205*. Notions. To duties on one side correspond rights on the other side, and indeed in such a way that the right of one extends as broadly as the duty of the other.

1. Duties, according to the diversity of laws from which they arise, are:

a. affirmative duties, which arise from precepts, and negative duties, which arise from prohibitions;

b. absolute duties, which oblige simply and without exception, and hypothetical duties, which oblige only under certain suppositions;

c. natural duties, which are founded in the law of nature, and positive duties, which are founded in positive law, whether divine or human;

d. higher and lower duties, according as they refer to preserving greater or lesser goods, to averting greater or lesser evils;

e. duties of justice, from whose violation an obligation of restitution of itself arises, and duties of charity, from whose violation an obligation of restitution does not arise.

2. Since rights cohere with duties, they are distinguished in the same manner as duties; specifically these are to be noted:

a. connate rights, which are founded in the law of nature, and acquired rights, which are founded in positive law or in contracts.

b. inalienable rights, which can in no way be renounced, and alienable rights, which can be renounced: for what is necessary for man either for attaining the ultimate end or for fulfilling a moral obligation cannot be abdicated.

3. Collision of duties is the concurrence of several obligations which cannot be fulfilled at the same time.

Thus in the case of an unjust aggressor, two obligations collide: preserving one's own life and preserving the life of another. Since the obligation of preserving one's own life is more excellent, the other obligation loses its force.

a. So many and various are the relations of man, whether toward God or toward himself or toward other men, and consequently so manifold are the obligations which arise from them, that not rarely duties which are opposed to one another urge at the same time. But the collision of duties is only apparent, because of the colliding obligations only one in reality exists and requires that it be fulfilled; the rest lose their force or are suspended as long as the collision lasts: for their fulfillment is impossible; but no one is bound to the impossible. Certainly the supreme reason of all obligations is the will of God; but God, whose will is wisdom, cannot wish that at the same time we place actions of which one excludes the other.

b. Wherefore in a case in which duties collide, this is chiefly at issue: that the collision be solved, or that it be determined which obligation among the colliding ones, while the others cease, requires that it be fulfilled. Several rules are established for determining this.

205**. Rules for solving collision. The supreme principle in this matter is this: a higher obligation is to be preferred to a lower; but that obligation is judged higher which arises from a law which is of greater moment. Hence the following rules are inferred.

a. Precepts of the law of nature are to be preferred to precepts of positive divine law, these to precepts of positive human law; among these latter, precepts of ecclesiastical law prevail over precepts of civil law, which is drawn from the diverse end of these laws, one of which is nobler than the other.

The law which requires that we aid a needy neighbor is higher than the law of abstaining from servile works; the law of preserving health is to be preferred to the law of fasting or abstinence.

b. Negative precepts prevail over positive precepts; therefore in general the obligation of avoiding prohibited things is greater than that of doing prescribed things: for that which is prohibited is evil and pernicious in itself; but that which is prescribed is simply fitting and useful.

It is not lawful to lie nor to exercise a shameful business in order to aid one in need.

c. Precepts of justice in general prevail over precepts of charity.

If at the same time the obligation of paying a debt and of giving alms concur, the former, which is of justice, prevails over the latter obligation, which is of charity. Nevertheless, if someone must pay a debt by which, once paid, the debtor casts himself into grave necessity, he can defer payment, although it is an obligation of justice.

d. Precepts (negative and positive) which protect greater goods prevail over laws which protect lesser ones; therefore precepts which refer to spiritual goods, internal goods, common goods, are to be preferred to precepts which refer to bodily, external, private goods.

Thus a citizen is bound to serve as a soldier, even if his own life or his own family suffers damage. - A priest or physician is bound to help the sick, even if his own health or his own family is endangered. - It is not lawful to defect from the faith in order to preserve life; nor to deny the faith in order to avoid persecution. - A servant for whom service is an occasion of sin which can be removed by no means is bound to leave the service, even if the temporal damages would be most grave. - It is not lawful to expose life to danger on account of some slight temporal good.

e. But if in a case of colliding duties, after diligent examination, it cannot be determined which obligation prevails, and at the same time the necessity of acting urges, the choice can be made at will. An error which perhaps is committed in this case is involuntary and is not imputed to the agent.

357. Definition. Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing according to one's choice concerning some thing as one's own, unless the owner is prohibited from elsewhere.

a. To be owner of a thing signifies that the thing is one's own, and has such a connection with its owner that in having it and in its use he ought to be preferred to all others. Therefore, although he must render an account of its use to none of men, nevertheless he must render it to God.¹

b. Of disposing, that is, of possessing, using, selling, exchanging, giving, destroying, etc. According to one's choice: ownership gives to the owner the faculty of disposing of his own thing as it shall please him, without injuring justice; therefore by an arbitrary disposition, for example, by a prodigal donation or destruction of the thing, he can sin against another virtue, say liberality, charity, or piety, but he does not sin against justice. Concerning some thing is to be taken generically, insofar as it signifies corporeal and incorporeal things: for there is ownership not only of corporeal things, such as gold or a field, but also of incorporeal things, such as reputation, honor, right of inheritance. As one's own, so that ownership may be distinguished from a simple right to a thing, which does not give the faculty of disposing of the thing, from mere possession, even legitimate possession, which, for example, gives to a tenant the right of disposing of a thing, but not as his own, and finally from the power of a curator and procurator, who likewise dispose of a thing, but not as their own.

c. In various ways the owner can be impeded from disposing of his own thing according to his choice: alpha. by civil law, as if minors are prohibited from selling their own things; beta. by agreement, as if someone sells another his house with this pact, that it not be converted into an inn; gamma. by the will of a testator, as if someone transmits an estate by legacy to another on this condition, that it cannot be sold.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De iustit., disp. 1, n. 5.

358. Principles of right. From the nature of ownership these principles are deduced and explained, of which there is frequent use in law:

a. A thing cries out for its owner.

This principle exhibits the very right of ownership: for since by force of the right of ownership the thing itself is bound to the owner, it tends to return to the owner when it has escaped from his possession.

b. A thing bears fruit for its owner.

This follows immediately from the notion of ownership: for if the whole substance of a thing pertains to the owner and ought to serve for his advantage, the fruits also begotten from it fall to the owner.

c. A thing perishes for its owner, or more accurately: a thing which perishes by chance perishes for its owner; a thing which perishes by fault perishes for him who committed the fault.

This likewise follows immediately from the nature of ownership: for since the owner by force of ownership possesses a right in the thing itself, when the thing perishes the right in it also naturally perishes. But if the thing perishes by another's fault, the thing itself indeed perishes for the owner, but because he by whose fault it perishes is bound to render to the owner an equivalent price, it is said to perish for him who committed the fault.

d. It is not licit to grow rich from another's thing.

This follows from the second principle: for he who grows rich from another's thing turns the fruits of another's thing to his own utility, which is opposed to justice. But he who grows rich not from another's thing, but on the occasion of another's thing, injures neither another's right nor justice.

359. Divisions of ownership. 1. Ownership is divided into high and low: high ownership is the power which belongs to public authority of establishing concerning the goods of its subjects for the common utility; low ownership is the ownership which private men have in their own things and is called private right.

a. It is clear that high ownership is not ownership of property in the true name (for civil power has no property in the goods of subjects), but in reality is nothing except ownership of jurisdiction or the right of prescribing concerning the goods of citizens those things which the prince has judged expedient for the common good. Therefore the prince can transfer ownership from one to another, restrict the exercise of ownership in various ways, indeed he can even deprive subjects of their goods by the right of expropriation, or rather compel them to abdicate ownership of their goods.

b. A twofold condition is required that supreme power can use this ownership of its own: alpha. that a cause of necessity or of great public utility be present; beta. that, if it can be done, it make the subjects who are deprived of their goods by the right of expropriation unharmed.¹

2. Low ownership is divided into perfect or full and imperfect or semi-full: the former is the power of disposing according to one's choice concerning the substance and the utility of a thing; the latter is the power of disposing either concerning the substance of the thing or concerning its utility.

3. Imperfect ownership is divided into direct or radical ownership, which is power over the substance alone of a thing, and indirect ownership or useful ownership, which is power over the utility alone of a thing, and is defined: the power of receiving utility from another's thing while its substance is preserved. The chief species of indirect ownership are use, usufruct, and servitude.

Note. Recent codes reduce the diverse species of imperfect ownership to servitude, and therefore treat use and usufruct as species of servitude, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning servitude.

¹ Cf. Van Gestel, l. c., n. 46 s.

360. On use. 1. Use is the right of using another's thing while its substance is preserved.

a. He to whom the use of some thing belongs is called a user, so that he may be distinguished from the proprietor of the same thing.

b. It is one thing to use some thing; it is another thing to enjoy some thing. He who can use a thing can receive for himself and his own from the thing that utility which necessity requires; but he who can enjoy a thing receives by right every utility from the thing which it can offer.

2. To use are usually referred: a. habitation or the right of using some part of another's house; b. gathering wood or the right of gathering wood in another's forest; c. pasture or the right of leading cattle into another's pastures; d. diverse species of loan for use, as the use of a horse, garment, etc.

3. Use, as it is taken here, is a right of using some thing which is not revocable at will. From this use there must be distinguished use revocable at will, of which sort is permission of using some thing, such as religious receive from their superior.

Formerly a sharp dispute arose whether there is true use of a thing when the substance of the thing is consumed by use, as happens in food and drink, or rather whether the use of a thing consumable by its first use contains ownership of it. Religious gave occasion to the question, who (as the Friars Minor) said that they had ownership of no thing, not even the least, but only use. Those who affirmed that the use of a thing which is consumed by use cannot be separated from its ownership argued in this way: he who can dispose concerning the substance of a thing has ownership of it; but he who can use a thing which is consumed by the very use disposes concerning its substance. But those who affirmed that the use of a thing consumable by the very use can be separated from the ownership of the same thing used this distinction: if use is understood as an irrevocable right and independent from the will of the one granting, the use of this thing contains ownership; but if the use of a thing is understood as a right revocable at will and fully dependent on the will of the one granting, the use of this thing does not contain ownership, even if the thing is consumed by the very use.¹

¹ Cf. Holzmann, Theologia moralis, IV, n. 166 ss.; Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, II, pr. 5, n. 40 ss.

361. On usufruct. Usufruct is the right of using and enjoying another's thing while its substance is preserved. Usufruct is distinguished as legal and conventional, according as it is had from canonical or civil law, or from contract.

a. He to whom the usufruct of some thing belongs is called a usufructuary or fruituary, so that he may be distinguished from the owner or proprietor of the same thing.

b. Usufruct differs from use in this, that the fruituary has the right not only of using another's thing, but also of receiving the fruits which arise from it. Indeed he has perfect ownership in the fruits, so that he can receive not only the fruits necessary to himself, but all, and alienate them according to his choice.

c. By canonical law beneficiaries have the usufruct of their benefices; by civil law parents have the usufruct from the goods of minor children, and sometimes the husband from certain goods of his wife.

362. On servitude. a. Servitude (Dienstbarkeit) taken actively is the right which someone has, that another's thing may serve him or his own thing; taken passively it is a burden inhering in a thing, by force of which it ought to serve another for some advantage. Thus if a right of passing through another's field belongs to someone, he himself is the subject of active servitude, but the field is the subject of passive servitude.

b. Passive servitude is twofold: one personal, when some thing ought to furnish utility to another person, of which sort are use and usufruct, if they are taken passively; the other real or praedial, if some thing ought to furnish an advantage to another thing, as is the servitude of pasturing a flock in some forest.

c. For constituting a real servitude two things are required, of which one bears the burden and is called serving (the forest), the other receives the utility and is called dominant (the flock).

Note. 1. The law of servitudes is drawn up in modern codes with diligent study; and since it determines rights and conduces to preserving the mutual concord of citizens, it obliges in conscience.¹

2. Since the law of servitudes, especially real servitudes, is very intricate, it often gives occasion for disagreements among neighbors. Let the pastor take care either to forestall or to remove disputes of this kind, and for obtaining this end let him admonish the opposing parties that they should rather yield somewhat from their right than expose goods of fortune and mutual concord to danger.

¹ C. A., Section 472-530; C. G., Section 1018-1093.

363. Fruits of a thing. By the name fruits of a thing is understood everything which arises from the thing. Fruits are divided by reason of origin into spontaneous, industrial, and mixed, and by reason of collection into pending, to be received, and received.

1. a. Those are called spontaneous which the thing produces without special industry of men. Special is said because there will scarcely be a fruitful thing which bears fruits without any industry and labor of man.

Spontaneous fruits are either natural or civil, according as they are produced by nature itself, such as hay of a meadow, wood of a forest, offspring of animals, milk, wool, eggs, etc., or are received by force of a contract or another obligation, such as the price which is acquired for the rental of a house, interest which is acquired for money lent, a pension which is acquired for an office.

b. Those are called industrial which are acquired by the industry and labor of man alone, although by means of some thing or instrument, such as the works of artisans and workers, profit received from trading.

Profit received from simple sale can be considered as a fruit of industry; for that profit received can be called a fruit of industry, it is not required that singular and extraordinary industry have intervened, but true work and industry of the person suffices.

c. Those are called mixed which are produced partly by nature and are owed partly to human industry, such as crops, wine, oil, cheese, butter. And because even natural fruits require some industry, it is sometimes difficult to say whether some fruit ought to be reckoned among natural or mixed fruits.

2. a. Those are called pending which have not been separated from the thing, such as offspring of animals not yet brought forth into light, apples still hanging from the tree, crops not yet harvested.

b. Those are called to be received which the possessor could have received if he had wished, but did not receive, whether by negligence or by fraud.

c. Those are called received which have already been separated from the fruitful thing and collected by the possessor. These again are divided into consumed and extant.

Article Second. On the Object of Ownership

The object of ownership is that of which man can be owner. Those things of which man can be owner are usually called goods, and are distinguished into three kinds: internal, mixed, and external. Among internal goods are reckoned man's life, powers, members, and actions; mixed goods are reputation and honor, which are, as it were, midway between internal and external goods; external goods which fall under man's ownership are sublunar things.

364. On internal goods. 1. Of those internal goods which are not distinct from man himself, such as life, powers, and members, man does not have direct ownership, but only useful ownership, so that he receives every utility from them and is their administrator and guardian.

a. God has given no one the right over his own life and members, but has reserved it to Himself: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; I will kill and I will make alive."¹ And indeed no one can truly be lord of himself, because lord signifies superiority with respect to him whose lord he is. b. He ought to have the power of using them for obtaining his end, and he cannot be impeded by any man in this use, since in tending to his own end he is independent from any man and fully in his own right.

2. Of those internal goods which are distinct from man, such as actions both natural and supernatural and the goods effected by them, man has full ownership, and therefore can dispose concerning them at will. For since he can use his own faculties as his own, he has ownership both in their operations and in the goods arisen from the operations, which are the fruits of the operations.

¹ Deut. 32:39. Cf. Wis. 16:13 s.

365. On mixed goods. Man has full ownership of reputation and honor: for he has ownership of those goods which are the fruits of his own industry; but reputation and honor are acquired and increased by his own industry. Besides, by the consent of all, acts of ownership concerning reputation and honor belong to man: for by defaming himself he can cast them aside for seeking counsel, and he can condone restitution to a calumniator. Nevertheless this ownership is sometimes restricted by another and higher law.

366. On external goods. It will be said below that man can acquire full ownership in external goods; here it is helpful to set forth the various distinctions of external things of which man can have ownership.

1. Things placed in commerce are those which can be in the ownership of a private person; and things placed outside commerce are those which cannot be in the ownership of a private person. Of this kind are: a. public things of the Church, such as sacred places, temples, cemeteries; b. public things of civil society, such as public roads, squares, public bridges, city walls; c. common things, such as air, light, the sea, of which things the use is common to all, but ownership belongs to none.

2. Things are movable and immovable according as, with their substance preserved, they can be transferred from place to place, such as animals and furniture, or cannot be transferred, such as a house or forest. Some things are movable and immovable from their nature, others from the disposition of law, concerning which the civil codes must be consulted.

Civil law also counts fruits not yet collected and the "stocked estate," that is, those things which are necessary for carrying on domestic economy, among immovable goods in some cases.

3. Fungible things (vertretbare) are those of which one can perform the function of another in payment or restitution, in which therefore attention is given not to the species (that is, to the individual thing), but to the genus (to quantity and quality), such as oil, wine, wheat, money, in which not the substance of the coin but its value is considered. Non-fungible things are those of which one cannot perform the function of another, but which must be handed over in the individual, in which therefore attention is given to the species (that is, to the individual thing), not only to the genus, of which sort are animals, garments, etc.

4. Finally, things consumable by first use and things not consumable by first use: the former in their first natural use are destroyed or changed into another substance, such as bread, wine, wood for burning; the latter are indeed worn by use, but are not corrupted, but endure in their substance after use, such as a garment, house, furniture.

The division of external things into corporeal, which can be touched, such as a house, field, money, and incorporeal, which cannot be touched, such as diverse rights, for example, the right of hunting and the right of fishing, which was of great importance in Roman law, scarcely occurs any longer in recent codes.

367. On the subject itself. By the subject of ownership is understood the person to whom ownership belongs. A twofold person is distinguished who is capable of ownership: a physical person and a moral person.

1. From the law of nature the subject of ownership is every living man, even an infant not yet born and a man perpetually insane.¹

a. The foundation of ownership is rational nature: for through reason man has the power of disposing concerning his own things. Wherefore even infants and the perpetually insane are capable of acquiring ownership and habitually retaining it, but not of exercising ownership; for rational nature without any act of will suffices for acquiring and habitually retaining ownership, but the use of reason is required for the exercise of ownership.

b. After death man does not retain ownership of goods of fortune, although he retains ownership of reputation: for since goods of fortune have been granted by the author of nature to man for sustaining temporal life, the right in goods of fortune is extinguished by death itself.

c. Although every man using reason is capable, by the law of nature, of ownership and its exercise, nevertheless by positive law this capacity is restricted in various ways on account of the common good. These matters must be treated below.

2. Moral persons or societies are also capable of ownership. Any society which has been instituted for an honest end is, by the law of nature, capable of acquiring ownership of temporal things. But by civil law this right is recognized only in those which are constituted by it as juridical persons, namely persons capable of acquiring rights.

a. With respect to ecclesiastical societies, juridical persons are first the universal Church, which by natural and divine right is capable of ownership of temporal goods; then within the ambit of the Church: lesser societies, namely dioceses, parishes, church fabric funds, religious societies, seminaries, hospitals, pious institutes, etc.

b. With respect to profane societies, juridical persons are first the state itself or republic, which, since it is a perfect and independent society, has ownership of its goods by its nature; then within the ambit of the state: provinces, municipalities, colleges, universities, and several other lesser societies which are endowed with the privilege of juridical personality and thence are called privileged societies.

¹ Gal. 4:1. Cf. C. A., Section 22; C. G., Section 1, 1923.

368. Principles. Concerning the origin of ownership, from those things which natural right teaches expressly, only those principles are to be taken which are required for rightly understanding these questions.¹

1. God granted the ownership of temporal goods for the preservation of life at the beginning to the human race in such a way that the goods were common to all and proper to one no more than to another.

a. Temporal goods were made by the author of nature for this end, that man may provide for himself from them concerning the things necessary for the preservation of life. Therefore man has a right of acquiring for himself from temporal goods the things which are necessary for the sustenance of life; but this right is true ownership in temporal goods.

b. Twice God granted dominion of earthly things to man: first indeed soon after creation: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the heaven and all living things that move upon the earth";² then again after the fall and the flood: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth, and let your terror and dread be upon all the animals of the earth," etc.³ By these words God granted created things to the human race as a common good.

2. The division of things initially common, and private ownership of them, both movable and immovable, is not only licit, but in the present state of fallen nature also necessary.

Socialists affirm that temporal goods are to be held and preserved as a good common to all, so that the division of goods and private ownership of them is illicit and altogether unjust. But by a manifold argument it is shown that private ownership in the present order of things is altogether necessary, and therefore must be derived from the will of God.⁴ From these things it is clear that the distinction between rich and poor will never cease in human society at any time: "The poor you have always with you."⁵

3. From the law of nature itself, and indeed by occupation, the division among men of things initially common and private ownership were introduced.

By what right the first division of things was made, and in what way private ownership was first introduced, is not established among the learned. Some think that it was made by paternal authority; others by a pact of men, whether explicit or implicit; others by human law; others finally by force and violence by which the stronger oppressed the weak. In general it cannot be denied that this was done by the law of nature. With the natural faculty of acquiring ownership of things there must be joined a free fact which is the reason and title of ownership in some determinate thing; but this fact is the occupation of a negatively common thing. Hence the principle: a thing belonging to no one becomes the thing of the first occupier.

4. Ownership obtained by legitimate occupation is not absolute, but restricted by its own limits. Namely, man cannot have his goods as his own in such a way that in no respect are they any longer common, or that he can always and under every condition exclude all others from their use; for private ownership, which is a secondary right, cannot take away a primary right. Now the primary end on account of which corporeal goods were created is this: that there be at hand for men means for preserving those goods which nature itself wills to be common to all. Therefore, even after the division of goods has been made, man retains the right implanted by nature itself to those things which are required for protecting and preserving these goods.⁶

a. This right of acquiring those things which are necessary for preserving life is diverse according to the diverse condition of men. alpha. He who can labor has a (strict) right to labor, that is, of acquiring for himself the necessaries of life by labor (n. 69). beta. He who is unfit for labor has a (moral or legal) right of receiving the necessaries of life from the superfluous goods of the rich. gamma. He who is in extreme necessity has a (strict) right of taking those things which are necessary for preserving life. For each right, as far as can be done, ought to be preserved uninjured; but if private ownership impedes the preservation of life, the secondary right ceases and the primary right prevails. This right is not to be understood in such a way that the rich man is bound to confer upon the one in extreme need those things which he needs, but in such a way that he is bound not to impede him who, in extreme danger, provides for himself concerning the necessaries. To these rights on the other side correspond just so many duties, which are connected with ownership of temporal things.

b. Goods which nature wills to be common to all must be distinguished from goods which nature itself does not intend for all, but which individuals acquire for themselves according to their condition. Goods of the former kind are life, health, liberty, reputation; goods of the latter kind are a noble state, riches, great dignity, office, and things of this sort.⁷

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2. Encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, 16 May 1891. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas u. s. w. (Freiburg: Herder, 1895). F. Cathrein, Sozialismus^7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1903). F. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902), II, p. 247 ff. H. Pesch, Liberalismus, Socialismus u. chr. Gesellschaftsordnung (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), p. 196 ff. Schaub, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus (Freiburg: Herder, 1898). Th. Mayer, Institutiones iuris naturalis (Friburgi: Herder, 1900), II, n. 162 ss. A. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia^2 (Brugis: Beyaert, 1904), n. 194-245. Pottier, De iure et iustitia (Leodii: Ancion, 1900), p. 18-47. Diederlack, Die soziale Frage^6 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1904), p. 131 ff.

² Gen. 1:28.

³ Gen. 9:1-2.

⁴ Diederlack briefly gathers the arguments, Die soziale Frage^6, n. 91 ff.; Cathrein, Das Privateigentum (Freiburg: Herder).

⁵ Matt. 26:11.

⁶ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2; H. Pesch, l. c., Pflichten und Schranken des Eigentums, p. 390 ff.

⁷ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 153 ss.

372. Declarations. A son under family power is called a legitimate son (or legitimated son) who is not yet in his own right, but is subject to paternal power.

a. Distinction of persons. An infant is called a man up to the completed seventh year of age; an impubes is called one who has not yet arrived at puberty, therefore up to the fourteenth year of age if he is a boy, and up to the twelfth if she is a girl; a minor or minor of age is called one already pubescent up to emancipation; an adult or one of full age exists after emancipation. The year of emancipation is different in different laws.¹ A ward is called an impubes who by the death of the father or by sentence of the judge (for example, on account of a physical or moral defect of the father) has gone out from paternal power; for him by force of law a tutor is constituted. For a minor who, already pubescent, has gone out from paternal power, a curator is constituted for the administration of goods.

b. Distinction of goods. From Roman law the goods of sons were distinguished into castrensian goods, which a son acquires for himself from military service or another public office; profectitious goods, which a son receives from his father or gains from the goods of the father; adventitious goods, which come to the son from elsewhere, for example, by inheritance, donation, special industry and labor.

Recent codes distinguish: alpha. free goods, which the son acquires by separated industry (while outside the paternal house he devotes himself to an office or labor, even if he lives at home) or by donation or a similar title; beta. non-free goods, which the son acquires by non-separated industry (laboring at home together with the father, or trading from paternal goods).

¹ According to several codes (C. G., Section 2), children are minors up to the completed twenty-first year; according to C. A., Section 21, up to the completed twenty-fourth year. Emancipation according to some laws happens by that very fact when the son has attained legitimate age, according to others only must happen if the son wishes; with the conditions prescribed by law observed, it can also happen before this age.

373. Rights of sons, in establishing which recent codes nearly agree.¹

a. Of goods which are called free, the son himself, even if he is a minor, has ownership; but their administration, and sometimes also usufruct, pertain to the father.²

alpha. Therefore where the son has not only direct ownership but also useful ownership of these goods, all their fruits pass into his ownership. And if the son dissipates these goods against the will of the parents, he sins against other virtues, but not against justice. - Although a minor son acquires for himself of himself those things which he acquires outside the paternal house by furnishing service or exercising his own art or trading with another's goods, nevertheless, since their administration belongs to the father, he ought to hand them over to the father; and if he secretly retains some things for himself without the father's knowledge, he acts illicitly by arrogating the administration to himself.

beta. If the son labors outside the paternal house, but lives and is fed at home, he ought to pay for his sustenance. For the father is not bound to feed a son who can provide for himself. Wherefore he ought to hand over the whole wage to his parents for paying the expenses of sustenance, unless perhaps he receives an extraordinarily great wage, or undertakes labor altogether extraordinary, or the parents consent that he retain some part of the wage for himself. But if, without the father's knowledge and against his will, he secretly retains part of the ordinary wage for himself, so that he does not pay the expenses of sustenance, of himself he sins against justice.

gamma. In a twofold case sons are not to be accused of sin because they withdraw something of the wage received from the father's administration, provided they have paid as much as is sufficient for sustenance: alpha. if they notice that the parents do not reserve those things which remain over after sustenance for the sons, but spend them for superfluous uses; beta. if sparing parents do not grant to sons, for honest recreations, those things which they can prudently expect from them.

b. Non-free goods of themselves pertain to the father, even if the son is of full age. For the fruits of the labor which the son exercises not in his own name but in the father's name fall to the father. Wherefore if the son withdraws or dissipates these goods against the will of the parents, he acts against justice.

¹ C. A., Section 140 ff.; C. G., Section 1627 ff.

² From C. A., Section 149, administration alone; from C. G., Section 1649 ss., partly also usufruct pertains to the father.

374. Whether a son can demand some wage by laboring in the paternal business.

a. A minor son constituted under paternal power cannot demand a wage for his labor: for as long as he is under paternal power, the parents can demand by right that he labor for preserving and increasing the domestic estate, and that he be content with the sustenance received at home.

b. A son of full age can demand nothing for owed labor. That labor is judged owed which, according to the condition of the father, is necessary for the decent and suitable sustenance of the family: for the father has the right of demanding from the son services which are necessary for the sustenance of the family. For example, a farmer can demand that he be helped by his son in agriculture; but for those things which are owed from piety no stipend can be demanded.¹

c. A son of full age can of himself demand a wage for labor not owed, unless he intended to labor gratuitously; for parents have no right of demanding from sons services which are not necessary to their state and condition. But the son cannot demand a greater wage than an outsider would receive for the same labor; profit received from the business and labor pertains to the father, yet the father can by right subtract the expenses of sustenance and therefore diminish the wage.

alpha. But the son cannot demand the owed wage immediately; rather it must be committed to the father at what time and in what way he wishes to pay the debt owed to the son.

Ordinarily parents are not accustomed to pay wages to sons laboring at home, nor to increase the inheritance on account of their labors. Nor by this way of acting is justice judged to be injured: for ordinary labors are nearly compensated by food, clothing, peculium, and other advantages received in the paternal house. But on the other side, if sons, especially those of full age, remaining and laboring at home, steal something from paternal goods for the labors undergone or secretly compensate themselves, after the fact they are not easily to be compelled to restitution.

beta. And this, namely that the son cannot demand or take for himself another compensation for ordinary labor furnished in the paternal house, is valid even if other brothers meanwhile have been idle or have given themselves to studies; for these circumstances, merely external, do not make the profit of the labor fall not to the family but to the son. Yet parents are accustomed, either by donations or by other ways, to see to it that the industry and diligence of sons has its reward.

d. Yet if the labor not owed is extraordinary, which notably exceeds the customary labors of others or is very useful to the family estate, the son can of himself demand a greater wage or part of the profit, with the expenses for food deducted, unless from the beginning he had the express intention of furnishing those labors gratuitously; for if he had such an intention, it is not licit for him afterward, with his will changed, to demand a stipend.

If the son, without the father's knowledge, receives profit by trading from his goods, it must be distinguished in this way:

alpha. If the son acted in the father's name from the presumed permission of the father, he committed no sin, but the whole profit is the father's.

beta. If the son acted in his own name with money which he had made his own, the profit is the son's, but he committed sin because he took the money, and he ought to repair damage to the father if any arose in the father's business from the lack of money.

gamma. If the son acted in his own name with money which remained in the father's ownership, he can retain half the profit: for the matter can be considered as a partnership business, to which the father contributed the money, and the son the industry. Whether the son in this case committed sin depends on whether he acted against the father's will or from the presumed permission of the father.²

¹ Cf. Lugo, De iustitia, disp. 5, n. 42.

² Cf. Lehmkuhl, Casus consc., I, n. 565 ss.

375. Whether a minor son has ownership in goods given to him. - To determine the ownership which a minor son living outside the family has in goods given to him by parents or relatives, attention must be given to the will of those giving, whether expressed or reasonably presumed.

a. If goods are given absolutely, the son acquires full ownership of them, and therefore can dispose of them at will. In this way things consumable by their very use, money destined for recreation, and things which are given not by parents but by relatives, are usually given. Therefore if the son spends these things for vain uses, he sins by prodigality, but not by injustice.

b. If goods are given exclusively for a determined end, for example, money for buying books, garments, paying room and board, etc., the son does not acquire full ownership, and therefore he acts against justice and of himself is bound to restitution if he spends them for other ends, especially vain or dishonest ends. Yet he is often excused from restitution, because condonation by the parents can be supposed.

c. If things are given generally for occurring necessities, with no condition attached, the parents are judged to transfer full ownership of them to the son; wherefore he can spend some part of them, according to the state and condition of the parents, even on honest recreations. But if the son spends them against the will of the parents for vain uses, he sins against obedience, but not against justice.

d. If goods are given by the parents for use, as it is said, which are not consumable by first use, such as garments, books, etc., the son indeed has perfect ownership of them;¹ nevertheless he ought to use them according to the intention of the giver, to whom he owes obedience. Hence if, for example, he were to sell books and dissipate the money received from them, he would not indeed sin against justice, but nevertheless, besides prodigality, also against obedience.

Note. Of itself it is not to be advised that agreements be made between parents and sons who live together and labor in the paternal house; much less are secret compensations to be promoted. Rather, the piety of sons toward parents and of parents toward sons is to be fostered and inculcated. But parents are to be exhorted to grant a just peculium and an equitable wage to sons remaining and laboring with them.

¹ C. A., Section 151.

THE word “ justice” is used in a variety of senses, but here it is used in its strict meaning to designate the moral virtue which inclines its possessor to give to everyone his due or his right.

The habit of giving to everyone his due from principle because it is right and proper is obviously a virtue, and it is 5 a moral, not a theological, virtue, for its immediate motive is not God, but the natural honesty and uprightness of so acting. Justice is a moral virtue which resides in and perfects the will, not the intellect, like prudence; it inclines the will to wish and to execute what is right. Justice inclines the just man to give his due to everyone irrespective of who he may be. It does not consider the relation in which that other stands to God, or to one’s self, as charity does; nor precisely what it is becoming in the just man to do, so that his actions may be worthy of himself, as does temperance, for example; it only considers what is owing to another, what is his due; and because it is the right thing that everyone should have his own, justice inclines to give it to him.

What is due to another in justice and is therefore his strict right must be distinguished from what a man has a claim to on some other ground. A poor man who cannot support himself has a claim on our help, but out of charity, not out of justice. He is our brother; he is a child of our common Father in heaven; he is destined to be a fellow-citizen with us for ever in the kingdom of heaven; the bond of mutual love which binds all such in one body, and makes them one big family, requires that all who can, should, out of their abundance, assist those who are in want. But this does not cause the abundance of one to belong to a needy neighbour in justice; it only prescribes that as much as is required to succour him in his necessity should be given him out of charity. A sufferer who is in pain has a claim on my sympathy and pity, not that it would be unjust to deny him my sympathy, but because pity and compassion require it of me. But when ten pounds are due to another in justice, those ten pounds belong to him; they are his property; he has a right exclusive of all others to all the benefit that can be derived from them, because they are his. Because they are his he can dispose of them as he pleases; he can put them in the bank, or spend them, or give them away; he would wrong no one even if he threw them into the sea, Anyone who steals them, or to whom he lends them, must, if he would be just, restore them to the owner, because justice requires that all should have their own.

We may divide the species of justice into individual or commutative and social justice.

Commutative justice regards the relations between man and man in their private and individual capacity. It supposes a perfect distinction of rights between them, and prescribes that these should be duly observed and respected. It exists between physical and moral persons alike, or between a physical and a moral person, provided that their rights are perfectly distinct from each other.

Social justice regulates the mutual relations between the individual and the society or State to which he belongs. As a member of society the individual has certain duties toward it; he must contribute his share to the common burdens; he must be ready to defend the common weal at the call of authority; he must obey just and equitable laws. This duty of rendering to the State what is its due is called legal justice. On the other hand, the State has its obligations toward its subjects; it must distribute burdens, honours, and rewards equitably without showing favour to particular classes and persons; not indeed with absolute arithmetical equality all round, but according to respective merits. The virtue which should regulate the distribution of burdens and rewards among its subjects by the State is called distributive justice. To such as have committed crime and injured the common weal the State metes out condign punishment according as vindictive justice demands.

There is a difference of opinion among Catholic writers as to whether legal, distributive, and vindictive justice, which we have grouped together under the name of social justice, are really subordinate species of the virtue, or whether commutative justice is the only species that may in strictness be so called. Whatever view be taken we must allow that in commutative justice alone is there a perfect distinction between debtor and creditor; it alone observes arithmetical equality in satisfying its obligations; it alone binds to restitution after being violated. In social justice, on the contrary, there is no perfect distinction between the State and its subjects; social justice does not prescribe the observance of arithmetical equality, nor does its violation bind to restitution, except when by the same act commutative justice has also been infringed.

That which in justice is due to me is my right, as it is called. I have a right to my life, to my good name, to my property; and anyone who deprives me of these rights is guilty of injustice. Rights, then, are the subject-matter of justice, and in this, its strict sense, a right may be defined as a moral power of having, doing, or exacting something.

It is said to be a moral power to distinguish it from the mere physical capacity of brute force, which confers no rights of itself. It is a moral power which may not without injustice be interfered with. It is the power of having and possessing as one’s own something which man values and which serves his convenience and wants; or of doing something, of giving scope to his bodily or mental activity; or of exacting some service as due to him from another.

A right is in re or ad rem. A right in re is a right which one has to something determined and already his own. In order that one may have a right in re the object must already exist; it must not be merely possible or future; it must be determined and separate; it must belong to the person by a title of justice so that it is his. If one of these conditions is wanting but notwithstanding someone has a claim in justice that something should become his property, he has a right ad rem to it. Thus a farmer has a right in re to his harvest after he has gathered it; before it has grown he has only a right ad rem. 'The right of a servant to his wages is ad rem until they are paid; after they are paid his right is in re.

A right in re seems to be practically equivalent to ownership (dominium). Ownership is absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership is the unlimited power of disposing of a thing for one’s own benefit. The absolute owner of a horse may use him, sell him, give him away, or kill him, without violating justice; he may do what he likes with his own. If ownership is limited in some way so that the owner has not a right to all the uses to which the object may be put, the ownership is qualified. Qualified ownership of the thing while its use belongs to someone else is called direct; qualified ownership of the use of what belongs to someone else is called indirect ownership.

According to English law, a subject is incapable of absolute ownership of realty; he is only capable of a qualified ownership therein, although to all intents and purposes an estate in fee simple is equivalent to absolute ownership. A qualified property of many different kinds may be had in realty, and both an absolute and qualified property of many different sorts may be had in movables. The various kinds of property, especially in immovables, are recognized and determined by law, which enforces the rights and obligations annexed thereto. In different systems of law there will be different kinds of property recognized. It will be sufficient for our purpose merely to mention ususfructus, usus, habitatio, servitus, of the Roman and canon law.

In. English law the quantity of interest which a man has in lands and tenements is called an estate, of which there is a great variety: equitable and legal estates; estates of inheritance and not of inheritance; estates of freehold interest and less than freehold, such as estates for years, estates at will, and estates at sufferance.

I. Ecclesiastical law strictly so called is the complex of canons or laws which have been made by ecclesiastical authority.

II. Ecclesiastical laws are distinguished:

1. By reason of the legislator, into papal, episcopal, and synodal laws.

2. By reason of matter, into dogmatic and disciplinary canons. The former propose truths pertaining to faith and morals; the latter regard the external government of the Church.

3. By reason of the mode in which they were made, into written and unwritten law. Unwritten law is divided into handed-down and customary law, according as it has been established orally or by the consent of the legislator in custom.

4. By reason of territory, into universal and particular laws, according as they bind the universal Church or only certain regions.

5. By reason of time, into: 1. ancient law, from the beginning of the Church until Gratian around 1150; 2. the law of the Middle Ages, from Gratian until the Council of Trent, 1545; 3. new law, from the Council of Trent until the Vatican Council, or rather until the new Code; 4. newest law, from the new Code.

III. Ecclesiastical laws, as they formerly were in force, are found for the greater part in the Corpus Iuris Canonici, as it is called; as they now are in force, in the Codex Iuris Canonici.

1. The Corpus Iuris Canonici consists of five parts, which are: 1. the Decretum Gratiani; 2. the Decretals of Gregory IX; 3. the Liber Sextus of Boniface VIII; 4. the Clementines; 5. the Extravagantes of John XXII and the Extravagantes Communes.¹

2. The Codex Iuris Canonici, arranged by order of Pius X, promulgated by the authority of Benedict XV in the year 1917, on May 27, and in force from May 19, 1918, consists of five books, of which the first treats general norms, the second persons, the third things, the fourth processes, and the fifth delicts and penalties.

¹ They are generally cited thus:

1. Decretum Gratiani. First part of the decree: c. 9 "Palam est" 11 = c. 9, D. 11 = c. 9, D. XI = canon 9 of distinction XI. Second part: c. 24, C. II, q. 7 = canon 24 of cause II, question 7. The treatise De poenitentia is cited in this way: c. 26, D. I de poenit. = canon 26 of the first distinction concerning penance. Third part: c. 15, D. III de consecr. = canon 15 of distinction III concerning consecration. Summaries written by Gratian are cited by the expression "dictum Gratiani" = dict. Gratiani. The cited dictum is determined by distinction or by cause and question.

2. The Decretals of Gregory IX are cited by the characteristic letter X = extra, for example c. 5 X de praebendis (III, 5) = c. 5 X 3.5 = the fifth chapter of the Decretals of Gregory IX concerning prebends and dignities, book III, title 5.

3. The Liber Sextus of Boniface VIII: c. "ut animarum" 2 de constit. in VIto (I, 2) = c. 2 de constit. in VIto (I, 2) = c. 2 in VIto (I, 2).

4. The Clementines: for example Clem. 1 de celebratione miss. (III, 14), or c. 1 III, 14 in Clem. = Clementina 1 de celebr. miss. = c. 1 III, 14 in Clementinis.

5. The Extravagantes of John XXII: c. un. de praebendis extrav. Ioann. XXII (tit. 3) = c. un. extr. Ioan. (3). The Extravagantes Communes: c. 1 de electione, extrav. com. (I, 3) = c. 1 Xvag. co. I, 3.

I. Civil law is the complex of laws made by civil authority.

II. Civil law is distinguished:

1. By reason of time, into old and modern law.

a) Old law, by which Roman Law is understood, consists of four parts, which are: 1. the Institutes; 2. the Digest or Pandects (pan and dechomai, as if things which contain all); 3. the Code; 4. the Novellae, as if newly issued.⁴

b) Modern law is the law which each kingdom has established for itself, especially from the time of the upheaval of the republic in France, that is, at the end of the eighteenth century.

2. By reason of scope, civil law is distinguished into international and national law.

a) International law is that which is established by express pacts entered into among the rulers of nations. It is called public or private according as it moderates the relation of state to state, or of the citizen of one state to the citizen of another state.

b) National law is that which has been established for a determinate state, such as Dutch law.

¹ Cf. Marcellus a Puero Jesu, Ethica moralis et socialis, pp. 336-340.

² Cf. Lijdsman, Introductio in Ius Canonicum, n. 64 sq.

³ Cf. Lijdsman, Introductio in Ius Canonicum, n. 52 sq.

⁴ They are usually cited in this way: Institutes: § 1 Instit. de adoptionibus lib. I, tit. 11 = § 1, I. I, 11. Digest: the beginning of law, or fragment, 4, Digest, or Pandects, ff., de pactis, book II, title 14 = l. 4 pr. D. II, 14 (fr. 4 pr. ff. II, 14) = l. 4, § 1, D. II, 14. Code: law 7, § 1, Cod. de diversis rescriptis, book I, title 23 = l. 7, § 1, C. I, 23. Novellae: Nov. VII praef. = Nov. VII, cap. 1.

IV. Fuller exposition; this is especially set forth by a fuller exposition both of the object of justice, that is, as is clear from the definition handed down, right,¹ and of its subject.

1. Notion of right. The word right is taken in different senses, for example for a moral and inviolable faculty in regard to something, that is, in regard to some thing or some action, whether one's own or another's; for a law granting some moral faculty in regard to something; for a body of laws, as when someone is said to study law; for the sentence of a judge, who therefore is said to declare the law; for the place in which sentence is pronounced, whence someone is said to appear in court.

Now right, insofar as it is the object of justice, is a thing due to someone according to some equality; namely the material object is the thing due, and the formal object is the character of debt. Moreover, under the name of thing we also comprehend an action or omission.

2. Source of right. The remote source of every right is law, whether natural or positive, and ultimately the eternal law, which is the origin of all laws according to these words of St. Alphonsus: "The will of God alone, as being most holy, most wise, most upright, is the one source of every law, of every rule, and of the measure of honesty" (Dichiarazione del sistema, n. 18). The proximate source of right is the moral faculty itself, on account of which some thing is due to someone. I said moral faculty, by which is understood some power with respect to some thing.

3. Division of right. Right, insofar as it is the object of justice, is divided:

a) By reason of origin, into natural right and positive right, according as it flows from natural law (n. 82) or from positive law (n. 89).

b) By reason of subject, into individual right and social right, according as it belongs to man as an individual, or as part of a whole, or as a member of society.

c) By reason of the title in which it is proximately founded, into right founded in the title of devinction or quasi-devinction² of a thing to some person, and this is the object of commutative justice; into right founded in the title of capacity, dignity, merit, or necessity, on account of which some good, for example an office, ought to be granted by the whole, that is, by the prince, to some member of society, and this is the object of distributive justice; into right founded in the ordination of subjects and of the prince to society, and this is the object of legal justice.

d) By reason of efficacy, into strict right and less strict right, according as it is founded in the title of devinction or quasi-devinction of a thing to some person, or in another of the titles just assigned.

Strict right, that is, the object of commutative justice, is distinguished into ius in re, or real right, and ius ad rem, according as a thing has already been bound to someone, or someone has a right that a thing, still bound to another, be bound to himself. This right is sometimes called ius in personam, insofar, namely, as some person, from commutative justice, is obliged to render some thing to someone (St. Alphonsus, III, 486).

4. Subject of right. A rational being, and it alone, is the subject of right. For right is a thing due to someone according to some equality. But something can be due only to a rational being.

The Minor is proved. Something can be due only to him who has a moral faculty in regard to something. But a moral faculty in regard to something belongs to a rational being, and to it alone.

The subsumed Minor is proved. A moral faculty belongs to him, and to him alone, who can and ought to direct himself to the ultimate end; for such a one and such a one alone enjoys the faculty of choosing means to the ultimate end, a faculty, I say, of which others ought to take account. But a rational being, as free, and it alone can and ought to direct itself to the ultimate end; irrational beings, as lacking liberty, cannot direct themselves. Therefore a moral faculty belongs to a rational being, and to it alone.

Corollary I. Even infants and the insane are capable of rights. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "For as long as the heir is a little child, he differs nothing from a servant, although he is lord of all; but he is under tutors and governors until the time predetermined by the father";³ 2. from the consent of all nations and laws; 3. from the fact that nothing prevents some thing from being destined to the special utility of someone and therefore owed to him, even if in the use of the thing he must be directed by the reason and will of another.

Corollary II. Not only physical persons, but also moral persons, can be the subject of right, or at least be regarded as if they were the subject of right;⁴ concerning these we shall speak specifically later.

Corollary III. The capacity of acquiring a right can be restricted by authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, and this both directly, for example if someone is deprived of the usufruct of his own thing (n. 764), or is rendered incapable by reason of a solemn vow of poverty; and indirectly, insofar as certain things are placed outside commerce. The state in which someone exists deprived of the capacity of right is called civil death.

And with these things having been premised concerning justice taken more generally, let us proceed to the treatment of commutative justice, speaking, as we have already noted, first of commutative justice itself, then of injustice and restitution. We shall add a double appendix, the former on distributive justice, the latter on legal justice.

¹ Cf. Lijdsman, C.SS.R., Introductio in Ius Canonicum, vol. I, n. 1.

² By quasi-devinction I understand the power which belongs to a private person, so that some thing may be bound to him (ius ad rem).

³ Gal. 4:1-2.

⁴ It is disputed: 1. whether and 2. in what precise sense a moral person can be called the subject of right. Cf. Brinz, Pandekten, III, § 432-454; Ihering, Der Geist des Romischen Rechts; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia, XIV; F. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Romischen Rechts, II, § 85-103; d'Annibale, Summula Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 43; Waffelaert, Etude de theologie morale sur l'obligation en conscience des lois civiles, p. 157-184; Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, II, p. 394-395; Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, cited by Duynstee, n. 22.

