The Theological Virtues

3. Notions. 1. To believe signifies to give assent to some thing on account of the testimony or authority of another.

a. Faith differs from opinion, because it holds a thing as true certainly and without fear of erring; it differs from knowledge, because it holds a thing as true not from internal reasons, but on account of the authority of a witness. What we know, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority.²

b. To an act of faith considered in general, the intellect is for the most part moved by the will; but that faith may be rational, the intellect ought beforehand to know that the witness deserves belief, because it understands that the witness can neither be deceived in knowing nor deceive in testifying.

2. The theological virtue of faith can be considered insofar as it is a habit and insofar as it is an act. Habitual faith is permanent and is already had in baptized infants; actual faith is transient and is had in him who elicits an act of faith.

a. Theological faith as a virtue is defined: an infused supernatural habit by which man is disposed to assent firmly to truths revealed by God on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

a. The first words of the definition present the mark which faith has in common with the remaining theological virtues; the words, "to assent firmly," etc., present that which is proper to faith and by which it is distinguished from the remaining theological virtues, namely its material and formal object.

b. The subject of faith, or the power in which the habit of faith inheres, is the intellect: for a habit resides in the same power from which the act is elicited; but the act of faith is elicited by the intellect, which is furnished with the habit for eliciting that very act. Yet because the will also concurs in eliciting the act of faith, namely by commanding the assent, there is also in the will a habit disposing it to elicit the pious affection of believing.

c. The habit of faith is lost only through the sin of infidelity or through the sin of heresy, which is directly opposed to faith: for by an act by which man withdraws from the motive of faith, the habit itself of faith is destroyed. Therefore if someone culpably omits to elicit an act of faith, or if someone only externally denies the faith, he indeed sins gravely against faith, yet he does not lose the habit of faith, because he does not withdraw from the motive of faith.

b. The habit of faith is customarily called the light of faith: for as the intellect by which we know the truths of the natural order is called the natural light, so the power by which we embrace revealed truths is called the supernatural light.

b. Theological faith as an act is defined: the firm assent by which we embrace truths revealed by God on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 1-16. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, nn. 1-19. Laymann, Theologia moralis, bk. 2, tract. 1. John de Lugo, Disputationes scholasticae de virtute fidei divinae, disp. 3, nn. 2-20. Francis Suarez, De fide, disp. 1-8; 12-24. Lacroix, Theologia moralis, bk. 2, nn. 1-115. John Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, nn. 1-39. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1901, I, tr. 2, nn. 1-92. August Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, Freiburg: Herder, 1902, I, nn. 269-404. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, Prato: Giachetti, 1899, II, nn. 1-108. Fr. Ad. Goepfert, Moraltheologie, Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1905, I, nn. 264-282. E. Genicot, Theologiae moralis institutiones, Louvain: Polleunis and Ceuterick, 1905.

² St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, n. 25.

4. Object of faith. a. The material object of theological faith is the word of God: namely, all truths revealed by God constitute it. The primary material object is distinguished, which is God Himself and His perfections; and the secondary material object, which is constituted by other truths distinct from God, which nevertheless have all been revealed in order to God, namely that God and His perfections may be known better, and that man may be able to arrive at God, his eternal beatitude.

b. The formal object of theological faith is constituted by the authority of God revealing, who, since He is first truth, can neither be deceived in knowing nor deceive in speaking. Therefore theological faith rests on first truth, or on two divine perfections: on the supreme wisdom of God, or infallibility in knowing, and on the supreme veracity of God in speaking.

From the formal motive it is clear that faith ought to be universal, that is, that it should extend itself to all revealed truths: for he who denies even one article of faith, by that very fact implicitly denies all, because he denies the formal object of faith, the authority of God revealing, on which all the remaining articles rest.

5. Genesis or analysis of faith. In order that an act of faith may be elicited, reason must first know several truths, which cognitions therefore are called by theologians the preambles of faith.

1. First, it ought to know that God has spoken, or that God has given revelation: for unless it is established that a truth has in reality been revealed by God, we neither can nor ought to believe it with divine faith. Those arguments by which the fact of revelation is demonstrated are called motives of credibility, because they render revelation, that is, the Christian religion, credible. Now these arguments, miracles, prophecies, the wondrous preservation and propagation of the Church, the constancy of martyrs, etc., are indeed not evident, yet they are of such a kind that anyone from them can know the fact of revelation certainly, or without prudent fear of erring.

2. Next, it ought to know that God is supremely wise and supremely truthful, so that He can neither Himself be deceived nor deceive others: for faith by its nature rests upon the authority of God revealing, known with certainty; but authority derives all its force from the knowledge and truthfulness of the witness.

3. From this twofold cognition there arises the judgment: truths revealed by God are credible, that is, they can be believed rationally and prudently, which judgment is called the judgment concerning the credibility of revelation; indeed there arises the judgment: truths revealed by God must be believed, that is, they must be believed absolutely, which judgment is called the judgment concerning the credendity of revelation. Certainly, where it is certain that God, supremely wise and truthful, has spoken, man understands the most grave obligation of believing: for man is bound to believe God demanding faith; but by the very fact of revelation God demands faith. Each of these judgments, concerning the credibility and the credendity of revelation, is altogether evident.

4. Therefore this twofold cognition precedes the act of faith: namely, the cognition of divine authority, that what God reveals is true and must be believed, and the cognition of the fact of revelation, but God has revealed the Christian religion. Yet once these things have been known beforehand, the assent of the mind does not yet immediately follow, therefore the Christian religion is true and must be believed. For since one of the prerequisite cognitions, namely the fact of revelation, is not evident, the mind is not determined by arguments of reason to giving assent to revealed truth, but must be moved and determined by command of the will to giving the assent of faith. Now with this cognition shining beforehand, namely that the will can and ought to command assent, the will itself by a positive act commands the assent of faith to the intellect; this act of the will the Second Synod of Orange calls the affection of credulity. From this command of the will the act or assent of faith finally follows.

5. The assent of faith is free and therefore, the suppositions being supposed, meritorious. But the liberty of faith consists in this, that the assent of faith depends on the free will: for the will itself, with the goodness of that same assent shining beforehand, freely determines itself to command it.

6. Since theological faith, which by the Council of Trent is called the beginning, foundation, and root of all justification,¹ must be a supernatural act, it is elicited not by the powers of nature, but of grace. Therefore the judgment of the intellect by which we know the fact of revelation, the authority of God revealing, and the obligation of believing, proceeds from supernatural illumination; the will through the inspiration of grace conceives the pious affection of credulity; and finally the intellect through the powers of grace assents to revealed truth.

a. Once the nature of faith has been explained, it is now easily understood that by acts of faith we believe God (credere Deo), because by reason of the formal object we believe God revealing; that we believe God (credere Deum), because by reason of the material object we believe God and whatever things have been revealed concerning God; and finally that we believe in God (credere in Deum), because through faith we tend into God, our end.²

b. Although true faith requires from man the sacrifice of the intellect, insofar as he is bound to embrace truths whose internal reason he does not understand, and insofar therefore as he must bring his intellect into captivity unto the obedience of faith, nevertheless true faith is and must be a rational service, insofar as it does not believe and cannot believe unless by the light of reason it knows that all those things which it embraces by faith are absolutely true from divine authority.

¹ Sess. 6, c. 8.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 2.

6. Division of faith. 1. Into habitual faith, which is the habit or virtue of faith described above; and into actual faith, which is the act or assent of faith likewise defined above.

2. Habitual faith is one thing when formed by charity, or living, and another when unformed, or dead, according as it is joined with the habit of charity as in a just man, or is deprived of it as in a sinful man.

Unformed faith is not therefore called dead because it cannot and ought not exercise itself by acts of faith, and those supernatural acts: for it is a true virtue and true faith;¹ but it is called dead because the faithful man not yet justified lacks true supernatural life, which is had only where meritorious acts of eternal life can be exercised.

3. Actual faith is divided into internal faith, which is the assent of faith conceived in the mind; and external faith, which is the external profession of internal faith by words, actions, or other signs.

4. Actual faith is further divided into faith simply divine, by which that is believed which indeed has been revealed by God, but has not also been proposed by the Church to be believed; and into Catholic faith, by which is believed whatever is revealed by God and proposed by the Church to be believed.

a. By the will of Christ the Church has been constituted the means and organ by which revealed truths to be believed are proposed to the faithful; from this it is clear that by Catholic faith only public revelation can be believed, which by the authority of the Church is proposed to all to be believed, but by divine faith even a private revelation can be believed, which is granted to one man alone.

b. Therefore faith is also secondarily founded on the authority of the Church as on an infallible and necessary means by which we know the things which God has revealed. Therefore he who believes an article of faith acknowledges not only the authority of God revealing, but also the infallible authority of the Church; and he who denies an article of faith contemns not only the authority of God revealing, but also the authority of the Church infallibly proposing revealed truths.

c. Hence it is rightly said that theological faith is immediately resolved into the authority of the Church as into the means infallibly proposing truths revealed by God, and is ultimately resolved into the wisdom and veracity of God as into the motive of faith.

5. Actual faith is divided objectively into explicit faith, by which something is believed in itself, whether this happens with the terms known only confusedly or distinctly; and implicit faith, by which something is believed not in itself, but in another in which it is in some way contained.

Now that which is believed can be contained in another in two ways: a. in the truth which is believed, if this truth is general, in which other truths are contained; thus he who explicitly believes all things which God has revealed implicitly believes the Most Holy Trinity, and he who explicitly believes that God is the creator of all things implicitly believes that He is the creator of men; b. in the motive on account of which it is believed, which is the authority of God revealing: for he who explicitly believes some determinate article of faith because God has revealed it, by that very fact implicitly believes all other revealed truths, because their faith rests on the same motive.

