooperation: for every formal cooperation is illicit, but not vice versa; for example, he who, on account of a reason not proportioned to the evil, furnishes material cooperation certainly sins, but does not become guilty of formal cooperation. The number of actions which of themselves, from the end of the work, are formal cooperations is not so great.

518. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal cooperation is never licit. For formal cooperation, since it includes some consent of the will in another's sin as sin, is intrinsically evil, and cannot be without fault. Therefore it can be excused by no reason, not even fear of death (H. Ap., IV, 31).

Indeed, no otherwise than scandal, it has at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue which is wounded (cf. n. 507).

Hence it is never licit to furnish work which, from its nature, can be ordered only to sin as such: as would be, for example, to make instruments suited only to impeding generation, to prepare remedies destined only to procuring abortion, to seek a concubine for a master, to write amorous and filthy letters to a concubine for a concubinary, to invite a woman to commit crime with the master, etc. (II, 67). Likewise, according to St. Alphonsus (II, 64, 65, 68; l. El. qq. ref., 11), it is never licit for a servant to carry amorous letters to the concubine of his master, or to carry little gifts and dainties to a prostitute; because this service also, from its nature, as regards this act taken concretely, fosters base love, and by its nature is born to produce no other effect of itself.² And the same must be said of a girl if she willingly accepts gifts of a lover basely desiring her. For thus she fosters his base love, in which she at least implicitly consents (II, 76).

But if, on account of peculiar circumstances, the action of the cooperator does not involve consent of this kind, it can be without sin; for example, if a girl accepting gifts offered before others cannot refuse without stirring up suspicions and incurring danger of infamy. Then her acceptance becomes morally another action, insofar as she simply consults her reputation. Thus also postal officials who carry letters which, from certain indications, they know to be amorous, simply fulfill a public function, in the name of the State.

519. II. Material cooperation is sometimes licit. It is licit, namely, if three conditions are present, from the indirect voluntary, that is: 1. if the action of the cooperator is good of itself, or at least indifferent; 2. if his intention is right; 3. if there is present a just cause, and proportioned both to the gravity of the sin of another, and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.³

"The reason is that when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if the other should wish to abuse it for executing his sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it; and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, positing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin: for then that man's sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him who abuses your action. Nor does it avail to say that your action, although indifferent, nevertheless, joined with the circumstance of the depraved intention of another, becomes evil; for in reality, your action is not conjoined of itself with his evil will, but he conjoins his evil will with your action; whence your action will not then be a cause influencing the sin of itself, but only an occasion which he abuses for sinning" (II, 63).

Moreover, for judging when the CAUSE is just and proportionate, above all let it be observed as a rule what the Doctors say; because, since this depends upon the estimation of prudent men, the more common opinion in this matter will also be the more probable. - Therefore generally it can be said that "a cause is required so much the graver: 1. the graver the sin is whose occasion is given; 2. the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin, or the more certain the effect of the sin is; 3. the more closely your cooperation touches the sin; 4. the less right you have to such a work; 5. finally, the more the sin conflicts with justice, and this on account of harm to a third party" (II, 59; H. Ap., IV, 32). Cf. above n. 314.

520. Hence the following SPECIAL RULES are drawn out:

1. It is always licit to cooperate materially with the sin of another in order to avoid a greater evil; for the axiom holds: "Of two evils the lesser is to be chosen." Thus, for example, you licitly furnish wine to one about to make himself drunk, lest he break out into blasphemies (II, 69; V, 77).

2. It is licit to cooperate materially in the lesser harm of neighbor, so that HE may be freed from a greater one, if another means is lacking; for since the owner can dispose of his own thing, he is judged reasonably to will this. Thus it is licit to help an enemy to lay waste a house, to steal, etc., lest the owner be killed (II, 74).

3. It is licit to cooperate materially, even IMMEDIATELY, with harm to a third party, for example by breaking doors, so that one's OWN harm of a superior order may be avoided. Thus it is lawful to burn a house in order to avoid death. For one constituted in such necessity can suppose the consent of the owner, who would be unwilling irrationally. But MEDIATELY it is licit to cooperate if it is a question of avoiding equal harm to oneself. Thus it is licit to give back a sword to one about to kill, so that one's own life may thereby be consulted. The reason is that, from the order of charity, we are not bound to impede the harm of another (even if this one is in extreme necessity) with equal detriment to ourselves (II, 76; III, 571; Istr., X, 56).

4. The cause which suffices for excusing a private cooperator does not suffice for excusing a Superior, magistrate, or anyone else who, not only from charity, but by force of his function, is held to ward off evil or to impede others' sins; for where there is a twofold obligation, there the excusing cause must necessarily be morally twofold. Thus, for example, parents must impede the sins of children, parish priests the sins of parishioners, magistrates the delicts of citizens, etc. Thus also merchants sometimes, from a special law, are bound not to sell certain dangerous weapons, poisonous drinks, etc. (H. Ap., IV, 32).

5. The cause which would excuse you if the one principally acting would attain his end equally easily does not suffice for excusing you if, your concurrence being denied, the other would not have sinned.

Since an enumeration of all the cases in which cooperation intervenes is plainly impossible, it will be enough to have enumerated those which are accustomed to occur more frequently, and from which the rest can be judged.⁴ But the prudent

confessor should ADVERT: 1. that good faith often excuses in this matter; 2. that for various places and times, much attention must be given to common estimation; 3. that in doubt, favor is not to be given to liberty where the reason of scandal, danger of perversion, of formal sin, etc., stands in the way; and if it is a question of a public matter, recourse to Superiors and to the more prudent is not to be omitted (cf. Konings, 312; Aertnys, l. II, n. 79).

521. 1. To the violation of the law of abstinence. a) If the sin of the master violating the law is established, it is not licit for a servant to prepare or serve forbidden food from the sole reason of service, because it is a question of proximate cooperation; it is licit only on account of notable detriment. b) In doubt, the master is presumed to be excused by a just cause. - But in practice, rarely will either doubt or notable detriment be lacking (II, 68).

2. To usury. a) He who helps a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or carrying a pledge, can be excused by the reason of service alone. b) Otherwise, if he exacts usuries: because exaction is a more proximate cooperation with the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably. c) But if he exacted by force or threats, he would not only sin, but besides would be held to restitution, the master failing.

3. To lust. Three kinds of services must here be distinguished: a) services which from their nature are determined to filthiness; b) services indifferent of themselves which concur proximately with the filthiness of the master; c) services which concur with the same only remotely. Now:

Services of the FIRST kind are excused by no reason, since they constitute true formal cooperation (cf. n. 518).

Services of the SECOND kind, because they are proximate cooperations, cannot be excused from the sole reason of service, but only from another cause, whether grave or most grave, according to the diversity of the case. Thus, for example, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus (II, 64), the sole reason of service does not suffice, but besides there is required at least fear of grave harm, in order that a servant may licitly accompany his master to a place of filthiness; or saddle the horse for him departing there (even if the master is not rendered more bold by these things); or bring the concubine in a carriage to the house of the concubinary master, if it had already been agreed between him and the concubine; to offer a shoulder to one ascending to a woman not unwilling, etc., even if in these matters the servant furnishes merely material work. But a most grave cause, indeed fear of death, would be required in order that he could licitly help the master by carrying a ladder, or placing his shoulders under, or opening a door by force, when the master wishes to ascend to deflower a virgin.

Services of the THIRD kind, since the cooperation is remote, can be excused from the sole reason of service. Hence, for example, it will be licit for a servant, in the usual manner, to open the door to a concubine or prostitute, if, if he himself does not open, there is another who will open. But if the servant were many times compelled to such services, he would have to be earnestly admonished to leave the service (II, 66).

It is asked. What concerning public carriage-drivers conveying others to a brothel?

Resp. 1. It is proximate cooperation; therefore they are not excused by reason of wages, but only on account of grave harm to be avoided; for example, if a public carriage-driver feared lest he be dismissed, not easily about to find another master (II, 75; l. El. qq. ref., n. 15). Likewise, if carriage-drivers are held by civil law to convey travelers wherever they wish.

2. They can never offer their work for leading someone more safely or more secretly, or indicate to one ignorant where the brothel is. For it is formal cooperation (II, 64, 75; Kon., n. 311).

522. 1. To violation of the law of abstinence. a) Of themselves it is not licit for innkeepers, on a forbidden day, to serve meats of their own accord: because it would be a true and at least remote cooperation with another's sin, without a just cause (II, 80; l. El. qq. ref., n. 17). But it seems licit (at least where the usage prevails) universally to serve meats to guests asking for it, provided their request is not made in contempt of religion (III, 1030, q. 3).

b) Those innkeepers who establish a common table (table d'hote), at which guests sit jointly, or who await travelers arriving by public carriages or railway at a determined hour, taught by experience that many will ask for meat or broth from meat, can licitly have these things ready, so that they may then set them before those asking; or even spread the table with licit and illicit foods, offer them, mark them on a card, so that each may choose what has pleased him.

The reason is both that among so many, many are presumed to be legitimately excused or to be in good faith, whom to question individually would be grave or dangerous; and that such cooperation does not seem to be except remote, and if sometimes it were proximate, it must be said that in the present state of affairs it is impossible, at least in many places, to exercise the office of innkeeper otherwise (Kon., 310).

c) Those who have received some Catholics into board for an agreed price (pension) ought not so easily to furnish meats on forbidden days; because it is proximate cooperation, and in a private house the laws of the Church are more easily observed, nor does there generally occur so grave a reason for cooperating (ibid.). Yet those are more easily excused who, on fast days, in morning and evening, furnish foods not prohibited by reason of quality. For more are excused from fasting than from abstinence, on account of grave labor or not firm health. Therefore the cooperation is rather remote, and the matter is safely remitted to the conscience of individual boarders.

2. To drunkenness. It is not licit for innkeepers to give wine to those concerning whom they foresee that they will become drunk, unless on account of fear of grave evil, for example to forestall blasphemies or brawls, or also if from refusal they fear lest they be notably injured on account of diminution of guests: for it is proximate cooperation. Other evils also are to be weighed which often follow from drunkenness, as dissipation of goods, the misfortune of the wife, scandal of the children, etc. (II, 69).

3. To lust. a) Innkeepers are guilty of most grave sin and unworthy of absolution who, formally cooperating, furnish secret rooms for lust; or who conduct wholly filthy and lascivious dances at their place, unless the filthiness or lasciviousness would happen accidentally, for example in wedding dances. b) Universally, innkeepers are to be deterred as much as possible from instituting dances, because dances are generally done less honorably and furnish occasion to innumerable sins. Moreover, for judging whether absolution is to be denied to those wishing to institute them, the circumstances are to be inspected, and the mode in which the dances are accustomed to be done (Kon., n. 310). Cf. n. 829.

4. To harmful reading. a) Innkeepers cannot expose for reading those public papers which evidently and ordinarily are adverse to religion or morals, or positively prohibited by the Bishop, even if guests on that account cease to flow together to them; for in the latter case it is a question of proximate cooperation in a public evil. The same is to be said of those papers which generally and evidently are adverse to the clergy, and are the cause why the faithful detract from the veneration owed to them. A sufficient reason for exposing papers of this kind could be only a particular necessity, for guests, of knowing something from them, for example news pertaining to commerce, which would be sought elsewhere in vain. But in this case the master of the inn, in the best way which can be done, ought to signify that he exposes such papers only on account of the aforesaid reason, and does not approve their arguments. He must also watch lest they be exposed without necessity, and that they be destroyed as soon as possible. b) Commonly a sufficient reason is present for admitting those papers which treat of merely political matters. Nor do innkeepers seem to be bound to reject a newspaper which now and then contains something less right by reason of faith or morals, provided it is not generally opposed to religion or good morals (Kon., n. 310, d). Cf. n. 453.

523. To abuse of the things which they hand over. 1. If the thing of itself is determined to evil, and has no good use, as, for example, an idol for pagans in a region of unbelievers; a theatrical garment manifestly filthy; a woman's adornment obscene of itself; a scenic mask which has no other end than to turn religion and its rites and ministers into mockery; the distinctive insignia of a Masonic sect or of another of the same kind; a drug destined solely to procuring abortion, etc.; it is clear that the making and sale of this thing are generally altogether illicit.¹ - Whence St. Alphonsus (II, 72): "The sale of poison," he says, "which does not serve except for the killing of a man, is simply evil." But poisons which can be useful may not be sold except to those who are thought to be going to use them well, for example for making colors, or for medicine.

2. If the thing is indifferent of itself, but from the circumstances it is established that the buyer is led by an evil intention, it will not be licit to make, rent, or sell it, except from a grave or proportionate cause, even if it would equally be bought from others. Thus it is not licit to sell ornaments to a girl about to abuse them, unless otherwise the seller would suffer notable inconvenience (II, 71; l. El. qq. ref., 14; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 8). It is said: even if it would equally be bought from others; because we are bound, at least short of grave inconvenience, to admonish one sinning, and especially one giving scandal, when opportunity is given. Now, "the denial of my cooperation," says Sanchez (Decal., l. 1, c. 7, n. 16), "is a certain kind of admonition, by which neighbor could have been recalled, if not from the present sin, at least from a future one, from the memory of this denial."

3. Catholics are not to be disquieted who, in order to avoid grave harm, build or restore synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, provided scandal is not present and it is not in contempt of religion. On account of defect of this condition, they are bound to abstain from the work: a) where a work of this kind is commonly held as a protestative sign of false religion; b) or something is contained in it which of itself directly and solely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; c) or it is established that Catholic artisans are driven or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion (from the declaration of the Holy Office, Aug. 17, 1613; Jan. 14, 1818; July 7, 1864).² The Holy Office declared the same on July 27, 1892,³ concerning cooperation with cremation of corpses (cf. n. 1388bis). With the same cause existing, it is licit for Catholics, for the use of heretics, to make and sell organs, a pulpit, a supper-table, altars, a chalice, priestly vestments, etc. A fortiori, it is licit to build and adorn theaters, etc., provided the ornaments are not impious or dishonorable in themselves. A sufficient cause for excusing workmen is more easily given than one which would be sufficient to excuse architects, contractors, and masters of workers, since they are not placed in the same necessity as the workers.⁴

4. A graver cause is required in order that it be licit to sell land to heretics for building a temple, to rent or sell to those enrolled in a Masonic sect a house destined for their meetings, etc.⁵

5. But a most grave cause is required, suppose danger of death, of most harsh exile, or an equivalent danger, in order that it be licit to furnish work for building or restoring temples of false gods, etc. Others say that this is in no way licit, from decrees of the Holy Inquisition of the years 1629 and 1699. But the mentioned decrees seem to have been issued on account of peculiar circumstances, from which the concurrence of Catholics would have been formal cooperation and, from the concrete nature of the thing, a protestative sign of false religion (Coll. Miss. Ext., n. 1070 and 1089; Gallo, l. c., p. 251).

6. If the depraved end of the one asking is not established, it is licit for workers, merchants, renters, etc., by the sole title of commerce, to hand over indifferent things to anyone asking; because in doubt no one is presumed evil. Thus, for example, strong liquors, dice, playing-cards, pigments, etc., are licitly sold, although many generally abuse them (II, 71).

524. 1. To the printing of depraved books or papers. Cooperation is either proximate, namely in those who are masters of the printing office, publishers of books; in those who arrange the types, place the paper upon the types, turn the press, direct the printing; or remote, for example in those who prepare ink or paper, correct or arrange books already printed, apply fire to the machine in more recent printing shops, or exercise other ministries pertaining only remotely to the printing.

These things having been premised: a) In a printing shop erected solely or principally for an evil end, it is licit for no cause, not even mediately, to cooperate. Thus, for example, Catholics can in no way be occupied around Protestant printing shops which by profession oppose the Catholic religion. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 825. b) In a common printing shop, if rarely and as it were per accidens a depraved book comes forth, or in a newspaper certain things are sometimes published against faith or good morals, mediate cooperators can be excused from a grave cause. Indeed Kenrick notes: "Those who are occupied in turning the press, and do not set the types, are not judged to know the things which are printed, and therefore in a common printing shop, where books of every kind are published, they are not bound to make a distinction. But those who have the right of direction ought to put far away the things which are opposed to faith and good morals" (tr. XIII, n. 157).

2. To the propagation or publication of the same. a) To expose, sell, give, lend, procure for a master asking, etc., books altogether obscene or filthy is proximate cooperation, from which only very grave necessity excuses (Lehmkuhl, ib. 4). Those buying depraved newspapers for a year or for months of themselves sin gravely, because by their money they efficaciously concur in publishing them. b) It is not licit indiscriminately to sell to all, or to procure, heretical books, for example Protestant bibles; or other harmful books, for example those which defend errors fixed in the Syllabus; or books of non-Catholics which professedly treat of religion. Yet those do not seem to be condemned who procure books of this kind, or others prohibited by the law of the Index, for someone who specially seeks them, and who is not certainly known to lack the due license for reading them: concerning which the bookseller at least is not bound to inquire. See CONST. Officiorum, n. 3 and 46. c) Those who, in depraved newspapers or in sheets to be posted publicly, carry advertisements of those things which by their nature tend to the detriment of faith or morals, as, for example, a heretical sermon to be held, books professedly harmful, dishonorable dances, filthy spectacles, etc., if they do this knowingly, do not seem able to be excused from formal cooperation. For they indicate the opportunity of sin. But it is licit to announce harmful books in scientific papers, so that they may be known by those whose interest it is (Kon., 315, 317). d) But those who in depraved newspapers only announce things to be sold or rented; or who only write scientific articles, are to be blamed for merely remote material cooperation. The case is excepted in which the cooperation of the writer would furnish notable favor to these newspapers (Genicot, I, 240). If the Bishop, on account of the common good, entirely prohibits insertion, one must stand by his decision.

