TREATISE ON VIRTUES

Preliminary Matters. - There inheres in the powers (n. 1) a certain quality by which they are inclined to acting in one mode rather than another, whether well or badly.¹ A quality of this sort is called a habit, and is added over and above the power, and completes or perfects this in order to its operation.² As far as our matter is concerned, one habit is acquired, another infused; the former is generated from acts multiplied, the latter (we are speaking of the supernatural) exceeds the faculty of human nature and is obtained from immediate divine action, without a natural principle, as the habits of Faith, Hope, Charity, and of all the supernatural virtues. - The chief effects of habits are: 1° Uniformity³ in the operations of the powers in which they inhere, so that the operations are exercised constantly in the same mode. Thus, for example, the will, by force of the habit of virtue, constantly chooses that which is agreeable to the rule of morals, and for this reason a habit is called a second nature;⁴ yet in this sense only, that by a habit the power is inclined to acting in a similar mode, not that it is compelled.⁵ 2° Facility in exercising operations, since a habit consists in a certain propensity to acting.⁶ 3° Delectability in performing operations, because a habit "renders the operation proper to itself as it were natural" (a second nature), "and consequently delightful, for congruence is the cause of delight."⁷ Sanseverino, Comp. Dynam. n. 26-29, 31. - Hence:

247. • Virtue is a habit of acting honestly or according to right order.

It is called: 1° A habit, that is, a stable quality or disposition, infused or acquired. For it is not the same thing to be virtuous and to posit an act of virtue, which can be done without a habit. - But that habit is not only dispositive, as for example beauty is, but also, and indeed especially, operative, namely inclining the power to acting honestly.

It is called: 2° of acting honestly or according to right order. But right order, among other things, also demands this, that the mean of virtue be preserved, namely by avoiding defect and excess in the exercise of virtue. But that mean is either of the thing, or of reason. The mean of the thing is so determined and fixed that it is always one and indivisible, and therefore is not varied according to place, time, and person. This must be preserved in commutative justice. Thus, for example, if I owe you 100, I also ought to give you 100, and I fall short of the virtue of justice if I give you only 99 3/4; on the contrary, if I return 110 to you, I will posit an act not only of justice, but also of liberality. - But the mean of reason, which must be preserved in the other virtues, is divisible, and is varied according to place, time, and person, according to the estimation of the prudent; and therefore it is called of reason.

That virtue consists in the mean can indeed rightly be said of all virtues, yet not in the same sense; for there are virtues which, by reason of their object, do not admit a mean, namely the theological virtues, and that moral virtue which is called Religion. For we never pursue God, the object of these virtues, enough or too much by Faith, Hope, Charity, or worship (Religion). Yet these same virtues, by reason of the circumstances which accompany their acts (by reason of mode, time, place, etc.), are rightly said to consist in the mean. Thus one sins by excess through presumption against Hope, and through superstition against Religion.¹

Virtues are distinguished in various species, namely:

1° Natural, which are also called human and philosophical; or supernatural, which are also called Christian, according as they tend to perfecting man in order to a natural or supernatural end or happiness.

2° Infused or acquired, according as they are infused by God Himself into the heart, or are acquired by repeated acts of the agent.

3° Theological or moral, according as they immediately regard God, or have for their immediate object the honesty of an action. There are three theological virtues, namely Faith, Hope, Charity. There are four cardinal moral virtues, to which the others are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

4° Intellectual, which reside in the intellect as in their proximate subject, as Faith and prudence; or appetitive, which reside in the will as in their proximate subject, as the other two theological virtues and the three remaining cardinal virtues.

5° Formed or unformed, according as they are joined or not joined with habitual Charity or sanctifying grace.

Quaer. 1° Whether and in what sense are virtues connected among themselves?

Resp. 1° The theological virtues are connected among themselves in this sense: a) that Charity in this life cannot be without Faith and Hope; for it is infused with these,² and when these are lost through infidelity and despair, Charity also is lost; for Charity cannot stand with mortal sin. b) That Hope cannot be without Faith; for "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,"³ that is, their foundation. But Hope can be without Charity; for a sinner who has not yet despaired, although Charity has been lost, nevertheless retains Hope, as is clear from proposition 57 among the condemned Quesnellian propositions: "... there is no Hope in God where there is no Love of God." Likewise Faith can be without Hope and Charity; for even if someone sins by the mortal sin of despair, if he does not become an unbeliever, after Hope has been lost, as also Charity, he retains Faith, because this is lost only by infidelity.¹ Nor say that without Charity true Faith and Hope are not given; for Trent² condemns those who say that "when grace has been lost through sin, ... the Faith which remains is not true Faith." For although Charity is the form of Faith and also of Hope, nevertheless it is only an extrinsic form, insofar as it gives them accidental life, or the force of meriting de condigno.³