6. Finally, actual faith is divided subjectively into formal and virtual, or exercised, faith: the former is faith which is expressly elicited in some truth on account of the authority of God revealing, as if someone believes that God is triune in persons because God, supremely wise and truthful, has revealed it; the latter is faith in some truth which is presupposed by the act of some virtue and accompanies it by its own influence. Thus faith in the Most Holy Trinity accompanies by its influence the act of one forming the sign of the cross and is presupposed by it.

The difference between formal and virtual faith consists in this, that he who elicits formal faith explicitly attends to the motive of faith, while he who elicits virtual faith does not expressly attend to the authority of God revealing nor think reflectively about it. Virtual and exercised faith supposes actual and express cognition of the motive of faith, which cognition, remaining habitually in the soul, flows by its power into the action by which faith is exercised. Thus he has virtual and exercised faith who bends his knees before the Most Holy Sacrament, or receives the sacrament of penance, even if he does not think reflectively about the revelation of God, just as the farmer has virtual and exercised hope of the harvest who scatters seeds from hope of the harvest, even if he does not think reflectively about the harvest.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 28.

7. Assertion. Actual faith is necessary for all adults by necessity of means: for those not yet justified, unto justification; for those justified, unto salvation.

a. In order to salvation there is distinguished a twofold necessity, one of means, the other of precept. That is called necessary by necessity of means without which the end cannot be obtained, even if it is inculpably not employed; and that is called necessary by necessity of precept without which the end cannot be obtained only then, if it is culpably not employed. Of this kind is everything which obliges under grave precept.

If that which is necessary by necessity of means is not in our power, it is called necessary by necessity of means only; but if it is in our power, it is called necessary by necessity of means and of precept: for by the same obligation by which we are bound to the end, we are also bound to employ the means necessary for it, if they are in our power.

If that which is necessary by necessity of means is required in itself and cannot be supplied by another means, as sanctifying grace at the end of life, it is called necessary by a strict, absolute necessity of means and in reality; but if it can be supplied by another means, as the sacrament of baptism, it is called necessary by a broad, hypothetical necessity of means and at least in desire.

b. Habitual faith also is necessary for salvation by necessity of means: for from faith it is certain that no one is saved unless he is adorned with sanctifying grace; but together with sanctifying grace, which is infused in justification, habitual faith also is at the same time infused. But since moral theology treats not of habits, but chiefly of the acts of virtues, the discussion in this place is concerning the necessity of the act of faith. From this it is clear that this necessity regards adults alone; but in moral theology those are called adults who have attained the use of reason.

c. There are among recent theologians some who, in order to render easier the eternal salvation of unbelievers, teach that for obtaining justification there is not always required faith properly so called, by which a revealed truth is believed on account of the authority of God revealing, but that sometimes faith improperly so called suffices, by which the mind embraces a truth known by the light of reason under the actual influence of grace. The assertion is understood concerning faith properly so called.¹

d. Where here the necessity of the act of faith is treated, it is only affirmed that some act of theological faith is necessary, prescinding from its object or from the truths to be believed, concerning which there will be discussion below.

¹ Fr. Schmid, Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege, Brixen: Pressverein, 1899, second section, Die Notwendigkeit des Glaubens, p. 79. W. Liese, Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, Freiburg: Charitas-Druckerei, 1902. Martin, De necessitate credendi et credendorum seu de fide salutari, Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1906.

8. Necessity of means. 1. Actual faith is necessary for adults not yet justified by necessity of means unto obtaining first justification, whether ex opere operato through the sacrament or ex opere operantis through an act of charity or of perfect contrition: a. But without faith it is impossible to please God: for he who approaches God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him;¹ but these words of the apostle must be understood concerning actual faith, and that properly so called.² b. And indeed an adult man cannot arrive at justification unless by his own acts he disposes himself for it; but he cannot dispose himself for it unless he knows that God is and that the same God will be propitious to him; and he cannot know this except through faith.³ c. The Council of Trent, speaking of faith, and that properly so called, adds, "without which justification has never happened to anyone."⁴

Explicit and formal actual faith is necessary only for the first justification of an adult; but for second justification, which the sinner obtains either in the sacrament of penance or through perfect contrition, virtual faith suffices, unless he has lost the habit of faith. For although the Council of Trent⁵ enumerates faith and hope among the dispositions of the adult for obtaining justification, nevertheless the acts which the council enumerates do not always have to be formally elicited, as in first justification, but it suffices that they be virtually present.

2. Actual faith is necessary for adults already justified by necessity of means unto salvation: for the adult man ought to order himself and all his things to God, the ultimate end, or to tend by his acts to the supernatural end of eternal life and merit it for himself by good works; but this cannot happen unless he believes that God is, and that He is the rewarder of the good and the avenger of evils.

There are some who say that actual faith is necessary by necessity of means for absolutely all men using reason, even baptized children, as soon as they have arrived at the use of reason;⁶ others, on the contrary, say that actual faith is necessary for children of this kind by necessity of precept.⁷ Now nothing prevents it from being called necessary by necessity of means, provided it is held that adults of this kind are to be equated with infants until they have been instructed in faith and attend to the obligation of eliciting an act of faith, and therefore can be saved even without an act of faith.

3. This faith in adults not yet justified ought to be explicit and formal, by which some truths are believed explicitly in themselves; nevertheless in adults already justified virtual faith suffices, provided they explicitly know the things which must be believed by necessity of means and acknowledge the authority of God revealing: for a more perfect faith is not required for obtaining the end on account of which faith is necessary. Furthermore, faith is necessary in reality, nor does its desire suffice, which is contained in the act of charity of God.

¹ Heb. 11:6. Cf. Gal. 2:16.

² Cf. Schmid, loc. cit., n. 103.

³ Cf. Schmid, loc. cit., who in n. 94 ff. develops the arguments with equal acuteness and learning.

⁴ Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7. Cf. Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3.

⁵ Sess. 6, c. 6.

⁶ Lacroix, bk. 2, n. 11 ff.

⁷ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 10.

13. Things to be premised concerning the precepts themselves of faith. 1. The precept of faith concerns both the internal act and the external act; each is twofold: negative, of not denying the faith either interiorly or exteriorly; and affirmative, of eliciting interiorly an act of faith and of confessing the faith exteriorly. This precept of external faith is both divine and ecclesiastical.

2. The obligation of eliciting an act of faith sometimes exists per se, or by reason of faith itself; sometimes it exists accidentally, or by reason of another precept which cannot be fulfilled without an act of faith, for example, of receiving Holy Communion. He who violates the former obligation commits a sin against faith; he who violates the latter sins only against that virtue which cannot be exercised without an act of faith.

3. In order that the faithful may satisfy the precept of faith, it is not necessary that the act of faith be formal, but virtual faith suffices, such as pious faithful very frequently elicit, provided the mysteries of faith have been proposed to them as revealed by God, for example, when they recite the Apostolic Symbol, make the sign of the cross, pray, hear Mass, frequent the sacraments: for all these things suppose or include an act of faith.

14. Whether it exists and when it obliges. 1. There exists a divine precept gravely obliging one to elicit acts of faith. In Sacred Scripture this precept is often enjoined: He who has not believed will be condemned;¹ he who does not believe is already judged;² and this is His commandment, that we believe in the name of His Son, Jesus Christ.³ But it is clear that this precept is grave: for condemnation is the punishment of mortal sin.⁴

2. Since an affirmative precept does not oblige always, but only at certain times, it is now asked how often and when the internal act of faith must be elicited. An affirmative precept which at the same time does not determine the time at which it obliges is judged to oblige when it is understood to be necessary; and there are five times at which the precept of eliciting an act of faith urges per se:

a. When divine revelation has been sufficiently proposed to a man.

a. As soon as divine revelation has been sufficiently proposed, an act of faith is necessary: for reverence toward the infallible authority of God demands that man believe at once when something is proposed to him as revealed by God and to be believed; otherwise the authority of God would be judged to be contemned. Just as we ought immediately to show reverence to a king appearing to us, so we ought immediately to believe God speaking to us. Besides this, when man has attained the use of reason, he is bound to place the beginning of spiritual life, that is, to tend to God, the supernatural ultimate end of his life, through the observation of the commandments; but this cannot happen without an act of faith at least virtually elicited.

b. The truths of faith are judged to have been sufficiently proposed to those who certainly know that their revelation has been made by God and know the obligation of believing. Therefore the children of the Christian faithful are bound to elicit an act of faith as soon as they have perfectly attained the use of reason and have been so instructed in faith that they apprehend the mysteries of faith as revealed by God; but unbelievers and heretics are bound to this, together with entrance into the Catholic Church, when first the truths of faith have been so proposed to them that they certainly know them as revealed by God and know the obligation of believing them.⁵

c. If anywhere the political power forbids conversion to the true faith before a certain year of age, the sixteenth or eighteenth, the law is impious, and it is not permitted to him who has been persuaded of the truth of the Catholic religion to defer the profession of faith longer on account of civil law. Pastors of souls are bound to admit to the profession of faith those who seek to be gathered into the bosom of the Church, notwithstanding any temporal evil of their own or of another. But to avoid evils which from the civil law threaten both the parish priest and the one to be converted, it can be permitted that by mutual consent the conversion be deferred until the legal age, or that the conversion already completed be hidden until that age, if it is now very near.

b. More often in life, because faith is very necessary for conserving the spiritual life. Apart from the beginning of spiritual life, another determinate time cannot indeed be assigned at which the divine precept of eliciting an act of faith obliges; nevertheless it cannot be denied that it obliges several times. Therefore the faithful are indeed to be earnestly exhorted to elicit acts of faith frequently; but they are not easily to be accused of sin on account of an omitted act of faith.