525. 1. To cooperate in dishonorable dances, whether by music or by rental of a place, is proximate cooperation. Yet the reason of grave harm will excuse a musician not producing sounds of that sort which pertain solely to the dishonorable manner of dancing; for in this case the dances become dishonorable from the malice alone of those dancing. Thus Suarez, Palaus, Giribaldus. Yet there are some who permit this in no way, because sound influences too much and more intimately inflames toward dishonorable dances (Scavini, II, 957). Cf. n. 829.

2. To concur in the same way with lascivious dances, for example with prostitutes, is formal cooperation where those are instituted as such. But where lasciviousness occurs only by chance, by reason of private malice, there will be merely material cooperation.

3. All are guilty of mortal sin who, without just cause, concur by applause or money in notably filthy spectacles, even if they would be performed without them: for proximate cooperation is present. Likewise, those who from office are held to impede them and can do so without grave and notable harm; or who otherwise can conveniently impede them and do not impede them; a fortiori the actors representing them (III, 427, 428). Cf. n. 834.

4. In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, prostitutes are permitted to dwell, it is licit from a reasonable cause to rent a house to them, because this cooperation is remote material: unless, however, the prostitutes would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or by reason of the location would give greater occasion to sins (II, 70).

5. To paint or make for a lover an image of a person basely loved by him is proximate cooperation, which only very grave necessity excuses. Indeed to paint obscene things is not always formal cooperation, provided those things can have a good end, that is, the study of anatomical art (Lehmkuhl, I, 827).

526. To this matter pertain very many responses of the Most Holy Roman Congregations, given on the occasion of the sacrilegious invasion of the Pontifical State, and also of the separation of State and Church carried out in France.

I. On the occasion of the invasion of the Pontifical State.

1. It can be tolerated that votes be given for councils and municipal representative persons, provided the municipal persons are not driven to those things which are opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws, and abstain from an oath according to the form proposed by the invading government.

2. It is licit to compete for teaching offices, to accept those offered, scandal being removed, no adhesion nor approbation being given as regards the intruded government.

3. It can be tolerated that, under the intruded government, offices are retained and accepted, provided they do not directly and proximately influence the spoliation, the maintenance and exercise of the plunder, and danger of wounding divine and ecclesiastical laws is absent. In practice it is better that in individual cases the Ordinary be consulted.

4. Administrators of ecclesiastical goods can hand over to the government an inventory of the revenues of the Church, if it is demanded under grave penalties, yet a protest in writing having been issued, before or after the handover (S. Poenit., Dec. 10, 1860).

5. To cast votes in political elections is not expedient, that is, according to the interpretation of the Holy See, is prohibited (S. Off., July 30, 1866).

6. The sin of him who shall have taken part in political elections is to be judged in particular cases, according to conscience and prudence, all adjuncts having been weighed, so that censure is incurred or not incurred according to the adjuncts of the fact and the dispositions of the subject, according to the norms handed down by the authors (S. Poenit., 1883).

7. Place can be given to dispensation of the law in particular cases - from reason of the supreme good of society - the necessity having been acknowledged by the Bishops and the dispensation having been sought by them. Encyclical Letter to the Bishops of Italy, June 17, 1905 (A. S. S., 37, p. 741).

II. On the occasion of the separation of State and Church in France and elsewhere.

1. Deputies and Senators who established the law of separation are excommunicated by the fact itself and are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial if they die in sin (S. Poenit., May 30, 1908).

2. It is not licit for clerics, whether secular or regular, in France, in present circumstances, to present themselves as candidates in elections to assemblies of deputies, without the consent of their proper Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place where they wish to present themselves as candidates (S. Congr. a neg. eccl. extr., Apr. 2, 1906). Similarly, it is not licit for priests in Italy to undertake the function of counselor in administrative affairs, whether of municipalities or of civil provinces, and for this end to accept that they be proposed as candidates in elections, unless with the previous consent both of their proper Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place in which the administrative mandate is to be exercised. S. C. Cons., June 8, 1914 (A. A. S., VI, p. 313). Likewise it is not licit for them to give their name to syndicalist associations (A. A. S., VI, 349).

3. Associations of Worship, to be constituted from the French law, can be established by no pact, because by them the most holy rights which pertain to the life of the Church itself are violated. Encyclical Gravissimo, Aug. 10, 1906 (A. S. S., 39, p. 385).

4. The so-called approved mutual societies (mutualites approuvees), to which Mass foundations are attributed, but without the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, are to be disapproved (Letter, May 7, 1908).

5. Renters occupying ecclesiastical goods (otherwise, however, concerning the liquidator, acting in the name of the government but retaining no part of the goods for himself; otherwise also concerning a notary of the tribunal), incur excommunication and are held to restitution. - Buyers of natural fruits publicly sold are held only to almsgiving toward the despoiled Congregation and for the price by which they bought for less than the just price (S. Poenit., Aug. 5 and Sept. 7, 1907).

6. Counselors and the Mayor of a city, who acquired despoiled goods for the common uses of the city, do not incur excommunication. In a case of necessity or usefulness, faculty is to be sought from the Holy See or from the Religious Order (S. Poenit., Jan. 3, Mar. 8, May 9, 1906).

7. Those giving work to the sale of religious goods in France (secondary cooperators) do not incur excommunication; yet in a particular case they can be deprived of ecclesiastical burial. - As regards them, as also regards liquidators, the obligation of restoring is not established (S. Poenit., Sept. 17, 1906).¹

527. St. Alphonsus notes (II, 74, from Busenbaum): "Inhabitants of a city or province which a tyrant has occupied licitly remain among the unjust possessors, and, the command compelling, help them by watches, digging, contribution; and this from the presumed consent of the legitimate prince; from which also they promise such services with an oath, in order to avoid greater evils of themselves and of the legitimate prince." - See other things in PART IV, n. 2287 and 2292. Cf. Rev. des sciences eccl., t. II, p. 256; likewise Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1882, p. 582, where various cooperations are treated.

The discussion must be: 1° on the precept of love of the neighbor in itself; 2° on works of charity to be fulfilled from it; 3° on vices opposed to charity toward the neighbor.

§ I. On The Precept Of Love Of The Neighbor In Itself.

1° Toward all in general; 2° toward enemies in particular.

278. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is established 1° from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, created to His image and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; therefore, just as we must love God, so also we must love the neighbor on account of God. - 2° It is established from Sacred Scripture:¹ "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." - 3° It is also established from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI (see p. XV).

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, as to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts, he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

II. Some order of charity must be preserved in love of the neighbor; for the objects which charity embraces are not equal; therefore neither are they to be loved equally. But this whole order is placed in this, that we assign to each lovable subject its own fitting place, with regard namely both to goods, to necessity, and to persons.

1. Account must be had of goods, for all goods are not of the same excellence. For this is their order, that the first place be held, and therefore before all things procured, by spiritual goods; the second by intrinsic natural goods, as life, health, integrity of members; the third by extrinsic natural goods, as reputation and honor; to which riches are to be added in the last place as being of an inferior order. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to the private good.

2. Account must be had of necessity, which can be diverse, whether it is spiritual or temporal. A threefold necessity is distinguished: - extreme, as when someone without the help of another cannot free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil almost equal; - grave, as when someone, unless he is helped by another, can escape the danger of the soul or of the life of the body, or of another grave evil, only with very great difficulty; - common or mediocre, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are situated, who, if they wished to employ some effort, could rise again from the depraved state. But in the temporal order, beggars are generally in this necessity; for them, according to their condition, life is not held as too burdensome.

3. Account must be had of persons; for the love of diverse persons must be measured according to the diverse reason of excellence and conjunction of the person to be loved.

279. • Special rules of the order of effective charity, or of succor, from the common doctrine of Theologians, are these:

First Rule. Each one is held, absolutely speaking and in equal necessity, to love himself more than the neighbor, as to goods of the same order, according to that: well-ordered charity begins from oneself; for "no one is nearer than each one is to himself"; and this moreover is clear from the natural and invincible inclination of all. And therefore: 1) we are held to love our own soul more than the soul of the neighbor; and for this reason it will never be licit to sin either gravely or lightly in order to consult the salvation of another. Yet it will be licit for a just cause to expose oneself to a probable, not certain, danger of sinning. Thus, for example, it is licit for physicians and priests to read and handle dangerous matters; and in the extreme spiritual necessity of the neighbor, for example if otherwise an infant is certainly about to die without baptism, it will be necessary to expose oneself to it. - 2) We are regularly held to prefer our life to the life of the neighbor. I said: regularly; for a private person a) is held to expose life to certain danger for the republic, or for preserving the life of a person altogether necessary for the public good (n. 278, II, 1); b) can from the motive of virtue expose life for the life of another private person. For the order of charity in this case is not injured, since not precisely the life of the neighbor, but the good of virtue, is then preferred to our life.

Second Rule. 1° If the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, he must be succored even with danger to our life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a more excellent good than our temporal life. Hence you are bound, with danger to your life, to baptize a dying infant. Likewise if you know that someone, existing in mortal sin, is to be killed while asleep or thinking of nothing. Make exception if either a) there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor, whence a mother is not held to undergo danger of life so that the offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether the latter will come through to baptism; or b) another is present who can and wills to succor him; or c) a graver evil is feared from it, as if he who exposes life for a brother is necessary for the common good. The reason for these exceptions is clear of itself.

2° If the necessity of the neighbor is temporal, you are not held to very difficult or almost morally impossible means, for example to spending on him an extraordinary sum of money, although you are rich; because although in a necessity of this sort charity obliges even with great inconvenience, nevertheless not with the greatest, even toward yourself.

Third Rule. If the neighbor is in grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, no one is held of himself to succor him with grave inconvenience; for when another absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to come to his aid with such great difficulty, since then the neighbor cannot truly be said to be in a case of necessity, as being not ineluctable. I said: 1) of himself; for he would be held even with danger to life who was obliged to this either by reason of office, as Pastors of souls are; - or by reason of a delict, as if someone had taught heresy; - or if that grave necessity is public, because a public grave necessity is accustomed always to be joined with the extreme necessity of certain private persons. Hence if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are held to impede him with danger to life, if you can do this efficaciously and no one else impedes him. Likewise if in persecution or hostile incursion some people lacked a priest, and otherwise were exposed to grave dangers of sinning, you are likewise held to assist them with danger to life. I said: 2) with grave inconvenience; for each one is held to assist the neighbor constituted in grave necessity with mediocre inconvenience, as the matter itself says.

Fourth Rule. If the neighbor is situated in common necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, he will indeed have to be helped, because love of neighbor demands this; but speaking of itself there cannot be present except a light obligation, for the neighbor himself can rather easily free himself from such necessity, nor is it so burdensome to him.

Fifth Rule. Finally, if a comparison is instituted among diverse persons, in equal necessity we ought to prefer blood relatives, or those joined in some other way, to strangers; because charity does not change the order of nature, but perfects it. - I said: in equal necessity; for since the obligation of succoring the neighbor does not exist except by reason of the necessity in which he is situated, it is clear that the obligation is greater where the necessity is greater. - But among those joined to us, those more closely joined are always to be preferred according to their various degrees, with regard to the necessity and the goods which are owed to such conjunction and in which it is founded. Hence in grave necessity: 1) the wife is to be preferred, because she is one flesh with the man and the principle of children; 2) children, because they are more closely joined, since they proceed from the substance of the parents; 3) parents, who after those named concur toward the fellowship of life and the increase of the republic; 4) brothers, sisters, relatives, domestics, fellow citizens, and fellow soldiers. I said: in grave necessity; for if the necessity is extreme, more probably not the good of families, but of life, must be attended to. Hence then parents are to be preferred to all because of the eminence of the principle; and indeed the father is to be preferred to the mother, as being the more noble principle; then come children, spouse, etc., as above.⁴

Note. - By accident it can happen that one is to be preferred who naturally would have to be placed after another. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father who is harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to domestic affairs can be preferred to a useless and clamorous wife. This is clear from n. 280, q. 3°, Resp. 1°.

280. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Are penitents to be interrogated about due care of the soul or body neglected?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking. For either there is question of damage of the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must no more be expressed than in a sin, for example of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or there is question of the omission of means by which faults are guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins. Lugo.² - But if there is question of damage inflicted on life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself would seem to have to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body, nevertheless since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost never infer grave guilt, unless nevertheless the illnesses have been certainly foreseen from causes, even remote ones.

Quaer. 2° Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself because of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet those do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is estimated harsher than death itself. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever. Yet little women desiring death for themselves because of the smallest troubles are, for the most part, not improbably excused from mortal sin because of defect of advertence and deliberation.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it against Charity to desire temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the due order of Charity is preserved, that is, if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1° because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2° because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3° because of a good even of several persons, of much greater moment, for example of a family, or even of an innocent person.² - Besides, such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor the death of her daughter because she cannot marry because of deformity or poverty. This is established from the condemnation of propositions 13, 14, and 15 by Innocent XI.³ - See p. XV; cf. Vind.⁴

281. Preliminary notes. - 1) By this precept hatred is forbidden. Hatred generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward another: and this can happen in a twofold way; namely, so that he wills evil to him, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him (hatred of malevolence or of enmity); or so that he turns away from him as from an evil to himself or to a loved person (hatred of abomination). But the object of abomination is someone either by reason of himself or as simply evil (for example, as a man), and this is called hatred of abomination of nature; - or only under some respect (for example, as a sinner), while under another respect he remains lovable, and this is called hatred of abomination of quality. Bouq. de Virt. th. n. 507-509.

2. Signs of love are either common or special. Those are called common which are customarily given to others of the same state; yet they are diverse according as certain persons are bound together among themselves by a diverse reason of conjunction. Hence some are common signs, for example among brothers or among pupils of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; others finally, which man owes to any man from charity.

Special signs are those which are shown particularly to certain persons by reason of some conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all others otherwise of the same condition. Thus not only among men bound by no other bond besides, but also among fellow members of any community or society or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar with one than with another.

282. Principles. - I. Hatred of abomination is not absolutely evil, but can be good. The reason is that it arises from love of oneself or of another, and therefore it is evil only when that love is not ordered. Hence hatred of abomination of nature is gravely evil, and of itself also hatred of abomination of quality, if this quality is good, as if you have someone in hatred because he is pious, just, etc.; but in no way is it evil, but rather praiseworthy, if the quality is evil. This is clear also from Scripture, Ps. 118. 113 and 138. 21; Wis. 14. 9. Yet one must beware lest abomination of the quality degenerate into hatred of the person.

II. Hatred of enmity is absolutely and from its genus mortally evil; for it cannot fail to be a sin to will evil to the neighbor, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him; nor can it be a light sin if the evil thus willed is grave. This is clear also from 1 John II. 11; III. 14, 15; IV. 20. Bouq. ib., n. 515, 516.

Resolutions. - I. Common signs are owed, of themselves, to enemies, because their denial would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity, which is owed also to enemies. Hence:

1. It is not licit to exclude enemies from prayers, for example from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them if this one means alone were available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred.

2. It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, from return greeting, from response, from the sale of exposed goods, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly.

3. Those sin who do not assist an enemy in necessity, or who do not prevent his grave damage, when they can do so easily.

II. Special signs of love are not owed of themselves to enemies, for example to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to visit the sick, to console the sorrowful. For these proceed not from debt, but from liberality. Yet I said: of themselves; for by accident sometimes they are owed, namely 1) if their omission would be scandalous, as if the enemies were Superiors, or had already previously shown such signs to oneself; 2) if grave necessity of the enemy, whether temporal or spiritual, precisely demands them and they can be shown without grave inconvenience; 3) if signs which are customarily enumerated as special, by reason of state or condition or office, are in reality common; as if someone as a physician ought to visit the sick and serve them, or as an innkeeper ought to receive travelers with table and lodging, etc.

III. Not only is an offense to be forgiven to an enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust vengeance is cast away, and common signs of love are not denied; but to one seeking pardon, and furnishing fitting satisfaction for the injury, if any intervened, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking are not altogether to be refused.

Hence those sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices this and is gravely affected by it, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand a greater one than is fitting, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and vengeance.

283. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and even to seek it?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if every affection of vengeance is absent; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily exposed to delusion, and ordinarily illicit.¹

Quaer. 2° What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1° He who has offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. I said: of himself; for otherwise one must speak if someone is excused by a legitimate reason, as if the offense was light, or the offended person absent, or he does not care about the deprecation of fault or is not going to accept it, or satisfaction is considered to have been made to him in some other way.

2° If the offense is mutual and equal, he who first offended should first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him precede who offended more gravely. Besides, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered. Thus, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and speak who passes in the presence of another standing or sitting, or who arrives after others. Add that a more opportune time must sometimes be awaited, and ordinarily reconciliation scarcely turns out well except by means of a friend and prudent man, as Gousset aptly observes.

