Sins against Faith

25. What sins there are against faith. One can sin against faith by omission, namely by omitting: a. due diligence in learning the truths of faith necessary to be known; b. the prescribed act of faith; c. the profession of faith prescribed either by God or by the Church; and by commission, by placing an action prohibited by the precept of faith. A sin of commission can be committed by excess and by defect. By excess one sins through credulity, by which, without sufficient reason, something is rashly believed as revealed by God which has not been revealed, as if someone lightly believes private revelations; yet this sin does not exceed venial sin. By defect one sins by external or internal denial of faith, which happens by infidelity, apostasy, heresy, doubt concerning faith, and communication in sacred things with unbelievers and heretics.

THE chief sins against faith are infidelity, heresy, and apostasy.

All who have sufficient knowledge of the Gospel are bound to embrace and believe it: “‘ He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.¹ A grave sin, then, is committed by one who rejects the faith when it has been sufficiently made known to him with adequate grounds for believing, and this grave sin is called infidelity. This positive infidelity is distinguished from privative and negative infidelity. One who has the opportunity of knowing the faith, and recognizes the obligation of making inquiries about it, but neglects to do so, commits the sin of privative infidelity. This is also a grave sin if the degree of negligence be grave. One who has no opportunity of learning the faith, or who does not advert to the obligation of making inquiries, is in negative infidelity. This is not sinful, but St Thomas² teaches that it is the penalty of sin, inasmuch as if a man were faithful to the light that he has in natural reason, God would take care that he should have an opportunity of knowing the faith even if it were necessary to send him a special messenger, or an angel from heaven, to make the Gospel known to him. If, then, the Gospel is not preached to every man, not God but men are to be blamed for it.

¹ Mark xvi 16.

² De Verit., q. 14, a. 11, ad I.

Heresy is the rejection by one who has embraced the faith of some portion of revealed truth which is proposed by the Church for our belief. If the rejection is voluntary and accompanied with full knowledge that what is rejected is proposed by the Church as an article of faith, the heresy is formal. Otherwise it will only be material.

It is not heresy, though sinful, to reject what is known to have been revealed by God in a private revelation; private revelations are not proposed by the Church for our belief. Nor is it heresy, but disobedience, to reject what is proposed by the infallible authority of the Church for our acceptance, but which forms no part of divine revelation. One who 1 Mark xvi r. denied that a canonized saint is in heaven would not be a heretic, but he would be disobedient to the Church, who assures us with divine authority that he is in heaven, and bids us honour him as a saint. Formal heresy is committed not only by knowingly and wilfully rejecting a revealed truth which is proposed for our belief by the Church, but by wilfully doubting about such a revealed truth. For such a one positively doubts whether a portion of God’s revelation is true, and thereby injures him as much as if he asserted that it was untrue. Similarly one who would not submit to the Church’s decision, even if she defined some doctrine to be of faith, is a formal heretic. Negative doubt, by which assent to a revealed truth is withheld or suspended, and voluntary ignorance of the true Church or of other necessary truths of faith, are sinful, but they do not constitute formal heresy. Great numbers of baptized Christians who were born of schismatical and heretical parents, and who do not know the true Church, are material, not formal heretics. When they begin to doubt about their position, and advert to the obligation they are under of making inquiries, they sin against the faith, more or less grievously according to their negligence, if they remain as they are. They do not become formal heretics until the truth fully dawns upon them, or they are so disposed that they would not submit to the Church even if they knew that she alone is the true Church of Christ.

Heresy is punished by the Church as a crime which attacks the foundations and the very raison d’étre of her existence. In order to incur the penalties inflicted on heresy, the sin must be both formal and external, for the Church in her external forum does not take cognizance of sins of thought. The external act must be such as of its own nature, or from custom, or from the special circumstances, is held sufficient to manifest an heretical mind. The reception of the sacrament in an Anglican church, or being married in a non-Catholic place of worship by a non-Catholic minister, are considered acts of heresy and punished as such by excommunication.

A special form for the reception of converts into the Church, based on various Roman decrees, has been approved by the English Bishops.

Apostasy from the faith is the grave sin committed by one who throws the faith overboard entirely. The apostate not only rejects special dogmas like the heretic, but wholly abandons the Catholic faith, and becomes a free-thinker, atheist, materialist, Mohammedan, Buddhist, etc.

Besides omission of the internal act prescribed by reason of faith, the principal sins are infidelity and heresy, to which apostasy belongs. There are added sins which, although they do not destroy faith, nevertheless in some way are opposed to it. Schism, which "per se is opposed to the ecclesiastical unity of charity" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 39, a. 1, ad 3), is discussed in n. 569.

I. Infidelity. 1. Notion. Infidelity is the lack of faith in a non-baptized man.

2. Division. Three kinds are distinguished, namely positive, privative, and negative. Positive infidelity is when an unbaptized person knows that God has spoken, and nevertheless denies or doubts that which God has manifested; privative infidelity is when an unbaptized person doubts that God has spoken, or suspects that revelation has taken place and neglects inquiry. Negative infidelity is when an unbaptized person does not doubt his religion or does not suspect that revelation has taken place (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, aa. 1 and 5; St. Alphonsus, II, 17).

By reason of the diverse errors there are enumerated: Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, Rationalism, etc. Yet those of the enumerated classes who have been baptized are rather heretics or apostates.

3. Morality. a) Positive and privative infidelity are grave sin from their whole genus. For reverence due to divine truthfulness requires that, if it is clear that it has spoken, we assent to it; if it is doubtful, we inquire whether and what it has taught, with this end, that if we have learned that it has spoken, we adhere to it. Yet privative infidelity by accident, that is, on account of the obligation of inquiring not being sufficiently perceived, can more easily be venial or even no sin. Negative infidelity is not sin, as is clear. Hence proposition 68 of Baius was rightly condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is sin" (St. Alphonsus, II, 17).

b) Positive infidelity and heresy do not differ in species, as we shall explain at once. But it is disputed whether positive infidelity (and heresy) differ in species from privative infidelity. Many affirm this, because positive infidelity (and heresy) directly injure divine authority; privative infidelity only indirectly, insofar as it prevents me from knowing that God has spoken and from being able to subject myself to Him speaking; these seem to differ in species (St. Alphonsus, VII, 301).¹ The diverse physical species of infidelity (Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, etc.) do not differ in moral species, although diverse species of irreligiosity can be attached to them.

¹ If someone neglects inquiry because he does not wish to submit himself to God revealing, there is privative infidelity, which does not differ in species from positive infidelity.

II. Heresy. 1. Notion. Heresy is the lack of faith in a baptized person; it is called apostasy if someone totally falls away from the faith. Apostasy does not differ in species from heresy, because they agree as to the formal object; namely, they reach God under the same aspect, or each is opposed to the truthfulness of God. As to the material object they differ insofar as apostasy rejects more revealed truths, or rather all revelation (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3).

But heresy is usually considered as clothed with certain individuating circumstances; hence, in the ecclesiastical sense, "if anyone, retaining the name Christian, pertinaciously denies or doubts some one of the truths to be believed with divine and catholic faith, he is a heretic; if he totally withdraws from the Christian faith, he is an apostate" (can. 1325, § 2). The customary definition of heresy agrees with these things: "A pertinacious error against divine and catholic faith." It is said:

a) "An error against divine and catholic faith," that is, it is required that something be denied or called into doubt among those things "which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal magisterium, as to be believed as divinely revealed" (can. 1322, § 1).

b) A pertinacious error, that is, it is required that someone deny or call into doubt something which he sufficiently knows both to have been revealed and to have been proposed as such to be believed (St. Thomas, I, q. 32, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 19; VII, 300).

2. Division. Heresy is distinguished:

a) Into formal and material, according as it is culpable or inculpable.

b) Into internal and external, according as it is completed by an act of mind alone, or is expressed by words or signs.

Corollary I. The following is a heretic, attending only to specific malice and therefore abstracting from individuating circumstances, which do not change the species:

a) One who does not inquire into revelation, because he does not wish to submit himself to God revealing.

b) One who rejects or calls into doubt a doctrine which he sufficiently knows to have been revealed, even if only privately (St. Alphonsus, II, 19).

c) One who indeed admits a doctrine which he holds as revealed, but not on account of the authority of God revealing, rather on account of the mere view of reason.

d) One who rejects or calls into doubt a doctrine which the Church has proposed by definitive judgment, though not as revealed, will easily become a heretic, by denying or calling into doubt the revealed truth that the Church is infallible in proposing that doctrine.

Corollary II. The following is not a heretic:

a) One who does not inquire into revelation out of levity, out of weariness, or out of fear lest, when revelation has been found out, he be bound to change his opinion. The reason is that he does not deny or call into doubt what he knows to have been revealed; nevertheless he sins gravely¹ (St. Alphonsus, VII, 301).

b) One who denies the faith only externally (St. Alphonsus, II, 19, 1).

c) One who suspends judgment, for example "turning himself to other things lest he fatigue the mind, or so that he may apply himself to another thought." Otherwise it must be said if he suspends judgment because he doubts either whether an opinion which he holds as revealed is true, or whether the Church, in proposing something as revealed, teaches what is true; in the latter case he calls into doubt the revealed doctrine concerning the infallibility of the Church (St. Alphonsus, VII, 302; II, 19).

d) One who rejects or calls into doubt a theological conclusion deduced from a truth either revealed or proposed by the Church by definitive judgment; although he will easily become a heretic by rejecting or calling into doubt the revealed premise, or the doctrine that the Church is infallible.

3. Morality. a) Heresy and apostasy are grave sin from their whole genus. For reverence due to divine truthfulness altogether requires that we assent to it, if it is clear that it has spoken.

b) Heresy and apostasy do not differ in species from positive infidelity; for they agree with it in the formal object, because they reach God under the same aspect, namely by offending His truthfulness; and they differ from it only insofar as they are found in a baptized subject.

c) Nor, as is clear, do diverse sects (Lutheranism, Calvinism, etc.) differ in moral species, although diverse species of irreligiosity, customarily exercised in the different sects, can be added.

4. Loss of faith. a) Faith (the habit of faith) is not lost except through a formal sin against faith (n. 357).

b) It is another question whether someone can bid farewell to the Catholic Church without formal sin against faith. Now strictly speaking it seems this must be answered affirmatively; namely, it seems possible that someone gradually call into doubt or even reject the truth of the Catholic Church without calling into doubt or rejecting a truth which he sufficiently perceives to have been revealed. Nor is the Vatican Council (De fide, chapter 3) an obstacle, for it only teaches that no one has an objectively valid reason for calling the Catholic faith into doubt, and that at least material sin is contained in such a manner of acting.²

c) Again, it is another question whether someone can leave the Catholic Church without any grave sin, either preceding or contained in the very defection. Now it seems it must be said as follows: No one without grave sin will come to such a point that he calls into doubt or denies those things which must be believed by necessity of means; for God abandons no one unless He is abandoned.³ Now one who without grave sin loses faith in those things which must be believed by necessity of means seems to have been abandoned by God without himself having abandoned God. As regards defection from the Catholic Church which does not include things to be believed by necessity of means, the matter is more doubtful.

d) But it can more easily happen that a Catholic without grave sin calls into doubt or even denies one or another point of the Catholic faith, namely:

alpha) Either by not noticing that an opinion admitted by him is opposed to the infallible doctrine of the Church, although he knows that it is reproved by priests, but not authoritatively.

beta) Or by persuading himself that he has reason to withdraw from the Church as regards those points, and that they are not rightly proposed by the Church as revealed: such persons do not notice that they are denying the infallibility of the Church, but rather suppose that the Church is erring in a matter which, in the opinion of the one erring, does not belong to the competence of the Church.

gamma) Or by persuading themselves that certain things are proposed by the Church as revealed which seem false to them and which they cannot believe.

The aforesaid persons regularly, at least for the sake of the common good, should not be left in good faith, nor should they be absolved unless they are willing to admit what the Church has proposed either as revealed by God or as indubitable.

¹ There are those who judge that this sin does not differ in species from heresy (p. 330).

² Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, II, p. 179.

³ Van Noort, De fide divina, n. 280.

III. Acceptance of propositions condemned by a note lower than heresy. Besides the sins explained under I and II, which exclude faith, there are others by which believers who retain faith in some way sin against faith, for example if someone culpably is ignorant of things which according to the above notes must be known; likewise if someone maintains propositions condemned by a note lower than heresy; concerning these we must speak more fully.¹

I set forth first can. 1324: "It is not enough to avoid heretical depravity, but it is also necessary diligently to flee those errors which more or less approach it; wherefore all must also observe the constitutions and decrees by which evil opinions of this sort have been proscribed and prohibited by the Holy See." And can. 2317: "Those who pertinaciously teach or defend, whether publicly or privately, a doctrine which has indeed been condemned by the Apostolic See or by a General Council, but not as formally heretical, are to be barred from the ministry of preaching the word of God or hearing sacramental confessions and from any office of teaching, without prejudice to other penalties which the sentence of condemnation may perhaps have established, or which the Ordinary, after warning, has judged necessary for repairing scandal."

1. What are the lower notes? Among these:

a) Some directly signify the falsity of a proposition. Thus: 1. proximate to heresy is that which denies what is proximate to faith, that is, what is commonly held as revealed, but not yet defined as such by the Church; 2. erroneous is that which denies what is theologically certain, that is, what, by mediation of another naturally evident truth, is certainly gathered from revealed doctrine; 3. proximate to error is that which denies what is most probably deduced from revealed doctrine; 4. rash is that which is defended against the common opinion without a solid argument.

b) Others directly indicate that some proposition is brought forward incautiously. Thus: 1. savoring of heresy or suspected of heresy is that which, after inspection of the words and various circumstances, gives occasion for suspecting that some other heresy is in the author; 2. savoring of error or suspected of error is that which gives occasion for suspecting that another erroneous proposition is admitted by the author; 3. ill-sounding is that by which matters pertaining to faith and morals are brought forward beside and against the received manner of speaking; 4. offensive to pious ears is that which states something that weakens the piety of the faithful, or expresses something in such a way that a similar effect follows.

c) Others directly designate some evil influence of a proposition. Thus: 1. scandalous is that which gives those hearing it occasion of spiritual ruin; 2. contumelious is that which is opposed to the honor due to another; it is called blasphemous if it inflicts injury upon God or the things of God as such; 3. schismatic is that which is opposed to the unity of the Church.

2. To what extent must account be taken of the lower notes? Account must be taken of them as follows:

a) If some note has been inflicted on some doctrine by the Church, that doctrine must be held as such, for example as scandalous, contumelious, etc. (can. 1324, 2317). Yet one who does not take account of the lower notes, although he sins, nevertheless is not thereby already a heretic. Sometimes, however, he will easily fall into heresy, for example if someone admits a proposition which is called erroneous; for one who denies what is certainly gathered from revealed doctrine by mediation of some naturally evident truth will easily deny revealed doctrine itself. Besides this, those who externally do not take account of the lower notes must also be accused of scandal.

b) As regards doctrinal declarations issued either by the Supreme Pontiff, yet not by definitive judgment, or by a Congregation which can issue declarations of this sort, as, for example, the Holy Office, as regards these declarations, I say:

alpha) Some subjection is certainly required, as is clear from the Apostolic Letter of Pius IX to the Archbishop of Munich;² likewise from the decree of the Holy Office Lamentabili,³ which Pius X confirmed by his Motu Proprio on November 18, 1907; finally, from those things which Pius X declares in the same Motu Proprio concerning the Biblical Commission: "We declare for the present and expressly command that all, every one, are bound in conscience by the duty of subjecting themselves to the judgments of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters, pertaining to doctrine..., just as to the decrees of the Sacred Congregations pertaining to doctrine and approved by the Pontiff; nor can all those who impugn such judgments in words or writings avoid the mark both of withheld obedience and of rashness, or therefore be free from grave fault." Besides, it seems altogether consonant that the Church can in some way delegate to others the power of the magisterium, which is not merely doctrinal but authoritative. Now to this right and faculty there corresponds in subjects the obligation of taking account of the things which are taught by those to whom the aforesaid power has in fact in some way been delegated.

beta) External subjection is certainly required; for this at least must be gathered from the documents cited. Indeed, that it is required under grave obligation is clear both from the fact that a grave matter is involved, and from the cited words of the Motu Proprio of Pius X.

gamma) Authors quite commonly teach that even internal assent is required, and it is rightly deduced from the Letter of Pius IX and the obvious sense of the other documents. Nor should you object that the Church lacks the faculty of imposing merely internal acts. It cannot impose acts of this sort by its own authority, but it can do so by vicarious authority (n. 117). Firm assent, however, is not required, because definitive decrees are not in question; rather, an opinionative assent suffices, an assent which, moreover, the said decrees truly deserve. For first, the Sacred Congregations consist of men most versed in the matters which pertain to their province. Then those men in Rome have continual intercourse both with the Supreme Pontiff and with the whole episcopate, so that the sense of the universal magisterium becomes known to them more easily. Finally, it is difficult to deny that, especially upon those to whom the Supreme Pontiff has in some measure delegated his magisterium, something of the divine assistance promised to the Church redounds. Besides this, opinionative assent seems to be required under grave obligation, because the matter seems grave. Yet:

delta) It is licit, provided internal assent is furnished, to study further the matter which the decrees regard, even with the intention of inquiring whether they are true or not. This seems to follow from the nature of the thing, since the Roman Congregations cannot settle the question. But when the question has not been settled, it is licit to undertake further inquiry, and that even with the intention that the truth may be made clear. This is confirmed by the letters given by Cardinal Vaughan to Wilfrid Ward.⁴

epsilon) It is licit afterward, for a very grave cause, to withhold assent first given, indeed even to adhere to the contrary opinion; for example, as regards a learned man, if, after the matter has been investigated further, he finds a new and grave reason; as regards the less learned, if other grave and God-fearing authors already withhold assent or adhere to the contrary opinion.

Now that reason for denying assent, indeed for adhering to the contrary opinion, will occur more easily if the matter concerns decrees of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters than if it concerns decrees of other Congregations, in other words, if it concerns scriptural matter rather than dogmatic or moral matter. For in biblical matters, whose decision often depends on external arguments both critical and historical, new arguments are more easily found than in a moral or dogmatic matter, which is often decided by internal arguments alone. For the same reason it seems it must be said that an assent equally efficacious as that owed to decrees of other Congregations is not owed to decrees of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters. For since it can happen more easily that new arguments are found, the fear of error is greater. Indeed I would not say that decrees of the Pontifical Council have less authority in themselves; but the condition on account of which it is licit to withhold assent will more easily exist; hence the fear of erring is greater.

zeta) Finally, it is not illicit to propose new arguments which have been found, certainly with due reverence.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Annotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis, n. 229 sq.; besides, different authors explain several lower notes in different ways.

² December 21, 1863.

³ July 3, 1907.

⁴ Cf. The Guardian, June 4, 1897.

Question 1. To what extent does one sin who professes Liberalism, that is, the politico-religious system which teaches the full independence of the State from the Church?

Response 1. One who plainly professes Liberalism is a heretic, because revelation teaches at least some dependence of the State upon the Church.¹ The same, as is clear, must be said of one who adheres to a particular doctrine which is opposed to faith.

Response 2. One who admits a particular doctrine, not indeed reproved by the Church as heretical, but nevertheless definitively reproved, sins gravely. Of this sort is, for example, proposition 48 of the Syllabus of Pius IX: "That manner of instructing youth which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which looks only, or at least primarily, to the science of merely natural things and to the ends of earthly social life, can be approved by Catholic men."²

Response 3. One who gives his name to a group, for example an electoral group, of Liberals sins gravely, according to what is to be said in n. 509.

¹ Bull of Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam, November 18, 1302; Encyclical of Pius IX, Quanta cura, December 8, 1864; Encyclical Libertas, June 20, 1888.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1748; cf. Encyclical of Pius XI Divini illius Magistri, December 31, 1929.

Question 2. To what extent does one sin who professes Socialism?

Response 1. One who adheres to the deepest principles of the socialists, namely materialism and atheism, is a heretic.

Response 2. One who rejects all private ownership sins gravely, because a doctrine of this sort cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the Church.¹

Response 3. One who admits the system of Socialism, even as it exists today, likewise sins gravely, since the said system is opposed to the doctrine of the Church. "Whether Socialism is considered as a doctrine - thus Pius XI² - or as a historical fact, or as 'action,' if it truly remains Socialism, even after it has conceded to truth and justice in those things of which we have spoken, it cannot be reconciled with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, since it imagines society itself as utterly alien from Christian truth."

"For, thus the Supreme Pontiff continues, according to Christian doctrine, man, furnished with a social nature, is placed on this earth so that, living in society and under authority ordained by God,³ he may fully cultivate and develop all his faculties to the praise and glory of his Creator, and, by faithfully performing the duty of his art or other vocation, may obtain for himself happiness both temporal and eternal. But Socialism, being utterly ignorant and careless of this sublime end, both of man and of society, supposes that human association has been instituted for the sake of advantage alone.

"For from the fact that goods are produced more efficaciously by an apt division of works than by the divided efforts of individuals, the socialists infer that economic efficiency, of which only material objects are observed by their minds, must proceed socially by necessity. By this necessity, so they judge, men are constrained to devote and subject themselves wholly to society, as far as the production of goods is concerned. Indeed, to possess the widest possible supply of things which serve the conveniences of this life is counted so highly that the higher goods of man, not excepting liberty itself, must be placed after and even sacrificed to the demands of the most efficacious production of goods. But they suppose that this loss of human dignity, to be undergone in the 'socialized' process of production, will easily be compensated by the abundance of goods socially produced, which will be poured out to individuals, so that according to their own pleasure they may freely apply them to the conveniences and culture of life. Therefore society such as Socialism imagines it, on the one hand, neither can exist nor be conceived without violence that is plainly excessive; on the other hand, it indulges a liberty no less false, since true social authority is absent from it, seeing that this authority is not based on temporal and material conveniences, but descends from God alone, the Creator and ultimate end of all things."

Response 4. One who gives his name to a socialist group sins gravely, according to what is to be said in n. 509.

¹ Encyclical of Leo XIII Quod apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878; Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891; Encyclical of Pius XI Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

² Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1931, p. 215).

³ Cf. Rom. 13:1.

The principal sins against the precept of the external act are: omission of the external act prescribed by reason of faith, or concealment of faith; denial of faith; and dissimulation of it without proportionate reason.

I. Concealment of faith; concerning this note: one converted or returned to the faith per se cannot conceal his conversion; by accident, on account of a grave cause, this is licit for a longer or shorter time, although on account of the honor publicly due to God revealing, to which there is easily added scandal that must be repaired, it is scarcely ever licit to conceal conversion for a long time.¹

If someone placed in danger of death is converted and has a grave reason for concealing his conversion, let him profess the faith before at least two witnesses, who afterward should make the conversion known.²

¹ Cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, May 28, 1635 (Collectanea, n. 84); n. 490.

² Cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1790 (Collectanea, n. 602).

II. Denial of faith is always illicit, even in a case where it would be done only externally. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture (Matt. 10:33) and from the nature of the thing. Denial of faith made only externally is called simulation. Likewise, it is always illicit to be ashamed of the faith (Luke 9:26; St. Alphonsus, II, 12).

III. Dissimulation of faith, that is, an act by which someone signifies neither the true nor a false faith, but expressly hides the true one, is per se illicit; but from a sufficiently grave cause it becomes licit (St. Alphonsus, II, 12). Indeed, sometimes it obliges, namely if on the one hand the necessity of confessing the faith is absent, but on the other hand great harms are to be feared from manifestation of the faith.

Both denial and dissimulation can be done by words, signs, and deeds. Since often it is difficult to distinguish whether denial or dissimulation is had, let this be:

IV. Criterion for distinguishing denial and dissimulation of faith.

1. Things which of themselves or from the circumstances signify internal rejection of faith must be avoided as a denial of faith; of this sort are, for example, "burning incense or genuflection before an idol; likewise taking a heretical supper, etc." (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 8).

2. Things which only indirectly, or by accident, signify internal rejection of faith contain dissimulation of faith, and therefore are licit from a proportionate cause; for example, the clothing and signs of the Turkish nation (St. Alphonsus, cited place, 9).

3. Things which neither of themselves nor from circumstances nor by accident signify internal rejection of faith contain neither denial nor dissimulation of faith, and therefore are per se licit, as if someone says: "I am not a priest"; by accident, because of a reason extrinsic to this precept, they can become illicit. These things noted, it is useful to apply the doctrine set forth to diverse cases.

V. Applications. In making applications we distinguish the diverse things by which both denial and dissimulation of faith can be done, namely words, signs more strictly taken, clothing, and deeds.

1. Words. One who is questioned about the faith, even by a private person, cannot respond in such a way that he must certainly be believed to deny the true faith. Hence he cannot respond, for example, that he is a Calvinist, or that he adheres to the faith of the kingdom, if the kingdom as such professes a false faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 13).

2. Signs more strictly taken. The distinctive signs of Freemasons (nods, movements of hands or fingers, a particular way of signing letters) contain profession of a false sect, since they are equivalent to words by which someone signifies that he belongs to a false sect.¹ Nor do the aforesaid signs seem to lose their signification from the fact that some who do not belong to the sect use them, for example so that they may be treated amicably; for these seem rather to lie than to make the signs lose their signification. Besides, those who use signs of this sort at least proximately intend that they be taken, at least probably, for Freemasons; but to use such a means is illicit.

3. Clothing. Among clothing: 1. Some garments are distinctive of a people or nation, as the cap of the Turks. It is licit to use these from a just cause, because garments of this sort, although they may be worn in a region of unbelievers, nevertheless of themselves do not involve profession of any faith. 2. Other garments are distinctive of a sect. It is not licit to use these, because one who uses them, considering the circumstances, signifies that he belongs to that sect.² Many, however, permit the use of garments "which do not have a peculiar sign of professing error, but are only an indication of more elegant dress, as formerly the cloaks of preachers in Germany; or of a more eminent life among their own, as the robes of bonzes in Japan. The same must be said concerning signs which the Jews used, for example, a yellow ring on the cloak at Frankfurt, etc.; because these are merely political signs and distinctive of one class of men from another, and not properly professive of faith" (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 9).

4. Deeds. a) The eating of meat on a day of abstinence does not contain profession of a false religion. But to eat out of shame is not licit. Likewise it is illicit if someone is provoked to eating in contempt of religion, unless there is a grave cause and the one provoked protests that he is not acting in contempt of religion, but because the Church for a grave cause does not urge the law (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 10).

b) Active assistance³ at the sacred rites of non-Catholics is illicit. The reason is that assistance of this sort either constitutes part of a worship that must be reproved or, as it is taken here, involves proximate cooperation in such worship. Hence can. 1258, § 1: It is not licit for the faithful in any way actively to assist or to have part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics. And can. 2316: Whoever in any way spontaneously and knowingly assists the propagation of heresy, or who communicates in divine things with heretics contrary to the prescription of can. 1258, is suspected of heresy. And so it is illicit, for example, to take a non-Catholic supper; to hear the Mass of a non-Catholic, even if on a feast of precept no other can be heard;⁴ to chant psalms or play the organ in their assemblies;⁵ to perform the office of sponsor in their baptisms;⁶ etc. Besides, compare what is to be said about cooperation (n. 557).

c) Assistance at sermons and merely passive assistance⁷ at sacred functions of non-Catholics contain at most material and remote cooperation, and therefore, considered under this respect, are licit for a just cause. But scandal is easily added and, if more frequent assistance is in question, danger of perversion. Hence the Holy Office⁸ declared that "regularly it is not licit for Catholics to be present at the sermons (baptisms and marriages) of heretics or schismatics" (cf. can. 1258, § 2). If civil authority orders Catholics, for example soldiers, to assist at the sermons and rites of non-Catholics, practically there is a cause excusing, while precautions against danger of perversion must nevertheless be employed.

It is licit, scandal being excluded, to enter the church of schismatics and there privately, not as if acting together with them, to adore the Most Holy Sacrament.⁹ Yet if this were done regularly, it would certainly provide scandal and occasion for religious indifferentism.

Besides this, the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide,¹⁰ to the doubt: "Whether it is licit for Catholics to adore the Most Holy Sacrament, carried by a schismatic parish priest in the public way, whether to a sick person or otherwise," responded: "Not only is it licit, but Catholics must adore the Most Holy Sacrament; nevertheless they must abstain from accompanying it."

Entry into the churches of non-Catholics in order to look at them involves nothing illicit.

d) Passive presence at funerals and weddings of non-Catholics. Passive or merely material presence can be tolerated, for the sake of civil office or honor, on account of a grave reason to be approved by the Bishop in a case of doubt, at the funerals, weddings, and similar solemnities of non-Catholics, provided danger of perversion and scandal is absent (can. 1258, § 2). It is said passive presence; hence if the wedding is entered into before a heretical minister as such, it is not licit to function as witness. Nor is it lawful to undertake the office of paranymph, if this office is as it were to offer the spouses to the heretical minister so that he may join them. It is said provided danger of scandal is absent; now in many regions scandal certainly would be present if there were question of cremating the body or of carrying out burial with the insignia of the Masonic sect.

e) Selection of a non-Catholic sponsor. The Holy Office said "that it is preferable that Baptism be conferred without a sponsor than with a non-Catholic."¹¹ Finally, can. 795, among other things, requires for validity that the sponsor in Baptism "be enrolled in no heretical or schismatic sect."

f) Flight in time of persecution is per se licit, because it involves neither denial nor dissimulation of faith, but only the use of the right to protect one's life. Practically:

alpha) It is illicit if, by your flight, the honor of God or the salvation of souls would suffer detriment; as if pastors of souls, that is, bishops and parish priests, were to flee.

beta) It is licit if your presence is indeed useful, but not necessary, and you cannot remain without grave inconvenience.

gamma) It obliges: 1. if by remaining you would harm rather than benefit the common good; 2. if by remaining you would expose yourself to danger of denying the faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 6).

Note 1. For dissimulating the faith it is more easily licit to omit signs of Catholics than to use signs of non-Catholics.

Note 2. One who is converted to the faith is indeed bound, on the occasion of Baptism, to profess the faith; but if there are grave causes for dissimulating the faith for a time, and for that end for not observing certain precepts of the Church or even for passively assisting at rites of non-Catholics, this is licit (n. 498 sq.). Nevertheless it is preferable to explain the matter to the Ordinary, or even, if the dissimulation of faith will have to endure only for a short time, to defer Baptism. Yet the aforesaid should not per se be applied readily to one who has departed from the faith and desires to return to it, since he is also bound to repair scandal.

¹ According to some, these things are not to be extended to the signs by which Masons usually recognize one another; this does not seem equivalent to a profession of this sect, but is a means so that they may be treated amicably by members of the sect. But signs by which Masons usually recognize one another, if others do not use them, truly signify that someone belongs to the sect; this is and remains profession of the sect, although the said signs may be used as a means so that they may be treated amicably by members of the sect.

² Objection. Garments which are distinctive of a sect are not necessarily protestative of the sect. Now it is licit to use garments non-protestative of the sect, although distinctive, from a grave cause. Thus several authors. Response: Leaving aside the word protestative, I would say: one who uses garments distinctive of a sect signifies that he belongs to the sect; this is profession of the sect and denial of the true faith at least externally.

³ Active assistance is had when the one assisting has a part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics (can. 1258, § 1).

⁴ Holy Office, August 7, 1704 (Collectanea, n. 267).

⁵ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, July 8, 1889 (Collectanea, n. 1713).

⁶ The Holy Office, May 10, 1770 (Collectanea, n. 478), responded that "it is absolutely not licit, either by oneself or through others, to perform the office of sponsor in Baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics"; likewise June 30 and July 5, 1864 (Collectanea, n. 1257).

⁷ Merely passive assistance is had if the one assisting, unlike one actively assisting, has no part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics (cf. can. 1258, § 1).

⁸ May 10, 1770.

⁹ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, December 15, 1764 (Collectanea, n. 458, ad 1).

¹⁰ December 15, 1764 (Collectanea, n. 458, ad 4).

¹¹ May 3, 1893 (Collectanea, n. 1831).

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 10-15.)

The sins against faith can all be reduced to four heads: (a) sins of unbelief (see 813-886), which are opposed to the internal act of faith; (b) sins of blasphemy (see 887-903), which are opposed to the external act of faith; (c) sins of ignorance (see 904-911), which are opposed to the Gift of Knowledge; (d) sins of blindness and dullness (912), which are opposed to the Gift of Understanding.

A twofold vice adverse to faith is distinguished, namely 1º infidelity, 2º heresy, to which apostasy is joined.

Who make laws in Civil Society? - The Prince or the people or both together, according to the varied form of government, make laws. In monarchical Governments, Princes who enjoy supreme power in civil society make laws. In representative Governments the power of making laws resides in the King, or in the President of the republic, and in the legislative Body constituted from Deputies, or also from Senators. Indeed secular Princes are true superiors in civil society, and that power is necessary for the right governance of civil society. Therefore there is no doubt that their laws can also oblige in conscience. L. 104; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 105. a. 1; E. M.

You will resolve: Every man is subject to natural law. For natural law is the very reason and divine will commanding the order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed, promulgated through the very light of reason, namely insofar as God inserted it into the mind of men to be known naturally. But every man enjoys reason. Therefore it is not licit to provoke infants, drunkards, and the insane to intrinsically evil actions. L. 153. 155. - All and only those habitually possessed of reason, who exist under the jurisdiction of the legislator, can be subject to a positive law commanding or prohibiting human action. For law is a rational and stable rule for the common good. But men habitually lacking the use of reason cannot be directed by a rational and stable rule to the common end of society. Hence meats are licitly given to infants not yet having obtained the use of reason, and to the perpetually insane, on prohibited days. They are illicitly given to those insane for a short time and to drunkards. L. 153. 155; Elbel n. 355 seq.; Struggl q. 3. n. 8 seq.

The legislator is not bound directly by his laws as such, that is, as regards the obliging and coercive force; nevertheless indirectly, as regards the merely directive force, from a certain equity he is bound to conform himself as head to the members, namely as regards those laws which befit his state. Hence "it is probable, scandal being excluded, that he is bound only under light fault, because he is bound to the law only from honorableness." L. 154. Scandal being excluded: for if scandal were present in a public transgression of the law, he would be bound to observe it; by no means however in that case would he also be subject to the penalties which he himself imposed on transgressors. Likewise he is also bound to use equal condition in contracts. C. Iustum Dist. 9; L. 154; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 5; Struggl q. 3. n. 1; Lessius De Iur. et Iustit. l. 2. c. 35. dub. 5. n. 33; Suarez De Legib. l. 3. c. 35.

Infidels, not yet baptized, are not obligated by the laws of the Church, although they are bound to enter the Church. 1 Cor. 5:12. On the contrary, heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated are of themselves held by ecclesiastical laws. This must be understood of the excommunicated as regards acts not interdicted by the excommunication itself. But as regards heretics, in places where they are tolerated, penal laws have no effect. Trent sess. 7. c. 8 de Bapt.; Schmalz. l. 4. t. 1. n. 378-380, t. 3. n. 99, l. 5. t. 7. n. 171-174; Reiffenst. l. 1. t. 2. n. 274; L. 154.

Greek Catholics, and generally Orientals, although they are held by definitions of catholic doctrine concerning faith and morals, nevertheless are not bound by disciplinary laws of the universal Church, unless something is established concerning them, either by express mention made of them, or by reason of the matter implicitly extended to them by the law. Indeed Constitutions of Roman Pontiffs made for one oriental rite are not extended to other rites without express extension. Nor indeed is it licit for Catholics to depart from the custom and observance of their own rite approved by the Holy Roman Church. E. M. de Stat. partic. 213; Bened. XIV, C. Etsi pastoralis, May 26, 1742, § 9. n. 24, C. Allatae, July 26, 1755; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 113. 1999.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

What are the sins and vices opposed to faith? - To faith is opposed unbelief, which generally is the lack of faith; and specifically it is the lack of faith in one not baptized; and this is threefold: negative, privative, positive. The first is lack of faith in one who has never heard anything about the true religion. The other is lack of faith in one who neglects to procure for himself knowledge of faith when occasion has been given. The third is lack of faith in one to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it. - Although negative unbelief, as is clear, is not a sin, nevertheless it is a punishment of sin; because if he had done what was in him, God would not have hidden faith from him. But privative and positive unbelief is a most grave sin. The reason is that the former indirectly and virtually, the latter directly and formally, contains grave contempt and injury of the authority of God revealing. Faith besides is the beginning, foundation, and root of justification. Trid. s. 6, C. 8. Therefore he who voluntarily deprives himself of faith likewise deprives himself of justification, and accordingly sins very greatly.

Heresy is also opposed to faith, and it is twofold: formal and material. The first is a voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith proposed by the Church, in one who has received faith. But the other is that by which someone adheres to error against faith, but without pertinacity. Moreover to err pertinaciously here is not sharply and tooth-and-nail to defend one's error, but to retain it knowingly and voluntarily, after the contrary has been sufficiently proposed; or when it is known that the contrary is held by the universal Church of Christ on earth, to which someone prefers his own judgment, whether this is done from vainglory, or from the lust of contradicting, or from another cause. Merely material heresy is not a sin, for that error proceeds from invincible ignorance of the truth. But formal heresy is a most grave sin, as unbelief itself, for the same reasons.

Finally apostasy is opposed to faith, which is total defection from the truth of the Catholic faith. Therefore it is not distinguished in species from heresy. For whether more or less of the material object of faith is rejected, the formal object is always rejected in the same mode. It is reduced to positive unbelief if someone, departing absolutely from faith, passes over to unbelief. And if someone passes over to a sect in which false worship of God is had, he also sins against religion. Non-Catholics are as many as are not Catholics. Their genus is threefold: schismatics, heretics, apostates. More broadly non-Catholics are also infidels.