Some authors affirm that faith must be elicited at a determinate time, and some indeed at least once a year, others once a month, others on each Sunday and feast.⁶ To confirm this opinion of theirs they appeal to two propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which one (17) is this: It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life; but the other (65) reads thus: It suffices to have believed those mysteries, namely of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation, once. Yet the authors who establish these precepts add that they are satisfied through the use of faith, namely, by the fact that faith is exercised through the observation of other precepts.

But from the condemned propositions we have only this: that there exists a precept of eliciting an act of faith more than once, or more often, in life; but how often and when it must be elicited is altogether indeterminate; and an indeterminate precept cannot urge at a determinate time. Besides, the faithful will rarely sin formally against this precept: for those who live as Christians satisfy it abundantly through the exercise of faith; but others do not advert to the obligation of believing. Therefore it is not necessary that the confessor question penitents about an act of faith elicited from time to time, whether they had been diligent or negligent in exercising religion.

c. After a lapse into heresy or after a denial of faith: for he who has lost faith ought again to adhere to God through faith.

d. When a temptation against faith urges which is hoped to be overcome only through an act of faith.

If a temptation against faith urges, by the virtue itself of faith we are bound to fight against the temptation in order to preserve this faith; therefore as often as an act of faith is the only means of overcoming the temptation, we are bound to elicit it from the precept of faith. Yet outside the article of death it will rarely happen that a temptation against faith can be overcome only through an act of faith, and this all the more because temptations against faith are generally overcome more efficaciously if we do not struggle against them directly, but turn the mind to other objects.

e. When a new definition or a new article of faith is proposed: for God speaking is to be believed. Hence, if some new dogma is proposed, it does not suffice not to deny it by suspending assent, but it must be believed by internal assent.

There are some who, with St. Alphonsus (n. 7), say that the precept of eliciting an act of faith also urges per se in the article of death, because then we are most of all bound to tend into God, the ultimate end; and besides this, if the precept of communion then obliges, the precept of faith also obliges. But it cannot be proved with certainty that faith is necessary at that time, unless a vehement temptation against faith urges. And indeed, he who is said to be bound in death to elicit faith is either in the state of grace or in the state of sin: if the first, the necessity of faith does not appear, unless otherwise the temptation against faith cannot be overcome; if the second, faith is indeed necessary, but not per se from the virtue of faith, but accidentally from the obligation of reconciling oneself with God, which cannot happen without faith at least virtually elicited. And as regards Holy Communion, there indeed exists a precept of receiving the Holy Eucharist in death on account of the particular necessity of this sacrament in the last struggle, but a precept of eliciting an act of faith in death cannot be brought forward.

¹ Mark 16:16.

² John 3:18.

³ 1 John 3:23.

⁴ This proposition (16) was condemned by Innocent XI: faith is not judged to fall under a special precept and according to itself.

⁵ An unbeliever or heretic is not indeed bound to believe so long as he does not certainly know the truth of the Christian faith, but he is bound to inquire into the true faith: for where eternal salvation is at stake, it is not permitted to rest before the certain way of obtaining it has been found. Therefore this proposition (4) was condemned by Innocent XI: An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity; that is, so long as his sect appears probable to the unbeliever, even if less probable than the Christian religion, he indeed is not bound to believe, but neither can he licitly remain tranquil in his sect, since he is bound to inquire further until he has arrived at certain knowledge of the truth.

⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, n. 7.

15. When it obliges accidentally. Accidentally the obligation of eliciting an act of faith urges: a. when other obligations which require faith must be fulfilled; thus the faithful cannot hear Mass, nor receive the sacraments, etc., unless an act of faith is supposed, which is virtually elicited; b. when a grave temptation against another virtue urges, and this temptation cannot be overcome without an act of faith: for everyone is bound to use the necessary means for avoiding sin.

16. Whether there exists a divine precept and when it obliges. 1. There exists a grave obligation of confessing faith externally, even with danger to life; this is established from Sacred Scripture: Everyone therefore who shall confess Me before men, I also will confess him before My Father who is in heaven; but he who shall deny Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father who is in heaven.¹ If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart, you will be saved: for with the heart belief is unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.²

Since this precept also is affirmative, it is asked when the obligation of confessing faith externally urges. The question, however, is concerning formal confession of faith, which is made with the intention that internal faith be outwardly manifested, not concerning material confession, which is made through the observation of a precept that contains a manifestation of faith.

2. The divine precept of formally confessing faith obliges:

a. When the honor of God or of Christ requires external confession, where namely from the omission of confession great detriment of divine honor follows, but from confession great honor accrues to God or to Christ; and this happens especially: a. if someone is asked about his faith by public authority in a cause of faith; b. if the doctrine of faith is mocked or if sacred things are violated.

a. If someone is asked by public authority in a cause of faith about his faith, namely whether he is a Catholic, or what he thinks about some truth of faith, whether this happens publicly or privately, he is bound to confess his faith without ambiguity, even with danger to life,³ because the omission of profession among unbelievers would greatly diminish esteem for God and for the true religion; on the contrary, through public confession the true faith is confirmed and propagated. But if some private unbeliever or heretic asks someone about his faith, of itself he is not bound to confess it, but can be silent or evade the question in another way.

b. If in your presence the doctrine of faith or of the Church is exposed to mockery or blasphemies, you are bound not only to profess the faith, but also, if you judge yourself sufficient for this, to defend it; and if in your presence the Most Holy Eucharist or sacred images or relics are violated, you are bound to manifest yourself as a Catholic and to restrain the injuries, unless you foresee that your efforts will be of no profit.⁴

b. When the utility of the neighbor requires external confession, where namely from the omission of confession the faithful would fall away from the faith and unbelievers would be confirmed in their error; but, on the contrary, from confession unbelievers would be converted and the faithful confirmed in the true faith.

Whether an adult who receives baptism or returns to the Church ought publicly to profess the faith. Every Christian, by the will of Christ, ought visibly to adhere to the Church; but he adheres visibly to the Church through profession of faith. This obligation of outwardly manifesting the faith endures throughout the course of life; but it is fulfilled by this very fact, that the precepts are observed which contain the external profession of faith, such as hearing Mass, receiving the sacraments, etc.

a. Hence, outside the case of necessity, it is not permitted to baptize an adult or admit him to conversion secretly, with only the priest knowing, but this ought to happen publicly before others, at least two witnesses. Therefore the Church prescribes that the abjuration of heresy which is required of new converts be made before two witnesses, and that the completed conversion be inserted into the parochial books, both so that satisfaction may be made to the obligation of professing the faith, and so that the converted person may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Church in the external forum.

b. Baptism received or conversion completed may indeed be hidden for a time for a grave reason, without being made public, provided the new convert does nothing by which he professes a false sect; thus, as history witnesses, hidden Christians lived in the court of the Roman emperors; but meanwhile he is excused from the positive precepts either of God or of the Church on account of grave inconvenience. Yet concealment for a long time is illicit, both because the obligation of professing the faith urges, and because in practice it cannot happen that circumstances will not soon occur in which the convert must deny the faith and externally profess the sect. Therefore it has been established that a Mohammedan who on account of danger to life wishes to be and remain a hidden Christian cannot be admitted to baptism, but he ought to transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion.⁵

c. In a case of necessity, where namely one dying, for a grave cause, refuses public conversion to the faith, he can be received into the Church altogether secretly by any priest, so that provision may be made for his salvation, unless the reason of preventing scandal or of promoting the salvation of the neighbor requires otherwise, as in a man of great dignity and authority. But even in this case the conversion can be made before only two witnesses, who, if there is need, can afterwards make the matter public.⁶

¹ Matt. 10:32-33.

² Rom. 10:9 ff. Cf. 2 Tim. 2:12.

³ Proposition 18, condemned by Innocent XI: If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel that he sincerely confess the faith as glorious to God and to the faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful of itself.

⁴ Sporer-Bierbaum, I, tract. 2, n. 43.

⁵ S. C. de Prop. Fide, 28 May 1635.

⁶ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Casus conscientiae, I, n. 182 ff.

17. By ecclesiastical law, to certain persons, both ecclesiastical and lay, in certain circumstances profession of faith is prescribed. The cause of this precept is judged to be grave, namely lest spiritual or temporal rule and the office of teaching others be committed to an unbelieving or heretical man. Yet in many regions this precept, at least in part, has been abolished by desuetude.¹

¹ Concerning who must emit the profession of faith according to the form prescribed by Pius IV, with the addition made by Pius IX, see Lehmkuhl, I, n. 296; Aichner, Compendium iuris ecclesiastici, Brixen: Weger, 1900, §150, 3.

25. What sins there are against faith. One can sin against faith by omission, namely by omitting: a. due diligence in learning the truths of faith necessary to be known; b. the prescribed act of faith; c. the profession of faith prescribed either by God or by the Church; and by commission, by placing an action prohibited by the precept of faith. A sin of commission can be committed by excess and by defect. By excess one sins through credulity, by which, without sufficient reason, something is rashly believed as revealed by God which has not been revealed, as if someone lightly believes private revelations; yet this sin does not exceed venial sin. By defect one sins by external or internal denial of faith, which happens by infidelity, apostasy, heresy, doubt concerning faith, and communication in sacred things with unbelievers and heretics.