All strict real rights involve something of ownership; most, however, involve only limited ownership. So that these may be explained completely and in order, we shall treat first of ownership generally, then of limited ownerships.

We must speak first of the notion, division, legitimacy, and necessity of ownership, then of the objects of ownership.

Since rights and duties are correlative—there being a duty that corresponds to every right, and vice versa—and since both are regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.

(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example: Titus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the hospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.

(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because they are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc. Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to serve God or preserve one’s life.

Resemblance between Distributive and Commutative Justice.—The general likeness between distributive and commutative justice may be summed up as follows:

(a) they have the same remote matter, since both alike are concerned with external things, persons or works. Thus, things such as goods of fortune may be distributed by the community to its members, or may be exchanged by individuals between them; labors to be performed may be assigned by the community or may be agreed on by private persons through contract;

(b) they have the same general form, since both alike seek to impress equality on the matter with which they deal, by rendering in these things to every one his due, and by making man’s actions towards his neighbor to follow the mean of reason and of the thing (see 1711).

The Special Differences between Distributive and Commutative Justice.—(a) They differ in their proximate matter, that is, in the operations by which use is made of external things, persons or works; for while distributive justice acts through distribution (or division), appointment, or assignment among many, commutative justice acts through exchange, or transfer from one to another between two persons.

(b) They differ in their special form; for distributive justice seeks equality and the golden mean, according to proportion, while commutative justice seeks the same according to quantity (see 1712). Distributive justice does not treat parties as equals, but gives to each one according to his personal worth—to the more deserving the superior positions and high salaries, to the less deserving the inferior positions and lower salaries. Commutative justice, on the other hand, treats the parties as equal, and decrees that debts must be paid and injuries repaired, even though payment or reparation must be made by a good man to a bad man, and that the recompense must equal the difference created between the parties by the debt or the injury.

The Vices against Commutative Justice.—These vices can be classified under two general heads: (a) the vices committed in involuntary commutations (see 1748), which include deeds against the person (such as homicide, mutilation, imprisonment) and against property (such as theft and rapine), and unjust words, whether spoken during judicial process (by judges, advocates, witnesses, etc.), or outside of judicial process (such as contumely, detraction, etc); (b) vices committed in voluntary commutations (see 1748), which include fraud and usury.

What are the seventh and tenth precepts of the Decalogue? - "You shall not steal... You shall not covet your neighbor's house, nor his servant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his." Exod. 20:15, 17. By the seventh precept, formally negative, under the name of theft taken broadly, every injury, or unjust lesion or damaging of one's neighbor in the temporal goods of fortune, is prohibited; and consequently, by the same precept, insofar as it is virtually and implicitly affirmative, it is commanded that to each one his own right with respect to temporal goods must be rendered. Certainly it pertains to the same precept and to the same virtue both to prohibit another's right from being injured through injustice, and especially to oblige that to each other person his own right be rendered through restitution and other modes.

But as by the seventh precept the external act is prohibited, so by the tenth the internal act injurious to one's neighbor in the goods of fortune is prohibited. For by it every inordinate and unjust appetite for the goods of fortune of one's neighbor is prohibited. Therefore against this tenth precept sin not only the envious, but also the avaricious, who seek riches with excessive eagerness, and desire to increase wealth by unjust modes. Both these precepts regard the virtue of justice.

What is justice? - Justice is so called from iustari, or from two things being made equal to each other. Justice taken broadly imports all virtues; hence a man is customarily called simply just if he preserves every honesty in every matter. Taken strictly, insofar as it is the special virtue with which we are here dealing, it is defined: the constant and perpetual will of rendering to each one his own right. Inst. 1. 1. t. 1. "Constant and perpetual will," because there must be a firm disposition not only for one or another day, but always, of rendering to each one his own right; for otherwise it is not a perfect virtue, just as penance is not a perfect virtue unless it includes the firm purpose of never sinning. The virtue is defined from the act. Therefore it can be said otherwise that "justice is a habit according to which someone, by a constant and perpetual will, renders to each one his own right." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58. a. 1. "Right" here is not understood as right broadly so called, which is the exigency of right reason toward something as honorable, that is, toward something to be done because of its honesty, or omitted because of its dishonesty; but right strictly so called is understood, which is a moral power toward something as one's own, that is, toward something to be done, omitted, had, retained, demanded as one's own, that is, as subject to one's own liberty, with others excluded, namely so that it may fall to one's own advantage and utility. This right is founded in the very nature of man, who by reason of his liberty must move himself toward the end and apply the means necessary for obtaining that end. C. L. 359 ff., 2167 ff., 2287, 2339, 2354; C. He. 641; C. I. 438; C. A. 362, 366; C. B. 903; Lugo d. 1. n. 6.

This right, however, is one thing as right of jurisdiction, another as right of property. The first is the legitimate power of a superior to command or prohibit something to subjects for their own good, or for the good of the whole community. The necessity and utility of administering the community is the measure of this right as to its acts. The other is the legitimate power of any private person to dispose of some thing for the advantage of his own liberty, or as his own. Hence in the right of property the thing exists for the proprietor; in the right of jurisdiction neither the Prince exists for the people, nor the people for the Prince, but each exists for the common good.

The right of property is one thing in the thing, another to the thing. The first is that by which someone has the thing itself immediately bound and juridically obligated to himself as his own. Hence a thing obligated to someone by such a right carries its obligation with it, and wherever it may come, it can be sought back by its owner and juridically claimed. The second, however, is that by which someone does not have the thing itself immediately bound and juridically obligated to himself, but rather has another person bound to hand over some thing to him. Therefore a right in the thing makes the thing already his own; a right to the thing makes the thing become his own. A right in the thing gives an immediate real action against the thing itself, so that you may take it to yourself. A right to the thing gives an immediate personal action against the person himself, so that you may compel him to hand the thing over to you, for example by the sentence of a judge. By a right to the thing someone has a just title to having it, for example by title of legacy, but he does not yet have possession of the thing. By a right in the thing someone has possession of the thing itself. For a right in the thing, therefore, there is required a title transferring ownership, of a thing determined in the individual, and its possession, at least regularly. For a right to the thing a just title for having it suffices. And thus the owner of a farm has a right in the thing as regards the existing fruits of that farm; he has a right to the thing as regards the rent of a leased farm. C. A. 307, 308; Inst. 1. 4. t. 6. Whenever a thing is sought by force of an obligation by which someone has not yet acquired ownership of the thing, the action is personal; but if a thing is sought of which he has full ownership, the action is real. Finally, an action is mixed, personal and real, and, as is said, the action is personal written upon the thing, if by the petition of the thing someone acquires ownership of the thing, and then the lawsuit instituted over it begins with a personal action and is concluded by a real action, as in the case in which, by the office of the judge, the sale made of a thing is dissolved, and the thing returns to the seller as his own. A personal action is from some personal fact, that is, from contract or from delict. A real action is from the defect of another's right. Inst. 1. 4. t. 6. section 1. Cf. Troplong, On Sale, article 1654, nn. 624-630; on article 1659, n. 698; on article 1664, nn. 728, 729; on article 1674, nn. 806, 807. "His own"; a thing can be one's own in three ways, if the person is considered in society as its member. Hence right also is distinguished in three ways: into high right, low right, and right of property. High right is that which the Prince, the republic, or the community has over the goods of the members, which it can demand as its own for the common good, by the "ownness" of the community, since whatever the part is belongs to the whole and exists for the whole. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 2; q. 65. a. 1. Low right is in the member of the community, as such, to common goods, which the member can demand in their distribution as his own by the "ownness" of a member. The right of property, however, is in the member of the community, as such, to proper goods, which one member can demand from another as his own, by the "ownness" of property. "Of rendering to each one his own right," that is, of equating the right of another by the rendering of what is owed; for to right, as to a certain moral exigency, debt correspondingly responds. Therefore, as is clear, justice is not a virtue toward oneself, but toward another. And as charity has its foundation in the conjunction of men among themselves, so justice rests upon the distinction of one man from another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 57, 58; Gousset 670, 674.

You will resolve: The Prince can indeed, if at some time this is required for the common good, take a thing from a subject, because right to the end necessarily imports right to the means without which the end cannot be obtained. But the public good sometimes requires that someone be deprived of his own thing, for example of a field for the construction of a public road, etc. But then the Prince, in so far as can be done, is bound to just compensation, because it is not equitable that one person be despoiled while others remain untouched, as is clear from natural and positive law. C. I. 438; C. G. 545; C. H. 349; C. A. 365; C. L. 2360.

But in no way can he, without a grave cause of the public good, but for his own convenience, take away by law from a subject some notable thing of his, or an acquired right, because he has no power over the goods of private persons unless the reason of the common good altogether demands it. Therefore he is then bound to restitution. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 8.

Equity is distinguished from justice. First, equity is justice itself. And thus in L. 14. de Condict. indeb. it is said: "It is equitable by nature that no one be enriched with the loss of another." But equity proceeds further, by constituting a certain fitting measure in justice itself, and generally in all laws, namely by tempering according to various circumstances the rigor and subtlety of right and laws. Rigor, for example: "It is of the highest equity that one who has promised money, or something else, by reason of donation, should not owe interest because of delay in payment of the money." L. 22. de Donat. Subtlety, for example: "If a surety, though freed by lapse of time alone, nevertheless pays the creditor, he will rightly have an action of mandate against the principal debtor; for although he paid when already freed, nevertheless he fulfilled his pledge and freed the debtor. Therefore, if he is prepared to defend the principal debtor against the creditor, it is most equitable that by the judgment of mandate he recover what he paid." L. 29. section 6. Mandati. Cf. also L. 17. de Iniu. rupto irr. f. testam.; L. 85. de R. I.

Equity, taken in this way, is the same as epicheia, which is a part of justice commonly so called, and is a subjective part of justice; and justice is said of it prior to legal justice, for legal justice is directed according to epicheia. For legal justice follows the words of the law; equity or epicheia follows the intention of the legislator. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 120. a. 2. Equity is to be observed in interpreting laws and acts, and also in onerous contracts.

It is altogether unlawful to exercise one's right when an exercise of this sort has no other end than to inflict damage on another. Likewise it is unlawful to exercise that right against the prescription of the laws. C. B. 226, 826, 907, 908, 909, 912. Likewise it is unlawful to exercise one's right excessively, with damage to others. C. He. 679, 684. But it is not unlawful to violate the property of another in order to avoid one's own greater damage, compensation afterward being made to the other for the damage inflicted on him. C. He. 701.

How many kinds of justice are there? - Justice is threefold, namely general or legal, distributive, and commutative. For since justice is wholly situated in this, that it render to another his own right, it is specified and divided according to right. But right, as was just said, is threefold, namely high, low, and of property. Hence there are three species of justice, each of which renders what is owed according to equality.

Legal justice equates high right through the actions and goods which are owed to the Prince or to the republic for promoting the common good; and this is justice of the part toward the whole, or of the members toward the head and the community. It is called legal because it has for its object that which is owed to the community by reason and force of the laws, "because by it man agrees with the law ordering the acts of all virtues to the common good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58. a. 5.

Therefore this justice is a general and special virtue at the same time. General, insofar as it orders the acts of all virtues to the common good; special, insofar as it regards the common good as its proper object. "And thus it is in the Prince principally and as it were architectonically; but in subjects secondarily and as it were administratively." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58. a. 6. Legal justice, insofar as it is in the Prince, inclines him to procuring the common good, for example by establishing laws necessary for it. Insofar as it is in private citizens, it inclines them to the obedience owed to the laws by reason of the common good. Illegal injustice is opposed to this legal justice, which "is a special vice insofar as it regards a special object, namely the common good, which it contemns"; and general, insofar as "through contempt of the common good man can be led to all sins," and insofar as "all vices are repugnant to the common good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 59. a. 1.

Distributive justice equates low right through the distribution of common goods, public functions, offices, rewards, namely the right which a member of the community, as such, has to these; and this is justice of the whole toward the part, or of the head or community toward the members. "When something from common goods is distributed to individuals, each one in some way receives what is his own." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 61. a. 1 ad 2. Distributive justice is in the Prince as distributing common goods according to the dignity of persons; but in the particular persons themselves it is present insofar as they are content with what is owed to them.

Acceptance of persons is opposed to distributive justice; for in distributive justice those conditions of persons are considered which make for the cause of dignity or debt; but in acceptance of persons other conditions are considered, which do not make for the cause of dignity or debt. For whatever condition does not make for the cause on account of which someone is worthy of such a thing is referred to the person. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 63. a. 1.

Commutative justice, however, equates the right of property, or the low right of one member against another member, through the exchange of things and prices; and this is justice of part toward part. Therefore, as legal justice orders man immediately to the common good, so commutative justice orders man concerning those things which are directed to another singular person, namely concerning external actions and things by which men can communicate with one another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58. aa. 7, 8.

Hence special injustice is opposed to commutative justice insofar as it imports "a certain inequality toward another," according to the aforesaid actions and things owed to another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 59. a. 1. Therefore theft and robbery are opposed to commutative justice, through which harm is inflicted on one's neighbor in exterior goods by secretly or violently taking them away. And since harm of this sort can also be inflicted in the goods of the body and of the soul, and also of the whole person, hence by reduction many other sins are opposed to the same justice: homicide, mutilation, damaging, etc.; calumny, detraction, insult, etc., whether outside judgment or in judgment through an unjust sentence, false testimony, etc.

Now if justice is not taken generally, namely insofar as it is also a certain general justice, but insofar as it is particular justice ordered to some private person, then there are only two species of justice, commutative and distributive. For there is only a twofold ordering to a private person, namely of part to part, which commutative justice directs, and of whole to parts, which distributive justice directs. The former directs the exchanges of private persons among themselves. The latter directs the distributions of the Prince to particular persons. But in them the notion of what is owed is diverse. For what is proper is owed to someone in one way, and what is common in another way.

These two kinds of justice are particular justices, while legal justice is general justice; for motion receives species from the terminus, and it pertains to legal justice to order those things which belong to private persons to the common good; but, on the contrary, to order the common good to particular persons, and those things which are done mutually between two particular persons to one another, belongs to particular justice. Therefore justice can well be divided into general and particular; and the latter into distributive and commutative. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 61. a. 1.

But in the strict sense, by the name justice, only commutative justice is meant. For general or legal justice does not regard entirely distinct persons; for each citizen is part of the community, and what is contributed to the community is contributed also to that same citizen. But distributive justice by no means includes right strictly so called, or right of property. For it supposes only dignity and aptitude in the person for receiving such common goods.

Vindictive justice, which is customarily added to the three prior species of justice, is not properly a fourth species of justice, because justice, taken generally, is specified and divided according to the diversity of the right which it regards; and this is only that threefold right just mentioned. For it would be incongruous to say that a guilty person has a right to punishment. It is a potential part of justice itself. Nevertheless, under a diverse respect it can be reduced to all those three species. Insofar as a superior provides for the common happiness of citizens by punishments, it pertains to legal justice; insofar as he decrees the punishments themselves proportioned to the gravity of crimes, it pertains to distributive justice; finally, insofar as a superior carries out the offices of vindictive justice from a certain quasi-contract entered into with the republic concerning the right administration of public affairs, it pertains to commutative justice. L. 486; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, q. 61, q. 80, q. 108. a. 2 ad 1.

Whether the mean of the thing, or equality, must be observed in the same way in commutative and distributive justice? - In commutative justice arithmetical equality must be observed; in distributive justice geometrical proportion. Commutative justice is exercised by citizen toward citizen, by private person toward private person, and has place in contracts and in other affairs pertaining to social commerce; in this only the things themselves are considered, which are the object of contracts and of the exchanges by which commerce is exercised. Therefore in it there must be preserved equality of the things themselves, namely equality of thing to thing, as if, for example, you owe one hundred, you render one hundred, considering only what is owed, so that, except in cases in which regard for persons is prescribed by the law itself, for example when minors are involved, in all other cases no respect is had for the condition or merits of the person. And this is that equality which they call arithmetical.

But distributive justice is exercised by a superior toward a subject, and has place in distributing common goods, dignities, offices, honors, burdens, rewards and punishments; and therefore it must not have regard of thing to thing, but of condignity, merits, and condition of persons, for example their capacity or need, with respect to imposing taxes, or granting subsidies to a person, whether physical or moral. For so much more of common goods is owed to someone, the greater principality he has in the community. And likewise so much more is owed, for example, to some community from common goods, the greater its need may be, for example for hospitals to be erected, schools, etc. From this arises and is constituted what is called geometrical proportion, which namely is not equality of thing to thing, but proportion of thing to person, that is, to the merits and quality of persons, so that just as one person exceeds another, so also the thing which is given to one person exceeds the thing which is given to another. Hence equality is considered not according to quantity, but according to proportion; or, what is the same, equality not of things but of ratios is considered. Therefore if to him who has merits as five there are given, for example, ten coins, to him whose merits are as ten, twenty must be given. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58. a. 10; q. 61. a. 2; Inst. 1. 4. t. 4. sections 7, 8; Gousset 670.

What is the obligation of justice? - Both commutative justice and also distributive, vindictive, and legal justice oblige per se under grave sin. For the violation of commutative justice, as is clear from several places of Sacred Scripture, is to be punished with eternal punishment, 1 Cor. 6:10. Besides, it is per se, or from its nature, repugnant to charity, which moves one to will the good of another; for it itself consists essentially in inflicting harm on another. Therefore per se and from its genus it is a mortal sin. But a lesion of distributive, vindictive, and legal justice induces per se a grave disorder, since it gravely harms the necessary order of society. Per se, because in this matter smallness of matter is admitted. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 59. a. 4.

What is ownership? - Among the three species of justice, as has already been said, commutative justice alone is strictly and properly justice altogether. For in legal justice there is lacking distinction toward another; for every citizen is part of the community. But in distributive justice there is lacking right strictly so called; for in the distribution of common goods, toward obtaining a part of them, there is given only mere dignity, and in no way property. But since commutative justice is exercised only between private persons, and renders to each one what is his own proper thing, hence it alone is strictly and properly justice altogether, and it is chiefly treated in this treatise. But since commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, it is concerned only with the right of property, which is customarily called property and ownership.

Ownership is: the moral power of disposing at will of some corporeal thing as one's own, unless nevertheless it is prohibited by law, agreement, or the will of a testator. "Moral power," and thus it is distinguished from physical power; moral power, and therefore legitimate. "Of disposing of a thing," and thus it is distinguished from jurisdiction, which is also called ownership of jurisdiction, so that it may be distinguished from ownership of property: for jurisdiction is the moral power of governing; nor is it exercised immediately over a thing, but over a subject person. "Corporeal," because of incorporeal things one does not have ownership, but rather a right. "At will," that is, by selling, donating, or even destroying without cause, which although otherwise prohibited, because God permits ownership to each one only for this purpose, that it may serve his own necessity and utility and that of his own people, nevertheless does not violate the right of another and is not against commutative justice. "As one's own," for ownership properly is a right in the thing, and not precisely a right to the thing, which tends to that right and is perfected and completed by it. Much less is ownership mere possession of a thing. "Unless prohibited by law": by natural law, if one cannot dispose of his own thing without injury to anyone; by positive law, and thus alienation of their things is not permitted to minors except from a just cause and with certain solemnities observed, though in this case ownership is not taken away, but only its use is impeded. "By agreement": this would be, for example, if it were agreed between seller and buyer that the buyer is not to use the thing bought except after a certain day. "By the will of a testator": this would be, for example, if the testator had bequeathed a farm to someone on this condition, that he not use it except after a year. C. I. 436; C. G. 544; C. H. 348; C. A. 353, 354; C. B. 903; C. He. 641; C. L. 2167 ff.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66; Gousset 673; E. M.

How many kinds of ownership are there? - Ownership of property is immediately divided into perfect ownership and imperfect ownership. Perfect ownership of property, or full ownership, is the legitimate power of receiving in one's own name every advantage of one's liberty from some thing, by disposing of it and using it. Imperfect ownership, however, is the legitimate power of receiving from a thing some advantage, yet not every advantage, of one's liberty.

Imperfect ownership is immediately subdivided into direct ownership and useful ownership. The former is the legitimate power over the substance of a thing without the fruits. The latter is the legitimate power of receiving fruits and emoluments from another's thing, while its substance remains intact. Useful ownership, according to the various advantages of things to be received, is divided into various species, principally into use, habitation, surface right, usufruct, servitude, possession, emphyteusis, fief, and census. Each ownership, however, is either perpetual or revocable. By its nature ownership is full and perpetual. Here it will be necessary to speak of the first six species; of the last three it will be necessary to speak below, when there will be discussion of contracts. C. G. 543; C. He. 641 ff.; C. L. 2187-2189; L. 487.

What is use? Use is defined: The right of using another's things, their substance being preserved both as to matter and also as to form. "Right" signifies the faculty which belongs to a competent user, for thus the one to whom use belongs is called; but the one to whom the property or ownership of the thing belongs is called the proprietor. Therefore use here is not taken generally for the actual exercise of any ownership whatever, but specially for a certain special power. "Right," and therefore there is question of use of right, not of use in fact, which is the actual use of another's thing, revocable at the will of the one granting it. "Of using" signifies that the faculty belonging to the user extends only to those things which are necessary. C. I. 521; C. G. 630; C. H. 524; C. A. 504; C. L. 2254. This necessity, however, is to be measured according to the condition, state, and dignity of the user himself and of his family, with servants included, and with children born after the exercise of use not excluded. C. I. 521, 523; C. G. 630; C. H. 524, 526; C. A. 505, 506. Yet use of a thing can be granted to a person for daily personal necessities, C. L. 2254, and from mere agreement altogether limited to some act, for example if someone grants to a friend that he may walk through his forest, hold a banquet in his house, or pluck apples from the trees of his field. "Another's things" indicates that use cannot consist in one's own things; for each one is said to have in his own things not use only, but also ownership. "Their substance being preserved"; otherwise it would not be use but abuse. From this it follows that the user cannot change the thing whose use he has obtained even into a better form; and therefore those words are also added: "both as to matter and also as to form." C. A. 507. And this is the principal obligation of the user; hence he is also bound to ordinary repairs and taxes, yet in proportion to the fruits, so that the thing may be preserved whole for its owner. C. I. 537; C. G. 635; C. L. 2259, 2260. Cf. C. A. 508; C. H. 527.

Use is acquired and ceases in the same modes by which usufruct is acquired and ceases. C. I. 529; C. G. 625; C. H. 529; C. L. 2255; Inst. 1. 2. t. 5. sections 1, 3, 4; L. 487. Cf. here 848, 849.

Hence it is clear: that under use, as also under usufruct, there do not come things consumable by one act, such as wine, oil, bread, etc., because through such use the substance of the thing does not remain preserved. In the case of destruction of the thing, one is bound to repay an equivalent price. Therefore prior security must be given, and the condition of immovables and an inventory of movables must be made. C. I. 525; C. G. 626; C. L. 2256. Cf. C. A. 520.

Considering the nature of use itself, the user cannot lease, sell, or donate his right to another. For use consists in this, that someone uses a thing according to the measure of his necessity. C. I. 528; C. G. 631, 634; C. H. 525; C. A. 507; C. L. 2258. Make exception, unless it clearly appears that this faculty also was granted to them by a special agreement, or if the use would be altogether useless unless it could be alienated. A user of a fruitful thing, such as a garden, fields, vineyards, etc., cannot justly collect more from the fruits than is required for necessary support; hence if he collects more fruits, he is bound to restore them to the direct owner. C. I. 821; C. G. 630; C. A. 505, 506; C. L. 2257.

What is habitation? Habitation is: The right of inhabiting another's buildings, their substance being preserved. And thus to noble widows there is often granted by husbands the right of dwelling for the days of life in the house of the heir. He to whom habitation of a house has been granted can dwell in it with his family, although at the time when he acquired the habitation of the building he was not married, and can receive guests in it; nevertheless he cannot transfer his right to another by selling it, or by leasing the building and acquiring for himself the price of the lease. One who inhabits the whole house is bound to all necessary and ordinary expenses and taxes; one who inhabits only part is bound only according to the proportion of the thing.

Habitation begins and ceases as use, with which it is almost confused according to more recent laws. C. I. 521 ff.; C. G. 625 ff.; C. A. 521-522; C. H. 524, 525, 529; C. He. 776, 777; C. L. 2254, 2259, 2260. Cf. C. A. 508; C. H. 527; C. B. 1093. C. I. 1415; C. G. 1570: besides clothing, habitation is owed to a widow from the inheritance of her husband for the year of mourning. C. B. 1969: the heir is bound for one month to permit use of the house to members of the family of the deceased, from the inheritance devolved to him. Inst. 1. 2. t. 5. sections 2, 5.

842bis. What is surface right? - With use, surface right also is almost confused. Surface is said to be whatever has been placed upon the soil and stands above the ground, such as a building, tree, plant, vine, etc. Hence there is right of surface; and the one having it is called the superficiary, and the thing itself is called superficiary. Dig. title 18, book 43. The surface yields to the soil. The right of surface can be limited only to occupation of the surface, and only to ownership of the superficiary thing, whether it be above the soil or beneath the soil. C. He. 675, 779.

What is usufruct? - Usufruct is: The right of using and enjoying another's thing, by receiving fruits from it in that very mode by which the proprietor himself would receive them, while nevertheless its substance is preserved, both as to matter and also as to form, as in use. C. I. 447; C. G. 578; C. H. 467; C. A. 509; C. B. 1030; C. He. 745; C. L. 2197, 2202; L. 487.

It differs from use in this, that it extends more broadly; for simply to use is to receive only necessary fruits, but to enjoy is to receive them as the proprietor himself would receive them. Thus, for example, if someone has the use of some garden, he can indeed take fruits from it for himself and his own, but he cannot alienate them and bestow them on outsiders; but he can do so if he has usufruct of the same. Those words, "of using and enjoying," are not added in vain; for usufruct, insofar as it regards a fruitful thing, is the right of using; but insofar as it regards the fruits, it is the right of enjoying, or of receiving fruits from it. And thus, if the revenues of some estate are bequeathed, it is not judged to be a usufruct, but a legacy of revenues, which is a personal burden, not a burden of the estate. And therefore it is said, "the right of using and enjoying another's thing, by receiving fruits from it," etc. Hence it is a real right constituted in the thing, and thus it differs from lease. "Another's thing," because usufruct is a servitude. The owner uses his thing by right of property. The one to whom usufruct belongs is called the fructuary. Inst. 1. 2. t. 4. section 1.

What is fruit of a thing, and how many kinds are there? Fruit is what a thing bears or produces. For fruits are so called from bearing; and some are natural, which are produced from the thing itself and by the benefit of nature alone, such as grass, apples, nuts; likewise the offspring of animals and the things which come from them, since they are held as a part of the entrails. Others are industrial, which are acquired by industry alone, and it is the profit which is received from money exposed to trade, or from improvements made to a thing. Others, however, are those in which, besides nature, the labor and industry of man also has a part, such as, for example, grain and crops; theologians call these mixed, because they are produced partly by nature, partly by the benefit of human industry. Finally, others are civil, which arise only on occasion of the thing and by force of a particular obligation founded in civil law, for example the price of a leased house, rents of a farm, interest of money given as a loan, etc. C. L. 495.

But fruits are not understood except after expenses have been deducted. The natural and industrial fruits themselves are divided into those to be born and those born; these likewise are customarily divided into pending and received, and these still into existing and consumed. C. I. 444, 445, 480, 494; C. G. 547, 548, 583, 584, 585, 598; C. H. 354-357; C. A. 330, 405; C. B. 99, 100, 102; C. He. 643; L. 609, 610.

How many kinds of usufruct are there? - There is a threefold division of usufruct. The first is into proper and improper usufruct. The former is constituted in things which are by no means consumed by use, such as, for example, a house and a garden; the latter, however, is constituted in fungible things, as they are called, namely those which are consumed by use, such as linens and household furnishings. Improper usufruct is also called quasi-usufruct. C. I. 483, 484; C. G. 587, 589; C. H. 481, 482; C. A. 510; C. B. 1031, 1032, 1067.

The second division is into singular usufruct, that is, of certain things in species; particular usufruct, that is, of some part of goods; and universal usufruct, in which all goods are contained. C. G. 612; C. H. 469; C. B. 1038.

Finally, the third division is into usufruct of things and of rights, as, for example, usufruct of a life annuity, which brings a right of receiving even past and unreceived fruits. Thus from C. G. 588. Cf. C. I. 482; C. H. 469; C. A. 510; C. B. 1068 ff., 1085 ff.; C. He. 745; Inst. 1. 2. t. 4. section 2.

What are the rights of the usufructuary? - These in general are, apart from a special agreement:

1. Since the usufructuary is judged to act as the person of the proprietor with respect to useful ownership, his first right is that he can receive all fruits, whether natural, industrial, or civil, and make them his own, whether he has collected them by himself or through others. But they are understood to have been collected when they have been separated from the soil or from the thing. Hence, if the fructuary dies, fruits indeed mature but not yet separated from the soil or the thing do not belong to the heir of the fructuary, but to the proprietor of the thing, without the burden of paying for cultivation or seed, etc.; for fruits, as long as they adhere to the farm, are judged one with it. But if that heir, when the fructuary is already near death, has collected immature fruits, he is bound to restore them to the proprietor; for just as the fructuary could not collect immature fruits, so much less can his heir. On the contrary, the usufructuary receives natural and industrial fruits pending at the beginning, also without the burden of paying for cultivation or seed, etc. But civil fruits are acquired day by day, and therefore must be divided according to the proportion of the time during which the usufruct lasted. Inst. 1. 2. t. 1. section 36; C. I. 477, 479, 480, 481, 494, 496; C. G. 578, 582, 585, 586, 588, 598, 600; C. H. 471, 472, 474, 475; C. A. 509, 511. Cf. ib. art. 519; C. H. 472, 476, 477; C. B. 1039; C. He. 755, 756, 757; C. L. 2203 ff., 2252, 2253, 495.

2. In addition, he has a right to all those things without which usufruct cannot be had; therefore he has right of way to the usufructuary thing through the hereditary farm, if access does not lie open from elsewhere; likewise the right of using all servitudes adhering to the farm, because they are held as qualities of the farm itself; likewise he has a right to opened mines and to the individual instruments of the farm, unless the contrary will of the testator appears; for it is not to be presumed that the testator wished the fructuary to furnish instruments for himself for a farm which he is to use only for a time. C. I. 494; C. G. 597, 598; C. A. 511; C. H. 479. Cf. ib. arts. 476, 477; C. B. 1031; C. L. 2206, 2213, 2287.

3. Besides, he has the right that he can sell, donate, lease, lend, and subject to mortgage the fruits and the usufructuary things, and grant them to another to enjoy; indeed even hand them over as a pledge. For one who enjoys through another is seen to enjoy by himself. C. I. 492, 493, 1967; C. G. 595, 2118; C. H. 480; C. He. 758; C. B. 1059; Inst. 1. 2. t. 1. sections 36-38, t. 4. section 1.

4. As the usufructuary is not bound to make improvements, so he has no right to compensation for improvements made. For he is judged to have donated them. Nevertheless, he will be able to compensate an increase of price with losses, if any followed without grave fault of the fructuary. If this compensation cannot have place, it is lawful for the fructuary and his heirs to retake additions made, if they can be removed without detriment to the farm and with the utility of the fructuary, and the proprietor does not prefer to retain the additions made for himself after paying their valuation. But it will always be lawful for the fructuary and his heirs to recover mirrors, painted panels, and other ornaments, provided all things are restored to their former condition. C. I. 495; C. G. 599; C. H. 487, 488; C. He. 753; C. L. 2217, 2220. Cf. C. A. 514-517.

What are the obligations of the fructuary? - These in general are, apart from a special agreement:

1. The burden falls upon the fructuary both of furnishing custody and of undergoing ordinary expenses, so that the thing may be preserved in its whole condition, and also of making expenditures so that he may receive natural fruits from it. He is also bound to pay the ordinary burdens by which the usufructuary thing is burdened, such as salaries, annual taxes, and similar things. He is likewise bound to notify the owner if anything happens which may harm his property. C. I. 477, 501, 504, 506, 509, 511; C. G. 605, 606, 608, 614; C. H. 500-502, 504, 505; C. A. 512, 513; C. B. 1036, 1037, 1041 ff.; C. He. 764, 765, 767, 769; C. L. 2228, 229, 2238, 2240.

2. The fructuary must use another's thing as a good father of a family, and must return it such as it ought to be found after good administration. But the proprietor can do nothing by which the condition of the usufructuary becomes worse, because he suffers him to enjoy. C. I. 495, 497; C. G. 599, 601; C. H. 489, 497, 503; C. A. 513; C. B. 1051 ff.; C. He. 755, 759, 768; C. L. 2223, 2227.

3. The usufructuary thing must be restored to the owner, when the usufruct has ended, such as it was with respect to its substance when it began. C. I. 477; C. He. 751 ff. Therefore security must be given, and the condition of immovables and an inventory of movables must be made. C. I. 496, 497; C. G. 600, 601; C. H. 491; C. B. 1034 f., 1048, 1049. From C. I. 1922 either security or pledge can be given. Cf. C. G. 2041; C. He. 760 ff. But security is not to be given by a father or mother in legal usufruct, nor by one who sold or donated the thing while reserving usufruct to himself. C. I. 497; C. G. 601; C. H. 492. Nor indeed is security to be given, nor an inventory to be made, if the one who constitutes the usufruct remits all these things. C. I. 496, 497; C. H. 493. C. I. 483, 484; C. H. 481, 482; C. G. 587, 589; C. A. 518, 520; C. B. 1034, 1035, 1050, 1055; C. L. 2221, 2224.

4. Things which are consumed by use are to be restored according to their valuation made, or otherwise in the same quantity and quality, or at the current price, when the usufruct ceases. But things which deteriorate by use are restored in the condition in which they are when the usufruct ceases. C. I. 483, 484; C. G. 587, 589; C. B. 1050, 1067; C. He. 772; C. L. 2208, 2209.

From Roman Law: The usufructuary of a field has a right to hay, crops, willows, and trees to be cut, but not to large and fruit-bearing trees, to stakes, to stones, or to sand. In place of trees that have died, he is bound to substitute others, and the former belong to the fructuary; nevertheless he by no means ought to substitute trees overthrown by the force of a storm without fault on his part. And if there are bees, their usufruct also belongs to him. L. 9, 11, 18, 59 de Usufr. etc. From C. G. 594; C. I. 490: fruit-bearing trees which perish, or which are overturned by some accidental event, belong to the usufructuary with the burden of substitution. Cf. C. H. 483-485.

Usufruct of a forest. "The fructuary can cut a coppice wood and a reed-bed, as the father of a family was cutting, and sell them, even if the father of a family was not accustomed to sell but to use them himself; for it must be referred to the mode, not to the quality, of using." L. 9. section 7. de Usufructu et quemadmodum, etc. Cf. C. G. 590, 591; C. I. 485, 486; C. He. 770; C. L. 2211. "But if there were large trees, he cannot cut them." L. 11. de Usufructu, etc. Cf. C. G. 590, 592; C. I. 487, 579. "Labeo says that, when trees have been torn up or thrown down by the force of winds, the usufructuary can take them up to the measure of his own use and of the villa... He thinks that the usufructuary can cut timber as much as is necessary for the repair of the villa; just as, he says, he can burn lime or dig sand or take anything else necessary for the building." L. 12. de Usufructu, etc. Cf. C. G. 592, 593; C. I. 488, 489; C. A. 511; C. L. 2210, 2213, 2226. "I think that the fruit of a nursery belongs to the fructuary, yet in such a way that it is lawful for him to sell and to sow; nevertheless, for the sake of sowing the field, he must always renew the prepared nursery as an instrument of the field, so that, when the usufruct has ended, it may be restored to the owner." L. 9. section 6. de Usufructu, etc. Cf. C. G. 590; C. I. 485, 491; C. H. 485; C. L. 2112.

The usufructuary of a flock has a right to wool, milk, and offspring. Inst. 1. 2. t. 1. section 37, t. 5. section 4. But he is bound to substitute other heads from the offspring in place of heads that have died, unless he has the usufruct of the individual heads separately, not of all the heads collectively, or of the flock, herd, or drove, that is, of the universality. L. 68. section 2, 69, 70. section 3. de Usufructu, etc. Cf. C. G. 615, 616; C. I. 512, 513; C. H. 499; C. L. 2225.

How is usufruct acquired? - Usufruct is acquired: 1. From law, and then it is called legal; such is the usufruct of parents from the goods of children, or of a husband from the goods of his wife. 2. From agreement or contract, and therefore it is called conventional, for example by force of donation or testament. 3. By prescription. In its acquisition, the formalities of the various laws must be observed. C. He. 746.

C. I. 478, 901, 2137; C. H. 468; C. B. 1032, 1033.

How does usufruct cease? - "Lest properties be useless in general, when the usufruct has always departed, it has pleased the law that usufruct be extinguished in certain ways and return to the proprietor." Inst. 1. 2. t. 4. section 1; C. L. 2251.

Moreover, usufruct ceases: 1. By the natural or civil death of the fructuary; for since both use and usufruct are personal rights, they ought to be extinguished by the death of the one to whom they belong. Hence usufruct, that is, the stable right itself of using and enjoying, neither passes to heirs nor can even be sold without the consent of the direct owner. C. I. 515; C. G. 617; C. H. 498, 513; C. B. 1059, 1061; C. L. 2250. A usufruct granted to a community or moral body is extinguished after the space of 30 years, C. I. 518; C. G. 619; C. H. 515; C. L. 2244; of 100 years, C. He. 749.

2. When the time has ended, if any has been established by law or constituted by agreement. C. I. 515, 517; C. G. 617, 620; C. H. 513, 516; C. A. 528; C. He. 748; C. L. 2245.

3. By every manner of change, for example if a meadow becomes a pond, or by the total destruction of the thing, if, for example, the whole building is demolished. Total destruction; for if the thing perishes only partially, usufruct is sustained in that which remains. C. I. 515, 519, 520; C. G. 617-624; C. H. 513, 514, 517. Cf. C. A. 525; C. He. 748; C. L. 2243, 2246.

4. Likewise, usufruct is extinguished when the right of the one ceding the usufruct has been resolved. For example, if Titius sells a house to Caius under a pact of redemption, and meanwhile Caius grants its usufruct to Sempronius, once the house has been redeemed by Titius, the usufruct also ceases.

5. By consolidation, namely when the fructuary obtains the property and ownership of the thing itself, or when the owner also acquires the usufruct. C. I. 515; C. G. 617; C. H. 513; C. B. 1063.

6. By renunciation of the fructuary, provided it is not done in fraud of creditors. C. H. 513.

7. By abuse, by which the thing is made worse through the fault of the fructuary. But the sentence of a judge is necessary. C. I. 516; C. G. 618. Otherwise, however, from C. L. 2249, and from C. H. 520, 529, which establishes a distinction between usufruct and use, which is extinguished by grave abuse of the thing.

8. By prescription, namely if the fructuary does not use his right for so much time that the usufructuary thing can be usucapted by another; 30 years are required so that the owner can prescribe against the fructuary. C. I. 515; C. G. 617; C. H. 513; C. L. 2241; Inst. 1. 2. t. 4. section 3; C. G. 621, 622.

What is servitude, and how many kinds are there? - Servitude, taken actively and generically, is a right which belongs to someone, so that the thing of another, or another person, serves his thing or himself, that is, is applied to its or his utility. But servitude taken passively is the obligation of another's thing, or of a person, corresponding to the aforesaid right. "The thing of another, or another person"; for one's own thing does not serve its owner. Therefore the advantages which the owner receives from it, he receives by right of ownership, not by right of servitude. The same must be said a fortiori of a person.

Hence servitude can be: 1. Personal, which is owed by a person to a person, and is proper to a slave toward a master. 2. Mixed, which is owed by a thing to a person, of which sort are use, usufruct, habitation. C. A. 521. 3. Real, which is owed to a thing by a thing, as a burden imposed on an estate for the utility of another estate. The thing bearing the burden is called serving; the thing receiving the utility is called dominant. C. I. 531; C. G. 637; C. H. 530; C. A. 473; C. B. 1018, 1019, 1090; C. L. 2267.

Real servitude is divided into continuous and discontinuous. The former is exercised without the act of man, such as servitude of prospect, of drip, of aqueduct, of sewer. The latter is exercised by the act of man, such as servitude of way, of drawing water, etc. C. I. 617; C. G. 688; C. H. 532; C. L. 2270. Besides, one is apparent, another non-apparent. The former appears outwardly by some sign, such as servitude of door, window, aqueduct; the latter lacks this outward sign, such as servitude of not raising a building higher, of pasturing a flock, of cutting wood. C. I. 618; C. G. 689; C. H. 532; C. L. 2270; Inst. 1. 2. t. 3. sections 1, 2, 3; Book 8 of the Digest.

Real servitude is divided into urban and rural, according as it is for the utility of a building or of a field. L. 1. Communia praediorum, etc. "The rights of urban estates are such: of raising higher and obstructing the lights of a neighbor, or of not raising higher; likewise of turning drip-water onto the roof or area of a neighbor, or of not turning it; likewise of inserting beams into the wall of a neighbor; and finally of projecting (that is, making a projection; a projection is a member of a building extending out, sporto) and protecting (or making a projection in the roof of buildings, namely of projecting the roof, fare uno sporto nel tetto), and other things similar to these." L. 2. de Servit. praed. urbanorum. "The servitudes of rural estates are these: path, driving-way, road, aqueduct. A path is the right of going, walking for a man, but not also of driving a beast of burden. A driving-way is the right of driving. A driving-way is the right of driving either a beast of burden or a vehicle. Therefore he who has a path does not have a driving-way; he who has a driving-way also has a path, even without a beast of burden. A road is the right of going and driving and walking; for road contains in itself both path and driving-way. Aqueduct is the right of leading water through another's farm. Among rural servitudes are to be counted drawing water, driving cattle to water, the right of pasturing, of burning lime, of digging sand." L. 1. de Servit. praed. rustic.

By what modes is servitude constituted? Real servitude can arise from a threefold source. The first is the natural position of places; thus, for example, a farm which is in a lower situation is bound to receive waters flowing down from a farm which is in a higher situation. Servitudes flowing from this source are therefore called natural. C. L. 2271. And thus owners of an estate which has no communication with public roads have a right of passage through another's estates, with damage compensated to their owners. C. L. 2309 ff.

Another source is law, under which name also comes the sentence of a judge; thus, for example, because of public or private utility, the law prescribes rules to be observed as regards the construction and repair of roads, the drawing off of waters, the building of houses, the distance of walls, passages, etc. C. He. 686, 688, 699, 702; C. L. 2325, 2338. Servitudes arising in this way are called legal. C. I. 533 ff.; C. G. 649 ff.

Besides this, a servitude can be acquired by prescription. C. I. 2137; C. A. 480, 1469, 1470. Only apparent and continuous servitudes, such as the servitude of aqueduct through another's farm, can be acquired by usucaption, and only by prescription of 30 years. C. I. 629, 630; C. G. 690, 691; but C. H. 537-539 by prescription of 20 years. Cf. C. A. 1469. But in the forum of conscience good faith is necessary, by which one namely thinks that the owner, who suffers him to use the servitude, is not unwilling. Continuous non-apparent servitudes, such as the servitude of not raising higher, and non-continuous servitudes, whether apparent or non-apparent, cannot be established except by means of title. Possession, even immemorial, does not suffice to constitute them. C. I. 630; C. G. 691; C. H. 539; C. L. 2272, 2273.

Finally, the third source is agreement: namely, the proprietors of neighboring farms can, if law or public order does not obstruct, agree among themselves that one farm serve another, and conversely, if it so pleases. These servitudes are called conventional. C. I. 532; C. G. 639. In them transcription is required. C. I. 1932; C. He. 731, 732. Likewise a servitude can be constituted by destination of the father of a family, by some act of last will, or among the living. C. I. 629, 630; C. G. 692, 693; C. A. 480; C. B. 903 ff.; Inst. 1. 2. t. 3.

But here it must be observed: 1. Servitude in the things of the Church falls under the Extravagant Ambitiosae; for it is a certain alienation of right, and therefore cannot be imposed without Apostolic beneplacit. 2. C. I. 556: the faculty of making a contiguous wall common does not extend to buildings of public use, and therefore not to churches. 3. Agreements which constitute burdensome praedial servitudes, or moderate them, must be made by public act or private writing, under penalty of nullity. C. I. 1314. But if they are constituted by gratuitous title, a public act is required, since then donation is had; and all acts of donation without a public act are null. C. I. 1056. Cf. here 1011.

By what modes is servitude ended? - Real servitude is extinguished: 1. When the established time has elapsed, or the condition has been fulfilled. 2. By express or tacit renunciation. 3. By consolidation, by which the owner of the dominant estate at the same time becomes owner of the serving estate, or vice versa. 4. If the thing is changed; if nevertheless the thing is reduced to its former state, the servitudes revive, unless prescription obstructs. 5. By prescription, or non-use of the right of servitude for 20 years from C. H., for 30 years from C. I. and C. G., if it is discontinuous, for example if someone has ceased to go through another's farm; or, if it is continuous, from the time when someone has done something contrary to the servitude, for example if someone on his own farm planted or built short of the legitimate distance, obstructed an aqueduct, etc. C. I. 662 ff.; C. G. 703 ff.; C. H. 546 ff.; C. A. 524 ff., 1488; C. B. 1028; C. He. 734 ff.; C. L. 2279, 2280.

You will resolve: Someone cannot dig a source of water on his own farm with damage to others, unless for the sake of greater public utility, and with the damage repaid, if the judge has judged this equitable. C. I. 578. Nor can he contain it on his own farm, or divert it elsewhere, if some town or suburb needs it, if another has already acquired a right to it, if it is useful to other neighboring estates and otherwise would be lost. C. I. 540, 542, 545, 578; C. G. 641, 643, 674; C. He. 709 ff.

The owner of a higher estate cannot do anything so that the flow of waters is unusually increased, with harm to the lower estate. Nor indeed can the owner of the lower estate do anything which impedes the flow of water with damage to the higher estate. C. I. 536; C. G. 640; C. H. 543, 545; C. B. 1020-1026; C. He. 689, 730, 737.