Quaer. 3° Is there given an obligation of greeting an enemy met on the way?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor. Yet one must speak otherwise if adjuncts of state, condition, or other similar things require that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if there is question of a subject toward his superior.²

Quaer. 4° Ought the offender to ask pardon from the injured person?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, unless another means or mode of reconciliation more suitable is available, for example by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems likely to avail nothing for placating the offended person. They make exception also if the offender is far superior to the offended person, or if the offended person is prudently judged to forgive it. But other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix,³ Tambur., etc.

Quaer. 5° Do parents sin who refuse to a son or daughter, although asking pardon, both conversation and sight, because of a marriage contracted by them against their reasonable will?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they refuse for a long time, and intend to refuse in perpetuity, or for a short time only. - If the former, they sin gravely, as is clear of itself. - If the latter, they do not sin in the case in which they act thus for the amendment of the son or daughter, or as a punishment of the fault, or as an example for the other children. Thus Laymann, Diana, and others apud Varceno.¹

§ II. On Works Of Mercy.

Works of mercy are some corporal, as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; - others spiritual, as to correct those sinning, to teach the ignorant, to console the sorrowful, etc. We shall speak specifically only of two: 1° of almsgiving; 2° of fraternal correction, insofar as they are referred to the precept of Charity.

284. • Principles. I. There is truly given a precept of giving alms to the needy. This is established 1° from the natural law, that is, from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity (n. 278). - It is established 2° from Sacred Scripture: "Defraud not the poor man of alms";² and "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ... for I was hungry and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me not to drink."³

II. Generally, from St. Thomas,⁴ something must be considered on the part of the giver, namely that what is to be spent in alms is superfluous to him; and something on the part of the recipient, namely that he suffers necessity.

III. The superfluous on the part of the giver is distinguished as twofold, namely superfluous to life and to state. Superfluous to life is called that which is not necessary for preserving your life, and the life of others whose care has been entrusted to you. Superfluous to state is that which is not necessary either so that someone, with those whose care has been entrusted to him, may live decently according to the condition of the state in which he here and now is situated, or so that he may render this condition moderately better.

IV. Necessity on the part of the recipient can be threefold, namely extreme, grave, common.

285. Rules. - I. In extreme necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to life; but from those alone. - From things superfluous to life: since the right order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor prevail over a good of ours far inferior. - From those alone: since it does not demand that we prefer another's life to our life and that of our own, as would happen if we were to succor him from things necessary to life.

II. In grave and common necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to state.

I say: 1° He must be succored; for the precept of almsgiving regards not only extreme necessity - which is very rare - and grave necessity - which is rarer - but also, and indeed especially, common necessity, which is frequent. Thus all.

I say: 2° from goods superfluous to state; for besides things superfluous to life there are no others from which the neighbor may be succored.

III. The quantity of alms: - a) sufficient is that by which the neighbor is sufficiently succored according to the degree of present necessity; - b) strictly prescribed in necessity, 1) whether grave or extreme, cannot be called a great sum of money (n. 279, second Rule under 2°); 2) in common necessity, according to St. Alph., a fiftieth part, or 2%, of surplus revenues. For if individual rich persons spent that quantity on the poor, it would already be sufficient for meeting common necessities.

Therefore rich persons sin who, where the poor are not supported by public stipends, always repel them harshly from themselves, and reserve all surplus things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which was recounted above, cannot impede an honest ascent to a higher state. - Likewise physicians, advocates, etc., sin who refuse to expend their service freely on the poor, for whom provision is not made by public authority.

286. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of almsgiving oblige under grave sin?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, according to St. Alph.,¹ also in grave necessity, and if there is question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor man, also in common necessity. The reason is that since in Scripture men are frequently condemned because works of mercy were neglected, the grave obligation of these works is not to be restricted to extreme necessity, or a very rare one, nor to grave necessity, or a rare one. - Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man harshly repelling from himself all who are situated in common necessity, since rich persons almost always bring forward excusing reasons, which in practice the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty.¹

Quaer. 2° To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. To the truly poor - yet to those asking - and without excluding strangers or non-Catholics. I say: 1) to the truly poor, but not to those unwilling to labor; for these cannot be said to be pressed by any true necessity. - I say: 2) yet to those asking; namely when they can easily ask. - I say: 3) without excluding strangers or non-Catholics, while preserving, nevertheless, the right order of Charity, and unless in some place there has obtained, for a just cause, a custom or statute of excluding poor strangers from cities, namely so that they may be fed by their own citizens.

Quaer. 3° From which goods ought or can alms be given?

Resp. 1° From one's own goods, of which someone has free administration. I say: 1) from one's own goods. Therefore not from goods liable to restitution; - not with damage to creditors; - not by children from the proper goods of parents; - not by servants from the goods of masters. - Yet tutors and curators can give from goods committed to them those moderate alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person. - I say: 2) of which someone has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of the husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which namely she has both dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods according to the custom of wives of her condition.

Resp. 2° From another's goods, when either 1) the poor person is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own;² or 2) the owner consents or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence children can bestow very small things, and servants bread and similar things.

287. Definition. - Fraternal correction is an admonition by which someone, from charity, endeavors to recall another from sin. It is said: by which someone, from charity; therefore it differs from that which is made from office, which is distinguished as twofold, namely judicial, which is made by public authority and for the common good; the other paternal, which is made by a superior for the private and at the same time public good. That which is made from office obliges only those who discharge that office, namely Bishops, Pastors, Prelates of regulars, Magistrates, Parents, and those who are in their place, and it is to be made only to subjects; - but fraternal correction, like charity from which it proceeds, obliges all and toward all.

288. Principles. - I. There is given a true precept of fraternal correction. This is established 1° from the natural law of Charity, by which we are obliged to remove the evils of the neighbor. - 2° From Sacred Scripture: "Reprove thy neighbor ... lest perhaps he repeat it";¹ and "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother."²

II. For the strict obligation of this precept there is required: 1° that the sin of the neighbor, or the proximate danger of sinning, be certainly established. - 2° That the amendment of the neighbor be more probable than his non-amendment. - 3° That there not be another equally suitable person who is believed to be about to correct him. - 4° That the correction can be made without grave inconvenience of the one correcting. - 5° That it be judged necessary for the amendment of the delinquent, and that there is not at least probable hope that he will amend himself of his own accord. Thus commonly.³

The first is required, lest you act rashly and inflict injury on the neighbor, for example by lending your ears too easily to some rumor. - But in doubt you are not held to inquire about the sin, since this pertains only to those who are held to correction from office.⁴

The second; for the doubtful man only imprudently puts his hand to a moral action.⁵ Hence prudence for the most part counsels that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with a hostile spirit, they become worse. Make exception, nevertheless, if either 1) the one to be corrected, who is not in good faith, is situated in danger of death; or 2) there is question of a danger of perversion in faith or morals to be averted from others.

The third; for then there is not present true and absolute necessity.

The fourth; for charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience unless either the neighbor is situated in extreme spiritual necessity, or, supposing that to the obligation of charity in the one correcting there is also added an obligation of justice, as in a Prelate, Pastor, Magistrate toward subjects, in grave necessity. But parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, although from office (of piety, etc.), nevertheless not from justice, and therefore not with their grave detriment, are held as Prelates, Pastors, Magistrates are. L. II. 40.

The fifth; for since many bear correction with difficulty, it is to be employed only in necessity.

From these things it follows that private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are joined familiarly among themselves; because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present; more rarely still toward Superiors because of unsuitability. - Likewise often you will not be held to correct detractors, at least under grave sin; for in this matter it is most difficult to establish that correction will be profitable; detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; there is danger lest they increase or confirm the detraction; the hearer for the most part does not know whether what is said is notorious, and in doubt there is no reason why he should condemn the detractor (unless he is a lost man); once detraction has begun, often the neighbor is better consulted if this is allowed to be completed; for if it is explained distinctly, often it is not apprehended as so grave as had been conceived at the beginning. L. IV. 979. 981. Cf. what is to be said n. 524. - I suppose that silence is not equivalent to approbation. - Scrupulous persons likewise are ordinarily excused from the office of fraternal correction.

289. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of fraternal correction oblige under grave sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if the required conditions are present, and there is question of grave matter. Hence he can sin gravely who from vain fear lest the neighbor be offended somewhat, or lest he himself suffer light detriment from it, omits correction in a grave matter, where he thinks it will more probably be profitable. - Yet he sins lightly who from faintheartedness and bashfulness considers himself less suitable for correcting. - St. Thom.,¹ - St. Alph.²

But matter in this, as in the other precepts, can be grave either from itself or because of circumstances. Thus, if in some religious Order through venial sins the vigor of discipline seems either to be dissolved or even greatly diminished, the obligation of correction can be grave. Likewise if a son or subject often steals small things, or little by little habituates himself to drinking, to dangerous play, although he does not yet sin gravely.

Quaer. 2° Does the precept of correction have place where someone sins from ignorance?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of vincible ignorance, because this does not excuse from sin.

Resp. 2° But if the ignorance is invincible, there is not so much question of fraternal correction as of warning, by which the neighbor is taught about the truth; since correction is an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults. But that warning must be made if the sins are against divine law, whether natural or positive; but if against human law, it is disputed on both sides probably whether private persons are obliged to it under grave sin. Yet the affirmative opinion is the more probable and more common according to St. Alphonsus;³ for that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, with the certain law posited, is always evil, and therefore to be impeded through correction. But certainly it must be made by those who from office are held to teach subjects, as prelates, parents, confessors, teachers.

They generally add that, although no fruit is hoped for and the ignorance is invincible, nevertheless admonition must still be made if there is question of things necessary by necessity of means, or of those things which furnish public scandal, lest namely others think that to be licit which is not corrected.

Quaer. 3° What order must be observed in fraternal correction?

Resp. The order assigned by Christ Himself must be observed, unless circumstances suggest otherwise. - Hence 1° Correct secretly: "Rebuke him between thee and him alone." - 2° Before witnesses, if the first admonition does not suffice: "If he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two." - 3° Refer the matter to the Superior: "Tell the Church."

Sometimes that order can and must be inverted, namely: - 1° if the sin is public or soon to be made public; - 2° if it is gravely harmful to another; - 3° if secret admonition is not judged to be profitable; - 4° if it is better to manifest the matter immediately to the Superior, as it is generally better in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc. Nor can members or fellow residents be absolved who do not consent to a denunciation of this sort where there is question of grave damage to the community. Likewise by natural law corrupting priests, who inflict great spiritual damage on the faithful or seem likely to inflict it, must be denounced to ecclesiastical Superiors; - 5° if the delinquent has yielded his right, as happens in various religious Orders.

Quaer. 4° In what manner must fraternal correction be made?

Resp. Fraternal correction must be made with true charity also as to the manner; therefore it ought to be paternal toward inferiors, kindly among equals, and reverential toward Superiors. - Moreover, it is required that time, place, and other adjuncts be suitably chosen. Therefore he does not sin who puts the matter off to another time, when he can correct either more conveniently or equally conveniently, unless perhaps grave danger threatens from delay.

You will resolve: 1° A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as to a father, cannot proceed judicially, because the delict was not manifested to him as to a judge. L. V. 246. Not. III.

2° Those sin who refer to a superior a defect of a subject perfectly amended.¹

3° Likewise those who refer a delict to mediate superiors while passing over the immediate superior, who can correct by himself and concerning whom there is not probable suspicion that he will not discharge his office, or will not discharge it duly; for the reputation of the neighbor must be consulted.

4° Superiors are held to inquire into the sins of subjects, yet not of some certain subject, unless some peculiar reason moves them to this. - Nor ought they easily to admit spontaneous accusers, and much less immediately to give faith to them. - A grave obligation likewise falls upon them of not manifesting those by whom they were made more certain about someone's fault, if namely the fault is grave, - or, although it is light, if that manifestation, from another cause, ought to be regarded as a grave delict. - They also sin gravely if, when the common good does not demand it, they manifest to those whose counsel or help in correcting the subject they do not need a grave and occult delict of a subject brought to them.¹ But if the manifestation of the delict alone suffices for asking counsel, they sin if they also manifest the delinquent.

§ III. On Vices Opposed To Charity Toward The Neighbor.

The principal ones are hatred, envy, quarrels, scandal, and cooperation in others' sins.

We shall speak only of the two latter, since the matter has already been treated concerning the others in another place, or is to be discussed under the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

290. • By the name scandal, Greek rather than Latin, which from its primary signification denotes an obstacle or impediment placed in the way, by which occasion of stumbling and ruin is furnished to one walking ("stumbling-block or stone"), the Sacred Writers, the holy Fathers, and Theologians are accustomed to designate a spiritual obstacle placed before the neighbor in the course of the way of salvation. Hence scandal, accepted in this sense, is rightly defined with St. Thomas² as "a word or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin." From this definition it is clear that for scandal there is required:

a) That it be a word or deed, that is, an external speech or action and known to another; for those things which are merely internal or occult cannot furnish occasion of ruin to another, since in no way are they perceived by him. But under the terms word or deed there must also be comprehended an external omission, that is, a not-said where one ought to speak, a not-done where one ought to do; for, as the Angelic Doctor notes,³ "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act."

b) That it be a word or deed less right, that is, having some defect of rectitude; which can happen in two ways: 1° when the word or deed according to itself is evil, for example a blasphemous word, a lustful deed; and 2° when it carries before itself the appearance of evil, for example if from dispensation you eat meats on a fast day before persons ignorant of the dispensation. Hence for the notion of scandal it is not necessary that the word or deed be of itself a sin; but it suffices that it have the likeness of sin; "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor,¹ "it is fittingly called less right, so that both those things which are sins according to themselves and those things which have the appearance of evil may be comprehended." But as to words or deeds which bear no appearance of evil, as being wholly right, it seems one must say: - they never constitute scandal strictly so called, although perhaps another may take occasion of sinning from them; - yet sometimes even such words or deeds can put on in some way the malice of scandal, and therefore are not undeservedly called scandal broadly so called, or scandal by accident, namely in a case in which, by command of the law of charity, even those words or deeds must be omitted precisely so that the sin of the neighbor may be guarded against.

c) That it furnish to another occasion of spiritual ruin, that is, that it expose another to probable danger of sinning, although nevertheless it is not necessary that the sin of the other actually follow; for scandal of itself is not, nor can be, an efficient cause, but only an occasion of ruin, or, as St. Thomas again says,² "nothing can be for man a sufficient cause of sin ... except his own will; and therefore the words or deeds of another man can only be an imperfect cause" (occasion) "inducing in some way to sin." - Therefore it suffices, but also is necessarily required for the essence of scandal, that it be in some way inductive to sin; and hence Busembaum rightly resolves apud St. Alph.:³ "it is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, with attention to the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that through this act those will be drawn to sin who otherwise would not have sinned." Thus, for example, it is not scandal if someone blasphemes or curses the neighbor in the presence of persons, for whom he notices that no probable danger of sinning will arise from it, as can often happen (provided there is not question of matter of the Sixth), and especially then when the person sinning himself is a man of the lowest condition and of bad reputation, or when the persons present are very upright or very depraved. - From these things also you will understand that Dens rightly warns¹ that the opinion of the common people is false, namely that someone is scandalized when, on occasion of an improper word or deed, he is justly indignant; but then he is not scandalized when he applauds or delights in the impropriety of another; since, on the contrary, in the second case he is scandalized, not in the first. And for this reason, as Suarez notes,² scandals are often said to be committed which properly are not scandals.

291. Division Of Scandal. - Theologians commonly distinguish:

I. Active scandal and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the definition handed down and explained above (n. 290) belongs. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of the scandalized person, or, as it pleases certain Moralists to say, it is the very sin of the neighbor occasioned. But it is established from what was said above that active scandal can exist without passive scandal, just as, on the contrary, it will be established from what is to be said later that passive scandal can sometimes exist without active scandal, for example if there is question of Pharisaic scandal.

II. Division of active scandal. Active scandal is divided into direct (which by another name is called seduction) and indirect.

Direct scandal is when the ruin or sin of the neighbor is intended by the scandalizer. But the sin of the neighbor can be intended in two ways, namely a) precisely so that the neighbor may sin and lose his soul (which is proper to the devil, and occurs more rarely among men, unless perhaps among those given to magical arts or openly impious); or b) so that the sin of the neighbor may serve the proper pleasure of the scandalizer, as happens in the lustful, - or his proper utility, as happens in the avaricious, thieves, etc. In the first hypothesis direct scandal is called diabolical; in the other it is simply called direct.

Indirect scandal is scandal when the sin of the neighbor is not indeed intended by the scandalizer, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited by him without just cause, and therefore to be omitted lest the sin of the neighbor follow. - But when a word or deed of this sort, even if of itself right, must be considered as posited without just cause and to be omitted under the aforesaid title, will be more accurately explained below. Here you will usefully recall the doctrine on the indirect voluntary, n. 6-8.

III. Division of passive scandal. - Passive scandal is divided by St. Alph.¹ into given and accepted. Given, in the sense of the holy Author, is the sin to the committing of which someone is induced from active scandal; but accepted is the sin which is committed under the pretext of active scandal from pure malice of one's own. - Whatever given scandal is called by the holy Doctor scandal of the little ones, by reason of the weakness or infirmity by which those are considered to labor who allow themselves to be induced to sin through the word or deed of another; for scandal can scarcely fall upon the perfect and constant, according to that:² "Much peace have they that love thy law, and to them there is no scandal." Then any accepted scandal is called by St. Alph.² Pharisaic scandal, from the Pharisees, who, according to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, in order to destroy Christ feigned that they suffered scandal from His holy words; just as today false Liberals or Revolutionaries, in order to destroy the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, feign themselves to be scandalized by his most celebrated Syllabus.