Resp. 2° Natural moral virtues are not necessarily connected with the theological virtues, and are often in heretics and unbelievers, who, although they lack theological virtues, nevertheless are often just, temperate, etc. This is clear from proposition 25, condemned among the Baian propositions (p. X).⁴

Resp. 3° Moral virtues are necessarily connected among themselves if they are perfect, or such as are habits which have all their effects, namely uniformity, facility, delectability. Cf. above the Preliminary Matters. Someone, for example, is just but not liberal: since this man loves money too much, he would easily inflict injury on the neighbor, or would pay a debt to another only with difficulty (therefore neither easily nor delightfully). - If they are imperfect, they are not necessarily connected, as is clear.⁵

Yet from this, that one who lacks one moral virtue is destitute of the others, it does not follow that he is altogether unequal to acting well; for perfect virtue does not denote the possibility for an act of virtue, but the constancy and facility of operating rightly. Thus even those who do not have the virtue of temperance can nevertheless posit acts of temperance.⁶ On the contrary, from the fact that someone has perfect virtue, it does not follow that the acts of all virtues are found in him. "Hence the act of magnanimity does not belong to every virtuous man"; for it suffices if he has "the habit of greatness," or a proximate disposition toward exercising it, in the case in which this, according to his state, would be licit for him.⁷

Note. - Perfect virtue is also called by Ascetics solid, at least in this sense: that by difficulties occurring in the exercise of virtues it is not hindered in its acts.

Quaer. 2° Whether virtues are unequal, or some more perfect than others?

Resp. 1° Virtues, according to their diverse species, are absolutely unequal, that is, with regard to the good to which they are ordered; for that good, according to the diversity or species of the virtues, is greater or less. Wherefore theological virtues, according to their species, are more perfect than moral virtues, because the good to which the former are immediately ordered, namely God, is greater than the good to which the latter are ordered. But among the theological virtues, under this reason Charity is more perfect;¹ among the moral virtues, prudence, "because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man bears himself well not only in himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man on account of the good contemns the dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man on account of the good contemns the greatest delights of bodily things."²

Resp. 2° The same species of virtue, considered in itself, is equal, because "whoever has some virtue," namely perfect virtue, "for instance temperance, has it as to all things to which temperance extends."³

Resp. 3° By reason of the subject which participates in virtue, the same species of virtue can be unequal; for virtue consists in the mean, but in reaching this mean "one is better disposed than another, either because of greater habituation, or because of a better disposition of nature, or because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason." Therefore the same virtue can be unequal "either according to diverse times in the same person, or in diverse men."⁴

Quaer. 3° How are virtues acquired?

Resp. Supernatural virtues are acquired through infusion, natural virtues through the exercise of acts. I say: of acts, and not of an act; for through one act a habit is not customarily acquired. I said, not customarily; for it could be acquired if perhaps the act were so intense and lasting that it would be equivalent to several. - I said, supernatural virtues are acquired through infusion; this is not to be understood as if our acts contributed nothing to this; for they contribute by way of preceding dispositions, not however as efficient causes. For God alone is the efficient cause of the acquisition of these virtues; yet, according to His ordinary law, He does not work these virtues in us except either through the Sacraments, as instrumental causes, or with our previous cooperation with His grace; and this in adults is necessary as a dispositive, or meritorious, cause. Trent clearly explains these things.¹

If sometimes natural virtues are said to be infused by nature, this is to be understood: a) of a certain inchoative aptitude for virtue, which aptitude is in the intellect, insofar as it knows the good of virtue, and in the will, insofar as it naturally seeks that good; likewise sometimes in the sensitive appetite, insofar as it is naturally subject to reason; likewise at times in the complexion of certain persons, insofar as this in them resists the good of virtue less. b) Of that aptitude alone, not of the perfection of virtues, as is clear even from this, that what is from nature is determined to one thing, while on the contrary perfect virtues bear themselves in diverse ways, according to the diversity both of the matter about which they are conversant and of the circumstances in which they are exercised.²

Quaer. 4° How are virtues lost?

