Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
On the definition, object, and subject of justice
Justice is defined in law, from Ulpian : « The constant and perpetual will to render to each his right. »
Iustitia definitur in iure, ex Ulpiano : « Constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. »
By will is not understood the very power of willing, but the act315 ; whence a habit is defined through the act : which is not unusual. It is called « perpetual », not on the part of the act, which endures perpetually, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man wills to render to everyone his right perpetually and in all things : whence, if anyone wishes to reduce this definition to due form, let him say that justice is « the virtue inclining the will constantly to render forever to everyone his right ». Hence you have that it belongs to the reason of justice properly so called that it be toward another. 315 Hic q. 58, a. 1, ad 1, 3 and 4.
Per voluntatem non intelligitur ipsa potentia volendi, sed actus315; unde definitur habitus per actum : quod non est insolitum. Dicitur « perpetua », non ex parte actus qui perpetuo duret, sed ex parte obiecti, quatenus iustus vult reddere perpetuo et in omnibus cuique ius suum : unde, si quis velit hanc definitionem ad debitam formam reducere, dicat quod iustitia sit « virtus inclinans constanter voluntatem ad perpetuo reddendum unicuique ius suum ». Hinc habes, esse de ratione iustitiae proprie dictae quod sit ad alterum. 315 Hic q. 58, a. 1, ad 1, 3 et 4.
I say 2°: The remote material object of justice are external things which are commuted or distributed. The proximate material object are the actions by which these things are commuted and distributed. Because justice differs in this from the other moral virtues, that these rectify primarily and per se man in himself, but justice in order to another316. Now the ordination of one man to another is not attended to according to interior affections or passions, but according to exterior actions and things by which men can communicate with one another, such as, as to things, goods of fortune, money, houses, fields, grains, etc. ; as to actions, those by which these things are commuted, namely sale, payment, loan for consumption, loan for use, lease, etc. ; likewise also those actions in which no exterior thing intervenes, as honor, praise, detraction, etc. Therefore. 316 Ibid., a. 9 and 10, c.
Dico 2°: Obiectum materiale remotum iustitiae sunt res exteriores quae commutantur aut distribuuntur. Materiale proximum sunt actiones quibus hae res commutantur et distribuuntur. Quia iustitia in hoc differt ab aliis virtutibus moralibus, quod hae rectificent primario et per se hominem in seipso, iustitia vero in ordine ad alium316. Atqui ordinatio unius hominis ad alium non attenditur secundum interiores affectiones seu passiones, sed secundum exteriores actiones et res quibus homines sibi invicem communicare possunt, ut sunt, quoad res, bona fortunae, pecuniae, domus, agri, frumenta, etc.; quoad actiones, eae quibus istae res commutantur, nimirum venditio, solutio, mutuum, commodatum, locatio, etc.; item etiam eae actiones in quibus nulla intervenit res exterior, ut honoratio, laudatio, detractio, etc. Ergo. 316 Ibid., a. 9 et 10, c.
The formal object quod of justice is right taken for the just, or the equal owed to another317 ; because this justice principally intends and effects, as appears from its definition, and thereby it is distinguished from the other virtues. Whence he is called just who makes or preserves this equality, unjust who does not preserve it. 317 Hic q. 57, a. 1, o.
Obiectum formale quod iustitiae est ius acceptum pro iusto, seu aequali alteri debito317; quia id principaliter intendit et facit iustitia, ut patet ex eius definitione, et per hoc ab aliis virtutibus distinguitur. Unde dicitur iustus qui hanc aequalitatem facit aut servat, iniustus qui non servat. 317 Hic q. 57, a. 1, o.
The formal object quo is the ratio of debt, or right in another, taken for the legitimate faculty of possessing, alienating, etc. For the reason why I render the equal to another is because I owe it to him ; I owe it however because that other has a right to it : for debt and right are correlatives.
Obiectum formale quo est ratio debiti, seu ius in altero, sumptum pro legitima facultate possidendi, alienandi, etc. Ratio enim cur aequale alteri reddam, est quia ipsi debeo; debeo autem quia ille alter habet ius ad illud : debitum enim et ius sunt correlativa.
I say 3°: The subject of justice is the will318. For it is not the intellect, because justice is not ordered per se and primarily to direct any cognitive act ; nor is it the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite follows sensitive apprehension, but sensitive apprehension does not consider the proportion of one thing to another, which pertains to justice ; for this is proper to reason. Therefore. 318 Hic q. 58, a. 4, o.
Dico 3°: Subiectum iustitiae est voluntas318. Non enim est intellectus, quia iustitia non ordinatur per se primario ad dirigendum aliquem actum cognoscitivum; neque est appetitus sensitivus, quia appetitus sensitivus sequitur apprehensionem sensitivam, apprehensio autem sensitiva non considerat proportionem unius ad alterum, quod spectat ad iustitiam ; hoc enim est proprium rationis. Ergo. 318 Hic q. 58, a. 4, o.