292. Malice Of Scandal. - There is not here to be raised a question about the malice of passive scandal, which is nothing other than the very sin of the scandalized person. For it is clear of itself that such a sin has the same malice which it would have if it were committed by one not scandalized; so that the fact of having been scandalized adds to it no new species, indeed not even an aggravating circumstance; unless perhaps there is question of Pharisaic scandal, which can have a new specific malice joined to itself, for example from the fact that the words or deeds of Christ the Lord Himself are sacrilegiously employed as a pretext for sinning with impunity. - Hence in the following there will be discussion only of the malice of active scandal, concerning which let there be a twofold question.

Quaer. 1° How great a sin is active scandal?

Resp. 1° Active scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, since it is gravely opposed to the negative precept of charity: namely, do not harm your neighbor, and much more, do not induce him into sin, which is the gravest of all the damages that can be inflicted on the neighbor. But the guilt of active scandal is the graver:

a) The more the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is intended; and thus, for example, direct scandal is graver than indirect.

b) The more efficaciously active scandal flows into the ruin of the neighbor; and thus, for example, bad example given by clerics and priests regularly tends more efficaciously into the ruin of others than bad example given by laymen.

c) The graver the spiritual damage of the neighbor which is caused through scandal; and under this reason no scandals are more detestable than those by which innocent souls of tender children are corrupted.

Resp. 2° Yet from a threefold head active scandal can be only a venial sin, namely:

a) From defect of sufficient deliberation, as if someone from negligence lightly culpable does not notice the occasion of mortal sin which is furnished to another by his word or deed.

b) From the lightness of the influence which the scandal exercises upon the grave ruin of the neighbor, as if in speaking or acting you commit some light indiscretion, which regularly, unless a special circumstance intervenes, indeed is accustomed to move the neighbor somewhat, but not so much that it could reasonably have been feared that he would fall from it into mortal sin, into which by accident he has fallen.

c) From smallness of matter, namely if to another there is furnished an occasion of committing only venial sin (which nevertheless is not to him a likely occasion of further grave ruin). And this is true even if that occasion of venial sin is furnished through a word or deed according to itself mortally evil; for the malice of active scandal is not to be measured from the malice of the word or deed which furnishes occasion of sin to another, but from the malice of the sin itself for which occasion is furnished; and hence it can happen that some word or deed according to itself is mortal sin and only venial in the reason of scandal; or the contrary, that some word or deed according to itself is venial and mortal in the reason of scandal. Thus, for example, he who inflicts a grave wound on a neighbor whom he knows will only become lightly angry sins mortally by reason of the injury and venially by reason of scandal; on the contrary, he who strikes a light slap on a neighbor whom he knows is to be moved from it to blasphemies sins venially by reason of the injury and mortally by reason of scandal.

293. • Quaer. 2° What kind of sin (that is, of what species) is active scandal?

Resp. Active scandal has at least a twofold specific malice, one against charity and another against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced. And this is generally admitted by theologians concerning direct scandal; but concerning indirect scandal they dissent somewhat. Cardinal de Lugo and others fewer in number think that through indirect scandal one indeed sins against charity, but not against another virtue; so that he who indirectly scandalized another would of himself satisfy by saying in Confession: I gave grave scandal to the neighbor, without declaring in what matter. Yet much more common is the opposite opinion, to which St. Alph.¹ wholly subscribes: namely, that through scandal, even indirect, one sins not only against charity but besides against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced, so that he who scandalized another either directly or indirectly must declare in Confession in what matter, for example of chastity, justice, etc. The solid reasons of this opinion are:

1° Because the case of indirect scandal seems to be one of the cases to which the axiom must be applied: the evil effect (the sin of the neighbor) foreseen from the cause (in scandal) communicates its malice to the cause itself (the scandal itself).

2° Because any virtue of precept seems to demand from us both that we not injure it ourselves and that we not be either directly or indirectly the cause or occasion why it is injured by others.

We have said: Scandal has at least a twofold malice; for often still more malices, whether in species or in number, it can contain, namely because of the proper sin which is committed by the scandalizer whenever he scandalizes another through a word or deed according to itself already evil, for example through blasphemy, detraction, theft, etc.; - or because of the quality of the person scandalizing, as if scandal is furnished to children by parents, or to parishioners by their pastors; for these are held not only from charity, but also from office, to guard against the ruin of their subjects; - or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if someone induces a married person or a person bound by a vow of chastity to shameful acts; - or even because of the number of those scandalized, for more probably there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized.

Note. - The resolution just given concerning the at least twofold malice of active scandal, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ also obtains in the case in which someone furnishes to another the occasion of executing by work a sin for which the other was already prepared and determined, so that for example one seeking fornication from a prostitute prepared for fornicating sins not only against the virtue of chastity, but also against charity. The reason, very powerful to him, is this: that although such a prostitute is in the actual will of sinning, nevertheless by completing that particular sin of fornication in work she certainly brings upon herself a gravely greater ruin; and therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating this sin in work thereby cooperates toward her gravely greater ruin. But to cooperate toward another's gravely greater ruin is without doubt gravely opposed to charity.

294. Conclusions. - A penitent who is guilty of the mortal sin of scandal must explain in Confession:

1° The very word or deed by which he scandalized another, if namely that word or deed according to itself already is a mortal sin, as blasphemy, grave detraction, perfect drunkenness, etc.

2° The species of grave sin for which he furnished occasion to the neighbor, for example that he furnished to the neighbor an occasion of committing a mortal sin of drunkenness, blasphemy, luxury, theft, etc. And this not only if the scandal was direct, but also, from the much more common opinion proved above n. 293, if it was only indirect; so that this simple accusation never suffices of itself: I gave grave scandal to another, but it must always be added in what species of grave sin.

3° The number of persons whom he induced to grave sin, or foresaw could probably have been induced. "He who sows scandals before others," says Dionysius Carth.,¹ "is worthy of so many and such condemnations as from how many and what sort he is seen." But if a certain number cannot be morally determined, as generally happens, then it suffices to assign a probable number.

4° The quality of himself (for example, that he is a father of a family, teacher, pastor, etc.), and the quality of the scandalized person (for example, that the person is married, related by blood, bound by a vow of chastity, etc.), whenever a quality of this sort is a circumstance changing the species in a grave matter.

But it is asked: In sins against chastity which have an accomplice, for example in the sin of fornication, must it be expressed who first solicited? Or, as others propose this question: must the circumstance of induction to fornication and similar things be explained in Confession?

Resp. Sufficiently probably it is not of itself necessary that in Confession of sins of this sort it be explained who first solicited; because one consenting to the solicitation, by this consent itself, is also guilty of grave scandal, and consequently contracts malices specifically the same as those which the one first soliciting contracts, namely grave malice against chastity and against charity. Therefore it can only be said that the first one soliciting sins more gravely, or that the circumstance of solicitation is only a circumstance aggravating in the same species, which does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession. Cf. St. Alph.²

295. • Confessors regularly ought of themselves to judge especially the following to be guilty of mortal fault of scandal:

1° Those who have a detestable habit of blaspheming, in the presence of persons of any kind, especially younger persons.

2° Those who compose, spread, or publicly sing impure songs or poems.

3° Those who institute and prolong, whether in clear words or in equivocal words (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers), lascivious conversations. See n. 492, II.

4° Those who write or publish depraved books or other perverse writings.

5° Those who sell the aforesaid irreligious or immoral publications indiscriminately to any person, or rent them for reading; or those who in libraries established for lending books expose to the use of all works which commonly ought to be considered as poisoned cups to be removed from the lips of the faithful.

6° Those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books.

7° Those who hand over to boys or girls books perhaps good in themselves, but treating matter the knowledge of which is reputed of itself an occasion of offense to them, according to their natural innocence and sensibility. Who, for example, would doubt that anatomical and surgical books cannot be handed into the hands of children without scandal!

8° Authors, Actors, and Actresses of Comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances (ballet-dances), in which, by reason of the dress of the dancers, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, the greatest foulness appears, as often happens in those which are made under the name gallop, polka, waltz. - It is certain, says St. Alphonsus,¹ speaking of immodest spectacles, that those representing or composing notably impure comedies are in no way free from grave sin of scandal; nor can gain, however great, excuse them. - But whether and to what extent the spectators of such comedies (who ordinarily stain themselves with several internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles to be established later concerning cooperation. Authors of dances which are called "round dances" are commonly guilty of grave scandal, as manifestly follows from that grave admonition which is contained in the Pastoral Letters which the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore² gave in the vernacular tongue to the clergy and people committed to them: "We consider it to be our duty to warn our people against ... those fashionable dances, which, as at present carried on, are revolting to every feeling of delicacy and propriety, and are fraught with the greatest danger to morals." Cooperation in these dances is treated below. - As to the modern gatherings of boys and girls which are held under the name children's balls, I indeed would not wish to precipitate a judgment, although, relying on testimonies not to be despised, I would almost dare sometimes to compare them to a whirlwind destroying the rising roses of innocence.¹ Therefore let parents see to it that they do not cause one of these little ones to be scandalized! - But concerning those gatherings of diverse sex which are called masked balls, there is scarcely need to say a word; since no one fails to understand that by their character they are for the most part full of danger and scandalous. Those festivities also are often to be called scandalous which are commonly called "Pic-Nics," "Excursions," "Fairs," "in which" (these are the words of the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore in the same pastoral letters²), "as too often conducted, the name of charity is made to cover up a multitude of sins." Wherefore the Fathers proceed: "We forbid all Catholics from having anything to do with them, except when managed in accordance with the regulations of the Ordinary, and under the immediate supervision of their respective Pastors."

9° Painters, Sculptors, and Photographers who, eagerly seizing upon the thesis too much sung today: le chaste c'est le nu ("nakedness is chastity"), exhibit statues or images truly obscene and commonly incentive to lust, for example images in which those parts of the body appear naked (I do not say of an infant, but of an older person), which modesty everywhere among peoples demands to be veiled, and which therefore are called shameful parts. Indeed, generally speaking, we concede that artificial things often move less than natural ones, and therefore that grave scandal can more easily be given through natural nakedness than through artificial; but with the common body of Theologians we altogether deny that the nakedness, although artificial, of the aforesaid parts moves so little that it can be excused from grave scandal. What we have said here about painters, etc., "I think the same," says St. Alph.,¹ "must be said about those who retain such images at home" (Gousset² adds: in museums or gardens) "exposed to the sight of all." And at this time we affirm the same especially of those who circulate wholly immodest photographic cards, especially those which are to be viewed by means of a stereoscope. - Note, however, that in the preceding there is not question of the case in which something obscene must be painted, for example for the assistance of anatomical and obstetrical science.

10° Fabricators of female adornment or dress (milliners, hair-dressers), who in their shops show to the eyes of passers-by samples so adorned and dressed that they are gravely offensive, by which namely women are represented in a manner wholly immodest and greatly provocative to lasciviousness.

11° Women or girls adorning themselves in such a way, as often happens in solemn dinners and evening gatherings (soirées). But here one must distinguish between adornment that of itself greatly excites to lasciviousness - such as enormous uncovering of the breasts or their translucent covering is judged to be - and adornment indeed immodest, but not of itself so lascivious, as perhaps is, for example, the uncovering of those parts more modest. Those assuming adornment of the first kind are not to be excused from grave sin of scandal. But those assuming adornment of the second kind are also not excused from mortal scandal if they introduce the use of such clothing where it is not in force; but if they follow a custom already introduced, certainly not in the least to be praised, indeed severely to be rebuked, yet they are not of themselves to be condemned of mortal sin, provided they intend nothing evil. For customary things, provided they are not altogether lascivious of themselves, are not accustomed to move passion so notably.

To be noted. - What we have observed in the last place about custom once introduced as to clothing not altogether lascivious, seems in some measure to have to be said also as to other matters, not simply obscene, for example as to comedies or equestrian games (circus), not notably impure. Hence I would indeed strive to dissuade from those comedies, etc., and, if it could be done, to root them out; but I would not dare in these provinces, where there is in force no special prohibition or Ecclesiastical censure concerning this matter, as elsewhere there is, to teach publicly that actors and actresses in those equestrian games also or comedies, which are made in a manner not to be praised, yet usual and not irreligious or gravely impure, are of themselves guilty of mortal scandal, and therefore unworthy of the Sacraments unless they abandon their office. Therefore let the pastor and confessor judge concerning individual cases, with account taken of the nature of the representations, of the usage of the places where they are made, and of the persons commonly attending; and regularly let him disapprove their office, but not condemn it as mortal unless this is sufficiently established. - We say the same a fortiori of simple lay spectators of such representations. Meanwhile we carefully warn here that in the preceding we have treated only of grave scandal to others; for if a question is instituted about the proximate occasion in which perhaps the actors themselves, etc., or spectators are situated, it will often happen that abstinence from their office or their attendance, which cannot be imposed upon the same under grave fault by title of grave scandal, nevertheless must be imposed under grave fault by title of their own proximate occasion; concerning which n. 1444, Resp. 2°, 3), will speak more broadly.

12° Finally, we still generally assign as guilty of scandal of themselves: a) clerics who, by retaining at home a person suspected by the people, furnish occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state; cf. Counc. Trent;¹ and the same must be said of a husband as to a maid-servant suspected by his wife not without reason; b) married women who, by admitting their handsome lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; c) parents who permit to their daughters conversations in the evening and in hidden places with betrothed men and lovers; and the same must be said of superiors as to servants and other domestics.

296. Preliminary note. - 1° We are not treating here of omitting direct active scandal, the malice of which is of itself manifest to anyone; but only of those things which are to be omitted under the fault of indirect active scandal, the description of which see above n. 291.

2° Mindful of the Apostolic word:¹ "giving no offense to any man," and at the same time of the exhortation of the divine Master Himself:² "Let them alone; they are blind"; Moralists commonly resolve: it is never licit to give the neighbor scandal, even indirect; but sometimes it can be licit simply to permit that the neighbor, beyond our intention, take scandal. But when someone morally must be judged, whether in a strict or in a certain broader sense, to give scandal; and when he can be judged licitly to permit the taking of scandal: this depends totally on this: whether by the law of charity he is held or not held to omit some word or deed precisely so that the ruin of the neighbor may be avoided. In the first hypothesis namely, he must be judged, in whatever sense finally, to give scandal; in the second hypothesis he can be judged licitly to permit the scandal of the neighbor. Hence of itself there arises the general question proposed in the title of this Section, the solution of which we now approach by parts, by positing four special questions, of which the first will regard things less right, the second indifferent things, the third spiritual goods, the fourth temporal goods.

297. First Question. - Must things less right always be omitted by the law of charity because of passive scandal of the neighbor foreseen from them?

Resp. Affirmatively, without any exception, if the things less right are already evil of themselves; indeed, speaking of itself, affirmatively also if they carry before themselves only the appearance of evil, as is established from the words of the Apostle:³ "from all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Cf. 1 Corinthians,⁴ where the Apostle thus addresses those who reclined in an idol's temple (which was not evil of itself, yet had the appearance of evil for the weak): "Take heed lest perhaps this liberty of yours become an offense to the weak." To this also pertains the very well-known heroic example of the venerable old man Eleazar.⁵

We have said: speaking of itself; for by accident it can be licit to do before others what bears the appearance of evil, namely if you have a legitimate reason of necessity or great utility, and at the same time you take care that, as far as lies in you, you remove the occasion of ruin by teaching, for example, those present (unless from circumstances they already sufficiently recognize it) that you can act licitly, that you can licitly eat meats on a fast day because you are excused from the precept of fasting because of a dispensation, etc. For where after these things scandal still arises or persists, it is generally rightly considered as purely accepted scandal, which from the law of charity (apart from the gravest or extreme necessity of the neighbor) we are not held to avoid with grave inconvenience of our own; unless perhaps at the same time there was question of such damage, for example of a community, of faith, or of religion, that it would have to be guarded against before one's own private damage.

298. Second Question. - From the law of charity must indifferent things be omitted from which the neighbor is thought to be about to accept scandal?

Resp. Affirmatively, as often as they can be omitted without notable inconvenience; because from charity we are held to impede the ruin of the neighbor when we easily can, for example by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. But on the contrary, negatively, as often as they cannot be omitted without such inconvenience; because then charity ceases to oblige. Here, however, one ought to notice with St. Alph.¹ that, other things being equal, a greater inconvenience is required the graver or the more certain the sin of the neighbor which is feared, or the more numerous are those to be scandalized; likewise a greater one is required so that scandal of the little ones may licitly be permitted than Pharisaic scandal, which for the most part, when a reasonable cause stands, is to be cared about little, unless perhaps fruit is hoped for from some easy delay, or unless the evil to be feared from it is far more notable than the good which will be obtained through our indifferent works. Besides, this still deserves to be noted: scandal of the little ones, persisting after admonition made to the little ones, can easily be equated to Pharisaic scandal.