Heretics and those suspect concerning the faith must be denounced to the Bishop or Inquisitor from C. Noveritis of Nicholas II, and from the natural law, since such a crime tends to common harm. L. l. 4, n. 249 seqq.; l. 7, n. 248. But the Bishop has the faculty of proceeding in a cause of heresy even against regulars, although exempt, C. 9, de Haeret. - Those who wish to be converted from heresy to the Catholic Church before absolution must abjure their heresy and make a public profession of faith, according to what is prescribed by C. Si qui voluerint 8, can. 1, q. 7, and the Roman Ritual. - An abjuration made privately before someone delegated by the Bishop, such as a notary, and some persons as witnesses, suffices. S. O. 8 Apr. 1786; 28 Mar. 1900; Struggl, q. 2, nn. 1, 9; Suarez, d. 16, s. 1; Lugo, d. 16, n. 187, 291 seqq.; d. 18, n. 3 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 5, 10, 11, 12; L. 17 seqq.; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., ed. 1, nn. 1682, 1683, 1689, and ed. 2, nn. 1341, 1496, 2079; E. M. 346.

351 bis. Note: 1. The books of Sacred Scripture whole with all their parts, as the Holy Synod of Trent, s. 4, reviewed them, are divinely inspired, and are sacred and canonical. 2. The heresies of schismatics and Orientals are reviewed in the Epistle of Pius X, Ex quo, 26 Dec. 1910, Acta Apost. Sed., v. 3, p. 117 seqq. 3. Modernism is the collection of all heresies. - Bishops must be vigilant that it be extirpated, if it has been present, and must take precautions lest it be present.

Bishops should impede the writings of Modernists from being published and read; especially they should not be permitted to adolescents in Seminaries and to hearers in Universities. - They should establish a council of vigilance, to meet with the Bishop every other month and on a stated day. It will belong to it to investigate judgments of modernism in books and in teaching; likewise to keep watch over books and periodicals, lest dangerous questions be treated in them with weak arguments and prejudged questions; finally, over all writings concerning social matters. - By Modernism there are condemned rash and false novelties against the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and constantly handed down by the Fathers and Catholic Doctors; but by no means is there condemned any modern invention which is proved by solid reason. - Those who are prone to the errors of modernism are to be excluded from Sacred Orders. Pius X, Enc. Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907.

4. Several errors of Americanism are condemned. Its fundamental and chief error consists in this: "It is opportune, for attracting the wills of those who disagree, if certain heads of doctrine, as if of lighter moment, are passed over, or softened so that they do not retain the same sense which the Church has constantly held." Brief to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, of Leo XIII, 22 Jan. 1899, Testem benevolentiae.

Is he a formal heretic who doubts concerning some article of faith? R. Affirmatively, if he doubts positively, by judging that a truth is uncertain which he knows to be revealed by God and proposed by the Church; for he voluntarily contradicts faith sufficiently proposed, and accordingly there is truly had voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith, which is the definition of formal heresy. - R. Negatively, if he behaves negatively, and suspends assent, whether this is done from formal or virtual contempt of divine revelation, or whether it is done from negligence, or because he wishes to turn his mind to other things, etc. The reason is that since he judges nothing, and affirms nothing against the infallibility of faith, as is supposed, he does not err positively in faith and accordingly is not a heretic; although he sins gravely against faith, either from contempt of the word of God, or from negligence by omitting a commanded act of faith. - Struggl, q. 2, nn. 12, 13.

What things are to be believed explicitly by necessity of precept? - "The object of faith per se is that by which man is made blessed. But all things which are contained in Sacred Scripture as handed down by God are related per accidens or secondarily to the object of faith.... As to the first credible things, which are the articles of faith, man is bound to believe explicitly, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other credible things man is not bound to believe explicitly, but only implicitly, or in readiness of soul, insofar as he is prepared to believe whatever divine Scripture contains," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, a. 5; q. 1, a. 6 c. ad 1, or divine Tradition.

"Explicitly, by necessity of precept, there must be known and believed, at least in substance: 1. The Apostles' Creed. 2. The Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation. 3. The precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. 4. The sacraments which are necessary to each one, such as baptism, eucharist, and penance; for concerning the others it suffices to have implicit faith, since explicit faith is necessary only to those who receive them." L. H. A. tr. 4, n. 3. Proof from common practice and the common authority of theologians. The reason is that these contain the substantial heads and foundations of Religion, which one must profess; and the necessary precepts according to which one must live. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 3-6; E. M. 356, 357.

As to the Eucharist. - All must know and believe the real presence of Christ in it. Likewise, according to the common opinion, it must be believed explicitly that Christ is whole under each species, and more probably also that he is offered in sacrifice, since all must assist at the sacrifice of the Mass. But transubstantiation is more probably not to be believed explicitly. Lugo, d. 13, n. 121.

Can those be absolved who are ignorant of those things which by necessity of precept and under mortal sin must be known? - R. Affirmatively, because although they have sinned by omitting to learn, nevertheless they can be sorry for this, with the purpose of learning. But the parish priest, like a parent his children, is bound under mortal sin, by himself or through another, to teach his sheep at least those things which they are bound under mortal sin to know. L. 3.

Pontifical Constitutions concerning the Chinese and Malabar rites are to be had as doctrinal, by no means as disciplinary; and therefore, except for censures, they still hold force. S. O. 5 Aug. 1891. The doctrine concerning Eschatological Renewal must be reproved. S. O. 2 Mar. 1910. It cannot safely be denied, or called into doubt, that the text of St. John in 1 Ep. c. 5, v. 5, concerning the three giving testimony in heaven, is authentic. S. O. 15 Jan. 1897. Those cannot be absolved who hold that the fire of hell is not real, but metaphorical. S. Poenit. 30 Apr. 1890.

With all reverence and submission of soul, all propositions condemned by the Holy See up to the year 1794, in which the propositions of the Synod of Pistoia were condemned, must be reproved. With like reverence and submission of soul must also be reproved: the Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Errors of our age, 80, condemned in the Syllabus transmitted to the whole Christian world; the 40 Propositions condemned from recently published works under the name of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, Decr. S. O. 7 Mar. 1888, Post obitum, approved and confirmed by Leo XIII; the doctrines of Americanism, condemned by the same Leo XIII, Brief of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore; the 65 Propositions condemned by the Decr. S. O. Lamentabili sane exitu, 3 July 1907, containing the chief errors of reformism or modernism, afterward proscribed by Pius X through the Encyclical Letter Pascendi dominici gregis, 8 Sept., and through the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, 1 Sept. 1904. E. M. 356, 357, 359.

Is there also given a precept of the external act of faith? As to the external act of faith, there is given a negative precept, prohibiting the denial of the true faith or the profession of a false one. Likewise there is given an affirmative precept, obliging sometimes to confess the faith even with danger to life. Proof of the first part. To deny the true faith, or to profess a false one, is to deny God and Christ. But Christ says: He who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. Matt. 10:33. Proof of the second part. For ordered charity, which we owe to God and neighbor, requires that, when God's honor and the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be withdrawn privatively or contrarily, for professing the faith we should sometimes spurn temporal goods and even life. - Privatively, as if therefore great honor to God and great utility to neighbor would cease. Contrarily, as if otherwise God would be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave evil, e.g., if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, depended on it. Suarez, d. 4, s. 2; L. 10; Laymann, c. 11, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, aa. 1, 2; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1647, 1648, 1653, 1657, 1683, 1827.

By positive law all to be baptized are bound to profession of faith, either by themselves or through sponsors; converted heretics; Bishops before consecration, and before the dispatch of letters of their own provision, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; Sixtus V, C. Romanus; Gregory XIV, C. Onus Apostolicae; all regular Prelates, Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis, id. Nov. 1564; nevertheless this Constitution has not been received in use as to those regular Prelates who are not immediately set over government by the Holy See, but either by chapter or by a higher superior, Thesaurus, de Poenis, c. 1, v. Fides, cf. 550; those about to have ecclesiastical benefices, and those who must assemble in a diocesan synod, Trid. l. c.; likewise those provided with a benefice with care of souls, within two months from possession obtained, before the Bishop himself, or if he is impeded, his vicar general, otherwise they do not make the fruits their own; canons and dignities of a cathedral church, who likewise within two months from begun possession are bound to do this also in chapter; otherwise neither do they make the fruits their own, although they can gain distributions for their choir assistance, S. C. C. 1726; Trid. s. 24, C. 12, de R.; Primates, Archbishops, Bishops in the first provincial synod which they attend, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; those to be chosen for the government and chairs of Universities and public gymnasia; and also those to be promoted to scholastic degrees of doctor, master, etc., Pius IV, C. In Sacrosancta, 13 Nov. 1654, § V. But Doctors and Masters of Universities at the beginning of any year must issue a solemn oath by which they are bound to hand down orthodox doctrine, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R. It belongs to the Rector or Prefect to see that this is observed. - Profession of faith can be emitted immediately after institution or collation of a benefice, and before possession, S. C. C. 11 May 1782; but cf. here below, paragraph Non manet, and it must altogether be made in the form proposed by Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis. But a few things are to be added, so that account may also be taken of the Decrees of the Vatican Council, S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. Made otherwise, it will not profit toward avoiding the canonical penalties laid against those who omit this profession. Conc. Rom. Bened. XIII, tit. 1, c. 1; Bened. XIV, Inst. 60; Ferrar., v. Fidei professio; L. 41; Collectan. cit., n. 1670; E. M. 364.

Those who are announced as doctors in Sacred Scripture are bound to furnish an oath according to the prescribed formula approved by the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 29 June 1910. Likewise an oath, according to the prescribed formula, must be furnished by all those who are listed in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910, a profession of faith having been premised; - and also, by reason of office, synodal examiners and parish-priest consultors and those who are listed in C. Sapienti consilio, Order of Service in the Roman Curia, and others, concerning all of whom cf. below n. 550. This obligation of profession of faith seems grave, unless it has been derogated by legitimate custom. The penalty of restoring the fruits probably needs a declaratory sentence of the delict. Sanchez, l. 2, c. 5; Tamburini, l. 2, c. 1, D. 12, n. 4. The faculty made by the Council of Trent no longer remains, by which those provided with any benefices whatever can emit profession of faith within two months from the day of possession obtained; and consequently in the future profession of faith must be emitted before possession of the benefice. S. C. Cons. 1 Mar. 1911.

In external confession of faith and divine worship, the rite of one's own church, Latin or Oriental, is to be observed. Cf. for the Ruthenian rite constituted in the United States of North America, Apostolic Letter of Pius X, 18 Kal. 1907, and for the same rite constituted in the Canadian region, Decr. S. C. de Pr. I., 18 Aug. 1913. E. M. 365.

Blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. For by it man in heart or mouth, according to intellect or affection, attributes to God things which do not befit him, or denies things which befit him. The vice of blasphemy thus pertains to unbelief. Speech concerning it will occur in the second precept of the Decalogue. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 13.

Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal? R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking; for either a great loss of money must be suffered, and charity toward neighbor does not urge with so great an inconvenience; or there is only a light loss of money, and this, since it could occur rather often, already easily becomes grave. Besides, it would harm the common good, because an occasion would be given to wicked persons of extorting and seizing others' things, and it would be harmful to the wicked themselves, since thus they would be confirmed in their depraved will. Ordinarily speaking; for if, in some particular case, grave inconvenience ceases, and the scandal were not of Pharisees but of little ones, then either temporal goods must be given up, or the scandal must be calmed through some admonition. L. 52; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 8.

Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? Is it ever lawful to rebel? Is it ever lawful to kill a Prince? R. To the 1st: As was already said above, n. 171, 4. Laws unjust through contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust through contrariety to divine good are in no way lawful to observe. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful, and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even to the difficult, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in Br. 9 Jun. 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. Pius VI, Br. Pastoralis, 5 Jul. 1796; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, aa. 5, 6.

R. To the 2nd: It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "In this matter," says St. Liguori, "the principle of John Gerson was exceedingly pernicious, who dared to assert that a monarch can lawfully be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the Prince, by judging and punishing him. L. H. A. Tr. 8, n. 13; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2; q. 60, a. 6; q. 64, a. 3; q. 69, a. 4. But it is one thing to make rebellion, or to bring violence against a legitimate prince in order to depose him; another thing to resist unjust laws and their execution. Rebellion is a kind of aggression, not defense. But if a force plainly unjust is brought, resistance is then made not to authority, but to unjust force. "And therefore, just as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful in such a case to resist bad Princes, unless perhaps because of scandal, when from this some grave disturbance would be feared," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 42, a. 2, or there were no hope of a good outcome, and greater public evils were to be feared. Cf. also the Letters of Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, who, speaking of laws openly disagreeing with divine right, injurious to the Church and contrary to Religion, then says, "to resist is a duty, to obey a crime." Therefore it is lawful to oppose passive resistance to unjust laws. For one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29. "For this reason to cast off obedience, and by the force of the multitude to call the matter to sedition, is the crime of treason, not only against human majesty, but also against divine." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1895, section Non est magni toward the end. For "whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere, but from that supreme Prince of all, God. There is no power except from God, Rom. 13:1... Nature itself testifies that whatever power there is anywhere proceeds from God." When this is known and persuaded, "those things are understood altogether to pertain to justice: to revere the majesty of Princes, to be subject constantly and faithfully to public power, to do nothing seditiously, to preserve the holy discipline of the city."

Leo XIII, l. c., sections Talis, Eiusmodi; Pius X, Ep. Notre charge, 25 Aug. 1910.

R. To the 3rd: It is never lawful for anyone to kill a Prince, neither for a private man nor for the multitude; for the reason is the same for him and for this. The contrary opinion of the ancients is called by St. Alphonsus, l. c., improbable, false, most false. "I ask," says the Holy Doctor, "is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to expel him from life or goods. The doctrine of the holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, however private, and however iniquitous he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life." And the very same holds whether the Prince is good or bad; whether legitimate, or an usurper of the kingdom. Prop. condemned by the Council of Constance, Sess. 15, d. 6 Jul. 1414; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 12, a. 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 64, a. 3; q. 101, aa. 1, 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 5; Aertnys 178; E. M.

What is war? War is a fight of a multitude against an external multitude, undertaken by the legitimate authority of Princes, for defending the good of the commonwealth or for vindicating an injury inflicted upon it. War differs from a brawl because a brawl is a fight between private persons, of a few or of individuals against a few or individuals. It differs from sedition, because sedition is the attack of a multitude against a multitude in the same commonwealth or society. A brawl proceeds from an inordinate will. And therefore a brawl always imports sin. And in him indeed who unjustly attacks another, it is per se mortal sin; for to inflict harm on a neighbor, even by natural work, is not without mortal sin. But because sedition has a special good to which it is opposed, namely the unity and peace of the multitude, it is a special sin. It is opposed to justice and to the common good, insofar as it inflicts harm on the commonwealth and its citizens. "And therefore from its genus it is mortal sin, and so much the more grave as the common good which is attacked through sedition is greater than private good.... But those who defend the common good by resisting them are not to be called seditious, just as neither are those who defend themselves called brawlers." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1; q. 41, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1.

What about the care to be had for doctrine? - It belongs to the Bishop to watch over institutions, whether private or public, and also over the printing of books in such a way that nothing be handed down which is opposed to faith and morals. It also pertains to him by a special title to denounce pernicious books. This is openly established from his office as pastor. Trent s. 5, c. 2 de R.; Leo XIII, C. Officiorum, VIII Kal. Febr. 1896.

Modernism: It is the collection of all heresies. Bishops must watch that it be rooted out if it has been present, and must take care lest it be present. Bishops are to prevent the writings of Modernists from being published and read; especially they are not to permit them to adolescents in Seminaries and to hearers in Universities. Let them institute a council of vigilance, to meet with the Bishop every other month and on a fixed day. Its duty will be to investigate indications of modernism in books and in teachings; likewise to watch over books and journals, lest dangerous questions be treated in these with weak arguments and prejudged questions; finally, in all writings concerning the social matter. By Modernism rash and false novelties are condemned, against the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and that constantly handed down by the Fathers and Catholic Doctors; but by no means is any modern discovery whatever condemned which is proved by solid reason.

Those who are prone to the errors of modernism are to be excluded from teaching and from sacred orders. Pius X, Encyclical Pascendi, Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum.

What about the obligation of denying the sacraments to the unworthy who ask? - Generally and under grave obligation, speaking in itself, the minister is bound to deny the sacraments to the unworthy, because natural law obliges the dispenser to dispense the goods of the Lord faithfully and according to his will; moreover the certain will of Christ is that the sacraments not be conferred on the unworthy, according to that saying of Matthew 7:6: Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor cast your pearls before swine. Roman Ritual de SS. euch. sacr., de Sacr. extr. unct. - Cf. Lugo d. 8, n. 164, 180, 193; Suarez d. 8, s. 2. Indeed, as St. Alphonsus 43 notes, "in certain sacraments, for the minister to show himself a faithful dispenser, it does not suffice if he does not know the petitioner to be unworthy, but further he is bound to have a prudent reason that he is worthy; for in the sacrament of penance, since the disposition of the penitent is altogether required for validity, the minister, as judge constituted for this, must make himself certain about it. Likewise in the sacrament of order, the bishop must have certain knowledge concerning the dignity of the one to be ordained, since for order, as directed to the public good, no one has a right unless he is called by God, as Aaron was. But in matrimony the assisting priest must inquire into impediments, since he is constituted for this by the Church. But in the other sacraments, they are not to be denied to those who live as Catholics, unless the unworthiness of the penitent is established... The reason is that all the faithful have a right to these other sacraments and the ministers are not judges, but dispensers; hence in these they do not have a right of inquiring, but only the duty of dispensing to all who ask, provided they are not positively unworthy." Cf. Decr. Ne temere de Spons. et Matr., S. C. C., Aug. 2, 1907.

To a public sinner, whether asking secretly or publicly, the sacrament is to be denied; because there is no reason why an exception should be made to the general rule; indeed grave scandal of the faithful would follow from the concession of the sacraments. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 80, a. 6; L. 44. But in the case of doubt whether someone has sinned, it is to be conceded; in doubt whether he has done penance, it is to be denied. L. 48. "Yet excepted is a sinner constituted at the point of death,"

L. 44, because everyone is then presumed to wish to dispose himself rightly, and necessity removes scandal, as does the hidden penance itself of the dying person, to be made public by the minister if the sacraments were to be publicly ministered to him. La Croix 143. Very rare is the case in which the denial of the sacraments is extended even to penance. But the obligation is always present, as regards penance itself, of denying absolution to one indisposed.

Likewise the sacrament is to be denied to a hidden sinner asking secretly; because reverence toward the sacrament and charity toward one's neighbor demand this in these circumstances, St. Thomas 3 p., q. 80, a. 6; L. 50, except the case in which the crime was known from Confession; for then it is not even licit for the minister to warn the sinner. And this is forbidden even if the confessor could deny the sacrament under the pretext of other causes. L. 50, 51. - But the sacrament is not to be denied to a hidden sinner asking publicly. The reason is drawn from the inconveniences which would follow from denial of the sacrament; for scandals and disturbances would arise in the Church, and especially the faithful, brought into suspicion lest they be prohibited from the sacraments, would withdraw from them. But he who ministers sacraments to an unworthy person cooperates only materially in his sin, and such cooperation is licit from a grave proportionate cause. Cf. 374. St. Thomas p. 3, q. 80, a. 6; L. 49, 50; Lugo d. 8, n. 176; Roman Ritual de Euch. sacram. - E. M.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

Resolutions: The marriage of unbelievers, although it is valid in the notion of contract, nevertheless is not a sacrament. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 2. Whether the marriage of a faithful person with an unbeliever, with the Pope's dispensation acceding, is a sacrament, some deny, others affirm. But a marriage contracted by unbelievers, when both spouses are converted to the faith, passes into a sacrament by the reception of baptism. - Heretics and schismatics who, in entering marriage, observe the laws of the Church as regards the substance of marriage, validly contract and are fortified with the sacrament. - All Christians who are altogether unwilling to receive the sacrament do not validly contract, even if they wish to contract marriage; and if they truly wish to contract marriage, they also receive the sacrament, even if they do not wish to make the sacrament. - Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 120-130; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 302-304; t. 19, n. 164-176; Ferraris, v. Matrimonium, a. 1, n. 19; Clericatus, de Matr., decis. 4, n. 25.

Is marriage governed by civil or ecclesiastical authority? - Since among Christians the contract itself of marriage is a sacrament, marriage cannot, insofar as it is contract, be governed by civil power, and insofar as it is sacrament, by ecclesiastical power; nor at the same time, insofar as it is contract and sacrament, be governed by both powers, civil and ecclesiastical; but it must be governed exclusively, both as contract and as sacrament, by the authority of the Church.

Wherefore to the Church alone it belongs to establish especially those things which regard the substance of this contract, both as regards the incapacity of persons and as regards the form and solemnity to be constituted, namely as regards diriment impediments to be established. And likewise to the Church alone belong matrimonial causes and causes of betrothals and of other impediments immediately and directly impeding marriage. Trent, sess. 24, c. 4, 12; Benedict XIV, Const. Singulari, sections 7, 9; Leo XIII, Encyclical Arcanum, and Letter to the Bishops of the Province of Venice, February 3, 1893; Syllabus, prop. 68 ff. - But since families are members of Civil Society, hence marriage in Civil Society produces civil rights and obligations, which are called the civil effects of marriage.

Therefore if civil Princes can do anything over marriages, those things only are regarded which are situated in the civil order. Leo XIII, Encyclical Arcanum, and Letter dated February 8, 1893. - But marriage is not a certain civil contract, but is most of all natural. The contract of marriage was instituted by God Himself at the beginning of the world, Gen. 2:18; and furthermore it always was and is a sacred thing, sacred indeed not only by natural law, but also by the supernatural ordination of God. Trent, sess. 24, Doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony; Leo XIII, cited Encyclical.

Hence marriage, as regards unbelievers, both as natural contract and as sacred thing, by no means depends on the civil power and jurisdiction of Princes as regards impediments diriment of it, according to the opinion of many grave doctors. But there are other doctors who think that the marriages of unbelievers, since they are not sacraments, and therefore cannot be governed by canon law, lest those contracting be without law in so grave a matter, are governed by the power and jurisdiction of Princes, whether faithful or unbelieving. St. Thomas seems to adhere to this second opinion, 4 d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, since "those things which pertain to the law of nature are determinable by positive law; and therefore if by some positive law among those unbelievers marriage with unbelievers of another rite is prohibited, disparity of worship impedes marriage among them." - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 42, a. 2; 4 d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. 5, a. 15; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 360 ff.; t. 18, n. 2-8; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1089; E. M.

Is an exception given as regards the aforesaid firmness of marriage? - A threefold case must be excepted. 1. Ratified and non-consummated marriage of Christians can be dissolved, for a grave cause, by dispensation of the Pope, from the power divinely conceded to him. This is clear from the fact that the Supreme Pontiffs have already used this power many times, as St. Gregory VII, Paul III, etc.; Benedict XIV, Const. Dei miseratione. Cf. Perrone, de Matr., t. 3, s. 2, c. 6, a. 4. Moreover, this faculty is to be extended to marriages consummated in unbelief, if the spouses after baptism, by which the union becomes ratified, have not again consummated it; and likewise to marriages consummated in unbelief, when the spouse converted and baptized is permitted, by Apostolic Authority, to remain with the wife who was converted and baptized with him, as with a legitimate wife, the others having been dismissed, although she is not his first wife; or, because the absent unbelieving spouse cannot be warned, when it is permitted by Apostolic Authority that the spouse converted to the faith and baptized contract marriage with any faithful person. Indeed this marriage is valid and firm, even if afterward it becomes known that the prior unbelieving spouse could not justly declare his or her will because of an impediment, and had also been converted to the faith at the time the second marriage was contracted. This is most clearly established from the Letters of St. Pius V, August 2, 1571; Gregory XIII, January 25, 1585; Urban VIII, October 20, 1624; September 17, 1627. - Non-consummated, namely by an act of itself suitable for the effect of generation; and consequently, St. Alphonsus 1036, St. Thomas, 4 D. 41, q. 1, a. 1, q. 4, ad 2, by an act perfect on both sides. - Consummated marriage of Christians can in no way be dissolved, Matt. 19:6; Trent, sess. 24, C. 7, de M., and the same must be said if marriage is contracted by a faithful person with an unbeliever from dispensation of the Roman Pontiff. Clement XIII, August 2, 1759; Holy Office, August 1, 1753. - L. 955, 956, 959; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1308.

Dispensation from ratified non-consummated marriage is to be obtained exclusively from the Supreme Pontiff. The Bishop in this cause cannot, without a special faculty obtained from the S. C. of Sacraments, institute the process. But in other causes the Bishop is the competent judge in first instance.

2. Ratified and non-consummated marriage can be dissolved through the solemn religious profession of one spouse, and this from a special privilege conceded by Christ and declared by the Church. C. Verum, C. Ex parte, de Convers. coniugat.; Trent, sess. 24, c. 6. Solemn: i.e., not of simple vows, even in the Society of Jesus, but solemn vows. Profession; not mere entrance into Religion. - But so that the spouses may deliberate about the use of this privilege, by the law itself they have two months conceded to them after the nuptials, during which time they are not bound to render the debt. C. Verum, C. Ex publico, de Convers. coniug. And "either spouse can licitly deny the debt within the two-month period, although he does not have the intention of entering Religion, because he uses his own right." L. 956. Indeed after that two-month period also, if the marriage has not been consummated even through illicit denial of the debt, this privilege remains. Nor is it impeded by fornication had between the spouses before the celebration of marriage, unless the marriage is necessary for legitimating offspring, or for repairing scandal, or the honor of the bride. If within the two-month period violence is applied, and the marriage is thus consummated while the bride was in fact thinking about embracing religion, although the marriage is now indissoluble, nevertheless the bride can even in this case enter Religion. But he sins who contracts marriage with the intention of entering Religion without warning the other party. - L. 870, 958; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 61, a. 2, 3; Schmalzgrueber, l. 3, t. 32, n. 11 ff.

There are those who judge that a right of this sort is not conceded except to those who, after nuptials have been contracted and not yet consummated, deliberate about entrance into religion. But in this sense that right would be void, for then immediately after the contract of marriage each one would be bound to render the debt. For who is so mad that, while deliberating about entrance into religion, he would contract marriage?

3. Even consummated marriage of unbelievers can be dissolved from divine concession, when either spouse is converted to the Christian faith, although not Catholic but heretical, through reception of baptism, and the other refuses to cohabit peacefully with him, or does not cohabit except with injury to the Creator and contempt of the Christian Religion, or makes an attempt to draw the faithful party into mortal sin. This divine concession is drawn from the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:12-15, where he says: If any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not dismiss her...; but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, for the brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such matters; but God has called us in peace. Innocent III explains the same more fully in C. Quanto 7, de Divortiis. - L. 955, 956; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3-6; E. M.

Interpellation of the unbelieving spouse is to be made, if the other, while that one remains in unbelief, is converted and wishes to enter a new marriage. Provided it is clear that the spouse is unwilling to live peacefully from that one's response, or from a process at least summary that he or she was unwilling to give any response, or dispensation from making interpellation has been obtained from the Holy See, marriage can be contracted.

Note: Marriage is not dissolved immediately by reception of baptism; Crimes are dissolved in baptism, not marriages, C. Gaudemus 8, de Divortiis, C. Si quis 28, q. 2; but when the converted and baptized spouse enters a new union. Even after intercourse has been had after the conversion of either party, if the other party is unwilling to cohabit peacefully without insult to the Creator, the marriage can still be dissolved, whatever time has elapsed. But when the spouse converted passes to other nuptials, since the prior marriage is now dissolved, even the spouse who remains in unbelief can validly and licitly contract another marriage. - Regularly, from the prescription of the Law, C. Quanto 7, de Divortiis, interpreting the Pauline privilege, But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, the converted party cannot pass to other vows before the unbeliever, having been interpellated, has either absolutely refused to cohabit with the converted party, or at least has been unwilling to cohabit without insult to the Creator. - If the unbeliever cannot be interpellated, because he or she is far absent and has fled, or lies hidden, several judge, apud Sanchez, l. 7, d. 74, n. 13-15, that interpellation can be omitted, because there is no obligation of impossibilities; nor is there need of it, since it is now clear with moral certainty that the unbelieving spouse is unwilling to be converted, nor willing to live peacefully. Others, with whom Benedict XIV agrees, de Syn., l. 6, c. 4, n. 3, think pontifical dispensation necessary; and the S. C. C., January 17, 1722, adhered to this opinion apud the same Benedict XIV, l. c., and the Holy Office, September 16, 1824. Cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1328. The case would certainly be different if the unbelieving spouse is absent from the spouse by some compulsion and wishes to be joined with that spouse; for then the unbeliever neither departs nor can depart, in which case Apostolic dispensation would be needed for the converted unbeliever, and then indeed in this sense the dispensation from interpellation which is given can be well understood. - When, in some places, by law or custom, in order to remove a peculiar danger of perversion, it is prohibited that the converted party cohabit with the unbeliever unless this one also wishes to be converted to the faith, not only must the unbeliever be interpellated whether he consents to cohabit peacefully, but also whether he wishes to embrace the Christian faith. But if, when the time prefixed by law or custom has elapsed, he has declared that he is unwilling to be converted to the faith, although from another source he would wish to cohabit peacefully, the converted spouse recovers liberty and is permitted to fly to new nuptials. For by the judgment of the Church, according to the circumstances of places, the pertinacity alone of the unbeliever in unbelief is judged to present danger for the perversion of the faithful spouse, and for insult to the Creator. - By the Pauline privilege, it is not conceded to the converted party that he can enter a new marriage with another unbeliever, or even with a catechumen, but only with a baptized faithful person. S. C. de P. F., January 16, 1683; August 7, 1891, Collectanea cit. n. 2183; L. 956, 957; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3, 6; Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 13, c. 21; Sanchez, l. 7, d. 73; Monit. Eccles., v. 11, p. 533.

When one of two unbelieving spouses is converted to the faith, the other remaining in unbelief, the converted one can receive sacred orders or profess religion. In the first case the marriage is not dissolved, and therefore if the other spouse is converted, he or she cannot contract a new marriage. Sanchez, l. 7, d. 76, n. 11. But in the other case, "it must altogether be held," says Sanchez, l. c., n. 9, "that the prior consummated marriage is dissolved through profession, just as it would be dissolved through subsequent marriage." - Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Privilegium Paulinum; E. M.

What and of how many kinds is an impediment of marriage; by what law is it constituted, and by what superior; whom does it affect? Impediments of marriage are certain conditions or circumstances constituted by law, which prohibit from contracting marriage. By law, for a particular precept or prohibition made to someone or to some persons is not customarily called an impediment. - Impediments which forbid entering marriage licitly are called impedient; those which bar from validly contracting marriage are called diriment. Contracting, for if perhaps they supervene when it has already been contracted, they by no means render it invalid. Diriment impediments fall into inhabiting and invalidating laws. Wherefore regularly neither ignorance nor force nor fear even of death excuses from incurring them. - All diriment impediments are established either by natural law, or by divine law, or by canon law. Nor can Bishops constitute them, but only the Roman Pontiff. Impediments introduced by Christian Princes are neither diriment, nor properly impedient, and therefore do not oblige in conscience except merely per accidens, from damage that would occur if they were not observed. - Impediments of natural and divine law oblige all, even unbelievers. Impediments of canon law oblige only Christians, C. 4, de Consang., C. 8, de Divort., namely Catholics and heretics; and thus the Holy See, when permitting mixed marriages of Catholics and non-Catholics, if some diriment impediment is present, first dispenses it. And if marriage is entered by a faithful person with an unbeliever, an impediment of ecclesiastical law certainly does not directly affect the unbeliever; nevertheless it directly affects the faithful person, and because marriage is a contract, and a contract is between two and cannot be invalid on one side and valid on the other, the impediment indirectly affects even the unbeliever, as is seen in the impediment of disparity of worship, crime, etc. C. 1, de Conv. infid. - Trent, sess. 24, c. 3, 4; Sanchez, l. 7, d. 5, d. 78, n. 3; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 375; t. 7, n. 46; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 3, n. 525; Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 8, c. 14, n. 5; l. 13, n. 23; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 45, n. 4; E. M.

What is excommunication, and how many kinds are there? Excommunication is a censure through which someone is deprived of communion with the Church. "It is a penalty, the gravest which the Church can inflict, and in itself it contains by force the other censures of suspension and interdict, as those which deprive one not so fully, but only partially, of the goods of the Church, or of their use." Pichler, book 4, title 39, n. 23. An excommunicated person who, after legitimate warnings, has not repented, and has grown filthy in excommunication for a year, or has persevered obstinately, incurs suspicion of heresy, because he seems to despise the authority of the Church. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref. It is twofold: one is minor, the other major. This major excommunication is evident in two ways. For one is that by which someone is an excommunicated tolerated person, whom the faithful are not bound to avoid; the other is that by which someone is an excommunicated person not tolerated, whom they are bound to avoid.

I. All apostates from the Christian faith, and all and each heretics, by whatever name they are reckoned, and of whatever sect they exist, and those believing them; and their receivers, favorers, and generally any defenders of them.

Apostates are those who, utterly defecting from the Christian religion, pass over to the Mohammedan sect or another, or even to none. But understand an apostate not only by exterior work or sign, but also in soul. For he is called an apostate from the Christian faith. But one who is only externally an apostate is an apostate not from faith, but from confession of faith. Moreover the discussion is of apostasy from the Christian faith, not only inwardly conceived, but also outwardly solemnly professed in baptism.

Heretics. In order that this excommunication, imposed precisely because of heresy, be incurred, it is required, 1. that the heresy be formal, i.e., with error of the intellect and pertinacity of will. But he is called pertinacious who adheres to his opinion notwithstanding that he knows it to be opposed to the doctrine of the Roman Church sufficiently proposed to him; or who is so disposed in soul that, even if that doctrine should be sufficiently proposed to him, nevertheless he would not wish to be moved from his opinion. The reason for this last member of the disjunction is that any ignorance, even crass and affected, according to the truer and more common opinion excuses from heresy and the penalties of heretics. For someone can very well have the will of believing all things which are sufficiently proposed to him as revealed by God and as dogmas of the Church, although he does not have the will of applying diligence so that he may know what things have been revealed by God and what defined by the Church. Hence although he sins gravely against faith, nevertheless he is not formally an infidel and heretic, but a faithful and Catholic person believing all things which have been revealed by God and defined by the Church, and which are sufficiently proposed to him. De Lugo, De Fide, disp. 20, sec. 6; L. 301. It is required, 2. that the heresy of the mind be betrayed exteriorly by an external sign manifestative of internal error, from itself or from the circumstances, with a gravely culpable manifestation, although the matter becomes known to no one. L. 303-305. Hence these do not incur excommunication: 1. a merely mental heretic, or one who abstains from hearing Mass; 2. one who manifests his heresy in order to seek counsel. But a positive doubt outwardly betrayed by no means excuses, because one doubting thus judges that the truth proposed by the Church can be false. L. 302. Cf. Struggl, tract 4, q. 2, n. 12; Lugo, De Fide, disp. 20, n. 17. It is required, 3. that the heresy has not been brought to the judicial forum of the Bishop. For Bishops by themselves or by a delegate can absolve in each forum from any heresy, if it has once been brought to their judicial forum. L., appendix de Priv., n. 39; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 9, chap. 4. But the Constitution of Pius IX does not seem to derogate from this faculty of Bishops. Therefore Bishops have no faculty of absolving only from heresy, whether occult or notorious, which has not yet been brought to their forum. Hence all Protestants who wished to abjure their heresy, and consequently to bring it to the external forum, need not have recourse to Rome, but can be absolved by the Bishop, both for the external and for the internal forum, either by himself or by a delegate.

By whatever name they are reckoned, namely by some peculiar name of heretics. Of whatever sect they exist, "even if they do not adhere to heresy in soul, they enroll themselves even only by name in a sect, whatever name it may have, heretical or schismatical, from whatever cause this is done," according to the Declaration of the Holy Office. Diocesan Synod of Albano, year 1886, part 1, art. 6, n. 2.

Those believing, namely those truly believing heretics, whether explicitly or implicitly; those believing either in particular some false dogma of heretics, although they do not adhere to them in all things, nor are called by a particular name, e.g., Calvinists, Lutherans, etc., nor are judged enrolled in some particular sect, e.g., the Reformed Church, etc.; or those believing only generally that heretics have the true faith and religion, although they believe nothing distinctly and in particular against faith; those believing them when they say that the Catholic religion is false.

Receivers: to receive is to furnish refuge for the sake of hiding in one's own or another's place. Therefore receivers are those who receive by hospitality or conceal, even once, a heretic so that he may escape the penalties of his heresy. Favorers: to favor generally is to furnish any work to someone for his advantage and usefulness, whether by doing something, e.g., by recommending, by giving money, or by omitting what someone by office ought to have done. Therefore favorers are those who in the cause of faith favor heretics, either negatively, namely by omitting, when they can and are bound by office, to capture, guard, or punish a heretic; or positively, by helping him, as such, with praises, recommendations, money, etc., e.g., so that he may flee, etc. Hence the Holy Office, May 11, 1892, declared that excommunication is contracted by those who enter marriage before a heretical or schismatic minister assigned to sacred things. Defenders: to defend is to protect someone, so that he can do something safely and freely, or to protect something against contrary attacks. Therefore defenders of errors or of the person are those who defend their errors by words, writings, etc., although inwardly they think otherwise, or who prevent them from being captured or punished because of heresy.