The owner of a serving estate cannot change the position of a road, of waters, or of a stream, unless the servitude has become more burdensome, or prevents repairs useful to the estate from being made; and then he is bound to bring no harm, or to compensate it for the dominant estate. C. H. 545; C. L. 2278, 2282, 2283.

No one is compelled on his own estate, whether rural or urban, to receive the dripping rainwater of a neighbor. C. I. 591; C. G. 681; C. L. 2327. All can enclose their estates, unless they are subject to a reciprocal servitude of pasturing cattle. C. I. 442, 682; C. G. 647; C. L. 2346.

If the tree of a neighbor extends roots into one's own farm, one can cut them; if its branches overhang, he can compel the owner to cut them. C. I. 582; C. A. 422; C. B. 910; C. L. 2317. But there is a question whether fruits which fall into another's field from the tree of another belong to this latter, as C. He. 687 has it; or to the owner of that field, as C. B. 911 has it. Cf. ib. 923; Gousset 983.

C. L. 2318. He is guilty of damage who prevents a neighbor from restoring on his own farm an embankment destroyed by the force of a river, C. I. 537; likewise he who digs so deeply on his own farm that the wall of the neighbor can no longer stand, C. I. 573, 575; C. He. 685. Every proprietor must permit access or passage through his farm if a neighbor's wall or another work is to be built or repaired, provided the damage inflicted is repaired. C. I. 592, 594; C. L. 2276; C. B. 867, 905 ff.; C. He. 694, 695, 700.

One who plants a hedge, vines, or shrubs is bound to leave half a meter from the neighboring estate; one who plants trees not greater, pear trees, cherry trees, etc., one and a half meters; one who plants greater trees, nut trees, elms, etc., three meters. But with a wall interposed, these spaces need not be preserved, if the trees do not rise above the wall. C. I. 579.

Flowing water belongs to those who possess estates near the banks, and they can use it. Those who possess fields at the banks of navigable rivers cannot obstruct the opening of a way necessary for the course of ships. The same must be said of those whose estates are adjacent to roads or other public works; for they are bound to suffer the servitude as long as it is necessary for the making or repair of the aforesaid works. But in each case the injured proprietors have a right to a certain indemnity, if it can be made. C. I. 534, 543; C. G. 650; Inst. 1. 2. t. 1. sections 4, 5.

To acquire by prescription the right of servitude, for example of aqueduct, that is, of leading water through another's farm, the one prescribing must exercise positive acts by which he acquires such a right, and at the same time have good faith, by which he believes that right belongs to him. Nor does the knowledge and tolerance of him against whom prescription is made suffice, if he does not have a title. But if he has a title, knowledge and tolerance of this sort are not required. C. I. 630; C. G. 691; C. A. 539; C. He. 740.

Drawing water and driving cattle to water are discontinuous rural servitudes, which cannot be constituted without title. In controversies which arise among proprietors concerning the use of waters, because this concerns the common good by reason of agriculture and industry, the judge has the right to establish between the parties what is more equitable in the case. C. I. 544; C. G. 645.

What is possession, and how many kinds are there? "Possession is so called, as Labeo also says, from seats, as if position, because it is naturally held by him who stands upon it; the Greeks call it detention." L. 1. de Possessione. Possession is often confused with property. Yet it differs from it, because possession is a right by which a thing is held as one's own; but property or ownership is the very right by which a thing is one's own, and someone is its owner. Possession is rather a matter of fact than of right. Nevertheless, possession is distinguished as twofold: one of fact, the other of right. C. B. 854 ff.; Troplong, On Prescription, c. 2, On Possession.

What is possession of fact and of right? Possession of fact is: the apprehension or detention of a thing, with the support of body, mind, and right. "Of a thing"; by this name we understand not only corporeal things, but also incorporeal things, such as censuses, patronages, etc.; these are said to be quasi-possessed, to distinguish them from corporeal things, which are said to be possessed. "Apprehension or detention"; because possession is considered either in its beginning, or in its continuation; in its beginning it is apprehension of a thing; in its continuation it is detention of the same. "With the support of body"; because, for some corporeal thing to be possessed, it must be apprehended by some bodily act, for example by hands, feet, etc. If the thing belongs to no one, true and real apprehension is required for acquiring it. If the thing belongs to someone who hands it over to another, fictive apprehension suffices, as if he hands over the keys of a house to another. Finally, if the thing is acquired by the disposition of law alone, legal apprehension suffices, as if an heir, without knowing, acquires an inheritance. From C. A. 441 legal possession is had from the fact that a document proving the right of property has been inscribed in a public book. If the thing is incorporeal, apprehension and detention are had by acceptance of the right, and by the very use or exercise of the right, or with the forms prescribed by law observed. "Of mind"; because for a thing to be possessed, it must be apprehended with the intention of having it as one's own, and retained by persuasion that it is one's own. Possession indeed is not had if someone detains a thing without any intention of receiving from it advantage and emolument as from his own. Hence if someone, while he is waiting for a friend, takes in his hand that friend's book which he found in a hall, and looks at the title, he holds the book, but does not possess it. Hence also one who by right of neighborhood or familiarity or mere tolerance enters a neighbor's farm, or draws water from a neighbor's well, is not understood to quasi-possess. Error, whether of law or fact, does not obstruct the aforesaid intention and persuasion, as is openly clear from C. I. 701; C. G. 550; C. A. 326. "Of right," that is, with right not resisting nor impeding; because for possession it is required that right or the laws not impede the detention of a thing from being judged its true possession, by rendering one incapable of possession. Thus, for example, detention by a layman of a sacred thing which belongs to a church, or detention by a private person of a public thing, cannot even be called possession of fact; because right, by rendering these persons incapable of such possession, impedes such possession. On the contrary, detention of a stolen profane thing by a thief is true possession of fact, although unjust, because right does not impede detention of such a thing from sufficing for possession. L. Qui universos de acquir. vel amitt. possess.; Inst. 1. 2. t. 1. sections 1, 3, 4; C. I. 685, 687, 688, 690; C. G. 2134, 2228, 2230-2232; C. H. 430-432, 437-440; C. A. 309-315; C. L. 474.

Possession of right is defined: the right of standing upon a thing as one's own, which is not prohibited to be possessed. "Right," by which it differs from possession of fact, which is the very occupation of a thing or its detention, by which either there is had a right, namely the right of standing upon a thing as one's own, if it is just; or it is not had, if it is unjust. Just, unjust: therefore the right itself of ownership and property does not arise and cannot arise from detention or possession; but on the contrary, just detention or possession arises from the aforesaid right. Hence in judgments there is given a twofold action: action in a possessory cause, and action in a petitory cause; in the former there is question of the right of possession; in the latter of the very ownership of the thing. Possession nevertheless carries with itself a presumption of property in favor of the possessor. C. L. 477. "Of standing upon a thing," that is, of peacefully detaining the thing against disturbers. "As one's own"; for if someone stands upon a thing in the name of another, there will not be true possession. Thus, for example, a tutor cannot be said to possess the goods of a minor, but the minor himself possesses through the tutor, because the tutor does not retain those goods as his own, but in the name of the minor. "Which is not prohibited to be possessed," that is, with no law resisting and impeding, as was said above concerning possession of fact. But for possession to be legitimate, besides this, the formalities prescribed by law must be observed. C. I. 686, 701; C. G. 540, 550, 2229, 2268; C. H. 430-432, 437-441; C. A. 316, 329.

From C. He. 919, 922; C. B. 854-857, possession is acquired by the fact of obtained power over a thing; this power, for retaining possession, can also be exercised through another. But when power over the thing has ended, possession ends; nevertheless it passes over to heirs and successors, and can be continued in them.

If a possessor has handed over a thing to another, so that the latter may exercise some limited real right, or a personal right, both are possessors. The one who possesses as proprietor has original possession; the other has derived possession. C. He. 920.

Acts of mere tolerance and facultative acts, as also violent and clandestine acts, cannot constitute the beginning of legitimate possession. C. I. 688, 689; C. L. 474. Only those things can be possessed which can be the object of property. C. L. 479. Or at least possession of things whose property cannot be acquired has no juridical effect. C. I. 690. Troplong, On Prescription, c. 2, On Possession, n. 253 ff.

What is natural and civil possession? Possession is divided into natural, civil, and most civil. Natural possession is that by which the thing possessed is retained by body and mind as one's own, namely when someone bodily stands upon the detention of a thing as his own; this is done by one who is so near to a thing placed within sight that he can be present to it immediately. Civil possession is that by which a thing apprehended by body and mind is retained by mind alone; thus he possesses his own house who is absent from the house, as long as he has the intention of retaining it for himself. Likewise the owner of a thing possesses civilly what a thief retains with himself. Finally, most civil possession is that which is retained by the disposition of law alone, without any support of mind and body; this happens, for example, in a little child to whom some inheritance has come; he possesses the inheritance of the deceased without any act of apprehension, indeed even without any cognition of intellect. C. L. 483.

Natural and civil possession are also distinguished insofar as merely natural possession is called the mere detention of some thing, or the mere use of some right, such as is the possession of one who detains a thing in another's name; but civil possession is called this same detention of a thing, or use of a right, but together with the intention of having the thing or right as one's own. Therefore someone possesses not in another's name, but in his own name, namely with the mind of an owner, whether indeed he detains the thing, or uses the right, by himself or through another, through a farmer, tenant, fructuary, etc. And thus a borrower for use, depositary, and lessee possess naturally; the owner possesses civilly. C. I. 685, 687, 688; C. G. 2134, 2228, 2232; C. H. 430-432, 438, 441; C. A. 309, 310, 313, 352; Inst. 1. 4. t. 15.

From C. B. 868 ff., if someone possesses a thing as usufructuary, lessee, depositary, or in another similar way, by force of which he himself has a right or obligation of possession with respect to another, this one also is a possessor, but by indirect possession. This indirect possession can be transferred to another by cession of the right to restitution of the thing to himself. He who possesses a thing as its proprietor is a possessor in his own name. Natural possession by body and mind altogether prevails over civil possession by mind alone. Thus, for example, Titius, lessee of a field, sells the field to Sempronius, who, buying it in good faith, cultivates the field for 10 or 20 years and receives fruits from it in good faith as his own. During that space of 10 or 20 years, Titius, from the interest of the price received, pays to Caius, the owner of the field, the rent owed for the lease. After 10 or 20 years Caius visits his field, and when he finds in it not the farmer Titius but the owner Sempronius, he claims his property, but in vain, because Sempronius opposes prescription, his natural possession in good faith prevailing. C. I. 2117; C. G. 2239.

What are the rights of a possessor? The rights and juridical privileges annexed to juridical possession are the following: 1. By taking possession of a thing belonging to no one, its ownership is acquired. C. A. 381. Likewise a possessor in good faith, after a certain time has elapsed, can prescribe against the direct owner of the thing and acquire ownership of it.

Nevertheless it always confers the right of standing upon the thing; and no one can by private authority deprive another of possession of a thing, and possession obtained in this way is defective. C. B. 858. Possession is continued by the law itself in the person of a successor by universal title. A successor by particular title can unite to his own possession the possession of his author, namely so that he may obtain the effect of it. C. I. 693; C. B. 221, 858, 943, 944; C. He. 941.

2. Possession in good faith, if it is immemorial, or if its beginning exceeds the memory of men now living, regularly supplies all defects from which otherwise legitimate ownership would not exist, as is clear from C. Quibusdam de Verb. signific. Cf. C. I. 530. From more recent laws a possessor in good faith makes his own the fruits received. Cf. here 1337. But possession itself stands in place of title as regards movable things, C. G. 2279, acquired from one who is not the owner, by onerous title, C. A. 367, because things by their nature movable, and as regards unnamed bank notes, not as regards a universality of movables, and in relation to third parties, C. I. 707. Movable things; not rights, such as credits, excepting the aforesaid unnamed bank notes from C. I. As regards found and stolen things, cf. here 893. "From one who is not the owner," as regards third parties; and therefore the owner can prove that the possessor possesses the thing in his name, for example a thing leased, deposited, given to him in pledge, etc. From C. He. 930 ff., the possessor of a movable thing is presumed to be the proprietor. But a possessor in good faith is not bound to restore bearer securities and money, although the preceding possessor had been unwillingly deprived of them.

3. A possessor who begins possession of a thing which no one possesses begins possession legitimately, although he doubts whether it belongs to another, but apprehends it with the intention of inquiring about the owner, whether he truly exists. But a possessor who begins possession of a thing which another possesses, while doubting whether it is truly his own, begins to possess illegitimately. A possessor in good faith, when doubt arises whether the thing is his own or another's, if the contrary cannot be shown certainly, can with a safe conscience retain the thing; and the judge, while such doubt stands, ought to adjudge the thing to him. In the external forum good faith is presumed. Likewise, by legitimate possession of a thing, property itself is presumed. But in whatever name, whether another's or his own, he began to possess, in that same name he is now presumed to possess. And thus one who at the beginning possesses a thing deposited with him by an unknown traveler, who left it from forgetfulness and could always return to seek it back for himself, cannot thereafter begin to possess it as though lost or abandoned. C. I. 687, 691, 694, 700, 702; C. G. 2230, 2231, 2268; C. A. 446, 459; C. A. 323, 324, 328; C. B. 1006; C. L. 477, 478.

4. A possessor in good faith can, by the sole title of possession in good faith, use the thing possessed according to his will, and he can even consume and destroy it, without responsibility. Nevertheless, no possessor of another's thing can further retain it by title of another debt. C. A. 329, 471; C. He. 938. But retention of goods belongs to him by reason of improvement made and existing in them, if indemnity is not sought in judgment without proof. C. I. 706.

5. A possessor at the time of contested litigation is to be defended by the judge in possession, unless he drew that possession to himself by force, secretly, or by sufferance; for then he would have to be deprived of possession. C. H. 446; C. I. 694; C. B. 861, 862; C. He. 933.

6. If a possessor has been driven from possession by private violence, before all things restitution of the despoiled person must be made, nor is the occupier first to be heard when he alleges title and wishes to prove the thing to be his own. C. In litteris de Restit. spoliat. Cf. C. I. 694, 695, 697, 700; C. A. 339, 346; C. He. 927; C. L. 484 ff.

7. A possessor in good faith can defend the thing possessed even with arms against an invader, provided this is done immediately and with the moderation of blameless defense, that is, defensively and not offensively. And he can immediately retake for himself a thing violently taken from him. L. 3. ff. de Vi et de vi armata; C. A. 344; C. B. 859; C. He. 926 ff.; C. L. 486.

8. If someone is successively obligated to donate or hand over the same movable thing to two persons, the one who first obtains possession of that thing also has its property, although his title is later, provided he is in good faith. C. I. 1126; C. G. 1141; C. H. 445, 1473; C. A. 322; L. 1. 3. n. 927, 1. 4. n. 210; Inst. 1. 4. t. 15.

Does man have ownership of himself? - Having explained the intrinsic nature of ownership, we now proceed to explain the object and subject of ownership. Man does not have direct ownership of his soul and its faculties, nor of his body and its members, but only useful ownership.

Proof of the first part. For ownership imports a certain superiority; but man is not superior to himself, and to his members, or to another man as regards the very nature of man. Therefore. Besides, direct ownership belongs by natural right over other sublunary creatures because these are ordered by their nature to man, that they may serve him. Therefore, since man by his nature is not ordered to serve himself nor another man, but God, direct ownership of property in man, and in his faculties and members, belongs to God alone. Hence in Wis. 16:13 it is said: You are, O Lord, who have power of life and death. And in Deut. 32:39 God says: I will kill, and I will make alive.

Proof of the second part. For man can not only freely and licitly use his body and members for very many functions, but also through these, aided by divine grace, can merit eternal life. Therefore. Lugo d. 10. nn. 9, 17; Molina t. 4. d. 1. n. 1.

You will resolve: Suicide and mutilation, speaking per se, are not only against charity, but also against justice, or against divine right of property; for a user has the obligation of preserving the substance of the thing granted to him for use. But homicide of another person is not only against charity and divine right of property, but also against human useful right. Cf. 710, 715.

Does man have ownership of another man? One man can be under the ownership of another not only by jurisdiction, but also by property, but imperfect, or useful. Imperfect, or useful; for perfect ownership of property belongs to God alone, as is clear from the preceding proposition. The reason is that every man is owner of his own labor; and therefore he can alienate it for his own utility, and hand it over into the ownership of another. For an owner can dispose at will of the object of his ownership. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 57. aa. 3, 4; E. M.

From what titles can servitude be introduced? From the four following titles:

1. From pact, or one's own renunciation. For it is not repugnant that someone renounce his liberty in order to relieve his own need, etc.

2. From the right of war. For it is not repugnant that the victor sometimes inflict this penalty. For sometimes he could kill captives for the security of the nation; therefore a fortiori he could reduce them to servitude.

3. From delict, or from condemnation. For if a guilty person can be condemned to death, a fortiori to servitude, since deprivation of life is deservedly judged the greatest of all punishments.

4. From birth in a state of servitude, since by law those are slaves who are born from slaves. Thus from the law of nations, according to the common opinion. Inst. 1. 1. t. 3. sections 3, 4; Lugo d. 6. nn. 10-17; E. M.

Is the trade in Black persons lawful? It is altogether unlawful by every law, whenever Black persons are unjustly despoiled of liberty, and in crowds are transported from their regions like cheap cattle and sold, as happens in the nefarious commerce in them. Against so savage a trade various Apostolic Constitutions have come forth, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, Gregory XVI, In supremo apostolatus, 3 Dec. 1839. Cf. the Letter of Leo XIII to the Bishops of Brazil, In pluribus, 5 May 1888, and the Letter Catholicae Ecclesiae, 20 Nov. 1890.

Those who have perpetrated so great a crime are bound at their own expense to vindicate them into liberty; and those who have bought them for a price must, even if they cannot recover the money, freely release them, insofar as this can be done without graver danger; for by retaining them they would continue the injury. But if there is question of Black persons or others existing in legitimate servitude, per se it is not absolutely unlawful, because once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right over slaves, or over their works, and therefore can transfer that right to others. Per se; for circumstances can obstruct, for example if a spouse would have to be separated from a spouse, or if civil laws forbid it, just as in fact servitude is generally forbidden in Europe. But a slave could flee if the master compelled him to unlawful things or treated him cruelly. Collectan. S. C. de P. F. nn. 2103, 2104, 2105, 2107; E. M.

Note: From C. I. 1628; C. G. 1780, someone cannot obligate his own labor into the service of another except for a determinate time and a determinate object. From C. H. 1583, someone can obligate his own labor without a fixed time, for a certain time, or for a determinate thing. Lease for one's whole life is null. From C. B. 624, lease of service for one's whole life is permitted. Nevertheless it can be rescinded after five years, with notice having been given before the last six months.

The Supreme Pontiff Pius X, in the Encyclical Letter to the Archbishops and Bishops of Latin America, Lacrimabili statu, 7 Jun. 1912, exhorts them to undertake paternal care for the miserable condition of the Indians, against whom cruel crimes and evils are committed. "This first," he says, "we earnestly exhort you, that whatever things have been instituted in your dioceses for the good of the Indians you most zealously promote, and likewise that you see to the instituting of those things which seem likely to be useful for the same matter. Then you will diligently admonish your peoples concerning their own most holy duty of assisting the sacred expeditions to the indigenous people who first inhabited that American soil. Therefore let them know that they ought to benefit this matter especially in a twofold way: by contribution of money and by the suffrage of prayers.... We condemn and declare guilty of a savage crime whoever dare or presume to reduce the aforesaid Indians to servitude, sell, buy, exchange, or donate them, separate them from wives and children, despoil them of their things and goods, lead and transport them to other places, or in any way deprive them of liberty, retain them in servitude; and also those who under any pretext and sought color furnish counsel, aid, favor, and assistance to those doing the aforesaid things, or preach or teach that this is lawful, and otherwise cooperate in any way with the foregoing." Therefore we will that the power of absolving penitents from these crimes in the sacramental forum be reserved to the local Ordinaries.

What about one's own reputation? Man simply has ownership of his own reputation. For it is something really distinct from the man himself, since it comes to him from without, and man acquires it by labor altogether dependent on his own free will through the exercise of virtue, and therefore through his own acts, which reputation follows as a natural effect. Moreover, it is not necessary for its own sake, but only for the edification of one's neighbor. L. 1. 3. n. 983; Billuart d. 3. art. 2.

You will resolve: Man, from a just cause, and with scandal and the defamation of others set aside, can licitly defame himself, for example to seek counsel, to restrain his own pride, to commend divine mercy, to restore another's reputation, etc. "From a just cause"; for if someone squanders his own reputation without a just cause, he sins venially. But he would sin gravely if the infamy would obstruct the execution of his own office, for example of pastor, teacher, rector, etc. "And with scandal set aside"; for if someone, by revealing some wholly hidden crime of his own, would give scandal to others, he would sin by scandalizing others. "And with defamation of others set aside"; for otherwise man would sin by injuring the reputation of others, for example of an accomplice, family, or community. Thus a religious cannot reveal to outsiders his crimes committed in religion, because in this way he would in some measure injure the reputation of his religion and community. Struggl 9; L. 983; S. Th. Quodl. 10. a. 13.

What about things; what is their division? - R. To the first: Man can have useful and direct ownership in external goods of fortune legitimately acquired. For irrational creatures were immediately created for man, so that he might use them for his own advantage and utility, and might serve God. Nor indeed was any restriction placed by God upon this use; indeed, it was granted without limit with respect to the aforesaid end, as is clear from the words of Gen. 1:28: Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of heaven, etc.; and Ps. 8:8: You have subjected all things under his feet. Therefore God granted to man useful and direct ownership of these external things. Aristotle, Politics 1. 2. c. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. aa. 1, 2.

But since all things of this sort necessary for human life were given by God to all in common, property and division of them in particular was made by the first occupation of them, namely of those things which men first apprehended for relieving their own necessities, with others excluded; otherwise sufficient provision would not have been made for their own necessities, and there would be continual discord and strife among men. Hence the maxim and principle of law: a thing belonging to no one becomes the property of the first occupier.

And hence it is clear why, in extreme necessity of life, notwithstanding the division and property of things, all things remain common, so that anyone can relieve his own necessity from the goods of the earth, although already occupied and acquired by another, and the owner of these goods cannot impede one who, being in extreme need, provides for himself from his goods.

Concerning the ocean and the sea, it has been disputed whether they can be subject to the ownership of someone. Moreover, the ocean and great seas are subject to the ownership of no one, since their uses are inexhaustible, by which all can enjoy them without detriment to anyone. But parts of the sea adjoining the continent, as also gulfs and straits, can well be subjected to the ownership of some nation, since this is expedient for the utility of the aforesaid nation, of which otherwise it would be deprived, both because of fishing, and because of the security of commerce, and because of the defense of the fatherland.

R. To the second: A thing, in law, is everything which is not a person, and which can be of use to man. By the name thing is signified both that thing which is in our patrimony, and that which is outside our patrimony, but can be among our goods. L. 5. de Verbor. significatione. Goods are called those things which bless or profit, L. 49. de Verbor. signific., and in law they signify things which can be the object of public or private property.

Corporeal things are those which are subject to the action of the senses, such as houses, fields; incorporeal things are those which are apprehended only by the intellect, such as all rights and all actions. Public goods are those which belong to the people or the city, L. 15. de Verbor. signific. Private goods are those which belong to a particular moral body, or moral person, or some individual person.

Goods, whether public or private, are some immovable, others movable, and these latter precious or not. Immovable goods are immovable either by nature, or by destination, or by the object to which they are referred. C. I. 407. By nature: those which cannot be moved from place to place, such as rural and urban estates, surfaces or whatever is planted or built upon the soil, mines or whatever is found beneath the soil as a part of the soil, estimable by price. By destination, namely of the owner, for example rural instruments, animals prepared for cultivating the farm, statues placed in their shrines or bases, mirrors and other things enclosed or built into walls. By object, when they are referred to immovables, as, for example, use, usufruct, and servitude of immovables. But incorporeal rights, for example mortgages, are generally reckoned sometimes among immovables, sometimes among movables, from the object; and those rights are customarily called simply rights.

Movable goods are movable either by nature or by law. By nature: those which are moved from place to place by their own force or by another's, such as animals and inanimate things which are moved by an exterior force. By law: such as ships which are not stationary, mills which are not fixed, censuses, etc. Movable things, if they are consumed by use, are called fungible, such as wheat and money; otherwise, non-fungible, such as books and clothing. Precious things are those which excel by antiquity, art, or value. C. I. 406 ff.; C. G. 516 ff., 1874; C. H. 333 ff.; C. A. 285 ff.; C. B. 90 ff.

What is the subject of ownership? - It is certain that every and only intellectual substance is capable of ownership. Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing according to one's will of some thing as one's own, for one's own advantage and utility. But every and only intellectual substance can have this faculty, since it alone is endowed with free will.

Indeed, to God alone belongs supreme, absolute, and independent ownership over all created things. But particular ownership, subject to the supreme ownership of God, also belongs to men, even to infidels and sinners; indeed even to little children and the insane. For the use of reason is indeed necessary for disposing of goods, but not for having possession and habitual ownership of them; otherwise those sleeping and drunk would not have true ownership, and would wholly lose it by the act by which they sleep, or by which they are overwhelmed by drunkenness. By the very necessity of natural law and by the disposition of positive law, ownership can be acquired and retained even without any positive act of one's own will. Lugo d. 3. n. 16; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 12. a. 2; q. 66. aa. 1, 2; L. 725.

Capable of ownership are individual physical persons, and also moral persons, whether these consist of several singular persons, such as Colleges, Chapters, etc., and are called moral bodies, or not, such as hospitals and ecclesiastical benefices, and are rather called moral entities. They are called moral because they are persons not in reality, but by fiction of law. But for these moral persons to acquire ownership in reality, it is necessary that they have been legitimately constituted, namely by the due authority of the Prince, civil or ecclesiastical. As regards ecclesiastical moral persons in Italy, cf. Laws 7 Jul. 1886, 15 Aug. 1887, by which some were suppressed and some preserved. To the suppressed only civil rights were taken away. The preserved cannot alienate their goods without approval of the Government, nor can they acquire other goods, C. I. 434; Law 19 Jun. 1873, arts. 27, 28, likewise by civil law.

What about ownership of children under paternal power and of wives? - A child under paternal power is one who is still subject to paternal power. But although "the woman is equal to the man in the act of marriage, nevertheless in those things which pertain to the disposition of the house, the husband is the head of the woman, according to the Apostle, 1 Cor. 11." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32. a. 8 ad 2. Moreover, "he who is constituted under the power of another, insofar as he is such, ought to be regulated according to the power of the superior. For this is the natural order, that lower things be regulated according to higher. And therefore it is necessary that in those things in which an inferior is subject to a superior, he dispense no otherwise than has been permitted to him by the superior." S. Th. ibid. c.

Hence it is clear that although children under paternal power and wives can well have ownership of things, nevertheless this ownership is not independent, speaking per se, from the power of the father of the family and of the husband; but it is subject to their power as regards administration, and also as regards usufruct, for sustaining the expenses of education and the burdens of marriage. Cf. 667 ff., 677 ff.

The ownership of children under paternal power regards things given to them by any title transferring ownership, or acquired by their own industry. For as regards paternal goods, children have no strict right to paternal goods while the father lives. Hence, if children under paternal power take anything from these goods, they are per se bound to restitution. Per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of less importance, and it is prudently presumed that the father remits that obligation.

Likewise ownership of wives is understood in their own goods, not in the goods of the husband. Hence a wife also, if she takes something from the husband from his goods, is per se bound to restitution. Again per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of less importance, and it is prudently presumed that the husband consents. Likewise a wife would be excused if, not having paraphernal goods, she took something from the common goods, or from the fruits of her dowry, to relieve the necessity of parents or children who had been received from a first marriage. For she is bound to this by the law of nature, and the husband ought to consent to it. But since the husband does not have direct ownership of the goods of the wife, if he dissipates them, he is bound to restitution. Cf. 667 ff., 677 ff.; 1 Kings 25; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 57. a. 4; L. 539, 542-544; H. A. 33.

The question is raised here only concerning common goods, whether the husband is bound to restitution if he dissipates them; and it must be affirmed if there is question of the capital and common goods themselves, since if these goods are common and consequently belong to the husband and wife in common, it is clear that the right of the wife is injured in this matter, and therefore is to be repaired. If there is question of the revenues of the same goods, when these are assigned to the husband by the laws, he is excused from restitution as regards those badly spent; but when they enter the common goods and constitute goods of the community, he is bound to restitution, as when the profits themselves enter the community and constitute common goods. And this is had indeed in C. G. 401, 1421, 1422; C. I. 1433, 1435, 1436; C. H. 1392 ff. For although the husband alone has administration of the goods of the community, nevertheless he does not have usufruct except only for the good of the family, C. G. 1409, and of the community itself, C. I. 1436; C. H. 1401, 1408, 1409, 1413, 1415.

From C. He., in the regime of union of goods, the revenues of the wife and the natural fruits of the goods brought by her are the property of the husband, 195. In the regime of communion of goods, all goods and all revenues belong undividedly to each spouse, 215. From C. B., in the regime of universal community of goods, the goods of the husband and wife are the common goods of each, and among these are also reckoned those things which the husband and wife acquire during the community, 1438. The husband administers them; but he cannot freely dispose of them, 1443 ff., especially to the detriment of the wife, 1456. From them, however, the expenses of marriage are to be made, 1458. And almost the same holds in the regime of community of acquisitions, 1519 ff., and in the regime of community of movables and acquisitions, 1549 ff. Cf. here 677, 1237; L. 539, 542; Lessius 1. 2. c. 25. d. 4. n. 37.

What about the ownership of the Church? - The Church has ownership of civil jurisdiction, such as is the temporal ownership of the Roman Pontiff. Besides, the Church has ownership of property in goods, whether movable or immovable. But the right of the Church in this matter is by its nature independent of the power of the civil State; and therefore it cannot be limited or narrowed by this. Direct ownership of these goods belongs to the universal or Catholic Church itself. Hence they are called goods of the Church, and simply ecclesiastical goods.

Hence, when the immediate subject of these goods ceases, for example a pious Institute, Monastery, etc., their goods do not become the goods of no one, but continue to belong to the Church; and consequently the Supreme Pontiff can dispose of them in favor, for example, of another pious Institute, Monastery, etc. For indeed the Supreme Pontiff has plenary and supreme administration and disposition of all ecclesiastical goods. C. Licet 2. de Praeb. et dignit. in the Sixth; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 100. a. 1 ad 7; Suarez, Def. Fid. 1. 4. c. 18. n. 8; L. 1. 3. nn. 591, 615.

But the immediate administration and usufruct of these goods per se respectively belongs, by transfer of right, to those persons, places, etc., to whom they have been donated or left by the faithful. For, since donations of this sort by the faithful are made altogether voluntarily, it must be whole and free to the offerers, just as to make them or not make them, so also, when they make them, to transfer the right of them to whomever they have preferred, while nevertheless the power of the Supreme Pontiff in this matter remains intact for the good of souls and of the Church. Per se, since the Supreme Pontiff could by his power change this administration and usufruct, as also condone due fruits, etc.

Offerings of this sort made to churches or other religious places are customarily destined for certain uses. If the will of the offerers is certain, it must altogether be obeyed. The immediate administration of these offerings belongs to the Bishop, pastor, or rector of the church, under dependence on the Bishop, but by no means to laypersons, unless the works are works of merely lay beneficence. Nevertheless laypersons can be employed in the administration of ecclesiastical goods as pure ministers. For since the right of administration of this sort is something spiritual, laypersons cannot possess it. Clem. Quia contingit de Religios. dom.; Trid. sess. 25. C. 8. de R.; Ithur. Cas. 45. n. 47; A. S. S. v. 8. p. 174. "Administrators, both ecclesiastical and lay, of the fabric of any church, even a cathedral, of a hospital, confraternity, alms, mount of piety, and of whatever pious places, are bound each year to render an account of administration to the Ordinary, with any customs and privileges whatsoever to the contrary removed, unless perhaps otherwise had been expressly provided in the institution and ordering of such church or fabric." Council of Trent, sess. 22. C. 9. de R.

Hence it is easily understood why ecclesiastical goods cannot be alienated without Apostolic beneplacit. Extravagant Ambitiosae de Reb. Eccl. non alienand.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 86; Collectan. S. C. de P. F. nn. 1622-1626; E. M.

What about the ownership of clerics? The goods of clerics are distinguished into four kinds:

1. Patrimonial goods, which come from paternal inheritance, or from any other profane cause, for example from donation, succession, etc. To these patrimonial goods are to be equated pensions which are allotted by the Government to infirm priests, or to religious formerly ejected from monasteries, as aids given for their support and in compensation.

2. Quasi-patrimonial goods, which are acquired on the occasion and in view of sacred functions, for example by celebrating Mass, preaching, etc. They are also called quasi-ecclesiastical, or casual. To this class also belong the uncertain revenues of pastors, which are called stole-fees, and the daily distributions of canons because of service of choir, as though a stipend of the person.

3. Ecclesiastical goods, which are received from benefices of the Church, that is, from the revenues of benefices. To this class also belong goods which are paid by the Government to pastors and canons by title of supplement, S. Poenit., 19 Jan. 1819, and also tithes. Therefore, by the name ecclesiastical goods, there are not understood here farms, which clerics certainly cannot alienate, since ownership of them is with the Church and clerics are simple usufructuaries, but only the revenues proceeding from them are understood.

4. Parcimonial goods, which a cleric sets aside by living sparingly from the fruits of a benefice, and which he could consume by living honorably. L. 490, 491.

A cleric has perfect ownership of patrimonial goods. The reason is that a cleric is per se truly capable of ownership, nor is he prohibited by any law from freely disposing of the aforesaid goods. Indeed that right is supposed in six hundred places of canon and civil law. L. 491.

A cleric has perfect ownership of quasi-patrimonial goods, or quasi-ecclesiastical or casual goods. The reason is that these goods are not fruits of a benefice, nor the price of a sacred office, but a certain stipend, as it were, of his own labor, to which the cleric is not bound, or also a certain largess given by the faithful for the support of the cleric. It is also clear from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 9 Aug. 1824, by which it declared offerings of the faithful not to be ecclesiastical goods. L. 491; Lugo d. 4. n. 23; Gousset 694.

A cleric can use the fruits of a benefice for honorable support; but he is bound to expend all that is superfluous on the poor, or on other pious works. The first reason is because one ministering to the church can live honorably from the goods of the church, since benefices were established especially for this end. The second reason is drawn from the precept of the Church, which is manifest from innumerable decrees of Councils and Sacred Canons. For the canons of the Church impose this obligation upon clerics, or suppose it imposed, says Benedict XIV, de Syn. 1. 7. c. 2. n. 4. Trent, sess. 25. C. 1. de R.; L. 491.

Under the name of pious use comes whatever pertains to divine worship. Under the name of the poor, however, come not only those begging door to door, but also those who otherwise cannot preserve their own state. Blood relatives also come under this name, if they are truly poor, so that otherwise they cannot sustain their own state. And this is clear from Trent, sess. 25. C. 1. de R. But a cleric can prefer these needy blood relatives to other poor persons, even those more gravely in need, because assistance of needy relatives also pertains to preserving the proper state of the cleric, since their poverty redounds to his disgrace. Although it is more fitting, nevertheless it is not necessary in an equal case that the poor who are in the place of the benefice be assisted, because the canons indistinctly prescribe that alms be given whether to citizens or to outsiders. L. 491.

Although this special and grave obligation radically and occasionally proceeds from the virtue of charity and religion, nevertheless formally it arises only from the precept of the Church, and from positive law and the virtue of obedience, with every obligation from justice excluded. Thus with Lessius 1. 2. c. 4. dub. 6, commonly others. The reason as to the first part is: because nowhere is a special precept imposed on clerics from charity of expending superfluous revenues on the poor; but they are bound only by the general precept of giving alms, although somewhat more strictly than laypersons. Nor likewise is a special precept imposed on clerics from religion of expending the superfluous on pious causes. But the reason as to the second part is: because founders did not assign ample revenues to clerics under this formal obligation, but only by hope and intention. But the Church simply commands that the superfluous from the fruits which they make simply their own be expended on pious causes or for relieving the poor. Therefore. Thus Struggl 27. St. Alphonsus 491, 492, although he admits at least probably that this obligation does not arise from justice, nevertheless admits that it arises from a precept of the Church from the motive of the virtue of religion, but more probably from justice. Schmalz. 1. 3. t. 25. n. 35. "It has been dispensed with clerics living in the City and its district to 10 miles, that they might dispose freely of benefice goods, just as of their own and patrimonial goods, as is had in the Constitution of Sixtus IV, Etsi diversis, Kal. Jan. 1474, the Constitution of Julius III, Capientes, Ides of May 1549, and the Constitution of Paul V, In eminenti, 18 Apr. 1608." Schmalz. l. c. n. 36. The privilege, besides clerics of the City, was also granted to conclavists from the Constitution of Gregory XV, Romanus Pontifex, 15 Mar. 1621, section 14.

A cleric enjoys perfect ownership of parcimonial goods, and therefore can dispose of them as a true owner. The reason is that a cleric has a strict right to honorable support; therefore whatever he takes from it by living more sparingly belongs to him, and remains in his free power, since that right is altogether absolute. Trent, sess. 24. C. 12. de R.; C. Consuetudinem de Cler. non resid. in the Sixth; L. 491; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 185. a. 7; Quodl. 6. a. 12 ad 3; Lessius c. 4; Benedict XIV, de Syn. 1. 7. c. 2. n. 12.

It is lawful for secular clerics to make a testament concerning their patrimonial, quasi-patrimonial, and parcimonial goods; but concerning superfluous benefice goods they themselves cannot by common law make any testament, even for pious causes. C. Ut unusquisque 3. de Pec. cler.; C. Si quis 5. ib.; C. 7, 8, 9, 12 de Testam. By common law; for a special case of privilege or custom must be excepted. Struggl 28; Schmalz. l. c. n. 33; S. Th. Quodl. 6. a. 12; Kenrick tr. 10. n. 35 ff.; E. M.

Are clerics badly spending the superfluous goods of ecclesiastical goods bound to restitution? R. Negatively, probably, because although the precept of the Church is certain, nevertheless the obligation from justice is not certain. Indeed, from Trent, sess. 24. C. 12. de R., it is gathered that they make the fruits their own, although with the obligation of expending the superfluous on alms or other pious works. For the Council says concerning non-resident clerics: Let them not make the fruits their own.

Nevertheless others probably affirm, because clerics are only administrators and stewards of ecclesiastical goods; or at least because the Church does not grant them ownership of those goods except limited, with this burden imposed from justice. The first opinion, that is, the negative, says St. Liguori in Retract. qu. X, seems no less probable in practice, notably because of the authority and reason of S. Th. 2. 2. q. 185. a. 7. But as regards the fault of violating the precept of the Church, for grave matter there is required a quantity much greater than in theft. L. 491. IV. 492; S. Th. Quodl. 6. a. 12. Since each opinion is probable, heirs also of these goods can probably retain them without injustice and sin.

But whether one who receives these goods sins by cooperating with the sin of the donor, many affirm; but it must more probably be said that "the receiver does not sin, neither against religion nor against charity, unless he asks, or induces to donating." L. 492.

517. • Definition. Justice in the broader sense ¹ signifies some equality, or charity, or the universality of virtues. Thus Christ says, Matth. 5. 6: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice!" But in the stricter sense ² it is a moral virtue constantly inclining the will to render to another his right. We must treat of justice thus accepted.

¹ The Doctors commonly observe that the name justice is used in Sacred Scripture also in a multiple sense, so that sometimes it signifies: 1. the complex of all virtues; 2. charity or sanctifying grace; 3. generally a right act; 4. any good habit; 5. finally, the special virtue from the four cardinal virtues.

² Commonly the definition handed down by Ulpian is received by the Doctors: "Justice is the constant and perpetual will of giving to each one his right." See St. Thomas, who explains its individual parts (2. 2, q. 58, art. 1).

Therefore justice is a special virtue which aims to urge the payment of a debt ³, and to preserve due equality among all men and each single man. Therefore to it pertains to restore things unjustly taken away, to repair things damaged, to abstain from frauds, to keep faith given in agreements, and to preserve intact to each one his right.

³ The word debt is too vague; for man owes, for example, worship to God, and obedience to parents; yet the virtue of justice does not urge the payment of these debts. Nevertheless the Author in some way confines the sense by the words immediately following.

It is said in the definition, to another; because justice is always toward another, and therefore requires diversity of persons; for no one can be called just toward himself, nor do injury to himself, which is the wounding of a right when the other is unwilling. - Lugo, disp. 1, n. 10 ⁴.

⁴ "I infer," says Lugo, "that justice is always toward another, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 58, a. 2. For no one can inflict injury on himself or render a debt to himself, just as he cannot properly owe to himself, since he can do nothing except willingly; but to one knowing and willing there can be done neither injury nor deceit." From this, since between father and son, as the same Lugo adds in the same place, n. 31, insofar as they are father and son, there is not given with rigor such otherness and diversity as is required for justice, for the son seems to be part of the father and, as it were, another himself; therefore between them, as such, the notion or debt of justice is lacking; and generally, insofar as that distinction or diversity of persons seems to be lacking, to that extent there is departure from the perfect notion of justice.

518. • Division. Justice is distinguished as fourfold, namely legal, distributive, vindicative, and commutative ⁵.

⁵ There are some who, in order to establish a certain order among these diverse justices, affirm first indeed that it is twofold: one which orders man toward the community, and this is legal or general; but another which orders him toward other particular or private persons, and this with Aristotle and St. Thomas they call particular; then they divide this latter into others in such a way that one is commutative, another distributive, and besides another vindicative. But in all these things there is found in no way a partition of some genus into species; but you have one in which the perfect notion of justice is found, and which is called justice taken precisely, or commutative justice; but the rest, since in something they fall short of the former, nevertheless participate something from it as by analogy, whence they are also accustomed to be called justice in a qualified sense. See Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 5, punct. 2), and Lugo (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 50, 68, and 70).

1. Legal justice ⁶ inclines each one to render his right to the society of which he is a part, or to the Prince, on account of the common good. Hence it orders the subject to the community as a part to the whole. It is called legal because it has for its object that which is owed to the community according to natural or positive law.

⁶ Legal justice, as Lugo has it (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 62), is a special virtue by which someone is borne toward the good of the republic or community, of which he himself is a part.

The material object of this virtue is any honorable act, or, as the Doctors are accustomed to speak, the acts of all the other virtues; whence the name general justice also has been given to it. For as St. Thomas says (2. 2, q. 58, a. 5), "the good of any virtue whatever... is referable to the common good, to which justice," namely legal justice, "orders. And according to this the acts of all virtues can pertain to justice, according as this orders man to the common good. And as to this, justice is called general justice."

But the formal object resides in this, that this virtue commands the acts of other virtues, namely any honorable acts, and orders them to the end proper to itself, namely to the common good. Hence St. Thom. (2. 2, q. 58, a. 6): "Legal justice is a certain special virtue according to its essence, according as it regards the common good as its proper object."

Moreover it is called legal justice because it belongs especially to law to order to the common good. "Because," thus St. Thomas, l. c., "it belongs to law to order to the common good, hence it is that such justice, general in the aforesaid way, is called legal justice; because evidently through it man is in concord with the law ordering the acts of all virtues to the common good."

But this justice has this singular feature, that it is not altogether and perfectly toward another. For as St. Thomas has it (2. 2, q. 58, a. 5), "All who are contained under some community are compared to the community as parts to the whole: but the part, as to what it is, belongs to the whole." And Card. De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 68): "The community is not distinguished from its members, as is clear; and therefore it does not regard the common good in such a way that it abstracts from the good of the one acting, but rather it regards it precisely because it is considered to be the good also of the one acting, just as the good of the body is the good of the members: but justice properly regards the good of another by abstracting altogether from my utility." But according to the opinion of all, justice properly so called exists only between those things which are so mutually distinct that one is not something of the other. Therefore Lugo adds (ibid.): "Just as piety toward parents is not properly justice, because it does not regard the perfect otherness required for justice, a fortiori the same will be true in the present case," namely legal justice.

And from this it is clear that legal justice is not aptly confused with duties either of piety or of formal obedience toward the prince; for not only are the motives of these virtues plainly diverse, but moreover the distinction which intervenes between subject and prince is not present between citizen and the community of which he is a part; and the duties of the subject tend to the good of the prince alone, while those things which the citizen confers upon the community are conferred upon the good of that same citizen, as a part of the community. Indeed even the prince himself, as a member of the community, is ordered to it as a part to the whole through legal justice, although somewhat otherwise than the subject. "Legal justice," says St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 58, a. 6, "... regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the prince principally and, as it were, architectonically," because he prescribes the mode of contributing to the common good, "but in subjects secondarily and, as it were, administratively."

2. Distributive justice inclines the Superior or his ministers to an equal ⁷, or just, distribution of burdens and goods. Hence it orders the community or Superior to subjects, as the whole to parts ⁸.

⁷ The difference between the equality proper to distributive justice and that proper to commutative justice Lugo intimates thus (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 45), according to the common doctrine taken from Aristotle and St. Thomas: "Distributive justice," he says, "seeks in its object equality according to geometric proportion, not according to arithmetic, that is, it attends to equality between two proportions: for commutative justice regards equality between thing and thing, which is called arithmetic equality; but distributive justice attends to equality of proportions; so that if there are two persons, one of whom has merit as four, the other as eight, the latter exceeds the former in the distribution according to the double, so that if the former receives twenty, the latter receives forty." You may see these things set forth more fully in St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 61, art. 2).

⁸ But distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom distribution is made, insofar, namely, as they are content with a just distribution. St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 61, art. 1, ad 3.

3. Vindicative justice inclines the Prince to punish the guilty with congruent punishments for the good of society. Therefore it consists in the congruent punishment of the guilty for the public good ⁹.

⁹ More commonly the Doctors do not hold vindicative justice as a fourth species of justice; but they call it back to legal justice, insofar as either a superior, by avenging crimes, looks to the common good, or a private person with the same affection desires or requires the punishment of crimes; but to distributive justice, insofar as it inflicts punishments congruent to the gravity of crimes; finally to commutative justice, insofar as from office a judge is bound to punish offenses, not otherwise than a guard is bound to keep off a thief, and likewise to inflict on a crime no graver punishment than the matter or the law bears.