From the given response, by way of example, it will be licit to resolve: Therefore a woman is not held to put aside decent adornment (which she assumes because it is fitting to her state, or to please her husband, or that she may find a spouse) because of the scandal of some indeterminate man; for this is to be reputed too grave for her. But if a woman foresees that some determinate man will fall from it into mortal sin, then for one or another time, if it could be done conveniently, she ought to lessen her adornment or abstain from the sight of such a man, but not for a long time, since this again would be too difficult. But if a woman of this sort, although she does not intend the ruin of such a man, nevertheless led by mere vanity, presents herself to his sight on purpose, she could not be excused from grave sin of scandal, just as she also would not be excused if she were to seek some place which she would not approach unless she knew that a shameful lover was there. Cf. St. Alph.¹ The following resolution, which occurs apud several Authors, can also be referred to this place: A woman or girl is held, when she knows certainly that some man sins gravely when she sits in his sight in church, to choose another place, if she conveniently can. - But from these resolutions, proposed by way of example, it will be licit to judge prudently about other similar cases, with account taken of the response given above.

299. Third Question. - To avoid the scandal of the neighbor, must spiritual goods sometimes be omitted by the law of charity?

Resp. Works good of themselves (under which are understood also omissions good of themselves) are either of counsel or of precept:

a) As to good works which are of mere counsel, the same thing must be established, preserving proportion, which we established in the preceding question about omitting indifferent works.

b) As to good works of precept one must say: they are never to be omitted because of scandal, whether Pharisaic or of the little ones, as often as they are absolutely necessary to salvation, as reception of Baptism before death, - or as often as they are prescribed from the law of nature, here and now urging, and not ceasing because of changed circumstances; for evils are not to be done, even venial ones, that good things may come. But where there is question of works prescribed from positive law alone, especially human law, for example of hearing Mass on Sunday, this distinction must be made: such works generally must not be omitted because of Pharisaic scandal; but whether they sometimes must be omitted because of scandal of the little ones is a question controverted among Authors, concerning which see St. Alph.² The opinion which seems practically able to be safely counseled holds: such works can more advisably and licitly be omitted because of scandal of the little ones, at least sometimes, but regularly they need not necessarily be omitted. - Therefore the confessor in the cases here supposed should proceed by persuading. See L. IV. 331.

300. Fourth Question. - Are temporal goods to be abandoned to avoid scandal?

Resp. Either there is question of temporal goods proper to us, or of another's goods committed to our care:

a) If the former: indeed they can licitly be abandoned, but ordinarily speaking they need not necessarily be abandoned to avoid scandal; for the law of charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not held, for example, to pay more than is equitable to some laborer, even if you foresee that he, notwithstanding your admonition about the justice of the payment, is going to blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often, and thus in the whole complex becomes grave. Similarly also a Pastor of himself is not held to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks forth into various slanders, etc.; for from this a grave inconvenience would happen not only to the pastor himself, but also to his successors.

b) If the latter: they cannot even licitly be abandoned, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed. Cf. St. Alph.,¹ where special warnings are also given to Prelates about ecclesiastical goods committed to their administration.

301. • From the same law of charity by which we are prohibited from giving scandal to another, we are also commanded to remove or repair scandal once given, in the best way in which it can be done. But for this it is required that the scandalizer, having henceforth omitted the active scandal once given, should besides, as far as he morally can, try to remove its further evil influence, if namely such influence is still reasonably to be feared, as often happens where there is question, for example, of the scandal of a Superior toward subjects, or of scandal given to another through an evil command, an unjust counsel, the spread of a perverse book, and similar things. But by what ways a further effect of this sort can and must be removed, and therefore scandal repaired, must altogether be judged from the circumstances of the diverse cases, and generally it is established rather easily, provided especially that attention is paid to the special character of the scandal given and its publicity, and to the quality of the person scandalizing and the person scandalized.

Thus, for example, he who gave scandal to others through unjust counsels still efficacious will have to render them inefficacious, as far as he can, through diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or by another. A father of a family who scandalized the domestics ordinarily, for repairing the scandal (if it is still judged efficacious), will have to be obliged to manifest to those same domestics his displeasure over his bad example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future. A bad Author who through heretical, immoral, or defamatory writings incited others to sinning will be held, as far as he can, to retract these through new writings. A concubinarian, usurer, or other sinner of this kind who gave public scandal will also have to be constrained to its public reparation, for example that publicly, having first abandoned his wicked commerce or business, he approach the Sacraments with devotion.

As to other ordinary scandals, we think one must say: more commonly, for such scandals a special reparation, at least under grave sin, cannot be imposed; both because often they scarcely have any persisting efficacy, and also because, although they remain efficacious, often nevertheless morally they cannot be repaired otherwise with fruit (and no one is held to what is useless) except by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the furnishing of good example, in prayer for the scandalized person, and similar things. With prudence as guide, judge in this matter, and impose an obligation on no one unless it is sufficiently established.

Note. - To the reparation of scandal there also pertains the obligation of procuring that the scandalized person be recalled to penance or true conversion. Nevertheless this obligation generally of itself does not seem to urge under mortal sin, except in the case in which the scandalized person, because of ignorance or some other cause, does not have in his power the means of penance; for if he has them and does not wish to use them, then he must impute his impenitence to his own malice and not to another. Thus Scavini.¹

302. • Cooperation differs from scandal, as it is an influence into the will of another, in that it is a concurrence toward the evil action of another principally acting. It is said: principally acting. For the cooperation about which the discussion is here is not to be confounded with immediate participation; because those thus participating in the evil action of another, for example of theft, homicide, etc., are equally principal authors of the same guilt, and for this reason are called by Theologians concurring causes. But such concurrence, or cooperation, can be furnished in nine ways, contained in the following little verse, and to be explained more broadly in the Treatise on Justice:

Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse,
Participant, silent one, one not preventing, one not manifesting.

In the first six ways concurrence is furnished positively, that is, by positing an action influencing the sin of another; in the last three ways concurrence is made negatively, that is, by omitting an act by which another's sin can and must be impeded (or, to use an expression too celebrated today, by not intervening). - Yet do not wonder if in the following there seems to be discussion almost exclusively of the positive ways of cooperating; for the negative ways, morally and with proportion preserved, are reduced to the positive according to that saying of the Angelic Doctor, already related before: "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act." - Besides, concerning negative cooperation, as much as is needed, there will be special discussion in the Treatise on Justice, n. 773 sqq.

303. • In the present treatment a twofold cooperation must be carefully distinguished: namely formal and material.

Formal cooperation is that which truly concurs toward the very evil will of another, namely by consenting to it, or by intending the sin; and this happens a) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which from its own nature is determined to evil; and b) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which at least from the intention of the cooperator is determined to evil, that is, is posited for this end, that another may be helped in sinning. - Hence formal cooperation always supposes in the cooperator some consent into the sin of another, if not by reason of the end which the cooperator expressly intends (the end of the agent), then at least by reason of the work furnished, which from its character tends into evil (the end of the work).

Material cooperation is that which concurs only toward the evil action of another; and this through assistance at least indifferent of itself, which namely neither from its character (from the end of the work), nor from the intention of the cooperator (from the end of the agent), is determined to evil; but is determined to evil only by the principal agent. Practically, cooperation of this sort for the most part consists in the furnishing of some matter, occasion, or means indifferent of itself, which another can use without sin, although, from his own malice, beyond the intention of the cooperator, he is in reality going to abuse them for sinning. Hence material cooperation does not of itself flow into the very evil will of another, nor does it include of itself any consent in his sin, as formal cooperation does; and therefore I would have thought that generally it can rightly be said: cooperation in the sins of others is formal or material according as, with attention to the end of the agent who concurs, and to the end of the work by which he concurs, the cooperation does, or does not, of itself involve some consent in the sin of the one principally acting. Cf. Vind.¹

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 7; De Malo q. 13, a. 4, ad 19.

487. Man is a cause of sin: a) by transmitting original sin, concerning which Dogmatic Theology treats;

b) by suggesting and persuading actual sin to others, which is done by scandal, namely, both by the perverse and false principles of the world (that is, of evil men), and by its depraved works and examples by which it draws the weak, and by threats by which it terrifies the timid, and by the attractions of exterior goods which excite concupiscence (Matt. XVIII, 7; II Tim. III, 1-10; Rom. XII, 2; I John V, 19; II, 16). Scandal formally and principally is against charity, and therefore its malice is spoken of specifically in the treatise on charity;

c) by cooperating with others, which can happen in 9 modes (6 positive and 3 negative): by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising and reproaching, patronizing, participating, by not admonishing, by not opposing, by not manifesting. These are commonly called, metonymically, others' sins (I Tim. V, 22), because, namely, they are committed by others, yet are imputed to us, because in some way we are their cause insofar as we have cooperated toward them as authors, helpers, or those not impeding them. Hence they are others' and our own at the same time, because although committed by others, by reason of cooperation they become our own.

488. Cooperation toward the sin of another is every concurrence furnished to the evil action of another.¹

¹ Waffelaert wrote excellently on cooperation in a special little work: Etude sur la Cooperation et l'espece morale du scandale.

A. By reason of the mode in which it is done: I. one cooperation is properly so called and directly voluntary, which is done by a positive act (the first 6 modes); II. another is improperly so called and indirectly voluntary, which is done by omission of an action impeding sin by one who can impede and is bound to this (the 3 negative modes): the latter is called negative, the former positive.

Positive cooperation is twofold: 1. broadly so called, which is done by a moral influence upon the will of another who executes the evil action (so that his will may be moved or in some way determined to sin): it is identified with direct scandal, which is not a mere occasion but a true moral cause of the sin of another, and is done by command, counsel and seduction, petition and consent, praise, moral patronage;

2. strictly so called, which is done by a real influence upon the evil effect itself, by helping another to produce it, or by partially causing with another principally acting the evil act or effect, which is done by participation or real patronage: it is called a) immediate when the cooperator executes with the principal agent the very act of sin, for example, by helping a thief in taking away another's thing, as if two steal one thing by carrying it together; b) mediate when the cooperator supplies something (matter, faculty, means) which serves the principal agent for executing the evil work, or for executing it more easily, for example, by handing over a ladder for stealing or by opening a window for a thief. This can be more or less proximate or remote, according as the means supplied, from its nature or from the circumstances, more or less influences and has a greater or lesser connection with the sin of the principal agent; for example, to hold a ladder for one ascending, or to furnish an idol to an unbeliever, is called proximate cooperation; to hand over a ladder, or to sell matter from which an idol is to be made, remote cooperation.

B. By reason of intention, it is divided into formal cooperation, when the cooperator consents to the evil will of the principal agent and intends his sin (as happens in direct scandal); and material cooperation, when he does not intend the sin but does something foreseeing that the principal agent will abuse it to perpetrate sin. Therefore the same action, according to a diverse intention, can be formal or material cooperation: thus an innkeeper, if he serves drink to someone for the end that he become drunk, is formal cooperation; but only material if for the sake of profit he furnishes drink to one who is foreseen to be about to make himself drunk.²

² Thus material and formal cooperation is better defined after St. Alphonsus. But in order that the doctrine of authors may be rightly understood, the reader must attend to the fact that they sometimes explain the terms otherwise.

489. Principles. Cooperation toward evil generally is illicit, because it is to place a cause of an evil effect; and this cannot be licit unless the action in itself is not evil, but at least indifferent, the intention is right, and there is produced equally immediately at the same time both a good effect and an evil one which is compensated (n. 173). Hence:

a) Formal cooperation is always illicit, because it does not proceed from a right intention but intends the sin of the principal agent, and therefore is always a sin of the same species as that sin, as consent in it and approval of it.

b) Immediate cooperation, even merely material, is illicit, because it is not an indifferent action but an evil one; indeed it is always a sin of the same species as the sin of the principal agent, because it is to execute with him and to do the prohibited work itself; - unless sometimes the question is of goods of fortune, in the taking away of which the owner can consent.

c) Mediate merely material cooperation, although not always and necessarily, nevertheless per se and ordinarily is illicit, because it is an act of evil appearance which is not licit except on account of an extrinsic reason rendering it honorable: for if the effect or end is evil and prohibited, even the means for obtaining it per se and ordinarily (unless there is an excusing reason) will be prohibited; for if the means are voluntarily employed, the effect also will be voluntary in its cause; if the means are culpably employed, the effect will be culpable in its cause. This is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the sin of the principal agent (although not of the same lowest species), and at the same time against charity when, by omitting cooperation, we could impede the sin of our neighbor.

d) Mediate merely material cooperation per accidens is licit, if a proportionately grave reason is present.³

³ Hence St. Thomas: "For avoiding some inconvenience, a man can licitly use the matter of another, or not subtract the matter from him, but furnish it." Q. D. De Malo 13, a. 4, ad 19.

Thus according to the rule handed down above concerning an action from which a twofold effect arises: it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself, which has a twofold equally immediate effect: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason for acting (n. 173). Of these four conditions, the two intermediate ones in this cooperation are always verified from the nature of the thing; hence it must be said that this cooperation is licit, if the action is not evil in itself (which is not always easy to determine), and if a proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present.

490. A proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present, if the good end or effect, that is, the utility and necessity of acting, compensates the evil effect, or rather the influence into the evil effect: thus, for example, if another means is lacking, it is licit to cooperate mediately toward the sin of another on account of avoiding his greater sin (as toward drunkenness lest he blaspheme), and toward harm to neighbor on account of avoiding either a greater harm to him or an equal harm to oneself; of two evils the lesser evil is to be preferred.

Hence a graver cause is required the graver the cooperation is, that is:

a) the graver the sin is toward which someone cooperates, both in itself and with respect to the harm which it brings to the honor of God, the common good, or a third party; for example, a graver cause is required for cooperating with a sin of injustice than with another, because the cooperation is done not only to the spiritual harm of the sinner but also to the temporal harm of a third party; likewise for cooperating with homicide than with theft;

b) the more proximate the cooperation is, that is, the more it influences the sin of another or is more closely connected with it; for example, a graver cause is required for arranging the type in printing a bad book than for preparing the papers, for extending the sword of killing than for the material from which it is made;

c) the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; for example, a greater cause is required for selling weapons, wine, bad books, etc., if there is one shop than if there are many who sell those things; for furnishing meats in a paternal house than in a tavern.

491. Therefore the following special practical rules can be established:

1. Proximate cooperation toward an action which is gravely harmful to the public good, whether of religion or of the state, is excused from mortal sin on account of no harm whatever, because it is a perversion of order: to prefer a private good to the public and common good.

2. If the evil action does not gravely harm the public good, proximate cooperation toward it (especially if it is necessary for the execution of the sin) will not be excused except on account of a grave cause or inconvenience; indeed, if the cooperation is gravely harmful to an innocent third party, a very grave inconvenience is required, namely, fear of at least equal harm.

3. Remote cooperation, if the other is already equipped for sinning, is excused on account of a light cause; unless, by denying consent, the sin could be impeded: for then fear of notable detriment is required.

492. Applications to cases. - In order that the doctrine explained above, and in a moral matter of daily application, may be better understood, it is useful to illustrate it by certain examples from approved authors concerning the cooperation of merchants and servants, which regards many matters, and therefore belongs more fittingly to general theology than other applications which pertain to the special virtues.

A. Concerning the cooperation of merchants: 1. To sell indifferent things, not of themselves destined to evil (painted cards, wine, weapons, knives, meats on Friday, feminine adornment), is licit by reason of profit alone, even if it is foreseen in general that many will abuse them: for the cooperation is sufficiently remote and abuse cannot be altogether impeded.

2. But if this or that one is foreseen in particular as going to abuse them:

a) the sale is not licit except on account of a grave cause proportioned to the sin, because the cooperation is proximate; hence it will not be licit to sell adornment to a girl who is going to abuse it for lust (or drink to one going to become drunk), even if it would equally be bought from others; unless for avoiding notable harm or inconvenience, or on account of a moderately grave cause (the departure of a wealthy customer, diminution of buyers, a grave quarrel, real blasphemy).

b) When by not selling it is foreseen that the sin will be impeded, a far graver cause is required; wherefore it is not licit, except perhaps on account of a most grave cause, to sell a bad book to an innocent person who otherwise would not be corrupted.

c) Finally, if the other is going to abuse the thing to the harm of a third party, fear of equivalent harm is required; for example, it is not licit to sell weapons to one going to kill unless to avoid one's own death or an equivalent evil, and scarcely ever will it be licit to sell things to those who, after making a truly harmful adulteration, are going to resell them to others, because this is gravely harmful to the public good.

3. Things not indifferent, but destined to an evil use either of themselves or by institution, and scarcely having another use, such as poison, truly obscene images, an abortive means, it is not licit to sell unless it is clear that danger of abuse is absent, or unless a most grave cause proportionately excuses.

4. Things which of themselves from their own nature have no other use than evil, and which man cannot use without sin, it is never licit to sell, such as a manifestly base theatrical garment, or instruments destined to impede generation, a drug destined only for abortion, insignia of the Masonic sect; unless it were certain that someone was seeking them for another end and would not abuse them.

B. Concerning the cooperation of servants: 1. To present garments, prepare a horse or carriage for a master going off to sin, open the door to a concubine, bring a torch, prepare a bed, bring a bad book or newspaper, prepare meats on a forbidden day, set out wine for a master going to make himself drunk, etc., is licit by reason of service alone, because these are indifferent services and cooperation toward sin is remote.