Therefore these words, receivers, favorers, defenders of heretics, must be understood formally of those who favor heretics insofar as they are heretics, namely either because they profess such doctrine, or also in order to teach, defend, or do something of this kind concerning that heresy. The reason is that penalty must be understood strictly, according to the subject matter. Besides, receivers, favorers, defenders: understand reception, favor, defense as completed. And so, if you have received, defended, and favored a heretic lest he be captured, yet he was captured, you have not incurred the excommunication imposed on receivers, favorers, and defenders of heretics. Bull In Coena Domini, sec. 1; C. Sicut ait 8; C. Excommunicamus 13, 15, de Haereticis; Suarez, disp. 21, sec. 2, first excommunication; Bonacina, De Censur. in partic., disp. 1, q. 2, parts 1, 2, 3; L. 300 ff.; Ferraris, v. Haeresis, Haereticus; Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 7; St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 10-12; Quodlibet 10, aa. 15, 16; E.M.

Public abjuration of heretics who desire to return to the faith is not necessary, but their abjuration can be made before someone delegated by the Bishop as notary, and some persons as witnesses. But they must abstain altogether from communication in spiritual things with heretics, and from every thing protestative of heresy. Holy Office, March 28, 1900; Monitor Ecclesiasticus, vol. 12, pp. 49-50.

II. All and each persons knowingly reading without authority of the Apostolic See books of the same apostates and heretics defending heresy, and also books of any author prohibited by name through Apostolic letters; and those retaining, printing, and in any way defending the same books.

Knowingly: this clause placed at the beginning affects, in the obvious and natural sense, not only those reading, but also those retaining, printing, and defending. Therefore ignorance, whether of fact or of law, even crass, and not improbably also affected, excuses from this censure. L. 296. Reading: by the name of reading here is understood reading in the proper sense, and in a human way, so that one understands the things which he reads. Moreover, reading strictly such is understood; whence it is indeed prohibited to read, but it is not prohibited to hear one reading, who perhaps has faculty; nor to recite part of the book from memory, because these things are not comprehended strictly under the name of reading. Ithur., case 39; L. 292. Reading, in a notable quantity and sufficient for grave sin. Thus commonly the doctors, who nevertheless disagree in determining the quantity of this kind. But it seems more rightly to be distinguished, because if by reading a prohibited book you immediately fall into heresy, you can incur excommunication by reading even a few lines, because there is great danger of perversion, which the prohibition of the Church intends to remove. But if you fall into matter altogether indifferent and infected by no error, even by reading a whole page, you are excused from mortal sin and therefore from excommunication. Ithur., l.c., nn. 30, 31; L. 284, 294. Say the same concerning those retaining; for one who retains a book for a moderate time, e.g., one or another day, even if he has the intention of always retaining it, does not incur excommunication. For the reason is the same for time as for matter. Nor are theologians lacking who excuse one who retains a book for a longer time while awaiting a suitable time to hand it over to a superior, or to another having license. Without authority of the Apostolic See. Therefore the Pope alone, or those to whom he has committed or delegated this faculty, can dispense concerning the reading of books prohibited by the present censure.

Books: letters, sermons, public newspapers, Holy Office, April 27, 1880, pamphlets, are not books. Nor are manuscripts books. Sheets separated from a prohibited book, fragments of a book, are not a book. Cf. St. Alphonsus, 293; Suarez, De Cens., disp. 23, sec. 7, n. 3. For a book properly is a volume of several sheets collected together, not of an altogether slight bulk, treating of one and the same argument, or even of various arguments. Whence those knowingly reading periodic publications bound into fascicles, defending heresy and having a heretical author, incur excommunication. Holy Office, January 13, 1892. Of apostates and heretics: the same is added; therefore there is question of those of whom the discussion is in the preceding excommunication, namely by whatever name they are reckoned and of whatever sect they exist; but those believing them are omitted, wherefore it seems to be required for incurring this excommunication that the heretical author be known from elsewhere, and it does not suffice that he be first manifested as such through the book itself. For such a person would rather be a Catholic believing the errors of heretics than a heretic, as is distinguished in the preceding excommunication. Yet if the author evidently and certainly defends heresy, and evidently with a pertinacious mind against the authority of the Church, by that very fact he will be judged a heretic by right and deservedly. Hence if the book is anonymous, from the book itself it can be known whether its author is a heretic, L. 283, and then the censure is incurred. This is confirmed from the constitution Officiorum of Leo XIII, de Prohib. et cens. libr., sec. 47. Defending heresy: "even if only one error is contained in the whole book, the whole is prohibited; nor, even with that error deleted, will it be lawful to retain the book, because it is absolutely prohibited by force of this clause." Suarez, l.c. La Croix, n. 330, and others deny this last point, and indeed probably, because then the book no longer contains heresy, nor does it induce any danger. L. 283. But it must be carefully noted that to defend heresy is not simply to contain heresy, but to undertake patronage of heresy intentionally and, as it were, with one's powers. Therefore books of heretics which only incidentally contain heresy are not comprehended under this excommunication, since they do not treat professedly of faith. L. 287. Nor do the books of the primitive heretics seem to be comprehended, since their heresy no longer harms, and knowledge of them is very useful for ecclesiastical history. La Croix, book 7, n. 333.

Through Apostolic letters. Apostolic letters are those which proceed immediately in the name of the Roman Pontiff, whether in the form of a Brief, or in the form of a Bull, or in any other form, provided that in them is read, by Apostolic Authority, or something equivalent. Prohibited by name, i.e., with the title of the book expressed in particular. Therefore all books which are condemned only in a general way through Apostolic letters are not comprehended by this censure. Prohibited by name: the words indeed are general; nevertheless the doctors commonly understand them of prohibition under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff. Otherwise the Supreme Pontiff seems to relax to others what he does not reserve to himself, and therefore then there will not be an excommunication reserved to himself in a special manner. But by this same argument it is shown that that excommunication, although reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, is nevertheless not reserved to him in a special manner. For if the Supreme Pontiff reserves it to himself only simply, he seems by that very fact to remove the special reservation. Therefore it would rather have to be said that there is question of prohibition under penalty of specially reserved excommunication. But then this second article of the Constitution would be entirely useless. Therefore it seems that it must be said that there is question of prohibition simply made under penalty of excommunication, although no reservation is added to it. It is said under penalty of excommunication, because if the prohibition is made either with no penalty added, or with another penalty, it surely does not pertain here. For here there is question of censures. Cf. 1178.

Retaining. "He is said to retain who has a book with himself, whether he has it borrowed, deposited, belonging to another, for binding, for selling, for adorning a library, whether in his own or another's house; so that in whatever way, and wherever he has the book, he incurs the censure imposed against those retaining. And so it is not lawful for you to sell or give them.... Yet I myself would think this must be limited, unless you sell or give to one having faculty to read them; for then I believe that the tacit or interpretative faculty of superiors is present, who are not reasonably judged unwilling.... You would not sin if, accommodating another who has faculty, you yourself were to carry with you some prohibited book bought at Rome, e.g., to Fano; just as the bookseller would not sin who kept the book longer in his shop for binding, because all these things are accessory to the faculty itself conceded and are understood as conceded through it." Ithur., case 39, n. 40. Printing: in the obvious sense, those printing are generally all who cooperate proximately in printing, such as those who compose the type, ink it, moisten the sheets, turn the press, etc. Those who arrange sheets and books already printed are not properly printers; those selling and carrying elsewhere are rather retainers. The owner of the typography and the publisher, in the obvious sense, are not printers, but those commanding printing. Regularly they are both readers and also retainers. Defending in any way, namely defending either by words or by deeds; either the depraved doctrine which they contain, or the material book itself, namely if they prevent the book from being burned or handed over to the Bishop or Inquisitor. L. 285. But one who approves and praises good and true doctrine contained in the book is not comprehended by this censure, provided nevertheless that he is not judged absolutely to approve the book itself; nor even one who praises the style, eloquence, phrase, or genius, provided that this does not argue praise and approval of the book. Bull In Coena Domini, sec. 1; Lugo, De Fide, disp. 25, n. 94; L. 281-299; Bouix, De Cur. Rom., part 3, sec. 3, chap. 11; Suarez, disp. 21, sec. 2, first excommunication; Bonacina, disp. 1, q. 2, part 4; E.M.

1. Marcellinus the missionary proposes the following doubts:

1. Is it licit for Christians to rent houses and workshops to gentiles? The reason for doubting is that the gentiles, in the nobler place of those houses, burn incense, exhibit reverence to an idol, and exercise other superstitious things.

R. "It is licit, if it is established that the houses are sought for inhabiting and the workshops for an indifferent use; yet it is not licit if they are expressly sought for constructing a shrine." S. C. de P. F., 8 Feb. 1806.

2. Is it licit for Christians to lease farms belonging to a temple?

R. Here is in summary the instruction given by the S. C. de P. F., 15 Jan. 1807. 1. It is licit to lease farms belonging to a temple; especially if a cause consonant with reason for contracting concurs; for the thing is of its own nature indifferent. 2. To pay the lease price is a debt of justice, even if the lessee thinks it will be expended for the sake of the temple. 3. Scandal which perhaps arises for Christians from a thing of this sort, insofar as it is born from ignorance, or is scandal of the little ones, must be restrained by protestation and instruction; insofar as it is produced by the malice of the wicked, or is pharisaic, it must be contemned. 4. The lessee is to be exhorted to abstain from the lease if from this some danger of perversion or occasion of scandal is feared.

2. Christians buy territories on which there are idols or oratories of idols. Can they admonish the gentiles, to whom the territory previously belonged, to remove them from the territory?

R. "They cannot, if the ownership of these idols or oratories is annexed to the territory, and passes with the dominion of the land to the buyer, who is held to remove and destroy them, or so change their form that every occasion of superstitious worship is removed, and no appearance of an oratory consecrated to idols appears any longer. But if such idols or oratories are of public right and under the power of the prince, it is not licit for Christians to remove or destroy them, but rather they should abstain from buying those territories in which these profane images and oratories are found." Holy Office, month of May, year 1781.

3. Gentiles who preserve the tablets of the progenitors of the family are converted to the faith. Can they hand over tablets of this sort to pagan relatives, to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them from their house, or hide them, to be handed over afterwards if they are demanded by relatives or by prefects, and they are compelled to this? Likewise, to what are proselytes held who have with themselves the idols of other pagans, which they preserve by way of deposit?

R. "If those superstitious tablets by special dominion belong to the converted gentile, he cannot preserve them at home, nor hand them over to other pagans of the family, but must altogether destroy them; and thus it is to be taught and enjoined by the missionaries. But if these tablets belong jointly to others of the family, the Christian is held to remove them from his house; but he can hand them over to others of the family to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them and take them for themselves; for thus he will confess his faith, and will render to another his own right. By equal right, the idols of pagans which the proselyte preserves for the sake of deposit are to be restored to their owners." Holy Office, 20 Aug. 1778.

4. The bishop of Sergiopolis, Apostolic Vicar of Kiang-nan, proposed a case to the S. C. de P. F.: "Whether Catholics can be permitted, with boats and carrying-chairs, by which they are accustomed indiscriminately to transfer all persons from place to place, also to convey those gentiles who, bringing with themselves incense, idols, and other superstitious things, approach the sepulchers of their ancestors, or other places, so that there they may exercise superstitions."

The S. C. de P. F., 14 Sept. 1868, transmitted the response of the Holy Office, July 1854, given to a similar question:

"Since the actions of which there is discussion are in themselves licit, or at least indifferent, and do not directly influence superstition, provided that scandal is not present, and grave damage is imminent, those Catholics are not to be disturbed; and provided that it is not in contempt of religion, and a protestation is made by the Christian sailors, insofar as it can conveniently be done, that they do not intend toward superstition." Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2195.

5. Marcellus, a missionary, proposes the following doubts:

1. In order to avoid some tumults against Christians, is it licit for Christians to contribute money which is demanded, to be spent in the new year on idolatries of demons, and at the same time on other indifferent demonstrations of the people's joy?

R. "The Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this sort they do not intend to concur in superstitious acts, the cause which is narrated being supposed, especially a protestation having been premised, if it can conveniently be done, that they furnish the taxes imposed only in order to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F., 12 Sept. 1645.

2. Is it lawful for Christians to contribute money which, if one is unwilling to give it, he is prohibited from entry into the market of goods; which money partly falls to the leading men, partly to repairing the market, and partly to burning incense to a false deity?

R. "The payment of the tax can be permitted to Christians, especially with a protestation premised." S. C. de P. F., year 1816; Holy Office, 21 Apr. 1849.

3. What if the tax to be paid is imposed solely for a superstitious end, for constructing pagodas, for making sacrifices to idols, etc.?

R. That indeed is not licit, even with any protestation premised. For this contribution bears before itself at least external consent with the superstition of the gentiles, which is altogether illicit. Holy Office, 16 Nov. 1769.

4. By the edict of the king Christians are now compelled to erect shrines to idols and to progenitors. Moreover, in very many places where pagans and Christians are mixed, Christians make an agreement with pagans that they themselves will sustain, according to their choice and as they can, a greater and some special part of public and licit works in the village, provided that the pagans do not disturb them concerning superstitions nor betray and accuse them before the Mandarins, and furthermore handle the superstitious business before the Mandarin for the whole village according to their choice and as they can. By acting thus, the Christians do not intend that the pagans perform superstitious things in their place, but only to free themselves from doing superstitions, and to hide themselves from the Mandarins. Moreover, the pagans do not do more superstitions, either greater or more in number, than they do according to their custom. - Q. Is such an agreement between Christians and pagans licit, with attention to the things said above, with attention also to the reason that, unless Christians make an agreement with pagans in such a way, they will either perform superstitions, or will be compelled to sustain innumerable vexations?"

R. "As it is explained, it can be tolerated, or they are not to be disturbed." S. C. de P. F., 10 Aug. 1841, Vicar Apostolic of Western Tonkin.

6. "Christians, few in number, cannot avoid using the society of gentiles: they find themselves daily at their tables and banquets; but because pagans have it as a custom that they offer to idols foods prepared not only directly for the worship of idols, but for the ordinary eating of the family, and place them indifferently on the table, Christians who sit there, timid, likewise eat indifferently, because it would be shame to themselves and injury to the gentiles if they refused to use the foods placed there."

"Q. Can those Christians eat of these, when scandal is not given?"

R. "It is licit to eat feasts placed indifferently, although offered to idols, provided that it is not in a temple, nor in a place sacred to idols, and provided that every appearance of worship or veneration of idols and of superstition is absent, and no danger is present of scandalizing the faithful or infidels." Holy Office, 15 Dec. 1768. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1703.

7. The wives, daughters, and maidservants of pagans are compelled to cook foods for the common meal of the family. But some part of these foods will afterwards be offered to an idol.

Q. In the case, can the aforesaid persons licitly cook foods?

R. "It is generally licit to cook and prepare foods if there is question of ordinary servants and cooks, who through the whole time of the year are assigned to a ministry of this sort; if extraordinary banquets of this sort are made primarily for the joy of the family, for guests, and for other occasions by no means superstitious, although it is not unknown that some part of them is to be offered to idols; if the dishes are not distinguished, so that some are made for a superstitious offering, others for the food of the guests, but the destination depends on the judgment of the father of the family; if no dishes are specially directed and prepared for the idol; if in the division of the feasts, nor in their exposition at the place of sacrifice, or at the table of the idol, they do not cooperate.

"It is not licit for maidservants and children of the family to buy, cook, or in any way prepare extraordinary foods accustomed to be deputed to sacrifice or superstitious offering, when they well know that such foods are destined by masters, husbands, or parents for sacrifice or offering to be made to their deceased. Nor is this licit for the same persons because of grave fear or damage which probably or certainly threatens themselves, even if a protestation is premised, that their mind is altogether alien from superstition. Likewise this is not licit for the same persons even when those extraordinary foods are bought, cooked, etc., in a greater quantity than is necessary for furnishing the said table serving superstition, when the primary end of the said preparation is to make the aforesaid superstitious table, although the part of the foods which remains over serves occasionally and accessorily for licit eating." S. C. de P. F., 13 Jan. 1793.

Pagans, driven into rage against Christians, engraved the sign of the Cross in public roads, on bridges, and on the threshold of city gates, to be trampled by the feet of those going to and fro; and this with such frequency and continuity that it is impossible for travelers to abstain from that injury. Furthermore some of the pagans placed themselves on watch, so that they might silently observe the manner of acting of Christians. The Christians, the matter having been known, threw themselves into anguish: for on one side they cannot abstain from access to the city unless they wish to renounce their commerce and the procuring of things necessary for life; on the other, it seems to them that by trampling those crosses they give an indication of religion forsworn.

Q. What is to be done in these straits of affairs?

R. The preceding case was proposed by the Apostolic Vicar of Hu-nan. The S. C. de P. F., 26 June 1863, responded: "... 1. If Christians are admonished by no one concerning some sign of the cross which perhaps they have before their feet, the Sacred Congregation judged that they should walk freely, examining nothing. For when those things are established which have been set forth by Your Apostolic Lordship, and those two especially are evident and publicly known, namely the necessity of making the journey for conducting one's own business and sustaining life itself, and the firm will of Christians to be retained in their religion and to exclude all those things which are contrary to it, anyone easily sees that such a manner of acting cannot be refuted either from the end, or from the object, or from the circumstances, which are the three elements by which the morality of an action is constituted. For the end, which is not directed to contempt of Religion, but to consulting one's own necessities, is manifestly honorable.

"But with an end of this sort proposed, the material act also of walking over crosses, in which act the object of the action here is, if it is considered in itself and receives nothing of depravity from the circumstances, must without doubt be free from all fault. For since to walk and to place footsteps is an act indifferent by its nature, it necessarily follows that, if a dishonorable end is excluded, but an honorable end and one conformable to reason is proposed, the act itself also must be held as honorable and conformable to reason. Therefore you know that not only is it counted among scruples if someone turns it into religion for himself that while walking he trampled straws joined in the form of a cross, but also that everywhere and freely in churches the faithful walk over the stones of sepulchers, where the most holy name of Jesus, and its monogram and crosses, are very often engraved.

"It remains, therefore, that from the circumstances nothing of depravity accede; of these, one proposition occurs which seems to stretch forth some appearance of difficulty, that in describing the aforesaid crosses the pagans proposed to set a snare for Christians, namely so that, if compelled by necessity they should trample them, they might seem to have forsworn religion; to which Your Apostolic Lordship adds another by which he seems not a little moved, namely that in the first days pagans were also seen on watch, so that they might observe the Christians' manner of acting; yet you will easily perceive that this circumstance brings no moment. For since you say that the same persons stood by altogether silent and daring nothing at all, you plainly understand that they are to be held just as those who by chance saw Christians passing by. Wherefore this one thing is to be asked here, both as regards them, and as regards others who by chance are present, and also as regards the rest who, absent, know the deed, whether, because the pagans engraved crosses with that evil mind, scandal would rightly arise among them if Christians walked over them, as if namely they seemed to have given a judgment of religion forsworn. Since those two things which we have mentioned leap into the eyes of all, and are publicly known, namely the will of Christians, which openly and firmly adheres to its religion, and by equal reason abhors those things which are contrary, and the true reason which drives the same to frequent the roads of the city, which is the necessity of conducting their affairs and sustaining their life, this indeed follows: that if someone, blinded by his voluntary malice, is unwilling to see these things which all see, so that by calumny he attributes apostasy to Christians, he certainly suffers not the scandal of the little ones, nor one born from infirmity, but that of the Pharisees and one produced from malice. But you know that the scandal of the Pharisees is to be spurned.

"2. If Christians are admonished by someone concerning some cross which they have near their feet, the same Sacred Congregation responded that they ought diligently to take care lest they press the cross; since, if, admonished, they should freely trample the same, when nevertheless they could avoid it, they would rightly seem to the little and weak to have violated the sanctity of religion....

"3. But if the way is so blocked that it is licit to pass only over the described crosses, in that case, since it is manifest that one walks over them not from some irreverence but from mere necessity, the Sacred Congregation indeed responded that this can be done, but that for removing every account of scandal a twofold condition must be observed. The first is that before the one admonishing, and those hearing, Christians expressly profess that the will of inflicting injury on the cross is altogether absent from them. The other is that, in the very fact of passing, they hold a manner, as far as can be done, becoming, so that some sign of reverence may appear from it.... But if someone should wish to take scandal from this, he would plainly follow the ways of the Pharisees, and therefore his calumny would have to be despised, especially since, if Christians allow themselves to be terrified more than is fitting by these injuries of pagans, an occasion would be furnished to them for making the condition of the Christian Religion more difficult day by day, and easily extinguishing it by these acts...." Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1662.

1. Francisca, a noble girl, her father having died burdened with debt, fell into such poverty and misery that she is compelled to seek alms, and thus sustain her own life and that of her infirm mother. With every zeal she seeks whether she can apply herself to some art or office, and by her industry and labor provide for the necessities of her own life and her mother's. Having suffered rejection by all, she is finally sought by a Protestant minister, that she be willing, to the sound of the organ on Sundays, to sing psalms in a Protestant temple during the time of public offices. Since Francisca is very skilled in the art of music and endowed with a beautiful voice, there is offered to her a rich and altogether extraordinary stipend, by which alone she could thereafter live together with her mother in a decent and suitable state. Francisca is a fervent Catholic, and has a firm purpose of fulfilling all the duties of the Catholic religion; indeed also, so that she may fortify herself against any danger, she proposes to approach sacred Communion more frequently, and to persist more fervently in daily prayer, which she never omits. Francisca indeed has no doubt concerning the liceity of the matter; nevertheless, because she is of a timorous conscience, she manifests the matter to her confessor, seeking counsel from him, ready rather to suffer poverty than to offend God.

Q. 1. Is communication with heretics prohibited? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 367. To the second: for the solution of the case two things are to be inquired. The first is whether it is licit for Francisca to accept the office of singer in a Protestant temple. The other, insofar as a negative response must be given to the prior question, is whether the confessor can and ought to manifest the truth to his penitent.

Now, as regards the first question, it must altogether be answered negatively. This is clear 1. from the authority of theologians. La-Croix, l. 2, n. 68, has these words: "Lessius rightly notes that it is not licit in temples or banquets of non-Catholics to sing their psalms together; likewise that it is not licit in their temples to play the organ or other instruments, because in these things there seems to be public approbation or scandalous communication in sacred things." Philippus de Carboneano, in the appendix to the treatise of Fr. Antoine, de Virt. Theol., part 1, c. 2, says: "Secondly, by deed they deny the faith who do those things which approve and ratify a false rite and sacrilegious worship. For this is to contemn the orthodox faith, which condemns these things, and to profess a false Religion by work. But they ratify the false rite and worship who in the temples of schismatics, heretics, and infidels play organs or other instruments, sing meters, or compose things to be sung, or exercise the musical art in another way." Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 37, speaking of the temples of heretics, says: "Those who in them sing hymns, play organs, respond to the herald, become plainly participants in the worship, and therefore in some way betray the faith." Other more recent theologians commonly teach the same.

It is clear 2. from the instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar for parish priests of Rome: "Most strictly, moreover, it is forbidden to enter, from mere curiosity and knowingly, the halls and temples of Protestants during the time of conferences; and all sin gravely who, from mere curiosity, listen to the conferences of Protestants and assist, although materially, at non-Catholic ceremonies; and all craftsmen who, even for the sole reason of gain, sing or play in the temples of Protestants." Enchir. Mor. 367.

“68. Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin.” Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

“28. If the Pope with a great part of the Church should hold an opinion in one way or another, and should not even be in error, it is still not a sin or heresy to hold the contrary, especially in a matter not necessary for salvation, until the one opinion has been rejected and the other approved by a universal Council.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“5. Although it is evident to you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him if you cannot prove it.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

“According to the present discipline introduced by Martin V in the celebrated Extravagant Ad evitanda, Catholics are permitted freely to associate with heretics, provided that they have not been expressly and by name denounced, and to communicate with them in merely profane and civil matters.” Holy Office, 10 May 1873; A. S. S., vol. 27, p. 449 ff.; C. 1816.

“10. If someone scandalizes others by his own defects, it is not necessary to reflect upon them, provided that the will to scandalize is not present; and to be unable to reflect upon one’s own defects is a grace of God.” Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

655. One can sin against faith by omission and commission.

(a) By omission, not only by omitting the prescribed act of faith, as was said above, n. 640; but also by omitting due diligence in learning the truths necessary to be known, n. 643, or in seeking the solution of difficulties which are proposed against faith. Yet by this sin the infused habit of faith is not lost, but there is incurred the danger of eliciting an act contrary to faith, by which the habit itself would be lost.

(b) By commission, and indeed in two ways: by excess, by accepting or handing on to others through rash credulity as revealed what has not been revealed, for example, by believing private revelations without sufficient reason, by proposing one's own opinions as dogmas of faith, not without great scandal of the faithful and of unbelievers;² - by defect, especially in a threefold way, namely by heresy, apostasy, and infidelity, concerning which it is necessary to discuss separately. These three sins formerly were called by the general name of infidelity:³ by these indeed the habit of faith is lost, when they are committed knowingly and willingly.

² Therefore these words of St. John must be kept before the mind (1 John 4:1): "Dearly beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world."

³ We say nothing concerning schism; when it is nothing else than a secession from legitimate authority, it is indeed opposed to obedience and charity, but not to faith; but when, as usually, it denies the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff or another defined truth, it is joined with heresy, and then concerning it one must say what we hand down concerning heresy.

66. By the superior law, with the quality of the writer more observed, all books of heresiarchs were proscribed, but of heretics at least those which expressly treated religion.¹ Now, in this article, the writer or his mind is not regarded, provided the clause obtains. Now:

What is an apostate

1. An apostate, who, as is clear, is here understood as an apostate from the Christian faith,² is anyone who not only the Catholic but the Christian faith externally (even secretly) and at the same time internally casts away completely, whether he passes over to the "errors of Mohammed, etc.," or merely becomes a perfect "free thinker." Avanzini, loc. cit., p. 8. Think, for example, of E. Renan, Laurent.

What is heresy

2. Understand heresy as an error opposed to a truth sufficiently proposed by the Church, whether through the ordinary magisterium or through a formal definition; namely, that error which, if externally proposed with pertinacity, makes one guilty of heresy in the canonical forum, and is punished by excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved to the Roman Pontiff through the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, n. 1.

Schism

3. Schism, taken perfectly, entails withdrawal from the communion of the universal Church, which practically will happen by rejecting the spiritual authority of the legitimate Supreme Pontiff. For if you refuse subjection to a legitimate Bishop, the schism will not be perfect unless you separate yourself from him because he himself preserves communion with the Roman Pontiff. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 8, n. 12.

To defend

4. To defend says more than to assert, or merely to praise without demonstration; rather, it is to uphold by reasons being added.

Foundations of religion

5. By the very foundations of Religion we understand only the truths which either found natural religion itself, or are necessary for an adult unbeliever so that he may be led to embrace the faith; but not at the same time the principal dogmas of the faith itself. These are less properly called the foundations of Religion, and are already touched by the earlier words of the article.³ These truths are: the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, the force of proof of miracles, the motives of credibility in general, and anything of this kind.⁴

To overturn in any way

6. To overturn in any way, or in whatever way it is done. Therefore by a serious attack, or one made through ridicule; directly or indirectly, for example by defending universal skepticism, from which God can no longer be demonstrated; from formal intention or objectively, from the subject matter of the work. There are so many books of this kind from the philosophy of materialists, positivists, rationalists.

Earlier heretics

7. Already formerly it was likely that by the severe proscription of heretics, books of earlier heretics, such as Tertullian, Pelagius, and those of this kind, were not comprehended, so that the reading of such books was permitted especially to theologians and students of ecclesiastical sciences.⁵

The benign intention of our Constitution allows us to preserve this exception of the law. So the common opinion. Indeed, nothing seems to prevent us from saying the same of other heretics who are not now so ancient, indeed, but whose errors have plainly become obsolete and are merely historically reported without danger of contagion. We would say this of heretics prior to the Protestant Reformation.⁶ For the argument is similar. Of itself the danger has ceased; therefore the reason of the law has been removed, not in some particular case but commonly; indeed, at least in part, it has ceased contrariwise, since the reading of them brings very many advantages for investigating the ancient morals of Christians or philosophical systems.

Collection of Labbe, Migne

Therefore, without scruple, one can have the collections of Councils which take their name from Labbe; the collection of patrology of Migne,⁷ where these works are inserted so that the monuments of ecclesiastical tradition may be possessed more fully.

What of debates of Parliaments?

For a somewhat different reason, that is, because they are not books properly so called, and at the same time with parts which attack the faith they contain others by which it is defended, it is lawful also not to refer to proscribed works the reports of speeches and disputes which are customarily held in Parliaments, as they are set forth in a public periodical (Journal Officiel, Annales parlementaires), or in private collections, such as Questions actuelles. A certain force of usage is added.

¹ From Rule 2 of the Index.

² For they distinguish apostasy from faith, from order (for example the sacred order of the diaconate), from religion (from a regular order).

³ With us Hollweck, op. cit., p. 31; Péries, op. cit., p. 64, note 2; Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, loc. cit., n. 21.3; against Gennari, op. cit., p. 30, note 1; and Piat, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 30, p. 53, n. XIII.

⁴ But not the divinity of Christ, against Pennacchi, who otherwise agrees with us. Op. cit., n. 40.

⁵ Cf. Cardinal de Lugo, De Fide, disp. 21, n. 29.

⁶ Going farther, Boudinhon, op. cit., p. 316, thinks the same should be said of books and writings which defend Jansenism.

⁷ Cf. Pennacchi, op. cit., n. 39.

What non-Catholics are

67. 1. Non-Catholics, taken closely - as if deprived only of the Catholic faith - seem to us to be those who, outside the Catholic Church, contend that they profess true Christianity. They are therefore only baptized persons who, through heresy or schism, are reputed plainly alien from Catholic communion. For the word non-Catholic is opposed not so much to the Christian genus as to the Catholic species. And when the word must receive a broader use, the Pontiff himself indicates this by a word, as he did, for example, in articles 5 and 8, where he treats of non-Catholics of any kind whatever. Besides, they are worthy of special mention both because the Christian truths retained by them create a greater danger that the faithful be deceived and seduced by the honorable appearance of their works, and because they give a greater hope that sometimes certain arguments, even religious ones, for example concerning God, concerning the divinity of Christ, may be treated in a way that can also benefit Catholics. Therefore the Legislator wisely establishes a presumption against their books which expressly treat religion, while at the same time conceding that this same presumption can be destroyed by contrary proof.

Pennacchi,¹ Génicot,² Péries,³ and Ciolli⁴ are with us. Others, however, also include Mohammedans, Jews, unbelievers.⁵

Therefore, in our opinion, books on religion written by an unbeliever or by a rationalist who was formerly Catholic are not governed by this article, nor are they prohibited unless they defend heresy or schism, or overturn the foundations of religion.

Expressly

2. Which expressly, so that religion is, by design, the subject matter, not indeed necessarily of the whole book, but at least of a notable part, for example of one chapter.

On religion

3. On Religion, that is, on sacred matter, on natural or positive religion, on Sacred Scripture, dogmatic and moral theology, liturgy, canon law, ecclesiastical history; on moral philosophy itself, insofar as it embraces duties toward God or religious society, or by its principles seems to attack the dogmas themselves. Suarez;⁶ Lugo;⁷ St. Alphonsus;⁸ Arndt;⁹ Piat.¹⁰

They treat

They treat. To treat, according to Lugo, loc. cit., is not to say one's meaning incidentally, but to defend something, to prove it, to solve the contrary.

How far they are reproved

5. Unless it is established. When they expressly treat religion, they are prohibited from the presumption of an evil character, until it is morally established, for example by the testimony of a trustworthy man, that nothing is contained in them against the Catholic faith. Nothing can be taken morally. Therefore understand: nothing which is of any moment.

What if the mind is not hostile

But what if nothing is said formally, or from a hostile intention, against the faith, yet some things are put forward which are materially opposed to it? Objective opposition seems entirely sufficient. Wernz, n. 111, note 56.

NB. What if Catholic notes have been added to the book of a heretic, or the contrary

NB. Certain Catholic notes added below do not prevent the book from being that of a non-Catholic; nor do certain notes added by a heretic to the book of a Catholic man cause it now no longer to be judged a book of a Catholic writer.¹¹ But if the scholia are so great that the book is judged rather to consist of these, it will receive its denomination from the author of the scholia.

¹ N. 41.

² Op. cit., I, 52, 3.

³ Op. cit., p. 70.

⁴ Op. cit., n. 15.

⁵ So Cardinal Gennari on this article, except that he does not here include schismatics; Hollweck, Das kirchliche Bücherverbot, p. 31; Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, loc. cit., n. 23; and Wernz, loc. cit., n. 111, note 55. The use of this probable doctrine will be this: that you extend the faculty positively made by this article to books of unbelievers which treat a religious subject in such a way that they contain nothing notable against the Catholic faith; but the other opinion gives the faculty of reading books of unbelievers who treat of their own religion and commend it, so long as they do not defend heresies or overturn the foundations of religion.

⁶ De Fide, disp. 20, n. 16.

⁷ De Fide, disp. 21, n. 51.

⁸ Book 7, n. 283.

⁹ Op. cit., pp. 121-123.

¹⁰ Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 30, pp. 55-56.

¹¹ Cf. Laymann, Theologia moralis, book 2, treatise 1, chapter 15, n. 2; Piat, ad Van der Velden, p. 621. Arndt speaks more severely, op. cit., pp. 123-125, n. 103.

Prior law

74. 1. The first part renews the disposition of the prior law, by which, in the General Decrees, § 2, n. 13, all writings of this sort were punished. Cf. Arndt, p. 148, n. 119.

Whether it is required that it be done of set purpose

2. Because words are to be taken properly, and the Legislator is accustomed to express the clause of set purpose wherever he requires it; indeed because in this same article, in the third part, he inserts the expression by designed effort, we cannot agree with the distinguished Pennacchi, who thinks that clause is to be understood here. With us are Génicot,¹ Card. Gennari,² Moureau.³

Yet practically we do not differ much. For, arguing from the inscription of this fifth chapter, "On Certain Books of Special Subject Matter," we think it necessary that the book be injurious to God, etc., sufficiently notably, although not yet of set purpose, so that it can be said to be of this special subject matter.⁴ Otherwise, moreover, contrary to the mind of this Constitution, this condemnation would extend itself to too many books. Finally, as Génicot, cited place, observes, scarcely will those books be apt gravely to wound or diminish the just esteem of God, etc., unless they are books in which the detraction is developed to some extent. But that grave wounding seems altogether necessary. Therefore it is necessary either that the detraction "be made in a notable manner,"⁵ or that from those detractions the work itself be morally reputed impious. Desjardins elegantly translates: "impious works, which attack God," etc.⁶

Wherefore a work in which detraction against the Blessed Virgin Mary is continued through two or three pages, even if in other parts honorable, we judge to be prohibited by this article.

What it is to disparage? Formal detraction is required

3. Furthermore, to disparage is to take away, diminish, the fame or esteem of someone by words. In French you would say: vilipender, dénigrer, discréditer. Thus detraction differs from heresy, by which a dogma is not derided but denied. But detraction is to be taken as formal, flowing from a depraved intention, not merely material or beyond intention.

Examples

4. God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the saints, the Catholic Church, and her worship or sacraments. Pennacchi, cited place, and C. Gennari⁷ report many examples of detractions of this sort, and well selected ones. Yet we do not, with Pennacchi, take the worship of the Church concerning the honor due to the Church, which would make that clause plainly useless, but concerning the divine worship which is exercised through liturgical actions. Thus the obvious sense has it, thus also the structure of the words which joins worship with sacraments: "and her worship or sacraments"; and with us say Desjardins, cited place, Son Culte; Gennari, cited place, Il sacro Culto; Hollweck, Ihr Cult; Planchard.⁸

What worship is

5. Apostolic See. This is not the person of some Pontiff as such. Yet if, from the intention of attacking the Holy See, reproachful narrations against various Supreme Pontiffs are heaped together, the present clause will obtain.

¹ Cited work, I, 452.

² On this place, p. 43.

³ Rev. des Sciences Eccl., t. 6, pp. 100, 101.

⁴ C. Gennari, cited place, sins here by excessive severity: "in whatever measure it is done (provided it is in grave matter)"; and Moureau, cited place: "it suffices that it be [injurious] in fact in some place."

⁵ Wernz, n. 111.

⁶ Études, t. 71, p. 208.

⁷ "He disparages God who blasphemes God or denies His goodness, justice, omnipotence, or any other attribute. He disparages the Blessed Virgin Mary who denies her virginity, divine maternity, sanctity, mercy, or in another way calumniates her excellence. He disparages the Saints who holds them as vicious or useless men, who are unworthy of honors, or who contemns their virtues and supernatural gifts. He disparages the Catholic Church who attacks some note or endowment of hers, or her divine origin, or equates her with other human institutes. He disparages sacred worship who exposes Catholic rites, as divine honors, to mockery, or detracts from their necessity and reasonable fittingness; he disparages the Sacraments who denies that they are necessary or useful, makes them ridiculous, or holds suspect the intentions of the Church administering them (that seems to us rather to be referred to detraction of the Church). He disparages the Apostolic See who contemns its supreme authority, divine institution, sublime and infallible magisterium." Thus nearly C. Gennari, on this place.

⁸ Desjardins, cited work, p. 34; Planchard, Rev. Th. Fr., n. 41.

Former law

125. By this article, in the same words, the Excommunication borne in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, n. 2, of the first series, is repeated. Therefore in itself it will receive a similar interpretation. Hence:

What "knowingly" means

1. Knowingly. By this word the case of any ignorance is excepted, even, probably, affected ignorance. Moreover the word is referred also to those retaining, etc.¹

Reading books. Whether periodic fascicles are books of heretics

2. Reading books, in a notable quantity. Cf. here above n. 57. But who are readers was said in n. 57, 50. Also before, n. 33 and following, we weighed what comes under the name of book, and in what manner periodic publications are to be regarded as books. From this, in order that they be judged to protect heresy as a book, it is required that the periodic publications themselves rather generally stain themselves with this vice.

