§ 4. On Cooperation

116. Notion. 1. Cooperation, taken in a broader sense, signifies concurrence with another who is acting; but in a stricter sense it signifies physical concurrence toward the evil action of another acting principally.

Cooperation taken in a broader sense also comprehends scandal and induction; but if it is taken in the stricter sense, it differs both from scandal and from induction: for scandal and induction concur in determining a neighbor, who is not yet determined to sin, either as an occasion or as a cause; but cooperation already supposes in another a will determined to sin and helps him by a physical action in perpetrating an external sin. Yet it can happen that cooperation at the same time becomes scandal, namely if it increases or confirms the evil will of the neighbor.

2. In this place the discussion is of cooperation taken in the strict sense, which is always positive and physical. Through this cooperation someone helps the neighbor in committing sin, either by his action alone, as he who puts his shoulders under one wishing to steal, or by furnishing matter, as he who supplies wine to one wishing to become drunk. Cooperation is to be considered insofar as it is opposed to charity.

¹ Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie III (1879), p. 511 ff.

117. Division of cooperation. Cooperation is divided:

1. Into formal, if the one cooperating concurs both with the intention and with the evil action, and into material, if he concurs only with the evil action.

a. One who hands keys to a thief so that he can steal cooperates formally if he intends to help him in the sin of theft, and cooperates materially if he supplies the keys, which the other abuses for stealing, from another end, for example to preserve his own life.

b. Cooperation can be formal in a twofold way: a. explicitly, from the intention of the one cooperating, who expressly has the will of participating in the sin of another; b. implicitly, from the nature of the work which is furnished, namely when someone exercises a work which by its nature or with attention to the circumstances is directly ordered to an evil action: for then the contrary intention is by that very fact retracted, and the intention of the evil action is had implicitly; as if someone participates in the sacred function of heretics, he cooperates formally, although he says that he does not intend this.

2. Into immediate, if the cooperation concurs in the evil action itself, and into mediate, if it concurs in an action which serves the sin and prepares the way for it.

Therefore one who sells a sword or poison which another abuses for homicide does not cooperate immediately; but one who with another beats or wounds someone, who with another sets fire to a house, drives cattle from a stable, or carries off a chest filled with another's property, cooperates immediately.

3. Mediate cooperation is either proximate or remote, according as the one cooperating concurs in those things which more proximately or more remotely serve the evil action. Let the cooperation of one who hands a ladder to a thief, or holds it while he climbs, or supports him as he climbs, be an example.

St. Alphonsus (n. 63) presents another notion of formal cooperation, who calls that cooperation formal which concurs with the evil will of another, "namely by exciting it or otherwise positively influencing it," as Aertnys interprets. Hence it happens that several particular questions are not solved by the holy doctor in the same way as by other authors.

118. Principles concerning the liceity of cooperation. 1. Formal cooperation is never licit: for since it includes approval of the sin of another, it is always evil in itself.

Formal cooperation has a twofold malice, one against charity, the other against the virtue which is injured through the cooperation; therefore in confession the sin to which someone has formally cooperated must be declared.

2. Material cooperation is indeed illicit of itself, but sometimes, when the required conditions are present, becomes licit.

a. Material cooperation is opposed to the precept of charity: for we are bound to prevent the sin of the neighbor if we conveniently can; therefore a fortiori not to help him in committing sin.

b. The conditions under which material cooperation becomes licit are two: that the action be good, or at least indifferent; that there be a proportionately grave cause of permitting another's sin. But when these conditions have been posited, material cooperation becomes licit: for where from some action not evil a twofold effect follows, one good, the other evil, from a proportionately grave cause it is licit to place that action, although the evil effect is foreseen as going to follow.¹

c. The cause excusing cooperation must be proportionately grave. Now what cause is sufficient so that cooperation can be made must be determined by the judgment of prudent persons; but in forming this judgment attention must be paid to these four things:

a. To the gravity of the sin: for the graver the sin is to which someone cooperates, the greater the cause excusing cooperation must be.