41. Definition. 1. Hope as a virtue, habitual hope, is defined: an infused supernatural habit by which man is disposed to expect with certainty, from the promise of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for it.

Theological hope as an act, actual hope, is defined: the certain expectation of future beatitude, to be obtained from the most faithful divine promise through the means ordained by God.

The name of hope is taken in various senses: for it signifies a. the expectation of a possible future good, whether sensible or suprasensible; b. the thing hoped for itself, as when it is said: awaiting the blessed hope,² or: hope, that is beatitude, comes to us from merits; c. the cause and reason of hope, whether primary or secondary, as when it is said: Thou hast become my hope, O Lord, or if the Blessed Virgin is called our hope; d. both the habit and the act of the theological virtue.

2. Hope is not an act of the intellect but of the will, consisting in a trustful expectation which is joined with certainty, or firmness and quiet, excluding inordinate fear lest we not obtain the hoped-for good.

a. The act of hope supposes and contains several acts: a. an act of love, love of concupiscence, by which God pleases us as our good and the object of our beatitude; for we cannot hope except for what pleases us as our good. b. An act of desire, by which the will is borne toward an absent good: for from love of a good by its nature there arises desire of it, if the beloved good is absent. c. From the divine promise we know that the attainment of the desired good is possible for us: for we cannot hope for a good which cannot be obtained by us, and at the same time we know that God, on account of His fidelity in preserving promises, cannot fail us; whence, toward that good, there arises an act of expectation and trust that we shall one day be made participants of it. Finally we understand that neither power nor will is lacking to God on His part for giving the promised goods, whence we are raised up to firm and certain expectation.

b. Therefore, because hope, looked at fully and adequately, contains several acts in itself, the formal object of hope so considered must also be called multiple: and indeed the formal object of love of concupiscence and of desire is God insofar as He is good to us, or the relative goodness of God; the motive of hope formally considered is the fidelity of God in fulfilling promises; the motive of the certainty and firmness which is inherent in trust is the omnipotence and mercy of God.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 17-22. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, nn. 20-21. Suarez, De spe, disp. 1 and 2. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, tract. 2, nn. 107-125. Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, nn. 56-70. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, II, nn. 109-133. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, I, nn. 305-313.

² Tit. 2:13.

42. Hope joined with fear. Theological hope ought to be firm and certain, excluding all diffidence and hesitation, and nevertheless it has fear joined to it: with fear and trembling work out your salvation.¹ Firmness is referred to the promise; fear to the attainment. The firmness and certainty of hope arises from the motive of hoping, which we have on the part of God, namely from certain knowledge that God can and wills to stand by all His promises, because He is omnipotent and merciful; and indeed the firmness of this knowledge is increased from the fact that God has already given such manifest arguments of His kindness and mercy toward us. The fear which is joined to hope has its origin on our part, because we know that the outcome of those things which we hope for can be frustrated because of our frailty. For God did not promise beatitude to us absolutely, but conditionally, namely dependently on our cooperation; now since with absolute certainty we cannot know whether the conditions are fulfilled on our part or not, there is always a reason for fear: for we cannot know with certainty whether we are worthy of love or hatred.² Yet since we can attain eternal beatitude, provided we ourselves seriously will it, this fear ought to exclude on the one hand rash security, and on the other also faint-hearted anxiety.

¹ Phil. 2:12. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9.

² Eccl. 9:1.

43. Object of hope. a. The material object of hope is constituted by all the goods promised to us by God; and since these are of two kinds, a primary object is distinguished, which is God Himself insofar as He is our highest good and our objective beatitude, and a secondary object, which is constituted by all the means which, from God's ordination, are necessary and useful for obtaining that beatitude, namely habitual gifts, helps of grace, remission of sins, goods both spiritual and also temporal, and the special providence of God, which may turn evils away from us and procure goods for us.

b. The formal object of hope is the supreme fidelity of God promising, who can perform what He has promised, because He is omnipotent, and wills to perform what He has promised, because He is most benign. And as faith supposes revelation, so hope supposes the divine promise of those things which we hope for as a necessary condition.¹

¹ Others present the reason of hope and its formal object otherwise. Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie XXII (1898), p. 63 ff.: "Das Formalobjekt der Hoffnung."

44. On the necessity itself of hope. 1. Actual hope is necessary for adults by necessity of means: for those not yet justified, unto justification; for those justified, unto salvation.

Arguments. a. An adult ought to dispose himself by his own acts for obtaining justification from God, which is impossible without hope, by which he trusts that he can obtain remission of sins. Besides this, he who intends to be justified ought to have at least the implicit purpose of keeping all the commandments for the whole time of his life; but since he cannot accomplish this by his own powers, he cannot conceive this purpose unless he trusts in the help of grace. Therefore the Council of Trent, among the dispositions which are required for the justification of adults, after faith also enumerates hope.¹ b. A justified man ought to attain his supernatural end of eternal beatitude by his own merits to be acquired through the help of grace; but he cannot tend to this end unless he hopes for eternal beatitude and for the helps of grace necessary for obtaining it. Besides this, prayer is necessary for salvation by necessity of means; but prayer is impossible without the exercise of hope;² therefore hope also is necessary by necessity of means.

The discussion here concerns the act of hope, which moral theology chiefly considers. The infused habit of hope is necessary for all, even infants, for salvation by absolute necessity of means: for since sanctifying grace is absolutely necessary, the habit of hope also, which is infused together with it, is absolutely necessary.

2. Actual hope is necessary for adults also by necessity of divine precept, both natural and positive.

a. For by natural precept man is bound to employ the means necessary for salvation; but the act of hope is a means necessary for salvation. b. In Sacred Scripture we are everywhere admonished and stirred up to hope;³ but by these texts of Sacred Scripture the act of hope is not only counseled, but truly prescribed. Besides this, Christ the Lord in the Lord's Prayer taught us the manner of hoping and asking, and prescribed it to us.⁴

The precept of hope is affirmative and negative: insofar as it is affirmative, it imposes the obligation of eliciting an act of hope; insofar as it is negative, it enjoins the obligation of not despairing and not presuming. But the affirmative precept obliges per se and accidentally; now it is asked when and how often the act of hope must be elicited.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6.

² James 1:6-7.

³ 1 Tim. 6:17; Rom. 8:24; Col. 1:5; Ps. 4:6.

⁴ Proposition 1, condemned by Alexander VII: Man at no time whatever of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, charity by force of the precepts pertaining to those virtues.

45. When the precept of hope obliges. 1. The precept of hope obliges per se, or by reason of the virtue itself of hope:

a. At the beginning of the use of reason or of spiritual life, that is, when first God and eternal beatitude, into which man ought to tend by the means ordained by God, have been sufficiently proposed to him.

a. For reverence owed to God requires that we immediately adhere to God with firm trust as soon as we know that God has promised eternal beatitude to us. b. Besides this, at the beginning of the use of reason man ought to tend into God, the ultimate end, through the means ordained for this; but he cannot tend into God and begin a spiritual life which is meritorious of eternal life unless he hopes for eternal retribution and the means necessary for salvation.

b. Several times in life, in order to conserve justice; but the time at which the act of hope ought to be elicited cannot be determined. Yet it must be elicited frequently, because it is so necessary for leading the Christian life; this is clear both from the fact that the desire of eternal beatitude is a most efficacious motive for observing the precepts, and from the fact that prayer is necessary, which cannot be exercised without hope.

Yet because, for satisfying the precept of hope, a formal act of hope is not required, but virtual hope suffices, practically it does not bring difficulty: for there is no sufficiently instructed Christian faithful person who does not in this way rather often elicit acts of hope, while he prays, receives the sacraments, observes the precepts, and purposes not to offend God lest he fall away from eternal salvation; but if he neglects the Christian life, he does not advert to this obligation.

c. When a temptation against hope urges which cannot be conquered except through an act of hope: for the precept of hope obliges one to repel temptations which arise against it; for if an act of hope is the means necessary for this, it must be employed from the precept of hope.

d. When man through the mortal sin of despair has lost the habit of hope: for he is bound to return to God by conversion from despair, which ought to happen through an act of hope.

2. Accidentally the precept of eliciting hope urges: a. in a temptation against another virtue, if this temptation cannot be overcome unless the soul is strengthened by an act of hope; b. when another precept must be fulfilled which cannot be fulfilled without at least a virtual and implicit act of hope, such as the precept of prayer, penance, etc.

46. On fear and hope insofar as they are motives of moral actions. Since non-Catholic writers reproach the moral doctrine of the Church, indeed even of the Gospel, for this reason, because Catholic doctrine says that moral actions performed from fear of punishment or from hope of reward are honorable and licit, although, they say, they are useless, indeed even vicious, it is helpful to explain briefly in what sense fear and hope are licit and honorable motives of moral actions. Namely, although according to the doctrine of the Church works done from charity are more perfect, nevertheless works performed with a view to eternal recompense do not lack moral honesty and spiritual usefulness.

Long ago Luther and Calvin had taught that works performed with a view to eternal recompense are useless and savor of vicious cupidity; afterwards Baius and the Jansenists had affirmed the same, whose doctrine the Council of Trent¹ and Alexander VIII² condemned. With these heretics today atheist philosophers agree, who agree in this affirmation: Actions from the motive of eternal life are opposed to pure morality. Die Motivierung der Handlungen durch die Hoffnung auf ewige Seligkeit ist eine Falschung der reinen Sittlichkeit.

1. On fear. a. Fear is an act of the will which turns away from an imminent evil; fear of God, or divine fear, turns away from the evil which God can inflict because of sin.