4. Commutative justice inclines the will to render his own strict right to each private person, by preserving equality of thing to thing. This regards only private persons, as distinct from one another ¹⁰. But it is called commutative because it is chiefly occupied with exchanges and contracts. Of this alone we shall treat, because it alone claims for itself the name of justice in the precise sense ¹¹.

¹⁰ This seems to be expressed too generally. For he too will plainly injure commutative justice who brings damage upon the public treasury; and likewise the prince will sin against commutative justice who distributes burdens unequally, or who inflicts punishment short of demerit.

¹¹ Distributive justice, namely, falls short of the proper and strict notion of justice in this, that it does not regard right strictly taken; and therefore, as will be said below, its violation per se does not impose the burden of restitution. But legal justice also departs from justice properly so called in this, that it is not, as we said, altogether toward another: for the community is not distinguished from its members, and therefore this justice does not regard the common good in such a way as to abstract from the good of the one acting.

God alone is truly and absolutely Lord of all things.

Printed pages 478-479 are wanting in the copy of the 1884 edition we translate (its scan passes from p. 477 to p. 480). From the head of Article III to "It is clear from" in n. 526 the text is translated from the 1866 edition (Internet Archive, compendiumtheo01gury), read against its page images.

522. • The matter is evident. For God alone is truly and absolutely Lord of all things, since from Him alone all things have their being, existence, action, conservation, and perfection. Hence it is said in Ps. 23. 1: "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all who dwell therein."

Hence 1. no created being can be truly proprietor with respect to God, since no created being is independent from God, and whatever it is and has, it must seek from God alone.

2. Therefore no created being can use any thing whatever as absolutely its own; for a created being is not a principle of existing toward another created being, but all things belong absolutely to God alone.

3. Consequently the right of property cannot be in a created being except from God alone; this follows from what has been said. For otherwise a created being could have something from another being independent of God, which is absolutely repugnant. - Lugo, disp. 2, n. 5.¹

¹ The Author dwells upon these things with somewhat greater labor on account of the special necessities of France brought on by the madness of the communists.

Man can be proprietor toward another man.

523. • Proof. Man can be proprietor with respect to others, if nothing stands in the way either on the part of the man himself, or on the part of the objects to be possessed, or on the part of God. But these things are certain. Therefore...

1. On the part of man. For any man is metaphysically independent from another man; for any individual receives and can receive his absolute being from God alone; and therefore he depends on no other by reason of his absolute being. Therefore he can be impeded by no other from becoming proprietor.

2. On the part of the objects. Because there are given objects: 1. of themselves apt for providing either for necessities or for the just pleasures of life, such as goods of fortune, honor, etc.; 2. free from another's right, such as goods not yet possessed or abandoned, or obtained by the cession of another's right.

3. On the part of God. Not only has God not forbidden man to make earthly things his own, but on the contrary He has Himself ordered them so that they should be subjected to man's dominion, as is clear from the nature of those goods, from the need of man, and also from positive divine right. Thus, for example, it is said in Gen. 1. 28: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and all living things which move upon the earth."

Hence from the beginning of the world primitive men could, at their own will, apply external goods to their own uses, as is clear from Sacred Scripture. Hence the first division of goods was not made by the law of nations, as several wish. Besides, the consent of all to the division of the earth is something merely gratuitous, not historical.

If any man has legitimately made certain goods his own, he has acquired in them a right inviolable of itself.

524. • Proof. Man could not make external goods his own, except by God so ordering it for the relief of the indigence of human nature, as is clear from what has been said. But God could not so order, or bestow upon man a right of possessing one's own, without at the same time establishing that the aforesaid right could not be violated, as also follows from what has been said. Therefore...

525. • Hence 1. there is given a natural precept, promulgated and sanctioned by God Himself, forbidding that another's right be injured, and commanding that, if ever it has been injured, it be restored to integrity. For from what has been said, the right of the proprietor is of itself inviolable and has God as its natural author and sponsor. But this inviolability would be overthrown, nor would God be considered its natural author and sponsor, unless He Himself imposed and sanctioned a natural precept commanding it to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed. Therefore...

2. He who unjustly usurps another's thing becomes guilty both toward his neighbor and toward God: 1. indeed toward his neighbor, because he injures the neighbor's natural independence, necessarily inviolable in goods possessed by a just title; 2. toward God, by violating the divine right communicated to the neighbor, and at the same time the natural precept commanding that aforesaid right to be observed.

Questions:

526. • Q. 1. How was the first division of goods made?

Resp. It is certain that goods were common in the first origin of things. For God granted the earth to Adam and his children without any division. It is likewise established that the division was made from the first age, so that the goods of one were not the goods of another. It is clear from

Gen. chap. 4, where it is said that Abel offered to God of the first-born of his flock.

But how the division of goods was made, various persons have devised various systems about this. For some derive this division from paternal authority; others from a convention made among men, or from the law of nations; others from civil authority; finally, others more commonly from the simple occupation of common things, that is, things not yet occupied. This last appears altogether more likely. For that mode of division of goods, namely by occupation, seems very natural and very easy, while the others are subject to not a few difficulties. Especially the mutual convention of assembled men seems chimerical and morally impossible. But civil legislation and the law of nations followed after the division had already been accomplished at least in greatest part.

Whatever may be true concerning the origin of property, it is certain that the right of dominion exists of itself inviolable: 1. by natural right, for when it is taken away society would be subverted; 2. by divine right, as is clear from the seventh and tenth precept of the Decalogue: "You shall not steal." - "You shall not covet your neighbor's house..." Exod. 20. 17, etc.; 3. from ecclesiastical and civil law, as is proved from the legislation of both forums.

527. • Q. 2. What must be thought concerning the system of the communists or socialists, concerning the division of goods?

Resp. That system is impious, supremely harmful to society, and in itself most absurd.

1. It is impious, because it utterly takes away the most wise order of things established and sanctioned by God, radically subverts the sweet economy of divine Providence, and arrogantly determines that provision has been badly made for men.

2. It is supremely harmful to society. For it brings in its total subversion, while it takes away from the midst the right of property, without which human society cannot stand.

528. • 3. It is in itself most absurd. For a perfect division of goods among men is altogether impossible, and therefore it is a foolish and ridiculous invention. For what is more absurd and more impossible than that equal distribution of things among all, and especially its stability? For grant that it has been carried out; how long, I ask, will it endure? Will not idleness, gambling, drunken revelry, prodigality, lack of skill, dullness, or, on the contrary, ambition, industry, or rapacity, good or bad success, destroy that equality as soon as it has been established?

529. • But certain ones say: Let no division of goods be made, and let no one be owner; let the Republic alone possess all goods, and let citizens be workers. But what incentive will be present for those laboring? Who will assign the kind of labor to individuals? How will daily sustenance and clothing be supplied to all? Will not a legion of overseers be required? But then not all, therefore, will be assigned to hard labors. But to whom will the office of overseers or subjects fall? What about the sick, the infirm, old men, children? What about the family? What about mutual duties between parents and children? How will the truly infirm, unfit for labor, be discerned from the innumerable who will feign incapacity? What about commerce? About the arts? About letters? About sciences necessary in society, for example, law, medicine, etc.? What, therefore, is more absurd than that utopia? Is this not to be held a heap of absurdities? Therefore what must be said of communism? That which the Poet said of another portent: "A horrible monster, formless, huge, to whom light was taken away."

530. • The communists object: The earth produces its fruits for all. Therefore... Thus Rousseau.

Resp. Certainly the earth produces its fruits for all, and in reality all from the beginning of the world have lived from the fruits of the earth. But fruits of this sort must be acquired by some legitimate title, for example, by purchase, exchange, and above all by labor and the sweat of the brow. But before all things the divine law must be kept: "You shall not steal."

531. • Among the most ardent patrons of the doctrine of the socialists Proudhon stands out, very famous for this astounding saying: "Property is theft" (la propriete c'est le vol).

Commutative justice obliges under grave sin, and with the burden of restitution.

532. • Proof of the first part. For commutative justice aims to preserve unharmed the natural independence of private persons ¹. But the violation of that independence per se is a grave disorder against the right of the neighbor and the dominion of God; therefore, etc. I said per se, because in this matter smallness of matter is admitted, as is clear to all.

¹ For this somewhat obscure principle another common one can be substituted without loss, namely that it is proper to justice to preserve to each one his right, and that violation of another's right from its genus expresses a grave disorder.

1. Titus, Sempronius, and Caius possess a house, of which the lowest part is Titus's, the middle Sempronius's, the upper Caius's. The roofs having been destroyed by the force of hail, a controversy arises among them, and Titus and Sempronius compel Caius to repair it, since he himself is the owner of the upper part of the house. Caius then begins not to repair the roof, but to construct another story, piano; but again Titus and Sempronius rise up against Caius.

Q. 1. What is co-ownership of things, and by what laws is it governed? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 1241, 1242. - To the second. If there are various owners of different parts of the same house, the repair of the great walls, muri maestri, and of the roofs is common, according to the proportion of the value of the story of each owner. The same is true for halls, anditi, gates, wells, cisterns, aqueducts, and other things common to all the owners. But latrines are common, as to repair, according to the proportion of the number of openings, aperture, of immission. The owner of each story is held to repair the pavements on which he walks and the vaults, volte, by which he is covered, and also the ceilings and panels, soffitti, which cover places pertaining to him. - Stairs are to be built by the owner of the story which they serve, according to the value of each story. Wherefore, if the same story is common to several, each is held according to the value of his part. And the repair of those stairs which provide access to the first stories is to be made proportionately by all; but the repair of those which provide access to the higher stories is to be made only by the owners of those stories. - Underground cells, cantine, floors, palchi morti, rooms, soffitte o camere a tetto, are considered as stories of the house. - The same is to be observed for the repair of terraces and roofs. If their use is not common to all, he who has their exclusive use contributes for a fourth part of the expenses, and the other three parts are to be furnished by him and by the other owners according to the value of each part. The owner of the last upper story cannot raise it higher without the consent of the others. He can construct only the coping of the terrace, parapetto, if it harms the others in nothing. C. I. 562-564. Cf. C. G. 664.

Hence it is clear that the repair of the roofs in the case does not pertain to Caius alone, but to Titus, to Sempronius, and to Caius according to the value of each part. But Caius cannot raise his apartments, appartamento, higher without the consent of the others, since this can well harm the others.

2. Amelius constructs a cabinet in the common wall of his house, since that wall is very deep. Likewise he places an aqueduct within it, since that wall is much nearer the public road through which the public water canal passes. Is this by right?

R. A wall between two houses, gardens, or courtyards, cortili, is presumed common, C. I. 546; C. G. 653; C. A. 854. - In a common wall no one can open windows, C. I. 583; C. G. 675, nor build against it an oven or chimney, C. I. 574; C. G. 674, nor make a hollow, incavo, in it, C. I. 557; C. G. 662, nor, generally, do anything which harms the common wall itself or the co-owner; yet it is permitted to insert beams in it. C. I. 551, 552, 558, 573; C. G. 657, 674.

Someone can raise a common wall higher, provided he does this at his own expense, does not harm the co-owner, and repays him damages, if he has brought any upon him; and the latter can compel him to cede to himself a part of the wall superimposed.

And generally the owner of any estate contiguous to a wall can make that wall common to himself, provided he does this over its whole extension, public buildings excepted. C. I. 553-556; C. G. 658-661. Someone can demand the communion even of a wall which has been built within a half-meter. C. I. 571.

Finally, someone can compel the co-owner to repair the common wall at common expense. C. I. 559, 561; C. G. 663.

It is clear from these dispositions of the law that Amelius could have done neither thing without the order of the other co-owner; and if he refuses, the necessary means are to be defined by experts, lest the work harm the rights of the other. C. I. 557; C. G. 662.

3. Sedulus and Sedulius move a dispute between themselves concerning the ownership of trees which are placed on the common boundary of their own fields. Sedulus says they are his, because they are nearer his own field. Sedulius contends they are his, because the hedge in which they are situated is his.

Q. What as to the case?

R. A hedge between two estates is presumed common and is preserved at common expense, unless one estate alone is enclosed by it, or there is a boundary marker, or proof to the contrary. C. I. 568; C. G. 670; C. A. 854. Trees which arise in a common hedge are common; and each of the two owners can always demand that they be cut down. Always, because division of a common thing is never prescribed. Trees arising on the boundary of two estates are presumed common when there is no title or proof to the contrary. Of them there belongs to each a part as great as he has in the land. Trees which mark the limits of fields cannot be cut down except by common consent, or with judicial authority approving. C. 569; C. G. 673; C. A. 421; L. 83, Pro socio.

Therefore the trees placed on the boundary of the two fields of Sedulus and Sedulius are common; namely those which are in the hedges are so in equal parts, although they are nearer Sedulus's estate. Hence the fruits belong to each from the region of each one's estate; trees uprooted or cut or torn away are common and are equally to be divided between the two owners. Wherefore what Sedulus says, that the trees are nearer his own estate, has no value, just as what Sedulius says, that the hedges are his, has no value, unless he proves this positively. For unless this is shown by some title, the hedge is presumed common and the trees situated in it are presumed common.

4. From a certain mountain water is flowing forth most abundantly, which until now was being dissipated, since all the surrounding fields were uncultivated. The owner of one of those fields, deciding to cultivate his field and to establish in it a large workshop, constructed a new course of the water at his own expense, and directed all the water to his own field and workshop. But the other owners of the neighboring fields, seeing this and wishing now also themselves to cultivate their fields and to build other workshops, bring suit concerning the aforesaid derivation of the water.

Q. What as to the case?

Water flowing naturally, and without manufactured works, except that which belongs to public right or to the right of some private person, can be used by him who possesses an estate near its bank, whether for irrigating his own estate or for exercising his own industry; but he must restore the remaining water to its ordinary course, which accordingly cannot be disturbed. And, if the water passes through the estate itself, likewise the owner of the estate can use it, but he also must restore it to its ordinary course when it leaves his estate; and therefore its course can be disturbed on one's own estate. C. I. 543; C. G. 644. Where a controversy arises, the water is to be divided by the judge, equity being preserved, according to the measure of the possessions and at the same time of the utility of agriculture and industry. C. I. 544; C. G. 645. If someone having a right to divert to his own estate the water of a river, torrent, stream, canal, lake, or water deposit must use a manufactured work, he is held to pay the expenses of this, and to repay all damages of other estates. C. I. 613.

It is clear from what has been said that the aforesaid owner altogether exceeded in appropriating all the water to himself and in changing its course, neither of which he could do. Hence by right the other owners of the neighboring fields protest. The water, its natural course having been changed, is to be divided among them according to the ownership of each one's estate, and then that which is left over, when it leaves one's own estate, must be restored to its ordinary course. Namely, just as the owners of lower fields receive the inconveniences, so also they should receive the advantages of waters flowing nearby.

1. Ioannes Iacobus, without any scruple, carries off the goods of another, saying that God alone is the Lord of all things, and that God created other things on account of man, namely on account of all men. Wherefore there is no property, but all things are common.

Q. What as to the case?

R. 1. Exterior things can be considered in two ways: in one way as to their nature, which is not subject to human power, but only to divine power, to which all things obey at a nod. In another way as to the use of the thing itself; and thus man has natural dominion of exterior things, because through reason and will he can use exterior things for his own utility, as if made on account of himself. For the more imperfect are always on account of the more perfect. And thus it is plain that, although God is the Lord of all things, nevertheless this does not exclude dominion and property of things in man. For thence it follows only that God alone has dominion over exterior things as to their natures, that God alone has principal dominion of all things. But God himself ordered, according to his providence, certain things to the bodily sustenance of man; and on account of this man has natural dominion of things as to the power of using them. For this is dominion, and nothing else: The right or faculty of using one's own thing for any use permitted by law, and this for one's own advantage. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 1; I. M. 838, 866, 867.

2. But although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that man also does not have dominion of things; indeed, the contrary follows. For if they are on account of man, these goods are man's, although they are not principally his, as is gathered from what has just been said. Moreover, although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that all things are to be possessed in common, and that nothing is to be possessed as proper; but from this it follows only that the distinction of possessions was not made naturally, but was naturally superadded to natural law, rational nature itself inclining and impelling toward that division and individual appropriation. First indeed, because each one is naturally more solicitous in procuring something which pertains to himself alone, than that which is common to all or to many, because each one, fleeing labor, leaves to others that which pertains to others. Secondly, because human affairs are treated in a more ordered way, if each has his own care of procuring some thing incumbent on him. But there would be confusion if anyone indiscriminately procured anything. Thirdly, because by this the state of men is preserved more peacefully, while each one is content with his own thing. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 2.

3. Ioannes Iacobus, therefore, a communist, is a true thief, and is held to restitution of all the things which he carried off. For to restore what has been unjustly taken away is of necessity of salvation, since to preserve justice is of necessity of salvation, and to restore what has been unjustly taken away is an act of commutative justice. S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 1, 2.

3. 1. The multiple meaning of justice. Among sacred authors² the word justice obtains a multiple signification: (a) often it designates the whole complex of all the virtues: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice";³ hence St. Joseph is called "just,"⁴ because, namely, he was endowed with all virtues; (b) sometimes it also signifies any act of virtue: "Take heed that you do not your justice (i.e., good works) before men";⁵ or the habit of virtue: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven";⁶ (c) since, moreover, the Christian virtues are infused in justification itself, justice is also taken for justification: "Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice";⁷ (d) finally, it signifies the special virtue of justice, by which to another his own right is rendered: "He has appointed a day wherein he will judge the world in equity,"⁸ dikaiosyne, which is the Greek word for justice. Therefore, whenever that word is found in Scripture, the sense must be defined from the context.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 58; Lugo, disp. I; Soto, lib. III, q. 2; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 1; Carriere, n. 2-7; Pottier, diss. II; Vermeersch, n. 12-76.

² In Hebrew justice is expressed by a double word: yoscher, which sounds the same as rectitude, which avoids crooked ways; and tsedaqah, which designates firmness, inasmuch as justice is a norm in no way flexible according to which human actions ought to be performed. - In Greek dikaiosyne arises from the root dike, by which custom, or the accustomed manner of acting, is signified, because among the Greeks that which was customarily done was held as just. - In Latin justitia is derived from the word jus, which, according to many, arises from the word jussum; but much more probably jus is a root akin to the Sanskrit word jaus, which signifies something religious and sacred, because right is something sacred. Cf. Breal and Bailly, Dictionnaire etymologique latin, Paris, 1898, p. 144.

³ Matt. V, 6.

⁴ Matt. I, 19.

⁵ Matt. VI, 1.

⁶ Matt. V, 20.

⁷ Rom., IV, 3; and so throughout the whole Epistle to the Romans.

⁸ Acts, XVII, 31. - We have found no place in the Vulgate where the word justice certainly designates the virtue by which to each one his own is rendered.

4. 2. The genuine definition of justice. (A) Inasmuch as it is a special virtue, justice is usually defined: the cardinal moral virtue inclining the will to render to another his own right according to equality.

5. It is called: (a) a moral virtue, that it may be distinguished from the theological virtues, whose material object¹ is God Himself, and whose formal object or motive is one of the divine attributes; that is to say, the object of justice is not God, but something created, namely, the right to be rendered to another; but the motive is not one of the divine attributes, but that special uprightness situated in this, that we revere the right of others. - It is also called cardinal, because among the moral virtues it holds a principal place, and is one of those four virtues to which the others are referred.

¹ The material object is that about which the virtue is concerned; the formal object or motive is that which moves the power to act according to this virtue. - Concerning the cardinal virtues, cf. On the Virtues in General, n. 587-590.

This virtue, considered in itself, can be natural, since many precepts of justice can be known by reason and fulfilled by the will, with the assistance of the divine concurrence alone as natural; but in fact, since we have been raised to the supernatural state, it must be supernatural in us, namely inasmuch as we must use at once the light of faith and of reason to know rights and duties, and be helped by actual grace and impelled by a supernatural motive to exercise acts of justice.

6. (b) Inclining the will: by these words is signified the faculty of the soul in which justice resides; for the intellectual moral virtues, such as prudence, are in the intellect, while justice is situated in the will and immediately perfects it.

7. (c) To render to another his own right: for the proper object of this virtue is to render to each one his own right, i.e., that which is strictly owed to him, not however from mere fittingness or charity. Hence justice is a virtue toward another; for no one, properly speaking, has rights toward himself, but rights and duties are so coordinated that to the right which inheres in some man there corresponds a duty in another. - Under this aspect it is distinguished from temperance and fortitude, which are cardinal virtues, but regard the subject himself, not other men. - Justice inclines us to render to each one his own right; for he cannot be called just who inflicts injustice even on one person; and constantly, or perpetually; for it does not suffice that someone wish to observe justice for an hour or a day, or only in some business, but it is required that he wish to cultivate it always and in all things.

4

(d) According to equality, so that as much is rendered as is owed; e.g., if you owe one hundred coins, you must render one hundred, neither more nor less: if less is rendered, justice is not preserved, since something owed remains; if more, the excess belongs not to justice, but to charity or liberality.¹

¹ Hence justice properly so called especially includes two things: alterity or distinction of persons, since it is a virtue toward another, and the rendering of what is owed according to equality. - Concerning the virtues annexed to justice, the reader will find a few things below, p. 438.

8. Corollary. From this definition the distinction between justice and the other cardinal virtues already appears; for prudence resides in the intellect, and in any business dictates what is fitting according to right reason; fortitude moderates, rules, and strengthens the irascible appetite according to the prescriptions of reason; temperance restrains and moderates the concupiscible appetite with respect to the pleasures of taste and touch. Prudence indeed orders man both to himself and to another, but temperance and fortitude only to himself. Therefore those virtues differ from justice, which is situated in the will, and inclines it to render to another his own.

9. Justice likewise differs from charity. Each indeed is a virtue toward another: but charity regards other men as brothers, who share the same human nature and the same supernatural life, pursue the same end by the same means, and are members of the same mystical body; and therefore it rests upon the intimate union of all men; - while justice rests upon the distinction of one man from another, inasmuch as each man, although a member of the human family, is truly distinguished from the other men, has rights proper to himself, and can vindicate them. - Charity is indeed in itself more excellent than justice, since it is a theological virtue; and also more universal, inasmuch as it extends itself to many more things than justice. But when the duties of charity and justice concur, these latter generally ought to precede the former, since they are stricter.

3. Species of justice. Since various divisions are proposed by various authors,² we select this one, which seems to us more comprehensive and more logical. Justice, inasmuch as it flourishes among private men, is called particular; as it is between society and its members, or conversely, it can be called social; insofar as it presides over relations among various Nations, it is called international.

² Commonly the older Theologians acknowledge a threefold justice: commutative, by which a private person renders to a private person what is owed to him; distributive, by which the Government distributes favors and burdens among citizens with equitable proportion preserved; general, or legal, which inclines citizens to render to the Republic or State what is owed to it.

10. (A) Particular justice is that by which a private person renders to a private person what is owed to him from strict right; therefore it primarily regards the particular good; it is also called commutative, because it is concerned chiefly with exchanges and various contracts. To this, according to all, certainly belong the conditions enumerated above in the definition of justice.

11. (B) Social justice, as it is here understood, is that by which citizens are ordered to society and society is ordered to citizens, for promoting the common good. It can be threefold: legal, distributive, and vindicative. (a) Legal justice is that which inclines individual citizens to render to society what is owed to it for procuring the common good. This virtue must be found both in the prince or president and in subjects: it inclines the former to command those things which contribute to the common good; the latter to carry them out, e.g., to pay taxes, to perform military service. It is called legal, because it is situated chiefly in establishing and observing laws; also general, insofar as it orders to the common good all acts which it commands.

12. (b) Distributive justice inclines the rulers of society to distribute common goods and burdens among citizens according to the common good and therefore according to the talents, capacities, and merits of individuals. In this matter arithmetical equality cannot be observed, but only a certain proportion, inasmuch as subsidies ought to be proportioned to needs, burdens to capacities, offices to talents, and rewards to merits; otherwise there will be respect of persons, by force of which, in the distribution of goods, attention is not given to that quality of the person which makes him worthy, but to something else, for example, consanguinity, gifts, friendship, and other things of this kind.

(c) Vindicative justice is that which moves superiors to inflict due and fitting punishments upon guilty subjects. This indeed is most closely allied to distributive justice, but nevertheless seems to be distinguished from it in this, that it immediately regards the reparation of the injured order.¹

¹ According to some, it is referred to distributive justice, because it inflicts punishments proportioned to offenses; according to others, to legal justice, inasmuch as the common good requires that superiors punish crimes; according to some, to commutative justice, because superiors are bound from a quasi-contract to punish the guilty.

13. It is controverted whether social justice is a species of justice properly so called, or a special virtue analogous indeed to commutative justice, but nevertheless truly distinct from it. (a) According to Lugo and not a few others, commutative justice alone attains the perfect notion of justice, because it alone is perfectly toward another, inasmuch as it exists between terms equal and independent of one another; - it alone preserves perfect arithmetical equality; - it alone obliges to restitution when it has been violated; but social justice, since it exists between society and its members, regards terms not wholly distinct nor independent; - it preserves only proportionate equality; - nor does it bind to restitution, except when commutative justice is at the same time injured.¹ (b) Yet not a few² contend that these differences are accidental rather than essential, and therefore that legal and distributive justice truly share in the notion of justice, and are, as it were, the lowest species of this virtue. - The former opinion seems to us more probable.

¹ Lugo, disp. I, n. 47-54; Crotty, n. 36-85; Cathrein, Philosophia Moralis, n. 142; Pottier, diss. II, n. 11-31. - The mind of St. Thomas seems doubtful; for in the body of the article (2. 2., q. 61, a. 1) he indeed teaches that there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative; but in the reply to 5 he adds: "Distributive and commutative justice are distinguished not only according to one and many, but according to the diverse nature of the debt"; these words seem to signify an essential difference.

² Thus Vermeersch, n. 21-25.

14. (C) International justice is that which exists among diverse Nations, and moves them to render to other nations, or to private citizens of other nations, what is owed to them; it therefore embraces the Law of Nations, namely the rules to be observed by various Nations in time of peace or war, the agreements entered into for fostering commerce among different peoples, for defining the rights and duties of citizens who dwell among foreign nations, for determining what is permitted or prohibited in time of war, etc. For Nations can be regarded as moral persons, among whom justice of the true name can intervene, so that even sometimes there may be place for restitution.

In this Treatise there is question especially of commutative justice; nevertheless we shall briefly touch in the course of the Treatise the principal questions which regard social justice; likewise we shall say a few things concerning international justice, where we speak of war.

15. Corollary. From this it is rightly inferred how necessary the virtue of justice is; for if it is observed both by citizens and by States, the rights of private persons and of Nations remain safe and sound, and therefore order and tranquility reign everywhere; but when the rights of citizens or of Nations have been violated, lawsuits, dissensions, and wars soon arise, most hostile to right order and peace,¹ as will appear more clearly from the things to be said below.

¹ Bossuet, Sermon sur la Justice, ed. Lebarq, Paris, 1892, t. V, p. 157-190; Card. Perraud, Les Vertus Morales, Paris, 1903, p. 35-90.

28. State of the question. 1. In Natural Ethics, and also in the Treatise on the Last End, n. 25, it has already been demonstrated that God is the primary font of right: for He is the supreme Creator and Lord of all things, and possesses all rights in Himself. Now, when He creates certain beings, He at the same time assigns duties and rights to them. Since He Himself is the ultimate end of all beings, the duty of tending toward God as ultimate end is incumbent upon all; but they cannot fulfill this duty unless at the same time they have the right not only of existing, but also of exercising their faculties. Therefore, if there is question of the priority of right and duty, these things can be established: (a) if the rights and duties of men are compared in relation to God, right in creatures primarily flows from duty, inasmuch as creatures ought to serve God before they can vindicate any rights for themselves. Nevertheless rights often extend more widely than duties; for, once it is posited that the right of exercising our faculties inheres in us, we can legitimately do certain things to which we are by no means bound; thus, for example, besides the knowledge of divine and human things which we are bound to acquire for salvation, we can know many other things.

(b) But if the rights and duties of men among themselves are compared, they are indeed correlative, inasmuch as some duty corresponds to some right; nevertheless in the same order right is logically prior to duty, since duty has been instituted in favor of right: for if I have a right of doing something, by that very fact the duty is incumbent upon other men not to prevent that right.

29. 2. Sometimes rights and duties seem to be in conflict with one another, e.g., the rights of creditors and debtors, or the rights of debtors among themselves, the rights of owners and workers, etc. The collision is only apparent, since rights and duties flow from one sole font, namely God, and moreover there can be no contradiction in things established by divine ordering. Therefore the question is which right or duty prevails. Now the order of rights and duties must be determined according to the demands of the last end, according to that saying: in all things look to the end.¹ Therefore, in an apparent collision of rights, that right prevails which, other things being equal, is more excellent, or more necessary or useful in relation to the last end. And so a more certain right prevails over a more uncertain right, since it is more necessary; a particular right, other things being equal, yields to a universal right, or to the public good, since this is more excellent or more necessary.

¹ This is treated in the Treatise on the Last End, n. 31.

30. 3. Division. In this chapter we shall treat: 1. of the object of right, weighing what rights men have or can have; 2. of the subject of right, namely who can acquire rights; 3. of the various modes of acquiring rights.

If we study the nature of the sins thus characterized as crying to Heaven for vengeance, we find that they form a category separate and distinct from the capital sins. For whereas the latter spring from an inordinate craving of the natural appetites, and are sinful only when they involve a lack of rational self-control, the distinguishing note of the so-called peccata clamantia is violent suppression of certain natural instincts and conscious frustration of their ends and objects. In other words, besides a transgression of the moral order, they entail a violation of the laws of nature, thus provoking divine wrath in a special manner. This fact is well expressed in the phrase, "sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance."

1. From the duty of labor flows the right of property or ownership, i. e., the right to acquire, hold, and dispose freely of the material fruits of labor, that is to say, the goods which are the result of man's individual and personal endeavor.

The right to acquire and possess property is by no means, as the Communists and Socialists maintain, a fictitious claim based on robbery and injustice,¹ but corresponds to the natural duty of labor from which it arises, and therefore is a natural right.

¹ Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Socialism: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application, tr. and adapted to conditions in the United States by V. Gettelmann, S.J., New York 1904.

Under certain conditions the acquisition of a limited amount of earthly goods even becomes a duty.² The supreme, though not the sole, title of ownership is labor.

² Gen. III, 19; Eccles. V, 17; 2 Thess. III, 10. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “With respect to an external thing, two powers belong to man, one of which is the power of procuring and administering it; and with respect to this it is lawful for man to possess things as his own. It is also necessary for human life for three reasons: first, because each person is more solicitous in procuring something that belongs to him alone than something common to all or to many, since each person, fleeing labor, leaves to another what pertains to the common good, as happens in a multitude of servants; secondly, because human affairs are handled in a more orderly way if the proper care of procuring some particular thing falls upon individuals, whereas there would be confusion if everyone indiscriminately procured everything; thirdly, because by this means a more peaceful condition of men is preserved, while each is content with his own thing. Hence we see that quarrels arise more frequently among those who possess something in common and undivided.” —Father J. Kelleher, in what is probably the best modern treatise on the subject (Private Ownership, Dublin 1911) points out (p. 149) that the classical theologians almost unanimously taught that the division of private property does not depend directly upon the natural law, but is derived from the ius gentium. (Cfr. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 278 sqq.)

Private ownership is a wonderful institution, to which humanity owes the development of trade, commerce, and industry, nay whatever determines the differences between civilized man and the savage. Without it labor would languish because the laborer would no longer be sure of the product of his industry. The surer he feels that he is toiling for himself and his own, rather than for strangers, the greater the persistency and diligence which he will bestow upon his work. Private ownership safeguards the future, as far as this is humanly possible, and without it diligence and thrift would never increase the movable capital that lends so powerful an impetus to production, nor would the constantly renewed and always laborious work of cultivating the soil insure to the earth that increase of fertility without which society would be condemned to endless misery.³

³ Chas. Perm, Les Lois de la Societe Chretienne, 2 vols., Paris 1876, especially Vol. I; F. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, Bonn 1863, pp. 145 sqq.

Barely touching the traditional arguments as developed, e. g., by St. Thomas, Pope Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical "Rerum Novarum," bases private ownership on the rational nature of man.

"Every man," he says, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep its powers on the alert, impel it to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine it to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other, the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for beasts are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind or reason which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a man human, and distinguishes him essentially and generically from the brute. And on this very account —that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason —it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have been reduced to use, continue for further use in after time. This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, and linking the future with the present, becoming, furthermore, by enlightened forethought, master of his own acts, guides his ways under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; although satisfied to-day, they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow."⁴

⁴ English tr. from The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 181 sq. A better tr. in Bolshevism — The Remedy, New Haven, Conn., 1919, pp. 5 sq.

The Pontiff goes on to show that private ownership was established through individual efforts before the existence of the State, and that it is recognized by history, by civil law, and by divine law.⁵

⁵ Cfr. A. C. Breig, Papal Program of Social Reform, Milwaukee 1913, pp. 14 sqq.

It is frequently asserted that the first Christians, especially those at Jerusalem, practiced Communism.⁶ Learned scholars who have investigated the question with great care deny that there was Communism in the primitive Church. The early Christians were allowed to keep their property, and if some of them sold it, they did so voluntarily, for the purpose of assisting the poor.⁷ The most that can be said is that in some sections of the great congregation of Jerusalem there existed a sort of religious community of goods.⁸

⁶ Cfr. Acts II, 44 sq.; IV, 32-37; V, 1-4.

⁷ Cfr. E. Baumgartner, "Der Kommunismus im Urchristentum," in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1909, pp. 625 sqq.

⁸ O. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum in der altkirchlichen Literatur, Freiburg 1908, pp. 16 sq.

Those Church Fathers who are represented as having preached Communism, did not oppose private ownership, but merely its abuse. The passages quoted from their writings by Socialist authors are largely spurious, and those which are genuine prove nothing more than that God did not distribute temporal goods directly among individual men, but gave the earth with its resources to the race at large for the common use of all, so that no one may claim anything as his own as if he had the right to exclude all others absolutely and for ever from its use.⁹ The Fathers simply wished to express the same truth which St. Thomas in the thirteenth century set forth as follows: "Man may not have exterior things for his own, but as the common property of all, namely in such a way that one readily shares them with others in case of need."¹⁰ There are many Patristic texts which unmistakably assert the right of private ownership.¹¹ Lactantius defends it with great scientific acumen. St. Ambrose, who frequently censures the wealthy, teaches that the condemnation pronounced by Christ does not affect all who have wealth, but only those who abuse it, and adds that every man is allowed perfect freedom in giving alms.¹²

⁹ Cfr. J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., p. 134, n. 1.

¹⁰ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “A man ought not to hold external things as his own, but as common, so that, namely, he may readily share them in the necessity of others.”

¹¹ See G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 82 sqq.; A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 266 sqq.: V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphiloso- phie, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 313 sqq.; J. Seipel, Die wirtschafts-ethischen Lehren der Kirchenvater, Vienna 1907, pp. 49 sqq., 120 sqq., 190 sqq.; J. A. Ryan Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913.

¹² St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel, sec. Luc., 1. V, n. 69: “Although in abundant wealth there are many enticements to sins, nevertheless there are also very many incentives to virtues. Although virtue does not require assistance, and the contribution of a poor man is more praiseworthy than the liberality of a rich man, nevertheless the heavenly sentence condemns by its authority not those who possess riches, but those who do not know how to use them.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1654).—IDEM, De Nabuthe Iezrael, c. 13, n. 55: “He who has been able to be proved faithful amid riches is truly perfect and worthy of glory.” (P. L., XIV, 748).—IDEM, De Officiis, l. I, c. 30, n. 14: “It is in your power to bestow what you wish.” (P. L., XVI, 66). —On the teaching of St. Ambrose consult O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (see note 8, supra) pp. 134 sqq., and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913, pp. 52-66. "What St. Ambrose teaches is not communism in any correct sense of the word," says Dr. Ryan (op. cit., p. 57 sq.). "It is rather a first principle of the natural law, namely that the earth belongs to all the children of men, and not to a few only. He tells the rich to restore their excessive wealth to the poor, while a communist would order them to turn it over to the community. It is true that he calls these donations of the rich by the name of restitution, but this is because the rich have accumulated so much that the poor have been deprived of their birth-right. Hence, he commands them to give back their unjust gains. Any one who will read the history of the oppression of the poor in Italy in the fourth century, will know that St. Ambrose was right when he told the rich that they had robbed the poor, and were consequently bound to make reparation. The most zealous defender of individual ownership could speak the same way in the same circumstances. What St. Ambrose demands, therefore, is not a return to common property, but a recognition of common rights."

The phrase, "Omnis dives aut iniquus aut iniqui heres,"¹³ which occurs repeatedly in the writings of St. Jerome, has led to his being classed as a Socialist. But the fact that St. Jerome makes this sentiment his own and quotes it with approval, does not prove that he looked upon every property holder as a thief. "Iniquus—from in + aequus—refers literally to a want of equality or want of proportion. Taken figuratively, it has about the same meaning as iniustus, for which it was often used as a synonym by the best authors. Now St. Jerome's style, as well as his own confession, assures us that he was well acquainted with classical Latin. We may safely infer then that he uses this word in the specific sense of iniustus, and not in the more general sense of peccator. This inference is confirmed by his manner of speaking in a sentence where he distinguishes between an impius on the one hand, and an iniquus and a peccator on the other. Even if he meant merely 'wrong doer' when he wrote iniquus, the specific wrong doing referred to must have been an act of injustice, since it was committed in acquiring riches. When a man gets possession by wrong-doing, the greater part of the wrong will fall under the head of injustice, violation of personal rights. St. Jerome, therefore, subscribed to the opinion that every dives was an unjust man, and by dives he meant, not a man of some property, but a man of much property. All the synonyms of dives and its use by the best authors show that it refers to an abundance of goods, and not to mere ownership, as some would have us believe."¹⁴

¹³ This remarkable saying, which seems to have been of pagan origin, was evidently current in St. Jerome's day, for he quotes it in three distinct passages of his writings. For an analysis of these passages see J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 67 sqq.

¹⁴ Ryan, op. cit., pp. 70 sq. Further on in his booklet (p. 74) Dr. Ryan shows that Herbert Spencer spoke in much the same way of the present titles to landed property as St. Jerome did of those of his time. "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate... Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning, these are the sources to which these titles may be traced." The passage occurs in Spencer's Social Statics and was omitted in later editions, but, as Dr. Ryan correctly says, "the question is one of fact, not of opinion." W. S. Lilly declares: "I say, without shadow of doubt, that to much property the saying of Proudhon [namely, that property is theft] is strictly ap- plicable." Charles S. Devas says: "As a matter of fact, much of the wealth of the rich classes in modern Europe has been gathered together, and is still kept up, by dreadful deeds of cruelty, injustice, and fraud." —"Mr. Lilly," comments Dr. Ryan, "is neither a Socialist nor a radical, but above all a pleader for law, while Mr. Devas was an unimaginative student of economics. If men of this character can write thus of titles to property in modern times, is it any wonder that St. Jerome used similar language in his day?" (Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 74 sq.)

The proposition, "No Christian should be engaged in commercial pursuits, and those who persist in them, should be expelled from the Church,"¹⁵ which is frequently ascribed to St. Chrysostom, does not occur in his genuine writings, but in the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum of an Arian writer falsely attributed to the Saint.¹⁶ Certain communistic ideas that occur in the genuine works of St. Chrysostom must be interpreted as the product of a sort of ideal Communism, resembling that of Plato, which marked a reaction against the dominating power of wealth, the materialism and egotism of certain rich people, and the exaggerated esteem in which worldly possessions were generally held at that time and which manifested itself in an insane pursuit of wealth similar to that which we behold all around us to-day. In attacking these flagrant and serious abuses St. Chrysostom occasionally employed expressions which, when read through modern glasses, seem to stamp him as an opponent of the principle of private ownership.¹⁷

¹⁵ “No Christian ought to be a merchant; or, if he wishes to be one, let him be cast out of the Church of God.”

¹⁶ Cfr. F. X. Funk's paper, "Ueber Reichtum und Handel im christlichen Altertum," in his Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen, Paderborn 1917, Vol. III, pp. 150 sqq.

¹⁷ On the teaching of St. Chrysostom, see O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (note 8, supra), p. 123 and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 1-7; on the teaching of St. Basil, ibid., pp. 7 sqq., 17 sqq.; of St. Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 10 sq.; of Clement of Alexandria, p. 11; of St. Augustine, pp. 12 sq.; of St. Gregory the Great, pp. 15 sq.

2. In all that regards wealth and earthly possessions (bona fortunae) Catholics must be guided by the following principles.

a) Broadly speaking, every man is in duty bound to acquire the means which are necessary to support himself and his dependents and to fulfil the obligations that rest upon him as a member of society. He may, moreover, acquire a superfluity of earthly possessions, but if he does so, he incurs the additional obligation of making good use of his surplus; in other words, he must not acquire or cherish wealth for its own sake, but in order to share it with the needy.¹⁸

¹⁸ Eph. IV, 28; I Tim. VI, 18. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3.

b) The possession of wealth is no sin in itself, but involves great danger because a rich man is constantly tempted to seek his happiness in this world and to neglect his soul.¹⁹ It is in this sense that Christ speaks of "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches,”²⁰ and warns His disciples that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven."²¹

¹⁹ Cfr. I Tim. VI, 9 sq., 17. — Seneca says (Epist., XVII, 3): “Riches have hindered many from philosophizing; poverty is unencumbered and secure.” And in another place (Ep., XVII, 5): “If you wish to be at leisure for the soul, you must either be poor or like a poor man.” —Cfr. G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 43 sqq.

²⁰ Matth. XIII, 22.

²¹ Matth. XIX, 23 sq.; cfr. Mark X, 23 sqq.; Luke XII, 16 sqq.; Jas. V, 1 sqq.

Neither is poverty in itself a virtue, or a source of virtue, though apt to become such. That it is no disgrace to be poor, appears from the example of Christ and His disciples, who were all poor laboring-men. "Jesus saith to him: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.”²² “Being rich," says St. Paul, "He [Jesus] became poor for your sakes, that through his poverty you might be rich."²³

²² Matth. VIII, 20; X, 9 sq.

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 9; IX, 1 sqq.

When poverty is the result of sloth and shiftlessness, it easily leads to immorality and is in itself a sin if it makes a man discontented and covetous of the possessions of others. We read in Sacred Scripture: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessaries of life, lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of God."²⁴ Poverty becomes a virtue if borne humbly and with resignation to the will of God. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."²⁵ St. Ambrose explains this text as follows: "Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is merely a means: both good men and bad may be poor, unless perhaps that poor man is to be considered blessed of whom the prophet says, 'Better is the poor man that walketh in his simplicity than a rich man that is perverse.’²⁶... Blessed the poor man who cried to the Lord and was heard: poor in crime, poor in vice, a poor man in whom the prince of this world finds nothing, who imitates Him who, being rich, was made poor for our sake.²⁷ St. Matthew unfolded the full truth when he said: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,'²⁸ for he who is poor in spirit does not become puffed up and proud in his conceit."²⁹

²⁴ Prov. XXX, 8-9.—St. Leo the Great says (Serm., 49 [al. 48], c. 1): “There are snares in the abundance of riches and snares in the straits of poverty. The former raise one up to pride; the latter incite one to complaint.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 302).

²⁵ Matth. V, 3; cfr. Jas. II, 5.

²⁶ Prov. XIX, 1.

²⁷ 2 Cor. VIII, 9.

²⁸ Matth. V, 3.

²⁹ St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel. in Lucam, l. V, n. 53: “Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is an intermediate thing: both good and evil men can be poor. Unless perhaps that blessed poor man is to be understood whom the prophet described, saying: ‘A just poor man is better than a lying rich man.’ Blessed is the poor man who cried out and the Lord heard him: poor in crime, poor in vices, a poor man in whom the prince of this world found nothing, an imitator of that Poor Man who, though He was rich, was made poor for us. Hence Matthew disclosed the matter fully, saying: ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit’; for the poor man in spirit is not puffed up and is not exalted in the mind of his flesh.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1650). —Cfr. A. Winterstein, Die christl. Lehre vom Erdengut, pp. 173 sqq.

"Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing," says Epicurus,³⁰ and Seneca, who quotes this sentiment with approval, adds: "Not he is poor who has little, but he who attempts to gain more by dishonest means."³¹ In another place the great Roman philosopher says: "Great is the man who remains poor [i. e., in spirit] amid riches, but safer is he who does without them."³²

³⁰ “Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing”; quoted by Seneca, Ep., II, 5.

³¹ Ep., II, 6: “Not he who has little, but he who desires more, is poor.”

³² Ep., XX, 10: “Great is he who is poor amid riches, but safer is he who lacks riches.”

c) Those who devote themselves entirely to intellectual or mental labor, have a just claim to such material goods as they require, not merely to satisfy their necessities, but to enable them to live according to their rank or station. St. Paul's dictum that "they who serve at the altar share with the altar,"³³ applies in a wider sense to all who devote themselves to spiritual and intellec- tual labor for the benefit of their fellowmen, and includes pre-eminently the members of contemplative orders. d) As the individual, so also each social group (the family, the Church, the State, etc.) has the right and the duty to acquire property. But the group no less than the individual is exposed to the dangers that arise from wealth. History furnishes abundant examples of the truth of the Apostle's saying: "They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires, which drown men into destruction and perdition."³⁴

³³ 1 Cor. IX, 13.

³⁴ 1 Tim. VI, 9; cfr. Ps. XXXIII, 11; Luke XII, 15-21.

Man is not the absolute owner, but rather the steward of his possessions, and as such must give a strict account to God. Material wealth should never be the ultimate aim either of the individual or of society, but should be regarded and employed merely as the basis and foundation of a higher life. "Charge the rich of this world," says St. Paul, "not to be proud, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God, who giveth us abundantly all things to enjoy, to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on the true life."³⁵

³⁵ 1 Tim. VI, 17-19; cfr. Matth. VI, 19-21.