What apostates are

3. Of apostates. We defined these above as those who entirely cast off the Christian faith externally and internally, whether they pass over to the errors of Mahomet, etc., or simply profess themselves to be perfect "free thinkers." Cf. Avanz., p. 8.

Heretics and a heretical book

4. And of heretics. It is necessary that the heresy be plainly established, either from the heretical sect to which the writer belongs, or, when the book is anonymous, or by an author hitherto Catholic, from manifest doctrine,² and proposed pertinaciously.

Therefore books of this kind are not those which principally belong to a Catholic author, although a heretic has appended scholia, unless these are the greater part of the book; nor those which report some text of heretics "even if you read with the mind of learning heresy." Laym.³ Cf. Piat,⁴ against Arndt.⁵

Nor books of infidels, Jews, schismatics, at least as such.

Nor are books of heretics which pertain to the first centuries of the Church, as now altogether harmless, comprehended here. Lehmkuhl, II, 923. Cf. above n. 66, where we transferred the same rule also to medieval heretics.

To defend heresy

5. Defending heresy. Not merely containing, or briefly defending as if while doing something else, but of set purpose, by bringing forward reasons. But it is not necessary that the subject matter of the book be religious. It is enough that the book defend one heresy in this way.

6. As well as books of any Author prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters. This clause requires:

Through Apostolic Letters

a) Apostolic Letters, or letters proceeding immediately from the Supreme Pontiff: a Brief, Bull, Encyclical, etc. Piat, on V. der Velden, p. 623.

Made by name

b) A prohibition made by name, that is, one by which a book is designated by its proper title. Yet a singular designation, for example of the author, is not demanded. Indeed, a generic indication of title seems to suffice. Hence B. P.⁶ judges that the clause is verified in the Constitution Ecclesiam, by which, in 1821, there were prohibited by Pius VII, under excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, "the catechisms of the Carbonari, the books by which they describe the things which are customarily carried on in their meetings, statutes, codes." But a disposition is not enough by which, for example, Innocent XI condemned all books and writings of Michael Molinos.⁷ Cf. Avanz.-Penn., Appendix III.

It is required that it be made under excommunication reserved to the Holy See

c) A prohibition under excommunication reserved to the Holy See. Thus the common opinion: Avanzini, Lehmkuhl, Bucceroni,⁸ etc. The reason is drawn from the end of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, by which this censure was borne. For Pius IX wished to narrow censures. Therefore it would in no way be likely that under the gravest censure (specially reserved) he prohibited books which his predecessors had condemned without reserved excommunication.⁹ Cf. Avanzini, cited place. Wherefore if, for example, you read without faculty the work of Lamennais, Les paroles d'un croyant, you will have committed no pontifical censure, since the apostolic letters by which it is reprobated contain none. The same is the case with the works of Jacob Frohschammer.

Those which were proscribed under another penalty latae sententiae have now been simply condemned, unless they are heretical and at the same time have defended heresy. Except those which, for the causes indicated elsewhere, have fallen from the Index.

d) Yet it is not necessary that those letters bear the penalty of excommunication specially reserved; otherwise the present clause would effect nothing special. Thus the authors.

e) Finally, the disposition affects future proscriptions equally with past ones.

Therefore in a few words: from article 47, those books which the Supreme Pontiffs formerly proscribed by name through apostolic letters under excommunication latae sententiae reserved to themselves are now prohibited under excommunication specially reserved.

What concerning future proscriptions?

Must it be said in the same way if certain books are hereafter condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs through apostolic letters by name? We think it must be said in the same way.

And Hollweck¹⁰ and Wernz¹¹ judge that in this article no times are distinguished. Nevertheless, since the legislator merely uses the past tense, while he could so easily have said prohibited or to be prohibited, the matter seems uncertain to us.

But if future proscriptions are touched, there is no cause why in these you should require mention of reserved excommunication, unless there is a cause on account of which the Pontiff must be judged to have been unwilling to refer himself to the present article, but to pronounce absolutely concerning the sanction.

What books are touched by this clause?

N.B. Because other apostolic letters by which works are condemned either do not bear the penalty of reserved excommunication, or indeed bear it but one afterwards removed, or do not indicate books by name, in reality this clause today has force only concerning 82 books which in the eighteenth century were proscribed by apostolic letters,¹² concerning the work of Fr. Vigil,¹³ and concerning two books of J. Nuyts,¹⁴ which Pius IX condemned by Briefs of June 10 and August 22, 1857. Wherefore in sentences of this kind inquiry must be made only from the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹⁵

Yet it easily happens that, on account of another cause, because they have been written by a heretic and defend heresy, they are prohibited by law under the penalty of excommunication specially reserved.

When those retaining are punished

7. And retaining the same books: knowingly and in that manner in which it is prohibited under grave obligation. Cf. above n. 51 and 58.

Who those printing are

8. Printing, in the commentaries on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, were understood as all who cooperate proximately, by mortal cooperation, toward "printing." Cf. Lehmk., II, 924.

But, from the general canon which we proposed at the beginning, we are not forbidden, the former law having been put aside, to explain this censure according to the benignity of the present Constitution. Now it seems sufficiently discordant that the same word "Printing" be taken in a different sense in two articles, of which one excepts the other. But in article 48, unless we wish, without a compelling reason, to interpret the words more strictly than formerly, the printer is he who undertakes the work to be printed: namely the impresser, whom in French we properly call l'Imprimeur. From another side it agrees very much with our benign law not to strike with censure those workers who cannot pass judgment on the books toward whose printing they cooperate, will for the most part be ignorant of the penalty borne, and not rarely are excused from contumacy by moral necessity. Wherefore the sentence of Hollweck¹⁶ is not displeasing to us, according to which those printing are only the editor and the "impresser." The corrector, however, will be punished as reading. With us concerning workers is Boudinhon.¹⁷

Those defending. Inefficacious defense suffices

9. And defending in any way. Cf. n. 48 and 55.

Observe, since the censure strikes readers, retainers, printers, and defenders in the same manner, namely directly and principally, defense is considered as a delict consisting in itself. Wherefore it is not necessary that the effect of the defense have been obtained, or that in reality, for example, you snatch the book from the flames. The act is judged consummated by the defense itself. Cf., for example, Lehmk., cited place.

What force special reservation has

10. By the fact itself an excommunication specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover this special reservation operates:

a) So that neither Bishops can for this case, even an occult one, use the faculty which they hold from chapter Liceat of the Council of Trent; nor is the case judged contained in the faculty simply given of absolving from reserved cases.

b) So that he who without faculty shall have presumed to absolve someone from that excommunication commits an excommunication simply reserved to the Holy See from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (after the first series).

c) So that one absolved, even in danger of death, by an inferior (that is, by one who did not have at least delegated faculty), must, under the penalty of falling again into censures, after he has recovered, within a month either seek a new absolution from one having faculty, or, either himself by himself or through the mediation of a Confessor, have recourse by letter to the Holy See and obey its commands.

¹ Cf. Hollweck, Die kirchl. Strafgesetze, sec. 107.

² Lehmk., II, n. 923; Bucc., II, p. 339; B. P., t. 7, n. 424.

³ L. 2, tr. 1, chapter 15, n. 1.

⁴ On V. der Velden, p. 621.

⁵ P. 124, 3, n. 103.

⁶ De Cens., t. 7, 456. Yet against this, Piat, cited work, p. 625, because works published after this Bull cannot be said to be prohibited by name through it.

⁷ Yet this cause has that peculiar thing, that there is only one work of Molinos, Guida spirituale, besides two little works which afterwards were published together with the former work. Nevertheless we judge that the nominal indication is lacking which is required for incurring excommunication. The propositions of the work were proscribed as heretical; but since the writer retracted the errors, the work does not seem to be that of a heretical author.

⁸ Appendix III, pp. 126, 129; II, n. 923; p. 340.

⁹ Nothing prevents our present Constitution, although in itself it softens the former laws, from increasing their sanction accidentally. From September 5, 1757 to November 11, 1784, by seven letters in the form of a Brief, works were proscribed under the penalty of reserved excommunication latae sententiae for laymen, and of suspension latae sententiae for clerics. In the same way, on August 2, 1851, two works of J. Nuyts were proscribed. That suspension is suppressed by our law; but, as it seems to us, now for all, even clerics, who unduly read those works, there remains, from our article 47, the penalty of excommunication which is specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.

¹⁰ Das kirchl. Bucherverbot, in this place.

¹¹ Ius Decretal., t. 3, n. 121, note 117.

¹² Cf. Hilgers, Der Index, p. 90 and following. He diligently explored this matter and afterwards accurately exhibits it in his valuable chronological Index of proscribed works (same place, pp. 418, 475). The same warns that those books can be found with difficulty, so that they can now do little harm.

¹³ Defensa de la autoridad de los gobernios y de los obispos contra las pretensiones de la curia romana (6 vols.).

¹⁴ Institutiones ecclesiasticae; Tractationes in ius ecclesiasticum universum.

¹⁵ Thus Avanzini, cited work, pp. 130, 131.

¹⁶ Cited work, pp. 48, 49, notes 1 and 2.

¹⁷ Cited work, p. 304. Wernz, n. 121, note 118, seems to favor us sufficiently.

"Gloom is an alien and an enemy in Christian hearts," writes Charles Stanton Devas. "If Christianity is the religion of sorrow, it is also, and pre-eminently, the religion of joy; the solution of this antinomy being that Christianity is the religion of love, and that in this world love and sorrow are linked by a mysterious partnership. Now Christian asceticism is no superstitious pain-worship, no offering to some pain-loving deity, some evil principle opposed to the good, as though life and health were not God's good gifts; nor again has it ought in common, except sometimes the outward show, with the proud self-righteousness of the Hindu ascetic or Moslem dervish. Much rather Christian asceticism is a form of love; and love being the root of joy, it follows that Christian joyfulness is not in spite of asceticism, but its consequence. We are taught as an elementary truth that man is on earth for the one end of perfecting himself in the love of God. This is his purpose and probation. But only through labor, pain and suffering is love perfected. Christianity, then, has no mission to eliminate labor, pain, and suffering from this world (pati et perpeti humanum est, wrote Leo XIII), but to transmute them. They can be the means whereby we can obtain the subjection of the lower selfish life and of greedy individualism; the suppression of false self-assertion and of blind nature before the law of reason and of God. Christianity is frankly 'the religion of suffering, of mortification, of self-sacrifice, of consuming love, of self-forgetting zeal, of self-crucifying union,... the religion of the cross and the Crucified.' ³⁸ Joyous abandonment, generous self-sacrifice, these are the watchwords, and to become living images of the Divine Model of whom it is written that He pleased not himself."³⁹

³⁸ Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., l. III, c. 8, n. 24: "These are the clouds [of the Pelagians] concerning praise of creation, praise of marriage, praise of free choice, and praise of the saints—as though any one of us disparaged these things and did not rather proclaim them all with the praises due to the honor of the Creator and Savior. But creation does not wish to be praised in such a way that it does not wish to be healed. And the more marriage is to be praised, the less the shameful concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world (1 John II, 16), is to be imputed to it. Marriage certainly found this concupiscence in human beings; it did not cause it, since concupiscence exists in very many without marriage, and marriage, if no one had sinned, could have existed without concupiscence." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 606). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 1-4; Contra Gent., l. III, c. 112, n. 6. —J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History, (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), New York, 1914, pp. 131 sqq.

³⁹ C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, pp. 121 sq., London, 1906.

Opposed to the virtue of faith are doubt, heresy, infidelity, schism, apostasy, and superstition.

1. DOUBT.—Doubt is the state of a mind hesitating whether to give assent to a truth or to withhold it.¹ As the formal object or motive of religious faith is the infallible authority of God, it would be irrational, and therefore sinful, to doubt anything that is contained in divine Revelation.

¹ Cfr. John Rickaby, S.J., First Principles of Knowledge (Stonyhurst Series), p. 44.

“The faithful,” says the Catechism of the Council of Trent, “can have no doubt touching those things of which God, who is truth itself, is the author. Hence we understand how great is the difference between this faith which we have in God, and that which we yield to the writers of human history.”²

² Cat. Rom., P. I, c. 1, qu. 1: “No doubt can occur to the faithful concerning those things of which God, who is truth itself, is the author. From this it is evident how great a difference there is between this faith which we have in God and that which we give to human histories.”

To doubt a doctrine which cannot stand the test of reason, either because it is not proposed by legitimate authority, or because all or some part of it is contradictory, is morally licit. Consequently, doubt is not forbidden per se, that is, not every kind of doubt is sinful, but there is a doubt that is reasonable and permissible.

A distinction must therefore be drawn between speculative doubt (also called theoretical or negative) and practical or positive doubt. The former has its origin in the intellect. When it is not directed against the substance of a revealed truth, but merely against the form in which that truth is couched, or against the arguments alleged in its support, or when it questions whether the dogma under consideration is really revealed by God or not, doubt is no sin, but rather a legitimate weapon against credulity, superstition, and intellectual sloth, and may prove an incitement to penetrate more deeply into the teaching of religion. When, on the other hand, a man harbors doubts against a truth of which he knows that, because proposed by the Church, it is surely contained in divine Revelation, he commits a sin, either of heresy or of infidelity.

Practical or positive doubt arises from the heart. It is the state of mind of him who, in the words of Jesus Christ, will not believe because he loves darkness rather than light.³ This kind of doubt is the product of a corrupt heart and logically leads to a denial of the faith and, in the end, to infidelity. “He that is of God, heareth the words of God; therefore you hear them not, because you are not of God.”⁴

³ John III, 19.

⁴ John VIII, 47; XVIII, 37; Rom. III, 4; IV, 19–22; 1 Thess. V, 21; Tit. II, 2.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 3.—St. Anselm, De Fide Trin., c. 2: “For no Christian ought to dispute how that which the Catholic Church believes in her heart and confesses with her mouth is not so; but, always holding the same faith without doubt, loving it, and living according to it, he should humbly seek, as far as he can, a reason for how it is so. If he can understand, let him give thanks to God; if he cannot, let him not thrust in his horns for butting, but bow his head in veneration.” (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, 262).

There is a third species of doubt which is to be regarded as a temptation and is not sinful so long as the mind withholds assent. This form of quasi-doubt is sometimes a trial inflicted by God, sometimes the result of natural causes, physical or intellectual, and sometimes the product of carelessness, pride, self-conceit, or the sign of a secret repugnance to the truths of faith. It should be treated like scrupulousness, to which it is related.⁵

⁵ See this Handbook, Vol. I, pp. 199 sqq.—Cfr. F. Hense, Die Versuchungen, 3rd ed., pp. 237 sqq.; C. Krieg, Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, Freiburg 1904, pp. 242 sqq.

2. HERESY.—Heresy (αἵρεσις, from αἱρεῖσθαι, to choose) is error repugnant to the faith, pertinaciously held (error pertinax) by one who professes the Christian religion. It may be negative or positive. Negative heresy implies a denial of, or refusal to accept, a truth proposed by the Catholic Church; positive heresy asserts as a revealed truth something which the Church does not teach as such.

Heresy, again, may be internal or it may be external. It is internal (haeresis interna) if held purely as a matter of conviction; external (haeresis externa) if expressed in words or manifested by deeds.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Acts XXIV, 5; XXVI, 5; 1 Tim. I, 3; IV, 2; 2 John X; Gal. I, 6–9; Tit. I, 11.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 11, art. 1.

Formal heresy involves rebellion against God and is a very grievous sin because it destroys the foundation of the means of salvation. “A man that is a heretic,” says the Apostle, “after the first and second admonition, avoid, knowing that he, that is such a one, is subverted and sinneth, being condemned by his own judgment.”⁷ “To have erred,” declares St. Augustine, “is human; pertinaciously to persevere in error is diabolical.”⁸

⁷ Tit. III, 10 sq.

⁸ Serm., 164 (al. 22, De Verbis Apost.), c. 10, n. 14: “To err was human; to remain in error through obstinacy is diabolical.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 901).—Cfr. A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche, pp. 83 sqq.

Material heresy (haeresis materialis) is the error of those who do not pertinaciously reject the teaching of the Church, but err in good faith, i. e., sincerely desirous of knowing the truth. This kind of heresy is sinful only when the error is inexcusable. A non-Catholic who is in good faith and believes that he has the true religion, lives in a state of excusable error. If serious doubts arise in his mind concerning the truth of what he believes, he is bound to enquire, and if his enquiry results in the conviction that the Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ, he must give up his erroneous belief, else his heresy will cease to be material and become formal. For every honest man is obliged to renounce, both internally and externally, a religion which he recognizes as false and to accept that which his conscience tells him is true. He who knowingly persists in religious error incurs the condemnation of Christ, who says: “He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, in this adulterous and sinful generation, the Son of man also will be ashamed of him, when He shall come in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.”⁹

⁹ Mark VIII, 38; cfr. John XII, 48.

A heresy is never formal, or grievously sinful, if it involves no real error against the faith (positivus assensus falsi seu dissensus veri), or if the holder is not a professed Christian, or the error is not deliberate and pertinacious.¹⁰ Involuntary error or error based upon ex- cusable ignorance is not even venially sinful. The distinctive mark of formal heresy, therefore, is wilful and obstinate rejection of a Catholic dogma. Hence the declaration of sincere Catholic writers: “I may err, but I shall never be a heretic.”¹¹

¹⁰ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. XVIII, c. 51, n. 1: “Heretics [are] those who under the Christian name resist Christian doctrine.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 612).—IDEM, Epist., 43 (al. 162), c. 1, n. 1: “Those who defend their opinion, however false and perverse, with no obstinate animosity, especially an opinion which the audacity of their own presumption did not produce, but which they received from parents seduced and fallen into error, and who seek the truth with cautious solicitude, ready to be corrected when they have found it, are by no means to be numbered among heretics.” (P. L., XXXIII, 160).—IDEM, De Gestis Pelagii, c. 6, n. 18: “It matters how much, it matters whence, finally it matters whether, upon being admonished, he corrects it, or by obstinately defending it even makes into a dogma what he had said through levity, not as a dogma. Therefore, although every heretic is consequently also a fool, not every fool is immediately to be called a heretic.” (P. L., XLIV, 351).—IDEM, De Anima, l. III, c. 15, n. 23: “These things, if each is defended obstinately, can make as many heresies as there are opinions numbered.” (P. L., XLIV, 522).—IDEM, De Bapt. contra Donat., l. IV, c. 16, n. 23: “I do not yet call him a heretic, unless, after Catholic doctrine has been manifested to him, he chooses to resist the faith and chooses that which he held.” (P. L., XLIII, 169).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 5, art. 3.—A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche, pp. 59 sqq., 89 sqq.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Celestine I, Epist., 25, n. 3: “Nor shall I give to this perfidy the name of error; not every impiety is error.” (Migne, P. L., L, 550).—Conc. Lateran. IV., c. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 432).—Cicero, Phil., XII, 2: “It belongs to any man to err; to none but a fool to persevere in error.”—A. M. Weiss, O. P., Lutherpsychologie, 2nd ed., pp. 29 sq.

As against heretical errors, the teaching of the Church is called by St. Paul “sound doctrine” or “the sound word.”¹² “Heretics,” says St. Ignatius of Antioch, “are scarcely to be cured; there is one physician, ... Jesus Christ our Lord.”¹³

¹² 1 Tim. I, 10; Tit. I, 9; II, 1, 8; cfr. 2 Tim. II, 17.

¹³ Epist. ad Ephes., c. 7 (Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 218, 17).

The chief sources of heresy are ignorance and pride.¹⁴ St. Augustine says that if there were no pride in the hearts of men, there would be neither heresy nor schism.¹⁵ It seems strange to have this truth confirmed by Martin Luther. “Every heretic and proud man,” he says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, written while he was still a Catholic, “is first misled by ignorance of the divine truth. Then he accepts as true what seems to him to be true, and is already trapped, because he proceeds securely, as if he were true and free, beyond snares and imprisonment. In course of time he objects to everything that does not suit him and turns away his ears. Finally he gets angry and zealously defends the creatures of his brain, persecuting his opponents, slandering them, and inflicting all manner of injury upon them. The consequence is that he becomes utterly blind and cannot see what others see, and while all the rest rise up, he remains lying on the ground, defending his opinions.”¹⁶

¹⁴ Cfr. Matt. VII, 15 sq.; XV, 14; XXIII, 2 sqq.; Luke VI, 39; Acts XX, 29 sq.; Col. II, 8.

¹⁵ De Vera Religione, c. 25, n. 47: “If this [pride] did not exist, there would be neither heretics nor schismatics, nor those circumcised in the flesh, nor worshippers of creatures and images.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 142).—IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 124, n. 5: “Do not think, brethren, that heresies could arise through certain small souls. None but great men have made heresies; but the greater they were, so much the more evil were those men.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1652).—IDEM, ibid., 134, n. 18: “There are learned men who afflict the Church by making schisms and heresies.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1750).—IDEM, ibid., 106, n. 14: “They [the heretics] are leaders, they are learned, they are great, they are precious stones.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1429).—IDEM, Serm., 46 (al. 165, De Temp.), c. 8, n. 18: “In different places there are different sects, but one mother, pride, has begotten them all.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 280).

¹⁶ Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, fol. 241b, apud Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 478.

3. INFIDELITY.—By infidelity (ἀπείθεια, infidelitas) we mean an absolute lack of faith in the Christian religion.

a) If this lack of faith arises from invincible ignorance, it is called negative and is no sin, but merely an evil or a penalty of sin. If, on the other hand, infidelity arises from unwillingness to know or accept the truths of Revelation (infidelitas positiva), it is per se sinful. “If I had not come and spoken to them,” says our Divine Saviour, “they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin.”¹⁷

¹⁷ John XV, 22.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Baii, n. 68: “Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1068).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 1: “Infidelity can be taken in two ways: in one way according to pure negation, so that one is called an unbeliever from this alone, that he does not have faith; in another way infidelity can be understood according to contrariety to faith, whereby, namely, someone resists the hearing of the faith or even despises it; and in this the nature of infidelity is properly completed, and according to this infidelity is a sin. But if it is taken according to pure negation, as in those who have heard nothing of the faith, it does not have the nature of sin, but rather of punishment, because such ignorance of divine things followed from the sin of our first parent.”

Positive infidelity, as a rule, amounts to more than mere negation; it opposes to the true faith, which it rejects, some false doctrine of its own invention. Its sources are ignorance, pride, sensuality, and malice.¹⁸ The degree of sinfulness involved in each case is to be measured by the gravity of the underlying cause.

¹⁸ Cfr. Luke XVI, 27–31; John III, 19 sq.; V, 44–47; VIII, 42–47; X, 24–26; Eph. IV, 17–19; 1 Tim. I, 19 sq.—P. Segneri, Incredulus non Excusabilis, Dillingen 1696.—A. Guyot, Les Causes de l’Incredulité, 6th ed., Paris 1904.—A. Kirchberger, Der Unglaube und die Vernunft, Ravensburg 1907.—Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 52 sq.

The sinfulness of infidelity may be judged from what has been said above¹⁹ on the necessity of faith. The subjective guilt involved in each case varies according to the degree of consciousness and pertinacity with which the truth is rejected and is objectively graver if it disfigures the truths it denies.²⁰

¹⁹ Supra, pp. 6 sqq.

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 3: “Every sin formally consists in turning away from God. Hence a sin is the graver, the more a man is separated from God through it. But through infidelity man is especially removed from God, because he does not have a true knowledge of God; and through a false knowledge of Him he does not approach Him but is removed farther from Him. Nor can it be that one who has a false opinion of God knows Him in some respect, because that which he supposes is not God. Hence it is manifest that the sin of infidelity is greater than all sins which occur in the perversity of morals. It is otherwise with the sins opposed to the other theological virtues.”

Infidelity is really the most grievous of all sins because by it a man departs farther than by any other sin from God, who is man’s last end.²¹ The terrible consequences of unbelief are variously described in Holy Writ. “He that believeth not shall be condemned;”²²—“He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him;”²³—“If you believe not that I am he, you shall die in your sin;”²⁴—“The wrath of God cometh upon the children of unbelief,”²⁵ etc.

²¹ St. Augustine, Tr. in Ioa., 89, n. 1: “He wishes a certain great sin to be understood, not every sin as though under a general name. For this is the sin by which all sins are held fast; if anyone does not have it, all sins are forgiven him.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1856).

²² Mark XVI, 16.

²³ John III, 36.

²⁴ John VIII, 24; XII, 48; Rom. XI, 20.

²⁵ Col. III, 6; Heb. III, 18; Apoc. XXI, 8.

b) There are various forms of infidelity.

α) Indifferentism (latitudinarianismus), or carelessness in religious matters, based upon the assumption that all religions, or at least all Christian denominations, are equally true or equally false (theoretical indifferentism),²⁶ or sloth in the fulfilment of the duties imposed by religion (practical indifferentism).²⁷

²⁶ 2 Cor. VI, 14–16.—Encyclical of Pius IX, Dec. 9, 1846: “To this pertains that horrible system of indifference concerning any religion, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason, by which those deceivers, having abolished every distinction between virtue and vice, truth and error, decency and disgrace, imagine that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever, just as though there could ever be any fellowship of justice with iniquity, any society of light with darkness, or any agreement of Christ with Belial.” (Syllab. Error., n. 15–18; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1715 sqq.).

²⁷ Apoc. III, 15 sq.

β) Eclecticism, so called, i. e., the arbitrary se- lection from the body of religious or philosophical truths presented by the Church of certain doctrines and combining them into a system; γ) Scepticism, which regards uncertainty or doubt as the product of reflection and the normal state of the human mind, and thereby completely renounces the knowledge of truth; δ) Formal or positive atheism in its various forms (Pantheism, Materialism, Naturalism, Rationalism), all of which agree in rejecting God and divine Revelation.²⁸

²⁸ Pii IX. Syllab. Error., n. 1–14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1701 sqq.).—J. Engert, Der naturalistische Monismus Häckels, Vienna 1907, pp. 208 sqq., 247 sqq.—W. Monod, Aux Croyants et aux Athées, 2nd ed., Paris 1910.—G. Grupp, Jenseitsreligion, Freiburg 1910, pp. 41, 95.

All these forms of unbelief are grievously sinful, though the personal guilt of individual unbelievers is often diminished by the influence of a wrong or defective training, by the power of deeply rooted prejudices or lack of proper instruction.

The reason why so many refuse to accept divine Revelation is not that they think too deeply, but that they do not think deeply enough. It is often asserted that a thorough training in the natural sciences (now-a-days called “Science” par excellence) destroys religious conviction. But this claim is untrue and can be easily refuted by the example of the many great scientists who have openly professed belief in God and the existence and knowability of miracles.²⁹

²⁹ K. A. Kneller, Das Christentum und die Vertreter der neueren Naturwissenschaft, 2nd ed., Frei- burg 1904 (tr. by T. M. Kettle, Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science, St. Louis 1911). Father Kneller brings overwhelming evidence to show how the real leaders of scientific thought are forced to recognize, if not always the truth of revealed religion, at least that of the groundwork on which it rests. See also the three volumes of James J. Walsh’s excellent work, Catholic Churchmen in Science, Philadelphia, The Dolphin Press, 1913 sqq.—G. Sortais, La Providence et le Miracle, Paris 1905.—E. Dennert, Vom Sterbelager des Darwinismus, 6th ed., Stuttgart 1905 (English tr., At the Deathbed of Darwinism, by E. V. O’Hara and J. H. Peschges, Burlington, Iowa, 1904); C. Gutberlet, Vernunft und Wunder, Munich 1905.

To solve the problem offered to the human mind by miracles we must try to view them from the viewpoint of Almighty God rather than from our own limited coign of vantage. Miracles are not detached phenomena, but parts of a wonderful system of government. They are wrought by the same God who has conceived and created the universe. This is the true metaphysical harmony. “To the Lord was his own work known from the beginning of the world.”³⁰

³⁰ Acts XV, 18.

Why should the chemist, the physicist, the botanist, the zoölogist, the meteorologist, the astronomer, the anthropologist, the physician or the technician be hindered in his work by accurate notions of God, the world of spirits, the human soul, or the origin, purpose, and end of man? In every field of scientific research there have been and are eminent men who have not only preserved, but deepened and strengthened their religious faith. He who proclaims religion and science to be irreconcilable merely proves that he is ignorant of the true meaning of dogma, the real significance of religious ceremonies, and the authentic interpretation of the mysteries of faith. Unfortunately, those who have achieved eminence in some branch of science as a rule devote little or no time to the study of religion. A learned mind needs more than the elementary instruction imparted in the catechism. Religion, like science, has its technical literature, and its representatives are ready to explain and defend whatever the Church teaches. Those who attack the Christian religion usually have but a vague notion of its sources and methods, even though they constantly harp on the need of original research and critical acumen in their own chosen field. Now he who neglects or refuses to devote serious study to philosophy and theology, has no right to draw philosophical or theological conclusions from the data furnished by natural science. To do so is to mistake the essence of religion, which, though it may be practiced by all, even the most ignorant, can be scientifically demonstrated only by those properly equipped for the task. Theology, like every other science, must be studied from its own sources and by its own methods, though, of course, there are many points of contact between it and the natural sciences. Thus the law of causation, the teleological principle, the laws of nature, and other data furnished by natural science lead the mind almost imperceptibly and with a kind of elemental necessity from the contemplation of the results of empirical research to religious speculation and a study of the supernatural.

4. SCHISM (σχίσμα) technically denotes a formal separation from the unity of the Church, and in this sense is not a direct antithesis of faith. But experience teaches that a state of pure schism, i. e., schism without heresy, cannot continue long, at least in the case of a large number of men. St. Jerome says: “Schism, at the beginning, may be understood as something different from heresy, but there is no schism which does not invent for itself some heresy, in order to justify its secession.”³¹

³¹ In Tit., c. 3, quoted by St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 39, art. 1.

5. APOSTASY (ἀποστασία) is of three kinds.

a) Apostasy from the faith (apostasia a fide)³² implies formal abandonment of the religion of Christ, coupled with the profession of some anti-Christian system (Judaism, Mohammedanism, paganism).

³² Thess. II, 3; 1 Tim. IV, 1 sq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 12.

b) Apostasy from ecclesiastical obedience (apostasia ab ordine) is committed by a Catholic who wilfully and contumaciously sets at nought the authority of the Church.

c) Apostasy from religious profession or from Holy Orders (apostasia a religione) is the sin of those who without permission abandon the religious order in which they are professed, or, after having received major orders, renounce the clerical profession and return to the dress and customs of the world.

Essentially, all three kinds of apostasy consist in abandoning or denying the truths of Revelation and embracing a religious system opposed to Christianity. Wilfully and contumaciously to abandon the Catholic faith is a sin against the Holy Ghost.³³ A Catholic can never have a le- gitimate reason for leaving his Church.³⁴ “There is no parity,” declare the Fathers of the Vatican Council, “between the condition of those who have adhered to the Catholic truth by the heavenly gift of faith, and of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for those who have received the faith under the teaching of the Church, can never have any just cause for changing or doubting that faith.”³⁵ Sacred Scripture attributes apostasy from the faith to the Devil, who is the author of evil and the father of lies. False apostles, says St. Paul, “are deceitful workmen, transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ, and no wonder, for Satan himself transformeth himself into an angel of light.”³⁶

³³ Heb. VI, 4–6; X, 26–29; 2 Pet. II, 21. See this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 91 sqq.

³⁴ Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 20: “Hence someone can prudently repudiate the supernatural assent which he had.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1170).

³⁵ Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. 3: “The condition of those who have adhered to Catholic truth through the heavenly gift of faith is by no means equal to that of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for those who have received the faith under the teaching authority of the Church can never have any just cause for changing that faith or calling it into doubt.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1794).

³⁶ 2 Cor. XI, 13 sq.; cfr. Gal. V, 7 sq.

6. CREDULITY (temeraria credulitas, in opposition to pius credulitatis affectus) means proneness to believe without sufficient evidence. In matters pertaining to faith and morals credulity is immoral because it runs counter to reason. The Catholic Church admonishes all men to scrutinize carefully whatever is offered in the name of religion without the warrant of divine authority.³⁷ Credulity leads to superstition, “the twin-sister of unbelief,” or at best to an emotional pietism without true religious conviction and genuine faith.

³⁷ Matt. VII, 15; Rom. XII, 1; 1 Thess. V, 21; 1 Pet. III, 15; 1 John IV, 1.—St. Augustine, De Utilitate Credendi, c. 11, n. 25: “Believing is then blameworthy when either something unworthy is believed about God, or something is easily believed about a man.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 83).—St. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, n. 2: “Just as right order demands that we believe the profound things of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them by reason, so it seems negligence to me if, after we have been confirmed in faith, we do not strive to understand what we believe.” (P. L., CLVIII, 362).

It is charged that Christianity demands a sacrifice of the intellect (sacrificium intellectus). This is true in a sense, and could not be otherwise, as Christianity is a divinely revealed religion. However, the Church does not demand blind obedience, but merely “a reasonable service,”³⁸ which enables the believer to say with the Apostle: “I know whom I have believed.”³⁹ Ours is an enlightened faith, which fills us with joy and confidence and gives us the strength which we need to perform our duties. The ideal state of the soul is as far removed from credulity as from scepticism. He who believes too readily is as easily deceived as he who deliberately shuts his mind to the truth.

³⁸ Rom. XII, 1; cfr. 2 Cor. X, 5.

³⁹ 2 Tim. I, 12.

Because of the importance of the true faith, the Church has taken special precautions to keep it pure. These precautions are embodied mainly in the organization against evil literature which is generally called the Index, and consists of three parts—preventive censorship, the prohibition of books, and the Index itself. The consideration of these measures belongs more particularly to Canon Law, and we will therefore confine ourselves to a few necessary remarks towards the end of this volume.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Infra, pp. 399 sqq.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 28 sqq.—Ern. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., Vienna 1887, pp. 37 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., Barcelona 1918, pp. 186 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, New York 1908, pp. 174 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 236 sqq.

On doubt and skepticism in religious matters: J. L. Balmes, Cartas a un Eseptico, Barcelona 1851 (English tr., Letters to a Sceptic, Dublin 1875).—F. Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. I, 9th ed. (edited by E. Müller), pp. 5 sqq.; in English under the title, Natural Religion, London 1890.—B. Kuhn, Formes Actuelles du Doute, Bruxelles 1906.—P. Jäger, Zur Überwindung des Zweifels, Tübingen 1906.—L. J. Walker, S.J., art. “Scepticism,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, pp. 516 sqq. (See also the literature cited in Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, p. 54).—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 35 sqq.

On heresy: J. Wilhelm in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, pp. 250–262.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 369–374.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., Barcelona 1918, pp. 187 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 30 sqq.

On infidelity: P. Segneri, Incredulus non Excusabilis, Dillingen 1696.—A. Guyot, Les Causes de l’Incrédulité, 6th ed., Paris 1904.—Ch. H. Vosen, Das Christentum, 5th ed. (by S. Weber), Freiburg 1905, pp. 46 sqq.—A. Kirchberger, Der Unglaube und die Vernunft, Ravensburg 1907.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 378–390.

— By the will of not believing with supernatural faith even those things whose revelation has been sufficiently proposed, there is constituted a sin directly contrary to faith, necessarily grave, by which the sinner is despoiled of the habit itself of faith.

But several other sins, of various gravity, can be committed against faith.

1. Sin is committed by omission of the profession of faith prescribed by divine or ecclesiastical law; - by omission of an act of faith to be elicited from divine law; - by omission of diligence in acquiring a relatively sufficient knowledge of faith; - by omission of diligence in seeking the true religion.

These sins, grave in their own genus, can be excused from mortal sin not only by error of conscience, but also by smallness of matter.

Sin is committed by external denial of faith or shame concerning it. Denial is grave in its whole genus; not so shame.

Sin is committed by rashness or imprudence by which faith is exposed to danger.

— You ask in what way he sins who rejects definitions concerning truths not revealed, or defends propositions noted below heresy?

1. From dogmatic theology we know that the infallibility of the Church extends to truths which, although they are not contained in the deposit of faith, are nevertheless so connected with the same that without them that deposit would not be safe. Although these cannot be believed by divine faith, nevertheless the virtue of divine faith renders obedience, even internal obedience, necessary to definitions of this kind. That obedience is called religious-Catholic. The motive of assent is infallible authority, constituted by God, to which we are all subject. Some use the words ecclesiastical faith.

Therefore, he who knowingly rejects an infallible declaration sins gravely by a sin of disobedience or rebellion toward the Church: which sin is opposed to the very virtue of faith, since our very subjection is prescribed for safeguarding faith. Cf. Palmieri, Op. theol., t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 106.

2. A proposition condemned as scandalous, savoring of heresy or error, offensive to pious ears, is not necessarily false. Then directly only the enunciation of the thesis is proscribed. Wherefore he who professes it sins against religion, while he refuses obedience to the religious power: which obedience is necessary from religion; he sins against charity, insofar as he is a scandal to others, or weakens the unity of the Church; finally he sins against the virtue which that proposition directly harms. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 418.

3. Even if the condemnation has proceeded from a non-infallible authority, for example, from a Sacred Roman Congregation, besides the external disobedience against religion which is committed by defending and professing the proscribed theses, for the most part sin is also committed by rashness through internal dissent, except in some rare case where assent can prudently be suspended until infallible authority has pronounced on the matter. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 419, and the things said I, 317. - Suarez, De Fide, d. 19, and Lugo, De Fide, d. 20, n. 133, treat of this question.

N. B. The Code, c. 2317, strikes with grave penalties, but ferendae sententiae, those who pertinaciously, whether publicly or privately, teach or defend doctrine condemned by the Apostolic See (that is, by the Roman Pontiff or by a Sacred Roman Congregation; cf. c. 7) or by a General Council, but not as formally heretical; and c. 2331 § 1 likewise says that he is to be punished with suitable penalties who pertinaciously does not obey the Roman Pontiff or his own Ordinary when they legitimately prescribe or prohibit something.

