Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 2. On cooperation in evil
617. Notions. To cooperate in general is to work with another; therefore to cooperate in evil is a concurrence furnished to the wicked action of another. This concurrence, however, can be furnished in a threefold way: a) By an influence upon the will of the agent who executes the wicked action; in this way those cooperate who command, counsel, flatter, etc. This cooperation does not differ essentially from scandal, concerning which enough has been said in the preceding paragraph, and concerning it there will be treatment again below II, n. 100, where there will be speech about cooperative damaging. b) By participation in the very wicked action; in this way, e.g., those cooperate who by combined strength execute a theft. c) By the presentation of matter or a faculty necessary for acting; in this way, e.g., those cooperate who furnish wine for drunkenness, weapons for killing, etc.
The first mode of cooperation is reduced to scandal, as has already been said, and is a cause of sin; the second mode is immediate cooperation; the third mode, however, is mediate cooperation, and is either proximate, when the matter or faculty furnished proximately influences the wicked action of another, as if someone sells poison to a man prepared to kill another; or it is remote, when the matter furnished influences the wicked action only remotely, as if someone sells a lamb to a Jew, which he perhaps will slaughter as a paschal lamb. From what has been said thus far it follows that scandal and cooperation are intimately connected. But the principal difference between the two is that scandal causes the evil will of the sinner, whether by counsel, or command, or persuasion, or example, etc.; cooperation, however, supposes the evil will of the sinner and serves only as an instrument for completing that evil will by an external work.
Division. Besides the distinctions of cooperation already given into mediate and immediate, and into proximate and remote, there is given the principal distinction into formal and material cooperation.
Formal cooperation is that which helps another toward the formal element of sin, i.e. toward sin as it is sin; and this indeed happens if formal cooperation is sinful in itself, i.e. whether from the moral object itself or end of the work, or from the end of the one operating, e.g. if someone helps another to perpetrate homicide.
Material cooperation is to help toward the material element of sin, i.e. toward the action of another, not as it is sin, but as it is a physical action;140 and therefore cooperation is an action honorable in itself or at least indifferent, which nevertheless another abuses for sin; e.g. if a wife from a good intention renders the conjugal debt to a husband abusing it for onanism. - It must be confessed that not rarely it is most difficult to discern whether formal cooperation is present or not; nor do different theologians always agree in this matter.
140 Authors do not agree in the description of material and formal cooperation. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 63) writes: "Some say that cooperation is then material when it of itself by accident and remotely conduces to the sin of another; but then formal when through itself, or on account of some joined circumstance, it proximately conduces to the execution of sin, although of itself it would be indifferent. - But it must better be said with others that that cooperation is formal which concurs only toward the evil will of another and cannot be without sin; but that that cooperation is material which concurs only toward the evil action of another besides the intention of the one operating." - Formal cooperation arises 1. from an intrinsically evil action, e.g. to print things against religion; 2. from the depraved intention of the agent, e.g. to help a maidservant so that she may more easily be able to sin with her paramour, as was said above.
618. Principle 1. Formal cooperation in the sin of another is intrinsically evil and therefore is never licit.
Thus all theologians teach. But the intrinsic reason for this principle is that formal cooperation includes the consent of the will in another's sin; and this, certainly, is never licit.
Formal cooperation has a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the particular virtue, e.g. justice, which is wounded through the sin of both cooperating persons; and therefore in confession that sin to which someone has formally cooperated must be declared with all its circumstances.
619. Principle 2. Material cooperation in the sin of another is sometimes licit, provided that a sufficient cause and a right intention are present.
St. Alphonsus proves this principle, admitted by almost all, in this way: "The reason is that, when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if another wishes to abuse it in order to execute his sin, you are not bound except from charity to prevent it; and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, placing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin. For then his sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him himself, who abuses your action. Nor is it valid to say that your action, although indifferent, yet joined with the circumstance of the depraved intention of another, becomes evil; for in truth your action is not through itself joined with that evil will of his, but he joins his evil will with your action; whence your action will not then be a cause through itself influencing sin, but only an occasion which he abuses for sinning."141
For discerning, however, when in individual cases this cooperation is licit, the rules are to be applied which above, n. 57, were given concerning the indirectly voluntary, namely if three conditions are present, i.e.: 1. if the action of the cooperator is good in itself or at least indifferent; 2. if the intention of the cooperator is right; and 3. if there is present a just cause, and indeed one proportioned both to the gravity of the sin of another and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.
Application in practice. The principle concerning material cooperation is clear and certain; but its application in individual cases that occur is often most difficult. Now difficulty in practice can occur 1. whether such an action is intrinsically evil or not; 2. even if it is certain that the action is not intrinsically evil, whether there is present an excusing cause sufficiently grave. As to the first,142 the action is not to be considered only abstractly, but with all circumstances and adjuncts. Hence, e.g., that a public driver (commonly Lohnkutscher, cocher) conveys in his carriage one asking to some determined place is an indifferent action; but if someone were to ask from that driver that he should conduct him to a brothel, this would not be licit and the action of conveying would become intrinsically evil. But in the case in which someone approaches such a driver now not asking that he wish to conduct him to a brothel, but to a determined house in a determined street, then even if that house designated is a brothel and the driver knows this, the action of conveying remains an indifferent action and therefore licit, if there is a sufficient cause. The reason is that a public driver is bound to convey all men asking to the places determined by them, nor does it belong to him to care what those asking are going to do in those places.