2. To accompany the master or carry him by carriage to the place of sin, for example, to a concubine, is not licit by reason of service or profit alone, but there must be added fear of some notable detriment (such as being treated badly, being expelled from the house, a grave quarrel), because the cooperation is more proximate.

But if by the company of the servant the master is rendered more bold for sinning, when otherwise he would not sin, according to St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 64, he can never accompany him; according to others, however, he can on account of the greatest harm, as cases similar to this are: to keep watch while the master sins with a mistress and to warn him if someone intervenes - secretly to gather information concerning the place in which such a girl is accustomed to dwell - to paint an image of a person basely loved - to offer one's shoulder to one ascending to a woman not unwilling.

3. To carry gifts or love letters to a concubine, according to St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 67, is illicit because, since they directly excite to sinning, it is intrinsically evil: for it is cooperation toward the sin of the master and direct scandal toward the concubine. Many authors, however, judge that this is an indifferent work which nevertheless will not be licit except for avoiding grave harm, because the cooperation is sufficiently proximate; but it would be intrinsically evil both to write and carry very base love letters, or to approve them before such a person.

4. To place one's shoulder under, to hold a ladder, to open a window by force so that the master can ascend to deflower a virgin will not be licit except on account of fear of death or equivalent evil, because the cooperation is altogether proximate and maximally injurious to an innocent third party (cf. Innocent XI, prop. 51 condemned).

C. Specifically as to the cooperation of a servant toward usuries: 1. He who helps a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or carrying a pledge, can be excused by reason of service alone.

2. Not so the servant who in the name of the master exacts usuries, because exaction is more proximate cooperation toward the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably.

3. But if he exacted by force or threats, he would not only sin but also be bound, in default of the master, to restitution.

I. Cooperation is called every concurrence afforded to the action of another; in the present case, concurrence afforded to a sterilization to be decreed or performed by another.

It can be given in diverse ways. One kind is cooperation in the broad sense, which occurs through a moral influence upon the will of another, whether directly and positively, as by commanding, counseling, requesting, seducing, consenting, and so forth; or indirectly and negatively, by not admonishing or not impeding, when someone can and ought to admonish or impede. Another is cooperation in the strict sense, which occurs through a real or physical influence, as by assisting, partially causing, supplying means, and so forth. This is immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator executes the work itself with the principal agent, as if he takes away another's property by carrying it together with a thief; or only supplies means by which the other can perform the work, or can perform it more easily. In the latter case the cooperation can be more proximate or more remote, according as the means exercises a greater or lesser influence and is more or less connected with the work of the other.

By reason of intention, one kind of cooperation is formal, when the cooperator consents to the will of the principal agent and intends the latter's work; another is merely material, when he does not consent to the latter's intention, but acts from another intention with foresight that the other will use it to perpetrate his work.

Now the question is asked whether it is licit to cooperate in sterilization.¹ Here the question concerns illicit sterilization; for if the sterilization is licit, it is also licit to cooperate in it, provided this is done by means which are not evil.

¹ Cf. Grosam, Die Sterilisation auf Grund privater Auktorität und auf Grund gesetzlicher Ermächtigung, in Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, 1930.

II. Formal cooperation, which proceeds from an evil intention and from approval of illicit sterilization, is always evil and prohibited. Indeed, it is a sin of the same species as sterilization, as a concurrence formally intending and approving it. Hence it is a special sin against justice.

Such are not only those who spontaneously offer themselves to be sterilized, but also physicians who, on their own initiative and without being bound by a public office, deliberately carry out an illicit sterilization; editors and writers who recommend and propagate it from conviction; deputies who approve by vote a law that sterilization is to be performed; and spouses who consent to the sterilization of their consort. Indeed, negative cooperators could in this way be guilty, namely, magistrates, officials, and agents who knew that evil sterilizations were being performed in their territory, provided they could and by reason of office ought to impede them, and could do so without inconvenience, but did not.

III. Merely material but real cooperation, whether immediate or mediate, proximate or remote. Merely material cooperation is that which, without an evil intention or consent to another's sin, someone freely affords to the action of another, but rather unwillingly, in order, for example, to avoid an inconvenience or loss, or to procure gain for himself.

1. If it is immediate, it is always evil, because it consists in the execution of the evil action itself. There is an exception when external goods of fortune are involved, to the removal of which the owner can consent; but this exception does not come under consideration in the question of sterilization, to which it is licit for no one to consent unless it were necessary for bodily health. Hence immediate cooperation in the action of decreeing or performing sterilization is intrinsically evil, just as sterilization itself is, and indeed it is a sin of the same species as the work itself.

Thus physicians who perform the operation unwillingly because they are compelled by law themselves cooperate immediately in the execution of a wicked law; or two physicians who together immediately execute the operation of sterilization itself.

2. Mediate cooperation, however, is that which supplies the means required for performing sterilization, by preparing or assisting. This also is of itself illicit unless there is a grave reason, and indeed a proportionately grave one; that is, a reason graver in proportion as the cooperation is more proximate and in proportion as it is more necessary, that is, as the sterilization would more probably be prevented if the cooperation were refused.

For it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself which has two equally immediate effects: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided there is a proportionately grave reason for acting. But merely material mediate cooperation has immediately a good effect which alone is intended. Therefore it is licit, provided the action is not evil in itself and there is a proportionately grave reason or a sufficient cause for cooperating.

Such cooperators are assisting physicians and nurses; a nurse who, for example, under the direction of a physician, attends to a Roentgen apparatus; subordinate officials who, by writing records or giving some assistance, cooperate in the execution of the law; workers who prepare the instruments or keep them clean or heated; and a fortiori those who hand instruments to the physician during the operation.

Cooperation that is altogether proximate, such as that of assisting physicians or nurses who attend to the apparatus, demands a most grave cause, for example, if they would lose their means of support but nevertheless could not impede the sterilization. It would very rarely be licit for Catholic Sisters, for example, if otherwise they would be expelled from the institution with great harm to religion.

Proximate but more remote cooperation requires a lesser cause, yet one still grave, for example, a grave inconvenience, and a greater cause in proportion as the cooperation is more proximate.

Cooperation can be altogether remote, for which the reason of one's office itself suffices. Thus it is licit for servants to keep the operating room or chamber clean or heated.

In a case in which there is not a sufficient reason for mediate cooperation, there is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the action of the principal agent; in the present case, against justice, because it is to assist in injuring justice by an unjust sterilization, although the sin is not of the same most specific species or the same gravity. Moreover, scandal, which can arise, is to be avoided; concerning it only those who know all the circumstances of places and persons can judge. This is not always easy. Hence, if it is doubtful whether scandal is to be feared in the concrete case, judgment concerning it in determinate circumstances pertains to the local Ordinaries, who are able to know and estimate all the circumstances.

IV. Moral cooperation is especially that by which someone positively influences the will of him who does evil, and it coincides with direct scandal or scandal inducing one to sin. It is committed, for example, by commanding, counseling, praising, requesting, protecting the sin, in the present case sterilization, or consenting to it.

This is a sin against charity, because it is scandal; and at the same time against the virtue which it induces one to violate, because it directly induces one to this. In the present case it is against justice, which is injured in a special manner whether by private sterilization or by public sterilization.

Such are those who by private authority decree that someone is to be sterilized; those who summon a physician and request sterilization for another; those who command sterilization or invite another to it; and those who report the sick in order that they be sterilized.

V. Observation. Illicit cooperation is not only a sin against the virtue or precept to whose violation concurrence is afforded; it is also against charity when the sin would be prevented if the cooperation were omitted.

VI. Applications. From the foregoing it follows:

1. It is illicit to recommend or counsel sterilization, to request it or formally consent to a request for it, to present a report or vote concerning persons infected with hereditary disease in order that they be sterilized, or to summon a physician for this purpose; because to recommend, counsel, request, or in any way procure a thing intrinsically evil, and so forth, is likewise intrinsically evil. But merely to report or explain the law of sterilization without approval, merely to indicate diseases or merely to report sick persons while nevertheless knowing that they are to be sterilized, and to summon a physician without saying anything, are not intrinsically evil. Hence, by these means, merely material cooperation can be licit for a grave cause and with scandal excluded. Scandal, however, could easily arise from a public explanation of the law made ex officio.

2. It is illicit for physicians to perform the operation of sterilization or to take active parts in carrying out the very act of sterilizing, because this is to do something intrinsically evil. On the contrary, to be present or assist during the operation, to hand over instruments, or to watch over the patient is not of itself intrinsically evil. Wherefore, merely material cooperation in this manner can be licit, but only for a graver cause, because it is altogether proximate cooperation.

3. Likewise, it is illicit for a physician to persuade patients to present themselves for the execution of sterilization, even if he acts thus from the obligation of a public office or of the law, and after the tribunal has pronounced a sentence of sterilization, because to counsel a thing intrinsically evil is always intrinsically evil. Nevertheless, perhaps it would not be illicit to say, "You know the provisions of the law," and merely to declare them without adding persuasion, but only for a graver cause, because this is proximate cooperation.

4. Likewise, it is illicit to present oneself voluntarily for sterilization, because this is to request and consent to a thing intrinsically evil, even if it is done lest a person, after the sentence of the tribunal has already been pronounced, suffer force through compulsion. Rather, he ought not yield except to violence. It is sufficient, however, that force begin to be applied, for example, if an official places his hand upon the shoulder, or if he declares that he has come to employ the force of compulsion. It is not necessary to offer further resistance, because it is then evident to all that the person does not proceed voluntarily but yields to compulsion.

5. Likewise, it is illicit for anyone to permit sterilization to be performed upon himself; rather, he ought to avoid it insofar as is morally possible for him, and to withdraw himself from the sterilization to be imposed.

6. Likewise, it is illicit to compel the sick by force to present themselves for sterilization, even if someone acts thus after the sentence of the tribunal has been pronounced and from the obligation of his office, because this is to compel another to a thing intrinsically evil. This is to be understood of officials who act by their own authority and according to their own judgment, but not of altogether subordinate agents who merely ministerially execute orders by leading persons to a determinate place, and who do not always understand the nature of the thing prescribed or to be executed. These appear to be excused by reason of their office, unless something were demanded of them out of hatred of religion or something manifestly dishonorable.

7. Likewise, it is illicit to discharge the office of judge in a special tribunal instituted solely to treat cases of sterilization. A fortiori, it is illicit to pronounce a decretory sentence that sterilization is to be executed, because this is to command a thing intrinsically evil.

Let it not be thought that the judge only pronounces that the conditions indicated in the law have been verified, upon the presence of which the law itself commands sterilization. On the contrary, the judge does not merely declare the law, but as a superior applies the law by his authority to particular cases and persons. For these he commands in the concrete, authentically intimates the obligation to them, and renders them liable to sterilization, since the law commands that they be rendered liable. Hence he establishes and introduces a new obligation, wherefore his sentence is like a particular law.² But directly to command a thing intrinsically evil and to oblige one to it is illicit.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 67, a. 1.

The judge, namely, cannot licitly apply an iniquitous law; iniquitous, I say, not only by reason of incompetence, because it is enacted concerning things not subject to the civil power, for in that case the Church could sometimes concede this or renounce its right; but iniquitous by reason of the matter or the thing prescribed, because it commands against the natural law. It is never licit, namely, to command a thing intrinsically evil and contrary to natural right.³

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 5, ad 1.

You will object: a. The judge does not act spontaneously and freely, but is compelled by the force of law. Therefore he is not responsible for the effect of the law. One who is compelled appears to afford only merely material cooperation, which can be licit for a grave cause.

Response. He is compelled not by physical force but by moral violence which leaves freedom. What is done from fear is involuntary in a qualified respect, because it is done with repugnance, but is voluntary simply. The judge acts as an agent, while the legislator gives the mandate. Just as the legislator is responsible for the mandate of the law, so the judge is responsible for the execution of the mandate or law. And just as it is not licit to command something intrinsically evil, neither is it licit to execute it. Thus the judge cooperates immediately in the execution of the iniquitous law; and he formally moves another toward a thing intrinsically evil by commanding it, which is direct scandal.

b. St. Thomas says that it is licit for a judge to condemn an innocent man whom he knows by private knowledge to be innocent, but who publicly and juridically has been convicted of a crime.⁴ In judgment he ought to be directed not according to what he himself knows as a private person, but according to what becomes known to him as a public person.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 67, a. 2, and q. 64, a. 6, ad 3.

Response. It is one thing to apply a law which is just in itself and favors the common good but which per accidens has an evil effect; it is another to apply a law unjust according to itself. It is one thing to compel him who has been juridically convicted of a crime according to laws just in themselves; it is another to compel him who is plainly manifest to be innocent and whom iniquitous laws alone intend to oblige to something intrinsically evil. This latter plainly cannot be licit, whereas the former could appear licit in certain circumstances.

c. According to many, it is licit for a judge to pronounce a civil divorce, which nevertheless is intrinsically evil.

Response. Those who think thus say that civil divorce is not intrinsically evil, because it does not dissolve the marriage but only the civil contract, and removes civil protection from the marriage, and consequently the opposition of the law to new civil nuptials. It is altogether another thing to command something intrinsically evil, which is never licit. Hence, if the pronouncement of civil divorce were evidently intrinsically evil, neither could it ever be licit.

No solid probability belongs to these and other similar little arguments which could be adduced. Wherefore it is in no way probable that it is licit for a judge to pronounce the execution of sterilization.

The chief ones are hatred, envy, quarrel, scandal, and cooperation in the sins of others. We shall speak only of the two latter, since concerning the others treatment has already been made above, or is to be made in the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing to someone an occasion of spiritual ruin. - I said 1st, a saying or deed, under which name omission also is understood. - I said 2nd, less right, that is, what is either evil in itself or has the appearance of evil. I said 3rd, furnishing an occasion, because the proper cause of sin is the will of the one acting. - I said 4th, of spiritual ruin, which can be grave or light; for by this name sin is understood, whether mortal or venial. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 1; and de Verit., q. 15, art. 1.

Scandal is divided: 1st, into direct and indirect, according as the evil action of another is intended in itself, or only in a cause by which one's neighbor is incited to sin; 2nd, into active and passive, according as the saying or deed itself which furnishes an incitement or occasion of sin is considered, or rather the incitement itself already taken up.

But two things are to be noted here:

1st. Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is formally intended. But if the spiritual ruin of another is not intended, but only one's own utility or pleasure, it is called simply direct.

2nd. Any scandal whatsoever can be active or given, without being passive or accepted; because an action apt of itself for scandal can be posited, without one's neighbor taking from it an occasion of spiritual ruin. And vice versa there can be accepted scandal, without its being given; but in that case scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of another, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal or admits it without foundation. If it is taken up from weakness or ignorance, it is called scandal of the little ones; but if it arises from the mere malice of the subject, it is called pharisaical. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

I Say 1st. Scandal, even indirect, is a grave sin from its genus, because from its genus it is opposed by commission to charity, since it is directly opposed to fraternal correction: for this draws one's neighbor away from sin, but that on the contrary draws him to sinning. Wherefore besides the proper malice of the action, which is called scandalous, there is had the specific malice of scandal, by which charity is injured. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 3.

I Say 2nd. Scandal of the little ones or of the weak is to be avoided whenever it can be done without grave inconvenience, by omission both of an indifferent work and also of a good work not prescribed. The reason is that by charity we are bound to impede the ruin of our neighbor who needs our help, when we easily can, for example, by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc.; but the little ones need help, since because of ignorance or weakness they are placed in a certain spiritual necessity. Therefore. - But St. Thomas well observes that scandal of the little ones after admonition for the most part becomes pharisaical. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. cited, art. 7.

I Say 3rd. Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. The reason is that those suffering scandal from their malice alone are not in a necessity from which they cannot easily free themselves without the help of another, and otherwise a place would be given to the wicked for impeding good works whenever they wished.

Question 1. In scandal is there had not only a sin against charity, but also against the virtue to violating which one's neighbor is induced?

Response. Affirmatively, as to direct scandal; for any virtue specially forbids not only that it be violated, but also that someone directly induce another to violate it. But as to indirect scandal there is much dispute, but the negative opinion which Lugo defends with others seems probable. The reason is both that virtues do not oblige us to impede the opposite vices in others, but only not to induce our neighbor positively and directly to violate them; and that otherwise he who by his example moves another to steal would be bound to restitution, which the Doctors most commonly deny. In this opinion it is enough that the penitent express generally the sin of scandal, without being bound to add the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary to express circumstances which perhaps add a species to the sins of others, for example, whether those who are induced to lust by foul speech are married or bound by vow, etc. Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 159. - Baller., note (b), p. 207.

Question 2. Are precepts sometimes to be omitted on account of scandal of the little ones?

Response. Negatively, as to negative precepts of natural law, because these oblige always and for always, and works contrary to them are intrinsically evil. But affirmative precepts, because these do not oblige for always, it is sometimes licit and indeed necessary to omit, for example, the precept of correcting sinners, if graver ruin is to be feared from it; or rather it must be said that then the law itself ceases. As to positive human precepts, there is controversy. The more probable opinion affirms, excluding grave inconvenience, because the precept of avoiding scandal to one's neighbor, as being natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone, if she goes to the prescribed Mass, is bound to omit it once or twice, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; but not several times, on account of the grave inconvenience which would result from it. But because the negative opinion is also probable, a burden concerning which there is no certainty must not be imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 206.