2. What the individual notes signify is proposed in dogmatic theology. Lehmkuhl, I, 116, sets forth the matter in summary this way: "Erroneous is opposed to a thesis theologically certain, or to one which, by means of another truth (naturally certain), certainly follows from revealed doctrine." He who sustains it is suspected of heresy and is presumed a heretic.

Near to heresy is that which is not only erroneous, but is also opposed to a thesis which is called next to faith, because it is held as revealed by many, yet not by all.

"Near to error is opposed to that which is gathered most probably from revealed doctrine."

Rash is opposed to the common doctrine of theologians, which is deserted without solid reasons and therefore rashly.

— You ask concerning the sin of him who adheres to liberalism.

1. Even setting aside extreme liberalism, which in reality is the same as pantheism or rationalism, objectively he is a heretic who either fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, even that which they call milder, or holds its chief heads: for example, the full independence, in Christian society, of the State from the Church and the subjection of the Church under the authority of the State. For this is altogether repugnant to the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and to the magisterium of the Church here on earth: both of which are dogmas of faith. Cf. Palmieri, Op. theol., t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 107.

2. He who holds only the secondary heads of liberalism will be objectively a heretic or not according to the quality of his error. Thus he will be a heretic who denies that the doctrine concerning the sacrament of matrimony is to be held by faith (cf. propositions 65, 66, 68, 73 of the Syllabus); he will not yet be a heretic if he absolutely defends the present opportuneness of the "modern" liberties against proposition 77 of the Syllabus. In doubt, what is minimum is to be held. Yet he sins against faith, because for the most part he will defend a doctrine reprobated by the infallible magisterium.

3. Subjectively, not rarely, because of ignorance, even though often gravely culpable, the liberal will be excused from formal heresy. In certain points, for example in relations between the Church and the State, he can more easily be in good faith.

4. The confessor, from the subjective state, will judge concerning the guilt and concerning the censure of the penitent. If he has detected good faith in a man who otherwise satisfies the duties of Christian life, the quality of the error under which he labors, the greater or lesser scandal which he has given, the hoped-for fruit and the harm to be feared from the error being denounced will teach him the prudent norm of questioning and admonishing. Cf. Palmieri, l. c. n. 103-108. Cf. the encyclical Libertas of Leo XIII, 20 June 1888.

— A similar question which can be raised concerning socialism is to be solved in almost the same way. There is a certain integral socialism, which sends religion away to private life, rejects authority, and repudiates marriage for free love: and this cannot be defended without heresy.

But restricted to external temporal goods and their possessions, it puts forth some tenets which are certainly condemned by the infallible magisterium of the Church, as if you should deny that external things which are a source of revenues can be justly possessed. But other tenets, by which, the previous order not being reprobated, a new order, a new regime of goods is proclaimed, are to be examined more cautiously. For besides rash and to-be-rejected points, they easily contain points which can either be disputed or even usefully introduced by a legitimate way.

The very coerced adherence of many workers to socialistic societies will move us so that in confession we act prudently, lest we sin either by scandalous connivance or by destructive severity. The instructions of the Ordinaries of places must also be diligently attended to.

— Besides contrary infidelity, which is committed by a will excluding faith, sin can be committed: a) by various omissions of the profession of faith, of acts of faith, of diligence in the knowledge of faith, in seeking the true faith: which sins are grave in their own genus; b) then by denial (always grave) of faith, by shame concerning faith; c) by rashness and imprudence in reading to be done, in frequenting companions by whom faith is exposed to danger.

To the virtue itself of faith is opposed the grave sin of disobedience committed by him who knowingly rejects infallible declarations, even outside faith strictly so called; for the most part he also sins by rashness who internally dissents from doctrinal decrees of a Sacred Roman Congregation, besides the sin of external disobedience, which also is dangerous to faith. He who violates decrees by which the propositions themselves or at least their enunciations are condemned sins variously, but not necessarily against faith.

One adhering to liberalism, even if he is not always objectively a heretic, is convicted of sinning against faith. Yet a prudent confessor will consider the subjective persuasion and all the circumstances, so that from them he may gather the manner of questioning and admonishing.

In almost the same way the question concerning socialism is to be solved theoretically and practically.

7. If a man has been duly contrite, every exterior Confession is superfluous and useless for him.

10. It is against sacred Scripture that ecclesiastical men should have possessions.

14. It is lawful for any deacon or priest to preach the word of God without the authority of the Apostolic See or of a Catholic Bishop.

16. Temporal lords can, at their own judgment, take temporal goods away from the Church, when those possessing them are habitually delinquent, that is, delinquent by habit, not only actually delinquent.

17. The people can, at their own judgment, correct delinquent lords.

18. Tithes are purely alms, and parishioners, on account of the sins of their prelates, can take them away at their own pleasure.

25. All those are simoniacs who bind themselves to pray for others when those others assist them in temporal things.

43. Oaths are illicit which are made for strengthening human contracts and civil commerce.

16. The immediate division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious; because if a man is vicious and does anything, then he acts viciously; and if he is virtuous and does anything, then he acts virtuously; because just as vice, which is called crime or mortal sin, universally infects the acts of a vicious man, so virtue vivifies all the acts of a virtuous man.

1. Mortal sins, as to guilt and the punishment of the other age, are blotted out by contrition of heart alone, without order to the keys.

2. Confession concerning sins in species was useful to the Church from some statute, not by divine right.

3. Depraved thoughts ought not to be confessed, but are blotted out by displeasure alone, without order to the keys.

4. Confession ought to be secret, that is, concerning secret sins, not manifest sins.

5. Penitents are not to be absolved unless the penance enjoined on them has first been completed.

8. The Pope cannot dispense in the statutes of the universal Church.

Condemned as scandalous and heretical.

4. The imperfect charity of one dying necessarily carries with it great fear, which by itself is enough to make the punishment of purgatory, and impedes entrance into the kingdom.

5. That there are three parts of Penance, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, is not founded in sacred Scripture, nor in the ancient holy Christian doctors.

6. Contrition, which is prepared by discussion, comparison, and detestation of sins, by which one thinks over his years in the bitterness of his soul, pondering the gravity of sins, their multitude, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the acquisition of eternal damnation, this contrition makes a hypocrite, indeed more a sinner.

7. The proverb is most true, and more excellent than every doctrine concerning contritions given up to this point: henceforth not to do it is the highest penance; the best penance is a new life.

8. In no way presume to confess venial sins, nor even all mortal sins, because it is impossible that you should know all mortal sins. Hence the primitive Church confessed only manifest mortal sins.

9. When we wish to confess all things purely, we do nothing else than that we wish to leave nothing to be forgiven by the mercy of God.

10. Sins are not remitted to anyone unless, when the priest remits, he believes that they are remitted to him; indeed the sin would remain unless he believed it remitted; for the remission of sin and the gift of grace do not suffice, but it is also necessary to believe that it has been remitted.

11. In no way trust that you are absolved on account of your contrition, but on account of the word of Christ: Whatever you shall loose, etc. (Matt. XVI.) Hence, I say, trust, if you have obtained the absolution of the priest, and firmly believe yourself absolved, and you will truly be absolved, whatever may be the case concerning contrition.

12. If, by an impossibility, the one confessed were not contrite, or the priest absolved not seriously, but in jest, nevertheless, if he believes himself absolved, he is most truly absolved.

13. In the sacrament of Penance and the remission of guilt, the Pope or a Bishop does no more than the lowest priest; indeed, where there is no priest, any Christian whatever does just as much, even if it were a woman or a boy.

14. No one ought to answer the priest that he is contrite, nor ought the priest to require it.

23. Excommunications are only external punishments, and do not deprive a man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church.

16. It is not true obedience to the law which is done without charity.

20. No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment.

25. All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices.

31. Perfect and sincere charity, which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith not feigned, can be in catechumens as well as in penitents without the remission of sins.

32. That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins.

35. Everything which a sinner, or servant of sin, does is sin.

38. Every love of a rational creature is either vicious cupidity, by which the world is loved, which is prohibited by John, or that laudable charity by which God is loved, diffused in the heart through the Holy Spirit.

39. What is done voluntarily, even if it is done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely.

40. In all his acts the sinner serves the dominating cupidity.

41. That mode of liberty which is from necessity is not found in the Scriptures under the name of liberty, but only the name of liberty from sin.

43. In penitent men before the Sacrament of absolution, and in catechumens before Baptism, there is true justification; yet separated from the remission of sins.

509. Since faith is the foundation of the whole spiritual life, hence the vices which destroy or even weaken faith are most pernicious and open a broad way to all other vices. But as long as the sinner conserves faith, he retains in himself some divine seed and firm hope is present that at some time he may be brought to sincere conversion. Hence infidelity is deservedly called by St. Thomas,¹ after hatred of God, the gravest sin.

509. Sins against faith can be divided 1. into sins of omission and 2. into sins of commission.

1. By culpable omission someone sins against faith a) through omission of an act of internal or external faith (concerning these it has already been said in the preceding chapter); b) through voluntary ignorance of the truths of faith necessary to be known. Any man is bound to take care that he have sufficient knowledge of faith; and therefore he must sometimes hear sermons on Catholic doctrine, unless he is prepared to procure for himself from elsewhere the necessary notion of faith; this indeed will be difficult for simple faithful. Especially parents who send their children to non-Catholic schools, in which either no instruction or insufficient instruction in Catholic doctrine is handed down, sin gravely by this omission.

2. By commission someone can sin against faith in two ways, namely a) by excess and b) by defect.

a) By excess man sins against faith either by rash credulity or by superstition. He sins by rash credulity who admits things as pertaining to faith and the Christian religion, although they are not such, e.g. if someone lightly believes private revelations which are suspect and very doubtful. Hence St. John admonishes: "Dearly beloved, do not believe every spirit; but test the spirits, whether they are from God; because many false prophets have gone out into the world."²

Superstition, which is a certain protestation of infidelity through an exterior act,³ is opposed not only to the virtue of faith, but also to the virtue of religion, because it exhibits divine worship either to one to whom it ought not, or in the way in which it ought not. Superstition will be treated more fully below, II, 501 sqq., in the treatise on the virtue of religion.

b) By defect one sins against faith by infidelity. But infidelity is twofold: negative and positive. Negative infidelity (also called material infidelity) is the lack of faith in him to whom either faith has never been announced or has not been sufficiently announced; therefore it is involuntary infidelity. Positive infidelity (also called formal infidelity) is a culpable lack of faith in him who resists the assent of faith or contemns faith. The principal species of positive or formal infidelity are: paganism, Judaism, heresy. Thus St. Thomas,⁴ who writes: "Since the sin of infidelity consists in resisting faith, this can happen in two ways: because either one resists faith not yet received, and such infidelity is that of pagans or gentiles; or one resists the Christian faith received, either in figure, and thus it is the infidelity of the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and thus it is the infidelity of heretics. Hence in general the three aforesaid species of infidelity can be assigned." Apostasy is reduced to heresy; it is a total falling away from faith in him who previously had the true faith.⁵ St. Thomas⁶ says: "Apostasy does not import a determinate species of infidelity, but a certain aggravating circumstance." Heresy strictly so called is the voluntary and pertinacious error of a baptized man against some truth of Catholic faith. From heresy schism is usually distinguished, which consists in pertinacious withdrawal from the obedience due to the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore schism is not directly opposed to faith, but almost always schismatics are also heretics, since they not only refuse obedience to the head of the Church, but also deny one or another article of faith (especially the primacy of the Supreme Pontiff).

St. Thomas⁷ teaches: "Heresy and schism are distinguished according to those things to which each is per se and directly opposed. For heresy per se is opposed to faith; but schism per se is opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. And therefore just as faith and charity are diverse virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so also schism and heresy are diverse vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic; but the reverse does not hold. And this is what St. Jerome⁸ says: 'Between schism and heresy I judge there to be this difference, that heresy has a perverse dogma, schism separates from the Church.' And nevertheless just as the loss of charity is the way to losing faith according to that: 'From which certain ones straying [namely from charity and other things of this kind] have turned aside into vain talking,'⁹ so also schism is the way to heresy. Hence Jerome adds in the same place that 'schism at the beginning can be understood in some part as diverse from heresy; for the rest, there is no schism which does not devise for itself some heresy, so that it may seem rightly to have withdrawn from the Church.'"

To apostasy from faith are reduced indifferentism, pantheism, materialism, skepticism, monism, etc., of a man previously educated Catholic.

In this chapter we shall treat 1. of paganism and Judaism, or of those who never received faith; 2. of apostasy from faith and of heresy; 3. of dangers of faith.

¹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 34, a. 2 ad 1; q. 20, a. 3; q. 10, a. 3.

² 1 John 4, 1.

³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 94, a. 1 ad 1.

⁴ Ib. q. 10, a. 5. Modern authors distinguish infidelity properly and improperly so called. "Infidelity properly so called is the lack of faith in a non-baptized man; for an unbeliever is properly called one who has not received the infused habit of faith. Infidelity improperly so called is any defect of internal faith, in which sense it comprehends also heresy and apostasy from faith." Thus Noldin, De praeceptis n. 26. Although in vernacular languages the unbaptized and they alone are usually regarded as unbelievers, nevertheless there is no reason why in moral Theology we should withdraw from the terminology used by St. Thomas and other older theologians.

⁵ Cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 1325, § 2.

⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 12, a. 1 ad 3.

⁷ Ib. q. 39, a. 1 ad 3.

⁸ Comm. in epist. ad Tit. 3, 10.

⁹ 1 Tim. 1, 6.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 10-12; St. Alphonsus, II, 17; ed. G., I, p. 309; Lugo, disp. XVIII seqq.; Aertnys, l. II, n. 9; Lehmkuhl, 1, 410; Tanquerey, II, n. 655; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 205 seq.; Gopfert, 1, § 47.

434. To the virtue of faith is opposed, by EXCESS, rash credulity, by which, from levity of heart, things are believed as belonging to the Christian faith and religion, when they are not such; as, for example, if someone lightly believed and handed on to others private revelations very suspect and doubtful. - Hence St. John warns (1 Ep. 4:1): Dearly beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits whether they are of God. But, the danger of losing true faith being excluded, the aforesaid credulity will be a venial sin, or none.

By DEFECT, to the virtue of faith are opposed: 1. Sins of omission, namely negligence in learning truths of faith necessary to know; and omission of acts which the affirmative precept of faith prescribes (cf. n. 428). Yet by these sins the infused habit of faith is not lost. 2. Sins of commission, namely denial of faith, whether external or internal, which the negative precept forbids (cf. n. 429). But since internal denial of faith is made especially through infidelity, heresy, and apostasy, and since the dangers of these sins also are prescribed to be avoided, we shall treat here: a) of infidelity; b) of heresy and apostasy from faith; c) of avoiding dangers of losing faith.

435. DEFINITION. Infidelity properly so called is lack of faith in a man not baptized. For those are called infidels who have not yet received the infused habit of faith.

DIVISION. A threefold infidelity is distinguished: negative, of those who have heard nothing about the faith; privative, of those who from vincible ignorance do not know the truths of faith; positive or contrary, of those who resist faith sufficiently proposed, or contemn it (Instr., IV, 4).

436. PRINCIPLES. I. Negative infidelity is not a sin. The reason is that it is not voluntary; and therefore this 68th proposition of Baius was deservedly condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin." Cf. n. 425.

II. Privative infidelity is a grave sin. For it proceeds from ignorance which is vincible, and therefore gravely culpable.

III. Positive infidelity is a most grave sin; because it contains grave injury and contempt of divine authority. Whence, he who has not believed shall be condemned (Mark 16:16).

The principal SPECIES of positive infidelity are: paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and other sects of unbelievers. To these are numbered atheism, pantheism, deism; finally rationalism, from which is born either incredulity, which rejects all religions as fictions, or indifferentism, which estimates all religions as equal. Yet these, in a baptized man, are rather referred to apostasy and heresy (cf. n. 438).

437. IT IS ASKED. Whether unbelievers can be compelled to receiving faith?

Resp. They cannot be compelled directly, both because the Church has no power over the non-baptized, and because the reception of faith, so that it may be true, ought to be voluntary. This is confirmed by canonical right and by the practice of the Church itself, which has never used coercion, but persuasion (l. V Decr., tit. 6 and c. 3).

We said directly: "for the Church, and any supreme prince, can indeed compel Jews and pagan subjects to hearing our faith" (II, 19). The prince can also prohibit idolatry, since this is repugnant to the natural law; and thus, the Church applauding, Constantine and Theodosius proscribed such impiety. Likewise, he can prohibit, even by arms, that faith be impeded. "And for this reason," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 10, a. 8), "the Christian faithful have frequently waged wars by right against unbelievers."

Three things come to be considered here: the sins of heresy and apostasy, the ecclesiastical sanction against these sins, the reconciliation of heretics.

438. NOTIONS. I. Heresy is a pertinacious error against faith, in one who has received the faith.

For heresy which is punished by canonical penalties there is required: 1. on the part of the person, profession of the Christian religion, and baptism validly received (for a catechumen cannot yet be punished by the Church); 2. on the part of the intellect, error, that is, assent, or a formed judgment; 3. on the part of the will, pertinacity, by which someone knowingly and willingly does not wish to submit his judgment to the Church teaching infallibly (which is characteristic of this sin); yet it is not required that someone adhere tooth and nail and with a delay of time to such error; 4. on the part of the matter, error against Catholic faith, that is, against some point of faith explicitly defined or proposed by the Church; 5. on the part of the act, that the error be externalized, whether by a deed or by a word indicating internal heresy (VII, 300 seqq.).

Before God, anyone is a heretic who rejects some truth which he knows to be revealed, even by voluntarily doubting (cf. 421, 4).

II. Apostasy is total departure from the Christian faith received through baptism.

Note. For the crime of apostasy the profession of some false religion is not required. Therefore, under the name of apostates come also Masons, nihilists, anarchists, more probably socialists properly so called, free-thinkers, rationalists, deists, pantheists, spiritists, and generally all those who, after baptism received, have completely withdrawn from Christian faith, although they have not passed over to Judaism or to another infidelity. Cf. L. Jaugey, de Fide, n. 161; Tanquerey, II, p. 387, note 2; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, vol. 16, die Quellen des Ungl.; vol. 48, Atheismus u. s. Folgen.

Note. There will be discussion of apostasy from Religion or from Sacred Order in Part IV.

DIVISION. Heresy is distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of the sin, it is formal, if someone adheres to error with pertinacity, that is, knowingly and willingly; or material, if there is error in the intellect without pertinacity in the will.

2. By reason of the act, it is internal, if it lies hidden in the mind; or merely external, if someone by mouth, for example by uttering a heretical blasphemy, or by deed, for example by prostrating himself before an idol, denies the faith which he retains in the heart; or externalized or manifested, if it is in the mind and is produced exteriorly.

3. By reason of manifestation, it is occult, if it becomes known to no one or to only a few; and public, if it is known to very many and cannot be concealed (Perrone, de Virt. fid., n. 481-490). Cf. n. 1199.

439. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal heresy, and apostasy from faith, are most grave sins. The reason is: 1. because they contemn the authority of God revealing, and therefore attack God himself; 2. because they directly impede the remission of other sins, since faith is "the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the fellowship of his sons." Trent, Sess. VI, c. 8, and Vatican, Sess. III, c. 3.

440. II. Material heresy, of itself, is free from fault. For it proceeds from ignorance. Yet except if it proceeds from culpable ignorance; because then it will be culpable in the same degree as the ignorance itself, although it does not yet reach formal heresy (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. I, n. 1-6; VII, 301).

The signs of heresy, whether material or formal, are the following:

1. He is considered only materially a heretic, and therefore, from the faith received in baptism, belonging to the Church of God: a) Who is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church when he has recognized the error, although meanwhile he may defend his own opinion tooth and nail. b) Who has known nothing concerning the Catholic faith, and has never doubted concerning his own. c) Who, while doubting, has studied to recognize the truth as much as he could. - But he who culpably procrastinates his conversion to the faith is not for this reason a heretic; nevertheless he sins against the affirmative precept of faith if he puts it off for a long time.

2. He must be considered a formal heretic: a) Who doubts, and from pertinacity or from contempt of the Church refuses to inquire further. b) Who deliberately turns the intellect away from truth sufficiently proposed, so that he may adhere to his own sect or opinion. c) Who, after the truth has been recognized, perseveres in contradicting the Church, as heresiarchs are accustomed to do from hatred of the Pope or of the Church. These are the three principal GRADES of pertinacity, of which the first is founded upon truth studiously neglected; the second upon truth sufficiently proposed but contemned; the third upon recognized truth maliciously opposed (Voit, I, 378-379).

441. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he is a formal heretic who DOUBTS concerning matters of faith?

Resp. 1. If he positively doubts concerning some dogma already defined or proposed by the Church, judging it to be uncertain on account of opposed reasons, beyond doubt he is a formal heretic. In this case, that saying of right strictly holds: "One doubtful in faith is an unbeliever" (c. 1, de Haeret.; cf. H. Ap., XIX, 53).

2. If he doubts negatively, namely by suspending judgment concerning some article of faith, one must distinguish thus: either a) deliberately and pertinaciously he suspends his assent, because he thinks the judgment of the Church is not a sufficient foundation for believing; and then he likewise is a formal heretic; or b) deliberately indeed, but not pertinaciously, he suspends assent; and in this case, although he sins gravely against faith, he is not nevertheless strictly a heretic, because there is not present a pertinacious choice; or c) neither deliberately nor pertinaciously, but from temptation, he remains so suspended that he neither dissents nor assents: in this case he does not sin, or at most only venially, because perhaps he resists the temptation tepidly (II, 19; VII, 302).

QUAER. 2. What is to be thought about those who adhere to opinions which are marked not only by the Sacred Congregations, but by the Church, indeed with a dogmatic censure, yet lighter than heresy?

Beforehand note. DOGMATIC censure, proceeding from the supreme and universal magisterium of the Church, condemns some thesis as heretical, or erroneous, or proximate to heresy or error, or rash. DISCIPLINARY censure, which corresponds rather to the prerogative of government than of magisterium, is not condemnatory of doctrine, as dogmatic censure is, but prohibitory of the same. This is also called ECONOMIC or PRUDENTIAL, when the enunciation of some doctrine is prohibited not on account of an intrinsic cause, but on account of causes or reasons of prudence, namely that dissensions may be removed, peace consulted, scandal guarded against (Konings, n. 268, q. 3).

Resp. Of themselves, they are not guilty of heresy, but certainly they sin mortally. We say of themselves; for those adhering to opinions of this kind as true and licit virtually deny the infallibility of the Church: and if they are conscious to themselves of this denial, they are guilty of heresy (I, 104). Cf. n. 1328.

From these things are to be judged followers of liberalism who embrace various errors concerning liberty, condemned by the Church in the Syllabus, or demand excessive tolerance for favorers of errors. Concerning these below (n. 445). Concerning liberalism cf. Aertnys, Theol. past., P. III, a. 5; Godts, Les droits en matiere d'education: la liberte, Ch. II; Berardi, Exam. Conf., n. 2455 and Casus Consc., a. 1894.

442. PRINCIPLES. I. Heretics and apostates are punished with spiritual and temporal penalties. Cf. n. 438, 1314, 1351.

1. The SPIRITUAL penalties are: a) Excommunication latae sententiae, reserved in a special way to the Supreme Pontiff, which is incurred also by those believing heretics ... and generally all their defenders. b) Irregularity, likewise reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, which is extended also to the sons of those who persist in heresy or have died in it, to the first and second degree through the paternal line, but through the maternal line to the first only (N. R. Th., 22, p. 601; 24, p. 276), even in Germany and in other places where heresies rage with impunity (S. Off., Dec. 14, 1890). c) Incapacity for any ecclesiastical office and benefice whatsoever. d) Privation by the right itself (but after a declaratory sentence) of every dignity, benefice, and office. e) Privation of ecclesiastical burial.

2. The TEMPORAL penalties are: perpetual prison, confiscation of goods, etc.; but these no longer have force (Soglia, Inst. Jur. priv., § 232).

II. There is given an obligation of denouncing heretics and those suspected of heresy.

1. By force of the edicts of the HOLY INQUISITION, the following must be denounced to Ordinaries or to the inquisitors themselves, under penalty of excommunication ferendae sententiae (if someone has neglected to denounce for a month): a) formal heretics, and their favorers; b) all suspected of heresy, such as sorcerers, heretical blasphemers, those abusing the sacraments (for example, those who celebrate or absolve without priesthood), confessors soliciting to base things, those contracting nuptials while a spouse is living or with a solemn vow (III, 123; IV, 251-54; VII, 249).

These decrees indeed are not observed in many places, because on account of the liberty of worship asserted for all, the errors of heretics rage with impunity, and therefore the denouncing of them imposed by the law of the Church by no means obliges. Yet clerics seem to have to be denounced in every case, so that the Bishop may meet the harm both of the people and of the clergy specially committed to himself (Scavini, II, 845, 3).

2. By force of the natural law, one must denounce either heretics or those suspected of heresy, as often as it is a question of avoiding grave harm of souls, to which the Superior can bring a remedy.

Let it be noted: 1. This obligation from the natural law will be able to urge even in places where heretics are everywhere mixed with Catholics, for example, if it is a question of an unusual danger which threatens the Catholic religion through them, the Superior being unaware, and to which the Superior can provide in at least some way. 2. Formal heretics, even if they are not dogmatizing, anyone is bound to denounce, even with danger of grave harm; even a blood-relative, brother, indeed wife, son, or father. The reason is that heresy is so harmful a plague that it has a remedy with difficulty and easily turns to common harm. 3. Those suspected of heresy generally are not bound to be denounced by blood-relatives or others fearing grave harm from it. The reason is that since in those suspected there is only doubtful heresy, only a doubtful evil can be feared from it, and the danger of common harm is considered remote (IV, 249-50).

443. I. ANY CONFESSOR can absolve both those guilty of merely internal heresy and also heretics who have incurred no censure.

II. The BISHOP, or INQUISITOR, can in the external forum, by himself or through another, absolve notorious heretics. It matters little whether they were denounced or appeared spontaneously. Yet abjuration must be premised before a notary or someone delegated by the Bishop for this (S. O., March 28, 1900) and witnesses. Thus from the Bull Cum sicut of Clement VII, January 15, 1530 (Anal. eccl., VIII, p. 191); cf. Coll. de Prop. Fide, n. 1682.

Note. 1. Nevertheless it is granted by the aforesaid Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide that sometimes abjuration be made before a few witnesses, without a notary (Coll., n. 1686 and 1681).

2. In places of mixed religion, Bishops are accustomed commonly to have and communicate a delegated faculty of absolving. - The formula of abjuration is that which the Holy Office composed on July 20, 1859.

3. Any confessor can absolve from the sin of heresy those guilty persons thus absolved from censure (VII, 83; H. Ap., XX, de Privil., 39).

III. ONLY THE ROMAN PONTIFF can absolve (by himself or through another) heretics whether notorious or occult. It is supposed that they have not yet presented themselves to the judicial forum of the Ordinary, either from delation or spontaneously (Bened. XIV, Const. Pastor bonus, 1744).

Hence: 1. Protestants, or other notorious heretics, who wish to abjure their heresy, can be absolved by the Bishop or by his delegate. For their heresy, in every case, must be brought to the external forum.

2. The contrary must be said of a Catholic who privately fell into heresy, or lived in some sect so occultly that his heresy became known to only a few. For he would be in a case of occult heresy, nor could he be absolved by the Bishop,

so long as his delict had not been brought to the judicial forum. Whence, if he refuses to manifest his heresy in the external forum, he will need an indult of the Holy See (that is, of the Major Penitentiary) to obtain absolution (Bouix, de Episc., II, p. 222). See nevertheless the things to be said at n. 1314.

Note. The MODE of reconciling heretics will be treated at n. 1832 seqq.

There are especially three things which bring danger to faith, namely: 1. liberty of worships conceded by a prince; 2. communication with heretics or unbelievers; 3. reading of depraved books.

In voluntarily incurring these dangers there is given a fault of imprudence, which nevertheless is not always mortal, nor opposed to faith; and therefore it does not necessarily expel the habit of faith (Tanquerey, I, 655-659). If the imprudence is against faith, from the fact that someone proximately exposes himself to danger, there will be present a grave sin of infidelity.

444. Note beforehand. That liberty or equality of worships lies greatly in ambush against the Catholic faith, nothing is more evident than this. For through it there is brought into Catholic kingdoms that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, "of the indifference of any religion whatsoever, which, after every distinction of truth and error has been taken away, boldly asserts that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever," and thus it casts peoples down into the abyss of incredulity (Pius IX, Enc., November 9, 1846).

445. PRINCIPLES. I. Liberty of worships, considered as doctrine, is a false principle of liberalism, which a Catholic legislator ought to impede by all the ways in which he can. Reason: he who cannot favor lesser vices, how much more ought he to resist those things which tear out the foundations of the commonwealth (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. 1, n. 4; opusc. Fedelta dei vassalli).

Liberalism is a politico-religious system which professes an independence of the State from the Church so complete that the State rules itself, no respect being had to Religion, as if this did not exist, and all religions were in reality equal in themselves.

Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have always reprobated this liberty and equality of worships: "What more insane can be devised?" exclaims Pius VI in the Letter to Cardinal La Rochefoucauld (on March 10, 1791). Gregory XVI, in the Encyclical Mirari vos; Pius IX, in the Encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864) and in the Syllabus (propositions 77, 78, and 79); Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Libertas (June 20, 1888), condemned this system by their supreme authority. The same Pontiff spoke thus concerning this doctrine in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: "If it differs from Atheism in name, in reality it differs not at all."

Note. But what kind of sin against faith he commits who professes liberalism was said above at n. 441.

II. Liberty of worships and of conscience can sometimes be tolerated where the prince cannot impede it without graver detriment to the true religion and commonwealth. Thus the Angelic Doctor teaches (2.2, q. 10, a. 11): Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits some evils to be done in the universe which he could prohibit, lest, by their being removed, greater goods be taken away, or even worse evils follow. St. Alphonsus is plainly consonant with the Angelic Doctor (II, 18). Cf. Zigliara, Summa Phil., p. 247.

III. Liberty of worships, existing in fact, creates a twofold danger for the faithful, both of embracing the theoretical error concerning the equal value of religions, and of confusing political tolerance with dogmatic tolerance (Villada, Casus Consc., I, p. 59).

The matter is clear. From this twofold danger it must always be discerned whether someone in reality has fallen into a sin opposed to faith, or has only undergone the danger of falling into it, and whether the matter is one of doctrinal liberalism, or only of political parties.

446. From these things you will resolve: A. As regards liberalism, as it is doctrine:

In order to determine what sin against faith he commits who professes this liberalism, one must carefully inspect (as Genicot says) what he understands by the sentence to which he gives assent, since among those who have not completely turned aside to atheism or rationalism and who wish to remain Catholics, this word liberalism is taken with manifold variety; then one must see how far, by reason of ignorance and good faith, each one is excused from formal sin.

Hence: 1. He is a heretic who: a) fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, that is, the full independence of the State from the Church, or (what is worse) the subjection of the Church to the authority of the State. For some subordination of the State to the Church is manifestly contained in the full power with which Christ furnished Peter and his successors; b) the same must be said of those liberals who pertinaciously hold certain particular doctrines which are also adverse to divine faith, for example, that by force of a merely civil contract there is given among Christians a true marriage. Cf. Sarda y Salvani, Le liberalisme est un peche.

2. They are excused from heresy, but expose themselves to danger, who defend these errors on account of ignorance for the most part culpable, and yet do not bear the mind of retaining them when they shall have known them to be reprobated by the Church. Likewise, by defect of religious assent, they sin gravely against prudence or reverence owed to the Church who hold only some secondary error, but one by no means contrary to divine faith, for example the 76th proposition of the Syllabus, concerning progress going to follow for the Church from the abrogation of the civil empire. But here some good faith can easily be admitted.

B. As regards liberalism, as it denotes political parties.

Before all things one must examine whether those who adhere to such parties nevertheless otherwise seem to fulfill the offices of good Catholics. Then it must prudently be explored whether they themselves admit something evil in doctrine or manner of acting, or without sufficient reason cooperate in the evil counsels of others; and according to these things let them be judged.

Concerning cooperation of this kind a question often occurs when there is question of schools, assemblies, and other social works.

447. Communication is either RELIGIOUS or in sacred rites, or CIVIL or political. The former is prohibited by reason of itself, by divine and ecclesiastical right, on account of scandal and cooperation in sin; namely insofar as it is simulation of false faith, or approbation of false religion (see n. 432). - The latter is prohibited chiefly by reason of the danger of perversion which it induces.

PRINCIPLES. I. Civil communication with unbelievers, heretics, and apostates is forbidden by the natural and divine law, if it is dangerous to those communicating. This is established from the things said at n. 374, and from several places of Sacred Scripture, for example the Epistle to Titus (3:10): Avoid a heretical man, and Romans (16:17, 18): Decline from them. For men of this kind do not serve Christ our Lord, but their own belly: and by sweet speeches and blessings they seduce the hearts of the innocent (cf. de Prohib. lib., c. 1).

Note. 1. From civil communication a threefold danger arises: a) lest the Catholic religion suffer detriment; b) lest someone make shipwreck of his own faith; c) lest others take scandal.

2. Apostates, free-thinkers, and heretics entice more to their errors than unbelievers do; because their speech creeps like a cancer (2 Tim. 2:17), and because Satan, so that he may more easily deceive the simple and unwary, with their help and work, is transfigured into an angel of light. The danger grows in places of heretics or unbelievers where there does not exist some church with a Catholic priest to whom it is free to exercise our rites publicly.

3. Formerly a more severe prohibition, even general, was had against civilly communicating, without just cause, with heretics and others denounced by name (cf. n. 1295). It was forbidden to Christians (cf. title de Judaeis in Canon Law) to dwell with Jews in the same house, to be present at banquets, to use a common bath, to employ them as physicians ... or to serve Jews. But these things, says Tanquerey, have passed more or less into desuetude, and today attention must rather be given to the danger of perversion (II, n. 677, note). Cf. Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 210; D'Annibale, I, n. 110.

4. For ITALIANS Clement VIII, Const. Cum sicut, established: a) That under whatever title they dare not dwell in places of heretics where there does not exist a church with a Catholic priest. b) That they not depart to dwell in the aforesaid places except after opportune admonitions have been received from the Ordinaries or inquisitors for guarding against the danger of subversion. c) That they not use heretical physicians if a suitable Catholic is present (Scavini, II, n. 820).

448. II. Religious communication with unbelievers, heretics, and apostates is of itself illicit and prohibited by the Church. It is established from reason and from the decisions cited above.

Note. 1. The prohibition is absolute in those things which contain heresy, as happens in active, public, and formal communication; it is only conditioned in those things which are administered in the Catholic rite, for example in mixed marriages, provided the dangers of religion are absent and ecclesiastical prohibition does not urge (cf. D'Annibale, l. c.; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 209). The reason is clear, for the first is the same as truly to deny the true faith, to profess and simulate a false one (cf. n. 429), which is never licit; the other contains only the appearance of adhesion to a condemned sect, although it brings danger; yet all these things can and ought sometimes to be removed.

2. It can more easily be admitted that heretics communicate with us in our rites; for this has less danger than if we communicate with them.

3. It is more strictly prohibited to communicate in sacred rites with unbelievers, because besides other inconveniences there is almost always present participation in superstitious worship (cf. D'Annibale, l. c., and above n. 432).

449. IT IS ASKED. Whether DISPUTATION with heretics is prohibited?

It must be noted beforehand. A twofold disputation is given: public, which, with day and hour fixed, has place before a multitude and judges appointed; private, which is made before a few hearers.

Resp. 1. For laymen, Alexander IV (c. 2, § 1, de Haeret., in Sexto) established thus: "We prohibit that it be licit for any lay person to dispute publicly or privately concerning the Catholic faith. But he who shall do contrary, let him be bound by the snare of excommunication" (excommunication ferendae sententiae). The law is founded on the presumption that laymen are not sufficiently taught. Therefore exception must be made if the controversy is made by learned men with the Bishop's permission, or in a case of great usefulness, or of introduced custom, as in Germany.

2. "Disputation is prohibited to clerics by no right, provided that they are suitable, and from the circumstances a happy outcome can be hoped; but public disputation with heretics cannot be made without permission" (namely, of the Supreme Pontiff). Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Council, March 6, 1625, and several times the S. C. Prop. Fide. Yet in a case of necessity, if there is danger in delay, the Ordinary of the place can grant this license (Konings, n. 255).

Disputations with socialists are subject to the same rules, the Sacred Congregation for extraordinary affairs declared, January 27, 1902 (A. S. S., 38, p. 107. Cf. Canon. Cont., XXV, p. 335; Etudes, August 20, 1905, p. 480; Ami du Clerge, 1905, p. 354).

450. From these things you will resolve: 1. Marriages with heretics and unbelievers, as being generally dangerous for the Catholic party and offspring, are, regularly speaking, gravely illicit. Yet sometimes, for a grave cause, and every danger being removed, the Church permits marriages of this kind to avoid a greater evil (II, 19). See the treatise on Matrimony (n. 1986).

2. It is not licit to serve heretics when there is danger of perversion. The same must be said if the servant is for the most part impeded from fulfillment of the precepts of the Church; but otherwise if he is only rarely impeded.

3. To send little children, young men, or girls into schools of heretics or of impious men is a great sin and a very great evil, ordinarily never repairable (cf. n. 713 seqq.). See the Instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar to the pastors of the Fair City, July 12, 1878 (A. S. S., vol. 11, p. 176). Likewise, parents sin gravely who for the sake of gain send their still tender children, or allow them to go, to places of heretics, without any necessity and due cautions.

4. Also with the greatest caution must young people be permitted to frequent associations called scholastic or postscholastic, or associations of Popular Universities, because often faith runs into danger there. See the things said at n. 432.