But as to the second, namely when there is present a proportionately grave cause, this depends upon the judgment of prudent men. St. Alphonsus143 assigns the following rules from Busenbaum: "A cause is required that is the graver, 1. in proportion as the sin, for which an occasion is given, is graver; 2. in proportion as it is more probable that, without your cooperating, the other would not sin, or in proportion as the effect of the sin is more certain; 3. in proportion as your cooperation touches the sin more nearly; 4. in proportion as you have less right to such a work; 5. finally, in proportion as the sin is more opposed to justice, and this on account of the damage of a third party."
From what has been said thus far it follows that not only formal cooperation, but sometimes (and that not rarely) even material cooperation is gravely illicit on account of defect of a sufficient cause. But that it may appear more clearly in what way the principles given are to be applied in practice, we solve the following practical cases:
141 Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 63.
142 Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 120.
143 L. c. n. 59.
620. Resolves. 1. Cooperation in religious and political matters. Today almost everywhere there exists so-called "liberty of worship." This liberty of worship of itself is something wholly illicit; nevertheless, on account of greater evils to be avoided, Catholics can accept it, and therefore Catholic deputies can from a grave cause give a vote in Parliaments that from the public treasury subsidies be given for non-Catholic worship.144 But it is not licit to elect as deputy for parliamentary or municipal assemblies one who wishes to defend Liberalism or something else against the Catholic religion; for this would be cooperation against the good of religion. It is not licit positively to adhere to Socialists who plot against religion and legitimate civil authority; but if there is a just cause, it is licit together with Socialists to employ legitimate means for obtaining a just wage, or for repelling unjust oppressions of the rich. Proximate cooperation in an action which is gravely harmful to the common good, whether of religion or of the republic, is licit on account of no private temporal damage. Hence in Rome, where once great damage was being brought upon the Catholic religion from any help whatever furnished to Protestantism, the construction of Protestant temples was gravely prohibited by the Cardinal Vicar through the Instruction of July 12, 1878: "Nor are exempt from mortal sin the architects, contractors of workmen, masters, who undertake care and labor for building and adorning some Protestant temple. But as regards the masons themselves and other subordinate workmen, they can be excused from sin, provided scandal is absent, and that the things they are ordered to do are not done in contempt of religion."
In other regions, however, where many Protestants live with Catholics, and no grave scandal arises, if a Catholic architect builds a Protestant temple, there being a grave reason, it can be permitted that he undertake such a work.145 The same must be said of those who adorn Protestant temples with paintings or statues, who sell utensils necessary for a non-Catholic rite. Marc-Raus146 writes to the point: "Catholics are not to be disquieted who, in order to avoid grave damage, build or restore synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, provided scandal is not present and it is not in contempt of religion. On account of the defect of this condition they are bound to abstain from the work, a) where a work of this kind is commonly held as a sign protesting for a false religion; or b) something is contained in it which through itself directly and uniquely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; or c) it is certain that Catholic artisans are driven or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion." - The S. Penitentiary, having been asked whether it is licit for Catholics to contribute money for building a heretical temple, in the year 1822 responded: "Affirmatively, but only for freeing themselves and their temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants."
144 Thus also Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 818.
145 Thus also S. Off. July 7, 1864, ad 10 (Collectan. de Prop. Fid. n. 1257).
146 Instit. mor. I, n. 523 (3).
621. 2. Cooperation of servants is judged to be material and licit: a) To prepare forbidden foods on days of fast. For they can form for themselves the conscience that the master has a dispensation for eating those foods. b) To open the door to visitors, although they come for an evil end, provided the danger of perversion is absent, which indeed will rarely be absent in that case. c) To accompany the master to a Protestant temple or to a synagogue, if this is required by them by reason of service and not in hatred of the faith. It is required, however, that such accompaniment not appear as a protestation of false religion, nor that the servants actively participate in the false worship.147 d) To carry letters or other things to some person with whom the master has illicit intercourse.148 The reason is that the servant by force of office is bound to perform works of this kind, nor does it belong to him to investigate what is contained in those letters or for what end such things are sent by the master.
Nor is St. Alphonsus opposed to this solution except apparently; for he seems to suppose that the servant has full confidence, as they say, of his master, and proximately and positively helps him by his works toward an evil end; and this indeed is certainly not licit. But in our times and in our regions servants are not accustomed to have the confidence of their masters in this way, but works are enjoined upon them simply, and it does not pertain to them to care what in particular the master intended by some enjoined work. Certainly it would be illicit cooperation if a male or female servant were to hide or help the evil actions of the sons of the family, lest they be detected by the parents. The proposition condemned by Innocent XI also seems to have to be understood of such proximate and positive cooperation in the evil action itself: "A servant who, with shoulders bent down, knowingly helps his master to ascend through a window to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in the same thing by carrying the ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally if he does this through fear of notable detriment, for instance lest he be badly treated by the master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house."149 For although such cooperation is not intrinsically evil, as St. Alphonsus rightly teaches,150 nevertheless the excusing causes brought forward do not suffice to render it licit.