Servile fear fears punishment, damnation, to be inflicted by God because of sin, or sin as the cause of this punishment; it is called servile because servants are accustomed to obey because of fear of punishment. This fear is servilely servile if one fearing punishment, or sin because of punishment, has the will of sinning if there were no punishment, that is, hell.

Filial fear fears offense of God and the loss of divine friendship, or sin because it is an offense of God with loss of divine friendship. It is called filial because it belongs to sons to fear lest they offend their parents.

Initial fear fears offense of God and eternal punishment, or sin because it is an offense of God to be punished by eternal punishment. It is called initial because it belongs to beginners to fear sin, both because it is an offense of God and because it is a cause of punishment.

b. Just as servile fear is licit and honorable, so to serve God, to avoid sins, and to observe the precepts from fear of punishment is licit and honorable, provided the will of sinning is excluded; yet the motive of charity is far nobler and more perfect.

Servilely servile fear is morally evil and vicious, because it does not exclude the will of sinning; it prefers punishment to sin, the sinner to God the Creator, which cannot be said of servile fear. Therefore fear is commanded by God: Fear Him who ... has power to cast into gehenna;³ in Sacred Scripture it is said to be opposed to sin: The fear of the Lord drives out sin;⁴ it is sought from God as a gift: Pierce my flesh with Thy fear.⁵

2. On hope. a. From the motive of hope someone can serve God and observe the precepts in three different ways: a. in such a way that he would not serve the precepts unless eternal reward had been promised; b. in such a way that he observes them only because of eternal reward, thinking nothing of that condition; c. in such a way that he observes them both because of the reward and because of God.

b. To observe the precepts with a view to eternal recompense in such a way that they would not be observed if no recompense were given is vicious cupidity: for he who thus does good prefers himself to God; but to observe the precepts with a view to recompense is a morally good work and, under the due conditions, meritorious.

a. The motive of hope is most fitting to human nature, since it is especially consonant with the natural appetite by which man is borne toward his own happiness. Besides this, where great difficulties must be overcome in the service of God, man must be aided by the motive of hope and fear, lest he fall away from moral perfection.

b. Sacred Scripture praises and commends works which are done from the motive of hope with a view to recompense: Everyone who contends in a contest abstains from all things; and they indeed do this in order that they may receive a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible one.⁶

c. Although the motive of hope is lower than the motive of charity, nevertheless it does not exclude the motive of charity; indeed it necessarily leads to charity.

He who wills to attain eternal life also wills those things which are necessary for attaining eternal life; but for attaining eternal life charity is necessary.⁷

Note. The peculiar relation which exists between man's holiness, charity of God, and eternal beatitude must be considered. Eternal life, toward which we strive, is at the same time man's holiness and happiness. Therefore he who observes the precepts with a view to recompense implicitly at the same time intends his own holiness and the glory of God; and he who observes the precepts from charity of God or for acquiring holiness implicitly at the same time intends his own beatitude, since eternal beatitude is God.

¹ Sess. 6, can. 31: If anyone shall say that the justified man sins when he works well with a view to eternal recompense, let him be anathema.

² Prop. 13. Whoever serves God even with a view to eternal recompense, if he lacks charity, is not without vice whenever he works with a view, although to beatitude.

³ Luke 12:5.

⁴ Ecclus. 1:27.

⁵ Ps. 118:120.

⁶ 1 Cor. 9:25. Cf. Ps. 118:112; Col. 3:23 s.; Apoc. 2:10.

⁷ Cf. concerning this question: Kneib, Die "Lohnsucht" der christlichen Moral, Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft, Vienna: Meyer, 1904. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, Freiburg: Herder, 1907. Schneider, Die gottliche Weltordnung, Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1900: "Die 'Lohnsucht' der religiosen Moral," p. 496.

47. What sins there are against hope. One can sin against hope by omission and by commission: by omission indeed if an act of hope is not elicited when by force of the precept it is to be elicited. Sins of commission against hope are of two kinds: for they are opposed either to the twofold act which precedes theological hope, namely to love and desire of beatitude, or to the act which essentially constitutes hope, namely to the trust of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for it. Further, to hope insofar as it contains desire of beatitude there is opposed hatred of God, our beatitude, or excessive adherence to earthly goods; but to hope insofar as it is trust two sins are opposed, one by defect, which is despair, the other by excess, which is presumption.

Whether it is a sin against hope to wish for death from weariness of life. Because this act does not contain aversion from God, the ultimate end, nor exclude the desire of eternal beatitude, it is not a sin against hope, but either is a defect of subjection toward the order of divine providence, which defect ordinarily does not exceed venial sin, or it is impatience arising from inordinate love of self, by which someone refuses to bear the miseries of this life, which likewise ordinarily does not exceed venial sin. This desire is a grave sin if it happens with full deliberation and express rebellion against divine providence. But if someone wishes for death with due patience and subordination toward God, he does not commit a sin but performs an act of virtue, provided it proceeds from desire of eternal beatitude to be attained in God.¹ To wish never to have been born, or to be annihilated, is a grave sin against hope, unless someone intends by desires of this kind only to signify the vehemence of pain.

¹ Phil. 1:23.

48. Hatred of God, which is directly opposed to hope, namely hatred of abomination, is that by which man turns himself away from God, his ultimate end, not willing to constitute his beatitude in Him. This hatred of God is a sign of great and inordinate adherence to earthly goods and is certainly a grave sin, because earthly goods are preferred to God and His possession, which involves contempt of God.

Whether it is a grave sin to wish to remain perpetually in this life. If this desire coheres with that disposition of soul by which someone is prepared to leave heaven to God if He grants him earth, it is a grave sin against hope, because, turning himself away from God, he turns himself to creatures and places his happiness in them. But if this desire only signifies an excessive affection for this earth and its goods, or fear of death because of the uncertainty of eternal happiness, it is not necessarily a grave sin against hope, because this disposition of soul of itself does not exclude desire of beatitude. Spouses who desire to live together perpetually on earth not rarely intend by words of this kind only to signify the vehemence of love.

49. Despair is voluntary and full diffidence of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for it.

a. Despair consists in a positive act of the will by which it, all hope having been cast away, voluntarily withdraws from God, the ultimate end, or from beatitude and the pursuit of it. Despair proximately arises from a prior judgment of the intellect by which someone thinks that he will be excluded from beatitude; but the reason because of which someone thinks that he is not to be saved can be diverse: for either he persuades himself that his sins are greater than that God can remit them, or he judges the way of the commandments of God to be too arduous, or he judges that God does not will either to spare him or to grant him helps, or he judges that it will never happen that God spare him, that he duly dispose himself for obtaining pardon of sins, etc.

b. From despair must be distinguished the fear by which sometimes even pious men are distressed because of the uncertainty of salvation. In like manner devout souls, which are sometimes troubled by continual temptations of despair, are not easily to be judged to have sinned gravely. In order that the confessor may know whether the penitent has consented to the sin of despair, he will be able to ask him whether for this reason he omitted his customary exercises of piety. For if someone, for example, for this reason ceases to pray because he is persuaded that God does not will to assist him, he sins gravely against hope; but if only from a certain inordinate sadness he loses heart and ceases from prayer, he does not sin gravely, and he sins in no way if he ceases to ask for health because he thinks that God does not will to restore it to him.¹

¹ Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscientiae, Rome: Typographia Iuvenum Opificum, 1902, n. 32.

50. Its moral malice. Since despair is directly repugnant to the divine attributes, fidelity and goodness, it is a sin mortal from its whole genus, not admitting smallness of matter; indeed greater than sins which are opposed to the moral virtues, but less than the sins of infidelity and hatred of God which is opposed to charity: for infidelity and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself; but despair is against God as He is our good.

a. Although despair is not the gravest sin of all, nevertheless it is more dangerous than other sins: for experience establishes that, with hope of salvation plainly cast away, men rush without restraint into vices.¹ But in concrete cases it must be adverted whether someone really despairs concerning the goodness and mercy of God, or rather from faint-heartedness concerning his own cooperation with divine grace.

b. Men who from a depraved habit are given to sins, for example of drunkenness or pollution, sometimes seem to despair, since they are accustomed to say that they can no longer lay aside a depraved habit now too inveterate. Yet these are more faint-hearted than despairing; they despair rather concerning their own cooperation than concerning divine help. Wherefore they are to be raised up into greater trust in divine grace and admonished concerning cooperation with the help of grace.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 3.

51. Presumption is the rash expectation of eternal beatitude and of the means for attaining it, namely otherwise than God has ordained. The sin of presumption can be committed in five different ways:

a. If someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude by his own powers, which is Pelagian presumption.

b. If someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude without good works, from the merits of Christ alone, or without observation of the commandments, from the mercy of God alone, which is Lutheran presumption.

c. If someone trusts that he will obtain divine help for carrying out evil, for example revenge. In this case blasphemy is joined with presumption.

d. If someone trusts that he will obtain extraordinary goods against the order of divine providence, for example the holiness of the Blessed Virgin Mary or of the greatest saint, to which he knows that he is not to be elevated by God.

e. If someone assumes divine mercy as a motive of sinning and of repeating sins.¹

Whether it is presumption to sin because of hope of obtaining pardon. a. To sin or to persevere in sin from passion or frailty with the hope of obtaining pardon is not presumption: for hope of pardon is not the motive inducing to sinning, but an affection accompanying the sin; as if a soldier indulging in a rather free life defers confession until his military service has been completed.

b. To sin because of the ease of accusing sins, that is, if someone repeats sin because it is easy to confess or because several sins are accused as easily as one, likewise is not presumption, because the motive inducing one to repeat sins is not the ease of obtaining pardon, but the ease of confession.

c. To sin because of hope of pardon, that is, if someone sins and perseveres in sins because God remits several sins as easily as one, late as easily as soon, is a sin of presumption, because hope of pardon is the motive inducing to sinning and therefore an inordinate trust in divine mercy. Yet this sin of presumption is rarely committed, because hope of pardon must be called rather the occasion than the motive of sinning.²

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 310.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 130.