Through the publication of books opposed to faith (or to good morals), especially in this our age, an immense slaughter of souls is made (de Prohib. lib.; ed. G., I, p. 253).

451. PRINCIPLES. I. By force of the natural law, there is given a most grave obligation of avoiding the danger of perversion which arises from the publication, retention, and reading of depraved books. For: 1. "If a pernicious word, which immediately flies away, creeps like a cancer and wounds unto death: what evil does an improper book not bring, which can become a perpetual font of subversion?" (l. c., n. 2). 2. If a continual occasion of lust must altogether be removed, so that the penitent may deserve to be absolved, how much more a pernicious book inducing danger of losing faith?

Hence it is inferred: 1. Bishops, pastors, fathers of families, princes, magistrates, teachers, etc., ought to use the greatest vigilance in this matter.

2. Although someone has been furnished with the faculty of reading prohibited books, nevertheless he cannot read them if he knows or experiences that reading of this kind is harmful to him, or proximately dangerous, for example if he does not know how to distinguish truth from error (ibid., n. 12).

3. "In this matter, it is ordinarily expedient to follow the stricter opinions" (ibid., c. V, n. 8).

452. II. By force of positive law, books prohibited by the Church, whether with censure or without censure, without legitimate license, can neither be read nor retained. The Church has received jurisdiction from the Lord himself for prohibiting to the faithful the reading of books which contain something against religion, good morals, or the discipline of the Church. If this faculty were not with the Church, and the faithful were not bound to obey it in this, neither could faith be preserved unharmed, nor would Christ have sufficiently provided for his Church. Hence the Doctors rightly teach that the judgment of the Church concerning books is altogether infallible (ibid., c. 2, n. 1).

It was said: 1. Books prohibited by the Church. Under the name book is understood a writing which consists in some bulk and unity of object, which must be judged from the judgment of prudent persons. Therefore positive prohibition is not extended to newspapers, letters, flying sheets, unless special mention is made of these. But periodical booklets, whose several fascicles are joined into one, are to be counted among books properly so called (S. Off., January 15, 1892). 2. Whether with censure, such as by the Constitution Officiorum are both books of heretics or apostates defending heresy and books of any author whatsoever prohibited by name through apostolic letters. 3. Or without censure, that is, all books which are contained in the Index of prohibited books or comprehended by the general rules. 4. Can neither be read nor retained; but it is required and suffices that you destroy books of this kind in whatever way, or hand them over to one having the faculty of retaining them, because even by acting thus you do not retain them. 5. Without legitimate license: which license is to be obtained from the Roman Pontiff, for example through the S. Congregation of the Index; for the faculty of permitting belongs to him whose office it is to prohibit. The Congregations of the Holy Office and de Propaganda Fide enjoy the same power; likewise the Master of the Sacred Palace for the City. Sometimes, however, Bishops, by force of special faculties, are able to grant this license to priests (A. S. S., 7, p. 302). Cf. Const. Officiorum, which we shall explain more fully in the Appendix.

453. III. All Bishops by divine right, for their dioceses, have the power of proscribing and prohibiting, even under censure, either books, or even daily papers, of harmful reading. This belongs essentially to their office. Indeed, because knowledge of all harmful books cannot so easily and immediately come to Rome, it is often preferable that they be proscribed by their own authority without any delay interposed (VII, 290).

"Ordinaries, even as delegates of the Apostolic See, should strive to proscribe books and other harmful writings published or spread in their diocese, and to remove them from the hands of the faithful. Let them refer to Apostolic judgment works or writings which require more subtle examination, or in which, for obtaining a salutary effect, the sentence of supreme authority may seem to be required." Const. Officiorum, n. 29.

454. IT IS ASKED. Whether necessity can sometimes excuse from the law of the Index?

Resp. "That which several Doctors teach does not seem improbable, ... namely that by just epikeia a truthful, pious, and learned man reading a heretical book is excused, if he necessarily needs such reading for convincing some heretic from his own, for instance by finding contradictions, concessions, fallacies, and similar things; provided necessity urges, and besides recourse to Rome or to one's own Bishop is not open." Thus St. Alphonsus (de Prohib. lib., c. 5, n. 2). Cf. Const. Officiorum, n. 25.

Outside these cases, to the question: "Whether one who is morally certain that the reading will not harm him can read a prohibited book without license?" St. Alphonsus responds (VII, 291): "Whatever others may say, it must altogether be denied." Cf. n. 451, 452.

455. Note. The INDEX OF PROHIBITED BOOKS was first made by order of Paul IV. Pius IV and Clement VIII perfected it. - It prohibited books partly through general decrees, which are called Rules of the Index, partly by indicating in alphabetical order either the titles of books or the names of authors. But lastly Leo XIII, by the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum (January 25, 1897), after abrogating the general decrees hitherto in force, instituted new ones and approved and confirmed a new Index, through the Brief Romani Pontifices (September 17, 1900).

733. Questions to be treated. - Under the name of an opposed sin there does not come a mere omission of the act of a precept, whether interior or of faith, or exterior or of confession of faith; but a contrary act, a sin of commission. But several vices and sins are opposed to faith:

1. To interior faith itself there is directly opposed a) infidelity, which from certain circumstances is called b) heresy and apostasy;

2. To faith there are indirectly opposed those things which for oneself or for others include occasion and danger of losing faith, such as a) communication with infidels and heretics; b) cooperation in infidelity and heresy; c) writings against doctrine of faith and morals; d) internal admission or external proposition of doctrines which are dangerous for faith.

3. To exterior faith or confession of faith there is directly opposed blasphemy.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 11 and 12.

743. Various conditions of infidelity. - On the part of the one sinning, infidelity is called either apostasy, or heresy, or simple infidelity. An apostate is one who totally casts off the faith of Christ previously received; a heretic is one who professes the faith of Christ at some time (at least now) received, but corrupts the dogmas which it belongs to the Church to propose; simply an infidel is one who has never received the faith of Christ. But in order that someone be held fully, that is, also in the external forum and before the Church, as an apostate or heretic, it is required that by solemn profession in Baptism he received the faith (at least externally), and that he totally or partially denied this faith explicitly proposed by the Church as to be believed (can. 1325, § 2).

Sins against God are committed directly against the theological virtues and against religion. The theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, are not formally and expressly proposed in the Decalogue, but are presupposed to it as principles to conclusions, the intention of the end to the ordering of means, and the recognition of the legislator to submission to the law. The virtue of religion is proposed in the first three precepts of the Decalogue, namely as to the three duties of fidelity toward God, reverence, and service.

In the following we shall speak:

1. concerning certain sins against divine faith, which in the present supernatural order is necessary for perfect fidelity toward God revealing;

2. concerning certain sins against reverence for God;

3. concerning the sin against the service of God, or concerning the violation of Sunday.

I. Object of the question. - The sin of infidelity is directly opposed to divine faith; in the baptized this is heresy and apostasy. Many things are indirectly opposed, namely whatever constitutes a danger or an occasion of losing or suppressing faith, such as communication with unbelievers and heretics, especially in sacred things, cooperation toward infidelity and heresy, the publication and reading of writings contrary to faith, and opinions dangerous to faith, concerning which in the Treatise on Faith.¹

¹ Cf. Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, nn. 733-780.

In the present matter there is especially treated: concerning liberalism and socialism, which for the most part constitute an indirect danger to faith from which the faithful are to be kept away; concerning heresy, which is a direct obstacle to faith, from which those who have fallen into it are to be converted; concerning doubt in faith, which can be either one or the other. Hence we shall consider penitents of three kinds:

a) those infected with liberalism or socialism, to be admonished or even dismissed,

b) heretics, to be received into the Church and to sacramental confession,

c) those doubting and wavering in the true faith.

II. Of how much importance it is to meet Liberalism and Socialism. - Not rarely does it happen that certain Catholics are imbued with the spirit of liberalism and adhere in some measure to its theories; similarly, to those of socialism. Therefore it is necessary that the confessor know those errors, and be able to bring forth a prudent judgment concerning the stain of liberalism or socialism by which perhaps penitents are infected, and to set before himself the right mode of acting with penitents of this kind.

For the matter is full of dangers. Ordinarily, indeed, someone does not become a complete liberal or socialist immediately from the beginning. He begins to read newspapers or other writings of liberals or socialists; he associates with their societies, perhaps without an evil intention, or gives them his vote in political elections. Nor for this reason does he necessarily become impious or indifferent in the matter of religion; but ordinarily his faith grows cold and religious practice is gradually diminished. In the sons of men of this kind religious indifference is wont to grow; and their sons are still baptized, make first Communion, enter marriage before the Church, and call a priest at the end of life, but besides these things there is almost no practice of religion. In the third generation there will already be complete indifference, or even hostility toward religion, so that in practical life paganism as it were prevails.

Against these dangers priests must seriously admonish and fortify the faithful, both publicly and also privately in confession.

In present times, indeed, the matter perhaps becomes less practical in our regions, because many liberals no longer frequent the church or the sacraments, nor is the struggle against them so sharp as formerly; nevertheless the principles always hold, and new circumstances could occur in which they would again serve more in practice. Indeed, because of the absence of struggle the dangers are perhaps greater, since the faithful do not so easily perceive the imminence of danger and the greatness of the evil. Hence one must never desist from opportune admonition.

III. Notions concerning Liberalism.² - In general, all those are called liberals who confuse the physical liberty of choosing with independence from God and from those sharing divine authority, which moderns call moral liberty; hence, under the false name of liberty, they pursue a certain absurd and most deadly license or independence.

² Concerning Liberalism, cf. Pius IX, const. Quanta Cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Syllabus; Leo XIII, const. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885, and enc. Libertas, 20 June 1888; Moulart, L'Eglise et l'Etat; Daris, L'Eglise et l'Etat; Villada, Casus Conscientiae; Aertnijs, Th. P., nn. 94-101; Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, n. 246 sq.; Ballerini, Opus Morale, II, tr. 4, n. 164 sq.; Theologia Mechliniensis, de Fide, nn. 44-46. Certain things are also found in Genicot, Th. M., I, n. 205, and in Lehmkuhl and Ferreres, in their respective work: Casus Conscientiae.

A. One kind is doctrinal or philosophical liberalism, which applies in the moral and civil matter the principles of rationalism or even naturalism, which place the principate of human reason, private or public, individual or universal, as the highest principle and judge of truth.

And indeed in such a way that it denies every divine power and law and follows a morality fully independent; or at least denies every revelation and positive and supernatural divine law, but admits a merely natural morality. This is not treated here, because it pertains to those who are not faithful and therefore do not confess.

B. Another kind is merely economic, which denies divine and moral law in economic matters and in the production of riches.

This is not considered in the present matter, because it is opposed more to justice than to faith and religion or to the first precept of the Decalogue.

C. Another kind is merely political, which admits divine law, even supernatural law, for private persons, but not for civil society and its laws; hence it defends liberty of conscience, of cults, of the press, of doctrine, and of association.

Namely, it proclaims the separation of the State and the Catholic Church, and the State's indifference concerning various religious confessions. But by the name of separation from the Church, they understand and signify an absolute divorce between the two powers, all mutual concord and all mutual help being taken away, so that the Church, despoiled of every influence, of all goods, and of all external prerogatives, lives in hiding, while the State governs all things as if the Church did not exist. Hence it professes the separation of marriage from the Church, and its subjection under the civil power; the separation of the school from the Church and its subordination under the direction of civil authority; the abrogation of the immunity of clerics from the burden of undergoing and exercising military service, etc. In one word: it is a political system which professes the full independence of the State from the Church or from religion.³

³ Cf. encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas, 20 June 1888.

In this form of liberalism a threefold grade can be distinguished:

1. Radical liberalism, which so exaggerates this independence that it wishes the Church to be subject to the State. Its watchword is: the Church in the State, that is, the Church subject to the State.

2. Moderate liberalism, which professes the simple separation of the State from the Church and from every religion, using this formula: a free Church in a free State.

3. So-called Catholic liberalism, which professes that from the nature of the thing religion is not to be separated from civil society, but that each power ought to govern the human race by a concordant effort; yet in the general hypothesis of the present age, attention being paid to progress and the condition of men, that it is no longer expedient to desire and defend that conjunction, but that simple separation is to be approved and sought, together with the modern liberties flowing from it, especially those of cults and of the press. Let the words be noted well: in the general hypothesis, to be sought, to be approved; because it is not liberal but truly Catholic to profess that in special circumstances these liberties are to be tolerated in order to avoid greater evils or to obtain greater goods.

Now the errors of liberalism in every grade have been condemned by the authority of the Church;⁴ hence those who knowingly profess such errors sin gravely.

⁴ Cf. the encyclical of Pius IX, Quanta Cura, and the Syllabus; likewise the encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas.

The word liberal is of itself equivocal; hence if in certain regions it is taken in an entirely different sense, or designates a merely political party which in no way defends condemned principles, those things which we have said would not hold concerning such liberalism. Nor do we intend to speak of it, but we speak in the theologically received sense.

IV. Whether there is invincible ignorance of liberalism. - The answer is:

1. As regards the radical form of liberalism, ordinarily this must be denied, because its errors are so open, and so opposed to the fundamental principles of morality, that even the more unlearned cannot fail to recognize its falsity and impiety.

2. As regards the other milder forms, if the unlearned are excepted, most who call themselves liberals are not in good faith, and therefore are to be treated as such by the confessor.

The reason is that the documents of the Holy See condemning Liberalism are publicly known, and have been so propagated that invincible ignorance among most people seems morally impossible: this holds especially and generally concerning those who by reason of office are bound to know the falsity and condemnation of liberalism, such as kings, ministers and counselors of the kingdom, senators, deputies, prefects of provinces and cities, judges, advocates, and similar officials who have a part in making laws or putting them into execution; and also editors of political newspapers.

3. Nevertheless, more unlearned persons and, exceptionally, certain educated persons are found who profess milder Liberalism in good faith.

This happens both because, having been preoccupied by the doctrine of their parents, teachers, and companions, they judge liberalism of this kind harmless, and because they do not know how to distinguish between thesis and hypothesis, and confuse the liberty of evil which is owed by right with the toleration of evil which is done for the sake of avoiding a greater evil or increasing or preserving good.

V. Is the confessor bound to question penitents concerning the sin of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, as concerning other sins. And indeed, if liberals everywhere are admitted to the sacraments without question or admonition, and confessors in the sacred tribunal keep deep silence concerning this matter, the faithful will think the matter is not of great importance and will not sufficiently perceive the depravity of liberalism. Hence, although the matter, as we have noted, has become less practical because of circumstances, nevertheless it is not to be consigned wholly to oblivion: otherwise concerning the evil doctrine and dangers of Liberalism the same will happen as concerning bad readings, which are no longer sufficiently held as evil, because priests have omitted sufficiently to admonish concerning their depravity. Therefore:

1. A penitent is to be questioned, whoever he may be, whether unlearned or learned, whether poor or prince, who is silent about the sin of liberalism of which he is certainly known to be guilty, for example from the confessor's own knowledge or from public knowledge. And if, when questioned, the penitent denies it and appears formally to lie, he can in no way be absolved.

2. Likewise he is to be questioned who is probably thought to be a liberal or a favorer of liberalism, for example if he is held as such by many grave men, or if he belongs to a liberal assembly or party which is opposed to religion or the Church, or if ordinarily he reads truly liberal newspapers without just cause. If a penitent of this kind seriously denies that he is a liberal, ordinarily he is to be believed: unless, because of special circumstances, a grave doubt remains, in which case the principles are to be applied which govern those doubtfully disposed, and he is to be absolved only under condition if a grave cause is present, or absolution is to be deferred if this is not feared to be harmful to the penitent.

3. Nevertheless not all penitents are to be questioned: for a mere suspicion of sin does not suffice, even from rumors of the crowd or from a reputation arising from no certain source, but true and solid probability, or a prudent and grave doubt, is required.

As to the manner of questioning, let the confessor proceed cautiously, beginning by asking generally, for example whether he feels any troublesome temptations against faith or against declarations of the Supreme Pontiffs or bishops or the doctrine of the Church; if the penitent denies this, let him ask further, for example, thus: do you not have relations with enemies of the Church, or sympathy for those who attack her? do you not frequent adversaries of the Church? are you therefore not a follower of liberalism?... From the response it will be clear what sort he is; then, if there is need, let him ask whether he reads liberal newspapers, frequents or supports an assembly of liberals; likewise concerning speaking against the doctrine, ministers, and precepts of the Church and concerning transgression of these.

VI. Must the confessor admonish penitents who seem to be in good faith concerning the malice of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, of itself, that is, unless at some time greater harm would follow from the admonition. Given opportunity, he is bound to admonish them, especially if the penitents are persons who, because of office, learning, or honor, exercise great influence upon others. The reason is both because they are rarely in invincible ignorance, and because the errors of liberalism are very harmful to the liberals themselves as to faith, to their family for the education of children, and to the common good because of public scandal and the depraved influence which they exercise upon others.⁵

⁵ Nor ought it create business for the confessor that such penitents will be deterred from the sacraments in the future; for by admonition precisely this is intended, that either they abstain from the sacraments, by the reception of which they provide scandal to the faithful, or they abandon the sin of liberalism now known to them.

But if, after the admonition has been made, someone refuses to obey and pertinaciously adheres to Liberalism, he is unworthy of absolution, and to grant it would be a great scandal for him and for other faithful.

Unbelief in general is the absence of faith³⁸. And it is either negative, privative, or contrary. Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard nothing of the faith, or has not heard sufficiently. Privative unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard sufficiently of the faith and does not will to assent to it, without however asserting the contrary. Contrary unbelief is the absence of faith in one who, though sufficiently instructed concerning the faith, not only refuses to embrace it, but even asserts the contrary and maintains a positive error against the faith. ³⁸ Hic q. 10, a. 1, o.

You will ask 1° whether unbelief is a sin.

I answer. 1°. Merely negative unbelief is not a sin, but a punishment of sin³⁹. ³⁹ Ibid.

Proof. 1° Christ, Ioann., XV, 22, says of the Jews: If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. Expounding this, Aug., Tract. LXXXIX in Ioann., says that Christ speaks of the sin by which they did not believe in Christ. But Christ spoke to negative unbelievers neither by himself nor through his ministers, at least not sufficiently. 2° No one sins by omitting what he cannot do.

How shall they believe in him whom they have not heard? It is just as if he had said: « They cannot believe. » 3° This proposition, the 68th among those of Baius: « Purely negative unbelief, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin, » was condemned by St Pius V, October 1, 1567, by Gregory XIII, January 29, 1579, and by Urban VIII, March 6, 1641.

I answer. 2°. Privative and contrary unbelief is a sin⁴⁰. ⁴⁰ Ibid.

1° Because no one is condemned except on account of sin. But he who will not have believed shall be condemned, Marc., XVI, 16. 2° Because faith is the necessary medium unto salvation. Therefore he to whom it is sufficiently proposed is bound to accept it.

You will ask 2° whether all the works of unbelievers are sins.

I answer. Negatively⁴¹. We weighed this question expressly in the treatise on Grace, dissertation III, § 1. Look for it there. ⁴¹ Ibid., a. 4, o.

You will ask 3° how many species of unbelief there are.

I answer. That three are commonly assigned, namely paganism, Judaism, and heresy⁴². For the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith. But one can resist the faith in three ways. For either one resists the faith which he has not yet professed himself to receive as true, and this is the unbelief of the pagans, who are so called from the pagi into which, expelled from the cities by command of the Christian emperors, they withdrew to worship their idols: before that time they were called gentiles. Or one resists the faith which he professed in figure, and this is the unbelief of the Jews. Or finally one resists the faith which he professed in the manifestation of the truth, and this is the unbelief of heretics. ⁴² Ibid., a. 5, o.

I said: « Which he has professed himself to receive; » because for Judaism or heresy there seems not to be required that one have truly received the faith in figure or in manifested truth, but it suffices if he have outwardly professed himself to receive it. Hence unbaptized infants of heretics, who therefore never received the faith, are called heretics because in estimation they profess together with their parents the faith of Christ.

To paganism belong atheists, deists, and Mohammedans; because they have never professed themselves to receive the faith of Christ, whether in figure or in truth. For although the Mohammedans acknowledge Christ as a prophet, they do not acknowledge him as God.

Apostasy seems not to be distinguished from heresy except according to more and less; for the apostate abandons the whole faith which he professed, the heretic only a part: understand this objectively. Similarly other forms of unbelief can be reduced to one of the aforementioned.

[You will ask 4° whether unbelievers are to be compelled to the faith.

I answer. Those who have never received the faith, whether they be subject to Christian princes or not, are by no means to be compelled to embrace the faith; they can, however, be compelled not to impede the faith and the preaching of the faith by blasphemies, wicked persuasions, or open proclamations.

The first part is clear; because the Church has no jurisdiction over those who have not received the faith, according to that saying, I Cor., V, 12: What have I to do to judge those who are without? And the Council of Trent, session XIV, chapter 5, declares that « the Church exercises judgment upon no one who has not first entered her through the door of baptism. » Christian princes likewise have no jurisdiction over foreigners, but over subjects they have jurisdiction by which they govern them politically; this jurisdiction nevertheless does not include the right of compelling them to the faith. And although they can compel subjects to abandon idolatry, which is against the natural law, of which every prince is the guardian, their power nevertheless does not extend to the law of faith, which is of the supernatural order.

This conclusion is confirmed by the decisive words of Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885: « If, he says, the Church judges it unlawful that the various kinds of divine worship hold the same right as the true religion, she does not on that account condemn those moderators of commonwealths who, for the sake of obtaining some great good or preventing some great evil, patiently bear by custom and usage that each of these things hold a place in the state. — The Church likewise greatly takes care that no one be compelled to embrace the Catholic faith against his will; because, as Augustine wisely admonishes, Tract. XXVI in Ioann., n. 2, man cannot believe unless he is willing. »

The second part is also clear. For the Church has from Christ the command, and consequently the right, of preaching the Gospel in the whole world, Matth., XXVIII, 19. If therefore barbarians impede this preaching, Christian princes can, and at times must, wage war against them and subdue rebels, that they may guard the violated rights of the Church and defend the innocent, both those who have the right of preaching and those who have the right of hearing.]

What is heresy, and how manyfold?

Heresy is a Greek word importing choice, because the heretic by his own judgment chooses to believe what he wills.

I say 1°: Heresy is « a pertinacious error manifestly contrary to the faith, in one who has professed the faith of Christ in truth. »

It is called error, that is, a positive assent to the false, or dissent from the true.

It is called manifestly contrary to the faith, because if anyone held something contrary to the faith about which it were not certain and manifest that it was contrary to it, he would not be a heretic, at least a formal one. That, moreover, is certainly and manifestly of the faith which is manifestly and certainly revealed by God, whether privately, or in Scripture, or in the definitions of the Church, and which all Catholics hold as of faith.

It is called pertinacious error. Pertinacity is an obstinate adhesion to one's own opinion against the faith sufficiently manifested: for this neither length of time is required, nor that one be canonically admonished several times; but voluntary dissent from the faith sufficiently proposed by the Church suffices, which can occur in an instant.

That such pertinacity is required for heresy is clear partly from the very name; for it is, as we said, a choice: partly because, just as for faith there is required the pious motion of the will inclining the intellect to assent with certainty to truth obscurely revealed, so for heresy, which is opposed to faith, there is required the perverse affection of the will to dissent pertinaciously from the truth proposed by the Church: partly from the law, cap. Dixit, cap. Qui in Ecclesia, cause 24, q. 3, and Clement. Ex gravi, book V, title 5, on usuries, where those only are acknowledged as heretics who have been pertinacious in denying some article of faith. Hence that saying of Augustine: « I may err, but I shall not be a heretic, » namely through want of pertinacity. The same St Thomas, q. 8 de Malo and on chapter 11 of I Cor., lecture 4. Hence you will infer that one who through ignorance, even culpable, crass, and supine, yet not affected, withstands the faith, being ready to assent if instructed, is not a formal heretic; for although he sins mortally against the affirmative precept of the faith by voluntarily ignoring what he ought to know, he would not nevertheless be pertinacious. Nay, he would not even sin, if his ignorance were involuntary and inculpable, as happens among uneducated Catholics, or those neglected through the carelessness of parents and pastors, and even among those brought up among heretics, who have never heard anything of the Catholic faith except mockeries and blasphemies against it, nor are they beset by any doubt in this matter; so that, if they hold what must be believed under necessity of means, and are disposed in mind to believe the rest if duly proposed, they do not seem to be outside the way of salvation. Nor does it stand in the way that outside the Church no one is saved; for these, by reason of baptism, likewise of the faith which they have, and of their interior disposition to believe the rest, can be said to be in the Church.

Nor does it stand in the way that for other sins voluntariness in the cause suffices: thus one who kills a man through culpable ignorance is truly a homicide. For the disparity is that other sins are not said to arise from election, as heresy is, for which the common voluntariness, whereby every sin must be voluntary, does not suffice, but there is required a special and pertinacious voluntariness opposed to the faith.

You will ask whether one doubting in the faith is a heretic.

It seems that he is not; because the doubter has no error in the intellect, since he neither assents nor dissents; for doubt is a suspension between assent and dissent.

Before the resolution, a twofold doubt must be distinguished: one negative, the other positive. Negative, which some call in actu exercito, is when someone, having apprehended both opposite sides, whether this be true or false, assenting to neither, remains suspended without any positive act. Positive, which others call in actu signato, is when someone likewise, having apprehended both opposite sides, assenting to neither, judges by a positive act that the thing is doubtful and uncertain.

I answer. 1°. Whoever deliberately doubts with a positive doubt concerning some article of the faith sufficiently proposed by the Church, v. g., whoever judges it doubtful whether there is a Purgatory, whether Christ is in the Eucharist, while knowing that it is so handed down and believed by the whole Church, is formally a heretic; because, although he does not deny the truth about which he doubts, he nevertheless judges positively that it, and the infallibility of the Church, are not certain: and thus he has a positive and pertinacious error in the intellect, if not explicitly against the truth of faith about which he doubts, at least against the firmness and certitude of the Church's infallibility, which is of the essence of the faith. By which the argument set down at the beginning is answered. And of one so doubting is verified what is said in the law: « Doubting in the faith, he is an unbeliever, » and he incurs the excommunication reserved to the Pope, no otherwise than other heretics.

I answer. 2°. Whoever doubts with a merely negative doubt about some article of the faith sufficiently proposed by the Church, that is, precisely suspends judgment without any positive act, because, v. g., he wishes now to attend to other things, or does not wish at the moment to fatigue his head in a matter so great, or wishes to inquire more fitly and agreeably into the motives for assenting, or on account of like motives, is not formally a heretic; because, since he has no judgment, for he suspends it, he has no positive error in the intellect. Nor does he seem to sin of itself, at least mortally, setting aside the danger of consenting to a positive doubt, unless the affirmative precept of the faith then press.

If, however, such suspension of judgment proceeded from a motion of the will on account of difficulties propounded by the intellect, which nevertheless does not judge, as though terrified by them and beguiled about the truth: some hold, not improbably, that the malice of heresy is included therein, so that the suspension ensuing upon that evil motion of the will is a kind of virtual and implicit judgment concerning the uncertainty of the object of faith. Moreover, the matter is exceedingly perilous, and there is no doubt that voluntary negative doubt can easily pass into positive, or arise from it.

[That every doubt concerning things that are of the faith is grave sin the Vatican Synod defined by the following canon: « If anyone shall say that the condition of the faithful and of those who have not yet attained to the one only true faith is equal, so that Catholics may have a just cause for calling into doubt, with suspended assent, the faith which they have already received under the magisterium of the Church, until they shall have completed a scientific demonstration of the credibility and truth of their faith: let him be anathema. »]

I say 2°: Heresy is divided 1° into material and formal. Formal is that which we defined and have explained hitherto. Material is the error of a baptized man against the truth of the faith arising from ignorance, and without pertinacity. This is clear from what has been said.

2° Heresy is divided into internal only, external only, and internal and external together. Internal only is the voluntary error against the faith abiding in the mind alone and manifested by no exterior sign. External only is when one denies by mouth or by deed the faith retained in the heart. Internal and external together, which is complete heresy, is that which, conceived in the mind, is outwardly manifested by word or sign, even if no one be present; provided only the sign be such that, if anyone were present, he would straightway understand that an article of the faith is denied, of which more presently.

3° External heresy is divided into occult and manifest. Occult is that which becomes known to none or to few; manifest, that which is known to many.

§ II. On the punishments of heretics.

The punishments of heretics are of twofold genus. Some are spiritual, as excommunication, irregularity, deprivation of every benefice, jurisdiction, and ecclesiastical dignity, likewise of ecclesiastical burial. Others are corporal, as confiscation of all goods, exemption of subjects from the oath of fidelity, infamy, and capital punishment. The temporal punishments belong to the secular forum. Wherefore, omitting these, we shall speak only of the spiritual ones.

I say 1°: Neither the material heretic, nor the merely internal, nor the merely external heretic incurs the excommunication and the other spiritual punishments of heretics.

Infidelity, taken generally, is lack of faith, and a threefold kind is distinguished, namely: 1st. positive or formal, which is lack of faith in him to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it; 2nd. negative or material, which is lack of faith in him who has never heard anything concerning the true religion, or indeed has heard, yet not sufficiently; 3rd. privative, which is lack of faith in him who, when the occasion has been given, neglects to obtain for himself knowledge of faith.

I Say. As infidelity both positive and privative is a most grave sin, so negative infidelity is no sin, but only the penalty of sin. The reason for the first is that in positive infidelity there is had explicitly, and in privative infidelity virtually, contempt of the first truth and of the authority of God revealing. But the reason for the second is both because no sin can exist where invincible ignorance is had, and because the following proposition, which is the 68th of Baius, "Purely negative infidelity in those among whom Christ has not been preached is a sin," was condemned by St. Pius V and Gregory XIII.

Heresy is error against some truth of faith proposed by the Church, in one who received the faith through baptism. But it is: 1st. formal, which is heresy properly so called, and is had when the error is voluntary and pertinacious, or material, by which someone ignorantly adheres to error; 2nd. purely internal, or purely external, or manifested, according as it is had only internally or externally, or in both ways; 3rd. occult or notorious, according as it is known to no one or to only a few, or to many.

To heresy is referred apostasy, which is total defection from the Christian faith.

I Say. Formal heresy is always a most grave sin, but material heresy is free from every fault. The reason for the first is both because heresy is opposed to one of the chief virtues, namely faith, and because heresy tends directly and immediately to contemning God. The reason for the second is that a material heretic, as is supposed, errs from invincible ignorance.

Question. What are the signs of material and formal heresy?

Response. He is to be judged a material heretic only: 1st. who is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church as soon as he shall have known it; 2nd. who, born among heretics, has known nothing concerning the true faith and has never doubted concerning his own religion; 3rd. who, doubting, has studied to know the truth as much as he could, and has not yet arrived at it. - But he will be reputed a formal heretic: 1st. who doubts, and from pertinacity does not wish to inquire further; 2nd. who again from pertinacity maliciously turns his intellect away from the motives of truth, so that he may adhere to his own sect; 3rd. who, having acknowledged the truth, still contradicts the Church.

Canon 1325, § 2, most clearly indicates who is and is to be judged a heretic, who an apostate, who a schismatic:

§ 2. After baptism has been received, if anyone, while retaining the Christian name, pertinaciously denies some truth from among those to be believed by divine and Catholic faith, or doubts concerning it, he is a heretic; if he totally withdraws from the Christian faith, he is an apostate; finally, if he refuses to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff or refuses to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him, he is a schismatic (Can. 1325).

Those who submit themselves to Christian Science for being healed sin gravely, because they formally participate in that damnable superstition, whose characteristic and special act is to heal. As is evident, he would deny the faith who gave his name to such a superstition.¹

It is not enough to avoid heretical depravity, but it is also necessary diligently to flee those errors which approach it more or less; wherefore all must also observe the constitutions and decrees by which evil opinions of this kind have been proscribed and prohibited by the Holy See (Can. 1324).

On the Care of Non-Catholics:

§ 1. Let local Ordinaries and pastors hold as commended to themselves in the Lord the non-Catholics dwelling in their dioceses and parishes.

§ 2. In other territories the whole care of missions among non-Catholics is reserved solely to the Apostolic See (Can. 1350).

Let no one be compelled unwillingly to embrace the Catholic faith (Can. 1351).

With relation to discussions, especially public ones, can. 1325, § 3 establishes thus:

§ 3. Let Catholics beware lest they have disputations or conferences, especially public ones, with non-Catholics, without permission of the Holy See or, if the case presses, of the local Ordinary.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1094, n. 28.

1°. Apostasy from the faith is total defection from the Christian faith; heresy is the voluntary error of some Christian against some truth of faith; schism is voluntary withdrawal from the unity of the Church and from obedience to the Head, the Roman Pontiff.

I.

1. An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity.

2. Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept and of itself.

3. It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in a lifetime.

4. If one be interrogated by the public Power, I counsel him to confess the faith openly, as glorious to God and to the faith; to keep silence I do not condemn as of itself sinful.

5. The will cannot make the assent of faith in itself more firm than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves.

6. Hence one can prudently repudiate the supernatural assent which he has.

7. The assent of supernatural faith, useful to salvation, stands with a merely probable knowledge of revelation; nay, with a fear whereby one fears lest God has not spoken.

8. Only faith in one God seems necessary with the necessity of means, but not explicit faith in God as rewarder.

9. Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive, suffices for justification.

10. A man is capable of absolution, however much he labor under ignorance of the mysteries of the faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he know not the mystery of the most Holy Trinity and of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

11. It suffices to have believed those mysteries once.

12. Two other propositions in this matter the Gallican Clergy proscribed in the year 1730. The first is this: The Christian religion is evidently credible: for it is evident that whoever embraces it is prudent; but it is not evidently true, for either it teaches obscurely, or the things it teaches are obscure. Nay, those who say the Christian religion is evidently true must needs confess that it is evidently false. Infer hence that it is not evident: 1. That there now exists on earth any true Religion — for whence have you it that not all flesh has corrupted its way? 2. That, of all the religions on earth, the Christian is the most verisimilar — for have you traversed all lands, or do you know them to have been traversed by others? 3. That the Divinity of Christ was manifested by the Apostles and by the demons — for if you teach this, you must teach that Christ is manifestly God. 4. That the oracles of the Prophets were poured forth by the breathing of God — for what would you oppose to me, whether I deny that those were true vaticinations, or affirm them conjectures? 5. That the miracles recorded as wrought by Christ were true — although no one can prudently deny these.

The censure which the Gallican Clergy pronounced upon the aforesaid proposition is this: The doctrine contained in this proposition is impious, blasphemous, erroneous, and favors the enemies of the Christian religion.

13. The other is this: It is not evident, with moral evidence properly so called, and physical evidence, that the Christian Religion is true.

Censure: This proposition, containing doctrine consonant with the preceding proposition, is temerarious, and leads into error.

14. Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin. It was condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII.

15. Nothing is to be believed which exceeds the power of our intellect. The Council of Rheims condemned this proposition of Peter Abelard in the year 1148.

16. When in great sinners all love is wanting, faith also is wanting; and even if they seem to believe, it is not divine faith, but human. Similar is proposition 51 of Paschasius Quesnel.

Among the unfaithful there are some who never received the faith, and these are the pagans: Others are those who rejected the faith once received, and these are heretics: Others, finally, who long worshiped the faith of the Savior under figures, but did not acknowledge it when it was manifested, and these are the Jews: Here we are to treat of unfaithfulness in general for the absence of faith, and when something is to be touched upon concerning the unbaptized unfaithful: in the following disputation, however, we shall discourse on heresy.

It is TO BE NOTED, from St. Bonaventura on those words Lucas 19. Non relinquent in te lapidem super lapidem: eo quod non cognoveris tempus visitationis tuae — There shall not be left in thee a stone upon a stone: because thou hast not known the time of thy visitation — that Infidelity is the ruin of the spiritual edifice; just as faith, on the contrary, is the foundation of that edifice. But this is Infidelity, not that which is opposed to Fidelity, which is a moral virtue inclining toward faith, or a promise to be kept, of which Eccles. 5. Displicet Deo infidelis promissio — An unfaithful promise displeaseth God — as the holy Doctor warns on that passage; but it is the infidelity that is opposed to the Theological virtue, as I said, disp. 1. quaest. 1., with St. Bonau. That Infidelity is a sin, I showed in disput. 1. quaest. 14. and the following, where the obligation to believe the articles of faith, and other matters, were treated of; and therefore it can be sinned against by grave omission, in not learning the things of faith that have been sufficiently proposed.

But Infidelity can be sinned against in TWO WAYS: either positively, by attacking and refusing the truth of faith once acknowledged, and this is called infidelity of contrariety; Or privatively, by lacking the due knowledge. Some add another negative lack, which is through invincible ignorance, but this the majority do not admit, with St. Bonavent. 3. dist. 21. art. 1. quaest. 3., of which I treated in Prima secundae, tract. de peccato, disp. 1. quaest 1.

Infidelity is DIVIDED, moreover, into Heresy, Judaism, and Paganism, by St. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 5. and St. Bonau. p. 1. Gentil. sect. 26. There the holy Doctor proves that infidelity is the greatest sin among sins, viz. Ioan. 16. Arguet mundum de peccato, etc. quia non crediderunt in me — He will argue the world of sin, etc. because they believed not in me. He calls this Sin antonomastically. And Ioan. 3. Qui non credit, iam iudicatus est: quia non credidit in nomine Unigeniti filii Dei — He that doth not believe is already judged: because he hath not believed in the name of the Only-begotten Son of God. And of Mark, at the end: Qui vero non crediderit, condemnabitur — But he that believeth not shall be condemned — as if the supreme punishment were prepared for the unfaithful. I said, with St. Bonau., that infidelity is the greatest sin among sins, because no one on the way hates God expressly, but only interpretatively, as St. Bonau. teaches on those words Ioan. 15. Et oderunt me, et Patrem meum — And they hated me, and my Father. Interpretatively indeed they hate, insofar as they are turned away from Him through sins, or would not be punished; but formal hatred is the proper possession of the damned.