Question 3. Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

Response. Negatively, ordinarily speaking, because charity toward neighbor does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme; for that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur rather often, and thus easily becomes grave; nay, it could rather often be an incitement to blaspheming. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

Question 4. Must one sinning with an accomplice declare in confession the circumstance of solicitation?

Response. Negatively, more probably, provided either from the nature of the sin, or from the mode in which the sin is accused, the confessor sufficiently understands that some accomplice was present. The reason is that by the simple communion of crime it is effected that there was mutual scandal, and indeed active on each side, between the one soliciting and the one consenting, and therefore, once that has been declared, the sin of scandal also is declared. But that one of the accomplices placed the cause of scandal before the other is a merely aggravating circumstance, which does not change the species of sin. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

Question 5. Is it licit to persuade someone determined upon a greater evil to a lesser evil?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably with St. Alphonsus. Yet some limit this if the lesser evil is contained in some way in the greater, as beating in homicide, etc.; which limitation, however, does not seem necessary to the Holy Doctor. Certain other theologians, as, for example, Cardinal de Lugo, posit another limitation, namely provided that to one willing to inflict greater harm on one person, you do not persuade lesser harm to be inflicted on another. But others deny that this limitation also is required. - But the reason of the solution is that this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that a greater sin not be committed; from which it happens that he from whom a robber steals what is less is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who gave the counsel. - Cf. Vasquez, Opuscul. de scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14. - Baller., note (b), p. 208.

Thence you conclude that if someone persuades another to inflict a lesser harm so that a greater evil may be avoided, he is not bound to restitution: not by reason of a thing received, because he has received nothing; not by reason of unjust damaging, because by his counsel he rather usefully managed the matter of another. Nor is the one giving counsel bound to restitution who has brought help to another, for example, to a robber, because he manages the master's matter usefully. And this conclusion is of very grave moment, namely lest an obligation of restitution be imposed where there truly is none. Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, disp. 11, nn. 17, 18; De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, disp. 19, n. 44.

Question 6. Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning so that the guilty person may be corrected?

Response. Affirmatively, because to permit is not to induce, and often there is a sufficient reason for permitting sin. Hence parents and masters are of themselves to be excused from sin who allow sons or servants to sin, in order that they may find an opportune place of correcting them. Indeed it is licit also, at least probably, to place an occasion of sin, provided the act is indifferent, and a just cause is present for placing it. Hence a master ought to be excused from sin who, deliberately, leaves the key attached to the chest in which money is stored, in order to test the doubtful fidelity of a servant; but in no way can a father be excused who keeps a prostitute at home, in order that he may take an experiment of his son's chastity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 58.

Note. - From the doctrine handed down thus far, all cases concerning scandal could already be solved, but because of special difficulties it will be useful to say something in particular concerning luxury, bad books, dances, and spectacles.

Concerning Luxury. To do, represent, or display those things which notably provoke to lust is indeed most grave scandal; because no subtler poison can be offered to the soul. Hence those are guilty of most grave scandal: 1st, who represent shameful things in plays or other assemblies; 2nd, who compose or sing shameful songs or poems; 3rd, who make or expose obscene statues or images; 4th, who seduce pupils entrusted to them by bad examples, etc. But especially attention must be given to the following.

Question 1. Does a woman sin gravely by displaying nudities on the breast and arms?

Response. Affirmatively, if the nudity is immoderate or very notable, notwithstanding any contrary custom whatsoever. But if it is not so immoderate, custom will easily excuse from grave sin, because it notably diminishes the force of concupiscence, since things customary excite the imagination less. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 55.

Question 2. What is to be said concerning women's adornment and cosmetics?

Response. The doctrine of St. Thomas concerning this matter is reduced to the following heads: 1st, women sin mortally if they adorn themselves with the intention of provoking to lust; 2nd, but venially, if they do this merely from vanity, levity, or boasting; 3rd, to wear superfluous adornment is only a venial fault from its genus; 4th, there is no sin of itself if the custom of the country and condition of state is observed; 5th, women licitly add something of adornment, so that they may please husbands either whom they have or whom they ought to receive; 6th, cosmetics will be mortal if they are applied for lasciviousness; venial, if merely to feign beauty; but none, if to hide some defect. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 169, art. 1 and 2; and Comm. in Isai., chap. 4. - Baller., note (a), p. 210.

Question 3. Is it licit to rent a house to prostitutes?

Response. Affirmatively, probably, especially if there are not other renters present, or if it is easy for the prostitutes to obtain another house. Yet except the case if the prostitutes gravely harm honest neighbors, or by the location of the dwelling furnish a greater occasion for sinning. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 70.

Question 4. What is to be said concerning the exposure of images along public ways, as is accustomed to be done among us by merchants?

Response. Often exposure of this kind is gravely scandalous, for those images sometimes, both because they are painted with more vivid colors and because they display immoderate nudities, gravely move the imagination and entice to sin. Nor should you say that scandal is not intended, because those images are exposed only either for showing the art, or for attracting buyers; for the response is that an end, even if good, can never be obtained by illicit means.

Concerning Bad Books. Among every kind of scandals, none is more execrable than that which is produced from impious and obscene books. This is the most dreadful plague of all, because it infects not one region or age only, but is diffused to all places and times. Therefore the reading, printing, and spreading of books altogether opposed to faith and morals is never to be permitted, even independently of the positive prohibition concerning which there will be discussion in the tract on censures. Wherefore altogether wisely the Fathers of the Third Council of Baltimore, after they had bitterly complained about the abuse of the excellent art of typography, warn pastors of souls, confessors, and preachers with most grave words concerning the obligation of keeping the faithful away from the reading of bad books. - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 224 and following.

Question 1. Can books which are partly good, partly bad, be committed to type?

Response. Negatively, generally speaking, unless they have been accurately purged; otherwise, however, if the danger to be feared from them is not so grave, and this seems to be compensated by a great utility to be taken from them. But printers should diligently ask learned and experienced men, especially ecclesiastical superiors, what is to be done in doubtful matters.

Question 2. Can bad books sometimes be sold?

Response. They can in no way be sold indiscriminately, namely to any buyer, as is clear. Yet sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men, who can read books of this kind usefully, for example, to refute them, etc. Except books altogether obscene, which are to be rooted out completely. The same, with proportion observed, is to be said concerning donation or rental of the same books.

Question 3. Can books of this kind be returned to the owner who has rented them?

Response. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience suggests otherwise. This flows of itself from the principles handed down above. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this kind from the owner. Slight sadness, or even fear of dissolving friendship, certainly would not be judged a reason, at least for the most part, for returning bad books to a friend.

Concerning Dances. Dances of themselves are not illicit, if they are done in an honorable manner, that is, with every immodest touch, gesture, or act removed; for dances of themselves are acts of gladness, and are prohibited by no law. But by reason of nudities, the manner of dancing, words, gestures, and songs, dances can become gravely illicit. But as to the fact, among dances gravely illicit certain more recent dances which among us are called round dances are reckoned by some. - Yet since, the case of a special prohibition always excluded, the malice of these dances consists only in danger, which is essentially relative, and therefore diverse for diverse persons, it will belong to the confessor to judge concerning particular cases. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de sexto praec. Decal., n. 429.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Those who are so weak that they undergo grave danger of sinning in dances even honorable ones must abstain from them under mortal sin; unless perhaps sometimes a certain necessity presses, and then, at least probably, proximate danger of consent is absent.

2nd. To be present at honorable dances, even without necessity, excluding however danger and notable scandal, and to dance decently in them, not only is not mortal, but can easily also be free of every sin. For there are found sometimes men, and not rarely women, to whom no danger or only very remote danger threatens. Although these persons are to be dissuaded from dances, nevertheless a promise of avoiding dances would be demanded from them altogether imprudently.

3rd. To legitimate the practice of those confessors who indiscriminately deny absolution to all those who lead dances commonly called among us round dances, it is not valid to say that those dances were condemned by the Fathers of Baltimore. For when the Baltimore Fathers name the aforesaid dances in the Pastoral Letters, they do not impose a precept, but only furnish an admonition. But when they speak more severely in Decree 472, they not only make no mention of those dances in particular, but neither do they impose a precept on all the faithful, and they require only that pastors of souls "attack immodest dances and condemn them altogether." - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 472, and the Pastoral Letters, n. x.

4th. Nor did the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore properly condemn any dances whatsoever, or even the aforesaid dances, when in n. 290 they imposed the following precept: "We command also that priests take care that the abuse by which banquets are prepared with dances (balls) for promoting pious works be altogether removed."

5th. Generally speaking, it is not expedient publicly in preaching to reprehend certain dances by name, because the preacher would accomplish nothing, indeed perhaps he would entice some persons to them. It is rather expedient to act indirectly against dances, and directly against the sins which are accustomed to be committed in them.

6th. Generally speaking, dances with masks (masked balls) are illicit and altogether to be condemned, because experience establishes that they incline very much to lust, from the fact that they suppress modesty, which is the guardian of decency.

7th. Certain very recent dances have seemed gravely indecent to many; hence because of the dangers connected with them, especially young persons of either sex are generally to be kept away from them altogether. Wherever there is a special prohibition, there indeed they are in no way to be permitted. It is wholly clear that the holding of them must never be favored. But when the confessor encounters particular cases, let him judge concerning them according to the circumstances of the singular case.

Sacred Consistorial Congregation. Decree concerning certain dances in the United States of North America and in the Canadian region. - In the last century, in the Federated States of North America, there had begun a custom of calling together Catholic families to dances which were accustomed to be prolonged for many hours of the night with banquets and other recreations. The reason and cause of this thing was given, namely that Catholics might mutually know one another and be united more intimately by bonds of love and charity, and at the same time that subsidies necessary for this or that pious work might be procured. But those who were accustomed to announce these gatherings and preside over them were for the most part presidents of some pious work, and not rarely rectors of churches themselves or pastors. But the Ordinaries of the places, although they did not doubt concerning the right end of those who promoted these dances, nevertheless, perceiving the harms and dangers of the introduced practice, judged that it belonged to their office to proscribe them; and therefore in can. 290 of the Plenary Council of Baltimore they established these things: "We command also that priests take care that the abuse by which banquets are prepared with dances (balls) for promoting pious works be altogether removed." But, as often happens in human affairs, those things which had most justly and wisely been commanded from the beginning gradually began to come into oblivion, and the use of dances again to prevail, indeed also to be diffused into the neighboring region of the Canadian dominion. Knowing these things, the Most Eminent Fathers of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, having heard several Ordinaries of the places, and with the matter subjected to examination with much study, judged that one must altogether stand by the sanctions established by the Third Council of Baltimore: and, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Benedict XV, Pope, they decreed that all priests, whether secular or regular, and other clerics, are altogether prohibited from promoting and fostering the mentioned dances, even if for the relief and subsidy of pious works, or for any other pious end; and moreover that all clerics are forbidden from being present at these dances, if perhaps they are promoted by laymen. But the Supreme Pontiff commanded that this decree be made public law and be observed religiously by all, anything whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding. Given at Rome, from the buildings of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, on the day of March 31, 1916.

To a certain Ordinary asking: Whether the dances of which the decree of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation of March 31, 1916 treats, and which the same Sacred Congregation proscribed, are sometimes licit, or are not comprehended in the reprobation, if they are held during daytime hours, or only in the first hours of the night, and are not too greatly prolonged, or even if they are held without banquets or by that method which commonly is accustomed to be called picnic? The Sacred Congregation responded: "They are comprehended in the reprobation: and therefore all clerics are prohibited from promoting them, even in the mentioned circumstances, and if they are promoted by others, they are prohibited from being present at them." Sacred Consistorial Congregation, Dec. 10, 1917.

Concerning Spectacles. Concerning spectacles nearly the same thing is to be held as concerning dances, namely that they are not illicit of themselves, but can become evil because of circumstances. The reason is that they are opposed to no law, neither natural nor positive. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 168, art. 3.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He does not sin mortally who, scandal being set aside, is present at a play not gravely shameful, unless perhaps he knows by experience that he is vehemently moved by games of this kind toward lust with proximate danger of consent, so that the spectacle is for him a proximate occasion of sinning. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de sexto praec. Decal., n. 427.

2nd. If in plays things notably shameful were represented, or in a shameful manner, it would indeed be mortal to watch them on account of delight arising from the shameful things themselves; but venial on account of curiosity only or vain enjoyment, excluding however danger of consent in shameful delight, which will easily be present in adolescents, or in others of little timorous conscience, and unless scandal is present; and it would plainly be present if clerics or religious were present at shameful plays. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. and Hom. Ap., tract. 9, n. 10.

3rd. Deservedly, because of the scandal of others, both those who by money or applause cooperate in notably shameful plays are condemned of mortal sin, and those also who are bound to impede them and, when they conveniently can, do not impede them; but a fortiori those who represent them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. But insofar as it can be opposed to charity, it is a certain participation in the evil action of another. Cooperation is distinguished in many ways; for it is: 1st, immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator acts with the sinner in the very act of sin, or posits other actions having some connection with the sin of another; 2nd, proximate or remote, according as the action of the cooperator is connected more closely or more remotely with the evil action of another; 3rd, positive or negative, according as the cooperator either posits some action influencing the sin of another, for example, by helping him, or omits a due act, for example, if he does not obstruct, when he ought to obstruct; 4th, formal or material: the former concurs with the evil will of another, and participates in his evil action insofar as it is evil; the latter concurs only with the action, insofar as it is something physical and indifferent, abstracting from the end and malice of the principal agent.

Cooperation is made chiefly in nine ways, namely by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising, furnishing recourse, participating in the action or profit, by being silent, by not obstructing, by not manifesting. Hence the verses:

Command, counsel, consent, praise, recourse, One participating, mute, not obstructing, not manifesting.

Formal cooperation is never licit; but material cooperation can become licit if there is present a just cause proportioned to the gravity of the sin of another and to the proximity of the concurrence to the execution of the sin. The reason of the first is taken from the very definition of formal cooperation. But the reason of the second is that, when you cooperate only materially, you do not contract the malice of the action itself, for this is supposed to be good or indifferent; nor do you sin by virtue of any evil intention whatsoever, because this must be wholly absent; nor finally do you become guilty by virtue of the sin of another, because if he wishes to abuse your cooperation for executing sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it, and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, when a just and proportionate cause intervenes, you are excused from every sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 63.

From the application of this principle all solutions concerning cooperation must be gathered. But this application, if it is considered speculatively, appears easy; but practically speaking, nothing in all moral theology is more difficult. For often it can scarcely be determined whether cooperation is formal or material, which indeed would always have to be determined in the first place. Then, once it is posited that it is known that cooperation in some case is only material, it does not follow from that that it is in fact licit, but only that it can be licit if the aforesaid required conditions have place. Now the verification of those conditions cannot be known from some physical mark of discernment or scale, but from rules of prudence and discretion, the application of which has always been difficult. Wherefore we add here several particular solutions, so that they may be an example for obtaining other similar ones.

As Regards Servants. - Question 1.

Is it licit for a servant to bring wine to the table, by which the master and guests will become drunk, or to prepare and serve meats on days of abstinence?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably as to each; for on the one hand cooperation of this kind seems certainly material, and on the other a servant could scarcely refuse those and other services of this kind without at the same time being bound to refuse any service whatever, at least among us, which certainly imports a grave inconvenience. Add that often it is difficult to foresee excess in drink or to know certainly that no reason or dispensation is had for eating meats. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 68 and 69. - Kenrick, n. 137.

Question 2. Is it ever licit for a servant to put his shoulders under, or to carry a ladder for, a master climbing up to fornicate, to open a door by force, and similar things?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, because these actions are indifferent of themselves, at least in relation to fornication, and the whole malice is held on the part of the master requiring them. But the sole reason of service, or fear of any notable detriment whatsoever, does not suffice for excusing, but fear of death, mutilation, or similar most grave harm is required. The reason is taken not only from the condemnation of the proposition to be cited immediately, but also from the proximity of the influence which cooperation has upon the sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 66 and 68. - Kenrick, n. 141.

Question 3. Can a maidservant open the door of the house to a prostitute?

Response. The Doctors more commonly affirm, and very many excuse her by the sole reason of service, but not when another who would open is lacking. - But other theologians contend that it is never licit to open the door to a prostitute, and they rely on the following proposition, which is the 51st condemned by Innocent XI: "The servant who, with shoulders placed under, knowingly helps his master to climb through windows to violate a virgin, and many times subserves him by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable detriment, for instance lest he be badly treated by the master, lest he be looked upon with fierce eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." - But these words, opening a door, manifestly ought to be understood of opening by force the house of another, as is clear from the context. Cf. Viva on this proposition. - St. Alphonsus, n. 66. - Kenrick, n. 140.

Question 4. Can a servant by reason of service saddle a horse for a man about to go forth to sin, or accompany him?

Response. Affirmatively, probably, if the servant only saddles the horse, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more with the sin of the master than if he should hand shoes or a hat to him when he is going to leave the house. But according to St. Alphonsus it would not be permitted to him to accompany his master to the place where the sin is to be perpetrated, unless he must incur some grave harm. But there are not lacking grave theologians who indeed require some other grave harm in the case in which the master would not go to sin without the servant, because then the cooperation would be more necessary and therefore more proximate; but if another servant would not be lacking, or the master would go equally without the servant, then they teach that the sole reason of service suffices for accompanying him. Yet all make exception for the case in which the master would be rendered more emboldened for sinning by the servant accompanying him, because then the cooperation would be formal, which is never licit.