52. Its moral malice. 1. Presumption is a sin grave from its whole genus, or always mortal, if it contains heresy or blasphemy, the first, second, or third mode; otherwise it admits smallness of matter, the fourth and fifth mode.

Thus it is light to assume divine mercy as a motive of sinning lightly. Likewise, in a light danger, to expect without prayer a help which God has not promised.

2. Despair and presumption are either simple or qualified, according as they either are or are not joined with a sin against faith. For both despair and presumption suppose an erroneous judgment of the intellect; now if that erroneous judgment is against faith, those sins are joined with heresy.

Thus he who despairs because he thinks that God cannot or does not will to save him, or because he judges that observation of the commandments is impossible for him, is not only despairing, but, the suppositions being supposed, also a heretic; likewise both Pelagian and Lutheran presumption contains heresy.

Note 1. For discerning in the practice of confession whether the penitent has really committed a sin against hope, and whether with the sin against hope there is also joined a sin against faith, he will have to be asked why he despaired or presumed, and from the response a judgment concerning this matter can be formed.

Note 2. The habit of hope is not lost through every sin against hope, but only through that which is directly opposed to the formal object of hope; wherefore through the sin of despair, through hatred of God by which one withdraws from God insofar as He is our beatitude, and through Pelagian presumption, the habit of hope is lost. Besides this, since faith is the foundation of hope, through sins by which the habit of faith is lost, at the same time the habit of hope is lost.

53. Definition. 1. Theological charity as a virtue is defined: an infused supernatural habit by which we are inclined to love God above all things for His own sake, and ourselves and the neighbor for God's sake.

Habitual charity is not the Holy Spirit Himself inhabiting the soul, nor sanctifying grace inhering in the soul, but is a supernatural gift really distinct from sanctifying grace, inhering in the will, which renders man capable of eliciting, with the help of grace, acts of supernatural love of benevolence toward God, himself, and the neighbor. Although charity is distinct from sanctifying grace, nevertheless it is inseparably joined with it; hence it is acquired, increased, and destroyed together with sanctifying grace and, when the habits of faith and hope cease, remains in the heavenly fatherland.

2. Theological charity as an act is defined: love by which we love God above all things for His own sake, and ourselves and the neighbor for God's sake. Therefore there is a twofold act of charity according as its object is twofold, but one motive of each act.

Note. 1. The name of love in theological usage signifies both natural and supernatural love, pure love and love of concupiscence, honorable and vicious love; on the contrary, the term charity signifies only supernatural and theological love, namely that by which God loves Himself and us, or that by which we by habit or by act love God.

2. The object of theological charity ought to be God, insofar as He is proposed to us by faith; for the theological virtues ought to be supernatural not only with respect to their principle but also with respect to their object. But in those who habitually hold faith, in reality God, wise, powerful, just, etc., is conceived not only as He is known by natural reason, but also as He is known from faith.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 23-44. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, nn. 22-80. Suarez, De caritate, disp. 1-10. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, tract. 2, nn. 126-225. John Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, nn. 71-138. Castropalao, Operis moralis, pars I, tract. 6, on charity. Lessius, De summo bono. St. Francis de Sales, Theotimus. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, II, nn. 134-302. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, I, nn. 314-327. Goepfert, Moraltheologie, I, nn. 305-312. Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, Freiburg: Herder, 1900, VIII, nn. 533-661.

54. Division. 1. Love of benevolence is love by which we love a thing or person for its own sake, or by which we will good to someone for his own sake, that it may be well with him; love of concupiscence is love by which we love a thing or person for our sake, or by which we will good to someone for our sake, that it may be well with us from it.

a. To love is to will good. Now since in the act of love two things are to be considered, the good which we will and the person to whom we will the good, we can will the good, whether thing or person, in two ways: because it is good in itself, or on account of the perfection which it has in itself and by which it is lovable in itself; or because it is good to us, or on account of the advantage which it brings to us. Likewise we can will or desire good to some person in two ways: either because it is good for the beloved person, or because good comes to us from it. In the former case there is love of benevolence; in the latter, love of concupiscence.

b. Love of benevolence can be distinguished into love of complacency, by which we love a thing or person, virtue or a friend, for its own sake; and into love of benevolence, by which we will and desire good to some person for the person's own sake, that it may be well with him.

c. Love of benevolence which is referred to God, by reason of the formal object, is called perfect charity; love of concupiscence referred to God is called imperfect charity, or less perfect charity, since it is more perfect to love God because He is good in Himself than to love Him because good from God redounds upon us. And this latter indeed is the love which is contained in hope.

d. Love of benevolence is called love of friendship if those loving a. mutually will and communicate good to themselves, or if by affection and effect they mutually love one another, and b. if they have knowledge of this mutual benevolence and beneficence. The act of theological charity is an act of love of benevolence and friendship exercised between God and man: You are My friends, if you do the things which I command you.¹

2. Charity of God can be highest or above all things in two ways: appreciatively, if through it God is preferred to all other things, if therefore by force of charity we are prepared rather to lose all other goods and to sustain all other evils than to make a loss of God, or, what returns to the same thing, if we are prepared to avoid any mortal sin; intensively, if with a more vehement and ardent affection we love God than any other created thing.

a. Charity by which God is loved above all things has three grades: the first is if God is loved in such a way that we are prepared rather to lose all things and suffer all things than to offend God by grave sin; the second is if we love God in such a way that we are prepared rather to lose all things and suffer all things than to displease God by a light offense; the third is if we love God in such a way that we are prepared rather to lose all things and suffer all things than to omit that which is pleasing to God, indeed that which we know to be more pleasing to God. The first grade, since it is simply love of God above all things and excludes affection for any grave sin, suffices for obtaining justification and for fulfilling the precept of charity.

b. Therefore the faithful who fear lest they love a creature, a son or spouse, more than God are to be instructed concerning appreciatively highest love of God, and they must be told that if they observe precepts obliging under grave matter, and a fortiori if they also observe precepts obliging under light matter, there is no need to doubt concerning love of God as it is required for salvation. But if without an excusing cause they violate some precept on account of love of a creature, their love is inordinate and is not appreciatively highest love of God.

3. Charity is divided into affective charity, by which by an internal act we love God and the neighbor; and effective or practical charity, by which we endeavor to observe the precepts and avoid sins, which two things are effects of internal charity.

¹ John 15:14.

55. Object of charity of God. 1. The primary material object of charity is God Himself; the secondary object is creatures capable of divine grace and glory. Therefore the same infused habit which inclines to loving God for His own sake also inclines secondarily to loving ourselves and the neighbor for God's sake.

2. The formal object or motive on account of which each object is to be loved is God Himself, His highest goodness. But this infinite goodness of God, which is the motive of theological charity, is constituted not only by the accumulation of all perfections, but also by each single attribute of God, whether absolute or relative: for any attribute of God is God Himself, and expresses infinite goodness and perfection.

a. The formal object of theological charity is the goodness of God; for because charity is a theological virtue, its formal object ought to be God Himself, and because it is an act of the will, it ought to be the goodness of God. Now the goodness of God can be considered in two ways: absolutely, insofar as it is good in itself; and relatively, insofar as it is our good, beatifying us. Considered in the latter way, it is the object of hope; considered in the former way, it is the object of charity. The absolute goodness of God again can be considered in two ways: insofar as it embraces the divine essence with all attributes, or insofar as it is some single divine attribute, for example, wisdom, benignity. But since the divine attributes are distinguished neither among themselves nor from the essence, any attribute of God, whether absolute or relative, includes the whole divine goodness. Therefore the formal object and motive of charity is both the goodness of God insofar as it is, as it were, the sum of all attributes, and the goodness of God insofar as in any divine perfection, whether absolute or relative, the whole infinite goodness of God is contained.

b. Since the act of perfect charity is necessary for all the faithful by necessity of means, it ought to be easy and accessible to all; but the act of charity is rendered easy for the faithful if they consider God under that aspect or perfection under which He moves more strongly to love. But the relative attributes of God move more strongly to love than the absolute ones: for through them the highest and infinite goodness of God is manifested to us better and more perfectly. And indeed goodness more fittingly shines forth from those perfections which show God as father, redeemer, sanctifier, as Him who adopts man through grace as a son and makes him a participant of divine beatitude. Therefore from these we are more easily moved to charity. And this is the reason why Sacred Scripture, provoking us to divine charity, proposes God to us under the aspect of our strength, our joy, and our benefactor.

c. Since Jesus Christ is true God, he who loves Jesus as He is a divine person elicits an act of charity of God. But nowhere does divine goodness manifest itself to us more splendidly than in the incarnation, passion, and death of Christ the Lord. Therefore there is no easier way of arriving at an act of divine charity than by considering the benignity of God by which, being born, He gave Himself as companion; eating with us, as food; dying, as price; reigning, as reward.