St. THOMAS compares infidelity with the hatred of God, and says that this is worse, because it is opposed to Charity, which is greater, 1 Corinth. 13. But that Infidelity is greater, he says, than Despair, as I shall say in disp. 6. quaest. un., although the latter is more perilous. See also Tannerus T. 1. quaest. 8. dub. 1.

Furthermore, the holy Doctor places infidelity in the intellect, in 3. dist. 5. quaest. 5. ad 4.; for it is opposed to faith, which is in the intellect and the will, or in free choice, as I said, disp. 1. quaest. 18. Of this treat Suarez disp. 16. sect. 3., Hurtado disp. 67., Lugo disp. 18. sect. 1. They ask especially: whether the sin of infidelity is always consummated in the intellect; whether sometimes in the Will alone.

Suarez loc. cit., Coninch. disp. 18. dub. 3., Tannerus 2. 2. disp. 1. quaest. 8. dubio secundo, Fuliens. lib. 3. cap 6. DENY it.

Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 10. p. 1., Hurtado disp. 68. sect. 2. ASSERT it, which opinion, understood Metaphysically, pleases Lugo, num. 9, although, speaking commonly, he adheres to the former. Fuliens., however, says that the objective malice is in the intellect, which fails from faith; but the formal [malice] in the will, from which the perverse act of the intellect freely goes forth.

It is certain that such infidel Princes, or even private persons, are capable of dominion. And indeed to have dominion over goods is defined by Paulus III. in a certain Bull cited by Coninch. disput. 1. dub. 10. num. 160. Of dominion also over persons as over slaves, it is certain that it can be with them if they hold slaves by a just title, say a just war, etc.

From many Scriptures S. Doct. shows that jurisdiction can be in infidels over the faithful. First from 1. a Petri 2. Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum: sive Regi, tanquam praecellenti. Be subject to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the King, as preeminent.

Next by that of Rom. 13. Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Et infra: Non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. And below: Not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience. Finally from the other epistles of Paul S. Doctor gathers the same.

Thirdly from that of Matth. 22. Reddite ergo, quae sunt Caesaris, Caesari. Render therefore to Caesar what is Caesar's. The Apostles inculcated this precept to refute the calumny, as if our faith denied obedience to Princes. Whence Paul ad Titum 3: Admone illos, ut Principibus obediant. Admonish them, that they obey Princes. The same precept the PP. enjoined: Clemens P. lib. 4. constitut. cap. 12. et lib. 7. cap. 17. Tertullianus lib. ad scapulam, cap. 2. Polycarpus cited by Euseb. lib. 4. hist. cap. 14. Basil. in Moral. reg. 79. Hieron. epist. 4. Chrysostomus homil. 23. in epist. ad Rom. Origenes lib. 9. in eandem epist. Oecumenius, Nazianzenus, Epiphan. and others, whom Suarez relates de defensione fidei, lib. 3. cap. 1.

It is proved fourthly by S. Doct. by the reason of the Apostle. Omnis potestas est a Deo, atque ordinata; et qui ei resistit, Deo resistit, et damnationem incurrit: All power is from God and ordained; and he who resists it resists God and incurs damnation: but by the law of nature many are given having power of jurisdiction, by a just title, whether by war, or custom, or prescription, or translation of dominion, whether into a true person, as is a King; or a fictitious one, such as a Republic. Nor indeed is it once acquired lost on account of the infidelity of the Prince, or through the faith of subjects; for an infidel can well rule the faithful people of God, even with just laws.

It is confirmed by D. Bonav. because to serve is not an evil, but meritorious: Therefore by Baptism we are not absolved from that servitude.

Of dominion therefore even real over faithful slaves it is proved by S. Doct. from that of Ephes. 6. Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore, et tremore, in simplicitate cordis vestri, sicut Christo: non ad oculum servientes, quasi hominibus placentes, sed ut servi Christi, facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo, cum bona voluntate servientes, sicut Domino, et non hominibus: Servants, obey your carnal masters with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ: not serving to the eye, as pleasing men, but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, serving with good will, as to the Lord, and not to men: The same he repeats ad Coloss. 3. ad Titum 2. But then all the princes were, nay, almost all even private masters, infidels. But Peter speaks of the slaves of infidel masters epist. 1. cap. 2. in those words: Servi subditi estote in omni timore dominis, non tantum bonis, et modestis, sed etiam discolis, Servants, be subject in all fear to your masters, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward: as S. Bonaventura observes, and Lugo num. 133. S. Bonav. renders the reason of this fundamento 4. with D. August. in Psalm. 124. because Christ did not make free men of slaves, but of bad slaves, good slaves, which S. August. also confirms conc. 31. in Psal. 118. and the author of the qq. novi, et veteris testamenti, under the name of August: quaest. 15. and in the Council of Gangra can. 3. it is related cap. si quis servum 17. quaest. 14. that anathema is inflicted on him who, under pretext of religion, urged a slave to flee. It was however celebrated in the time of Pope Sylvester, in which Gentile masters had many Christian slaves.

The authors of the contrary opinion object first, from that of 1 Cor. 7. Nolite fieri servi hominum, pretio empti estis. Do not become the slaves of men; you were bought with a price.

Some answer with Suarez, that Paul is not there speaking of civil, or penal servitude: for of this he had said a little before: Servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae. Were you called a slave? let it not be a care to you. And he concludes: Unusquisque in quo vocatus est fratres, in this let each remain with God. He speaks therefore of vitious servitude, by which one, in order to serve another, offends God: Nemo enim potest duobus dominis servire. For no one can serve two masters.

Cornelius there, Lugo n. 136. and others affirm that the exposition of D. Bonau. in the body of the text is BETTER, that those words are to be understood of civil servitude also, namely, that those compelled indeed into servitude ought patiently to bear it; yet if they are not compelled, and can be free, they ought not to reduce themselves into the servitude of infidels, for thus they will be able more promptly, more readily, and more freely to attend to religion, and the preceding words intimate this, as S. Doct. relates Servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae: sed et si potes fieri liber, magis utere, that is, if it is in your power not to be a slave, use it: but if you have been compelled, bear it patiently.

Yet it SEEMS that by fundamento 4. he does not reject the exposition of others on these words, namely, that even if one could go out from servitude, it is meritorious to remain in it; and therefore on this occasion it is to be used for the merit of humility. Indeed S. Doct. shows that they can sell themselves, 4. dist. 36. dub. 3. Simply however, that servants ought to obey their Princes, and Masters, the Apostle enjoins also 1 Timot. VI. Quicumque sunt sub iugo servitutis, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen Domini, et doctrina blasphemetur. Si quis aliter docet, et non acquiescit sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Iesu Christi: superbus est, et nihil sciens. Whoever are under the yoke of servitude, let them judge their masters worthy of all honor, lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed. If anyone teaches otherwise, and does not assent to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ: he is proud, and knowing nothing. And he proves this earnestly ad Rom. 13.

They OBJECT secondly, that the Evangelical Law carries liberty with it: For therefore, when Matth. 17. the tribute was demanded from the Apostles, the Lord asked Peter: Reges terrae a quibus accipiunt tributum, vel censum? a filiis suis, an ab alienis? The Kings of the earth, from whom do they receive tribute, or custom? from their own sons, or from strangers? Christ concluded: Ergo liberi sunt filii. Therefore the sons are free. In which place, under the name of sons, he seems to have understood all the faithful, as Lyra and Hieronymus indicate.

Suarez relates the VARIOUS expositions of that passage, lib. 1. cit. cap. 4. and lib. 4. cap. 5. and cap. 8.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that Christ ascribes this immunity to himself, as being the son of God by nature. Therefore from this passage the Fathers prove the natural filiation of God, because by it he declares himself not to be subject to the paying of tribute. So Chrysost. and Hilar. cited by Suarez cap. 5. num. 5. But they say he could have extended this exemption to his family, the Apostles, and others, who left all things and followed him, and Hieronymus speaks in this sense: but he communicated it especially to Peter, and his successors, as those words signified: Ut autem non scandalizemuseos, solve pro me, et te, But that we may not scandalize them, pay for me and you; for with the scandal removed, Peter could have not paid, the immunity having been communicated to him by Christ, as Lugo notes n. 138. with D. Bonau. prima parte Centil. sect. 31. Tannerus subscribes disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2. num. 44.

They OBJECT thirdly from the first of Iacobi: Qui autem perspexerit in lege perfecta libertatis, But he that has looked into the perfect law of liberty, where the Gloss: Lex libertatis est lex Evangelica. The law of liberty is the Evangelical law.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that the Evangelical Law makes us free from the servitude of sin, and the servitude of the old law, as is said Rom. 8. Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed accepistis Spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus: Abba, (Pater.) You have not received again the spirit of servitude in fear, but you have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, (Father.)

They OBJECT fourthly. The law of charity, composing all into one, makes all things common; whence 1 Cor. 3. Omnia vestra sunt, sive mors, sive vita. All things are yours, whether death, or life. And ad Ephes. et Coloss. Omnes sumus in Christo, etc. We are all in Christ, etc.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that charity makes us one by a certain communication of graces, and affections; but not of temporal dominion; otherwise it would be forbidden that even some Christians be unequal, say one a King: another a prisoner in the Ergastulum.

They OBJECT fifthly. The bond of the Divine law is greater than that of the human; but the Evangelical law absolves from the obligation of the old divine law: Therefore.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that it is not alike; for the new Law evacuates the old law, as truth the figure; but it is not thus with human Law, which aids the Divine to be observed: Whence the Apostle 1. Timot. 2. commands that prayer be made for Princes, that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life under them.

They OBJECT sixthly. Christ willed to redeem us by himself, that he might restore us to our pristine liberty, and that man might be subject to himself, as S. Anselmus says Lib. Cur Deus homo, cap. 5. since therefore we have been bought with the great price of the blood of Christ the Lord; we are his alone: Therefore it seems that a Christian, who has been reborn in Christ, is not bound to any servitude.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that we do not attain the liberty bought for us by Christ, unless translated into glory. Whence here liberty is begun from guilt; but there it is consummated, liberty from misery, and from every human power; Whence it does not follow that, if we are bought by Christ, we are not the servants of any man: The dominion indeed of the devil, or of sin, is excluded, according to that Matth. 6. Non potestis Deo servire, et Mammonae. You cannot serve God and Mammon.

But there is still a controversy: whether the Church can deprive infidel Princes of the temporal dominion which they exercise over the faithful.

INDIRECTLY indeed the Church has this power, by the right of defense, and the right of governance, because the Church can rule her faithful everywhere. So D. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 1. and Bannes, Aragon there, Valentia quaest. 10. p. 8. and Tanner. says it probable disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2. num. 53.

COMMONLY however the Doctors hold that the Church does not have this indirect power over infidel Princes, precisely as they are infidels, unless it redound to the prejudice of the faith. So Bellarm. Tom. 1. lib. 5. de Romano Pontifice, cap. 7. Lorca, Caietanus, and others cited by Hurtadum disp. 77. sect. 2. Coninch. disp. 18. dub. 10. num. 160. Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 1. Castro Palao T. 1. tract. 4. disp. 2. p. 8. num. 6. who adduces others; and Tannerus judges it probable in the place cited.

There is REQUIRED therefore, that the Church be compelled by a persecuting infidel Prince, or that a moral danger of persecution be imminent, as Suarez notes sect. 5. Lugo sect. 1. num. 148. See also D. Bonau. serm. 16. in Hexaëmerone, indicating some things.

As among the Turks (as is commonly noted) that man is the most bitter enemy of the Christian name who, born of Christian parents, is enrolled into a Mahometan family: so among infidels none more cruelly assaults the Church than he who, having been for some time nourished in it itself, and formed by the Sacrament of faith, pertinaciously adheres to his error, and is thrust the deeper into darkness the more the ray of truth shines around him, willingly blinding himself. This heresy works, building for itself, after the likeness of an Ape, a Synagogue, which it strives to dignify with a counterfeit title of religion; of its nature, state, and condition something must be said here as the subject matter requires.

The NAME of Heresy has its origin from eligo, in Greek αἵρεσις, and it signifies an Opinion which one voluntarily and pertinaciously elects for himself, as they commonly teach with D. Bonav. here. Whence it is also called a Sect, because we follow it; and in that sense the various sects of the Philosophers were so called, because, withdrawing from the common body, they erected new Schools, as S. Bonaventura says here.

But the name of Sect was once in a good sense, as Act. 24. et 26. Now however the name of sect must be abstained from for indicating our religion, as Suarez says disp. 19. sect. 2. Lugo disp. 20. sect. 1. because it avails for expressing only alien religions, as Beda notes ad 24. Act. and we now call heretics Sectaries, and we derive sect not from following, but from persecuting, as S. Doct. notes here.

Heresy is DEFINED: Est error, fidei Catholicae contrarius, cui pertinaci animo inhaereat is, qui est professus fidem in Baptismo. It is an error contrary to the Catholic faith, to which he who has professed the faith in Baptism adheres with pertinacious mind. Thus Turrecremata defines it, lib. 4. Summae, p. 2. cap. 1. from the common mind of the Doctors in 4. dist. 13. where D. Bonav. dub. 4. D. Thom. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 3. and his Interpreters. And more safely D. Bonau. in speculo animae, cap. 1. and p. 1. Centil. sect. 26. But in the former place D. Bonau. defines a heretic in these words: Haereticus est qui divinae legis ignorantia, vel contemptu, pertinax inventor proprii erroris, aut alieni sectator, Catholicae veritati mavult adversari, quam subiici. A heretic is he who, through ignorance or contempt of the divine law, a pertinacious inventor of his own error or a follower of another's, would rather oppose the Catholic truth than submit to it. Concerning this definition many questions occur.

The FIRST is: Whether error from ignorance is heresy: whether doubt, or merely probable assertion about matters of faith is heresy. What pertinacity is required for heresy: Whether it is required for heresy that it be in a baptized person, and other similar questions, which we shall run through.

Meanwhile I note that heresy is divided into Formal, and Objective. Formal is that actual sin by which someone is formally denominated a heretic: Objective indeed is the object which is falsely believed or asserted by the heretic, v. g. that Christ is not God, etc.

"When they say the King owes his crown to the choice of his people, they tell us that they mean to say no more than that some of the King's predecessors have been called to the throne by some sort of choice. Thus they hope to render their proposition safe by rendering it nugatory." (Burke, Reflections on French Revolution.)

1. The great question about civil power is, not whence it first came in remote antiquity, but whence it is now derived and flows continually as from its source, whether from the free consent of subjects so long as that lasts, or whether it obtains independently of their consent. Can subjects overthrow the ruler, or alter the polity itself, as often as they have a mind so to do? or has the ruler a right to his position even against the will of his people? A parallel question is, can a province annexed to an empire secede when it chooses, as South Carolina and other Confederates once attempted secession from the American Union?

2. These questions raise two totally different issues, which must be first carefully distinguished and then severally answered. The first point at issue is whether subjects may dethrone their ruler, a people alter their polity, or a province secede from an empire, at discretion. The second point is, whether the same may be done under pressure of dire injustice. One little matter of phraseology must be rectified before an answer is returned to this first point. The question whether subjects may dethrone their ruler at discretion, from the terms in which it is drawn, can lead to none but a negative answer. From the fact that they are subjects, and this man, or this body of men, their ruler, their allegiance cannot be wholly discretionary. That sovereign is a mere man of straw, there is no soul and substance of sovereign power in him, who may be knocked down and carted away for rubbish, any moment his so-called subjects please. Rousseau is quite clear on this point. The true debateable form of the question is, whether the people, being themselves sovereign, can remove at will the official persons who actually administer the State; whether they can change the polity, and whether the inhabitants of a province can secede. The answer now is simple: all depends upon the polity of the particular country where the case comes for discussion. And if so it be that the constitution makes no provision one way or another, any dispute that may occur must be settled by amicable arrangement among the parties concerned: if they cannot amicably agree, they must fight. To save this last eventuality, it were well that any claim which the people in any country may have to remove princes and statesmen from office, to alter the polity, or to divide the empire, should be made matter of the clearest understanding and most express and unambiguous stipulation. Even so, such a provision must be generally viewed with disfavour by the political philosopher, seeing how it tends to the weakening and undermining of government; whereas the same considerations that make out government to be at all a boon and a necessity to human nature, argue incapacity and instability in the governing power to be a deplorable evil. We must add, that where the people keep in their hands any power to alter the polity, or transfer the administration to other hands, there they hold part at least of the sovereignty; and the alteration or transference is effected by them, not as subjects, but as partial ruler.

3. The second point we raised was, whether a dethronement, or an alteration of polity, or a secession, may be brought about, not indeed at discretion for any cause, but under pressure of dire injustice. It comes to this: May the civil power be resisted when it does grievous wrong? Let us begin our reply with another question: May children strike their parents? No. Not even in self-defence? when the parent is going about to do the child some grievous bodily hurt? That is an unpleasant question, but the answer is plain. We can make no exceptions to the rule of self-defence. Self-defence in extreme cases may raise the arm of a child against its parent: in a similar extremity it may set a people in conflict with their civil ruler. Still we regard with horror the idea of striking a parent, and speak of it generally as a thing never to be done: so should we regard and speak of rebellion. We should not parade it before men's eyes as a deed to be contemplated, admired, and readily put in execution. "I confess to you, Sir," writes Burke, "I never liked this continual talk of resistance and revolution, or the practice of making the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread."

4. The conditions under which the civil authority may be withstood in self-defence, are fairly stated in the Dublin Review for April, 1865, p. 292. We must premise, that such a course of self-defence once publicly entered upon is like a rock rolled over the brow of a steep mountain: down it rolls and rebounds from point to point, gathering momentum in the descent, till in the end the ruler, once defied, has to be dethroned, the polity subverted, the empire rent, or they who made the resistance must perish.

"Resistance is lawful:—(1) When a government has become substantially and habitually tyrannical, and that is when it has lost sight of the common good, and pursues its own selfish objects to the manifest detriment of its subjects, especially where their religious interests are concerned. (2) When all legal and pacific means have been tried in vain to recall the ruler to a sense of his duty. (3) When there is a reasonable probability that resistance will be successful, and not entail greater evils than it seeks to remove. (4) When the judgment formed as to the badness of the government, and the prudence of resistance thereto, is not the opinion only of private persons or of a mere party: but is that of the larger and better portion of the people, so that it may morally be considered as the judgment of the community as a whole."

5. Side by side with this we will set the teaching of Leo XIII., Encyclical, Quod Apostolici.

"If ever it happens that civil power is wielded by rulers recklessly and beyond all bounds, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow of insurgents rising up against them by independent action (proprio marte), lest the tranquillity of order be more and more disturbed, or society receive greater injury thereby: and when things are come to such a pass that there appears no other ray or hope of preservation, the same authority teaches that a remedy must be sought in the merits of Christian patience and in earnest prayers to God."

The words we have italicized seem to point to conditions (4) and (3) respectively, as laid down by the writer in the Dublin Review.

For an instance of a king dethroned, not proprio marte, but with every appearance at least of an act of the whole nation, see the dethronement of Edward II., as related by Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, I., pp. 186, 187, Rolls Series.

6. "We save ourselves the more virulent and destructive diseases of revolution, sedition, and civil war, by submitting to the milder type of a change of ministry." (Times, April 7, 1880.)

7. It is not monarchical governments alone that can ever be resisted lawfully: but what is sauce for the king's goose is sauce also for the people's gander. There is no special sanctity attaching to democracy.

It might seem that, since resistance requires to be justified by the approval of "the larger and better portion of the people" (n. 4, condition [4]) no just resistance can ever be offered to the will of the democratic majority. But the said majority may be in divers ways coerced and cajoled, a mere packed majority, while the malcontents may be, if not "the larger," clearly "the better" portion of the community. (s. iv., n. 5, p. 321.)

Readings.—St. Thos., De Regimine Principum, i., 6; 2a 2æ, q. 42, art. 2; 2a 2æ, q, 69, art. 4, in corp.; Locke, Of Civil Government, nn. 200, 201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 223, 224, 225, 227, 229, 230, 232.

Case.—Adolf, a college student, mentions, in confession, that it appears to him that he has frequently sinned against faith. He says his faith is not strong, he is continually in a state of wavering, only his will to believe keeps him in the faith. The chief cause of his doubts is the attitude taken by so many men of science towards religion, some despising, others ignoring it. He often hears the remark that it is unworthy of a well-informed man to submit blindly to the truths of faith, such as the Catholic Church requires. These things increase the bewilderment that has taken possession of Adolf.

Question.—How should this penitent be treated?

Solution.—Adolf evidently is undergoing a period of stress. His faith which he learned at his mother’s knee, and which he faithfully preserved in home surroundings, is now subjected to hard tests, in an atmosphere of unbelief. It is apparent that despite these temptations, he still appreciates the faith as his most precious gift; hence he feels impelled to seek help from the priest, who, besides being confessor, exercises also the sacred office of teacher, guide and comforter.

In dealing with this penitent there is not merely a question of solving all the various particular doubts that bewilder his reasoning, and that render difficult the practice of his faith. First of all, he must be plainly and clearly instructed in his religion, to correct or perfect his understanding of the same, to liberate him from unfounded fears, as well as to eliminate real perils of his losing the faith.

He is worried especially by the thought that though the certainty of faith as the Church teaches is the greatest possible, this certainty is lacking in him. What should he be told on this point? Without doubt the certainty of faith is supreme, because the motive of faith, namely the authority of God revealing the truth, is the foundation of the faith, and that means absolute certainty; and since the principle of faith is the supernatural light of grace, one who honestly seeks the truth will arrive, through the enlightenment of Divine grace, at the positive belief that God has made revelations to man, that Jesus has manifested Himself as the Son of God, and as the Saviour of the world, that He brought us the full truth, and is proclaiming the same through the teaching office of the Church; and, accepting the authority of God and of His Church, he will, with the help of Divine grace give to the revealed truths a consent that is above every doubt and voluntary wavering. Nevertheless, an involuntary doubt may arise at times in believing Christians, a suggestion of insecurity may insinuate itself. Faith is, after all, a virtue, and the act of faith a voluntary subjection to the truths of the faith, dictated by the will, since reason is not impelled by a direct evidence of the motives of faith to an act of faith. For this reason faith, like any other virtue, is subject to temptations. Insinuations by the spirit of untruth, and, especially, the various objections made by men of science against the faith, as also the widespread religious indifference, are apt to bewilder an inexperienced youth whose judgment has not yet matured.

This is the condition in which Adolf finds himself. He is worried and in his bewilderment imagines that his faith is already shipwrecked. Yet this does not seem to be the case. He wants to believe, as he affirms, and in his temptation he clings to the foundation of faith, the authority of God and of the Church; thus, despite all the doubts that oppress him, he is still on firm ground, and may console himself with the knowledge that he is still in possession of the faith, and will so remain as long as he keeps his good will and makes zealous use of the necessary means for its preservation. Only when the will surrenders consciously to doubts, and entertains them voluntarily, does the virtue of faith vanish. Nevertheless, the state in which Adolf finds himself is not without its perils. For this reason it will be the confessor’s task to protect him, by practical advice, against these dangers.

First of all, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that faith is a virtue for which we must pray unceasingly. Many unbelievers, by painstaking inquiry, have approved the truth of the Catholic Church, without however being able to resolve upon accepting this truth. Only after they begin to offer up humble and fervent prayers do these difficulties disappear, and do they receive the strength to take the decisive step. On the other hand, the learned theologian may without continuous prayer for steadfastness in the faith drift far from the truth and be plunged in pernicious error. To prayer must be joined a chaste life. A life according to faith makes the possession of that faith sure. Indeed, the greater number of those who lose the precious gift of faith, became estranged from God through pride or immorality. “Many have done violence to their good conscience and suffered the shipwreck of their faith” says St. Paul, speaking of Christians in those days. Pride cannot dwell in harmony with the faith.

It is the language of pride that Adolf hears, when they tell him that it is unworthy of the cultured to believe something that one does not comprehend. This appeal to the self-respect of a talented, self-conscious youth, brought forward in the name of science, seldom fails of its harmful influence upon his faith. Yet it is not difficult to prove to him the fallacy of this assertion. True, faith requires the submission of reason to truths which far exceed our conception. Faith in this sense is a sacrifice, nevertheless the Church does not really require the sacrifice of reason, but rather that of arrogance. To refuse acceptance of God’s decrees, or to doubt them, must be regarded as an impertinent presumption. If an apprentice, while being initiated into the mysteries of an art by a clever master, would listen to the explanations with an incredulous shake of the head, and claim to know better, what would we think of such behavior? Now all of us, even the greatest scholars, are God’s apprentices: the Lord God in His mercy has taken us into His school, in order to teach us those supernatural truths of life, that concern our temporal and eternal welfare. What, therefore, is more beseeming than that man should give ready submission to God and to His Church?

In order, then that Adolf may escape perils to the faith, he must be impressed with the great need of prayer and of regularly receiving the Sacraments as a means to preserve purity of life, and he must avoid bad company. It is a great error for Adolf to suppose that in matters of faith reason must submit blindly. The Catholic religion, whose foundation is the faith, is not merely a matter of sentiment, it is not a religion of emotions. Reason and free will must, the same as in the practice of other virtues, be used in the exercise of faith, indeed, more particularly than the other faculties. Adolf must admit that an impartial and serious scrutiny of the motives of faith is calculated to satisfy the longing for certainty on part of the reason, and that only superficiality, prejudice and wilful resistance against truths that are inconvenient for a corrupt mind, can deny the strength of these arguments. The existence of the Catholic Church, her history for near two thousand years, the work of Divine Providence which in her is so abundantly evident, her victory over so many storms of persecution, the preservation of the purity of her teaching despite many assaults of the spirit of untruth, the glorious fruits of her sanctity in numberless servants of God, the wonderful works of charity ever present in the Catholic Church, all these must clearly demonstrate that this Church is the Divine Institution wherein we find truth and salvation. The study of Church history, also perusal of the lives of her saints and of her celebrated men, may be recommended to the doubter as an effective means for strengthening the faith. The numerous models of heroic virtues, of whom we possess so many in the Catholic Church, grant us an insight into the blessed workings of the Church, they fortify our faith and make us rejoice at being a child of this Church. Students are expected to accept the statements of eminent teachers as infallible truth; hence the words jurare in verba magistri. Yet even the most learned are not infallible, least of all in matters of religion. The overestimation of scientists and of their authority, to which Adolf is addicted, should be toned down by pointing out their incompetence in religious questions. The scientist may be an authority in his special science, but that does not qualify him to speak with authority on questions of religion, especially, as so often happens, if the fundamental truths of the Catholic religion are not even fully known to him. In matters of religion Adolf must seek elucidation where alone it can safely be found, in the Teaching Church, whose infallible decisions he may follow all through life as his never-failing lode-star. Finally he should be urged to associate with Catholic students, join Catholic organizations, thus to fortify his Catholic consciousness, and induce an interest in matters pertaining to his faith.

From our whole exposition of socialism it is evident that only a very superficial observer could possibly consider it the invention of some designing trickster or the artificial product of political adventurers. We have pointed repeatedly to the remoter origin and deeper sources of socialism. Yet it will be worth our while to review the actual causes of the socialist movement and to present them here arranged in proper order. We are the more willing to undertake this duty, since it will give us the opportunity to shed more light, not only upon the real significance of socialism, but also upon its intimate connection with liberalism.

Socialists themselves acknowledge that they have only drawn the logical conclusions from principles set up by liberals; and liberalism is accused by Catholics generally of having given birth to socialism. The liberals, on their part, with horror and indignation disclaim all connection with socialism. Liberalism does not profess, so say its defenders, to abolish private property: it only makes ownership free. Nor does it profess to advocate a servile industrial organization: it only advocates unrestricted freedom for all.

Notwithstanding all the protestations of the liberals, we cannot but consider socialism as the lineal descendant of liberalism, however much the parent may try to disown its offspring. The question is this, whether the principles set up and defended by liberals logically lead to socialism or not; and this question we believe must be answered in the affirmative.¹

¹ On Feb. 23, 1890, Bebel said in the Reichstag: “You know as well as we that the more faith in a life to come disappears from among the people, the more the people will clamor for having their heaven on earth.” This thought is not quite original with Bebel. Heine had said the same fifty years before. Remarking on the subversive influence of German philosophy on religion he continues: “The overthrow of the old beliefs has also uprooted the former morality. . . . The destruction of a belief in heaven is of consequence not only in morals but also in politics. The common people chafe at their earthly misery and yearn for happiness on earth. Communism is the natural outcome of these changed views, and it is spreading all over Germany. (Heine’s Works, vol. III. Hamburg, 1876, pp. 113-115.)

1. The deepest roots of socialism are atheism and materialism. If it is once admitted that all ends with this life, that man has no higher destiny than the lower animals which wallow in the mud, who, then, can require of the poor and oppressed, whose life is a continued struggle for existence, that they bear their hard lot with patience and resignation, and look on with indifference while their neighbors are clad in purple and fine linen, and daily revel at sumptuous banquets?

Is not the inextinguishable yearning for perfect happiness implanted also in the breast of the workingman? If you despoil him of every hope of a better life to come, what right have you to prevent him from striving to obtain happiness on earth as best he can, and therefore to make imperative demands for his share of earthly goods? Is he not a man as well as his employer, who thrives on the laborer’s exertions? Who can prove to workingmen from the standpoint of atheism that it is meet and just that one should pine in poverty and want, while another enjoys abundance of all things, since all have the same nature, and no reason can be given on atheistic grounds why the goods of this world should belong to one rather than to another? If the atheistic and materialistic theory is true, the demands of socialism are certainly just—that all the goods and enjoyments of this life should be equally divided among all; that it is, therefore, unjust that one should live in a magnificent palace and enjoy all pleasures without labor, while another is living in a squalid cellar or cold garret, and cannot, even with the greatest effort, obtain enough bread to appease his hunger.

Already in 1847, in a speech before the Prussian Diet, BISMARCK expressed this same idea in the following words: “I do not understand how in those states (which are not based on religion) the ideas of the communists, for instance, concerning the immorality of private ownership and the high moral value of theft as of an attempt to restore the inborn rights of men, can rightfully be prevented from asserting themselves if they have the power to do so. For, also these ideas are looked upon by their originators as very humanistic, yea, as the prime flower of humanism. Therefore, gentlemen, let us not curtail the Christian sentiments of our people.”¹

¹ Cf. Busch, Bismarck und seine Leute während des Krieges mit Frankreich, vol. I, p. 210.

Now, who is it that has preached and propagated atheism in all its forms? Who has sought by all ways and means to restrict the influence of Christianity in the school and in public life? Who is it that proclaimed extreme Darwinism as a dogma and popularized it for the ignorant masses? Who is it that even in our own day, in speech and in writing, in the chairs of universities and in public assemblies, preaches the grossest atheism? It is the representatives of liberalism, beginning with the French Encyclopedists down to our own university professors, who combat and decry the faith in God and in Christ the Saviour as stupidity and superstition. More especially Hegel and Feuerbach are the intellectual progenitors of the socialist heroes Marx and Engels (cf. above, p. 37 sqq.). Hence Marx himself utters the sarcastic taunt against the liberals, that atheism seems to them a venial fault compared with the crime of criticising the traditional conditions of property.¹ Wherein they have sinned therein they are punished.

¹ Capital, Introduction, p. ix. Virchow, one of the chief luminaries of liberalism, publicly maintained in the Prussian Diet, May 8, 1891, that he could not understand how a reasonable man could imagine that men are on earth in order to prepare for heaven.

It is especially by its baneful influence on the schools that liberalism has disseminated unbelief in the great mass of the people. For the last century already the universities have been hotbeds of infidelity. A pitifully small minority of university professors still make open profession of Christianity. By far the greater number is indifferent if not hostile to the Christian religion, or at most professes some milk-and-water kind of Christianity.

From the universities the streamlets of infidelity are trickling farther and farther. Wherever liberalism dares to show its true nature it endeavors to banish religious influences from the elementary schools, and, as it is called, to secularize them. And in doing so liberalism is but consistent with its principles.

Lately a liberal university professor—Dodel-Port— published a book which permits us to look behind the scenes perhaps more than is agreeable to some of the professor’s associates. His work is entitled, “ Moses and Darwin.” What, the author asks, is taught at our universities? Darwin and always Darwin. The doctrines of creation, of paradise, of the fall of the first man, the narration of miracles, he tells us, have been cast aside by modern science and relegated into the realm of fables. The representative “scientists” teach that there is no personal God, that man was developed from animality, that there is no immortal soul and no free will, and that in the history of mankind everything is determined by mechanical laws as in the rest of nature, etc. This is the teaching of the universities.

But what is taught in the (German) elementary schools? The very reverse. There the children are imbued with a belief in Moses, in the existence of God, the creation of the world, the fall of man, miracles, etc.

Is this contradiction to go on forever? No, is the verdict of our author. Off with the customary mask of hypocrisy! Let us show our true colors. Eject Moses and his miracles from the elementary school, that not every student of the higher branches may be forced to fight out the hard struggle between two systems which are diametrically opposed.

From the liberal point of view this demand is perfectly justified; but from it we can also perceive to whom is due that infidelity which is infecting all classes of the population and has blessed us with modern socialism and its revolutionary ideas.¹

¹ In the session of the Reichstag of May 23, 1878, Dr. Jörg remarked very aptly: "The most urgent necessity is the regeneration of the school. Personally I fear less the socialism of the present than the socialism of the future which is growing up among our young people. Owing to mistaken political calculations the schools have more and more been withdrawn from religious influences and thereby their doors have unwittingly been opened to socialism. Modern pedagogy, or, I might say, the modern schoolcraze, has become a seminary of socialism. Willy nilly, the effect is to raise the children above their level and thus to sow dissatisfaction broadcast among the people. Thus I wish to be understood, if I tell you openly that a wretched, burdened laborer who does not pray, who has forgotten or never learned it, will fall an easy prey to socialism as soon as it comes to fetch him.” If this be true of German elementary schools, what shall we say of our American public schools with their fads and pretensions?

Socialists are fully aware that their atheism is based on modern infidel science. Engels terms “the German labor movement the inheritor of classical German philosophy.” Bebel has repeatedly acknowledged his indebtedness to modern scientists. On September 16, 1878, he said in the Reichstag: “Gentlemen, you attack our views on religion because they are atheistic and materialistic. I acknowledge the correctness of the impeachment. ... I am firmly convinced that socialism finally leads to atheism. But who has established the scientific and philosophical foundations of those atheistic doctrines which cause you so much anxiety and displeasure? Was that done by socialists? Edgar and Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, David Strauss, Ernest Renan—were they socialists? They were men of science... . We have adopted our atheistic tenets in accordance with our scientific convictions, and we feel obliged in conscience to spread them among the masses. Why should that be forbidden to one party which is allowed to the other?” The spokesmen of modern science will be at a loss to find a suitable reply; for, even if they do not make open profession of infidelity, they are, at least for the most part, infected with the principles of Strauss and Renan.

2. The second great principle of the revolutionary party is equality. Here again socialism takes the same stand as liberalism, and draws the last consequence from its principles. Who invented the watchword liberty, equality, and fraternity, and thus gave an appearance of right and even of duty to the bloody French Revolution? It was the representatives of liberalism. The worthies of the Revolution—the Jacobins and Girondists—were the true forefathers of the modern liberals, who delight in their principles and phraseology, and continually spout liberty and equality. In virtue of this liberty and equality the ancient order of things was subverted; the privileges of the nobility and the prerogatives of the Church were abolished; every memory of ancient institutions was effaced; the people were declared sovereign; and, finally, the “citizen Capet” was brought to the scaffold. True, when the liberal bourgeoisie had once taken hold of the reins of government, they were eager to put a stop to the further development of their principles. After the Church had been persecuted and, as far as this was possible to human power, suppressed, the heroes of the Revolution— Robespierre at their head—were eager to introduce the worship of a Supreme Being in order to check the masses. After the property of the Church and of the nobility had been seized upon, and individuals had enriched themselves from the wealth of the nation, it was declared in the constitution that private property was sacred and inviolable. After the aristocracy had been removed and the hierarchy of the Church had been suppressed, they determined to establish an aristocracy of genius and wealth. Was such a step consistent? Had they any right to demand of the people to be satisfied with that equality which conferred upon it a semblance of freedom, but left it totally bereft of protection, and finally surrendered it to the power of the capitalists? Was the people not entitled to require that they should redeem their promises, and finally establish perfect equality in real earnest? We consider that demand as logical and just, according to the principles of liberalism.

3. The close relation of socialism to liberalism may be still more clearly shown in reference to the adopted theory of value. He who accepts this modern socialistic theory of value—that the exchange-value of all productions is only the result of labor, or accumulated labor—cannot possibly consider as just the conditions of modern production in which the laborer is always at a disadvantage, but must logically come to the principles of socialism. But who first established the socialistic theory of value? Is this theory the invention of socialism? By no means; it is the traditional doctrine of liberalism. Adam Smith, Ricardo, Say, and all the so-called classical political economists belong to the liberal school; and they have almost without exception laid down the principle that all value is to be credited to labor. Lassalle, as we have already shown, in establishing his theory of value could point to a stately line of liberal social economists. In recent times this theory, however, is either wholly abandoned, or at least essentially modified by liberals. They soon discovered what a dangerous weapon they put into the hands of socialism. But it was too late. The fact cannot be concealed from the world that liberalism forged the most dangerous weapon which socialism is using for the subversion of the existing social order.