Resp. They are lost directly and indirectly. - Directly through acts directly and gravely contrary to them, for example Faith through infidelity; or through long non-use, that is, through lasting negligence in exercising them. In this way both acquired and infused virtues are lost, which St. Thomas explains in this manner:³ "When someone does not use the habit of virtue for moderating the passions or proper operations, it is necessary that many passions and operations arise outside the mode of virtue, from the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other things which move exteriorly; whence virtue is corrupted" (lost) "through cessation from act." Indirectly, through the loss of another virtue which is their foundation and principle; and in this way supernatural virtues are lost. Thus, when Faith is lost, Hope is lost; when Charity is lost, all supernatural or infused moral virtues are lost. - I said: supernatural. Hence one sinning mortally, for example by the sin of drunkenness, not only loses the virtue of temperance, but, since Charity, which is lost through any mortal sin whatever, is the foundation of the supernatural virtues, he also loses the supernatural virtues of chastity, humility, etc.; but he would not lose these virtues insofar as they were natural. For natural virtues are not necessarily connected with Charity, as was said in Resp. 2° to Quaer. 1°.

Quaer. 5° How are virtues increased and diminished?

Resp. Since the increase and diminution of virtues signifies nothing other than their greater or lesser perfection, but not an addition or subtraction of them,¹ therefore virtues can be increased only insofar as their acts are exercised more intensely, and diminished insofar as they are exercised more remissly. Yet natural virtues differ from infused virtues in this: that the former can be increased and diminished both as to the intensity of the habit and as to the fervor of the act; the latter, only as to the fervor of the acts, but not as to the intensity of the habit. This is certain if the discussion is of Charity, and it seems it must also be said of the other infused virtues; for although absolutely it is not repugnant for these also to be increased and diminished as to the intensity of the habit, nevertheless in this providence no cause of an increase or diminution of this sort can be assigned. For these virtues are infused together with Charity. Wherefore through mortal sin they are not diminished, but lost; but through venial sin the habit of Charity, or sanctifying grace, is not diminished, as something to which it is not opposed; therefore neither is the habit of the other infused virtues. But since, as has been said, even infused virtues can be diminished as to exercise and fervor of acts, and in this way, as was explained from St. Thomas in Resp. to Quaer. 4°, certain dispositions can be contracted which conduce to their corruption or loss, it is clear that through venial sins, or even through cessation from the acts of Charity, a certain disposition toward the corruption of Charity can be induced.²

If you ask by what means virtues are increased, I answer that both natural and supernatural or infused virtues are increased by the multiplication or frequentation of acts; supernatural virtues principally by the same divine infusion by which they were produced; instrumentally through the Sacraments, especially those of the living; dispositively and meritoriously through good works.

The cardinal virtues are opposed to the four wounds of original sin, insofar as these are to be cured through them: namely prudence to ignorance in the intellect; justice to malice in the will; fortitude to weakness in the irascible appetite; temperance to concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite.

In what order of perfection the cardinal virtues follow one another, we have taught from St. Thomas above, p. 109, col. 1, q. 2°, Resp. 1°.

They are called cardinal because on them, as on hinges, the other moral virtues, which for this reason are called adjunct or annexed, are founded;² they are also called principal because they are conversant about that which is most important in the matter of moral virtues, and under this reason the remaining ones are called secondary.³ For all can be reduced to one of the principal virtues, and this in one of these three modes, namely either as subjective parts, or as integral parts, or as potential parts.

Subjective parts are those virtues which are subjected to some cardinal virtue as to a whole as so many species into which it is divided.

Integral parts are those which, although they are not necessary for the being of some cardinal virtue, are nevertheless required for its perfect act, just as, for example, for a perfect house a foundation, walls, and roof are required.

Potential parts are virtues connected indeed with some cardinal virtue, but ordered only to certain secondary acts or matters, in which the reason of some cardinal virtue is not found fully, perfectly, exactly, and which therefore do not equal the whole power of some cardinal virtue, but only some part of it, after the likeness of the soul, which through any one of the powers does not unfold its whole power, but only part of this power. ... These things being premised, hold these few things concerning the individual cardinal virtues and concerning certain annexed virtues.

I. Prudence¹ is a habit of the practical intellect dictating what, considering the circumstances here and now, is to be done as licit, decent, expedient, or is to be fled as illicit, not decent, not expedient.