56. Practice of theological charity.¹ Charity of God has several acts, and therefore can be exercised in diverse ways:

a. By complacency, by which we rejoice concerning the good which He possesses: for he who loves God wills His good, and since he understands that God possesses goods both internal, namely the highest and infinite perfections, and external, namely glory resulting from His wonderful works, he rejoices concerning these and exults that God is infinitely knowing, powerful, merciful, etc. This is the act of love by which God loves Himself, rejoicing infinitely concerning His infinite good, and by which the angels and saints love God: for clearly beholding God, carried away by love toward Him, they rejoice and exult with joy unspeakable and glorified that God is so immense, so incomprehensible.²

b. By desire, by which we wish good to Him, both that which He possesses and that which He does not possess: for he who loves God wills good to Him, and since he understands that God most abundantly possesses every good, namely infinite perfections, with intimate affection he congratulates Him, admiringly praises Him, and blesses Him. Since, besides this, he understands that there is a good which He does not possess, namely greater external glory, he wishes and desires that He be always more and more perfectly known and loved by all His creatures. Therefore he who recites Glory be to the Father, who prays, "hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done," elicits so many acts of theological charity.

c. By grief and sadness concerning sins: for he who wills good to God by that very fact hates what is contrary to the divine good, and since he understands that sins are contrary to the divine good, he is saddened by them, both his own and those of others, as by an evil contrary to God, and detests them.

d. By effective love, by which we endeavor to confer and procure external glory for God: for he who truly and sincerely wills goods to God and understands that the glory of God is a good which He can possess and does not yet possess, cares for increasing and promoting the knowledge and love of God, both in himself and in others. Hence zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of souls is an exercise of charity toward God.

e. By obediential love; for he who wills good to God and understands that God's good is increased and promoted by this, that what He Himself wills and commands is done, intends this, that God be served as perfectly as possible both by himself and by others, by the fact that precepts are observed and sin, at least mortal sin, is avoided. Therefore Christ says: If you love Me, keep My commandments. He who has My commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves Me. If anyone loves Me, he will keep My word.³

¹ Sporer-Bierbaum, I, tr. 2, n. 142 ff.

² 1 Pet. 1:8.

³ John 14:15, 21, 23.

57. On the efficacy of charity. 1. An act of perfect charity justifies man of itself without a sacrament, though not without the desire of the sacrament: I love those who love Me.¹ He who loves Me will be loved by My Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him.² Everyone who loves is born of God.³ Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much.⁴

a. The will of receiving the sacrament which is the necessary means instituted by God for obtaining remission of sins is implicitly contained in the act of charity, because in it is contained the will of observing all precepts.

b. An act of charity justifies man not by way of an efficient cause, but by way of the ultimate disposition; when this has been placed, God by force of promise infallibly infuses sanctifying grace.

2. Since charity is an act of love by which God is loved from the whole heart, from the whole mind, and from the whole soul, it contains full subjection and perfect oblation toward God, by which man subordinates himself to God and refers himself and all his things to God.

¹ Prov. 8:17.

² John 14:21.

³ 1 John 4:7.

⁴ Luke 7:47.

58. On the necessity itself of charity. Habitual charity, which is inseparably joined with sanctifying grace, is necessary for all, both adults and infants, by necessity of means unto salvation: for no one can come to God without sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. But here the question concerns the necessity of eliciting an act of charity.

1. Actual charity in the New Testament is not necessary by necessity of means unto justification and salvation except in defect of a sacrament: for if an adult first acquires justification through the sacrament of baptism or penance, the act of charity is not equally necessary as the act of faith and hope, since the disposition through attrition suffices for obtaining justification through the sacrament.

Yet an explicit or implicit act of charity in contrition, which in the Old Testament was absolutely necessary for justification and salvation, in the New Testament is hypothetically necessary by necessity of means, namely for those who cannot receive the sacraments of baptism or penance: for outside the sacrament, except in the case of martyrdom, there is no other means of arriving at justification.

2. Actual charity is necessary by necessity of divine precept: for there exists a special precept of charity by which we are bound to love God above all things with appreciatively highest charity, but not necessarily also with intensively highest charity.

a. Christ the Lord enjoins upon us the great commandment of charity in these words: You shall love the Lord your God from your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment.¹ And indeed, since God is the ultimate end of all things, supremely lovable for His own sake, the order of things requires that God be loved by a creature capable of love for His own sake and above all things; therefore He could not fail to command this act of charity. Besides this, the very nature of man is of such perfection that it cannot be quieted and fully beatified except in charity of God, the highest good, whence the well-known words of St. Augustine: Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee.²

b. The precept of charity is a special precept distinct from the others; therefore it is not satisfied by the mere observation of other precepts, but must be fulfilled by the act itself of charity. Certainly there exist three propositions condemned by Innocent XI, from which we especially gather this: that there exists a special precept, distinct from the others, of eliciting an act of love of God above all things.³

Nor let it be said that from Sacred Scripture effective charity suffices and affective charity is not required, since it says: He who keeps His word, in this man the charity of God is perfected.⁴ For since this testimony cannot conflict with the other words of Sacred Scripture which prescribe affective charity, it must be explained thus: he who keeps the commandments has perfect charity, internal and external, because observation of the commandments is the effect and sign of internal charity. Besides, he who does not elicit an act of charity does not keep His, God's, word, because he neglects the first and greatest commandment, which concerns affective charity of God.

c. To fulfill the precept of charity there is required perfect charity, which is love of benevolence: for the charity by which we ought to love God is an act of love from the whole heart, from the whole mind, from the whole soul, from all the powers; therefore it is love of the most perfect species. But charity by which we love God for His own sake is more perfect than charity by which we love God on account of goods coming to us from Him.

d. Above all things: If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother ... and besides this even his own soul, he cannot be My disciple.⁵ And indeed we ought to love God in that manner which corresponds to the divine goodness on account of which we love God; but this infinitely surpasses all other things.

e. Appreciatively highest, because the infinite goodness of God demands that we prefer God to all created goods. Not intensively, because the intensity of love corresponds not so much to the dignity of the object as to the vividness of apprehension and the natural disposition of the subject. Yet it is especially fitting that love of God even intensively be greater than love of a creature.

Therefore he does not sin who loves a son, friend, or bride more intensely and more sensibly than God, provided he is prepared in soul rather to lose all things than God and His friendship, because intensively highest love is not required. But he would sin who were so disposed in soul that he would not love God if there were no hope of reward or if hell were not to be feared, because he would constitute not God, but himself or his own beatitude, as the ultimate end.

¹ Matt. 22:37-38. Cf. Mark 12:30; Deut. 6:5.

² Confessions, bk. 1, c. 1.

³ We do not dare to condemn as sinning mortally him who would elicit the act of love of God only once in life (5). It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not rigorously oblige of itself even in single five-year periods (6). It obliges only then when we are bound to be justified and do not have another way by which we can be justified (7). Cf. also proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII (n. 45).

⁴ 1 John 2:5.

⁵ Luke 14:26. Cf. Matt. 10:37.

59. When the precept of charity obliges. The precept of loving God is affirmative and negative; insofar as it is negative, it prohibits hatred of God and love of creatures appreciatively greater than love of God; insofar as it is affirmative, it prescribes an act of love of God. Since affirmative precepts oblige at certain times, it is now asked how often and when an act of love of God must be elicited. Further, sometimes it must be elicited per se, or by reason of charity itself, sometimes accidentally, or by reason of another precept to be fulfilled.

The precept of loving God obliges per se: a. After man has attained the use of reason, that is, when man, sufficiently instructed concerning God and His goodness, apprehends the obligation of loving God above all things; yet this is to be taken not mathematically concerning a determinate time or day, but morally, that is, in such a way that after the use of reason has been acquired the act of charity cannot be deferred for a long time without sin.

b. Several times in life. From proposition 6 condemned by Innocent XI, it is certain that the precept of loving God obliges at least within five years; but whether it urges more often and how often cannot be determined.

Authors establish diverse things concerning this matter: for some say that an act of charity must be elicited on each Sunday and feast day; others with St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, n. 8, once a month; others once a year; others finally every three years; but nothing certain can be established. Therefore the faithful are to be earnestly exhorted and admonished to elicit acts of the theological virtues frequently, but it must not be said that they are obliged to this either each week, or each month, or each year, because this obligation is not determinately established.

c. In a temptation of sinning against charity by hatred of God, which can happen in adversities: for if an act of charity is the only means without which the temptation cannot be overcome, it must be elicited from the precept of charity; but it will rarely happen that an act of charity is the only means by which the temptation is repelled.

For the rest, since satisfaction can be made to the precept of charity, as also to the precept of faith and hope, by a virtual act of charity, it is not necessary that penitents be asked whether they have fulfilled the precept of charity of God. For those who live as Christians frequently elicit acts of charity, even if they do not advert that they elicit them, for example while they keep the precepts and avoid sins lest they displease God; while they desire that all may worship God; while they pray that His name be hallowed, His kingdom come, His will be done, etc. But those who live impiously do not advert to the obligation itself, and therefore they sin only materially.

Note. There are some who add that an act of charity must be elicited:

a. In the article of death. St. Alphonsus calls this obligation most probable, because then "the safest way must be chosen"; but this obligation exists only for those who are in mortal sin and cannot receive the sacrament. For the rest, it is not necessary that the safest way be chosen, but it suffices that one simply secure and safe be chosen.

b. When man through mortal sin has lost the habit of charity. Yet the obligation by which the sinner, who has been justified through attrition in the sacrament of penance, would be bound immediately or soon after he has obtained justification to elicit an act of charity, cannot be demonstrated by any probable argument. Indeed, those who urge this obligation too much seem to affirm, against the Council of Trent,¹ that attrition with the sacrament does not suffice for true justification, or without sufficient motive they establish a special precept of referring all our actions to God from the motive of charity.²

¹ Sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. On Principles, n. 85.