Thus a greater cause is required for it to be licit to cooperate in homicide than in theft, and a greater cause for it to be licit to cooperate in a sin against justice than in other sins: for this cooperation brings spiritual damage to the sinner alone, but that one also harms an innocent and unwilling neighbor.

b. To the proximity of the cooperation: for a graver cause is required for proximate cooperation than for remote cooperation; thus a greater reason is required for it to be licit to cooperate in printing an evil book by setting the type than by preparing the paper.

c. To the necessity of the cooperation: for a greater cause is required where the cooperation is so necessary that without it the sin would not be committed; but a lesser cause where, if cooperation were denied, the sin would nevertheless be committed.

d. To the obligation of preventing the sin: therefore a greater cause is required in those who are bound to prevent the sin also from the office of piety or justice.

3. Immediate cooperation likewise is illicit, excepting certain cases in sins against justice. For immediate cooperation ordinarily is evil from the nature of the work, therefore in itself; therefore it is never licit to cooperate immediately in the killing of another. But in some actions which are opposed to justice, sometimes the character of evil ceases; thus from a very grave cause it is licit to cooperate immediately in bringing grave damage upon the neighbor in goods of fortune.

a. It is licit, for example, from fear of death to help another in burning the house of another: a. if the one cooperating is willing afterwards to repair the damage; b. if the damage would have been inflicted even without his cooperation; c. if through the cooperation a greater evil of the neighbor can be prevented: for in all these cases the owner cannot be reasonably unwilling.

b. Whether this is also licit when the damage would not be done without the cooperation and the one cooperating cannot repair it, authors dispute. Those who deny say that the action of the one cooperating is intrinsically evil, because he who is injured is reasonably unwilling, since he is not bound with so great damage to himself to save the life of another. Those who affirm say more truly that one constituted in extreme necessity may take from the goods of the neighbor (even by destroying) as much as is required for preserving life.

4. Cooperation in a sin which tends to the destruction of the Church or of the republic is never licit; wherefore no cause ever, not even fear of the gravest evil, indeed not even of death itself, excuses from cooperation of this kind: for this evil, as public, is so great that any private person is bound to prevent it even with danger of life.

¹ Cf. De principiis, n. 82. Of the four conditions which are there said to be required in order that it be licit to place a cause from which a good and evil effect follow, two in this question are fulfilled from the nature of the thing; hence only two are counted here.

119. On material cooperation. The theory just explained concerning material cooperation and its liceity is altogether plain; but a great and twofold difficulty arises in judging particular facts: for often it is hardly understood whether some action is evil in itself or indifferent; then, not without trouble, there is determined the quantity of the cause which excuses from material cooperation to be furnished. Therefore first the principles must be explained from which judgment is to be made concerning the indifference of the action of the one cooperating; then some norm will be assigned according to which the gravity of the excusing cause can be determined.

120. On the indifference of the action of the one cooperating. 1. It belongs to the nature of a thing or action intrinsically evil that it cannot have a good use; things or actions which can become good or evil from the end of the agent are indifferent in themselves. Therefore a thing or action is not intrinsically evil because in fact it serves only an evil end, but because it neither has nor can have an honorable end. Thus to paint an obscene image which serves only to excite lust is an action evil in itself, because the image is unfit to serve another end, and that an honorable or indifferent one. There are very few (artificial) things evil in themselves which cannot have a good use; of this kind are wholly obscene images, wholly obscene writings, books wholly contumelious against God and religion, instruments which are apt only for frustrating generation, and remedies which can serve only for procuring abortion.

a. To make or sell idols is of itself an indifferent action: for idols, besides a superstitious end, can also have another use, for example for adorning a palace, for preserving the image of them, etc.

b. To write or print heretical things is indifferent of itself: for they can also be written and printed so that they may be refuted.

c. To make or sell signs of Freemasons, speaking absolutely, is an indifferent thing, because these signs also admit another use and contain no impiety.

d. To ring a bell for a heretical sermon is a conventional sign; from its signification it depends whether it is an action evil in itself or indifferent. For if it designates an invitation and convocation to a heretical rite, the action is evil in itself; but if it indicates nothing other than that the time of the sermon or heretical rite is present, it is indifferent. Laymann¹ and Lehmkuhl (n. 654), with others, attribute the latter signification to the sound of the bell.