The concentration of great fortunes in the hands of a few is becoming a serious danger, not only to the individual, since, as St. James says, the rich oppress the poor by might,³⁶ but also to society, because so many rich men now-a-days employ their wealth to establish monopolies, obtain excessive profits, defraud their fellowmen, purchase political power, etc. The fact that it is possible under present conditions, for the exceptionally able, the exceptionally cunning, and the exceptionally lucky, to accumulate enormous riches through the clever and unscrupulous utilization of special advantages, natural and otherwise, has given rise to a just demand for the legal limitation of fortunes. Various methods are suggested. The law might directly limit the amount of property to be held by any individual. One of our leading Catholic authorities on social and political science, Dr. John A. Ryan, thinks that if the limit were placed fairly high, say at one hundred thousand dollars, such a law "could scarcely be regarded as an infringement on the right of property. In the case of a family numbering ten members, this would mean one million dollars. All the essential objects of private ownership could be abundantly met out of a sum of one hundred thousand dollars for each person. Moreover, a restriction of this sort need not prevent a man from bestowing unlimited amounts upon charitable, religious, educational, or other benevolent causes."³⁷

³⁶ Jas. II, 6; cfr. Henry H. Klein, Dynastic America and Those Who Own It, New York, 1921; Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, New York 1900.

³⁷ J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916, pp. 292 sq.; cfr. Hy. H. Klein, Dynastic America, N. Y., 1921, pp. 164 sqq.

On the other hand, "the dangers and obstacles confronting any legal restriction of fortunes are so real as to render the proposal socially inexpedient. It would easily lend itself to grave abuse. Once the community had habituated itself to a direct limitation of any sort, the temptation to lower it in the interest of better distribution and simpler living would become exceedingly powerful. Eventually the right of property might take such an attenuated and uncertain form in the public mind as to discourage labor and initiative, and thus seriously to endanger human welfare. In the second place, the manifold evasions to which the measure would lend itself would make it of very doubtful efficacy."³⁸

³⁸ Ibid., p. 293.

Another suggestion is that the amount of property capable of being received by heirs of any person be limited, say, to one million dollars.³⁹ This would be a restriction of the rights of bequest and succession, which are integral elements of the right of ownership. Is such restriction admissible? The answer to this question, according to the same authority, "depends upon the effects of the measure on human welfare.... A person needs private property not only to provide for his personal wants and those of his family during his life-time, but also to safeguard the welfare of his dependents and to assist other worthy purposes, after he has passed away.... All the necessary and rational ends of bequest and succession could be attained in a society in which no man's heirs could inherit more than one million dollars. Under such an arrangement very few of the children of millionaires would be prevented from getting at least one hundred thousand dollars. That much would be amply sufficient for the essential and reasonable needs of any human being. Indeed, we may go further, and lay down the proposition that the overwhelming majority of persons can lead a more virtuous and reasonable life on the basis of a fortune of one hundred thousand dollars than when burdened with any larger amount. The persons who have the desire and the ability to use a greater sum than this in a rational way are so few that a limitation law need not take them into account. Corporate persons, such as hospitals, churches, schools, and other helpful institutions, should not, as a rule, be restricted as to the amount that they might inherit; for many of them could make a good use of more than the amount that suffices for a natural person."⁴⁰

³⁹ Final Report of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 32; H. E. Read, The Abolition of Inheritance, N. Y., 1919; A. Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, N. Y., 1901, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴⁰ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 294.

The limitation of inheritance would, of course, also be liable to abuse, and while its bad effects would probably not be as great as those following a similar abuse with regard to possessions, they are, in Dr. Ryan's opinion, "sufficiently grave and sufficiently probable to suggest that the legal restriction of bequest and succession should not be considered except as a last resort, and when the transmission of great fortunes had become a great and certain public peril."⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 295.

An indirect way of limiting large fortunes would be through a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances. This is a more feasible method, though the maximum limit that justice would set to the rate of taxation is not easy to determine. Some years ago Andrew Carnegie⁴² recommended an inheritance tax of fifty per cent on estates amounting to more than one million dollars. While no country has yet reached this high level, the proposal cannot be stigmatized as unjust either to the testator or his heirs, nor can it be proved that it is in any other manner injurious to human welfare. In a general way, all that can be said with confidence concerning the just rates of inheritance taxation is that "the increments of the tax should correspond as closely as possible to the diminishing intensity of the wants which the tax deprives of satisfaction; in the case of each heir a certain fairly high minimum of property should be entirely exempt; on all the highest estates the rate should be uniform, and it should fall a long way short of confis- cation; and the tax should at no point be such as to discourage socially useful activity and enterprise."⁴³

⁴² The Gospel of Wealth, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴³ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 300.

It would be still better, perhaps, instead of clipping off wealth from the top, by limiting possession and transmission, to prevent these things by going to the root, i. e., by abolishing the wage system and admitting workingmen to a share in the possession of the means of production. This, too, could best be brought about, not by legal enactment, but by molding public opinion.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ See Social Reconstruction, brochure issued by the four bishops constituting the Administrative Committee of the American Catholic War Council, Washington, D. C., 1919; Cardinal Bourne's Lenten Pastoral for 1918, "The Nation's a Crisis," London, Catholic Social Guild, 1918.

e) We will close this chapter with a few remarks on the duty of distributing superfluous wealth. Here, also, we shall follow Professor Ryan.

It is the fundamental teaching of Christianity that ownership is stewardship and that he who possesses superfluous goods must regard himself as a trustee for the needy. St. Thomas clearly and concisely formulates this principle as follows: "As regards the power of acquiring and dispensing material goods, man may lawfully possess them as his own; as regards their use, however, a man ought not to look upon them as his own, but as common, so that he may readily minister to the needs of others."⁴⁵ This teach- ing is in perfect conformity with reason. Since the goods of the earth were intended by the Creator for the common benefit of all mankind, the possessor of a surplus is reasonably required to use it in such a way that this original purpose of all created goods will be fulfilled. To refuse to do so is to treat one's less fortunate neighbor as something different from and less than oneself, as a creature whose claim upon the common bounty of nature is something less than one's own.

⁴⁵ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3.

Is this obligation one of charity or of justice? In the case of wealth unjustly acquired it is clearly one of justice. But how about wealth honestly acquired? St. Thomas says: "The goods which a man has in superfluity are due by the natural law to the sustenance of the poor."⁴⁶ This is the official teaching of the Church, for Pope Leo XIII says: "When one has provided sufficiently for one's necessities and the demands of one's state of life, there is a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains. It is a duty not of strict justice, save in case of extreme necessity, but of Christian charity."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Ibid., art. 7.

⁴⁷ Encyclical "On the Condition of Labor," 15 May, 1891; The Pope and the People, p. 192.

There seems to be a contradiction between this teaching and that of certain Fathers, but the contradiction is apparent rather than real. "The truly important fact of the whole situation," says Dr. Ryan, "is that both the Fathers and the later authorities of the Church regard the task of distributing superfluous goods as one of strict moral obligation, which in serious cases is binding under pain of grievous sin. Whether it falls under the head of justice or under that of charity, is of no great practical importance."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Distributive Justice, pp. 303 sq., 307 sq.

What portion of his superfluous wealth is a man obliged to distribute among the needy? Dr. Ryan, proceeding from the unanimous teaching of moral theologians that the entire mass of superfluous wealth is morally subject to the call of grave need, and from the principle of the moral law that the goods of the earth should be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the earth in proportion to their essential needs, attempts to answer this question from the standpoint of common welfare. He thinks that, in view of available statistics, the conclusion is inevitable "that the greater part of the superfluous income of the well-to-do and rich would be required to abolish all grave and ordinary need." He adds: "The proposition that men are under moral obligation to give away the greater portion of their superfluous goods or income is, indeed, a 'hard saying’.... No Catholic, however, who knows the traditional teaching of the Church on the right use of wealth, and who considers patiently and seriously the magnitude and the meaning of human distress, will be able to refute the proposition by reasoned arguments. Indeed, no man can logically deny it who admits that men are intrinsically sacred, and essentially equal by nature and in their claims to a reasonable livelihood from the common heritage of the earth. The wants that a man supplies out of his superfluous goods are not necessary for rational existence. For the most part they bring him merely irrational enjoyment, greater social prestige, or increased domination over his fellows. Judged by any reasonable standard, these are surely less important than those needs of the neighbor which are connected with humane living. If any considerable part of the community rejects these propositions, the explanation will be found not in a reasoned theory, but in the conventional assumption that a man may do what he likes with his own. This assumption is adopted without examination, without criticism, without any serious advertence to the great moral facts that ownership is stewardship, and that the Creator intended the earth for the reasonable support of all the children of men."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 314.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 1 sq. —Theodore Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. II, pp. 126 sqq., Freiburg 1900. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, Vol. II, pp. 285 sqq. —IDEM, Das Privateigentum und seine Gegner, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 240 sqq.—Ch. Perin, De la Richesse dans les Societes Chretiennes, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Paris 1881. —F. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Socialismus, pp. 266 sqq., Freiburg 1895. —H. Pesch, S.J., Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, Vol. I, Freiburg 1905, pp. 179 sqq.—Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 113 sqq.—R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, New York 1899, pp. 203 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 278 sqq. —J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth, New York 1916, pp. 3 sqq., 291 sqq., 303 sqq. —J. Husslein, S.J., The World Problem: Capital, Labor, and the Church, New York 1918, pp. 232 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 387 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 344 sqq., 350 sqq., New York 1919. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 499 sqq. —J. Kelleher, Private Ownership, Dublin 1911. —J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 271 sqq., New York 1919.—H. Belloc, The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property, London 1920. —J. A. Ryan, The Christian Doctrine of Property, New York 1923.

A particularly offensive sin against the precept here under consideration is involved in the grosser forms of slavery. It is true that the treatment of slaves is usually softened by natural compassion and kindliness on the part either of the master or of public opinion, or by the precepts of religion; that the law has in some instances granted the wretched slaves a certain measure of protection, and that it is not necessary to assume that every slaveholder is a cruel tyrant. Yet the status of a slave is by its very definition not that of a person, but rather that of a brute beast or an inanimate object that is bought and sold according to the whims of its owner. Dr. Devas is undoubtedly right when he says that “slavery by its very nature encourages immorality, hinders proper family life among the slaves, gives the master an arbitrary power with which no man can be trusted, fosters the scorn of manual labor, as a degradation for the freeman, and thus is always a social evil, any incidental advantages which it may give being attainable by serfdom.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Political Economy, 3rd ed., pp. 529 sq.—Cfr. Leo XIII, Epist. ad Episc. Brasil., 5 Maii 1888; P. Allard, Art. “Slavery,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 36 sqq.; J. J. Fox, ibid., pp. 39 sqq.; A. Ebeling, Die Sklaverei von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die Gegenwart, Paderborn 1899; J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, N.Y. 1919, p. 328.

"In modern times," writes Archbishop Simar, "the working classes live under conditions similar to those of pagan antiquity. All too frequently the laborer is degraded to the level of a mere tool for money-making, and no regard is paid to his bodily health, his social and economic welfare, and his spiritual, religious, and moral development. The evils and dangers which threaten humanity in consequence of this social injustice have their fountain-head in un-Christian views and principles, and therefore cannot be successfully and permanently abolished unless Christianity is again allowed to govern all social relations. The fundamental postulate of reform is respect for the personal dignity of every man as a man and as a Christian, for in no other soil can true charity and its concomitant spirit of self-sacrifice thrive." ¹⁸ The keynote of the famous Labor Encyclical of Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum," is the principle that conditions of labor shall be made more human and less servile, and that the worker be placed in a condition of greater economic freedom both as regards his security against want and the conditions of his labor. The worker is to be regarded as a human agent, not as a mere tool; and as one who has the right by means of his labor to achieve a wholesome human existence, since, as the Pope says, it is only by his labor that he can preserve and develop himself. His necessity gives him the right to such conditions of labor as will enable him to achieve a thoroughly human existence. Moreover, the same necessity demands that he should claim this right; since, as Leo XIII declares, "a man cannot give up his soul to servitude." Yet that is just what he is required to do under the system now largely prevalent in modern industry.

¹⁸ Simar, Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 372.—Cfr. Th. Meyer, S. J., Die christlich-ethischen Sozialprinzipien und die Arbeiterfrage, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B. 1906; Reuter-Lehmkuhl, S. J., Neoconfessarius, pp. 214 sqq.; J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., pp. 206 sqq.

1. The right of ownership (dominium) is defined as “the permanent and exclusive right of retaining, controlling, and disposing of an object in one’s own interest and according to one’s own wishes.”¹ It is derived from nature itself and protected by the natural law.²

¹ Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 113.—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 533: “Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one’s own. Ownership is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as there is a right to dispose both of the thing itself and of its utility, or only of one of the two. Imperfect ownership, however, is subdivided into direct and indirect, that is, useful, according as it regards solely the ownership of the thing or solely its utility. They also commonly distinguish high and low ownership. The former is ownership improperly so called and is termed the right which the supreme authority has, for the gravest cause and for the good of the community, sometimes to dispose of the goods of private persons with due compensation, insofar as this can be done. The latter is the ownership of private persons, to which the definition properly applies.” Cfr. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. I, pp. 248 sqq.

² Leo XIII, Encycl. “Quod apostolici,” Dec. 28, 1878: “The right of property and ownership, proceeding from nature itself, is sanctioned by natural law.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Rerum novarum,” May 15, 1891: “The right to possess things privately as one’s own has been given to man by nature. . . . The right of ownership which we have shown to have been bestowed by nature upon individuals must be transferred to man insofar as he is the head of a family. . . . Therefore, when relief for the people is sought, this must be held above all as a fundamental principle: private possessions must be preserved inviolate.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Graves de communi,” Jan. 18, 1901: “Therefore let nothing be more sacred to it [Christian democracy] than justice; let it command that the right of acquiring and possessing be kept intact.”

All ownership is based on some ground, usually called title. A title is a factor or an event by which a particular owner comes to have a right to his property. There is a variety of such titles, partly original or primary, partly derivative or secondary. An original title of ownership is one by which objects that belong to no one are appropriated, or by which existing private property is increased or improved. A secondary title is one based upon donation or legitimate purchase from a previous owner.

2. The chief original titles of ownership are: occupancy, accretion, and labor.

a) Occupancy (occupatio), the first and most primitive title of private ownership, is defined as the actual appropriation of ownerless objects with the intention to keep them as one’s own. This title of ownership (ius primi occupantis) presupposes that the object in question is by nature fit to become private property (res capax dominii privati). Hence it must not belong either to State or Church, nor be of such a nature that it cannot be occupied, e. g., the sea or air. Secondly, it must be actually ownerless, that is to say, it must never have belonged to anybody (res nullius), or, if it did, have been relinquished by the former owner (res relicta); third, the occupant must have the intention of acquiring the object as his own and of exercising the right of ownership in future. Fourth, the act of occupancy must be such as to convey to others some intimation that proprietary possession has been taken.³ This is usually done by some external act, e. g., in the case of a movable object, keeping it and turning it into something else; in the case of soil or real estate, by the act of cultivating it, fencing it in, setting out plants on it, and so forth.

³ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 139 sq.—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 558: “Occupancy is the actual taking possession of things which belong to no one. It is a legitimate mode of acquiring ownership, provided that the required conditions are present, namely: 1. That the thing be capable of private ownership and belong to no one; 2. That the occupant wish to make it his own and take possession of it; 3. That no law stand in the way of occupancy. The more frequent practical cases concerning this matter relate to the occupancy of animals.”

The principle that ownerless land in uncivilized countries may be occupied and thereby become private property is recognized by the law of nations.

The most common kinds of occupancy are: hunting (venatio), fishing (piscatio), and discovery (inventio). In civilized countries the right of hunting and fishing is regulated by positive laws and hence may not be exercised ad libitum, or if it is so exercised, entails the duty of making restitution for damage done. Hence the right of occupancy may be exercised:

Very great utility will be in this brief section if it should happen to us to correct the less accurate but very common notion of right, and to dissipate the confusion under which several labor in distinguishing the three virtues of justice.

Definition. Justice, a special cardinal virtue, is a moral virtue by which we are inclined to render to each one his own right.

The Various Notion of Right. 1. Right in the definition is taken objectively, and it is that which belongs to another as his own, i.e. what is owed to someone according to the formal rights which he has as another person coordinated to the same ultimate end.

2. Formal or subjective right is the inviolable autonomy of a person, or of a being existing for itself, in pursuing the proper end on account of which it exists, and the inviolable relation of prevalence or quasi-dominion over things which are destined to the end or good of that person. For the need of the person demands, and the nature of things permits, that certain things be referred to the good of the person as means. These things, understood in the broad sense, are both certain substances, and actions freely to be done by a person, and the performances of others owed to this person as such. To the autonomy of the person corresponds the word I; to the destination of things toward the good of the person, the word Mine; yet we also call our members, body, and own soul mine.

3. Moreover, the nature of the person and of things demands that among these things there be active faculties ¹, to be exercised toward the end of the person, which, by the same title by which the other things of each person are his own, are morally inviolable. Not a few today think that subjective right is defined by an inviolable active faculty, as if by the first essential mark; whence the common description by which subjective right is described: the morally inviolable faculty of a person of having, acting, exacting something (according to the threefold object of right). But those faculties are not always in the persons whose matters are being treated: for several persons (the impubes, moral persons) cannot direct themselves toward the end. They are then in the persons by whom they are directed, as consequences of the office by which they must direct those persons ².

4. Right is also taken for the rule of right, or law; indeed for some whole system of laws: natural, positive, civil, canon law; an expert of law.

5. Indeed it is taken for the very place where law is pronounced: to appear in court.

¹ For my subjective faculty can indeed be an inviolable object to another.

² Some say that faculties are in those incapable persons but are not exercised by them. Certainly, when there is question of a physical faculty, that distinction between potency and act is well understood, nor then does the faculty reside in another. But when the faculty is wholly moral, a faculty without exercise is a faculty which is not had but which would be had if the person were capable. Besides, a moral person never exercises those faculties; and those faculties are possessed by certain physical persons. Shall we say that those faculties exist twice?

Threefold Right in Species, Threefold Justice. Besides physical persons, which are as many in number as there are rational supposits, there exist moral persons, which are constituted by physical persons conspiring into one end and reduced through that end to a certain unity. Two of this kind are perfect: the Church, which exists as an institution of positive divine law; and civil Society, which exists as a natural institution. In relation to those societies, physical persons, not as persons, but through the things which they have, are parts, while societies are the whole. But parts as such are on account of the whole; and the whole in turn is on account of the good of the parts; which is more true here, since those Societies exist on account of the perfection of physical persons.

Now, if a part is on account of the whole, that which is (by right) of the part is of the whole; and similarly, that which is of the whole is of the parts; not immediately, however, but by mediation of the right of the parts or of the whole of which they are immediately.

Therefore right can be immediate right and mediate right; and this latter is of a twofold ratio: for mediate is both that right which the whole has to those things which belong to the parts, and the right which the parts have to those things which belong to the whole.

But as many rights as there are in species, so many justices there are. Therefore there is a justice by which immediate right is rendered: this exists among persons who are, or are considered as, coordinated or equal, and is called commutative. There is also justice by which mediate right is rendered; this, however, is again divided into two species. In one species the parts render what is owed to the community as such, and it is general or legal justice; in the other, the community renders what it owes to the parts, and it is distributive justice.

Right of the Public Order or of Jurisdiction, and Right of the Private Order. The morally inviolable faculty which is found among rights, and is often taken for formal right itself, exists in one way on account of private persons, in another on account of Society. This latter ratio of right is of the public order and is called jurisdiction. Therefore jurisdiction is the public power of ruling a perfect Society, or of directing it to the common good. It is called jurisdiction because it contains the faculty of commanding the members, on account of the common good, various acts of virtues which constitute the necessary cooperation of the members toward the common good: by exercising such a faculty rights are spoken, i.e. defined.

These are the properties of all justice: 1. that it be toward another, i.e. that it satisfy a title which is in another insofar as he is a distinct person; - 2. that it do what it ought, not what it could honestly omit. For its formal honesty is that it satisfy the exigency of right; - 3. that it render the debt to equality, i.e. that it furnish as much as it owes.

On account of the first property, those things must accurately be distinguished which joined persons, e.g. father and son, owe one another insofar as they are joined, and insofar as they are persons. The former offices, in the example brought forward of father and son, will pertain to piety; the latter alone will be ruled either by justice alone or by justice concurring with piety. And in a more general way, those things which I owe to my neighbor insofar as he is another self pertain to charity; insofar as he is a distinct person, they enter the province of justice.

Division of Rights. 1. Looking to the proximate foundation, some rights are absolute, i.e. loosened in their origin from every special relation of persons, or relative, which are founded in special relations of persons ¹.

Looking to the order in which they are found, rights are of the public or private order. Rights of the public order are political rights, or rights of jurisdiction, which give a share of public power; others are called civil or private rights. These again are common rights of the person and citizen in Church and State, public rights; or family rights, which distinguish persons in the family; finally patrimonial rights.

Patrimony is a being of reason by which is designated the sum of rights and obligations which can be estimated by price and consequently have economic value. These are either rights in a thing, which give immediate power over some thing, or rights of credit, which affect the obligation of another, or rights of doing something; e.g. of accepting an inheritance, a donation, of making a will.

A correlative obligation of credit can be something of doing (furnishing work), omitting (not building, not planting), or paying some thing, i.e. of bringing it about that the dominion of some thing be transferred to the creditor. The creditor is then said to have a right to a thing.

Concerning these things cf. Colin and Capitant, I, p. 101-106; Pacifici-Mazzoni, II, n. 1-6. Therefore it is seen that the division of right into right in a thing and right to a thing, even if you attend to merely patrimonial rights, is by no means adequate, although it is very useful. Compared among themselves, right in a thing has an immediate termination in things; right to a thing has an immediate termination to another's action by which the thing becomes mine. By right in a thing I preserve what is already mine; by right to a thing, I exact from another that it become mine, and consequently I acquire. Wherefore right to a thing is called personal right or credit. What is mine is always now determinate in body and can be shown in the individual; what is owed to me can be a thing determined only by genus, e.g. 100 kilograms of wheat, 5000 lire. He who has right in a thing, of itself excludes all others, competes with no one, vindicates the thing everywhere as his own, by an action which is called in rem; he who has right to a thing can exact it by a merely personal action from him who owes, nor is he who is prior creditor necessarily preferred to those posterior.

3. Looking to the perfection of dominion, some are alienable, others inalienable. Alienation causes the right to pass to another or to be extinguished; and it must especially be distinguished from non-use of right, or from non-opposition of right. He who has a right can always validly effect by his consent that the note of injustice against himself be removed from another's act, even an illicit one, so that this always holds: "No injury is done to one consenting." But if the right is inalienable, that consent is always validly revoked, so that the note of injury is restored.

¹ Rather than, with Colin and Capitant, from the persons by whom they are circumscribed, we prefer to divide rights from their proximate foundation. For there is also an office incumbent upon all of not impeding the exercise of rights which from contract oblige Titius to furnish various things; and we would have to distinguish a third, mixed genus. For the family rights of father, husband, and tutor must be observed by all, and at the same time induce special relations between parents and children, between husband and wife, between tutor and ward.

I. Justice, a special cardinal virtue, is a moral virtue by which we are bent to render to each one his own right. In that definition right is taken objectively, or signifies what is owed to another on account of some formal right of his.

II. Formal or subjective right is the inviolable autonomy of the person in the pursuit of his end, and the inviolable relation of prevalence or dominion over things which are ordered to the good of that person. Those things can be substances (which man calls his own), actions freely to be done by a person, and performances of others; and also active faculties to be exercised toward the end of the person. Hence, by the more common but less accurate description of right, subjective right is called the morally inviolable faculty of a person of having, acting, exacting.

Under the name of objective right there also comes the rule of right or law; indeed the whole system or complex of laws: natural law, civil law, an expert of law; and the very place where law is pronounced: to appear in court.

III. In the present order, physical persons, or rational supposits of this world, actually pertain, or ought or can pertain, as parts to two perfect societies (moral persons): the Church and some civil society. But parts, as such, are on account of the whole, while in this case personal dignity is preserved; and the whole in turn is on account of the parts. Hence those things which are of the part are also of the whole, and that by reason of the parts; and those things which are of the whole are also of the parts, by reason of the whole. That is, the parts are on account of the whole with the rights which they have, and similarly the whole is on account of the parts with the rights which it possesses. Therefore those things which immediately are of the parts or of the whole are mediately (because they are of the parts or of the whole) of the whole or of the parts.

Thus it happens that right can be immediate and mediate; but mediate right is of a twofold ratio: the right which the whole has to those things which are of the parts, and the right which the parts have to those things which are of the whole.

But as many rights as there are, so many justices there are. Therefore there is justice which renders immediate right, among persons who are, or are considered as, coordinated or equal: it is called commutative; there is justice which renders the mediate right of the community: general or legal justice; and justice which, residing in the community, renders the mediate right of the parts: distributive justice.

IV. What is owed to the community as such is exacted by a right (taken for an active faculty) of the public order, which is called jurisdiction. This is the public power of ruling society or directing it to the common good.

V. All justice is toward another: satisfying a title which is in another as he is a distinct person; it does what it ought, satisfying the exigency of right, so that all its acts are properly necessary; it equals the debt: as much as it owes it furnishes, neither more nor less.

VI. Division of rights. 1. Looking to their proximate foundation, some rights are relative, others absolute, according as they are, or are not, founded in a special relation of persons.

2. Looking to the order in which they are found, they are of the public order: political or jurisdictional; or of the private order: private or civil rights, whether they define the common condition of citizens in Church or State, as public rights; or their proper condition in the family: family rights; or affect their proper economic condition: patrimonial rights. The complex of rights and obligations of that order is called patrimony.

Patrimonial rights are either rights in a thing, which confer immediate power over some thing; or rights of doing, and rights of credit: these oblige another to do or omit something, or to transfer the dominion of some thing, in which case the creditor is said to have right to a thing. Right in a thing is protected by action in rem; right to a thing, by action in personam (a condiction) against the debtor, and can be removed by a more powerful right of another, e.g. in the thing itself.

3. Looking to the perfection of dominion, some rights are alienable, others inalienable. Alienation, which transfers a right, must especially be distinguished from mere non-use or non-opposition of right, which gives place to the proverb: "No injury is done to one consenting."

I. Justice is perfected by the virtue of Equity. That virtue, midway between justice and charity, and a potential part of justice, bends the soul to the human use of right.

It is a certain mitigation of strict right; - it observes in another some imperfect title to obtaining something, as when, beyond the promises of a contract, one divides a part of extraordinary profit among the workers, and thus shows himself nearer to justice than to charity.

We call that use of right human which is becoming to be employed by man, with attention to the term of right, which is another man bound by the office of justice.

From its genus, equity does not oblige under grave sin, because the title which it observes in another is imperfect, and the defect of equity proceeds not from some hatred of neighbor but from an excessive affection for one's own right.

When it is violated without injury of right, it induces no debt of restitution.

From that special virtue you ought to distinguish the equitable interpretation and application of right which is owed by the judge from office, and the benign interpretation of law, contrary to the words but according to the mind of the legislator, which is called epiikia or epikeia and is also prudently permitted to a private man.

II. Justice is perfected by the virtue of Liberality. , which, moderating the love of money, makes us easy and prompt to spend it when reason dictates.

Especially when that reason is mercy and beneficence, the virtue procures such a use of material goods as is demanded by their first destination.

III. Justice is perfected by the virtue of Gratitude. , which equalizes, with the affection of the benefactor, the will of him who has been moved by the benefit.

This is a certain justice common to the rich and to the needy. While the question concerned restitution, the question was about compensation of a damage of a higher order through a material return. Gratitude understands, in the material benefit, the affection of the giver, and, transcending the material benefit, strives to equalize the affection.

IV. Justice is perfected by the very virtue of Charity. For since the observance of rights is, as it were, the first condition of peace among men, justice can be considered as a certain beginning of friendship, which queen charity leads to the summit of unity with God and neighbor.

Conclusion. In order that we might consult for the weaker, we proposed what can be tolerated in rigor, while the substance of justice is preserved; but we did not pass over in silence what is more honorable.

There is a certain common or lowest probity, which refuses strict servitude to exterior things, yet does not know how to reject even anxious solicitude. Wherefore it carries a divided heart and attains only imperfect peace.

But there is also eminent probity, which meditates triumphing over external things.

This admits nothing even merely suspect, neither in the thing nor in the mode. By the complete repudiation of servitude it attains perfect liberty.

But if you consider what force there is in concupiscences for tempting man; what most praiseworthy affections, as of piety toward children, sometimes seem to advise less straight ways; what human confusions can sometimes be avoided only by fraud, while, on the contrary, the greatest worldly rewards are promised to a less scrupulous boldness, we shall easily understand that that exquisite probity communicates its nobility only to a few, and can scarcely be acquired without the power of the Most High. Wherefore St. Paul, in the Epistle to the Galatians, V, 22. 23, where he enumerates the fruits of the Holy Spirit, ascribes the more perfect honesty itself^(*) to the possession of the Holy Spirit.

Therefore let us inculcate and promote better and more perfect honesty by public preaching and private counsels. The good of the Church demands this, whose faithful ought to edify others by more perfect virtue; the greater and happier order of the state demands this; the peace and happiness of one's own conscience demands this.

But that our exhortation may be efficacious, let us at the same time strive to raise souls to that holy love of God by which, made superior to earthly things, we may pursue the highest justice, which consists in perfectly fulfilling the divine will and of which it has been said:

"Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice"!

I. Justice is perfected by the human use of rights, to which the virtue of equity inclines, so that a man, on account of a reasonable cause, exacts less than he strictly could; and recognizes in others even imperfect titles to obtaining something. That virtue occupies a middle place between justice and charity.

II. Justice is perfected by liberality, which uses exterior things according to their first destination.

III. Justice is perfected by gratitude, which tries to equalize the affection of the benefactor.

IV. Finally, justice is perfected by charity itself. For because the observance of rights is the condition of peace which charity makes intimate, it can be considered as friendship begun, which queen charity itself leads to the summit of unity with God and neighbor.

More perfect justice is numbered among the fruits of the Holy Spirit.

(*) By the name of goodness, ἀγαθωσύνη, probity is designated.

In this first section we shall treat 1. of right itself, which is the proper object of the virtue of justice, and which it is of much importance to understand rightly; for several false notions of right also harm Catholic Moral Theology and are not only errors in juridical science. 2. The character of the virtue of justice in general must be explained. 3. But since man, from frailty or malice, often wounds the obligations imposed from justice, it is then necessary to treat both of the wounding and of the reparation of justice. 4. Finally, because a great part of the obligations of justice arises from contracts entered into, lastly it is necessary to treat of contracts. Thus the whole treatise concerning the virtue of justice itself is contained in the four following questions:

1. On right itself.
2. On the virtue of justice considered in itself.
3. On the wounding of justice and on the reparation of wounded justice.
4. On contracts.

1. Notion. The name of right is taken in various ways; but among the various acceptions of right the following seem to be more notable for us:

1. The sentence or decree of the judge. Whence the judge says the right, when he pronounces a judicial sentence.

2. Law, or rather the complex of laws, by which it is determined what is just. In this sense we say: canon law, civil law, to study law, etc. Many authors call right accepted in this sense right taken objectively, and they attribute to it those things which pertain to laws.²

3. That which is just and which is owed to someone (δίκαιον). In this sense we say: to render to someone his right. This right is also called passive right, and it is the proper object of the virtue of justice, since justice is the constant and perpetual will of rendering to each one his right.

4. A moral faculty or power of doing, having, demanding, omitting something, etc.³ In this sense we say: someone uses his own right, the right of property. Concerning this last acception of right, which is also called active right or right taken subjectively, we shall chiefly treat in this chapter.

The given definition is explained. It is said, first: a moral faculty; therefore right is not a physical faculty, or a physical fact, as several non-Catholics have taught. Hence the following propositions were condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX:⁴ Prop. 59: "Right consists in a material fact, ... and all human facts have the force of right." Prop. 61: "A fortunate injustice of fact brings no detriment to the sanctity of right." Therefore true right arises from natural law alone, or from that positive law which is conformable to natural or divine law; but it is false that civil government can concede some right contrary to natural or divine law. Therefore in the same Syllabus the proposition defended by the Positivists was deservedly condemned (39): "The status of the republic, as being the origin and source of all rights, is endowed with a certain right circumscribed by no limits."⁵

It is said, second: of doing something, etc.; from which words it follows that a right belonging to some man produces in others a strict debt or obligation not to violate that right. Right (Recht) and debt (Pflicht) are correlatives. But if nevertheless another wounds the right of another and despises his own debt, then he commits a true punishable injustice. Both, namely human right and debt, are ultimately derived from eternal law, since it is the source and principle of all other laws, rights, and duties. Hence it can be said briefly: there is no right without debt; there is no debt without God.

Note. The assertion of several Positivist jurists cited above, that the republic is the origin and source of all rights, was deservedly proscribed by Pius IX; for this assertion is not only most false,⁶ but in reality heretical, because it denies that natural and divine rights precede the very existence of the republic; moreover, it is injurious toward the native dignity of man, because it hands the individual man over into the narrow servitude of the state. Hence St. Thomas⁷ says forcefully: "Written [human] law, just as it does not give force to natural right, so neither can it diminish or take away its force, because neither can the will of man change nature."

The three acceptions of right enumerated above under nn. 2, 3, 4 can be coordinated in the following schema:

Corollary. From what has been said it follows that rights do not belong to animals, because they are not endowed with moral faculties. Therefore no one ever commits injustice properly so called against an animal. For this reason theologians are accustomed to say briefly: animals are indeed an object, but not a subject of right.⁹

² Although those things which are predicated of this objective right can also ordinarily be predicated of law, nevertheless objective right and law are not altogether the same. Wherefore St. Thomas says: "Law is not right, properly speaking, but a certain account of right" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2; "The law is not the Right, but a norm of Right"). Hence not all laws can properly be called right, but only those which are concerned with passive right; for example, police laws are incongruously called police right; the law of loving oneself or one's neighbor is not right.

³ In German it is said: authorization (Befugnis) (cf. Gopfert, Moraltheol. II, § 74).

⁴ Denz. n. 1759, 1761.

⁵ Denz. n. 1739.

⁶ Cf. Cathrein, Moralphil. I, § 3, 1.

⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 5 ad 1.

⁸ Ground of right, laws of right, norms of right.

⁹ Cf. Gopfert, l.c.

2. Divisions Of Right. Among the multiple divisions of subjective right, the following seem to be the more principal:

1. By reason of origin, right is divided into natural, positive-divine, and human. Natural right is the moral faculty, belonging to man from the very principles of human nature, of doing, demanding, etc., something;¹⁰ for example, the right of defending one's own life, the right of possessing goods, etc. Positive-divine right is that faculty which belongs to man by force of a special divine decree; for example, the right of receiving the sacraments, the right of hearing the Gospel. Human right, which again is divided into ecclesiastical and civil, is that which emanates either from ecclesiastical law or from civil law. Thus parishioners have a right that the pastor administer the sacraments to them; citizens of the state, however, have a right that they be protected as to life and goods by the civil government.

Natural rights are either innate¹¹ or adventitious,¹² according as they arise of themselves from birth itself or from some contingent fact. An innate right is, for example, the right of children to receive suitable support from parents. An adventitious right is, for example, the right which someone acquires by the purchase of some thing. Natural right, and the same holds for positive right, is also divided into abdicable right,¹³ for example, the right to some possession, and inabdicable right;¹⁴ for example, a husband cannot abdicate his right over his wife, so that another may licitly live with her maritally.

Finally, natural right is divided into natural right strictly so called and the right of nations, which comprises conclusions necessarily deduced from natural right and therefore observed among all nations. The right of nations, therefore, is as it were a middle between natural right and civil right. Moreover, the right of nations is not always taken in the same sense.¹⁵

2. By reason of effect, strict right and non-strict right are distinguished. Strict right is that which is so closely connected with man that it cannot be taken away from him without manifest injury. A right of this kind is, for example, the right of legitimate property. For when someone takes away my legitimate property from me, he wounds my strict right and is held to repair the wounded justice. Non-strict, or broad, or imperfect right is that whose wounding does not constitute injustice properly so called, but a certain inconvenience more or less grave. The common poor man has a non-strict right to alms; a man who has deserved well of the republic has a non-strict right to honors, etc. Sometimes strict right is also divided against equitable right, which is then taken as a certain correction of excessively hard positive right, and which attends rather to the mind of the legislator than to the letter of the law. Cf. what was said above, I, n. 231, concerning epikeia.

3. Strict right is subdivided into ius in re and ius ad rem. This division is very celebrated both in ecclesiastical law and in civil law. Ius in re, or real right,¹⁶ is that by which someone enjoys some thing already legitimately existing, at least in some way, in his disposition. But what conditions are necessary in order that some thing be legitimately in the disposition of someone is usually determined by positive laws.¹⁷ This right confers a real action, that is, an action which immediately reaches the thing itself, wherever finally this thing may be found, for example, if someone has a mortgage over some thing.

Ius ad rem,¹⁸ or personal right or acquired right, is that which someone has so that some thing not yet possessed may become his. This right gives a personal action,¹⁹ which immediately reaches the person detaining the thing and only mediately the thing itself. Hence if someone has only ius ad rem, he cannot occupy that thing, but must first, if this is possible, call into judgment the person who detains the thing and refuses to hand it over; for example, if Peter owes me 1000 francs, I cannot licitly take away an equal value from him, but I must first demand from him the return of the money owed. Thus at least ordinarily. Ius ad rem is therefore the way to ius in re.²⁰

¹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 2. Concerning other acceptions of natural right less customary today, see Suppl. q. 65, a. 1 ad 4. That natural right truly exists is denied by some modern jurists, but it was already admitted in the Code of Justinian and manifestly follows from the existence of natural law; cf. above I, 152.

¹¹ Innate right.

¹² Acquired right.

¹³ Alienable right.

¹⁴ Inalienable right.

¹⁵ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 95, a. 4; 2, 2, q. 57, a. 3; Cathrein, Moralphil. I, 8, 6, § 2.

¹⁶ Real right, right in a thing.

¹⁷ Cf., for example, Cod. civ. Germ. § 854 sqq.

¹⁸ Right of claim.

¹⁹ Personal right of action.

²⁰ Cf. especially Gopfert, Moraltheol. II, 51 b; or Tanquerey, De iustitia n. 18; or Muller, Theol. mor. II, § 93.

3. On dominion.²¹ Ius in re is also called dominion, which is commonly defined: the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own.

It is said, first: legitimate faculty, that is, a faculty granted by right, whether natural or positive. Therefore a man having dominion over some thing can dispose of it only within the limits placed by law. Hence a rich man dissipating his own goods does not indeed sin against commutative justice nor against positive right, but he sins against natural right, committing the sin of prodigality, which indeed is against liberality, which is a potential part of justice.

It is said, second: of disposing of some thing as one's own. Therefore curators and dispensers of things belonging to another do not have dominion over those things, since they do not dispose of their own things but of another's. The exercise of this faculty of disposing is sometimes bound by civil law or statute; for example, children cannot dispose of their own goods.

Divisions Of Dominion. Dominion has received many divisions, of which the principal are the following:

a) Divine dominion and human dominion.

To God there belongs, by the title of creation and conservation, the most perfect dominion, according to that saying: "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all who dwell therein."²² By delegation from God, dominion belongs to man, who therefore cannot use it according to his own will, but according to the will of God delegating. Man is the steward of God. Human dominion is subdivided into:

b) Full dominion and semi-full dominion.

The first is the perfect faculty of disposing both of the thing itself and of its fruits. The other is the faculty of disposing either of the thing or of its fruits. But this semi-full dominion is subdivided a) into radical, or direct, or naked dominion, if someone indeed retains the ownership of the thing, but does not have free disposition either of the thing itself or of its fruits;²³ and b) into indirect or useful dominion, which extends either to the proper use of the thing and its fruits, with the substance of the thing preserved, without the fruits of the thing being able to be alienated, and then it is called use (Gebrauch); or it extends to total dominion of the fruits, even with the faculty of alienating them, while nevertheless the substance of the thing itself is preserved, and then there is usufruct (Niessbrauch). These two modes of dominion especially have place in contracts of leasing, emphyteusis, etc. Use and usufruct legitimately obtained introduce certain rights and debts both for the owner of the thing and for him who has useful dominion. The civil laws of each region must be attended to.²⁴ Generally speaking, the usufructuary has full dominion of all fruits which in any way arise from the thing. Treasures perhaps found in that thing are excepted,²⁵ since they are not properly fruits of the thing. But the usufructuary is held to pay annual taxes, which are considered to be burdens of the fruits; he is held to preserve the thing in the state in which he received it, and therefore he must make small repairs. Greater repairs, however, must be made by the owner himself. Then he is held to administer the thing as a good father of a family.

c) High dominion and low dominion.

The first is that which the supreme legitimate power has of disposing, sometimes from grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community. The other is the dominion of private persons, to which the definition given above applies. High dominion²⁶ is not dominion properly so called, since the supreme legitimate power is not a mistress possessing the goods of all subjects, nor can it convert them to its own advantage. Such high dominion may not licitly be exercised unless a) the true necessity of the community demands it, b) equivalent compensation has been given, and one subject is not burdened more than another. High dominion is exercised not rarely in our days in so-called expropriations for the construction of railroads and other roads.

To low dominion, which sometimes is also called private dominion,²⁷ there is opposed community of goods. Since in our days Socialism proclaims with a loud voice that private dominion is nothing other than theft, and that community of goods must be established, it is necessary here to say a few things:

On The Origin And Licitness Of Property And Private Dominion

²¹ Right of ownership, right of disposal, droit de propriete.

²² Ps. 23:1.

²³ Dominion of this kind, radical dominion, is had, for example, by religious over their goods after simple profession, and generally by all to whom free disposition of their own goods is forbidden by law, as, for example, wards.

²⁴ Cf. Cod. civ. Germ. § 1030 sqq.; Cod. civ. Gall. art. 578 sqq.

²⁵ Cod. civ. Germ. § 1040; cf. below n. 46.

²⁶ Superior ownership right, haut domaine, right of expropriation.

²⁷ Private ownership right.

4. Authors do not agree whence private dominion first arose. Some (Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf) wish that it arose from a social pact, by which men agreed that goods previously common to all would thereafter be divided among individuals. Others (Hobbes, Montesquieu, Bentham, several moderns) teach that the division of goods was first made by civil law. Others, namely modern Socialists, teach that the division of goods was introduced by violent occupation, so that the stronger, having overcome the weaker, violently and unjustly occupied goods previously common. Others have devised still other theories.²⁸

These opinions being left aside, it is better and more correct to distinguish in this matter the question of right and the question of fact. Certainly, sometimes private dominion was made by first occupation, as when inhabitants arrived in a land up to that point uninhabited. Sometimes, however, private dominion is constituted by civil law, as when the civil government assigns lands to be cultivated to certain farmers. Finally, sometimes the division of properties was made from a social pact, as we read in Sacred Scripture concerning the division of lands between Abraham and Lot.²⁹ But as to the question of right, without doubt private dominion (circumscribed by just limits) follows as a conclusion from natural law itself, not indeed in the sense that community of goods is directly against natural law,³⁰ but that, all circumstances considered, for the most part it is not so conformable to natural law. This is explained in this way by the Angelic Doctor:³¹ a) Because each person is more solicitous in procuring something which belongs to himself alone than that which is common to all or to many. For care concerning things exacts fatiguing labor, and if one must labor for the common good, many shrink back from the fatigue. b) Because human affairs are treated in a more orderly way if to each person there is incumbent the proper care of procuring some thing; but there would be confusion if each one indiscriminately procured anything whatever. c) For the preservation of peace. Hence we see that many and frequent quarrels arise among those who possess one and the same thing in common.

Deservedly, therefore, Leo XIII said in the Encyclical Rerum novarum: "To possess things privately as one's own is a right given to man by nature." Pius X proposed the same doctrine in the Motu proprio of 18 Dec. 1903 (Prop. 5). But if St. Thomas (and with him several theologians) teaches that private dominion was introduced from the ius gentium, under the name of the ius gentium he does not understand the so-called international law of peoples, but a right derived from natural law itself.³² Behold his words: "In another way something is naturally commensurate with another, not according to the absolute account of itself, but according to something which follows from it, for example the property of possessions; for if this field be considered absolutely, it has nothing by which it should be this man's rather than that man's; but if it be considered in respect to the suitability of cultivating it and to the peaceful use of the field, according to this it has a certain commensuration to this, that it be of one man and not of another."³³ And the same Angelic Doctor says: "Those things belong to the ius gentium which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from principles."³⁴ From all these things it is manifestly drawn out that private dominion is something licit, but Communism preached by the Socialists must be rejected.

²⁸ Cathrein enumerates seven diverse theories (Moralphilos. II, 44).

²⁹ Gen. 13:8 sqq.

³⁰ Hence St. Thomas says: "The property of possessions is not against natural law, but is superadded to natural law through the devising of human reason" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 2 ad 1).

³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 2. Franc. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Sozialismus (1895) 7 sqq., and Franc. Schaub, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus (1898) 259 sqq., wrote more broadly concerning this matter.

³² Concerning the diverse acceptions of the ius gentium, cf. Cathrein, Moralphil. I, 8, 6, § 2.

³³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 3.

³⁴ Ibid. 1, 2, q. 95, a. 4.

5. Scholion. On The Enemies Of Private Dominion. That private dominion is illicit and therefore to be abolished was taught by: a) the Apostolics (Apotacticae, Renuntiators), asserting that a man cannot be saved unless, after the example of the apostles, he lives free from any possession;³⁵ b) the Manichaeans, saying that to possess fields, houses, and money is illicit;³⁶ c) the Waldenses and Albigenses, teaching that at least perfect men must renounce every possession. But especially with all their strength there fight against private dominion: d) modern Socialists and Communists.

Modern Socialism is usually joined with Anarchism, with Indifferentism in matters touching religion, indeed almost always with a fight against every positive religion. In present times Socialism widely rages almost everywhere on earth and grows day by day. Although the Socialists are divided among themselves, nevertheless almost all agree in the principle stated by Karl Marx: Capital is pure and putrid theft, because it has been born from the retention of that money which was owed to workers for their labors. Likewise the following demands are proposed by all Socialists:

1. The right of choosing deputies completely general both for men and for women (from the twentieth year of age).

2. The right of choosing all superiors and officials of the state.

3. Religion is a private matter, that is, each person should exercise the religion which he prefers.

4. A lay school without religious instruction.

5. Separation of Church from State.

6. Abolition of all indirect taxes.³⁷

Things To Be Noted For Practice. Certainly it is not forbidden that workers and other men of lesser condition strive by any legitimate means both to have a better wage and favorably to raise their condition; nevertheless it is never licit to employ means forbidden by Catholic moral Theology in order to obtain that end. Several associations imbued with Christian principles already exist for improving the lot of workers. The priest must cautiously and prudently foster associations of this kind; but all workers must be deterred from socialist associations and especially communist ones, since these, as mournful experience bears witness, almost always ruin the religion and good morals of workers, and do not make their material lot better. Hence the priest with all his strength should teach workers that private dominion is licit, and that the possessions of the rich are not always theft; that one must labor in the sweat of his brow, as already after the fall of Adam was foretold by God to the whole human race; that true human happiness is not situated in great possessions, but in the good use of material things, and that it is better to need less than to have more, as St. Augustine says. Above all he should also promote the fervent exercise of religion both among the rich and among workers. For because charity has grown cold, thence hardness has arisen among the rich. But since faith has become tepid among all, thence workers no longer with all their strength long for eternal happiness, but through right and wrong seek earthly happiness and are carried away by monstrous passions.