Applying this solution to another similar case, we can say that it is licit for a coachman to carry someone to a brothel by the sole reason of service or of the fare accepted, since, if he refused, another coachman would not be lacking. Yet he seems to cooperate formally who would lead someone ignorant of where the brothel is to that place, or would furnish his work for carrying him there more secretly and safely. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 64. - Kenrick, n. 137. - Baller., note (b), p. 218. Revue des sciences ecclés., vol. 9, p. 161.

Question 5. Is it licit for a servant to write or transmit letters inciting to shameful things, or to carry gifts to a prostitute?

Response. It indeed seems never to be licit to write or transmit letters of this kind, when what they contain is known, because to utter shameful things or suggest them to another is intrinsically evil. - But if in those letters it is said only that the prostitute should wait at such a place, should come to the house at such an hour, or something else of this kind, then the malice is held only on the part of the agent, and therefore the cooperation would be only material, which, a proportionate cause being posited, can be excused. The same must be said concerning the transmission of gifts, which is not evil except from the intention and end of the master. Thus it seems that what is taught in diverse ways by different authors concerning a servant carrying love letters or gifts must be explained. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 219, and note (a), p. 220. - Revue des sciences ecclés., loc. cit., pp. 158 and following.

As Regards Workmen. - Question 1.

Is it licit for workmen to build temples of heretics?

Response. Negatively, if this is demanded by heretics in hatred of religion; but otherwise in another hypothesis, when a just cause presses, excluding however scandal, which among us scarcely has place.

Question 2. Is it licit to make statues of false gods?

Response. Affirmatively, if these are not to be employed for false worship, but for the ornament of streets, buildings, etc.; but otherwise, if they are to be handed over to a pagan. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 69.

Question 3. Is it sometimes licit to cooperate in publishing bad books?

Response. It is licit for a grave cause to cooperate mediately or remotely, for example, to prepare ink or paper or arrange printed books. But to cooperate immediately in the printing of such books, for example, to arrange the type, to direct the printing, etc., generally speaking, does not seem licit. I said generally speaking, because in a case of most grave detriment, for a brief time, Laymann indicates that some such thing can be furnished materially, de Caritate, chap. 13, n. 5.

Question 4. What is to be said concerning the cooperation of clerks among bankers?

Response. Kenrick has this: "Clerks among bankers are not bound to judge concerning their manner of acting whether it is just; nor are they considered to concur effectively in fraud, if perhaps there is any, since they furnish a bare ministry according to defined rules. Otherwise one must speak if they themselves persuaded others to sell promissory notes at an unjust price, or if they compose accounts falsely for fraud." - Cf. Kenrick, n. 154.

Question 5. Is it licit for a Catholic to make masonic signs?

Response. Negatively, unless there is a truly grave cause.

As Regards Merchants. - Question 1.

Is it licit for merchants to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, women's adornments, etc., when future abuse is foreseen?

Response. Affirmatively, because a sale of this kind is not evil of itself, since those things are indifferent, and can be turned to a good use. Therefore the only reason for doubting is taken from the foreseen sin of the buyer, which charity obliges you to impede. But charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, and this could easily be present, especially among us, if merchants, suspecting or even certainly foreseeing future abuse, refused to sell to someone in particular wares exposed to all and indifferent of themselves. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 71. - Baller., note (a), p. 223.

Question 2. Is it licit to sell poison?

Response. Affirmatively, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it badly; the reason is that today poisonous potions or herbs are employed for many effects, either good or indifferent, and therefore it can easily be presumed that poison is not bought for perpetrating evil. But the answer is otherwise if it is a question of the sale of those instruments (male protectors) which today are frequently employed for sinning more freely.

As Regards Innkeepers. - Question 1.

Is it licit for innkeepers to give liquors to those who are foreseen as about to make themselves drunk?

Response. It is not licit without a grave reason, as is clear. But it is licit on account of fear of some grave harm, for example, acts of violence, quarrels, etc. ...; because charity does not oblige us to turn another away from sin with grave inconvenience. Likewise for preventing blasphemies, which are graver evils. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 69.

Question 2. How must one act with innkeepers who admit dances in their buildings, so that they may attract more guests?

Response. Generally they are to be turned away from this insofar as can be done, because dances, especially those which are held in an inn, for the most part are done less honorably and furnish an occasion to many sins. Nevertheless absolution is not always to be denied to them, but the circumstances and the ordinary manner in which those dances are held must be considered.

Question 3. Is it licit for masters of inns to propose any public journals whatsoever to be read by guests?

Response. They cannot admit those which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to religion and good morals, even if guests cease to flow to them on that account. Yet they can admit all those which treat of merely political matters. Nor do they seem bound to reject some journal because it sometimes contains something less right against the faith, provided it is not generally opposed to religion.

As Regards Nuns and Other Catholics Serving the Sick. - Question 4. Is it licit for them to call a heretical minister to one dying?

Response. To call spontaneously a heretical minister, so that he may furnish the dying person with the consolations of religion, is illicit on account of forbidden communication in divine things. For the same reason it is illicit for nuns having care of the sick in a hospital to comply with the custom of a dying heretic asking the help of a minister of his sect, as the Holy Office responded in a particular case on March 14, 1848. The decree is as follows:

"D. Evens ... humbly sets forth that in the city of Neutz ... there exists a hospital, of which he himself is Rector and Chaplain, and in which Nuns have the care of the sick. ... But since in this hospital followers of a non-Catholic religion are from time to time received, and the same repeatedly ask for a heretical minister from whom they may receive the aids and consolations of religion, it is asked whether it is licit for the aforesaid nuns to call a minister of false religion? It is asked moreover whether the same solution is to be given where a sick heretic stays in the private house of a certain Catholic; namely whether then the Catholic can licitly call a heretical minister?

"Response. According to the things set forth, it is not licit; and according to the mind." The mind is, "that they conduct themselves passively." In the Declaration to the Vicar Apostolic of Egypt of February 5, 1872 the sense of the words they conduct themselves passively is explained: "The mind of the Most Eminent Fathers is that the Prelate Orator be notified that to Nuns or other Catholic persons assigned to the direction or service of the Hospital, it is not licit to furnish their work directly to non-Catholic sick persons for calling their own minister, and it will be well if, when the occasion has been given, they declare this; but the Most Eminent Fathers add that for calling the minister the ministry of some person belonging to the respective sect of those asking can be employed. And thus the doctrine remains intact with relation to forbidden communication in divine things." This Leo XIII approved on Dec. 26, 1898. Cf. Analecta Ecclesiastica, year 7, pp. 98, 99, where you will find the Declaration rendered into Latin. But if no non-Catholic is present, it is illicit for Catholics to call the minister, so that he may perform his heretical rites. But to say to the minister: this sick person wishes that you visit him, seems licit on account of a most grave reason, for example, on account of hatred against the Church and other harms otherwise going to arise. Cf. Genicot, vol. 1, n. 201. Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, n. 652.

It Must Be Noted. "In hospital ... X ... whose ownership belongs to the Sisters of the Congregation of S. N., the Superior is anxious: 1. Whether she ought to inquire into the doctors by questioning them themselves or by another means, whether they rightly observe the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition of May 4, 1898, with its declaration of March 5, 1902. The reason for the doubt is that practicing doctors are chosen by the Sisters. 2. Or whether it suffices that they choose conscientious doctors, to whom they leave both the manner of proceeding and the responsibility, without themselves inquiring." The Sacred Penitentiary responded to the proposed doubts: To 1 ... Negatively. To 2 ... Affirmatively, nor is the Superior bound to obstruct the work of such doctors, unless in the case in which their intention of prevaricating will evidently betray itself. Sacred Penitentiary, July 7, 1911. - Nouvelle Rev. Théol., v. 44, p. 35.

Mary, a good Catholic, acts as matron in a certain orphanage. She indeed frequents the Catholic church, but she is asked by the Anglican minister, who conducts divine service for the Anglicans in the orphanage itself, to assist and sing in that service, since she enjoys an excellent voice and the service is celebrated after Mass. Mary consents; and when she notices that not all the Anglicans in the house are present at the service, she afterward exhorts them to be present, and thus wins the minister’s favor to the greatest extent. But when she read a certain book about indifferentism, she conceived scruples about these things, and therefore questioned her confessor concerning their lawfulness. Hence it is asked:

1. To what is a Catholic bound by reason of the faith’s being professed externally?

2. What is cooperation with another’s sin, and to what extent is it unlawful?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. See this question answered, p. 144.

2. What is co-operation in another’s sin, and how far is it unlawful?

Co-operation, in general, is the helping of the principal agent in the doing of an action. Hence one who helps another to commit sin co-operates with him in that sin. This co-operation is formal or material. There is formal co-operation when help is given to do what is sinful and what can not be done without sin. Co-operation is material when help is given by doing something which is not sinful in itself, but which the principal agent abuses in order to commit sin. Formal co-operation in another’s sin is never lawful; material co-operation is lawful when the action of him who co-operates is good, or at least indifferent, and when there is a sufficient reason for the co-operation proportionate to the evil co-operated in, and to the closeness of the co-operation.

3. The case. Mary, a Catholic, is matron in an orphanage. She goes to the Catholic Church, but is asked by the Anglican minister, who conducts the Anglican service in the orphanage, to sing at the service, as she has a good voice, and the service is held after Mass, so that it will not prevent her going to her own Church. Mary consents, and still further conciliates the minister by urging all the Anglicans in the house to attend the service. From reading a book on indifferentism, she gets a scruple about the lawfulness of these actions, and asks her confessor about them.

Her confessor will tell Mary that she had done wrong, although she was excused on account of her good faith. She did wrong in taking part in non-Catholic religious services, for, as we saw above (p. 148), all such action is wrong. In urging others to join in Anglican worship, which she knew or ought to have known to be false, she also did wrong, although, of course, Anglicans, believing in it in good faith, join in it without committing sin. Mary should allow the inmates to follow their consciences with regard to their religious duties, and she should see that the time allowed for this purpose in the institution is not interfered with, but for the rest she should leave them alone.

Agatha and Lucy, the former a Catholic, the latter an Anglican of the church called High, were joined to one another by the bond of friendship. They often helped each other in works of charity; indeed, not rarely Lucy brought help to Agatha in works of religion, and in particular acted the part of a saleswoman in selling smaller goods of every kind (took a stall at a bazaar), so that the Catholic church might be built more splendidly. A little later, the Anglican church which Lucy frequented was to be restored by employing the same means, and Agatha was asked by her friend that she herself should perform the similar part of saleswoman for the Anglican church. Not knowing how to refuse, Agatha assented; indeed, she herself contributed some things to be sold as a testimony of a grateful spirit toward Lucy. The Catholics, however, were not a little scandalized, and accordingly Agatha afterward relieved her troubled conscience to her confessor. It is asked:

1. When is someone obliged to avoid the scandal of others?

2. When is cooperation in another’s sin lawful?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. When is one obliged to avoid giving scandal to others ?

We must of course avoid giving scandal to others by doing anything wrong ourselves which will lead them into sin. We are also obliged to omit any action which is indifferent or good but not of precept by which scandal would be given to the weak or ignorant, if we can do so without serious inconvenience. We may not omit in this case an action which is prescribed by natural law; whether we are bound to omit what is prescribed by positive law is a disputed question among theologians. We are not bound to avoid pharisaic scandal by omitting an action which is good or indifferent and which has no appearance of evil.

2. When is co-operation in another’s sin lawful?

Formal co-operation in another's sin is never lawful; material co-operation is lawful provided that the action by which co-operation is given is good or at least indifferent, and provided that there is a good and proportionate reason for the co-operation (see p. 152).

3. The case. Agatha, a Catholic, and Lucy, an Anglican of the High Church party, were friends. They often helped each other in works of charity, and Lucy often helped Agatha in what she did for religion, taking a stall when a bazaar was held to raise funds for making an addition to the Catholic church of the place. When the Anglican church was to be restored, Lucy asked Agatha to take a stall for her, and Agatha not only consented but gave some objects to be sold at the bazaar as a mark of her gratitude. At this Catholics were scandalized, and so Agatha told what she had done when she went to confession.

There was no harm in the two friends working together in deeds of charity, and Lucy’s help could be accepted in the Catholic bazaar. But Agatha should have shown her gratitude to her friend in some other way than by taking a stall and giving things to be sold at the Anglican bazaar held for the restoration of the Anglican church. For this is a religious object, and a Catholic is not at liberty to help and show favor to a non-Catholic religious object. It naturally gave scandal to other Catholics. Agatha, therefore, was guilty of material wrong-doing as she seems to have acted in good faith, and she should avoid such actions in future, as a general rule. There might be exceptional circumstances which might excuse a Catholic who contributed to the restoration of an Anglican church because it was an ancient historical monument, if it could be done without scandal. In the case we suppose no such special circumstances to exist.

Those who watch over the public peace in London were recently informed about certain forgers who were manufacturing counterfeit banknotes. Hence they induced a certain Caius to buy those counterfeit notes for them for the sake of proving the crime, which he did by giving fifty shillings for each note whose fictitious value was five pounds sterling. When the priests Titius and Julius read this in the public newspapers, they disagreed concerning the honesty of Caius’s action, Titius saying that it was lawful, but Julius denying it, since it is never lawful to incite anyone to evil. Hence it is asked:

1. What is scandal, and what kind of sin is it?

2. What is it to cooperate in another’s sin, and is it ever lawful?

3. How do an occasion and a cause of another’s sin differ, and is it lawful to posit either one?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 198.

2. This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 203.

3. How does an occasion of another's sin differ from a cause of it, and is it lawful to put either?

An occasion of sin is given when something is done which another takes advantage of to commit sin although what was done did not cause the sin either physically or morally.

The occasion may have suggested the sin, but it did not cause it; the sin is wholly due to him who takes advantage of the occasion to do wrong. A cause of sin on the other hand produces it, or effects it, either physically or morally. Thus one who induces another by persuasion to commit theft is the moral cause of his sin; if he merely committed theft himself without saying anything to the other, who thereupon followed his example, the former would be the occasion of the latter's sin.

The case. The London police had information about some forgers of bank notes. In order to be able to convict them they induced Caius to buy some of the forged notes for them at the rate of fifty shillings for each five pound note. When two priests, Titius and Julius, read of this in the papers, they disagreed about the lawfulness of the proceeding. Titius said that it was all right; Julius denied this, on the ground that it is never lawful to incite anyone to do wrong, and this Caius did by inducing the forgers to sell worthless bits of paper for fifty shillings.

Titius was right and Julius was wrong. Caius knew what he was doing and there was nothing wrong in it from his point of view. He was willing to pay fifty shillings in order to get certain evidence of the crime committed by the forgers. For the common good he furnished them with an opportunity of betraying themselves, and they took it. The forgers always had the habitual intention of selling their worthless notes; whenever they did this, they committed sin. But Caius had good reason for furnishing them with an occasion of selling their notes though they committed sin thereby. With this sin Caius only co-operated materially, not formally.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book ii, treatise 3, no. 47.

Wilhelmina, a widow with one child to support, ekes out a scanty living by keeping a notion store and renting rooms to a few lodgers. Juliana is a very liberal customer and purchases many things at the store of the widow. She has a son, a good fellow, but a little wild, who is in love with Alberta. He has tried to pay his address to the young lady at her home, but her parents will not permit him to do so. They have also forbidden Alberta to call at the house of her lover’s parents. To avoid the difficulty, Joyce, the lover, hires a room in the house of Wilhelmina and there he receives the visits of his sweetheart. Wilhelmina is now scrupulous about the matter and wishes to know from her confessor whether she can continue to rent the room for this use.

Answer.—The confessor must first find out what effects are consequent upon these secret visits of Alberta to the room of her devoted Joyce. Are these visits the occasion of serious sin? Do they give serious scandal? The lovers may meet and yet have no temptation to sin; or they may sin. If the widow has moral certainty that her lodger uses the room for the purpose of sin, then she must refuse to let him have the room. If she does not so act, she is guilty of cooperation in his sin. If the secret meeting becomes known then scandal will inevitably follow, with the loss of reputation to both parties. However, Wilhelmina is not certain that any sinful action takes place; and no one knows of the meeting but herself. Besides, if she dismisses Joyce, she will have difficulty in renting the room. This she knows from experience, and it is a serious matter with her, for she earns scarcely enough to pay for her own rent and support herself and child. Before compelling her to refuse the room to her lodger all these circumstances must be weighed. She fears likewise, and with good reason, that she will lose the trade of Juliana, which is a very considerable item in her battle for proper existence. If sin is committed, not even these circumstances will permit her to keep the room at the disposal of the young people. She must get rid of them. If they do not come together for evil purposes, but merely to see each other and spend a happy hour or two, and no scandal is the resultant, then we do not think that she is obliged to suffer the grave consequences alleged, but can continue to derive her revenue from the rental of the room. There is one thing certain: that is, Alberta is disobeying, if not the letter, at least the spirit, of the prohibition of her parents. Yet it is no part of the duty of the widow to force obedience from Alberta. In any case she cannot control Alberta on this point. So the widow is no determining factor in this disobedience. She is not to blame. In default of good reasons to the contrary we do not think it obligatory for Wilhelmina to dislodge the youthful schemer.