Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
§ I. Principles
I. Notion. Cooperation in sin, by the force of the word, is concurrence in the sin of another, whether of one already determined to sin or not yet determined. Here, however, it is taken chiefly for concurrence in the sin to which another is already determined; but concurrence in the sin of another not yet determined to sin we have called scandal1 (n. 545).
1 Nevertheless, occasionally we shall use the words scandal and cooperation interchangeably.
II. Division. Cooperation is distinguished as twofold, formal and material.
Formal cooperation is cooperation in the evil will of another; therefore it contains approval of the sin, and has place: 1. when someone cooperates with this intention, that the other sin, proceed more securely or more intensely, etc.; 2. when he places an action which either of itself or from the circumstances involves approval of the sin: of itself, as if you confirm the mind of the one sinning; from the circumstances, as if you spontaneously help another (St. Alphonsus, II, 63).
Material cooperation is cooperation in the execution of another's evil will. It is had when someone indeed concurs in the sin of another, but neither proceeds with the intention that the other sin, sin more securely, etc., nor places an action which of itself or from the circumstances involves approval of the sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).
Material cooperation is distinguished as twofold, immediate and mediate. Immediate cooperation is that by which someone participates in the depraved action or executes it with another, as if together with a thief you carry off the goods of a neighbor. Mediate cooperation is that by which someone supplies the means of executing the depraved action, as if you hand a key to a thief, by which he can open a house.
Mediate cooperation again is twofold, proximate and remote, according as the means supplied coheres more or less with the depraved action.
III. Morality; concerning this it must be investigated how far cooperation is a sin, what kind of sin it is, and how great a sin it is.
- How far is it a sin? Sacred Scripture teaches that cooperation in evil is of itself a sin. Thus, for example: "Cleanse me, O Lord, from hidden things, and spare your servant from those of others";1 likewise: "Impose hands quickly on no one, nor communicate in the sins of others."2 The reason to be stated presently is added, where there is question specifically of formal and material cooperation. Namely:
a) Formal cooperation is always illicit; for it contains approval, at least external approval, of the sin (St. Alphonsus, II, 63).
b) Immediate material cooperation likewise is always illicit if there is question of an action intrinsically and absolutely evil; hence it is not lawful together with another, for example, to discharge a gun at someone. If there is question of another action, for example of carrying off another's property together with a thief, immediate cooperation can sometimes become lawful, as will be explained later.
c) Mediate material cooperation is illicit of itself; by accident it can become lawful (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I have said:
a) Mediate material cooperation is illicit of itself; for it is opposed to charity, which of itself requires that we hinder the evil of our neighbor, much less does it permit that we cooperate in it (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Whether it is also opposed to the virtue in whose violation someone cooperates, we shall see later. With regard to illicitness, it is pleasing to add these words of canon 2209: "Not only the one commanding, who is the principal author of the delict, but also those who induce to the consummation of the delict or concur in this in any way, contract, other things being equal, no less imputability than the executor of the delict himself, if the delict would not have been committed without their work (§ 3). But if their concurrence only rendered easier the delict which would have been committed even without their concurrence, it carries with it lesser imputability (§ 4)."
Objection 1. The act by which someone cooperates in evil - for example the placing of a ladder which a thief will use for stealing - is an indifferent act, so that it is enough that it be placed for an honorable end.
Response. The act by which someone cooperates in evil is, or rather can be, indifferent if considered in itself or according to itself, I concede; it is indifferent insofar as here and now it is cooperative in evil, I deny.
Objection 2. Material cooperation, strictly speaking, is not cooperation in evil, and therefore cannot be called evil. It is not cooperation in evil, because it is only cooperation in the external act. But the external act of itself does not increase malice.
Response. Material cooperation, as is asserted in the objection, is cooperation in the external act. But even the external act comes under the name of sin, and in reality is a moral evil. Cooperation in moral evil, however, is an act illicit of itself. There is added that the external act by accident increases the malice of the will (n. 548). But cooperation in an act which, even if only by accident, will increase the malice of the agent, is illicit of itself.
Objection 3. St. Thomas permits that someone borrow money from a usurer; likewise that one who has fallen among robbers manifest the goods which he has, although by acting thus he materially cooperates in the sin of the usurer and of the robbers. Therefore according to the opinion of St. Thomas material cooperation is indifferent of itself.