Socialism does not everywhere have the same degree of perversity, whence the circumstances of individual regions must be considered. But generally speaking, all who freely and positively adhere to the sect of the Socialists (and a fortiori of the Communists) are not worthy of sacramental absolution unless they seriously promise to leave that sect as soon as they can. More mildly can those be treated who adhere to the Socialists not freely but compelled by grave fear, and not actively but merely passively. For if these seriously promise the confessor faithfully to observe the precepts of religion and to guard against scandal according to their powers, they can receive the sacraments. Nevertheless they must gradually, according to their powers, separate themselves from the socialist sect. Several authors, such as Heiner, D'Annibale, Ballerini-Palmieri, etc., teach that positive socialists fall into the excommunication laid upon those who plot against civil or ecclesiastical power. Whatever may be said of this opinion,³⁸ this is certain: socialists greatly harm the Catholic religion.

³⁵ Cf. St. Epiphanius, Adv. haer. 61; St. Augustine, De haer. 40; St. John Damascene, De haer. 61; see also Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlex., s. v. "Apostoliker."

³⁶ Cf. St. Augustine, De mor. eccl. l. 1, c. 35, n. 78.

³⁷ The history and diverse forms of Socialism may be seen in Tanquerey, Theol. mor.: De virtute Iustit., n. 54 sqq.

³⁸ Cf. below in the treatise on censures, III 516.

719. In the fourth precept we saw how man must have himself specially toward neighbor who is superior to him. In the six last precepts of the Decalogue we shall set forth the duties which must be observed toward EQUAL neighbors. There almost all things are ruled by strict or commutative justice. Among these duties the greatest is this, that neighbor not be harmed in his own person, as to the consistency of the person and the conservation of life. Therefore the precept concerning not killing comes here very fittingly.

This precept is formally negative, virtually affirmative.

1. Insofar as it is negative, it PROHIBITS directly and primarily homicide, or the unjust killing of a man; but indirectly and consequently every unjust harming of neighbor in the goods of the body through mutilation, incarceration, beating, duel, war, etc. - It also prohibits all those things which proximately dispose to harm of this kind, such as hatred, anger, vengeance, and imprecations, which deservedly are called homicides of the heart and mouth (cf. n. 498).

It prohibits besides suicide, and unjust mutilation of oneself; and finally drunkenness, by which the use of reason, and therefore the proper life of man, is harmed.

2. But insofar as this precept is virtually affirmative, it COMMANDS that we conserve our own and another's life in all licit ways, have peace with all, and patiently bear all inconveniences (cf. n. 476 seqq.).

Therefore there must be discussed: 1. justice and injury in general; - 2. homicide and its species; - 3. duel and war; - 4. suicide and drunkenness.³

Here there is treatment of commutative justice alone, to which injury and injustice are properly opposed. As regards other things, see n. 398.

Since justice is concerned solely with right, the notion of right must necessarily be premised; then the notion of strict justice.

720. Definition. Right is taken in a threefold way: 1. For law, which is the rule of what is just in general: in which sense we say natural right, divine positive right, canonical right, etc. Thus it is the foundation of right in the second sense. - 2. For a legitimate faculty which belongs to someone for doing something freely, or having something for his own convenience. It is active right, in which sense we are said to have a right to something. This is the foundation of right in the third sense. - 3. For that which is just, or owed to another, which therefore has a moral relation with another thing or person. It is passive right, which is the object of justice (Willems, Phil. mor., III, p. 207).

From these things you will gather: 1. Right in one supposes obligation in another, and conversely. Wherefore, in society, all rights depend on one another, to constitute order, nor are they ever really opposed to themselves. Right against right is not given.

2. The ultimate reason of every right is rooted in the obligation of attaining the ULTIMATE END. For by this very fact that some end is to be pursued and obtained, man has a right to those means without which this end cannot be obtained. But all ends are contained under the ultimate end as means to it.

3. Since this obligation of attaining the end is personal, it necessarily involves the faculty of using earthly things independently of another. For whatever is touched, apprehended, or changed by man receives as it were the seal of his person: from this comes the distinction between mine and thine. It will always belong to justice, the tendency toward the end being presupposed, to preserve those things by which mine and thine are distinguished from each other; but it belongs rather to charity, which considers itself in another, to join and unite.

Division. We can distinguish:

1. Right CONCERNING PERSONS, that is, the right which belongs to one person over another; and it is defined: A legitimate power of governing subjects for THEIR convenience.

Of this kind is: a) dominative right of private authority, for example of father over children, husband over wife; - b) right of jurisdiction of public power, which is ordered especially to the common good. Concerning these there has already been discussion.

2. Right CONCERNING GOODS, which is defined: A legitimate faculty of having or doing something for ONE'S OWN convenience. It is imperfect or perfect.

IMPERFECT right, not strict, right improperly such, is that which is not determined, whether in itself, or as regards persons, nor can be demanded by way of coercion. Such is, for example, the right of individuals to alms left by a testator to the poor in general; the right which the worthy have to obtaining functions or offices of the community, etc. (Carriere, de Just., n. 10).

PERFECT right, strict, coercible, right properly such, is that which is determined, both in itself and as regards persons, and can be demanded by way of coercion.¹ Such is the right of defending one's life or reputation, of recovering one's own thing, etc. It is subdivided into right to a thing and right in a thing, as will be explained below (cf. n. 839). - Perfect right is the object of strict justice.

See other distinctions in Lessius, l. c., c. 2.

721. • STRICT or COMMUTATIVE justice is a moral virtue constantly inclining the will to render to each one his own strict right, according to equality of thing to thing.

It is said 1. To render to each one; that is, either positively, when between two persons some contract or quasi-contract has intervened, or some action by which the right of either one has at least materially been violated; or negatively, by harming no one: for as he who renders to another the thing owed, so he who does not take it away is judged to render to him his own right.

2. To each one, private or moral person, his own strict right, that is, right objectively and passively taken, and indeed rigorous, in the sense which will be declared below (n. 723, 724).

3. According to equality of thing to thing, that is, through commensuration of the thing which must be rendered with the right of another (cf. n. 383).

This virtue differs: a) from natural love of neighbor. For love wills the good of another as the good of the beloved, and from complacence in him; but justice wills that good as owed and from simple rectitude of the will; - b) from charity toward neighbor: both because the material object of charity is the person of neighbor, but of justice the right which belongs to neighbor; and especially because the formal object of charity is God Himself, but of justice that special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own right, to equality. Cf. n. 478; - c) from legal and distributive justice, which do not regard strict right, as is plain from what was said n. 400.

722. Definition. Injury is the violation of another's right. - Strictly taken, as in this article, it is the violation of another's perfect right. But injury contains offense and damage. Offense is repaired by satisfaction; damage by restitution.

INJUSTICE has itself toward injury as a habit toward an act, and is an inclination to not rendering to each one his own right.

Division. Injury is: 1. By reason of the act itself, merely internal, or external. Merely internal, intentional, if by thought or purpose the right of neighbor is harmed, for example if someone judges rashly concerning neighbor, or adds to an act which can be good, for example taking away a book in jest, an evil intention, the mind of stealing. It is external, if by an external harmful action the strict right of neighbor is violated, for example by burning a house, and similar things. See n. 726 and 727.

2. By reason of the mode of acting, positive or negative, according as someone inflicts it either by commission, by acting against another's right, or by omission, by omitting to do what is owed to another by strict right.

3. By reason of imputability, material or formal. MATERIAL injury is an involuntary harming of another's right. FORMAL injury is an unjust action or omission, with the mind of harming directly or indirectly: directly, if the harm is intended; indirectly, if it is foreseen when the cause is posited, and permitted.

723. Principles. I. For the notion of injury, whether material or formal, it is required that it be involuntary on the part of the one suffering, that is, against his right will. Rule 27 of law in the Sixth agrees: "To one knowing and consenting no injury is done." The reason is that he who can and wishes to yield his right does not retain it, and therefore no injury is inflicted on him. Besides, no one receives injury from himself; therefore if someone assents that another harm him, it is just as if he himself inflicted harm on himself (St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 59, a. 3).

Hence: 1. Injury is done to him who consents to his own damage not freely, but from force, fraud, or fear unjustly struck in; as also to him who cannot validly renounce his right, because some law or the right of another stands in the way; for in this case at least the higher right is truly violated.

2. Notwithstanding the consent of the one suffering, injury is done: to the traveler who from fear of death hands money to a robber; to the buyer paying for merchandise beyond the highest price; to the worker who in necessity accepts a lesser salary; to the one giving money to him who fraudulently asserts that he is his blood relative, etc.; for none of these is judged to give freely. See however n. 1051.

3. Likewise, injury is done to the cleric who is struck, even if he consents; to the ward who consents that he be deprived of his right; to the husband of a woman committing adultery, even if he approves her adulteries; to martyrs, even if they gladly bear slaughter; indeed also to men themselves who ask to be killed, as unhappy Saul asked; because in all these the right is inalienable, nor can it ever be yielded without injury to others.

724. • II. For the notion of formal injury, it is required besides that it be voluntary on the part of the agent. For the primary reason of formal injury is the mind of harming, since injury without such a mind is only material (Lugo, disp. 8, n. 58; St. Alph., III, n. 551, 556).

Hence, formal injury does not extend more widely than the mind of harming. This again does not extend more widely than knowledge of the damage, because the will cannot choose what is thoroughly and invincibly unknown.

Therefore formal injury is not to be estimated from the damage which followed, but from knowledge of the damage, at least foreseen confusedly; and thus it can happen that it exists as less than the damage: for example, he who destroys a gem of the price of ten gold coins, which he thinks to be worth only five, inflicts an injury of five gold coins only, and the other five are to be referred only to material injury (cf. n. 950).

725. III. Injury is a grave sin from its genus. For it is gravely opposed to right reason and divine law.

We have said: from its genus; whence smallness of matter is admitted in this matter. Moreover, that matter is judged grave which from its nature, or from the common estimation of men, is apt to cause another sadness difficult to quiet, or great damage, or to dissolve mutual charity (Reuter, de Just., P. III, n. 294).

726. IV. Formal injury, the effect having followed, induces the obligation of restitution. Commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing. Whence it must demand the reparation of the harming of rights, if any has been made, and indeed by restitution; because otherwise equality is not had. In other words: as long as inequality remains, so long remains the obligation of reducing equality. Hence, he who does not restore, when he can, sins by preserving inequality, as he sinned by inducing it (cf. n. 924).

It is said: the effect having followed; for injurious acts merely internal do not oblige to external reparation.

727. A fuller explanation of certain things. I. THE SENSE OF THE AXIOMS: To one knowing and consenting no injury is done; to one unwilling unreasonably no injury is done.

Note. The axiom He who is silent seems to consent was explained above (n. 272).

a) The sense of the first is: To him who is not deceived, provided he freely, force and madness being excluded, positively, validly, perseveringly grants the harmful action, as remitting something from his own right, injury is not done, that is, a harmful action containing the formal notion of violated right is not committed against him. From this it does not follow that the action becomes licit, and that the other acquires certain rights; it follows only that the action lacks the guilt of formal injustice. Thus St. Thomas, Lessius, and others. Cf. Vermeersch, de Just., n. 142-155.

b) The sense of the second is: No formal injustice is present if neighbor, from strict justice, is held to yield his right, and does not wish to. But formal injustice is given if neighbor, from motives only of charity, gratitude, and the like, is held to yield, and refuses to do this. - In doubt, consent is presumed, since someone is always supposed to wish to act according to right reason.

Thus indeed the authors commonly. Nevertheless, as Vermeersch says, l. c., they also commonly admit certain exceptions, for example in the case in which someone defers restitution because of fear of danger for himself or his own, see below n. 1018. Therefore there are circumstances in which, from charity only or from epikeia, the owner ought to be willing and consenting; and yet no injury is present if one does not comply with him refusing (cf. n. 987).

II. CONCERNING AN ACTION WITH HARMFUL INTENTION. There is not one mind of authors concerning the question: Whether intention added to an external act makes this act become unjust.

What things are commonly admitted we shall indicate here.

a) If the action does not of itself harm the undoubted right of another, it does not become unjust from the intention of harming. If the intention is conceived from hatred, or from vengeance, anger, etc., it indeed adds sin, but not formal injury. Hence, they do not act unjustly: the lustful master who dismisses a modest maidservant, we suppose the conditions of the pact to have been observed; a judge condemning a homicide from hatred; a fellow citizen who from hatred refuses to succor another, except if by office he were held to this. Cf. Lugo, disp. 19, n. 110. See what is to be said n. 949.

b) If the action is indifferent, it can become unjust through intention, namely insofar as precisely the intention gives the species and nature of injury to the action. Thus to take a thing from the hands of a thief, with the intention of restoring it, is something good; but with the intention of retaining it, is something unjust.

c) If the action includes force or fraud in itself, a special intention directed against someone can effect that also with respect to this person it become unjust. Thus he who kills a man precisely so that creditors may be deprived of the obtaining of a just good acts unjustly also toward the creditors. Thus St. Alphonsus, III, n. 633, 634; ed. G., II, p. 111, with Lugo, Salmant.

As regards the last, there is disagreement of authors; see in Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1180, note. They rely on this reason, that intention cannot render unjust what from its nature does not harm strict right.

GENERAL DIVISION. There are as many species of injuries as there are goods or rights in which neighbor can be harmed. But four goods of man are numbered: 1. goods of one's own life, namely of body and soul, concerning which now; - 2. goods of modesty and of the life of the species, concerning which in the sixth precept; - 3. goods of fortune, concerning which in the seventh precept; - 4. finally goods of reputation and honor, concerning which discussion must be instituted in the eighth precept (cf. n. 324, 528).

That is, 1° concerning the general notions of justice and right; 2° concerning the principal species of right.

580. Definition. - The name of justice is used in a multiple sense, even in Sacred Scripture, and signifies 1° the complex of all virtues; 2° charity or sanctifying grace; 3° generally a right act; 4° any good habit; 5° finally the special virtue from the four cardinal virtues, which is defined by St. Thomas¹ as "a habit according to which someone by a constant and perpetual will renders to each one his right."

It is said 1°: "a habit," or a constant and perpetual will, as the definition pursues. Cf. n. 247.

It is said 2°: "by will"; for this is the subject of justice: "for we are not called just from the fact that we know something rightly" (namely what is to be rendered to each one), "... but we are called just from this, that we do something rightly" (or that we actually render to another his own right): "but the proximate principle of act is the appetitive power"; in the present matter not the sensitive, but the rational, power, or the will.¹

It is said 3°: "his right," i.e. the very thing which is owed to each one. Hence "it is proper to justice, among" or besides "the other virtues, that it order man in those things which are toward another":² and therefore "the proper operations of justice are exterior operations according as they are ordered to another."³ For "justice imports a certain equality, as the name itself shows; for those things which are made equal are commonly said to be adjusted; but equality is toward another."⁴ Wherefore someone can be called just toward himself only metaphorically.⁵

It is said 4°: "renders": namely by conserving the right of another, or not injuring it, or, if it has been injured, by repairing it.

581. Division. - The subjective parts, or species, of justice are general justice, which is also called legal, and particular justice, which is divided into commutative and distributive. For in however many ways someone can be compared to another, so many species of justice must there be. But as far as the present matter is concerned, someone can be related to another in three ways: namely either as a part to the whole, as a citizen to the city; or as part to part, as citizen to citizen; or as the whole to a part, as a Superior or city to subjects. The justice which makes man right or just in the first way is called general and legal: general indeed, because it pursues and intends the good of the city or republic, which is a certain general good; but legal because it strives toward that general good through law, whose function it is to procure the common good.¹ The justice which rightly disposes man compared to man in the second way is called commutative; for it is concerned with contracts, exchanges, and commerce, which are accustomed to be exercised between private persons. Finally, that which directs man compared in the third way is called distributive, because it has place in distributions of common goods and burdens; for it effects that both goods and common burdens are distributed to private persons in right order and by right reason.² Now commutative justice observes simple or arithmetical proportion; but distributive observes comparative or geometrical proportion. Namely commutative justice brings in an equality of all things, such as is between thing and thing, so that what is rendered is entirely equal to that which had been received; for example, if someone has received four coins by loan, he is bound to repay four coins to the creditor. But the equality which is observed by distributive justice is not of this kind, except by a certain proportion, namely that one receive so much more than another as he excels him more in dignity or merit; and thus there is not equality of thing to thing, but proportion of thing to person. It is called geometrical proportion, because as merit is related to merit, so reward is related to reward, so that if one having merit as eight receives one hundred coins, one having merit as four receives fifty.¹ In like manner the distribution of burdens ought to correspond to the unequal capacity of those upon whom they are imposed. Wherefore, other things being equal, greater taxes are to be imposed on the richer than on the less rich.

Legal justice "is in the Prince principally and, as it were, architectonically," because by making law he prescribes the manner of contributing to the common good; "but in subjects secondarily and, as it were, administratively,"² because namely they execute and fulfill the law. Distributive justice likewise is principally in the Prince and electors; yet it is "also in subjects, to whom distribution is made, inasmuch as they are content with a just distribution."³

582. Vindicative justice. - Some add this to the three species of justice just mentioned. It is defined: "justice inclining the prince to punish the guilty with congruous penalties for the good of society." Neither does St. Alphonsus commemorate this as a distinct species of justice, nor does St. Thomas⁴ hold it as such.

583. • Since it belongs to justice to render to each one his right, as is clear from the definition of justice handed down at n. 580, in this article what comes under the name of right must be explained.

Right is taken in various senses; for it signifies: 1) the very science of right or laws, those who cultivate which we call Jurists or Jurisconsults; 2) law or the rule of right, and thus divine right is spoken of, natural or positive, human, canonical or civil, of nations, etc.; 3) the very complex and system of laws, as when we say the Corpus Juris Canonici, Corpus Juris Civilis, Code of Law; 4) the sentence pronounced by a judge, although perhaps iniquitous, in which sense they say that a judge speaks right; 5) the very place or forum in which cases are conducted, in which sense the accused is said to be called into court.⁵

584. • Right, as it is taken here, is defined: "A legitimate moral faculty by which someone can do or have something in such a way that it is licit for no one to violate it without some injury."

1° It is a faculty. This, "according to the common use of speaking, signifies the power by which something is held at one's nod,"¹ or at one's own judgment.

2° It is a moral faculty, because it does not consist in physical force. Wherefore it cannot be diminished by the violence of anyone stronger. Cf. Syllabus p. XLV. n. 59, 60.

3° It is a faculty by which someone can do or have something, since the matter of right consists in actions, such as possessing, retaining, etc., and in things.

4° It is a faculty which it is licit for no one to violate without some injury; for otherwise that faculty would be vain and useless.

5° It is a legitimate faculty, because, when a just law is repugnant, nothing can be done or had by right. But law can be repugnant to a faculty in two ways, namely so that either it removes the faculty itself, for example of disposing of goods by testament, or renders the exercise of the faculty illicit, for example the prodigal squandering of one's own goods.

585. Title of right. - From what has been said it is understood what a title of right is: namely it is nothing other than the very reason why someone has a right or legitimate faculty of doing or having something, and why it is not licit for others to violate this faculty without some injury.

586. Division of right. - Right:

1° Is either objective, which others call passive, and is called the just thing, or that which is owed to another, or subjective, which others call active, and is the very faculty of doing or having something defined above.

2° It is either personal, or pertaining to a person considered in himself and immediately inhering in him, such as the right of preserving life; or real, or belonging to a person only on account of some thing which he possesses. Hence real rights can be transmitted from one person to another, according as this person succeeds that one in possession of the thing by force of which the rights exist, as, for example, the right by which a Bishop has power to make laws. - Real and personal right is also taken in another sense: namely the former for a right in a thing, the latter for a right to a thing, concerning which this number under 4° will treat.

3° One right is strictly so called, or strict without addition; another is broadly so called. The former, if it is taken objectively, is that "which is owed to another with equality of thing to thing, and which therefore cannot be violated without injury"; but the latter is that "which is indeed owed to another," but not with the said equality. Thus a seller "has a strict right in the price of the thing: therefore money is to be paid to him which equals the price of the thing; but parents indeed have a right to the obedience of children, but not a strict right; for what sort of obedience is owed to them cannot be defined by an adequate number."¹

Strict right by its nature is perfect. But perfect right is called a right which is joined with the right of coercing, namely of coercing him who would violate it, or lessen it, or disturb the use of it, so that he desist from violating it, etc.; and also of coercing him who has violated it, etc., so that he restore all things to their former state. Yet this right of coercion, if you except the right of repelling force by force, in a society rightly constituted passes into an action, i.e. into the right of reclaiming through a judge that which you think is owed to you. "In human society," says St. Thomas,² "no one has coercion except through public power." Yet it can happen that in fact no action is given from that right, for example because the proof which is required by law is lacking, or because the legislator denies an action to some special perfect right.³ Hence sometimes, as for example in hidden compensation, n. 709, 2° and n. 712, without imploring a judge, you licitly procure right for yourself.

4° Strict right is divided into right in a thing and right to a thing. A right in a thing is that which someone has in a thing already his own, or in a thing which is already bound to him in itself, and which therefore he will be able to vindicate from anyone into whose hands, against his will, it has come. A right to a thing is that by which we have not the thing itself, but the person obligated to us. Thus I have a right in a thing in my horse, and therefore I can vindicate it from any possessor into whose hands, against my will, it has come. But if I have bought a horse - where from law its handing over is required, so that it becomes mine - and the handing over has not yet been done, I can seek it only from the seller, but not from any other to whom the seller afterward sold and handed it over.

Corollary. - Since office or duty is said in order to right, duties can be divided in a manner corresponding to the division of rights. Wherefore some are personal, others real, this number under 2°; some perfect or legal, others imperfect or moral, this number under 3°.

587. The first part is proved. - For it is proper to justice to preserve to each one his right, and violation of another's right from its genus speaks a grave disorder. I said: from its genus, not from its whole genus; because in this matter smallness of matter is admitted, as is clear to all.

The second part is proved. - For justice regards equality of thing to thing; but an injury of this cannot be repaired except through restitution, or, as long as inequality remains, the obligation of reducing equality also remains; and the one injuring sins by preserving inequality, just as he sinned by inducing it.

The other species of justice, namely legal justice, distributive justice, and, if it pleases one to admit this as a fourth species of justice, vindicative justice, also obligate under grave sin, but OF THEMSELVES not with the burden of restitution.

588. The first part is proved. - For injury to these introduces grave disorder, and necessarily harms the order of society gravely.

The second part is proved. - For he who violates, for example, legal or distributive justice indeed acts against the common good, or does not preserve the due proportion in distributing common goods, yet he takes away from no one what is his, nor does he deprive anyone of a thing which is his. Therefore of itself he is not obligated to restitution.

I said: OF THEMSELVES not with the burden of restitution. For often commutative justice is joined to the others, and injury to it induces the burden of restitution. Thus a Superior, magistrates, and a judge are bound to restore when by grave negligence in punishing, or in assigning the unworthy to public offices, they are the cause why private persons or the community suffer grave damage; in which case they are guilty not only of not having procured the common good, to which legal justice inclines, but also of having violated the contract by which, by this very fact that they undertook the office, they tacitly obligated themselves to guarding against damages of subjects. Yet more probably he is not bound to restitution who distributes offices of society to the less worthy; because he does not violate the strict right of the more worthy, nor of the community, which by strict right cannot demand anything else except that the unworthy, from whom damage is to be feared, be kept from offices.¹ But otherwise if in a contest the Superior preferred the less worthy to the more worthy; because in a contest there intervenes a pact from which strict right belongs to the more worthy.

Nor is he bound to restitution who distributes merely honorific dignities - whether to the less worthy, or even to the unworthy; because he has deprived no one of his strict right, although he has sinned through acceptance of persons.

Here it can be asked whether and when, from the sentence of a judge, a strict obligation of justice arises?

Resp. 1° "The sentence of a judge produces an obligation of the same genus as the law itself according to which it is pronounced. Therefore ... in a penal cause it imposes an obligation of obedience, because penal laws are to be observed not from justice strictly so called, but from obedience, so that the fine or penalty imposed by a judge is to be paid not from strict justice, but from obedience."

Resp. 2° "That the sentence of a judge constitute an obligation of strict justice, it is required that the law itself, whence it has all its force, define the strict right of citizens, e.g. a just sentence of a judge concerning paying a legacy, in a singular cause judged, imposes upon the heir an obligation of strict justice, with the burden of restitution; but from the sentence of a judge rendered against parents or children according to a law which obligates from piety, an obligation of piety, without the burden of restitution, arises."

Resp. 3° "When from a certain law a certain obligation arises, the sentence of a judge does not 'wish' or at least does not 'have power' to remove it, e.g. if someone from a contract which is indeed certain but" which cannot be proved in the way prescribed by law, "owes a thing to another, the sentence of the judge which rejects the action ... of the creditor because of defect of legitimate proof in no way removes the obligation of the debtor to provide the thing agreed upon. But in a doubtful cause, whether there is doubt concerning right or concerning fact, it is licit with a safe conscience to stand by the sentence of the judge; for judges are constituted for this reason, that they may resolve doubts."¹

The principal species of right are dominion, use, usufruct, and servitude.

589. • Dominion is a perfect right, acquired through legitimate acts, of disposing at will of some thing and of its utility with the exclusion of others. - It is said:

1° Right (see n. 584).

2° Perfect right (see n. 586. 3°).

3° Acquired through legitimate acts. What those acts are, see below n. 638.

4° Of disposing: this word signifies three rights contained in dominion, namely:

a) The right of retaining or possessing the thing (concerning the notion of possession see n. 662): I say right, because the right of possessing a thing is to be distinguished from actual possession or the physical faculty of using and enjoying a thing; for legitimate possession can be lost while dominion and the right of possessing are preserved. Thus possession of a flooded field, or of a thing lost, or of a thing taken away by force or fraud, is lost, and nevertheless the right of possessing is retained; and this is not lost except from the express, or legitimately presumed, will of the owner.

b) The right of disposing of the thing as one pleases, so that he can change, consume, and alienate the thing; for "we are said to possess that which we have quietly and fully,"² and concerning which "we are able to do what we wish."³

c) The right of vindicating the thing, or reclaiming it, if perhaps, against the owner's will or without his knowledge, it has passed into the hands of others.

5° At will: yet this is not to be understood as if in civil society that right could not or should not sometimes be circumscribed by certain limits, as below, where there will be discussion concerning the dominion of children of a family, wives, etc., we shall see.

6° Of some thing, so that dominion of property may be distinguished from dominion of jurisdiction, which is referred especially to persons.

7° And of its utility: for the right of disposing of the utility of the thing is contained in the right of disposing of the thing itself, above under 4°. 2).

8° With the exclusion of others: therefore the object of dominion is not those things which are never exhausted by use, such as air, light, and the heat of the sun; for exclusion of others from these cannot even be imagined (n. 592).

Note. - Dominion is defined here as dominion taken subjectively and morally; understood objectively and materially, it is the thing itself of which someone is owner.¹

590. Division. - Dominion is principally divided into perfect or full, which in our law is called Fee simple if it is a question of immovables; if of movables, more commonly the complete and absolute ownership; and imperfect or not full, according as it is the right of disposing both of the thing itself and of its utility, or of only one of the two. But imperfect, or not full, is subdivided into direct and indirect or useful, according as it regards only the property of the thing, or only its utility. Thus an owner (the landlord) has direct dominion of an estate which he has leased to another; but the lessee or tenant has indirect or useful dominion.

They also commonly distinguish eminent dominion (the right of eminent domain) and lowly dominion. The former is called the right which supreme authority has of sometimes disposing, from a very grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community; the latter is the dominion of private persons.

The former properly is dominion only of jurisdiction, since the republic has no dominion of property in the goods of private persons, but only a right of administration, or the right of commanding when and how much from the goods of private persons is to be contributed to the common good. For the republic makes laws by which the dominion of private persons is governed not as supreme and universal owner of the territory, but as supreme administrator of the common good. "All things belong to princes for governing, not for retaining them to themselves," etc. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 24 ad 1.

That this right belongs to the supreme power is clear from this: that a right to an end necessarily implies the right to those means without which the end cannot be obtained. But the public good sometimes requires that someone be deprived of his thing, for example of a field for constructing a public road, etc.

But in the use of this right, not the utility of private persons, but only public utility is to be considered, nor is it licit to take away from someone what public utility does not require: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."¹

We must treat 1° of the object; 2° of the subject; 3° of the acquisition of dominion.

Goods, as objects of dominion, are 1° internal or external; 2° of soul or of body; 3° of reputation and honor; 4° of the person, i.e. of liberty and independence in those things in which man, as an individual, is his own right; 5° of fortune.

591. Principles. - I. Man has useful dominion of the goods of soul and body which are naturally inalienable; God has direct dominion.² Cf. n. 461.

II. Man has direct dominion of the goods of the person, in the sense above under 4°; likewise of the soul, insofar as they are abdicateable without legal injury, though very often not without moral injury, i.e. without sin: namely of his free acts, indeed also of habits, whether natural or supernatural, such as virtues and graces; likewise of reputation and honor in the sense explained at n. 525.

592. III. The proper objects of dominion are goods of fortune or external things,³ provided 1° they can be subjected to the power of man and insofar as they can; and thus things not beneath the moon, such as the sun, moon, and stars, can be subjected to it according to their effects and influences, not according to themselves; 2° they are not inexhaustible in use, such as air, wind, etc., of which only the use or particles already exhausted by someone, not the things themselves considered generically, are objects of particular dominion (n. 599); 3° they are not outside dominion by law. Van Egeren.

593. • Goods of fortune are distinguished in our law in this way. Property is ... divided:

1. Into things real and things personal. Things real include every valuable thing of a fixed and immovable nature, and pass under the general description of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or simply realty. Things personal include every valuable thing of an unfixed and movable nature, and pass under the general description of goods and chattels, or simply personalty: "There are certain things occupying a sort of intermediate position between the two, some of which are called chattels real, others fixtures";¹ to understand which, it should be borne in mind, that "although immobility is the distinguishing characteristic of realty, an indefinite duration of interest also enters into the idea; and therefore certain determinate interests in land, as leases for years, are called chattels real, because, although they have that immobility which is denoted by the term real, yet for want of an indefinite duration, they are treated as chattels." So also "there are various articles of personalty, which become realty by being annexed thereto; and these are called fixtures."²

2. Real property is again subdivided into things tangible and things not tangible. Things tangible include land and every corporeal thing permanently connected therewith to an indefinite extent above and below the surface, and pass under the general description of corporeal hereditaments, or simply land. Things not tangible include certain rights, privileges, or easements, annexed to land in the ownership of another, and pass under the general description of incorporeal hereditaments.³

For Louisiana, see "Civil Code of Louisiana."⁴

594. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does man have dominion of his reputation?

Resp. See n. 525.

595. • Quaer. 2° Can man have dominion over another man?

Resp. 1° In the negative, as to direct dominion; for that belongs to God alone, as is clear from what was said at n. 591, and men are metaphysically independent of one another; or:

Resp. 2° In the affirmative, as to useful dominion, or the works of man. The reason is that any man is owner of his own work, and therefore can alienate it and hand it over into the dominion of another. For an owner can use and abuse his own thing insofar as the character of right permits.

Hence 1° by natural right man can sell himself to another, even in perpetuity, and indeed hand himself over gratuitously as to useful dominion of himself. For if he can confer upon another useful dominion of himself for some time, he can do the same in perpetuity, since he can cede all that of which he is owner. 2° Servitude, or a perpetual state of subjection by which someone is bound to provide all his works to another for sustenance, is not of itself repugnant to the law of nature. I say: his works; for servitude in the strict sense, namely that by which slaves properly so called are counted not among persons but among things, which the master can use and abuse, can be called licit in no case.

596. Note. - Although servitude has been abrogated among us, nevertheless it is fitting that confessors receiving the Confession, especially general, of former masters or slaves know the sins to which they were more commonly liable. Wherefore in this place we briefly enumerate them. Therefore I. As to masters:

1° They sinned and are bound to restitution, if any exercised the so-called traffic in Negroes, or cooperated with it, or bought for themselves as slaves those whom they knew had been unjustly despoiled of liberty. - Against so inhuman a trade various Apostolic Constitutions have come forth, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, and lately Gregory XVI, Constitution In supremo Apostolatus, 3 Dec. 1839. And rightly indeed. For although someone, either from pact or his own renunciation, or, as formerly, by the law of war, or from delict or from just condemnation, or from birth from a slave mother, can sometimes be bound to hand over his works to another in perpetuity,¹ nevertheless he is unjustly forced to this where none of these titles can be invoked. But in the traffic in Negroes none of these titles can be invoked; for through it free men, against their own will and without any delict on their part, are carried away from their own regions and sold. Therefore:

I said: free men; for if it is a question of Negroes or others in servitude legitimate by one of the aforesaid titles existing, of itself that commerce is not absolutely illicit, because, once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right in the slaves, or in their works, and therefore can transmit it. I said: of itself; for either circumstances or civil laws can stand in the way.

2° They sinned because of circumstances standing against sale:

a) Those who by selling separated spouse from spouse, or offspring from parents, without grave cause. I said: without grave cause; which would have been present, for example, if a slave had been wicked, whom the master had tried in vain to bring back to good fruit, and from whom he feared death or some other grave evil.¹

b) Those who by selling a slave, especially a Catholic, cared nothing about seeking for him a Catholic, humane, and just buyer; for it was not licit for a master to cast the care of a slave upon just anyone at hand. Yet those would be excused who had sold to anyone at hand slaves from whom they feared death for themselves or their own, unless they were immediately dismissed from the house, provided nevertheless that damage was not inflicted on an unsuspecting buyer.² Those also are to be excused, as is clear of itself, through whom it did not stand that slaves were sold to anyone at hand, as if they had been sold at auction in the distribution of an inheritance, or by authority of law for punishing crimes or for satisfying creditors.³

3° They sinned who did not supply them necessary food and clothing; who did not care for the sick; who did not endeavor to relieve with remedies the old, or those otherwise no longer fit for labor.⁴

4° Those who selected or retained overseers whom they knew imposed harsher burdens upon bondmen, or treated them more severely and cruelly;⁵ and likewise those who, carried away by anger, flogged slaves for a light cause, or ordered them to be flogged, especially with danger to limbs or life.⁶

5° Those who did not leave to slaves the liberty of entering marriage and of using its rights, although slaves would not on account of this be drawn away from providing the work owed.⁷

6° Those who did not take care that the children of their slaves be baptized.

7° Those who did not provide for the salvation of the slaves themselves; of this kind were a) those who did not take care that they learn the rudiments of Christian doctrine, and that a supply of priestly ministry for receiving the Sacraments be made available to them; b) those who omitted every precaution for preserving integrity of morals among them, not taking care, for example, lest they use promiscuous sleeping together; c) those who fostered corruption of morals by their very bad example and wicked solicitations; d) those who favored the delicts of a female slave because of the utility that would come to them from offspring.¹

597. • II. As to former slaves. They sinned 1° who neglected the work enjoined upon them, or the care of things committed to them; yet they did not violate justice, but obedience owed to the master; for the actions of a slave are not owed to the master by the law of justice, as are those of a hired man, who receives a price for them.²

2° Those who stole from the master things other than common edibles; and these are bound to restitution, if they have the means from which they may repay, and unless by their works they seem to have repaired the damage inflicted.³

3° Those who ran around at night, so that they might visit women, and this not only because of immodesty, but also because of other crimes to the danger of which they exposed themselves.⁴

4° Those who lived in concubinage, whether simple fornication, or adulterous; and this simple or double.

5° Those who, when opportunity was offered, neglected to learn the documents of the faith and to fulfill the duties of religion.⁵

598. • Quaer. 3° Whether and by what right does man have dominion in the fruits of his industry and talent?

Resp. In the affirmative, and indeed 1° by natural right. For if a thing bears fruit for the owner, a fortiori this must be true of internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to man.

Hence a) it is certain that both he who steals from the inventor of some art, for example whose machine has not yet been handed over to commerce, his secret and divulges it publicly against his will; and he who prints the manuscript work of another, are bound to restitution and compensation of damages; for a work remains under the dominion of the author or inventor as long as it has not been given to public use.

b) It is disputed whether he who has printed a book has, positive law being set aside, the right of impeding lest anyone commit it to the press and sell it with damage to the author or bookseller to whom the author has transmitted his right. Those who deny bring forward this reason for their denial: that a thing handed over to the community, as a book published in print is, by that very fact becomes of common right, and for the same reason neither would those be guilty of injustice who brought to light the public lectures of some professor or the sermon of an orator. Those who affirm respond to the reason of those denying: the natural right which all attribute to the author in the fruit of his talent cannot be exercised by him unless he hand over this fruit to the community; and therefore it is absurd to say that that right is lost through that very thing without which it cannot be exercised. Practically, this question is of lesser moment; for usage today everywhere has it that works published in print are committed to the press and sold by others in the case in which either the author neglected to do those things which are required by positive law in order to provide for himself, or positive law does not assist him, whether because it does not sanction the property of some genus of books, or because it denies its protection to books edited in another region.

Resp. 2° In the affirmative, also by the positive law of almost all nations. And indeed by a law passed by Congress among us provision is made that one who wishes to claim as proper to himself the right of a thing invented by himself (Patent right) deposit a model in the public office (Patent-office) at Washington. But one who wishes to have the right of publishing his own books (copyright) ought to deposit a copy in the public office of the librarian of Congress in the same city, and on the title page of the book committed to type, or on the page immediately following the title page, to state it in the following words: "Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year by N., in the office of the librarian of Congress at Washington." He who desires to know more should go to Kent,¹ or Wells's Every Man his own Lawyer,² or New Amer. Encycl.³

If someone violates a privilege of this kind, a civil action is given against him. But although the inventor, or author or bookseller to whom the privilege belongs, does not bring a lawsuit, nevertheless the violator is bound in conscience to repair the damage inflicted on them. The same seems to be said whenever someone, by a certain change of a new machine or book, renders the force of the law and privilege void.¹

599. • Quaer. 4° Can seas and the ocean be subject to someone's dominion?

Resp. with Kent:² "Navigable rivers which flow through a territory, and the sea-coast adjoining it, and the navigable waters included in bays, and between headlands and arms of the sea, belong to the sovereign of the adjoining territory as being necessary to the safety of the nation, and to the undisturbed use of the neighboring shores. The open sea is not capable of being possessed as private property. The free use of the ocean for navigation and fishing is common to all mankind and the public jurists generally and explicitly deny that the main ocean can ever be appropriated."

600. • The subject of dominion is the owner of some thing, or he whose some thing is.

Hence 1° to God alone belongs supreme and absolute, and therefore independent, dominion over created things, as Scripture cries out: The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all they who dwell in it.³ Indeed he can communicate this dominion to no one, because it depends on creation and conservation, from which God cannot abdicate himself. Yet this does not prevent God from being able to communicate particular dominion to rational creatures, according to that: but the earth he has given to the children of men.⁴

2° On earth every and only man is capable of dominion. It is proved. "He alone can have a right who is capable of suffering injury ... but he alone suffers injury who suffers it unwillingly; but he ought to be unwilling not indeed by a will by which he wishes a thing to be his, but by a will by which he wishes to retain right to the thing itself, or to obligate others not to take it away. But brutes cannot have such a will, since they can know neither moral obligation nor turpitude; therefore they cannot be unwilling, just as they cannot give permission or transfer dominion for the same reason, because, since they do not know moral right, they cannot yield their own right. ... Therefore only intellectual nature, which can know objects of this kind, is capable of having dominion."¹

3° Nor are infants incapable of dominion, nor even the insane; for the use of reason, of which they lack, is necessary only for disposing here and now of goods, or for the exercise of right (n. 589), but not for having dominion, which is founded in the nature of man and his powers, not in the actual exercise of the powers. (a) p. 475.

We must treat especially of the dominion 1° of children of a family, - 2° of wives, - 3° public and national dominion, - 4° of colleges or corporations, - 5° of the Church and clerics. But concerning the dominion of Religious it will be said below in the Treatise on States, where the vow of poverty is treated.

601. • Children of a family are properly called in this place children of either sex born from legitimate marriage, or legitimated, and still subject to paternal power.

It is said: 1° Born from legitimate marriage, or legitimated. For the dominion of illegitimate children, if and insofar as it is not defined by civil law, is governed by natural right.

It is said: 2° Still subject to paternal power, or minors, not emancipated from paternal power. For although the obligations of children existing from natural right, and which exact offices of honor, love, and reverence toward parents, can never be dissolved, nevertheless this does not have place as to those which natural right does not impose forever, such as obedience, or which draw their origin from civil right alone.

602. • In Roman law various goods of children of a family are distinguished;² but since these distinctions are not found in the laws which we use, we set forth here only the dispositions of these. Hence:

603. • Quaer. 1° How many kinds of goods of children of a family are distinguished, and what right belongs to the father in them?

Resp. Among goods which come to a child of a family, some come from his own labor, others from another title, for example from inheritance, legacy, or donation. The father has the usufruct of these if either by law of the State,¹ or by the will of the testator or donor, this is assigned to him; but he has the administration² in every case, unless perhaps goods have been given or bequeathed to the son on this condition, that custody of them be committed to others and not to the father. But if the father has administration alone, the son who uses those goods against the will of the father or without his knowledge will indeed sin against the fourth precept of the Decalogue, but not against justice strictly so called: for in this case nothing of his own thing or of the fruits of the thing perishes for the father; for both the thing and the fruits of the thing, in the supposition, are the son's, not the father's. Yet in this case the son would sin against justice if the father also had the usufruct: for he would deprive the father of the part of the fruits owed to him.

The proper labor by which a son acquires goods is either private or common with the father. It will be private, if for example he carries on trade in his own name; if he exercises an art entirely diverse from the father's art; if he labors in a workshop outside the paternal house; if as a hired man he has hired out his work in his own name. Those things which the son acquires by private labor, with law forbidding this set aside,³ or with the father's consent, whether express or tacit,⁴ supposed,⁵ he acquires for himself, yet with the burden of compensating the father for the expenses of food, clothing, and shelter.

What if the son exercises a common industry with the father?

Resp. Setting aside a contract, for example of partnership, the son lacks right both to a part of the gain procured by his labor, because in this supposition he conducts the father's affairs only as helper or mandatary, and, if at least his labor is already compensated elsewhere by a just wage, to a stipend: for a double wage cannot be asked for the same labor. I say: if his labor is already compensated elsewhere by a just wage, for example by the increase of inheritance through equal labor of the brothers, or by food, clothing, etc., provided to him. Hence, that is, because of defect of compensated labor, he has a right to a stipend; and therefore he can demand it as owed to him by strict right, or, if from reverential fear or from another cause he has not demanded it, he can procure it for himself by hidden compensation, if his labor was certainly not owed. Such would be the case if either from his condition he was not bound to such labor, or by an indubitably extraordinary and undue excess he labored more with the father than the other brothers.¹

604. • Quaer. 2° Does a son have perfect dominion in movable goods given to him by parents or relatives?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they are consumable by first use, because they are given absolutely to him for use, as for example money granted for amusements (pocket money). Make exception if they are given for a determined use, as money for buying clothes or books, etc.

Resp. 2° If they are not consumable by first use, such as books, clothes, etc., the son generally has, that is, outside the case of consent of the parents either express or reasonably presumed, only useful dominion of them, because parents commonly intend to confer nothing else upon them. Wherefore, if the son disposes of these things against the right granted by the parents, a burden of restitution arises.

605. • By English and American common law, the goods of a wife can be said to be of three kinds, namely dotal, paraphernal, and common.

Under the name of dotal goods (Dowry or Dower) among us comes that which, according to the laws of each State, must be left from the goods of the husband to the surviving wife, namely, by common law, the usufruct of the third part of immovables during her life.

In Louisiana dowry "means the effects which the wife brings to the husband to support the expenses of marriage."¹

That which is termed by the civilians vidualitia, though we call it also dowry or dower, in the legal sense of the word is not a dower, but only that part of the goods of which the wife, after her husband's death, is heiress ad intestato, which, according to the common law, is the third of the personalty of the husband leaving issue, or a moiety, if he dies without issue.

606. • Paraphernalia are called those things which have been wholly reserved in the full dominion of the wife.

What these are from common law would be said almost uselessly, since the dispositions of common law concerning this matter have been changed in almost most States. Consult, if you please, Wells's Every Man, etc.² - But see the dispositions of common law, if you please, apud Kent.³ - For the law of Louisiana see Civil Code of Louis.⁴

Everywhere the following can be held as paraphernalia: both 1° paraphernalia strictly so called, or the wife's personal apparel and ornaments, suitable to her rank and condition in life; and 2° that which is called "pin-money," i.e. a sum payable by the husband to the wife, in virtue of a particular arrangement, and to be applied by the wife in attiring her person in a manner suitable to the rank of her husband, and in defraying other personal expenses. Finally 3° those things also ought to be held as paraphernalia which either by the laws of each State, or by antenuptial agreement, are reserved to the full dominion of the wife.

607. • Common goods among us can be called immovables which are given simultaneously to husband and wife during the marriage, or which are bought by them together. Concerning these our law establishes: "They" (the husband and wife) "are both seised of the entirety, and neither can sell without the consent of the other, and the survivor takes the whole."¹

Except Louisiana, where "the partnership ... of acquets or gains ... arising during coverture" (i.e. while the marriage stands) "exists by law in every marriage contract in the State, where there is no stipulation to the contrary."¹ "The community of acquets and gains ceases on the death of either party, and the survivor takes only his or her undivided moiety of the common property."²

608. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can a wife distribute alms from goods that are not paraphernal?