4. Not only theoretically, but also practically, did liberalism pave the way for socialism. The way was smoothed chiefly by the introduction and enforcement of unlimited industrial competition, with all the liberties and privileges which it brings in its train. All protecting organizations which, in the course of time, had arisen to counteract unlimited competition, whether in theory or in practice, were, in the name of freedom, violently suppressed. Even the laws against usury were abolished in the interest of freedom. Thus society was disintegrated, the weaker industries were isolated and, owing to unlimited competition, fell victims to the superior power of capital. Moreover, since modern discoveries were made to serve merely the interests of a few capitalists, the solid middle class, which formed the strongest support of the existing social order, began more and more to: disappear, and society was divided into two hostile classes—-the wealthier bourgeoisie, on the one hand, with their inveterate hatred of the Church and the nobility, with their insatiable avarice and reckless oppression of the laborers as of an inferior race; on the other hand, the huge masses of the poor, particularly laborers in factories, filled with hatred and revenge against their capitalist oppressors. Thus a fertile soil was prepared for social democracy. It needed only agitators to make the “disinherited” acquainted with the results of agnostic science, and to fling the firebrand of rebellion into the masses of the laborers—and there stood social democracy fullfledged.

5. Moreover, liberalism endeavored to bring about a centralization in all departments of social economy, not only by utilizing modern discoveries in the field of industry, but still more by its control of education, and even of science, religion, and politics. Now, socialism, according to its very nature, aims at the greatest possible centralization. The means of production, the organization of labor, the distribution of produce, education, instruction—all is to be controlled by the state. The state takes upon itself the duties of the separate community, of the family, and of the individual. Hence Schäffle¹ logically concludes that “all centralization of the liberal state advances the cause of socialism and harmonizes with its principle.”

¹ Quintessence of Socialism. English version edited by B. Bosanquet, London, p. 52.

But who has employed all means to centralize education, Church government, marriage discipline, the care of the poor? Who has abolished the independence of municipalities, churches, and religious orders, and given all into the hands of the state? This is the work of liberalism. Socialism is, therefore, nothing else than the logical development of the liberal idea of the state. The state is the source of all right, say the liberals; to this principle socialism can rightfully appeal against liberalism and in favor of its own entire programme.

Thus it is beyond a doubt that liberalism and socialism are closely related to each other, and that there is, therefore, no possibility of an efficient stand against socialism from the side of liberalism. Liberalism has but one means against socialism—the police. As soon as it tries other remedies its inconsistency and inefficiency against socialism become lamentably evident.

The Churchmen’s Union was inaugurated at the Church House, Westminster, on October 31st, 1898, for the advancement of Liberal religious thought. The members of the Council of this Union are well-known and representative clergymen and laymen belonging to the Church of England. They state that among the chief objects of the Union are the following: —

To maintain the right and duty of the Church to restate her belief from time to time as required by the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit. And to give all support in their power to those who are honestly and loyally endeavoring to vindicate the truth of Christianity by the light of scholarship and research, and while paying due regard to continuity, to work for such changes in the formularies and practices in the Church of England as from time to time are made necessary by the needs and knowledge of the day.

In furtherance of these objects a Quarterly Review, The Liberal Churchman, was started in November, 1904. The brief prospectus which was issued with the Review puts the objects of the Union in still clearer light. I transcribe it in its entirety.

The Liberal Churchman has been established in order to widen and develop the religious life of the community by advocating and ventilating the claims and principles of liberal religious thought within the Church of England and among English-speaking people as a whole. The object of liberal religious thought is to emancipate the Christian religion from a rigid subservience to the literal forms and theories in which it has been historically expressed and explained; and to re-express and explain the essential facts of the Christian faith in the terms of contemporary thought. There is no dislike to the principle of doctrinal forms; but there is a dislike to the assumption that doctrinal forms which were coined in bygone ages under a totally different set of ecclesiastical, social, and mental conditions are, and must always be, the best and the only forms for commending the Christian conception of life to the mind and conscience of the present time. The religious, moral, and intellectual temper of the modern Christian community has outgrown many of these forms; it does not find itself adequately expressed in them, and it is becoming more and more impatient of the rigid subservience which it is too often asked to accord to them by the official exponents of the Christian creed. It is hoped that the objects of The Liberal Churchman will commend themselves to those who feel that the traditional presentation of Christian truth is no longer adapted to meet the intellectual, ethical, and religious needs of the modern mind.

In the opening article of the Review, Dr. Morrison, the President of the Union, explains its object at greater length, and under the title— The Task of Liberal Theology, develops what is said in the prospectus.

This clearly defined object of the Churchmen’s Union has the sympathy of many earnest and intelligent men of our time. Thus, Mr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge begins an article in the Hibbert Journal for January, 1905, with this sentence: — Most open-minded laymen probably view with unqualified satisfaction the desire recently evinced on the part of the more progressive clergy of the Established Church to restate upon a basis of rational criticism the received dogmas of Christianity.¹

¹ Page 253.

Sir Oliver Lodge has more than once of late tried his hand at a restatement or re-interpretation of Christian doctrine. The following is the first paragraph of an article by this distinguished scientist in the Hibbert Journal for April, 1904, entitled, Suggestions towards the re-interpretation of Christian Doctrine.

Now that religion is becoming so much more real, is being born again in the spirit of modern criticism and scientific knowledge, may it not be well to ask whether the formal statement of some of the doctrines which we have inherited from medieval and still earlier times cannot be wisely and inoffensively modified? There is usually some sort of forced sense in which almost any statement can be judged to have in it an element of truth, especially a statement which embodies the beliefs of many generations. But when the element of truth is quite other than had been supposed, and when the original statement has to be tortured in order to display it, it may be time to consider whether without harm its mode of expression can‘ be reconsidered and re-drafted—to the ultimate benefit indeed of that religion of truth and clearness which we all seek to attain.²

² Page 461.

More than one of the papers read at the Church Congress, held last autumn in Liverpool, were contributions towards the same object of restatement and re-interpretation of dogma.

This also constitutes one of the main objects which Liberal Catholics of our time have in view. Professor Mivart in the Nineteenth Century for January, 1900, attempted to prove that as a matter of fact, through the labors of Catholic theologians in the past, there had been a process of gradual restatement of Catholic doctrine; he concluded his article in these words : —

My aim has been to strengthen Catholicity, and to that end I have enumerated the most striking modifications in the belief of Catholics I could find, to show how many and great changes the Catholic body can undergo without injury to its vitality.³

³ Page 72.

Several of Mivart’s instances of change of Catholic belief in the past certainly belong to matters of faith, but he regarded them as mere preludes to still greater changes in the future. In explanation of the reasons why he wrote his article he says: —

I am convinced that the great changes herein referred to are but preludes to far greater changes in the future— changes which will be most salutary, if duly foreseen and prepared for. They will take place surely sooner or later, as a new generation of mankind is sure anyhow to succeed the present one. But just as the certainty of that fact does not make the function of the accoucheur less useful, so the sure advent of new conceptions and beliefs does not render useless the work of those who would prepare for and facilitate their safe delivery into the world of ideas.⁴

⁴ Ib., p. 71.

And so Mivart’s object was to facilitate the restatement, and re-interpretation of Catholic dogma by showing how in his view of history the process had been continually going on in the past.

Similarly the writer or writers who under the pseudonym Voces Catholicæ wrote on the Abbé Loisy and the Catholic Reform Movement in the Contemporary Review for March, 1903, claim as the chief merit of the French exegete the successful restatement by him of worn out Catholic beliefs in the terms of modern historical criticism.

On one side, they write, are the formulas, avowedly drawn up for our intellect, yet shaped by old-world men whose mental equipment, so far as it was dependent upon acquired knowledge, was utterly unlike our own; and on the other side is the modern scientific spirit pressing violently against the barriers raised by those formulas and panting for an outlet into the region of light and life. M. Loisy claims to have found an issue which leads not beyond the pale of Catholic faith, but only to its calm and salubrious heights. Placing the definitions of Councils and Popes in the full light of historic experience he virtually says: We owe to them the same degree of respect and credence which we display to the words of the Saviour; and this we can continue to pay without refusing to science what is admitted to be her due. If the course of events, against which it is folly to argue, compels us to deepen, to spiritualize the words of Jesus which the Church for ages construed literally, and if we can—because we must— carry out the process without failing in our duty to God or our neighbor, what is there to show that the dogmas fashioned by men are less plastic? It is impossible to rebut the argument—which is but one of many—and it would be suicidal arbitrarily to condemn the conclusion without first providing some other means of adapting a structure built by the ancients to the wholly different needs of a new generation.

Long before M. Loisy came forward critics had eagerly thrown themselves upon salient facts in Church history; which, turn them how one might, would not dovetail with the dangerous claim to immutability advanced by certain theologians for the dogmas of the Church. Exposed to the fierce light of science, which they were never meant to endure, many of those old-world propositions seemed to shrivel up and harden, to the grave detriment of their religious contents. The French theologian is the first to show how by reverently approaching the formulas of past ages, which were admirable presentments of Christian doctrine as reflected in the minds of Christians of those generations, we can take over the fundamental and comprehensive truths which they embodied, without vainly straining to view them from a standing point which has receded from us forever. Far from loosening our hold on the substance of Jesus’ teachings, this needful process of spiritualization imparts to them a firm cohesion and harmonizes them with ideas of a scientific order from which it is impossible to withhold our assent.⁵

⁵ Pages 401-402.

In spite of what this writer says about the claim of Loisy to be a pioneer in the field of the re-interpretation of dogma, it is well known that he took this idea with much else from the French Protestant minister, A. Sabatier. Indeed, A. Sabatier seems to have been the common source from which English Protestants and liberal Catholics alike have largely drawn. For many years Sabatier was the recognized leader of a certain school of theology in France, and the Abbé Loisy is said to have attended his lectures in Paris. A very slight acquaintance with Sabatier’s writings will convince the reader of the justice of his claim to have led the way in the restatement of Christian dogma. I need do no more here than give a short extract from an article which he contributed to the Contemporary Review for November, 1899, on Christian Dogma and the Christian Life.

Hence it becomes an incontestable truth that no theologian of our day repeats and professes the dogmas of the great councils in the same sense they had for those who saw their birth or origin. Every one accommodates them, more or less consciously, to his own use, translates them into his language, takes or leaves portions as it pleases him; in a word, re-thinks them in his mind, and in rethinking them, interprets and transforms them! Well, modern theology invites us simply to do with reflexion and truthfulness that which we all do more or less and which we cannot help doing. And do we not see that far from being the death of dogma, this faculty of transformation by a new exegesis is the only way by which dogma can be rejuvenated and revived, the only way for us to reap its internal or spiritual substance, the Christian reality by which our religious life can and ought to be nourished? Shall we hesitate resolutely to enter on this path? 6

In another passage of their article in the Contemporary Review for March, 1903, Voces Catholicæ admit that Loisy is not original.

Most of the fruitful ideas [they write] with which his little volume teems have been in the air for some years past. They cannot, therefore, be said to be original. But they have been uttered by non-Catholic critics whose writings and names have remained hitherto unknown to the bulk of our co-religionists.

Any reader of Loisy who knows how constantly he refers to Protestant theologians and rationalistic 6 Page 737.

critics will corroborate this testimony that his views are not original. In this instance, as in so many others, the views of liberal Catholics are seen to be a more or less close approximation to those of heretics and rationalists. Since the condemnation of Loisy’s works by the Holy See there has been a lull in the activity of liberal Catholics, and the present seems to be a favorable opportunity for reviewing our position. Let us try to gain a clear idea of the crisis of Liberalism through which we have been passing. The process cannot fail to be useful to us.

And first of all let us pay a tribute to the vigilance of our bishops who betimes perceived the danger and faithfully fulfilled their office. In their joint Pastoral of 29th December, 1900, they say, after quoting the teaching of Leo XIII: —

Very different from this is the theory of progress or development excogitated in recent times, and approved by certain writers on the continent, and even in England. They make the progress of Christian doctrine to consist in real change. They argue that certain truths of revelation may become obsolete and die out; that, having served their time, higher truths will supplant them, in accordance with some real or fancied progress of natural science. They even suggest that higher perceptions in natural science will reduce mysteries to the level of natural phenomena; and that the development of Christian doctrine really means the reception into the deposit of faith of a number of extraneous truths, which will in course of time bring the Church into perfect conformity with modern ideas. There are even Catholics who imagine that they can save their orthodoxy by holding the creeds and definitions of faith, not according to the Church’s constant understanding of them, but according to their own. They profess to believe that the Church’s teaching may receive new light to illuminate it, so that the traditional sense, given by the Church to her formularies, shall give way to other meanings partially or wholly different. Against errors of this kind the Church, in the Vatican Council, has launched her formal anathema: ‘‘If any one shall say that it may ever be possible, with the progress of science, for a sense to be given to the doctrines proposed by the Church, other than that which the Church has understood and understands, let him be anathema.’’

So that the task which liberal theology sets itself is heretical, and this new heresy differs fundamentally in nothing from former heresies. Men imbued with modern subjective phenomenalism and the theories of evolution wish to apply their philosophical opinions to the interpretation of the doctrines of the Christian faith. This is precisely what St. Paul warned the Colossians against (ii. 8): “ Beware, lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit; according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ.”

A long catena of passages from the Fathers might be quoted to show the practice of heretics in all ages. One or two will be sufficient for my purpose. St. Athanasius writes : —

After adopting some impious principle as a canon, in accordance with this principle they proceed to corrupt all the sacred Scriptures.⁷

⁷ Orat. II., p. 176.

Faustinus in his treatise De Fide against the Arians (circ. 380) writes: — The Arian heresy when it makes its profession of faith confesses much in the same words indeed as we do but not in the same sense. For in the same words as we do, it proclaims God the Father and God the Son, and that by the Son all things were made by God the Father, and that the Son was begotten before time was. But although it agrees with us in using these words, nevertheless, by a sacrilegious interpretation of them it departs from the orthodox sense of the Catholic Church, calling God Father, but not in the sense that He begot the Son; making use of the word Son also, but meaning Son by adoption not by nature, in the sense that He was reckoned as such, not really begotten by the Father.⁸

⁸ Migne PP. Lat. xiii., p. 38.

One is tempted to wonder how Catholic priests and intelligent Catholic laymen could possibly suppose that the proposed restatement of Catholic dogma does not “lead beyond the pale of Catholic faith.” That the dogmas of the Faith are immutable, that all Catholics are bound to believe Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus; that in matters of faith Nil innovetur, nisi quod traditum est; Non nova, sed nove, Explodenda novitas, retinenda antiquitas; this belongs to the very rudiments of Catholic doctrine. The Catholic Church has always claimed to teach what she received from the apostles, that it is which constitutes the sacred deposit committed to her faithful keeping; if her claim is unfounded, if while professing to teach with divine authority the immutable divine truth entrusted to her keeping, she has all the while been stealthily accommodating and changing it to suit the fashions of the day, then is she indeed an impostor, her stupendous claims make her ridiculous, and the sooner she is shoveled out of the way the better.

But, say the liberal Catholics, there is no use arguing against facts, it is a fact that changes in dogma have taken place in the past, why should they not take place in the future?

This, of course, is the common Protestant and rationalistic objection against the immutability of Catholic dogma; if the liberal Catholic were as well read in the Catholic theology as in modern infidel literature, he would know how to answer the difficulty.

But, persists the liberal Catholic, in spite of the traditional answer of Catholic theologians to the difficulty — and here it is usual for him to introduce a sneer at scholasticism — it remains true that Catholic dogma has changed; LE pur si muove, as in a not dissimilar context asserted Galileo, that venerable confessor of the Faith, as Mivart called him.

One of the classical instances by which Loisy strives to show this, is the transition from the conception of the kingdom of God, as preached by the living Jesus, to that of the Catholic Church, brought about after the Resurrection of Our Lord. Loisy adopts the modern rationalistic view, according to which the Christ of history merely conceived of Himself as the Messias whom the Jews were expecting, whose office it was to preach repentance and thereby the forgiveness of sin, as the preparation for the immediate advent of His earthly but glorious kingdom. In the mind of Jesus there was no place and no need for the Christian Church, and He can only be said to be its founder inasmuch as He unwittingly sowed the seed from which the Church grew by the thought, labor, and adaptation of St. Paul and other great thinkers of the first two centuries of the Christian era. Then, of course, follows the conclusion — if there could be such restatement and re-interpretation of dogma in the first ages of Christianity, why should the process not continue on similar lines?

In answer to this I will quote the recent utterances of two non-Catholic writers. Mr. W. H. Mallock wrote in the Nineteenth Century for December, 1904: —

I will not pause to ask why that subjective experience, which was of no value in attesting the superhuman nature of Buddha, should be accepted as indubitable evidence of the superhuman nature of Christ. ... Nor does what I am going to say apply to neo-Anglicans only. It applies equally to men like Professors Harnack and Sabatier, and to liberal Catholics, such as the Abbé Loisy and Baron F. von Hügel. All these thinkers have come to the same conclusion, that if principles like the Bishop of Worcester’s are to be applied to the interpretation of the Gospels, our conception of the divine character of Christ must, in one respect at all events, undergo a profound change. We can no longer regard His incarnation of the Godhead as complete. We must regard Him, says the Bishop of Worcester, as ‘‘having refrained from the divine mode of consciousness’’ to such an extent that His knowledge, in many respects, was no better than an ignorant man’s. I do not know how far the Bishop may realize the scope of this admission; but, as other thinkers have shown, who are no less devout than he, it compels us to recognize that Christ was not only ignorant of many things, but was actually subject to very serious delusions—chief amongst these being the delusion that His own second coming would be immediate. Such being the case, as Baron F. von Hügel observes, the question has to be faced of how, under these conditions, Christ could have had any intention of founding an earthly Church.⁹

⁹ Page 920.

The Rev. Professor James Denney, of Glasgow, writes in the February number of the Expositor, 1905:—

He (Loisy) holds with that recent school of New Testament scholarship which lays the whole stress in the Gospels on the eschatological representation of the Kingdom. He rejects, unceremoniously, the idea that not what Jesus inherited is of value in Christianity, but only what is His own; nothing was more truly His own, nothing had greater value to Him than what He had inherited—the ancient revelation and the hopes it had inspired. He gets rid of the texts on which Harnack bases his spiritual conception of Christianity by methods which some will describe as exegetical and critical, others as the unscrupulous use of the rack and the knife. Perhaps it is enough to say that they are quite unconvincing.¹⁰

¹⁰ Page 115.

In other words this crucial instance of the apostolic restatement of Christian dogma, this undoubted result of modern criticism, this certain conclusion arrived at by the scientific historical method, is at best the opinion of a particular school of rationalistic scholars, arrived at by denying the authenticity of some texts in our authorities, by torturing others out of their obvious meaning, and by putting aside as unhistorical all supernatural phenomena like prophecies and miracles.

Again; in this question of the development of doctrine, it is all important to distinguish between what is of faith and what is merely theological speculation about the faith. And yet Mivart, in the article from which I quoted above, rides roughshod over this all important distinction.

BY a certain class of modern writers Christianity is regarded as a product of natural evolution. According to these critics it is a syncretism, or growing together of ideas, doctrines, and rites which were held in solution in the Greco-Roman world during the early period of the Roman Empire. Christianity, they suppose, adopted certain elements of Judaism, and with wonderful genius mixed them with pagan doctrines and rites, took over various ideas from Roman administration and Roman law, and the Catholic Church of history finally emerged. As an instance of the theory of this process we may take the rite of Baptism. Dr. J. A. McCulloch writes: ‘ First let it be clearly understood that the ceremonial use of water in rites which are sometimes exceedingly simple, but at other times are profoundly symbolic and complex, though now inextricably connected with other opinions regarding its nature and power, has proceeded by a regular process of evolution from the simple use of water as a cleansing and purifying medium.” In such passages as this we see that evolution has become a universal dogma. Religion, like everything else, must be explained by its light; nothing remains to be done but to discover facts which illustrate the gradual process. With regard to the evolution of baptism illustrative facts are discovered in the various mystery religions of the early Christian centuries. These existed in great numbers, gradually overspreading the West from the East. There were mysteries of Isis, Osiris, Demeter, Cybele, Mithras, Attis, and many more. They had their secret doctrines and rites which were jealously guarded from the profane world. If anyone wished to become an adept he was required to submit to a process of preparation before reception. His reception was an initiation into the mysteries, and quite commonly lustration, sprinkling or bathing with water, formed part of the initiation rites. Christian baptism, then, is a rite of initiation, and one of the proofs of this assertion is that certain technical terms used in the pagan mysteries, such as illuminati, mystæ, mystagogus, were applied by some of the early Christian writers to the baptized and to the minister of the Sacrament. This theory breaks down as soon as we descend to particular details and begin to examine them in the light of history. A syncretism is a patchwork of varied and more or less discordant elements. The various parts lack cohesion and unity. They betray their different origins. In man-made religions like modernism this characteristic is conspicuous. Modernism retained certain features of Christianity, but mixed with them ideas taken from modern philosophy and modern science. As Pope Pius X said, it was a synthesis of all the heresies. On the other hand, the striking characteristic of Christianity is its wonderful harmony and unity. It is the revelation of a spiritual universe in which part fits in with part; amid infinite variety unity reigns supreme; law and order dominate the whole. This by itself is a strong argument for its divine origin.

BEFORE Jesus Christ came on earth religion was a national institution. The religion of the Egyptians, Persians, Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans was national; they all worshipped the national gods in the national way. Even the Jewish religion was national, but, according to many a glowing passage of the Old Testament, a great change was to take place in this respect when the Messias came. He would establish a universal kingdom, he would rule from sea to sea and from the river unto the ends of the earth; all kings would adore him, and all the nations of the earth would serve him. Jesus Christ himself foretold that his Gospel was to be preached in the whole world, that they would come from the east and the west and from the north and the south and sit down in the kingdom of God, and that penance and remission of sins would be preached to all nations. In his final charge to his Apostles he commanded them to teach all nations, to make disciples of all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature. All that believed and were baptized would be saved. The Apostles were to be witnesses unto him even to the uttermost part of the earth. And so the middle wall of partition was broken down; the religion of Jesus Christ was not a national religion: it was a religion for all mankind; it was a universal, a Catholic religion.

Catholicity, then, was always a distinguishing mark of the Church founded by Jesus Christ. Christians were taught from the beginning to profess their faith in the Catholic Church. When heresies and schisms arose they were easily distinguished from the Church founded by Jesus Christ. They were particular, sectional: she was universal, Catholic. Schisms and sects were given the name of their founder; they were Donatist, Arian; or they took their name from some doctrine which they preached, like the Monophysites; or from the country where they lived, like the Cataphrygians: the Church founded by Jesus Christ was simply the universal, the Catholic Church. All through history it has been the same. In the sixteenth century Lutherans, Calvinists, Protestants separated from the Church, which always remained simply Catholic. Sometimes a sect would give itself the name of Catholic and Apostolic, but the world insisted on calling it Irvingite. When the Eastern Church went into schism it maintained that it was the whole Catholic Church, but still it called itself and was called by others the Orthodox Church. When Henry VIII and Elizabeth set up a new form of religion in England, it became known as the Church of England. An active section of the Church of England calls itself Catholic, and it would give much if it could induce others to do the same, but the most that the world will concede to them is to call them Anglo-Catholics. The simple name of Catholic is reserved for the old, historic, universal Church founded by Jesus Christ.

In the past, Anglo-Catholics have frequently protested against “the exclusive and arrogant usurpation of the name Catholic by the Church of Rome.” The last to do so was Bishop Gore, who devoted to this theme a course of sermons delivered in the Grosvenor Chapel, Mayfair, London. Father F. Woodlock, S.J., answered him in a course preached at Farm Street. This course has been published by Longmans with the title Constantinople, Canterbury, and Rome. Father Woodlock has no difficulty in showing that the Bishop is neither Catholic nor consistent. The Catholic doctrine about the Church is quite clear and precise, and it is founded on the teaching of our Lord himself. The Church is the pillar and ground of truth. As the Apostles and their successors were commanded to teach all the truths contained in the Gospel, so all who heard them were commanded, under pain of damnation, to believe all that the Apostles and their successors taught. He would guarantee their teaching; he would be with them in their teaching to the end of time; the powers of evil and of falsehood should never prevail against his Church. Those who heard their preaching heard him; those who despised them despised him and the Father who sent him. If anyone refused to hear the Church and preferred his own private judgement, he was to be treated as a heathen and a publican.

This is very different from Dr. Gore’s teaching. According to him there is no security that the Church of the New Covenant may not go wrong as the Church of the Old Covenant went wrong. Again and again the evidence shows that it has done so, he says. Throughout life it has been a principle with him that “to accept ecclesiastical authority in the face of the best judgement of his own reason would be an impossible treason against light.” That is not Catholic doctrine; it is not even orthodox Protestantism: it is flat rationalism. Bishop Gore claims the right to follow his own private judgement against the judgement of the Church, but if any of his hearers ventures to follow his own private judgement against that of some Anglo-Catholic leaders, he threatens them with the judgement of Christ !

One of the plainest things in the New Testament is that Jesus Christ taught with authority and required in his hearers absolute faith in and submission to his teaching. If any teacher was ever authoritative and dogmatic, Jesus Christ was. And yet Dr. Gore, who claims to be a Christian Bishop, and who undoubtedly is an able man, tells us that Christ “plainly desired that every man should think for himself’; that he “was strangely adverse to the dogmatic method,’ and that according to Christ “mere submission to dogmatic authority ” was a spirit to be discouraged. Truth to say, Catholicism and Anglo-Catholicism are poles apart even on first principles.

THIRTY years ago Pope Leo XIII issued his beautiful Encyclical Letter on the Reunion of Christendom. He invited the separated Churches of the East, the Russian Church, and the Protestant Churches of the West to form again one fold under one Shepherd, and thus fulfil the prayer and the will of Christ. He protested that it was no love of domination but a pure sense of duty as Pope which urged him to make this appeal. Later on the annual novena of prayer before Whitsuntide was enjoined on the faithful throughout the world for the same intention. More recently still a petition for the reunion of Christendom was added to the Litany of the Saints. These and other measures have had their effect on the Christian world. Some years ago it was calculated that in response to Pope Leo’s letter at least one hundred thousand Eastern schismatics had come back to the Church. During the same period many distinguished converts have joined the Church in America and in England. For some years past a strong movement towards reunion has been gaining ground in England. In 1920 the Conference of Anglican Bishops who met at Lambeth issued their “Appeal to all Christian People’ in favour of reunion. As is well known, since then certain informal conversations between Catholics and Anglicans have been held at Malines in Belgium, and more formal conferences at Lambeth between representatives of the Church of England and representatives of the Evangelical Free Churches. In 1922 a committee of six Anglicans and six Evangelicals was elected to meet under the presidency of the Archbishop of York, to report on certain fundamental questions of principle which had become prominent in the discussions of the Joint Conference. Those fundamental questions were (a) the nature of the Church, (6) the nature of the ministry, and (c) the place of Creeds in a united Church. The report was duly drawn up in a series of short propositions, and it was accepted by the Conference. It has been published by the S.P.C.K., with the authority of the Anglican Archbishops and of the Moderator of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Free Churches. We may, then, take these propositions as embodying the belief of representative Anglican and Nonconformist divines of to-day on the important questions with which they deal. In the first place, we are chiefly interested in the propositions which describe the nature of the Church. Reunion is impossible until clear and sound notions on that all-important subject are held by all parties concerned. Discussion will help towards this end, so I propose to state some of my own views on the propositions of the Report concerning the nature of the Church of Christ.

According to the Report, the Church has not been instituted by men: it is a creation of God. It consists of members who have passed out of this world and of others who are still living in this world, “but it has its expression in this world in a visible form.” ‘ This visible Church was instituted by Christ as a fellowship of men”; it is “an ordered society here on earth,”

Here a Catholic must pause and put a question for which there is no answer in the Report. If the Church has a visible form in this world, if it is a fellowship of men and an ordered society, and Christ himself thus instituted it, then it must have a visible head. Christ, of course, is the supreme head of all the Churches in heaven and on earth, but he is invisible. All visible societies of men require a visible head. No ordered society can exist without one. Where is the visible head of the visible society which we call the Church of Christ ?

The Report teaches that the Church is the Body of Christ, and as there is only one and can only be one Christ, so there is one and can only be one Church. Men become members of the Church by baptism. The Church visible on earth ought to express and manifest the one life of the one Body by its own visible unity. This it did in New Testament days. But now “there are different and even rival denominational Churches independent of each other,” and at least “temporarily separated’ from each other.

But, we ask, how can these different rival, independent, and separated Churches make one visible Church of Christ ?

The answer of the Report is that these separate and independent Churches, in as far as they have the marks which ought to characterize the Church visible on earth, are parts of that one Church of Christ. But they possess those marks in very varying degrees of completeness or defect. “Some, indeed, may be so defective that they cannot rightly be judged to be parts of that Church.”

To this Catholics would object that many different, rival, independent, and separated societies cannot possibly make one society, nor can many different, rival, independent, and separated societies be parts of one society. You may put together a quarter of an apple, a quarter of a pear, a quarter of an orange, and a quarter of a plum, but these four parts do not make one fruit. They remain four quarters of four different fruits. Moreover, Christ gave marks to the visible Church which he founded in order to distinguish it from other bodies which were not his Church. It is very true that those marks are not possessed by some Churches which call themselves Christian, and we need only use our eyes and common the sense to see it. “But such judgements,” says the Report, somewhat cryptically, “are limited to the sphere of the visible Church on earth; it would be presumption to claim that they are valid for the whole Church of Christ !”

Let us dwell a little on this fundamental question of the marks of the true Church of Jesus Christ.

The Lambeth Conference Report says very truly that as the Church of Christ on earth is a visible Church, it must possess certain visible and recognizable marks whereby it can be seen and known by men. Christ took care that his Church should be readily distinguishable from other societies which were not his Church but which would lay claim to the honour, as he well foreknew. According to English law, genuine gold and silver plate must be stamped with a hall-mark, so that buyers may not be cheated. Christ impressed his marks on the Church which he founded, so that no synagogue of Satan could be mistaken for it. In order that such a mark may fulfil its function, it must be more easily recognizable than that which it makes visible. Hence it will not do to say that the preaching of the true faith is a mark of the Church of Christ. We know the true faith from the preaching of the true Church of Christ; we do not know the Church of Christ from the preaching of the faith. Moreover, if a mark is to serve its purpose, it must be a really distinguishing mark, not something which is common to all the objects concerned. If I want someone who does not know him to distinguish John from Thomas and Andrew. I must not tell him that John has two arms and two legs, when those marks are common to all three.

Moreover, the marks which Christ gave to his Church so that it might be a city set on a hill and clearly visible from all the country round have been known and named from the earliest times. Two were expressly inserted in the Apostles’ Creed. Besides the Jewish synagogue there were heretical conventicles almost from the beginning. Catholicity or universality was a feature which was quite conspicuous and one which clearly distinguished the Church of Christ from the synagogue and from the local conventicles of the heretics. Not less clearly did the note of Holiness distinguish the Church of Christ from the Pharisaism of the synagogue and the licentiousness of the early heresies. Oneness and Apostolicity were, of course, marks of the Church from the beginning, but they were expressly added to the other two during the fourth century, when all four were regularly repeated in what we call the Nicene Creed. Christians of East and West continued for centuries to profess their faith in the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. Theologians differed in their enumeration of the marks of the true Church of Christ. Some reckoned only two, others three, others, again, six, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve. Bellarmine gives fifteen, among them being Antiquity and Indefectibility, but he acknowledges that they can all be reduced to the common four of the Nicene Creed if anyone prefers that number.

Luther taught that the marks of the true Church were these seven: The true and uncorrupt preaching of the Gospel; the lawful administration of Baptism; the lawful administration of the Eucharist; the lawful use of the keys; the lawful election of ministers to preach and administer the Sacraments; public prayer, psalmody, and catechism in a language that could be understood by the people; and the mystery of the Cross, or the bearing of persecution and suffering for the sake of justice. Bellarmine observes that Luther was careful not to mention the marks of the true Church which were assigned by the Nicene Creed and solemnly reaffirmed by many General Councils of the Church. The Church which Luther set up was neither One, nor Holy, nor Catholic, nor Apostolic. Luther knew this as well as anybody else, and so, as Bellarmine remarks, he said nothing about the marks of the true Church, even though they were taught by the Apostles’ Creed and the Nicene Creed. He characteristically substituted seven indications of his own which are not true marks at all. They cannot be recognized more readily than the Church herself, nor can they serve as distinguishing features of the true Church of Christ.

In this respect the Lambeth Conference seems to have copied from Luther. The Report asserts that the visible and recognizable marks by which the visible Church can be seen and known by men are the following: “(a) The profession of faith in God as revealed and incarnate in Christ; (6) the observance of the two Sacraments ordained by Christ himself; (c) an ideal of the Christian life protected by a common discipline; (d) a ministry representative of the Church, for the preaching of the Word, the administration of the Sacraments, and the maintenance of the unity and continuity of the Church’s witness and work.”

There is a close similarity between these so-called marks and those assigned by Luther. It is quite clear that they cannot serve to distinguish the true Church of Christ from false claimants of that honour. They are the common characteristics of all, or nearly all, the heretical and schismatical bodies which have separated from the Church since the days of the Apostles. It is hard to understand how the Lambeth Conference could accept and endorse the assertion of the Report that they have been regarded as the marks of the true Church “since the days of the Apostles.” And yet, sad to say, the Report is compelled to confess that when tested even by these so-called marks ‘some of the Christian Churches may be so defective that they cannot rightly be judged to be parts of the one visible Church of Christ at all.”

That portion of the Report which deals with the Christian Ministry begins by stating that the Christian ministry is a divine ordinance and that it has been an integral part of the organized life of the Church from the beginning. It exercises the powers and functions which are inherent in the Church in the name and by the authority of Christ himself. No one may take this honour upon himself. The Christian minister must have an inward call from God and an outward commission given him by the authorities of the Church. It is in accordance with Apostolic practice and the ancient custom of the Church that this commission should be given through Ordination by the laying on of hands and prayer of those who have authority to ordain. The members of the Committee and of the Joint Conference express their belief that divine grace is thus given to the ordained in response to prayer and faith.

The wording of these general propositions is carefully chosen, and it is not wonderful that they met with acceptance by the Joint Conference. Difficulties begin to appear when we descend to details. What is the nature of those powers and functions inherent in the Church which are exercised by the Christian ministry ?

The teaching of the Catholic Church on this point is precise, clear, and by no means without warrant of Scripture. Christ left a twofold spiritual power in his Church: the power of Orders and the power of Jurisdiction. The power of Orders is the power to consecrate the Body and Blood of Christ, to administer it in Holy Communion, together with all that is needful for the proper exercise of this power and all that it implies. It thus comprises also the power to forgive sins in the Sacrament of Penance. The power of jurisdiction gives authority to preach the Word of God, to bind and loose, or to make laws, and to govern, direct, and correct the faithful who are subject to it. All this the Catholic ministry does in the name and by the authority of Christ. It has pleased Christ that the power of Orders should be transmitted through the higher to the inferior ranks of the clergy by Ordination. Ordination consists essentially of the laying on of hands and of prayer. It is a sacred rite which gives the power of consecrating the Body and Blood of Christ, and makes the minister capable of forgiving the sins of those who are subject to him. Ordination also gives the grace which is necessary for the dutiful exercise of the spiritual powers which it confers. Neither the Apostles nor their successors could have annexed to Ordination the power of producing effects such as these. God alone can give an external rite the power of giving grace. Ordination, then, by the laying on of hands and prayer is a sacred sign which produces grace; it is a sacrament which has been instituted by Christ. It must be administered according to the rite instituted by Christ by one of the higher rank of the clergy according to an ordinance of Christ. If it is otherwise administered it is no sacrament, no ordination at all, and it does not give grace or transmit any spiritual powers. Thus the power of Orders which is inherent in the Church must be transmitted from one to another, from bishops to priests, by means of the Sacrament of Orders. Those ministers who exercise their sacred functions in the Church to-day have received power and authority to do so from their predecessors, who in like manner received it through Ordination from their predecessors, and so on up to the Apostles. Apostolicity, then, or the transmission of Orders and Jurisdiction from the Apostles, is a necessary mark of the Church of Christ. If any modern religious body has tampered with the Sacrament of Orders so that it is no longer what Christ made it, that religious body has lost the Christian ministry and is no longer an integral portion of the Church of Christ. That is precisely what happened in the Church of England at the time of the Reformation, and for that reason Leo XIII declared that Anglican Orders are null and void. For similar reasons most of the Protestant bodies have lost the Christian ministry.

The seventh paragraph of this section of the report is so curious and so tell-tale that I transcribe the whole of it.

“Within the many Christian Communions into which, in the course of history, Christendom has been divided, various forms of ministry have grown up according to the circumstances of these several Communions and their beliefs as to the mind of Christ and the guidance of the New Testament. These various ministries of Word and Sacrament have been, in God’s Providence, manifestly and abundantly used by the Holy Spirit in his work of ‘enlightening the world, converting sinners, and perfecting saints.’ But the differences which have arisen with regard to the authority and functions of these various forms of ministry have been and are the occasion of manifold doubts, questions, and misunderstandings. For the allaying of doubts and scruples in the future, and for the more perfect realization of the truth that the ministry is a ministry of the Church and not merely of any part thereof, means should be provided for the United Church which we desire, whereby its ministry may be acknowledged by every part thereof as possessing the authority of the whole body.”

The report, then, acknowledges that the Christian ministry is a divine ordinance and that it exercises its powers in the name and by the authority of Christ. Since the days of the Apostles the ministry has been perpetuated by Ordination, by a sacramental rite. The separated communions changed the rite in use by the early Church in order to suit their own circumstances and their own beliefs as to the mind of Christ and their private interpretation of the New Testament. Hence various forms of ministry which now cause doubts, scruples, and misunderstandings. To allay these is necessary if we are to have a united Church of the future. They cannot be allayed by again tampering with the institution of Jesus Christ. The only possible way is to recover that institution by accepting it from the Catholic Church, which has preserved it faithfully from the beginning.