Response. St. Thomas permits the aforesaid acts of themselves, I deny; he permits them by accident, or if the evil to be avoided or the good to be obtained makes them honorable, I concede. And indeed the holy Doctor speaks thus: "In no way is it lawful to induce someone to lend at usury; yet it is lawful to receive a loan under usury from him who is prepared to do this and exercises usury, on account of some good which is the relief of one's own necessity or that of another: just as it is lawful for him who has fallen among robbers to manifest the goods which he has, which the robbers sin by snatching away, in order that he may not be killed, after the example of the ten men who said to Ishmael: Do not kill us, because we have treasures in the field, as is said in Jeremiah 41" (II-II, q. 78, a. 4). And in the same place, ad 3: "It must be said that if someone were to entrust his money to a usurer not having other means from which he might exercise usury, or were to entrust it with this intention, that he might thence profit more copiously through usury, he would give matter for sinning; whence he himself also would be a participant in the fault. But if someone entrusts his money to a usurer otherwise having means from which he may exercise usury, so that it may be preserved more safely, he does not sin, but uses a sinful man for good."
b) Mediate material cooperation can become lawful by accident; namely it is lawful if the action by which someone cooperates is not evil according to itself, and there is a cause which makes honorable the influence upon another's sin and the consequences annexed to it. The reason is that charity does not oblige with proportionate inconvenience (St. Alphonsus, II, 63). Now a graver cause is required:
The graver the sin is in which someone cooperates.
The more that sin yields to the spiritual or temporal harm, or both, of others.
The nearer the concurrence is to the sin of another and the consequences annexed to it.
The more probably the sin would not follow without the cooperation.
The more certainly, once cooperation is admitted, it will follow.
The less right the one cooperating has to place the act.
The more he is bound to hinder the sin (St. Alphonsus, II, 59).
It is said - and this one point needs proof - the nearer the concurrence is to the sin. For the obligation of avoiding concurrence or remote cooperation, which easily has place, carries with it a greater burden than the obligation of avoiding proximate cooperation, which does not occur so easily; so that, if there is question of remote cooperation, a lighter reason seems required, but if there is question of proximate cooperation, a graver reason seems required. In practice the following rules can be established:
First Rule. Cooperation, both proximate and remote, is lawful if by cooperating you will avert a greater evil than is going to follow from the cooperation being omitted.
Second Rule. Proximate cooperation in grave sin is lawful for a grave cause, provided it is neither necessary nor yields to the harm of a third party; for a graver cause, if it is necessary or yields to the harm of a third party: in each case fear of equal harm to oneself is required. If it yields to common harm, it is excused for no private cause, but only for averting greater common harm.
Third Rule. Remote cooperation in grave sin is lawful for a just cause, provided it is neither necessary nor yields to the harm of a third party. If it yields to common harm, make a distinction: if it is necessary, it is not lawful except for averting greater common harm; if it is not necessary, a grave cause seems to suffice.
Fourth Rule. That your cooperation is not necessary, this alone never involves a cause on account of which it is lawful to cooperate; in other words, that someone without you is going to place the evil act is not a reason why you can help him in placing the act: for by acting thus the act and its consequences are also imputed to you in some measure.
What kind of sin is it? Every illicit cooperation is opposed to charity; for this of itself demands that we hinder the evil of our neighbor, much less cooperate in it. Besides, formal cooperation is opposed to the virtue in whose violation someone cooperates; for it involves approval and therefore the very malice of the said violation. The same seems to have to be said of material cooperation, namely on account of the same reasons which were brought forward for occasional and merely permissive scandal (n. 548).
How great a sin is it? Cooperation is a grave sin from its genus; namely:
a) Formal cooperation is a grave or light sin according as it influences a grave or light sin.
b) Material cooperation:
a) It is a grave sin: 1. if it is proximate and regards a grave sin either of a single man or of many; 2. if indeed it is remote, but necessary, and regards the sins of many.
b) It is a light sin: 1. if it regards a light sin; 2. if it is remote and regards the sin of a single man; 3. if it is remote and not necessary, even if it regards the sins of many.
1 Psalm 18:13, 14.