Resp. In the affirmative, even if otherwise she has paraphernalia or her own goods, provided this is done according to the custom of other women of that place and condition. The reason is that a wife is not a slave, but a partner; therefore she ought to have a certain administration in the house of the husband. - Then the husband, merely ignorant, is deservedly presumed to consent in those things which are done by the wife according to the honest custom of the region and of her condition; and if he shows himself unwilling, such dissent is judged irrational, because a husband cannot deprive his wife of a right conceded to her by legitimate custom. - So with the common sentence, Lugo, St. Alphonsus.³ - Moreover, if a wife were to acquire something by extraordinary labor after having spent due care upon the governance of the family; or if by thrift she were to subtract something from what has been conceded to her for solace, clothing, etc., she can likewise dispose of it for other uses, if nothing else stands in the way. So theologians from the rules of equity.

609. • Quaer. 2° Does a wife sin by taking something from goods that are not paraphernal in order to relieve the necessity of parents or children who were received from a prior marriage?

Resp. In the negative, if she does not have paraphernalia and the husband is unwilling to give what is necessary, because by natural right a wife is bound to feed the aforesaid blood-relations, and the husband is bound to consent to this.⁴ What is said here of parents and children certain authors also extend to brothers and sisters of the wife.⁵

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; I-II, q. 60, a. 2.

149. Various acceptations of right. - A. In the more received sense, right designates:

1st. Properly, and indeed in its primary signification, that which is just (the just thing itself), and thus it is the object of justice: that which is owed to another and to be rendered unto equality. In this sense one says: to give someone his right, a chacun son droit, wat recht is.¹ It is objective right, which is also called passive, since it must be given to each one.

¹ "In modern languages right is designated by a metaphorical word from geometry (straight line, droit, recht), because just as a straight line of itself and independently of our choice is the shorter line between two points, so right constitutes rectitude in the relations of men among themselves." Lehu, Phil. Mor., I, n. 353.

2nd. Secondarily, the foundation of the just, namely, the legitimate power or faculty of demanding something as owed; in which sense someone is said to use his right or to have the right of property or of election: it is the power of right² (pouvoir du droit, rechtsbevoegdheid, rechtsvermogen). This right is subjective, or also active, which each one can exercise.

² Thus more recent authors; the ancients are not accustomed to call this right, but faculty, power, or even dominion. Indeed it was said that in this sense the word ius never occurs in St. Thomas. But this is said too boldly, for it seems to be used somewhat in this sense, though very rarely, for example, I-II, q. 58, a. 2; II-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 2; Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; de Virt., q. 1, a. 4; in IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 3, ad 2.

3rd. Finally, by a signification not proper but metaphorical, yet proximately derived, the cause of each, namely, law (and by extension: the complex of laws), which is the rule both of the faculty of demanding a debt of this kind and of the just thing itself, because it determines the rights of men: thus natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil right are spoken of. It is normative right.³ Law is not right essentially, but causatively, because it is the reason of right, namely, the reason by which there is in another the faculty of demanding something, and consequently this is owed to him and must be rendered: for these are correlatives which correspond to one another.

³ Modern authors more often call law objective right.

The aforesaid order is according to the signification of the name; but the real order is inverse.⁴ For the first, namely, right in the first signification, according to the thing depends upon the second, and the second upon the third: nothing is owed to another without the faculty of demanding it in the other, and that the other has this faculty is given to him by natural or positive law. Thus the faculty of demanding something (active right) mediates between the reason of right (law) and the just thing (objective or passive right), and although it is not the object of justice, nevertheless it is something on which the object of justice depends, and to which it has an intrinsic order as to something which it supposes.

⁴ Let it be noted that the matter is thus proposed independently of etymology, but in order to the doctrine on justice, conformably to St. Thomas. There is doubt about the etymology. Formerly several said that the word ius was derived from iustum, signified the same as just, and was so called by apocope, i.e., amputation. Today this is abandoned by many. Others said it is the same as iussum, which indicates law. Others hold the word as primitive: ios or ious, i.e., good, holy, that which pertains to divinity; or iu, iug, which signifies a bond, a tie which joins men or to which they are subjected. But whatever may be the case concerning the first signification or etymology of the word, in the doctrine on justice the primary signification is the just or objective right, because the others do not pertain to justice except insofar as they have relation to its object, which is the just or objective right. Terminology is not wholly fixed and determined. The ancients especially understand right in the objective sense; subjective right they are not accustomed to call so. Modern authors, on the contrary, rarely speak of objective or passive right, and especially take right in the sense of faculty, or even of law. One must attend to this in reading authors.

B. By a signification more remotely derived and wholly improper, right designates:

1. the science by which what is just is known (the science of right, a jurist, to study law), or the code in which laws are found; 2) further, the place in which right is rendered (to appear in court, to be called into court, to have recourse to court); 3) finally, the sentence of a judge, to whom it belongs to make justice, even if what he decrees is unjust (to render right).

150. Definition of right. - Right cannot strictly be defined, but is a simple and primary notion;⁵ nevertheless it can be described somewhat, so that it may be more fully understood.

⁵ Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia, diss. I, sect. I, n. 3.

A. Right considered objectively or passively is that which is rigorously owed to another unto equality, so that the other can demand it as due to himself and exclusively his own, even legally or judicially; in other words, it is a strict debt to be rendered unto equality. Whence formally it is a true relation, namely, of equality toward another. It is the adequation, the adjustment, of one to another; consequently it is a relation constituting an objective order between them, and thus a due ordering of one to another: a relation by which they are adjusted or made adequate to one another, or a relation of adequation between two or more whom it renders equal and by which they are equal.

This relation is not immediate between persons, but is made by means of the object which specifies the right: something must be given to one which is owed to him by another. The object of right is not always a thing; it can be an action to be furnished, such as honor and service, or the omission of that which would impede the action of another. But the subject of right is he to whom it is owed, to whom right is his to something.⁶

⁶ It can be asked whether the object of justice is the just operation itself, the rendering of the debt, or rather the object of the operation. Fr. de Victoria responds in this place: The rendering of the debt can be called the object of justice, or the equality which arises from the fact that the debt is rendered. The just operation is for the one owing one hundred to render those to the creditor. If he renders them, a just operation is done and equality is made. The object of justice is each in some way: that giving, and the equality resulting thence. Yet more properly the resulting effect, namely, the equality following the just operation, is called the object of justice; because the operation tends to that, and the object of justice and of the just operation must be the same, just as the object of the habit and of the operation is the same.

B. But right considered actively or subjectively imports a relation of a rational being to something as to his own; yet formally it is power, and is usually defined as a legitimate and inviolable moral faculty of having, doing, or demanding something, as exclusively one's own, for one's proper advantage. It is said:

1st, moral faculty, i.e., not a mere fact, but a power, not indeed merely physical, which can be opposed to right,⁷ but moral and legitimate, which is obtained by force of law and is conformed to right reason. Whence the subject of right is a rational being;

⁷ Cf. Syll. prop. 59 and 61.

2nd, inviolable, i.e., which cannot licitly be prohibited by others, for right in one brings with it in others the obligation of not impeding the exercise of this right. Whence of itself it also includes coercive power by force of warding off those who try to injure the right; yet this faculty must be exercised not arbitrarily but according to law;

3rd, of having, doing, or demanding something, by which the object of right is indicated, which is threefold: possession of external things, exercise of one's own faculties (under which name also comes non-exercise: not paying, not serving as a soldier), the furnishing to be made by another (or omitted), or the action of another;

4th, as exclusively one's own for one's proper advantage: namely, it is founded on the connection of the thing with the possessor of the right, considered independently of other men, by which it comes about that the thing must serve his utility exclusively. - And thus right properly and simply so called is distinguished from right accepted in a broader sense and according to something, or the power of jurisdiction which someone has for ruling others, not for his own advantage but for the utility of subjects.

151. What is essential to right.⁸ - Therefore in right, considered both subjectively and objectively, there is essentially imported a moral preference by which someone is preferred, all others being excluded, in the use of some thing on account of the peculiar connection which the thing has with him; whence it is owed to him. That connection is a moral bond: namely, it is a connection conformed to right reason, by which it comes about that the thing about which there is question must now be judged as exclusively destined to the utility and advantage of him who has obtained this connection. Therefore the essential or constitutive foundation of right is that connection, namely, the ordering of something to something as to an end; if this exists, right exists; but if it does not exist or if it is removed, right does not exist.

⁸ On the notion and foundation of right, cf. Meyer, Zigliara, Lehu, Beysens, De Pascal, De Bie in the cited work; likewise Weiss, Apologie des Christenthums; Nolens, De Leer van den H. Thomas over het Recht; De Baets, Les Bases de la Morale et du Droit; Kuhlmann, Der Gesetzesbegriff des H. Thomas von Aquin; De la Barre, La morale d'apres S. Thomas d'Aquin et les anciens scolastiques; Lachance, Le Concept de droit selon Aristote et S. Thomas.

This connection can arise by various titles from the nature of the thing or from positive law; for example, he who from his own material, by his own instruments, has made some manufactured thing, for this reason has a connection with the work which no one has with it; and, this being posited, right reason dictates that he be preferred to all others in the faculty of disposing of that thing for his own utility. And he who has received the thing from him is rightly judged to succeed in the connection of dominion, and therefore to be preferred to all.

152. The proximate foundation of right. - The aforesaid titles provide the foundation of this or that right in the concrete, but there must also be a foundation of right itself, as such, in the abstract, or of every right: this is the dignity and inviolability of the person himself. A person essentially is an intellectual being, incommunicable, existing for himself: on the one hand he is master of his acts on account of freedom; on the other hand, because, existing incommunicably for himself, he is of his own right, and of himself in being and acting; whence he does not exist merely or chiefly on account of the good of others, but on account of his own good and proper end. Therefore he cannot be considered by others as a means subordinated to them, but they must revere him as a being existing alongside them and of the same dignity, who cannot be deprived of his own order to his proper good. Therefore every person is inviolable insofar as he tends to his end (S. Th., c. Gent. III, 112).

This being posited, we argue thus: A person enjoys the inviolable faculty of ordering himself to his end. But he cannot efficaciously attain the end without several means, even external ones: exterior things - the use of faculties - a prestation made by others, such as honor, help, the rule of superiors, etc. Therefore he also has the inviolable power of effecting or obtaining that those means are truly ordered to his proper end. But this is the right of disposing exclusively of these things.

153. The ultimate foundation of right. - The inviolability of the created person is the proximate and secondary foundation; but the primary foundation or ultimate source of right is God Himself. For:

1st. He who imposes an end upon us and wills that we attain it, must also give us the means necessary for this and order that by an inviolable power we can tend to the end through them (against Kant).

2nd. Moreover, right in one and duty in another are correlatives;⁹ but every obligation and duty is ultimately derived from the eternal law of God, as was proved in the treatise on Laws, I, n. 241; therefore God is the ultimate source of every right.

⁹ Against this assertion some object at times that there is an obligation, for example, of almsgiving, in one, without right in another; or, if it is not without right, that by this very fact almsgiving is owed in justice. - Resp. 1st. There is an obligation in one without right in another, I concede; there is a duty or obligation of justice in one without right in another, I deny. Or 2nd. There is an obligation without right in him to whom the obligation procures an advantage, I concede; without right in another who obliges us, for example, in God, I deny.

154. Errors concerning the nature and foundation of right are various, just as concerning the nature and foundation of morality and moral obligation.

A. Materialism, such as natural monism, acknowledges nothing except the law of brute matter, or the dominion of the stronger force; whence right is natural force or physical power. Cf. Syll., prop. 59 and 61.

B. Juridical positivism, which is akin to moral positivism. It arose among the sophists. Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Aristippus admitted some right of nature (individual right), namely, the physical force of the stronger, whose measure is the necessity of nature and the utility of man; but since society is necessary at least for the weak, so that they may be able to exercise that right and live securely, it must be transferred and communicated to the community, so that they may have right collectively and so that it may be determined from common power and will. Thus right becomes collective and positive, and the distinction of just and unjust is from external human authority, so that the whole of right is positive and of human origin.

Spinoza (1632-1677) taught almost the same thing; likewise Hobbes (1588-1679), deriving right from the power of command and civil authority; thereafter J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778), explaining the origin from the social contract, or from an express or tacit pact with society through the abdication of individual rights. Bentham, Wundt, Lasson, Schopenhauer, v. Hartmann, v. Kirschmann, v. Ihering, and afterward, in some sense, the promoters of the historical school, approached more or less to this.

C. Transcendental rationalism. Thomasius (1653-1728) was the first of all adequately to distinguish right from morality, so that right is torn away from morality: morality regards internal peace, right external peace.¹⁰ What he rather insinuated for practical reasons, Kant (1724-1804) attempted to establish from philosophical principles. Just as the internal liberty of a rational being, which is an end in itself, is the foundation of moral obligation, so also external liberty is the foundation of right. Morality regards the internal obligation of conscience or of practical reason essentially autonomous (namely, from every external law); right regards external law or external coercion. Hence the juridical order is independent of the moral order. Yet external liberty is the necessary complement of internal liberty; and thus right is the condition, or complex of conditions, of individual liberty. For the liberty of one must be harmonized with the liberty of another; whence the liberty of each must be restrained in favor of the liberty of all. Some positive common recognition of this is required; and therefore it is postulated that civil society be constituted by a social pact, by which rights are determined.

¹⁰ Thus against Wicleff and Luther, who, namely, acknowledge internal right, but no positive right.

Fichte (1762-1814), in his subjective idealism, followed Kantian doctrine rather closely: according to him the liberty of each one is to be restricted insofar as the possibility of the same liberty of others demands it. This restriction is to be made by common consent; and therefore every juridical relation exists really and determinately insofar as it is founded on common recognition. Hence the necessity of society, and in it of a coercive power, by which alone the liberty of all can be obtained and preserved, and which determines the rights of individuals. Thus subjective individualism of right was born.

To this there succeeded, by reaction, an absolute objectivism of right in objective transcendental idealism and ideal pantheism, which Schelling (1785-1854), and especially Hegel (1770-1831), defended, and to whom Schleiermacher (1768-1834) in some measure approached.

In place of the pact-like union of wills there was substituted the absolute universal will, and an absolute moral organism with absolute morality, which does not descend from the eternal law of God, but is realized and expressed by the political State, which State is the supreme deity of human affairs. Hence there arises the omnipotence of the State, which leads to full socialism.

Thus the State is the source of all right, whose immediate foundation is the universal will.

In more recent times many remain imbued with Kantian principles and profess pure rationalism or formalism, such as Stammler, Loening, Kelsen, Merke.

D. The historical school. From a certain reaction against Kant and individualism, and at the same time against absolute transcendental objectivism, there arose the school of historical right, according to which in fact and in the concrete there exists no valid right except positive right, whose source is the history of laws and customs: thus for the absolute will there is now substituted the union of wills; nor is the State the origin of right, but rather the State has arisen from the evolution of right.

Thus de Maistre, de Bonald and the traditionalists, Burke, likewise Lud. de Haller and Adam Miller; afterward, more scientifically, the strictly historical school represented by v. Savigny, Hugo, Puchta, v. Stahl, Schwind; the strictly empirical school with v. Ihering¹¹ and Levy-Bruhl, to which the sociological school with Durkheim in some measure approaches.

¹¹ Yet he holds the State to be the source of right, which he says is an advantage that is juridically protected.

Right properly so called, which is to be distinguished from morality, is nothing except positive right, nor has it any other source except a historical one, namely, historical custom and the statutes of laws. The science of right is the evolution of written law and legal custom; the subject of right is the people, and all right is human.

Several things can be opposed to these systems. Generally:

a) It is false that right is adequately distinguished from morality: for it is an objective part of the moral order, or part of the natural law, since man by his nature is social.

And indeed: objective or passive right is the object of justice, which is a moral virtue; subjective or active right is a moral faculty; normative right or law is of the moral order, for it depends upon the natural moral law.

b) It is false that there is nothing except positive right. For 1) we have demonstrated that the natural law exists (I, n. 244) and that there is intrinsic morality (I, n. 122); but the precepts of justice pertain to it. - 2) Positive law is necessarily founded upon natural law (I, n. 270); thus positive right is necessarily founded upon natural right.

Right, in the broader sense, is taken 1st. for skill in law, or jurisprudence; 2nd. for law or the rule of the just, and thus there is said to be natural right, positive, human, civil, canonical right, the right of nations, etc.; 3rd. for the sentence of a judge, and hence the word judge, as if one saying right. - But in the stricter sense, and taken actively, right is the legitimate power which someone has concerning his own thing or to a thing owed to him; but passively it is the same as what is just and equitable, or is that which is owed to one having such a power on account of that very power. - Therefore passive right is the debt itself; active right is the title or reason of the debt.

Right is chiefly divided into right in a thing and right to a thing. Right in a thing is that by which someone has the thing itself obligated to himself. This right confers a real action, which namely immediately touches the thing itself; wherefore whoever enjoys this right can reclaim his thing wherever it has passed. But right to a thing is that which someone has, that the thing become his, or that the thing be obligated to him. It gives a personal action against one impeding the acquisition of the thing; whence it is called personal right, because it immediately touches the person.

I. God alone is truly and absolutely Lord of all things. The reason is that, since he alone is the supreme creator and conserver of all things, all things have absolute dependence upon him alone. - Hence it follows 1st. that no created being can possess with respect to God, that is, use some thing as absolutely his own; and 2nd. that the right of property cannot be in a created being unless God wills it.

II. A man can be proprietor with respect to another man. The reason is that this is repugnant under no aspect: not on the part of men, because, since these are equal by nature, they do not depend in this matter one upon another; not on the part of the things themselves, because these rather have an aptitude to be possessed and brought into use, although not by diverse persons at the same time on account of their finitude; nor finally on the part of God, because God wills that we use created goods as means for conserving life, as is clear from the nature of those goods and from the exigency of man.

III. If any man has legitimately made certain goods his own, he has acquired in them a right inviolable of itself. The reason is that, this condition having been posited, God, who gave both aptitude and exigencies to man for the use of things, immediately communicates a right in them; but that right cannot be violated by another man without disorder. - Hence it follows 1st. that there is a natural precept promulgated and sanctioned by God himself, forbidding that the right of another be injured, and prescribing that if at any time it has been injured, it be restored whole; 2nd. that he who unjustly usurps another's thing becomes guilty both toward neighbor and toward God: toward neighbor indeed, because he injures his natural independence; toward God, by violating the divine right communicated to the neighbor, and at the same time the natural precept commanding that the aforesaid right be observed.

IV. Commutative justice obliges under grave sin and with the burden of restitution. The reason of the first is taken both from the fact that in the Scriptures eternal punishment is decreed not only once against those who violate commutative justice, and because the violation of another's right, since it is essentially harmful, by its own nature introduces great disorder into the mutual fellowship of men, and is repugnant to charity, which moves one to will another's good. But the reason of the second is that commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, which can be brought about only through full restitution, once it has been violated.

V. The other species of justice of themselves also oblige under grave sin, but not with the burden of restitution. The first is clear from this, that, their definitions being inspected, grave harm to the whole society would follow if they could be violated either with impunity or under light sin only. But the other is gathered from this, that there cannot be the burden of restitution where either equality or relation to another is lacking, namely where restitution itself is not possible. - Nevertheless, commutative justice is often joined to the others, and thus the burden of restitution is introduced. Wherefore a magistrate or judge is held to restore if, on account of grave negligence in punishing, he is the cause why private persons or the community suffer grave damage, not by virtue of legal justice having been neglected, but of a violated contract by which, in assuming the office, he implicitly obligated himself to prevent the damages of subjects.

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, a q. 57 ad q. 76.)

The name of right is taken in various ways: first, for that which is just. But the just is taken in two ways: generally, for everything that is consonant with law; strictly, for the equality owed to another; for those things that are equalized are vulgarly said to be justified. And right so taken is the object of justice, as we shall say below.

Secondly, right is taken for the legitimate faculty of doing something, acquiring, possessing, alienating, etc.: in which sense one is said to use his right. But right taken in this second way is the foundation of right taken in the first way. For nothing is owed to another by way of equality without a right in the other, because what is owed is owed to a right; right and debt are correlatives.

Thirdly, right is taken for law, which is the rule of the just in general. Hence right taken in the second way depends on this right; for that anyone have a right to something is attributed to him either by the law of nature, or by positive law, or at least by free concession of God or men. Wherefore

I say secondly: Right taken in these three ways can be divided, by the same division, into natural and positive right.

And as to right taken for law, it is evident; because law is one thing natural, another positive. Eternal law is not included, because this division is made into members entirely diverse; but natural law is not a thing entirely diverse from eternal law, rather it is its participation in a rational creature, as is taught in Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 2, ad 1.

Positive right is divided into divine and human. Divine is one thing of the Old Testament, another of the New. Human positive right is divided into the law of nations, canon law, and civil law. Canon law, which especially concerns us, is compounded from the canons of councils, the decrees of Pontiffs, and the judgments of the Fathers.

Right taken for the just is likewise adequately divided into natural right and positive right²⁴⁰ ; because right so taken is the just, or what is adequate to another. Now something can be adequate to another in two ways. In one way, from the nature of the thing, as when someone gives as much that he receive the same amount, and this is called natural right. In another way something is adequate or commensurate to another from the good pleasure of those who establish it, as when two private persons so covenant between themselves, or the community consents that such a thing be held as just, or the prince ordains by law that it be so; and this is called positive right. The other subdivisions are as in the division of law. ²⁴⁰ Ibid., a q. 57, a. 2, c.

Right taken for "the legitimate faculty, etc.," is also divided, on the part of the principle, into natural, which belongs by law or by the consent of nature, and positive, which belongs by positive law or by the free concession of God or men. The other subdivisions are as in the division of law. Likewise this right, on the part of the term it regards, is divided into right in a thing and right to a thing.

Right in a thing is what one has in a thing already his and obtained. Hence it gives a real action upon the very thing. Three conditions are required for it: the existence of the thing, a legitimate title, such as purchase, donation, etc., and delivery of the thing. So has right disposed, except in certain cases.

Right to a thing is what one has in order that some thing become his. For this no other condition is required than a legitimate title. It does not give an action upon the very thing, but upon the person only. Such right¹ is acquired by donation, purchase, etc., before delivery. Also by election, presentation to an office, by collation of a benefice before acceptance, etc. ¹ 1

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 58.)

Justice is taken in two ways : 1° generally for Christian holiness or for the collection of all the virtues, in which sense Christ said, Matt., V, 20 : Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, etc. 2° It is taken specially for the particular virtue which is second among the Cardinal virtues, by which one is inclined to render to everyone what is his, and of that we treat here.

Justice is defined in law, from Ulpian : « The constant and perpetual will to render to each his right. »

By will is not understood the very power of willing, but the act³¹⁵ ; whence a habit is defined through the act : which is not unusual. It is called « perpetual », not on the part of the act, which endures perpetually, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man wills to render to everyone his right perpetually and in all things : whence, if anyone wishes to reduce this definition to due form, let him say that justice is « the virtue inclining the will constantly to render forever to everyone his right ». Hence you have that it belongs to the reason of justice properly so called that it be toward another. ³¹⁵ Hic q. 58, a. 1, ad 1, 3 and 4.

I say 2°: The remote material object of justice are external things which are commuted or distributed. The proximate material object are the actions by which these things are commuted and distributed. Because justice differs in this from the other moral virtues, that these rectify primarily and per se man in himself, but justice in order to another³¹⁶. Now the ordination of one man to another is not attended to according to interior affections or passions, but according to exterior actions and things by which men can communicate with one another, such as, as to things, goods of fortune, money, houses, fields, grains, etc. ; as to actions, those by which these things are commuted, namely sale, payment, loan for consumption, loan for use, lease, etc. ; likewise also those actions in which no exterior thing intervenes, as honor, praise, detraction, etc. Therefore. ³¹⁶ Ibid., a. 9 and 10, c.

The formal object quod of justice is right taken for the just, or the equal owed to another³¹⁷ ; because this justice principally intends and effects, as appears from its definition, and thereby it is distinguished from the other virtues. Whence he is called just who makes or preserves this equality, unjust who does not preserve it. ³¹⁷ Hic q. 57, a. 1, o.

The formal object quo is the ratio of debt, or right in another, taken for the legitimate faculty of possessing, alienating, etc. For the reason why I render the equal to another is because I owe it to him ; I owe it however because that other has a right to it : for debt and right are correlatives.

I say 3°: The subject of justice is the will³¹⁸. For it is not the intellect, because justice is not ordered per se and primarily to direct any cognitive act ; nor is it the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite follows sensitive apprehension, but sensitive apprehension does not consider the proportion of one thing to another, which pertains to justice ; for this is proper to reason. Therefore. ³¹⁸ Hic q. 58, a. 4, o.

I. There are three acceptations of right. First, for the law defining what is to be attributed to each man out of justice: in which acceptation the law itself is called right, or the rule of right. Second, right signifies a power of doing, exacting, or receiving something. Third, right is taken for the equality between thing and thing. One right is in the thing, which gives an action both against the thing and against the person. By this right men possess the things which they hold, and are able to sell, alienate, let them out, and so forth. Another is a right to the thing, which gives an action against the person, not against the thing — that is, it gives a personal, not a real action. You sell your thing to another, which by the delivery of it becomes his. The buyer has a right in this thing bought; you retain a right to the thing, that is, you have an action against the person for exacting the price.

II. That potestative right is of two kinds: one of jurisdiction, which princes, prelates, and superiors possess over their own subjects; another of ownership, by which a man possesses his own thing. The remote matter of justice is things — money, wares, fields, houses, animals, and the like. The proximate matter is exterior human actions.

III. QUESTION I. What is justice, and of how many kinds is it? ANSWER. It is the perpetual and constant will of rendering to each his right. It is threefold: commutative, distributive, and legal. Commutative justice is between two equal men buying, selling, letting, and so forth. For in these contracts they are equals, even though on other grounds the one were a prince and the other a subject. Distributive justice is of the whole toward the parts, namely of the prince toward his subjects in distributing ranks, dignities, rewards, and the like. Legal justice is of the part toward the whole, that is, of subjects toward the prince, inasmuch as all render those things which are fitting to the community by the prescript of the laws. That this legal justice is not justice in the whole rigour of the term the Salmanticenses and others contend; but the opposite opinion is to me the more probable.

IV. Distributive justice distributes the goods of the community among the parts of the same community according to the proportion of merits. This virtue of justice resides in the superior, whose office it is to distribute the common goods; it is found also in subjects, inasmuch as they acquiesce in this justice. The mean of the thing which this justice regards is not one of arithmetical equality, but of geometrical proportion: which proportion holds between the goods to be distributed and the merits of the subjects.

V. QUESTION II. Whether commutative justice is distinguished from vindicative justice? ANSWER. Commutative justice, as has been said, renders to each his own thing according to the right which he has of exacting it; for it establishes an equality between debt and credit, which arises out of buyings, sellings, loans, and the remaining contracts; likewise out of thefts, homicides, and other injuries, whose damage is to be compensated. The principal act of commutative justice is restitution.

VI. Vindicative justice can be regarded either in the judge or prince, or in the private persons injured, who demand vengeance. Under the former consideration it is an act of true commutative justice; but in the persons injured it is not true justice, but a potential part of the same, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 80, art. 1, reply 1. The reason of the first part is evident. For the judge is bound by force of commutative justice not only to provide for the common good, but also to defend his subjects from injuries and oppressions. There is present besides a mean of the thing. For the judge is bound to inflict a penalty equalling the right of the offended person that has been injured. The second part is plain of itself.

VII. QUESTION III. Is commutative justice distinguished in species from distributive justice? ANSWER. The common opinion affirms it. Since indeed the specific diversity of virtues is taken from the formal diversity of objects. But each of these virtues regards a formally diverse object. Therefore a specific diversity resides between them. For the object of the virtue of justice is a right and an equality to be constituted between the right of one and the debt of another. Commutative justice regards arithmetical equality, distributive geometrical. The right of commutative justice is a rigorous right; the right of distributive justice is imperfect, founded not in the thing or to the thing, as the former, but in fitness and personal capacity. The first justice regards the price of the thing; the other the prerogatives of the person, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 61, art. 1.

VIII. It is to be observed nevertheless that distributive justice almost always has commutative justice inseparable from it. On which matter read Vol. VII, book 2, dissertation 1, chapter 4, no. 10.

IX. QUESTION IV. What are the vices opposed to justice? ANSWER. Justice is here taken, not for sanctifying grace, by which a man is called just, nor for the general justice set in the complex of all the virtues; but for that peculiar moral virtue which inclines the will to render to each what is his, as we have already said. Now the other virtues are wont to have two contrary vices: the one by excess, the other by defect. To justice there is opposed defect only, inasmuch as a man does not render what he owes. Excess in rendering more than is owed conflicts with the other virtues, but not with justice, unless harm be inflicted upon another.

X. The vice opposed to justice is injustice, which, like justice, is divided into various species. For one is legal injustice, which relaxes the laws; another is opposed to distributive justice, namely respect of persons; and to commutative justice are opposed thefts, homicides, rapines, contumelies, calumnies, false accusations, the impostures of advocates, the unjust judgments of judges, and the like. Injustice is in its own kind a mortal sin; from smallness of matter, or by reason of indeliberation, it is a venial fault.

ALL Theologians, Jurists, and Philosophers hold that Ius is the object of the Virtue of Justice: but one must diligently see which Ius is established as the object of this virtue; and which Virtue Justice is understood to be by us; for each can be taken in many ways.

FOR JUSTICE is taken chiefly in three ways. First, for the habit by which we are made suited to all things equitable, both in order to ourselves, and in order to God and others: thus it is taken by all Philosophers, but more by Theologians, who understand in this sense what is delivered universally in the Scriptures, when someone is named just, namely endowed with all the virtues, which is everywhere met with, where they name Just men heroes, as Genes. 6. Noë a just man Genes. 6. Iob. 1. Eccles. 40. et seq. as the Saintly Doctor observes everywhere. The Doctor interprets it at ad 3. Luca:¹ Make straight your paths, according to 16. Isa. The path of the just is right. Prouerb. 4. I led thee by the paths of equity. So Prouerb. 8. I walk in the ways of justice. So Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de beat. oratione 4. understands it Matth. 5. Blessed who hunger and thirst after justice, in which sense it is taken also by St. Augustine at that place, cited by St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centiloquii, sect. 44. and lib. 2. Pharet. cap. 42. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'Ided ad 3. Luca interpretatur id'; 'Ided' is unintelligible and is rendered 'Ideo' (therefore), as a new clause begins.

IN like manner Justice is taken for the habit infused with sanctifying grace, by which one is constituted just, and holy, endowed with all the virtues. So Rom. 3. But the justice of God, by the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all who believe in him. Which is called the justice of God, not formally, but efficiently from God, or the gift of God, as St. Augustine teaches lib. de Spiritu, et litt. cap. 9. and the Holy Council of Trent often inculcates, and gravely defines, as I showed Tract. de Gratia, disp. 2.

THEREFORE we do not take justice in so general a sense, but as it is a particular virtue among the four Cardinal ones, whose proper praise and office is to constitute the due equality between men, as the Saintly Doctor notes in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. et in quaestionibus passim, et in 4. dist. 15. passim et 3. p. Cencil. sect. 44. et 5. p. Breuil. cap. 4. et lib. 2. Phar. cap. 42. et in Diata, tit. 5. cap. 8.

WISDOM takes it thus, c. 8. where it is said, to teach Soberness, and Wisdom, Justice and Virtue; where it calls Soberness Temperance; for Wisdom it understands Prudence; for Virtue, Fortitude; but it takes Justice for the Virtue of Justice, which is the second Cardinal virtue among those, as Gregory of Valencia notes disp. 5. quaest. 1. puncto 1. after St. Bonaventure in the Commentary on that place.

THIRDLY, in another mode the Saintly Doctor takes it in 3. § dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. for the judicial, coercing with punishments; But this is a species of the Cardinal, as I shall say; nevertheless all commonly call it this, when it is said: Justice inquired into Peter, punishes; or: Peter is afflicted in Justice.

¶ Further, Ius also can be taken in many ways.

¶ First, whatever in any mode is equitable, or good, as the Jurist Paulus says l. Ius, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure.

¶ Second, it signifies whatever is conformable to law, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 1. In which way St. Isidore said lib. 5. Ethymol. cap. 3. that Law is a kind of species (that is, norm, or idea) of Ius, according to the doctrine of St. Thom. art. 1. ad 2.

¶ Third, it signifies the lawful faculty, or power of doing, or acquiring, or possessing, or alienating something, as the Jurists distinguish between Ius ad rem, which is owed to someone; and Ius in re, which someone also possesses.

¶ Fourth, it is taken for the Sentence of a judge, as the Jurist Paulus has it loco citato.

¶ Fifth, it signifies the same as Lex, that is, the dictamen of prudence, whether natural, or in habit, or the authority for making laws, in which way Ius is divided into the Natural of nations, and Civil, by Ulpian in l. Iuri, et often by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 1. et 3. p. Centil. cap. 44. et other places, cited in the tract. de Legibus.

¶ In none of the said modes, or the others enumerated by Valencia, is Ius taken here, but it is taken for the same as Iustum, through equality with another. Hence Scotus lib. 3. de Iustitia, et Iure, quaest. 1. art. 1. says that Ius, by APOCOPE, is said as it were iustum: Whence also in Greek Ius and Iustum are expressed by the same word δίκαιον. The ethymology of which word Ius properly sounds, to be just through the equality of thing with thing. For, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 4. on that account it is called ius δίκαιον, because it is δίχα, that is, divided in two, as if to say bipartite; and what is divided in two is divided into equal parts according to the ratio of discrete quantity, inasmuch as it is divided into one and one. Whence, and Iudex, as Aristotle says in the same place, because he determines the just through the equality of thing with thing, is called Bipartitor. And by this reason Justice is called Equity. Thus Proverb. 8. Mine is Equity, mine is Prudence, mine is Fortitude, as the Saintly Doctor observes ad cap. 8. Sapientiae.

¶ Aristotle also used Ius in this sense cap. 4. when he said: Ius, which is in exchanges, is a certain constant equality according to Arithmetic proportion; but that ius, which is in distributions, he had said cap. 3. according to Geometric proportion.

¶ Moderns labor in this ius, which is the object of Justice, in making it clear; and as I see, Mastrius observes the matter Tom. 2. disp. 7. num. 163. saying, that it is That which constitutes dominion, which is twofold, of Jurisdiction, and of Property. This dominion however is defined by the Jurists: The faculty of using a thing at pleasure, without injury to another. In which definition, says Hurtado disp. 12. de Incarn. sect. 3. a circle is committed; for also in defining injury, they say it is the use of a thing against the right and will of the Lord. Thus Ius is defined through Injury, and this through Ius, which is to run in a circle against Aristotle 5. Metaph. cap. 15. Hence Cardinal Lugo disp. 1. de Iustitia, et disp. 3. de Incarn. sect. 2. num. 42. teaches, that this ius, which is the object of Justice, is nothing else than a certain moral prelation, by which this man is morally preferred to others in the use of this thing, by reason of a peculiar connexion, which the thing has with him. Which explanation Bellutus also embraces disp. 7. de Incarn. quaest 6. art. 1. and Mastrius num. 164. He adds, however, that this prelation must be explained, from what head it arises, namely from the disposition of laws, or the nature of the thing. Thus it is explained a priori.

¶ I indeed, weighing this new invention, find that all of these relapse into the same circle; for the Praelation in the use of a thing is an effect of ius. For each one is preferred in the use of a thing, namely a house, a garment, etc. because he has right to it before others, and so Ius is the fountain and cause of that prelation, and therefore ius is not expressed a priori. Again therefore if you seek the origin of that prelation, it must be taken a priori from ius; and so they walk in a circle.

¶ Tanner therefore disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2. n. 8. says, that Ius in re, in the mode of dominion, can scarcely be explicated by any common concept, since it is an analogon of proportionality to its inferiors, such as the dominion of Jurisdiction, and of Property, of which I shall treat in the Disputationes de Furto, et Rapina.

¶ These things pre-stated, it is now established that the object of the Justice of which we treat is Ius, that is, as he says, the Iustum through a certain equality.

¶ It is proved first from the definition of Justice; which is defined through such Ius, as through its proper object. So Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. We see, that this kind of habit is wont to be called Justice; from which men are made suited to doing just things. And cap 5. Justice is that by which the just man is called the doer of the just from election. Where he takes iustum for the equal.

¶ The Jurists also with the words of Ulpian l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure, define Justice thus: Justice is a constant, and perpetual will of rendering to each his ius. Which definition St. Thom. also sets forth quaest. 58. art 1. and St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. where he asserts it to be of the Masters.

¶ So also St. Ambrose lib. 1. de offic. cap. 24. says: Justice renders to each his own ius, does not claim another's, neglects his own utility, and keeps the common equity. And St. Augustine lib. 19. de civit. cap. 21. There is not (he says) ius, where there is no justice: Justice moreover is that virtue which distributes to each his own,² So also St. Bonaventure reports loco citato. ² Editor's note: the print reads 'quae sua nique distribuit'; 'nique' is corrupt (apparently for 'unicuique'); rendered 'sua unicuique distribuit' (distributes to each his own).

¶ It is proved secondly by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8. That is the object of Justice, which constitutes the virtue, standing in the mean, not declining to the vicious extremes through excess, and defect: Such is ius, or iustum: Therefore. The Major is Aristotle's 2. Eth. cap. 6. The Minor is proved; For then is one sinning against justice, when more or less is given than is owed. But the mean is the equitable, as Aristotle shows 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. cited by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. He says. Thus cap. 4. he says: Whence when men contend, they flee to the judge, etc. and they seek a judge in the mean, and some call him mediator, as if, should they have attained the mean, they should also attain the ius itself. Ius therefore is a certain mean, if indeed the judge also is in the mean; But the judge reduces to equality; and as, if a line be divided into two unequal parts, that by which the greater part exceeds the half, he takes from it, and joins to the lesser.

¶ The Saintly Doctor expounds it with an elegant Astronomical example: For as he says the Polar star, near the pole, is borne with a small gyre in the diurnal motion around the Pole; yet so, that it does not recede from the middle, that is, from the pole of the world; so also created Justice gyrates closely around the immovable Justice of God: And as, not declining, it keeps the straightness of the diurnal motion; so that as the line of the Equator in the middle of its circulation describes the Highest circle, on that account it does not allow the gyrating stars to decline to the right, or to the left, that is, toward the South, nor toward the North; although it is borne through the immense space of 1017. Millions of miles; so also Justice, keeping the equatorial line of equity, does not allow the various things snatched by the first mobile to decline from East to West, either to the right of excess, or to the left of defect, giving more to one; and taking from the other.

From these the Saintly Doctor draws, in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. and 5. p. Brevil. cap. 4. with St. Thomas as cited by Cajetan art. 1. and Valencia p. 1. at the end. And Soto lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 1. the difference between justice and the other moral virtues; for Justice according to its proper reason makes right in order to another; but the others only in order to oneself. On this account St. Ambrose lib. 1. offic. cap. 28. says, that Justice is born rather for others than for itself. So also Cicero lib. 2. de Republica, and Seneca epist. 77. as the Saintly Doctor teaches in Pharetra, lib. 1. cap. 42.

It is GATHERED also, that the mean of Justice is the mean of the thing, even without comparison to the very agent; but of the other virtues, which turn about their own passions, and not about another, in no way does it consist in a mean without comparison to the very agent. But that equality is that very ius, which is called equitable between too much and too little, as Aristotle says 5. Eth. cap. 4.

This shines still more in that example of the Seraphic Doctor: For as without any thinking there is the pole, upon which the heaven moves, and the polar star; which, its small diurnal circle having been described around the pole, they keep the motion of both Hemispheres by the line of the Equator, the substance of the heaven being kept on both sides for each Hemisphere Mathematically; so also Justice, before every thought, and before all its operation, has that object alone, and only to be kept, which is not found in the other moral virtues.

HENCE also it is, that in the Disputation on Justice there is first treated of its object; then of the Virtue, because the object is presupposed before the virtue; not so in the other moral virtues. See Valencia at the end of the punctus.

IT MUST however be observed, that Ius, which is the object of Justice, includes two things; First, that it be owed: Second, that it be equal.

INASMUCH as it is owed, it can be either owed Legally by the force of some Law, or singular, arising from some pact, or convention of certain persons, such as is between buyer and seller.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is owed, is divided into natural Ius and human Ius. The owed thing of the first kind arises from the law of nature, namely, that if you give a measure of wheat as a loan; that he render that measure to you. This however is distinguished threefold by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 33. quaest. 1. The first is called that which is contained in the Law, and the Gospel, and this is called natural Ius commonly. The second is proper, and is defined at the beginning of the Decretals: Natural ius is that which is common to all nations; and this ius is that which reason dictates. The third, most proper, which nature taught all animals.

The owed thing from human law is, what has been established by some human law, as that between certain things vendible, and that price which is fixed by human law, it be the only price.

From the other head, however, inasmuch as it is something just, and equal; It is divided first by Aristotle lib. 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. into Ius, or the equal Geometric; and Arithmetic. The Geometric equal, which is according to proportion, is observed in the distribution of common goods among those who are members of the community, so that by as much as one surpasses another in merits, by the same proportion he may receive more of the goods of the community. But Aristotle says that Ius is exercised through Arithmetic equality, both in exchanges, which are done voluntarily between men, as in buying, selling, exchange, etc. and in compensating, or making amends for the dealings of men involuntary, and those without clandestine acts, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, the seduction of servants, deceitful homicide, false witness, etc. or manifestly violent, as flogging, captivity, slaughter, rapine, mutilation, reviling, contumely, etc. which examples the Philosopher brings in that cap. 2. and through this are distinguished two species of Justice properly so called, namely Distributive, and Commutative, which I exposed at length p. 1. Tract. 1. disput. 19. quaest. 1. et 2.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is equal, is divided into Ius, or the iustum simply, and Ius secundum quid. Ius simply is, what is altogether equal, or by which those are made equal between whom it is; and because equality is between distinct ones, therefore this equal is between those, of whom one is not a part of the other, as between two citizens, and it is called Political Ius. Ius secundum quid equal, is between those, of whom one is a part of the other, as between Father, and son, who is a part of the Father, since from his seed, as Aristotle teaches 8. Eth. cap. 12. So between Lord, and servant, who is something of the Lord, namely his instrument, and a part in goods, as Aristotle teaches 1. Polit. cap. 3. Such is also that between Husband, and Wife, as Aristotle says, because whichever spouse is of the other, as is gathered from the Philosopher 6. Eth. cap. 5. and more from Matth. 19. Ephes. 5. For they are one flesh, and on that account that ius is called by St. Thomas here, art. 4. Oeconomicum, and some dominion intervenes in bodies, and some other things, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 4. dist. 41. quaest. ult. Such improper ius seems to be also between citizen, and community, of which he is a part.

THEY DISPUTE: Whether this improper ius is also on the part of the father toward the son, since the father is not a part of the son. They respond affirmatively, Cajetan art. 4. Valencia punct. 2. for whatever pertains to the whole, pertains also to the part. Hence it comes about, that what the son renders to the father, he renders also to himself.

THEY ALSO DOUBT: Whether the son, even when emancipated, ought to be included under this improper ius. It is answered, that he is included by the reason made above, because to be a part of the Father came to him from generation, which always keeps sons, that they may be as it were other Fathers, as Aristotle says 8. Eth. cap. 11.

D. Bonav. brings forward VARIOUS definitions of Justice in various places in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. In Dieta tit. 5. cap. 8. et ad 3. et 20. Lucae et lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 42.

The FIRST is taken from Tully in the first book of the Rhetoric: Justice is a habit of mind, which, preserving the common utility, assigns to each his own dignity.

The SECOND is in Macrobius: Justice is to preserve for each what is his own.

The THIRD is from D. August. de lib. arb. What shall I say justice is, but the virtue by which each is given his own? And lib. 19. de civitate, cap. 21. Justice is the virtue which distributes to each his own. D. Bernardus has the same serm. 3. in adventu Domini, and the Gloss Matth. 5. I referred to other definitions above.

But the definition more commonly received, which D. Bonav. says belongs to the Masters, is that of Ulpianus, l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et iure: Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his right. D. Thom. approves this quaest. 58. art. 1. and the Doctors commonly.

Julius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, recently read in a certain newspaper an article which seems to defend the lawfulness of the action called “boycotting,” in order to prevent another from renting lands from which a previous tenant had been expelled by the landlord. For those who apply a “boycott” in the case do nothing violent; each indeed, as a result of a conspiracy, abstains from all association, except in a case of extreme necessity, with those who rent the lands, in which manner of acting nothing is discovered which is not conceded to physicians and others who do not associate with brethren who do not observe the rules of the profession. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a right, and how are rights divided?

2. What is the foundation of a right, or whence do human beings possess rights?

3. Is the saying true—It is lawful for several persons as a result of a conspiracy to do what is lawful for individuals?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a right and how are rights divided?

A right is a moral power of having, doing, or exacting something. Rights may be divided in a great many ways, but for the purposes of this case it will be sufficient to mention natural rights, such as the right to live and to hold property, rights due to positive law, such as the right of prescription, and rights arising out of contract.

2. What is the foundation of right, or whence do men get their rights?

The foundation of natural rights is man’s rational nature, which is ordered by God his Creator to eternal blessedness with God. The duty is imposed upon man by his Creator of working toward the attainment of the end for which he was created; he has consequently the right to fulfil his destiny unhindered by any one else. This is the ultimate foundation for all man’s natural rights. Positive law is the foundation of rights derived from that source; and voluntary agreement that of rights arising from contract.

3. Is the saying true: Whatever individuals are allowed to do may be done by many in conspiracy with one another?

In general it is, but sometimes it becomes unlawful because the very fact of numbers acting together in conspiracy causes hardship to others, or interferes with their rights. Thus individuals have a right to walk through a crowded thoroughfare, but it does not follow that a large number of people may form themselves into a compact body and march, so as to interfere with the traffic.

4. The case. Those who boycott another abstain from all intercourse with him and prevent others from having any intercourse with him with a view to compelling him to leave a place or occupation to which he has a legal right. Thus they violate his natural right of liberty to settle and employ himself as he chooses, provided that he does not violate just laws nor the rights of others. They also violate the right that he had acquired by contract with the owner of the property which he hired. Boycotting is also against charity on account of the hardship which it causes and the practical exclusion of the boycotted party from human society. It also interferes seriously with public order and peace. Doctors, lawyers, and others belonging to like voluntary associations have a right to make rules for their mutual protection, and any one who enters such profession may be required to conform to the established rules. If they will not do so, they may be professionally ostracized. Such ostracism, however, is only partial; it is applied for good reason to compel uniformity for the common good; it is very different from the ordinary boycott, which takes away rights, the enjoyment of which is necessary for human life.