2. Cooperation does not become illicit by this, that the one cooperating knows his thing or action to serve proximately for sin, provided the thing or action is indifferent and a sufficiently grave cause of permitting another's sin is present. Yet because in these circumstances, in which others also know that the thing is being used for an evil use, cooperation of itself signifies consent to an evil end, protestation can be necessary by which the one cooperating, in order to prevent scandal, declares that he does not wish to concur in evil.

a. A priest who administers the Eucharist to a sinner cooperates proximately indeed, but materially, in sacrilege: for his action, by which he places the consecrated host from one place into another, is indifferent and does not become evil in itself from the knowledge which he has that another abuses it for committing sacrilege.

b. To make or sell idols to those who use them for superstitious worship can practically be called illicit, because rarely will there be a sufficiently grave cause which excuses this proximate cooperation; but in itself and by its nature it is not to be called illicit, because the thing is indifferent and the knowledge by which it is known that it will be used proximately for evil does not make it illicit; therefore, if a gravest cause exists, this cooperation could be permitted.²

3. Actions which are apt to increase or confirm the evil will of the sinner are not intrinsically evil. For this circumstance, that the action of the one cooperating in its own way influences the evil will of the sinner, indeed shows that it also contains the character of scandal, because another is confirmed by it in evil; but it does not show that it is intrinsically evil.

Therefore the following actions are not evil, but indifferent: to accompany someone to a duel; to indicate to a thief the time and place in which he can put a theft into execution without danger; to keep watch while theft or adultery is committed; to carry love letters to a prostitute. Wherefore a servant can furnish these and things of this kind, not indeed by reason of service, but from a truly grave cause.³

¹ Bk. 2, tr. 3, c. 13, n. 5.

² Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 657; Genicot, I, n. 238. In this sense the responses of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide which declare cooperations of this kind illicit seem to be understood, namely because of defect of a sufficient cause.

³ Cf. Tamburini, Explicatio decalogi, bk. 5, c. 1, § 4, n. 19; St. Alphonsus, nn. 65, 67; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 289.

121. On the gravity of the excusing cause. 1. In order that some norm may be determined, these things can be established:

a. Remote cooperation is excused because of a light inconvenience which the one cooperating would suffer because of omitted cooperation, therefore also from the mere subjection by which a son is subject to his father, a servant to his master, or from the profit alone which is received from the action or ceases when the action is omitted.

b. Proximate cooperation is excused because of a grave cause or grave inconvenience which would follow from omitted cooperation.

c. Most proximate cooperation, especially that without which the sin would not be committed, is excused only from a very grave or even gravest cause, or from a gravest damage which would follow from omitted cooperation.

2. But grave, very grave, and gravest damage, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus, can be determined thus:

a. Examples of grave damage or inconvenience are: fear of great pain, of suffering great indignation from husband, father, or master; fear of losing notable profit (about ten florins for a poor man, about twenty for a man of slender fortune); notable annoyance or repugnance; great shame.

b. Examples of very grave damage: fear of not easily finding another master except with notable detriment, with great loss in reputation, honor, or goods of fortune; fear of falling notably from one's state; fear of grave prison.

c. Examples of gravest damage: danger of incurring death, of losing a principal member or some sense, for example an eye; fear of perpetual captivity, greatest infamy, acute disease; loss of all or almost all goods.¹

¹ Cf. Villada, Casus conscientiae, 2nd ed., Brussels: Vromant, 1885, I, p. 85 ff.