147 Cf. what was said above n. 525 sq. concerning active communication in false worship.
148 Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 129; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 828.
149 Dens, n. 1201; cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 830.
150 Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.
622. 3. Cooperation of innkeepers. a) Toward drunkenness. It is material cooperation indeed, but often illicit, if an innkeeper serves intoxicating drink to someone who is already drunk, or who in a short time will be drunk if he takes more drink. The reason is that intoxicating drink is a proximate cause of some sin against the natural law, and therefore loss of profit alone on account of such a quantity of wine not sold is an insufficient excusing cause. But if from drink denied great inconveniences would arise, e.g. great quarrels and disturbances in the inn, then in order to avoid a greater evil the innkeeper could licitly serve drink even with drunkenness foreseen.
b) Toward the violation of abstinence. As to forbidden foods, a milder practice can be permitted today, because the positive law of forbidden foods does not oblige with great inconvenience, and because in present times there exist, at least in some regions, many dispensations for those who eat in public taverns. Generally speaking, an innkeeper can serve meats to anyone asking, even on forbidden days, unless it is openly certain that scandal arises from this or that this is done in hatred of religion; but he ought suitably to warn or instruct guests that fasting foods are also available to them.
c) As to wicked gatherings which perhaps are held in his house, those principles seem to have to be employed which are established concerning the leasing of a house for prostitutes. If by such a leasing the sins and seductions of those women become more numerous and therefore more harmful, it is not licit to lease houses to them; but if that would not happen, and if great damage would arise for the lessor from not leasing, he could lease his house to prostitutes. St. Alphonsus151 writes to the point: "In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is permitted, it is licit to lease a house to a usurer and to prostitutes; especially if other tenants are lacking, unless however the prostitutes would gravely harm honest neighbors, or on account of the location would give greater occasion to sins." The Holy Doctor cites for this opinion several theologians, among whom are Sanchez, Suarez, Azor, and the Salmanticenses. Nevertheless in our times he would be condemned and would have ill repute among all upright persons who, while he could lease a house to persons of good name, leased it to prostitutes; whence in practice today all the conditions which render licit a leasing of this kind are present very rarely. - The same holds concerning openly evil gatherings, to which an innkeeper can almost never open his house; e.g. it would not be licit to grant some room to Freemasons. But if such gatherings are not evidently evil, or if only two suspect persons wish to rent a room (as, alas, frequently happens), then an excusing cause can more easily be present.
d) Toward depraved readings. Innkeepers cannot licitly set out to be read papers which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to religion or morals. Other papers, although not so good, they can indeed set out from a grave cause; let them take care, however, that good papers also are always available.
151 Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 70.
623. 4. Cooperation of merchants. a) It is never licit to sell things which by their very nature have no use except an evil use. Hence, e.g., it is not licit to sell those instruments which serve for the abuse of marriage; likewise it is not licit to sell obscene images. b) It is licit from a reasonable cause to sell other things, in themselves indifferent, which perhaps from the malice of the buyer are employed for an evil end; for this is only material cooperation. And this excusing cause ought to be the graver in proportion as the abuse of the thing sold is foreseen to be graver. Hence it is licit from a proportionate cause to sell poison, weapons, organs and a pulpit also for the temples of Protestants, etc. c) It is not licit in newspapers which are wholly bad, i.e. openly fighting against religion or good morals, to advertise one's things to be rented or sold; for this would be cooperation toward sustaining those worst papers. But if the newspapers are not so manifestly bad, it would be licit, there being a just and grave cause, to advertise things pertaining to commerce; whence Leo XIII established in the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum: "Let no one from Catholics, especially from ecclesiastical men, publish anything in newspapers, or papers, or periodical booklets of this kind, unless a just and reasonable cause urges it." Likewise it is not licit, except from a reasonable cause, to sell or buy those newspapers, especially habitually by the so-called subscription. But one must always guard against both one's own perversion and the scandal of others. Those newspapers and periodicals are accustomed to pay a great salary to those who write well for them. Nevertheless, for the sake of profit alone, a Catholic seems unable to write in them. For the Code of Canon Law establishes, c. 1386, § 2: "In newspapers, papers, or periodical booklets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, let Catholic laymen also write nothing unless a just and reasonable cause urges it, approved by the Ordinary of the place."
Scholion. There are still almost innumerable cases of cooperation. But all can be rightly solved if attention is given to the principles concerning the indirectly voluntary and if the circumstances of different places, times, and persons are kept before one's eyes. It is also to be noted that in present times not all the resolutions of the old theologians have force any longer, since times and circumstances have been much changed.152
152 Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 809-838.