The material object of prudence is actions here and now to be posited or omitted; the formal object is the truth of the practical intellect, not however the truth of the speculative intellect, because this pertains to science; and therefore, as with right conscience, speculative falsity can indeed underlie prudence, but practical falsity cannot.²

The chief acts of prudence are: 1. good counsel or to inquire concerning the means to the end; 2. to judge rightly, namely concerning the means found; 3. to prescribe or command, that is, to execute the things found and judged.³

The subjective parts or species of prudence are: private or personal prudence, by which one rules himself; and governing or moderating prudence, by which one rules a community, for instance a family (economic prudence), a city, province, kingdom (political), an army (military).⁵

The quasi-integral parts of prudence are: memory, namely instructed by many experiences which we ourselves have had concerning past affairs or have heard from others; understanding of present things; providence of future things; shrewdness or quick conjecture of a means; docility, by which we willingly receive the counsels of others; circumspection, by which the circumstances of an affair are attended to; caution, by which impediments which can stand in the way of execution are avoided.⁶

The potential parts of prudence are: eubulia, or the habit of inquiring well concerning means (good counsel); synesis, or the habit of judging well concerning means found according to common rules, as sensible persons, or men of good sense, do, as St. Thomas has it; gnome, or the habit of judging well according to higher principles, where common rules fail, as happens in epikeia.¹

The vices² opposed to prudence by defect are precipitation, inconsideration, negligence. The first is contrary to the first act of prudence, the second to the second, the third to the third (see above). By excess the following are opposed to prudence: astuteness, which if committed by words is called deceit, if by deeds fraud; and generally prudence of the flesh, which is described by St. Gregory the Pope in the sixteenth book of the Moralia on chapter XII of Job (see Roman Breviary, Common of Confessors not Pontiffs, Lesson 2 of the second Nocturn, in the place).

II. What justice is, and what its subjective parts are, see n. 580, 581.

The integral parts are more commonly said to be: to render his own right to each one, and to avoid injury of the same.

The potential parts are all moral virtues, namely under the reason of debt of honesty (n. 74, p. 37, col. 1, § Moreover); but more specially religion; piety toward parents, blood relatives, and country; observance, or worship and honor exhibited to Superiors and those constituted in dignity and corresponding to their dignity (obedience is referred to this by St. Thomas³); penance; veracity; gratitude; vindicative justice; affability or friendship, to which by excess flattery is opposed, by defect harshness of conversation; liberality. They are only potential parts, because they fall short of Justice either because they do not render what is equal to the right of another, as the four prior virtues; or because a rigorous and perfect right is lacking in the other, as in the remaining virtues.⁴

The act of justice is to render to each one what is his.⁵ What the object of justice is, see in the Treatise on Right and Justice.

III. Fortitude, as a special virtue, is the considered undertaking of dangers and the enduring of labors or evils.⁶

Therefore its remote material object is dangers and evils, especially the gravest; the proximate object is to preserve the mean between daring and fear, which are conversant about those dangers and evils, by moderating the former and restraining the latter.¹

The acts of this virtue are to undertake (dangers) and to endure (evils); yet the more principal act is to endure, because it is more difficult.²

No subjective parts are assigned to it, since it is an indivisible species; for it is conversant about dangers of death to be undergone and the greatest pains to be sustained, which, although some are greater than others, are all of the same species; but more and less do not change the species.³

The integral parts are: magnanimity, greatness of soul; magnificence, external execution of great things; patience, so that the soul is not broken by the magnitude of evil; perseverance, lest it be wearied by the duration of the same. The two former are necessary so that the first act, undertaking, may be exercised perfectly; the two latter so that the other act, enduring, may be exercised perfectly.⁴

The potential parts are the same as the integral parts, but insofar as they are conversant about dangers and evils of lesser moment.⁵

The vices opposed to this virtue by excess are timidity, daring, and presumption; by defect, defect of just fear or intrepidity, pusillanimity, and cowardice.⁶

IV. Temperance is the virtue placing the mean of reason in bodily delights, especially those of touch.⁷

Its subjective parts are: abstinence,⁸ to which gluttony is opposed; sobriety,⁹ to which drunkenness is opposed; chastity,¹⁰ to which lust is opposed; modesty, which nevertheless is not a virtue distinct in species from chastity, and differs from chastity only in this, that the latter is conversant about the act destined for the propagation of the species, the former about its circumstances or "signs,"¹¹ for instance kisses, touches, looks, etc. It is called modesty from shame, because concerning these acts, even when they are licitly done, an honest soul is especially ashamed. In other words: "modesty pertains to chastity as its special circumstance, although sometimes one is put for the other."¹² How manifold chastity itself is, see n. 482.