1. A right is that in virtue of which a person calls anything his own. More elaborately, a right is a moral power residing in a person, in virtue whereof he refers to himself as well his own actions as also other things, which stand referred to him in preference to other persons. A right is a moral power, as distinguished from physical force or ability. It resides in a person, a being whom we call autocentric, as distinguished from a thing, which is heterocentric. (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203.) A person is his own, a thing is another's. Every intellectual nature is a person except the Humanity of Christ, an exception which does not concern us here. To the Creator all created personalities are as things, but that again is not our concern in this place, where we treat of the relations between man and man. It will have to be noted hereafter with great emphasis, that the individual man is a person, not a thing and chattel, in relation to the State, and consequently has rights against the State.

2. Every intellectual being has the attribute of reflex consciousness. It may turn its regard in upon itself, and call itself me, and its powers and activities mine. It certainly has the physical ability of acting for self, and using its powers consciously for its own ends. Does this physical ability represent also a moral power? Is the agent justified in exercising it? and are his fellows under a moral obligation of justice to leave him free to exercise it? (Ethics, c. vi., s. i., nn. 5, 6, p. 111.) We have seen that morality consists in acting up to one's own intellectual or rational nature. Since then the calling oneself me, and one's power mine, and the using those powers for purposes which one's reason approves, is the distinguishing feature of an intellectual, or rational, and personal being, that being is morally warranted so to act. He calls himself his own, and his powers his own, and they are his own by the very fact of his calling them so by a natural act. And, as justice is to give to another his own, others are bound in justice to leave him free to dispose of himself and his powers, at least within certain limits. But this would be for man a barren freedom, were he not empowered to lay hold of and make his own some things, nay many things, outside of himself, for man is not self-sufficient, but has many natural necessities, and many psychical cravings to boot. Therefore man's right of preference extends, not only to his own actions, but also to external things, which he may make his own to act upon.

3. Rights are either connatural or acquired. Connatural rights spring from the very being of a man, as he is a person. Such are the rights to life, to honour, to personal liberty—that is, freedom to go where you will—to civil liberty—that is, not being a slave—also the rights to marry and to acquire property. Acquired rights spring from some deed of man, annexing something to his personality. Such are the rights to property, duly entered upon, to reputation, to the political franchise, and all rights that come by contract. Acquired rights may descend to heirs.

4. Rights again are alienable and inalienable, which division does not coincide with the preceding. Those rights are inalienable, shorn of which a man cannot work out his last end. Some rights are thus permanently and universally inalienable, as the right to life: others are so occasionally and for particular persons.

5. The correlative of right is duty: so that, wherever one man has a right, his neighbours have a duty in justice to leave him free to exercise the same. But the converse is not true, that wherever one man has a duty towards another, that other has a right to its performance, for there are duties of charity, which do not impart a corresponding right, but only a claim. Duties that correspond to rights are called by English moralists perfect duties. Duties answering to claims only they call imperfect.

6. Of duties, some are positive, which bind always, not for always, as the duty of adoring God. We are always bound to adore, we are not bound to be always adoring. Other duties are negative, and bind always, for always, as the duties of sobriety and chastity. The former class of duties we may more easily be excused from, because they can be deferred, and it is at times morally impossible to take them up. But negative duty, as Mr. Gladstone has finely said, "rises with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night: it is the shadow that follows us wheresoever we go, and only leaves us when we leave the light of life."

7. Only a person has rights, as appears by the definition of a right. Again, only persons have duties, for they only have free will. No one has duties without rights, and no man has rights without duties. Infants and idiots, in whom the use of reason is impeded, having notwithstanding rights, are said to have duties also radically. Hence it is wrong to make an idiot commit what is in him a material breach of some negative duty, as of temperance. Positive duties he is excused from.

8. Some have taught that all human rights are consequences of duties; a man having first a duty to perform, and then a right to the means necessary to its performance. But this doctrine appears more pious than probable. For, first, the type and example of sovereign right, God, has no duties. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 4, p. 130.) Then again, a man may have a right conjoined with a duty—not of justice, of course, but of some other virtue, as of religion—not to use that right. But if rights were consequent upon duties, the right would cease in such a case; and to pretend to exercise it would be a sin against justice, which it is not.

1. Brute beasts, not having understanding and therefore not being persons, cannot have any rights. The conclusion is clear. They are not autocentric. They are of the number of things, which are another's: they are chattels, or cattle. We have no duties to them,—not of justice, as is shown; not of religion, unless we are to worship them, like the Egyptians of old; not of fidelity, for they are incapable of accepting a promise. The only question can be of charity. Have we duties of charity to the lower animals? Charity is an extension of the love of ourselves to beings like ourselves, in view of our common nature and our common destiny to happiness in God. (c. iv., nn. 1, 2, p. 239.) It is not for the present treatise to prove, but to assume, that our nature is not common to brute beasts but immeasurably above theirs, higher indeed above them than we are below the angels. Man alone speaks, man alone hopes to contemplate for ever, if not—in the natural order—the Face of his Father in Heaven, at least the reflected brightness of that Divine Face. (Ethics, c. ii., s. iv., nn. 3, 4.) We have then no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, to the lower animals, as neither to stocks and stones.

2. Still we have duties about stones, not to fling them through our neighbour's windows; and we have duties about brute beasts. We must not harm them, when they are our neighbour's property. We must not break out into paroxysms of rage and impatience in dealing with them. It is a miserable way of showing off human pre-eminence, to torture poor brutes in malevolent glee at their pain and helplessness. Such wanton cruelty is especially deplorable, because it disposes the perpetrators to be cruel also to men. As St. Thomas says (1a 2æ, q. 102, art. 6, ad 8):

"Because the passion of pity arises from the afflictions of others, and it happens even to brute animals to feel pain, the affection of pity may arise in man even about the afflictions of animals. Obviously, whoever is practised in the affection of pity towards animals, is thereby more disposed to the affection of pity towards men: whence it is said in Proverbs xii. 10: 'The just regardeth the lives of his beasts, but the bowels of the wicked are cruel.' And therefore the Lord, seeing the Jewish people to be cruel, that He might reclaim them to pity, wished to train them to pity even towards brute beasts, forbidding certain things to be done to animals which seem to touch upon cruelty. And therefore He forbade them to seethe the kid in the mother's milk (Deut. xiv. 21), or to muzzle the treading ox (Deut. xxv. 4), or to kill the old bird with the young." (Deut. xxii. 6, 7.)

3. It is wanton cruelty to vex and annoy a brute beast for sport. This is unworthy of man, and disposes him to inhumanity towards his own species. Yet the converse is not to be relied on: there have been cruel men who have made pets of the brute creation. But there is no shadow of evil resting on the practice of causing pain to brutes in sport, where the pain is not the sport itself, but an incidental concomitant of it. Much more in all that conduces to the sustenance of man may we give pain to brutes, as also in the pursuit of science. Nor are we bound to any anxious care to make this pain as little as may be. Brutes are as things in our regard: so far as they are useful to us, they exist for us, not for themselves; and we do right in using them unsparingly for our need and convenience, though not for our wantonness. If then any special case of pain to a brute creature be a fact of considerable value for observation in biological science or the medical art, no reasoned considerations of morality can stand in the way of man making the experiment, yet so that even in the quest of science he be mindful of mercy.

4. Altogether it will be found that a sedulous observance of the rights and claims of other men, a mastery over one's own passions, and a reverence for the Creator, give the best assurance of a wise and humane treatment of the lower animals. But to preach kindness to brutes as a primary obligation, and capital point of amendment in the conversion of a sinner, is to treat the symptom and leave unchecked the inward malady.

Reading.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 25, art. 3.

1. Honour is the attestation of another's excellence. Reputation is the opinion of many touching another's life and conduct. Honour is paid to a man to his face, whereas his reputation is bruited behind his back. Honour is taken away by insult, reputation by detraction. If the detraction involve a falsehood, it is called calumny or slander. The name backbiting, given to detraction, points to the absence of the person spoken of. But no one meets with an insult except where he is present, either in person or by his representative.

2. Both honour and reputation are goods that a man can call his own, and has a right to, but on different titles. Honour, some honour at least, appertains to a man simply for his being a man: reputation is won by deeds. Honour is primarily a connatural right: reputation is acquired. An entire stranger has no reputation, but a certain honour is his due to start with.

3. As there is a right to honour and a right to reputation, so insult and detraction are sins, not against charity, but against commutative justice, calling for restitution. (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 106.) We must tender an apology for an insult, and labour to restore the good name that our detracting tongue has taken away.

4. Calumny is a double sin, one sin against truth, and another sin, the heavier of the two, against justice. If the blackening tale be true, the first sin is absent, but the second is there. The truth of the story is no justification for our publishing it. Though it is wrong to lie, it is not always right to blurt out the truth, especially when we are not asked for it. There are unprofitable disclosures, unseasonable, harmful, and wrongful. But, it will be said, does not a man forego his right to reputation by doing the evil that belies his fair fame? No, his right remains, unless the evil that he does, either of its own proper working or by the scandal that it gives, be subversive of social order. If he has committed a crime against society, he is to be denounced to the authorities who have charge of society: they will judge him, and, finding him guilty, they will punish him and brand him with infamy. If, again, he does evil, though not immediately against society, yet in the face of society and before the sun; he shocks the public conscience and rends his own reputation. But the evil private and proper to himself that any man works in secret, is not society's care, nor affects his social standing, nor brings any rightful diminution to his good name. If all our secret and personal offences are liable to be made public by any observer, which of us shall abide it? Our character is our public character; and that is not forfeit except for some manner of public sin.

5. Suppose a veteran, long retired, has made a name for military prowess by boasting of battles wherein he never came into danger, is the one old comrade who remembers him for a skulker and a runaway, justified in showing him up? No, for that reputation, however mendaciously got together, is still truly a good possession: it is not a fruit of injustice, therefore it is no matter of restitution: nor is it any instrument of injustice, which the holder is bound to drop: thus, as he is not bound to forego it, now that he has got it, so his neighbour may not rightfully take it from him.

Reading.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 73, art. 1.

1. A contract is a bargain productive of an obligation of commutative justice in each of the contracting parties. A bargain is a consent of two wills to the same object. Thus a promise, before it is accepted, is not a bargain. But even after acceptance a promise is not a contract, for the promiser may not choose to bind himself in justice, but only in good faith, while the promisee is under no obligation whatever.

2. There are such things as implicit contracts, attached to the bearing of certain offices, whereby a man becomes his brother's keeper. The liability contracted is limited by the nature of the office: thus a physician is officially bound in justice as to his patient's pulse, but not officially as to his purse. Where there is no explicit contract, the duties which the subjects of a person's official care have towards him are not duties of commutative justice. Thus these implicit contracts are not strictly contracts, as failing to carry a full reciprocity.

3. Contracts are either consensual or real, according as they are either complete by the mere consent of the parties, or further require that something should change hands and pass from one to the other. What contracts are consensual, and what real, depends chiefly on positive law. No natural law can tell whether buying and selling, for instance, be a consensual or a real contract. The interest of this particular case is when the goods are lost in transmission: then whichever of the two parties at the time be determined to be the owner, apart from culpable negligence or contrary agreement of the sender, he bears the loss, on the principle, res perit domino.

4. Contracts are otherwise divided as onerous and gratuitous. In an onerous contract either party renders some advantage in return for the advantage that he receives, as when Titius hires the horse of Caius. In a gratuitous contract all the advantage is on one side, as when Titius does not hire but borrows a horse. The Roman lawyers further distinguish contracts, somewhat humorously, into contracts with names and contracts without names, or nominate and innominate, as anatomists name a certain bone the innominate bone, and a certain artery the innominate artery. Innominate contracts are reckoned four: I give on the terms of your giving, otherwise than as buying and selling,—to some forms of this there are English names, as exchange and barter: I do on the terms of your doing: I do on the terms of your giving: I give on the terms of your doing.

Readings.—De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, 22, nn. 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 16, 17. For buying and selling and the frauds incident thereto, Paley, Moral Philosophy, bk. iii., p. 1, c. vii.

1. We must distinguish use value and market value. The use value of an article of property is the esteem which the owner has of it from every other point of view except as a thing to sell. Thus a man values his overcoat on a journey as a protection from cold and rain. A book is valued that was held in the dying hand of a parent. This is use value. The market value of an article is the estimate of society, fixing the rate of exchange between that and other articles, so much of one for so much of another, e.g., between mahogany and cedar wood, considered as things to sell.

2. Answering to this twofold value is a twofold exchange, private exchange, which regards use value; and commercial exchange, which is founded on market value. If I part with my watch to a sailor for carrying me across an arm of the sea where there is no public ferry, that is private exchange. If I pay the ordinary fare where there is a public ferry, that is commercial exchange.

3. Private exchange begins in the need of at least one of the contracting parties. It is an act of charity in the other party to accommodate him by offering the thing needed. If the offer is made otherwise than as a gift, and is accepted, he who avails himself of it is bound in justice to see that the afforder of the accommodation is compensated for the loss that he suffers in affording it. Thus far the recipient is bound in justice, and no further in that virtue. However wholesome or profitable the thing be to him that gets it, the supplier cannot charge for that but only for the loss that he himself suffers, or the gain that he foregoes, in handing the thing over, or the pains that he takes, or the hardship that he endures, or the risk that he runs, in rendering the service desired. If all the labour to be undergone, or damage incurred, or risk encountered, by the sailor who goes about by private bargain to be my ferryman, is fairly met by the remuneration of a thirty-shilling watch, he has no right to stipulate for any more, not though the passage that he gives me sets me on the way to a throne. The peculiar advantage that I have in prospect does not come out of him, but out of myself. He must not pretend to sell what is not his, what attaches, not to him, but to me. He can only sell his own loss, risk, pains and labour. At the same time, if I have any gentlemanly or generous feeling in me, I shall be forward to bestow extra remuneration on one who has rendered me so timely a service: but this is matter of my gratitude, not of his right and claim in justice. Gratitude must not be put into the bill. And this much of private exchange.

4. Commercial exchange is conducted according to market value. Apart from dire necessity—and one in dire necessity is not fit to enter into commercial exchanges—the rule is, that a seller may always ask the market value of his article, however much that may be above what the thing cost him, or the use value which it bears to him. Thus, if one finds in his garden a rare Roman coin—so far as his tastes go, a paltry bit of metal—he may sell it for whatever price numismatists will offer: whereas, if there were no market for coins, but only one individual who doted on such things, the finder could make no profit out of that individual, the coin having neither market value with the community, nor use value in the eyes of the finder.

5. As there is a twofold value, and a twofold exchange, so a twofold character is impressed on the great instrument of exchange, money. Money, in one character, is an instrument of private exchange: in its other character, to mercantile men more familiar, it is an instrument of commercial exchange. In the one, it represents use value to the particular owner, more or less to him than it would be to some other owner: in the other, it represents market value, the same to all at the same time.

6. Leo X. in the Fifth Council of Lateran, 1515, ruled that—"usury is properly interpreted to be the attempt to draw profit and increment, without labour, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify." In 1745 Benedict XIV. wrote in the same sense to the Bishops of Italy: "That kind of sin which is called usury, and which has its proper seat and place in the contract of mutuum, consists in turning that contract, which of its own nature requires the amount returned exactly to balance the amount received, into a ground for demanding a return in excess of the amount received." Mutuum, be it observed, is a loan for a definite period, of some article, the use of which lies in its consumption, as matches, fuel, food, and, in one respect, money. We shall prove this to be properly a gratuitous contract. (s. iv., n. 4, p. 254.)

7. Usury then is no mere taking of exorbitant interest. There is no question of more or less, but it is usury to take any interest at all upon the loan of a piece of property, which

(a) is of no use except to be used up, spent, consumed:

(b) is not wanted for the lender's own consumption within the period of the loan:

(c) is lent upon security that obviates risk:

(d) is so lent that the lender foregoes no occasion of lawful gain by lending it.

8. When all these four conditions are fulfilled, and yet interest is exacted upon a loan, such interest is usurious and unjust. And why? Simply by reason of the principle that we laid down before, speaking of private exchange (n. 3), a principle that is thus stated by St. Thomas:

"If one party is much benefited by the commodity which he receives of the other, while the other, the seller, is not a loser by going without the article, no extra price must be put on. The reason is, because the benefit that accrues to one party is not from the seller, but from the condition of the buyer. Now no one ought to sell to another that which is not his, though he may sell the loss that he suffers. He, however, who is much benefited by the commodity he receives of another, may spontaneously bestow some extra recompense on the seller: that is the part of one who has the feelings of a gentleman." (2a. 2æ, q. 77, art. 1, in corp.)

9. St. Thomas speaks of sales, but the principle applies equally to loans. It is upon loans of money that interest is commonly taken, and of money-loans we speak. Clearly, according to the doctrine stated, the lender can claim the compensation of interest, if he has to pinch himself in order to lend, or lends at a notable risk. He is selling his own loss,—or risk, which is loss once removed. But supposing he has other monies in hand, and the security is good, and he has enough still left for all domestic needs, and for all luxuries that he cares to indulge in,—moreover he has nothing absolutely to do with his money, in the event of his not lending it, but to hoard it up in his strong box, and wait long months till he has occasion to use it: in that case, if he lends it he will be no worse off on the day that he gets it back, no worse off in the time while it is away, than if it had never left his coffers. Such is the contract of mutuum, shorn of all accidental attendant circumstances, a contract, which "of its own nature," as Benedict XIV. says, that is, apart from circumstances, "requires the amount returned exactly to balance the amount received." Not though the borrower has profited of the loan to gain kingdoms, is any further return in strict justice to be exacted of him on that precise account.

10. But now an altered case. Suppose land is purchaseable, and it is proposed to stock a farm with cattle, and rear them, and convey them to a large town where there is a brisk demand for meat—the supposition is not always verified, nor any supposition like it, but suppose it verified in some one case—then, though the lender has other monies in hand for the needs of his household, and the security is good, yet the money is not so lent as that he foregoes no occasion of lawful gain by lending it. He foregoes the purchase of land and farm stock, or at least delays it, and delay is loss where profit is perennial. On that score of gain forfeited he may exact interest on the money that he lends, which interest will be no usury. The title of interest here given is recognized by divines as lucrum cessans, "interruption of profit." The interest is taken, so far as it goes upon a lawful title, not upon the fact of the borrower's profit—that is irrelevant—but upon the profit that the lender might have made, had he kept the money in hand.

11. This latter case (n. 10) represents that putting of money out to interest, which is an essential feature of modern commerce. The former case (n. 9) is the aspect that money-lending commonly bore in the Middle Ages. In those days land was hard to buy, agriculture backward, roads bad, seas unnavigable, carrying-trade precarious, messages slow, raids and marauders frequent, population sparse, commerce confined to a few centres, mines unworked, manufactures mostly domestic, capital yet unformed. Men kept their money in their cellars, or deposited it for safety in religious houses: whence the stories of treasure-trove belonging to those days. They took out the coin as they wanted it to spend on housekeeping, or on war, or feasting. It was very hard, next to impossible, to lay out money so as to make more money by it. Money was in those days really barren—a resource for housekeeping, not for trade—a medium of private, not of commercial exchange—a representative of use value, not of market value. Apart from risk of non-repayment, to take interest for money that you had no use for but to hoard, was getting "a breed of barren metal:" it was taking up what you laid not down: it was making profit out of your neighbour's need, or your neighbour's gain, where there was no corresponding need unsatisfied, or gain forfeited, on your part: it was that "attempt to draw profit and increment, without labour, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify," which the Fifth Lateran Council defines to be usury.

12. In our time, thanks to steam and electricity, the increase of population, and continued peace, the whole world has become one trading community, representing now more, now less abundant opportunities for the investment of money, and the conversion of it into other lucrative commodities. Money consequently with us is not a mere medium of private exchange for the purposes of housekeeping: it is a medium of commercial exchange. It represents, not use value, but market value. To be a thousand pounds out of pocket for a year means an opportunity of gain irretrievably lost, gain that could have been made otherwise than by money-lending. Where this is so, and so far as it is so, the lender may without violation of justice point to lucrum cessans, gain lost, and arrange beforehand with the borrower for being reimbursed with interest.

13. The transition from mediaeval housekeeping, with its use values and private exchange, to the mercantile society of modern times, was not made in a day, nor went on everywhere at the same rate. It was a growth of ages. In great cities commerce rapidly ripened, and was well on towards maturity five centuries ago. Then the conditions that render interest lawful, and mark it off from usury, readily came to obtain. But those centres were isolated. Like the centres of ossification, which appear here and there in cartilage when it is being converted into bone, they were separated one from another by large tracts remaining in the primitive condition. Here you might have a great city, Hamburg or Genoa, an early type of commercial enterprise, and, fifty miles inland, society was in its infancy, and the great city was as part of another world. Hence the same transaction, as described by the letter of the law, might mean lawful interest in the city, and usury out in the country—the two were so disconnected. In such a situation the legislator has to choose between forbidding interest here and allowing usury there; between restraining speculation and licensing oppression. The mediaeval legislator chose the former alternative. Church and State together enacted a number of laws to restrain the taking of interest, laws that, like the clothes of infancy, are not to be scorned as absurd restrictions, merely because they are inapplicable now, and would not fit the modern growth of nations. At this day the State has repealed those laws, and the Church has officially signified that she no longer insists on them. Still she maintains dogmatically that there is such a sin as usury, and what it is, as defined in the Fifth Council of Lateran.

Readings.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 77, art. 1; Ar., Pol., I., ix.; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 77, art. 4; The Month for September, 1886; _The Nineteenth Century _for September, 1877, pp. 181, seq.

To Our Venerable Brethren, All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in Peace and Communion With the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics, and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals, and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population ; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension ; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes ; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes,—all are occupied with it, and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions, when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interest of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters on Political Power, on Human Liberty, on the Christian Constitution of the State, and on similar subjects, so now We have thought it useful to speak on the CONDITION OF LABOR. It is a matter on which We have touched once or twice already. But in this Letter the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it free from danger. It is not easy to define the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men’s judgments and to stir up the people to sedition.

But all agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen’s Guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that Working Men have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is, nevertheless, under a different form, but with the same guilt, still practised by avaricious and grasping men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.

To remedy these evils the Socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that, by thus transferring property from private persons to the community, the present evil state of things will be set to rights, because each citizen will then have his equal share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their proposals are so clearly futile for all practical purposes, that if they were carried out the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. Moreover they are emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the State into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession. If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in land, the land in such a case is only his wages in another form; and, consequently, a working man’s little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in this power of disposal that ownership consists, whether the property be land or movable goods. The Socialists, therefore, in endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, for they deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.

What is of still greater importance, however, is that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. For the brute has no power of selfdirection, but is governed by two chief instincts, which keep his powers alert, move him to use his strength, and determine him to action without the power of choice. These instincts are self-preservation and the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which are close at hand ; beyond their surroundings the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by sensibility alone, and by the things which sense perceives. But with man it is different indeed. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of animal nature, and therefore he enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal race, the fruition of the things of the body. But animality, however perfect, is far from being the whole of humanity, and is, indeed, humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and obey. It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings ; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future.

This becomes still more clearly evident if we consider man’s nature a little more deeply. For man, comprehending by the power of his reason things innumerable, and joining the future with the present—being, moreover, the master of his own acts—governs himself by the foresight of his counsel, under the eternal law and the power of God whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice, not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself; for of the products of the earth he can make provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State ; and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State. And to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal human race is not to deny that there can be private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general; not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of individual peoples. Moreover, the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does not live on what the land brings forth. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labor ; so that it may be truly said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one’s own land, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have another proof that private ownership is according to nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life’s well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality ; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.

These arguments are so strong and convincing that it seems surprising that certain obsolete opinions should now be revived in opposition to what is here laid down. We are told that it is right for private persons to have the use the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for any one to possess as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated. But those who assert this do not perceive that they are robbing man of what his own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, it is now fruitful, it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved it becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a man’s sweat and labor should be enjoyed by another? As effects follow their cause, so it is just and right that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.

With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of Nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being preëminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing, in the most unmistakable manner, to the peace and tranquillity of human life. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws,—laws which, as long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority of the Divine Law adds its sanction, forbidding us, in the gravest terms, even to covet that which is another’s: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.^*

^* Deuteronomy v. 21.

The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in a much stronger light if they are considered in relation to man’s social and domestic obligations.

In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning. Increase and multiply.^† Thus we have the Family; the “society” of a man’s own household; a society limited, indeed, in numbers, but a true “ society,” anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth.

^† Genesis i. 28.

That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties. For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. A family, no less than a State, is, as We have said, a true society, governed by a power within itself, that is to say, by the father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the Family has, at least, equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty.

We say, at least, equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State—that is to say, the Families—on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after.

The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here. Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State, nor absorbed; for it has the same source as human life itself. “The child belongs to the father,” and is, as it were, the continuation of the father’s personality; and, to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is begotten. And it is for the very reason that “the child belongs to the father,” that, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, “ before it attains the use of free will, it is in the power and care of its parents.”^* The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and introducing the providence of the State, act against natural justice, and threaten the very existence of family life.

^* St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2æ Q. x. Art. 12.

And such interference is not only unjust, but is quite certain to harass and disturb all classes of citizens, and to subject them to odious and intolerable slavery. It would open the door to envy, to evil-speaking, and to quarrelling ; the sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal equality of which so much is said would, in reality, be the levelling down of all to the same condition of misery and dishonor.

Thus it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be utterly rejected; for it would injure those whom it is intended to benefit, it would be contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and it would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonwealth. Our first and most fundamental principle, therefore, when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This laid down, We go on to show where we must find the remedy that we seek.

We approach the subject with confidence, and in the exercise of the rights which belong to Us. For no practical solution of this question will ever be found without the assistance of Religion and of the Church. It is We who are the chief guardian of Religion, and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the Church, and We must not by silence neglect the duty which lies upon Us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides Ourselves—of the rulers of States, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves for whom We plead. But We affirm without hesitation, that all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church. It is the Church that proclaims from the Gospel those teachings by which the conflict can be put an end to, or at the least made far less bitter; the Church uses its efforts not only to enlighten the mind, but to direct by its precepts the life and conduct of men; the Church improves and ameliorates the condition of the working man by numerous useful organizations; does its best to enlist the services of all ranks in discussing and endeavoring to meet, in the most practical way, the claims of the working classes; and acts on the decided view that for these purposes recourse should be had, in due measure and degree, to the help of the law and of State authority.

Let it be laid down, in the first place, that humanity must remain as it is. It is impossible to reduce human society to a level. The Socialists may do their utmost, but all striving against nature is vain. There naturally exist among mankind innumerable differences of the most important kind; people differ in capability, in diligence, in health, and in strength; an unequal fortune is a necessary result of inequality in condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his case. As regards bodily labor, even had man never fallen from the state of innocence, he would not have been wholly unoccupied ; but that which would then have been his free choice and his delight, became afterwards compulsory, and the painful expiation of his sin. Cursed be the earth in thy work; in thy labor thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.^* In like manner, the other pains and hardships of life will have no end or cessation on this earth; for the consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must be with man as long as life lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let men try as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hardpressed people freedom from pain and trouble, undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they cheat the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only make the evil worse than before. There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is—and at the same time to look elsewhere for a remedy to its troubles.

^* Genesis iii. 17.

The great mistake that is made in the matter now under consideration, is to possess oneself of the idea that class is naturally hostile to class; that rich and poor are intended by nature to live at war with one another. So irrational and so false is this view, that the exact contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the members of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that these two classes should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and outrage. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in making it impossible, the efficacy of Christianity is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is nothing more powerful than Religion (of which the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing rich and poor together, by reminding each class of its duties to the other, and especially of the duties of justice. Thus Religion teaches the laboring man and the workman to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made; never to injure capital, or to outrage the person of an employer; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, or to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their slaves; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to right reason, and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power. Thus, again, Religion teaches that, as among the workman’s concerns are Religion herself and things spiritual and mental, the employer is bound to see that he has time for the duties of piety; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just. Doubtless before we can decide whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but rich men and masters should remember this—that to exercise pressure for the sake of gain, upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold the hire of the laborers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.^* Finally, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workman’s earnings, either by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing ; and with the more reason because the poor man is weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness.

^* St. James v. 4.

Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed, would not strife die out and cease ?

But the Church, with Jesus Christ for its Master and Guide, aims higher still. It lays down precepts yet more perfect, and tries to bind class to class in friendliness and good understanding. The things of this earth cannot be understood or valued rightly without taking into consideration the life to come, the life that will last forever. Exclude the idea of futurity, and the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay, the whole system of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its base—that when we have done with this present life, then we shall really begin to live. God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but for things heavenly and everlasting; He has given us this world as a place of exile, and not as our true country. Money, and the other things which men call good and desirable—we may have them in abundance, or we may want them altogether ; as far as eternal happiness is concerned, it is no matter; the only thing that is important is to use them aright. Jesus Christ, when He redeemed us with plentiful redemption, took not away the pains and sorrows which in such large proportion make up the texture of our mortal life; He transformed them into motives of virtue and occasions of merit: and no man can hope for eternal reward unless he follow in the blood-stained footprints of his Saviour. If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign with Him.^* His labors and His sufferings, accepted by His own free will, have marvellously sweetened all suffering and all labor. And not only by His example, but by His grace and by the hope of everlasting recompense, He has made pain and grief more easy to endure ; for that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.^†

^* II. Timothy ii. 12.

^† II. Corinthians iv. 17.

Therefore those whom fortune favors are warned that freedom from sorrow, and abundance of earthly riches, are no guarantee of the beatitude that shall never end, but rather the contrary ;^* that the rich should tremble at the threatenings of Jesus Christ—threatenings so strange in the mouth of Our Lord ;^† and that a most strict account must be given to the Supreme Judge for all that we possess. The chiefest and most excellent rule for the right use of money is one which the heathen philosophers indicated, but which the Church has traced out clearly, and has not only made known to men’s minds but has impressed upon their lives. It rests on the principle that it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money, and another to have a right to use money as one pleases. Private ownership, as we have seen, is the natural right of man; and to exercise that right, especially as members of society, is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary. It is lawful, says St. Thomas of Aquin, for a man to hold private property ; and it is also necessary for the carrying on of human life.^‡ But if the question be asked, How must one’s possessions be used? the Church replies without hesitation in the words of the same holy Doctor: Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need. Whence the Apostle saith, Command the rich of this world... to give with ease, to communicate.§ True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own necessities and those of his household; nor even to give away what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life; for no one ought to live unbecomingly.|| But when necessity has been supplied, and one’s position fairly considered, it is a duty to give to the indigent out of that which is over. That which remaineth, give alms.¶ It is a duty, not of justice (except in extreme cases), but of Christian charity —a duty which is not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must give place to the laws and judgments of Christ the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving—It is more blessed to give than to receive ;^* and Who will count a kindness done or refused to the poor as done or refused to Himself—as long as you did it to one of My least brethren, you did it to Me.^† Thus to sum up what has been said: Whoever has received from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they be external and corporeal or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the minister of God’s providence, for the benefit of others. He that hath a talent, says St. Gregory the Great, let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him arouse himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and the utility thereof with his neighbor.^‡

^* St. Matthew xix. 23, 24.

^† St. Luke vi. 24, 25.

^‡ 2a 2æ Q. lxvi. Art. 2. § Ibid. Q. lxv. Art. 2. || Ibid. Q. xxxii. Art. 6. ¶ St. Luke xi. 41.

^* Acts xx. 35.

^† St. Matthew xxv. 40.

^‡ St. Gregory the Great. Hom. ix. in Evangel. n. 7.

§ II. Corinthians viii. 9. || St. Mark vi. 3.

¶ St. Matthew v. 3: “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” ** Ibid. xi. 28. “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you.”

As for those who do not possess the gifts of fortune, they are taught by the Church that in God's sight poverty is no disgrace, and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor. This is strengthened by what we see in Christ Himself, Who whereas He was rich, for our sakes became poor ;§ and Who, being the Son of God, and God Himself, chose to seem and to be considered the son of a carpenter—nay, did not disdain to spend a great part of His life as a carpenter Himself. Is not this the carpenter, the Son of Mary?|| From the contemplation of this Divine example it is easy to understand that the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and poor; and that virtue, and virtue alone, wherever found, will be followed by the rewards of everlasting happiness. Nay, God Himself seems to incline more to those who suffer evil; for Jesus Christ calls the poor blessed;¶ He lovingly invites those in labor and grief to come to Him for solace;** and He displays the tenderest charity to the lowly and the oppressed. These reflections cannot fail to keep down the pride of those who are well off, and to cheer the spirit of the afflicted ; to incline the former to generosity and the latter to tranquil resignation. Thus the separation which pride would make tends to disappear, nor will it be difficult to make rich and poor join hands in friendly concord.

But if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also in those of brotherly love. For they will understand and feel that all men are the children of the common Father, that is, of God; that all have the same last end, which is God Himself, Who alone can make either men or angels absolutely and perfectly happy; that all and each are redeemed by Jesus Christ and raised to the dignity of children of God, and are thus united in brotherly ties both with each other and with Jesus Christ, the first-born among many brethren; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to the whole human race, and that to all, except to those who are unworthy, is promised the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven. If sons, heirs also, heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ.^*

^* Romans viii. 17.

Such is the scheme of duties and of rights which is put forth to the world by the Gospel. Would it not seem that strife must quickly cease were society penetrated with ideas like these ?

But the Church, not content with pointing out the remedy, also applies it. For the Church does its utmost to teach and to train men, and to educate them; and by means of its Bishops and clergy it diffuses its salutary teachings far and wide. It strives to influence the mind and heart so that all may willingly yield themselves to be formed and guided by the commandments of God. It is precisely in this fundamental and principal matter, on which everything depends, that the Church has a power peculiar to itself. The agencies which it employs are given it for the very purpose of reaching the hearts of men, by Jesus Christ Himself, and derive their efficiency from God. They alone can touch the innermost heart and conscience, and bring men to act from a motive of duty, to resist their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow-men with a love that is unique and supreme, and courageously to break down every barrier which stands in the way of a virtuous life.

On this subject We need only recall, for one moment, the examples written down in history. Of these things there cannot be the shadow of doubt; for instance, that civil society was renovated in every part by the teachings of Christianity ; that in the strength of that renewal the human race was lifted up to better things,—nay, that it was brought back from death to life, and to so excellent a life that nothing more perfect had been known before, or will come to pass in the ages that have yet to be. Of this beneficent transformation, Jesus Christ was at once the first cause and the final purpose; as from Him all came, so to Him all was to be referred. For when, by the light of the Gospel message, the human race came to know the grand mystery of the Incarnation of the Word and the redemption of man, the life of Jesus Christ, God and Man, penetrated every race and nation, and impregnated them with His faith, His precepts, and His laws. And if Society is to be cured now, in no other way can it be cured but by a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions. When a Society is perishing, the true advice to give to those who would restore it is to recall it to the principles from which it sprung; for the purpose and perfection of an association is to aim at and to attain that for which it was formed; and its operation should be put in motion and inspired by the end and object which originally gave it its being. So that to fall away from its primal constitution is disease; to go back to it is recovery. And this may be asserted with the utmost truth both of the State in general and of that body of its citizens—by far the greater number— who sustain life by labor.

Neither must it be supposed that the solicitude of the Church is so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor, for example, should rise above poverty and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life; and for this it strives. By the very fact that it calls men to virtue and forms them to its practice, it promotes this in no slight degree. Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity, for it merits the blessing of that God Who is the source of all blessings; it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure—twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abundance ;^* it makes men supply by economy for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance.

^* “The root of all evils is cupidity.”—I. Tim. vi. 10.

Moreover, the Church intervenes directly in the interest of the poor, by setting on foot and keeping up many things which it sees to be efficacious in the relief of poverty. Here, again, it has always succeeded so well that it has even extorted the praise of its enemies. Such was the ardor of brotherly love among the earliest Christians that numbers of those who were better off deprived themselves of their possessions in order to relieve their brethren; whence neither was there any one needy among them.^† To the order of Deacons, instituted for that very purpose, was committed by the Apostles the charge of the daily distributions; and the Apostle Paul, though burdened with the solicitude of all the churches, hesitated not to undertake laborious journeys in order to carry the alms of the Faithful to the poorer Christians. Tertullian calls these contributions, given voluntarily by Christians in their assemblies, deposits of piety ; because, to cite his words, they were employed in feeding the needy, in burying them, in the support of boys and girls destitute of means and deprived of their parents, in the care of the aged, and in relief of the shipwrecked.^‡

^† Acts iv. 34.

^‡ Apologia Secunda, xxxix.

Thus by degrees came into existence the patrimony which the Church has guarded with religious care as the inheritance of the poor. Nay, to spare them the shame of begging, the common Mother of rich and poor has exerted herself to gather together funds for the support of the needy. The Church has stirred up everywhere the heroism of charity, and has established Congregations of Religious and many other useful institutions for help and mercy, so that there might be hardly any kind of suffering which was not visited and relieved. At the present day there are many who, like the heathen of old, blame and condemn the Church for this beautiful charity. They would substitute in its place a system of State-organized relief. But no human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Charity, as a virtue, belongs to the Church; for it is no virtue unless it is drawn from the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ; and he who turns his back on the Church cannot be near to Christ.

It cannot, however, be doubted that to attain the purpose of which We treat, not only the Church but all human means must conspire. All who are concerned in the matter must be of one mind and must act together. It is in this as in the Providence which governs the world: results do not happen save where all the causes co-operate.

Let us now, therefore, inquire what part the State should play in the work of remedy and relief.

By the State We here understand, not the particular form of government which prevails in this or that nation, but the State, as rightly understood ; that is to say, any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the Divine wisdom which We have expounded in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of the State. The first duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper office of wise statesmanship and the work of the heads of the State. Now a State chiefly prospers and flourishes by morality, by well-regulated family life, by respect for religion and justice, by the moderation and equal distribution of public burdens, by the progress of the arts and of trade, by the abundant yield of the land—by everything which makes the citizens better and happier. Here, then, it is in the power of a ruler to benefit every order of the State, and amongst the rest to promote in the highest degree the interests of the poor, and this by virtue of his office, and without being exposed to any suspicion of undue interference; for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the common good. And the more that is done for the working population by the general laws of the country, the less need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve them.

There is another and a deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. To the State the interests of all are equal, whether high or low. The poor are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are real component parts, living parts, which make up, through the family, the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are by far the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and to favor another; and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working people, or else that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas of Aquin: As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in some sense claim what belongs to the whole.** Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called in the school distributive—towards each and every class.

But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so profitably to themselves, yet it is not to be supposed that all can contribute in the same way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may be made in forms of government, there will always be differences and inequalities of condition in the State: Society cannot exist or be conceived without them. Some there must be who dedicate themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who

• 2a 2æ Q. lxi. Art. 1 ad 2. make the laws, who administer justice, whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in the foremost estimation, for their work touches most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such a fashion as this; but they do in the most important way benefit the nation, though less directly. We have insisted that, since it is the end of Society to make men better, the chief good that Society can be possessed of is Virtue. Nevertheless, in all well-constituted States it is a by no means unimportant matter to provide those bodily and external commodities the use of which is necessary to virtuous action.^* And in the provision of material well-being, the labor of the poor— the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength in the culture of the land and the workshops of trade—is most efficacious and altogether indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation in this respect is so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of the working man that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the Administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to be conducive to the well-being of those who work should receive favorable consideration. Let it not be feared that solicitude of this kind will injure any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all; for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to secure from misery those on whom it so largely depends. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the community and all its parts; the community, because the conservation of the community is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a Government’s whole reason of existence; and the parts, because both philosophy and the Gospel agree in laying down that the object of the administration of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he rules. The gift of authority is from God, and is, as it were, a participation of the highest of all sovereignties; and it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised— with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches to details as well.

^* St. Thomas of Aquin. De Regimine Principum, I. cap. 15.

114. To say that a man has a right to a thing, means that he has a certain power over it. Evidently, however, physical power does not of itself constitute a right. The highwayman's power over the traveler's money gives him no right thereto. A right, then, belongs to the moral order. It is an inviolable moral power belonging to one man, which, therefore, all other men are bound to respect.

115. In every right four things are to be taken into account: (a) the subject, i. e., the person possessing the right; (b) the term, including all those who are bound to respect the right; (c) the title, or reason on which the right is founded; (d) the matter, or that to which the subject has a right. The matter may be my own act or the act of another person; that is, I may have the right to perform a certain act or to require the performance or the omission of an act on the part of another. Thus in N.'s right to the house which he owns, N. himself is the subject, all other persons constitute the term, his payment of the purchase money agreed upon is the title, and the ownership of the house is the matter. He has a right to occupy the house, to prevent others from dwelling in it, or to require the party who leases it to pay the stipulated rent.

116. A right possessed by one person involves, on the part of another or of others, the obligation to respect that right. This obligation is called a duty. We may therefore define duty in the abstract as a moral bond or obligation of doing or omitting certain acts in favor of another person. The act itself that ought to be done or omitted is the concrete duty. Every duty then supposes a corresponding right, and every right a duty: right and duty are correlative and inseparable. Hence brute animals can have no rights, for they have no duties or moral obligations, since by their irrational nature they are incapable of voluntary acts. We are under obligation to abstain from cruelty to animals, not because they have rights, but because such conduct is unworthy of our rational nature. Insane persons and infants have rights radically, which all are bound to respect; yet by reason of their mental helplessness they are exempt from performing duties.

117. Every duty or obligation supposes that some one who has power to bind the consciences of men has imposed the obligation. Now, moral acts, we know from the preceding book, are such as are in conformity with the moral law, which has God for its author. As every moral obligation is necessarily associated with a moral act, it depends, immediately or remotely, for its binding force upon the moral law and the Divine Author of the law. Therefore, the true rights and duties of man come from God; and they cannot be correctly understood if considered apart from their dependence upon God.

118. Rights and duties are inseparable; yet it may be asked, which is prior? Do the duties which rest upon us precede in the order of nature and of supposition the corresponding rights, or is the converse true? 1. Absolutely, or in the formal concept of right and duty, right is prior to duty. Right is a moral power existing in one person, which gives rise to an obligation in another. Consequently, the right is the cause of the obligation, and every cause is prior, in the order of nature and of supposition, to its effect. 2. Since God cannot be bound or limited, He has no duties towards His creatures, although He possesses sovereign rights over all creation. 3. Hence, man has no rights with regard to God; he has duties only. These duties, which God has imposed, confer upon him a right to the means required to attain the end of his existence. Thus man's dependence upon God is a duty prior to all his rights, and, at the same time, it is the source of all his rights. Once God has deigned to bestow upon us the right of existence, He owes it to His own infinite attributes to perfect His gift by endowing us with all the rights necessary for our existence as men. 4. A man's God-given rights impose obligations or duties on other men to respect his rights. Hence, in the relations of men with one another, right is prior to duty.

119. Rights are variously divided into connatural and acquired, alienable and inalienable, perfect and imperfect. 1. Connatural rights are those which are inseparable from the nature of man as a person. Such are the rights to life and limb, to personal integrity, to liberty of action within just limits, to specific equality as a member of the human family. Acquired rights come to a man in virtue of his own exertions, or of acts done by others in his favor; for example, rights to property, to franchise, to office, are acquired rights. 2. Inalienable rights are those which a man cannot renounce or transfer to another, because they are necessary to the attainment of his last end. All other rights are called alienable. "We hold these truths to be self-evident," says our Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 3. Perfect or strict rights are of such a kind that the corresponding duties are matters of commutative justice. Imperfect rights are not so definite; they are founded not on justice but on claims of gratitude or of honor, or on some similar title.

120. Rights in conflict. Rights cannot strictly be said to conflict. We may meet with conflicting claims to the same thing, or apparent rights in conflict, but of these only one can be a real right. For, by the nature of a right, its existence in one person imposes an obligation upon all others to respect that right. Consequently, conflicting rights is a contradiction in terms, because "I am bound to respect something" and "I am not so bound" are evidently contradictory propositions. When two claims conflict, the right disputed must be decided to belong to the claimant that has the true title, or at least the better title. Such a decision is not always easy, especially as men are naturally prepossessed in favor of their own interests, and on this account they are often forced to make use of arbitration and law courts.

121. The following principles regarding conflicting claims are obvious: of two claims otherwise equal that should prevail --

1. Which is more necessary for the attainment of man's last end: thus, the right to life takes precedence of that to property. Hence, if a man who is suffering extreme poverty has instant need of food, he possesses the right to supply his need from the provisions of others who are not in equal or greater need.

2. Which concerns the good of the greater number. For this reason, the common good takes precedence of private good, as when a citizen has to expose his life in defense of the State.

3. Which is more probably genuine: thus, a man possessing an object which he acquired in good faith can continue to hold it till a better claim be proved.

122. Various classes of duties correspond to the various classes of rights: to the natural rights of one person correspond the natural duties of others; to acquired rights, adventitious duties; to imperfect rights, imperfect duties. Positive duties, which are based on positive or affirmative precepts of the law, oblige us to perform certain acts; while negative duties, which are based on negative precepts, oblige us to abstain from certain acts. Positive duties do not require us to act at every moment, but only at certain times; negative duties, however, oblige us to abstain at all times from the forbidden acts.

We have duties to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbor. These three classes of duties we shall examine severally in the three following chapters.

220. We know from history that at the dawn of Christianity nearly half the human race was in a state of slavery. In the mildest meaning of the term, a slave is a human being bound for life to work for his master without other remuneration than his support, possessing no rights except those that are inalienable. Inalienable rights are such as are intimately connected with the attainment of our last end. They are the rights to life, limbs, health, surroundings favorable to morality, and in general all those aids to eternal happiness of which a man cannot justly deprive himself, since by so doing he would infringe God's rights to his service. Slavery thus limited may, perhaps, in certain special circumstances, contain no violation of strict right, and, therefore, no injustice; yet, it ever has been an evil, usually far greater than squalid poverty; and it has occasioned countless abuses of the most deplorable kind. Hence, the Church has always labored — and with unfailing success — to mitigate and finally to suppress it. To the general satisfaction, slavery has disappeared from all Christian lands. There is no reason, therefore, for treating the subject further.