The integral parts are shamefacedness, or fear of a base act and of the confusion arising from it,¹³ and honesty, or love of spiritual beauty as agreeing with reason.¹

The potential parts² are continence, meekness, and modesty.

Continence is taken here, not generally for the drawing back of the appetite from everything toward which it tends immoderately, nor for the virtue restraining the appetite from libidinous delights, in which manner it coincides with chastity; but specially for a habit residing in the will, which it so confirms against the impulses of concupiscence, especially against the impulses of delights of touch and principally venereal delights, that however much they swell up, it is not drawn by them into depraved consent. It is a potential part of temperance, because it is not judged perfect temperance, but only half-formed; for indeed it confirms the will against the rebellious motions of the passions, yet does not suffice to prohibit them from rising up immoderately.³

Meekness is the virtue moderating anger. But because in anger there are two things, namely the motion of anger and vengeance, this virtue contains two beneath itself: one which moderates the interior motion of anger, and this retains the common name of meekness; but the other, which tempers the external vengeance or penalty to be inflicted because of an injury which has been brought, as much as justice permits, and is called clemency.⁴

Modesty is the virtue by which someone holds a mode consonant with his condition in internal and external motions and exterior apparatus.⁵ Hence he is called modest, as though holding measure or standing in measure.⁶ It is divided into humility, studiousness, modesty of manners, eutrapely, and modesty of adornment. The two former hold measure in internal motions; for humility so moderates the appetite of excellence that in the affection and love of this excellence it does not exceed its lot;⁷ but studiousness restrains the desire of knowing within due limits.⁸ - Modesty of manners and eutrapely moderate exterior motions and actions of the body, so namely that they may be done decently and honestly, both in those things which are done seriously and in those which are done in play. If it moderates the exterior motions of the body in those things which are done seriously, for instance gait, voice, laughter, gaze, etc., it is called modesty of manners;¹ but eutrapely, when measure and decorum are preserved in playful words and deeds, for instance in games, jokes, and other things which are done for the sake of relaxing the soul.² - Modesty of adornment moderates exterior apparatus, or holds measure in clothing, furnishings, banquets, and other similar things, so namely that both display may be avoided and yet decorum preserved.³

Incontinence is opposed to continence.

To meekness by excess is opposed irascibility, by defect softness of soul; to clemency by excess cruelty,⁴ by defect excessive lenity.

To humility by excess pride is contrary, by defect excessive self-abjection. To studiousness curiosity is contrary by excess,⁵ negligence by defect.

To modesty of manners by defect is opposed crudity or rusticity of manners; by excess, petulance, insolence, affected courtliness. To eutrapely, scurrility by excess,⁶ moroseness by defect.⁷ To modesty of adornment by defect, neglect of apparatus is opposed; by excess, luxury.⁸

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit are supernatural habits by which the just man is well disposed toward more excellent acts of the virtues. Hence it is clear how they are distinguished from the virtues which they assist and perfect.⁹

Seven are numbered by Isaiah:¹⁰ of which we hand down here a brief notion.

By the Gift of Wisdom the intellect is assisted and perfected, so that it may consider and as it were taste God, whether in Himself or in His works, as supremely lovable and to be loved. It pertains to Charity.¹¹

By the Gift of Science the intellect is illumined for judging rightly and certainly concerning those things which are required and conduce to attaining eternal beatitude, and according to St. Bonaventure it assists Hope; according to St. Thomas, Faith.

By the Gift of Understanding the mind is illumined for penetrating the truths of Faith, and, as is clear, it subserves Faith.

By the Gift of Counsel we are directed "as if by counsel received from God."¹ It assists and perfects prudence.

By the Gift of Piety, from a certain filial affection, we exhibit worship to God as Father. It pertains to justice.

By the Gift of Fortitude we are strengthened against the dangers and difficulties to which our eternal salvation is exposed. It pertains to fortitude.

The Gift of Fear of the Lord effects that we venerate God most profoundly. It assists temperance, according to Psalm 118, 120: Pierce my flesh with thy fear.

The Fruits of the same Holy Spirit differ from the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in this, that the former are good works (not habits, as the gifts are) done through grace, having a peculiar reason of spiritual delight. Twelve are enumerated by the Apostle at Gal. c. 5, 22. - Cf. Muller, Th. Mor. T. I, § 120; St. Th. 1, 2, q. 68; L. 3 Sent. D. 34, q. 1, a. 4.