60. Accidentally the obligation of eliciting an act of charity urges: a. When someone needs the state of grace and cannot receive the sacrament, as when one existing in mortal sin must administer a sacrament or receive a sacrament of the living, or when someone is placed in danger of death and there is no supply of a confessor: for he cannot arrive at the state of grace unless he elicits an act of charity or of perfect contrition, in which an act of charity is contained.

b. When someone is found in a grave temptation against another virtue, and this temptation cannot be removed unless an act of charity has been elicited, as if someone must either deny faith or undergo death.

Note. 1. Parish priests, teachers, and parents ought to take care that children and the unformed are aptly instructed in eliciting the theological virtues. Wherefore not only are revealed truths to be explained, but at the same time it must be added that those truths have been revealed by God and that we ought to believe God revealing. In a like manner they ought to be instructed concerning the end for which they have been created by God, and that they may be more easily stirred up to love of God, God must be proposed to them under that respect under which He provokes more efficaciously to love (n. 55).

2. Nevertheless Lugo judges that even those faithful to whom it is only said that the Son of God was incarnate, that Christ died for us, without its being added that God revealed these things, "regularly elicit acts of divine faith," because they conceive this doctrine confusedly as something superhuman and divine.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, De virtute fidei divinae, disp. 1, n. 126.

61. Moral value of the theological virtues. 1. The theological virtues, as acts, are of the highest dignity and excellence; for since their immediate object is God Himself, man through the theological virtues is intimately joined by intellect and will with God and His perfections.

2. If they are compared with one another by reason of origin, the first is faith: for unless knowledge of the highest good precedes, neither desire nor love of it is possible; the second, ordinarily, is hope: for he who knows that the highest goods in heaven have been proposed to him tends trustingly toward them, that he may be beatified from them; the third is charity, which embraces God with love of benevolence on account of His highest lovableness. By reason of dignity the first is charity: a. by its nature it is an intimate and most pure union with the highest good; b. it immediately disposes for receiving sanctifying grace and accompanies it by an inseparable bond; c. when charity is lost, faith and hope are unformed virtues, which must be informed by habitual charity that they may make man simply good and his virtues meritorious; besides this, it perfects faith and hope, because it confers singular dignity and splendor upon virtues which are done from charity; d. faith and hope are virtues of the state of the way; charity is the virtue of the fatherland; therefore in the state of the term faith passes into vision, hope into possession, and charity alone remains.¹

3. If they are considered in themselves. Faith is the full service of intellect and will exhibited to God revealing: for the will, reverently obeying the Creator commanding faith, determines the intellect to embracing the truth, which in itself is indeed obscure, yet elevates man above that which can be known by natural light.² Hope, insofar as it is desire, tears man away from earthly pleasures and directs him to the spiritual beatitude of the other life; insofar as it is trust, man through it rests, fully trusting in the goodness of God and His grace. Charity embraces the highest good in the most perfect way and intimately joins man with God; it constitutes Christian perfection, and since charity cannot be sluggish and idle, it moves and stirs man to exercising virtues diligently; but the fullness of the law is love.³

¹ 1 Cor. 13:8.

² Cf. Vatican Council, constitution De fide, c. 3.

³ Rom. 13:10.

62. What sins there are against charity of God. a. All mortal sins indeed in some way are against charity of God, because any grave sin destroys the habit of charity and is a virtual aversion from God, since it is conversion to a created thing; but some are sins which, as formal aversion from God, are directly opposed to charity of God.

b. Sins directly opposed to charity of God are committed either by omission, when the act of charity to be elicited from the special precept of charity is omitted, or by commission, if an act prohibited by the precept of charity is placed. Acts of this kind are hatred of God and sloth, concerning which there has already been discussion.¹

There is no reason for confessors to be solicitous concerning the sin of omission: for those who live as Christians do not commit it, while those who for a long time entirely neglect Christian duties, because of inadvertence, sin only materially.

¹ Cf. On Principles, n. 310.

63. On hatred of God. 1. Hatred is an act of the will by which it turns away from some object as evil. A twofold hatred is distinguished: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity; the former is opposed to love of concupiscence, the latter to love of benevolence and friendship.

a. Hatred of abomination is that by which we turn away from something as evil to us or to ours. A twofold hatred of abomination is distinguished: hatred of abomination of a person, by which we turn away from the person himself as evil to us; and hatred of abomination of a quality, by which we turn away from a quality of the person as evil to us.

b. Hatred of enmity or malevolence is that by which we turn away from something, a person, because it is evil in itself, or by which we will evil to some person, that it may be ill with him. Thus the worst men wish and procure destruction for their enemies, even if they themselves receive no advantage from it.

2. Hatred of God is an act by which someone turns away from God apprehended as evil. Hatred of abomination of God is an act by which someone turns away from God apprehended as evil to himself or to another loved person. Hatred of enmity of God is an act by which someone wills evil to God, that it may be ill with Him, or because it is evil to Him.

Therefore he sins by hatred of enmity of God: a. who wills that God not exist or that God not be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; b. who is saddened by His perfections or rejoices concerning His offense, violates the precepts of God or persecutes the works of God because this displeases God. In this way the devil wishes and, as far as he can, procures evil for God because it is evil to God, even if he knows that he perceives no advantage from it.

64. Its malice. a. Hatred of God is the gravest of all sins, because it is directly opposed to the most excellent of all virtues and therefore to the infinite goodness itself of God; and indeed hatred of enmity is graver than hatred of abomination, because the former is opposed to the internal goodness of God, which is falsely apprehended as evil, while the latter is opposed to the external goodness of God, that is, to some effect proceeding from God, which is apprehended by man as evil and contrary to himself.

In order that this sin of hatred be committed, it is required that the abomination and indignation tend into God Himself: for if the affection of aversion and indignation is not referred to God, but to adverse things without respect to God, it will not be a sin of hatred, but of impatience or of hatred toward the neighbor.

b. Hatred of God does not admit smallness of matter, but every act of hatred and every depraved affection toward God, provided it is deliberate, is mortal sin, because it is directly opposed to the highest goodness of God. But when hatred of God is joined with blasphemy, imprecation, or an act of persecution against the Church, manifestly a twofold sin is committed.

65. Notions. 1. Self-love which is an innate appetite must be distinguished from self-love which is a moral act. Man by natural necessity is borne toward his own conservation, his own perfection, and his own happiness; and since he cannot attain these unless he appropriates that which is good for him, by natural necessity he is borne toward that which is good for him. But to will good for oneself is to love oneself. Now if man wills good to himself by an act which proceeds from a deliberate will, this act is moral self-love.

2. In acts of love there must be distinguished the necessary condition on the part of the object and the formal motive. For man cannot desire except that which is represented to the will as good and fitting for the one desiring. For a power cannot be moved to act except by its proper object; but the proper object of the will is that which is good and fitting for the one willing. But that which the one desiring knows and ought to know to be his own good, he can desire either because it is his own good, or because it is good in itself, or because it is good for another. Wherefore every act of love is implicitly self-love, insofar as in every act of love the love of one's own good is contained as a necessary condition, but not explicitly, insofar as one's own good is the formal motive of love; and this has place only in acts of love of concupiscence.

3. Self-love is called natural by reason of the object if it tends toward natural perfection and happiness, and by reason of the principle if it is elicited by the powers of nature alone; it is called supernatural by reason of the object if it tends toward supernatural perfection and happiness, which consists in the goods of grace and glory, and by reason of the principle if it is elicited by the help of grace.

Since natural self-love tends to this, that man procure for himself the goods of nature and avoid the evils of nature, this love must be ruled by divine law, lest he seek goods which indeed please the senses but harm the spirit, or avoid evils which must be borne so that man may attain his end.

4. Supernatural self-love is the love of hope if man loves God, his eternal beatitude, for himself, that it may be well with him; and it is theological charity if he loves himself for God's sake, namely because he is a participant of grace and glory and thus, as it were, of the family of God.

The foundation and condition of moral love and charity toward oneself is a fitting esteem of oneself (Selbstachtung), by which we know ourselves according to the natural dignity of the person and according to the supernatural dignity of sons of God and heirs of eternal life. Yet this esteem of self does not impede contempt and despising of self (Selbstverachtung), which the Christian religion commends to us as an exercise of humility: for humility is founded on recognition of those things which are in us from ourselves; but charity toward ourselves is founded on knowledge of those things which are in us from God.

¹ Lehmkuhl, I, nn. 569-590. Goepfert, II, nn. 1-10. Th. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis, Freiburg: Herder, 1900, II, nn. 29-47. V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, Freiburg: Herder, 1904, II, pp. 46-54. E. Muller, Theologia moralis, Vienna: Mayr, 1894, II, p. 86 ff.

66. On the precepts themselves. 1. There exists a divine precept of loving ourselves with theological charity: You shall love your neighbor as yourself;¹ by these words, if not explicitly, certainly virtually, theological charity toward ourselves is prescribed, since it is supposed that man ought to love himself, so that he may love the neighbor according to the likeness of this love. Besides this, we are bound to love God above all things; but charity of God, if it is true, naturally induces one to loving all those things which are God's, especially the adoptive sons of God or the members of His family; therefore it ought to be extended also to us and to the other sons of God.

2. By force of this obligation we are bound in general to will and procure for ourselves the supernatural goods of grace and glory and the natural goods, both spiritual and bodily, internal and external; and since the appetite of our own perfection and beatitude has been placed in us by nature together with the appetite of our own conservation, we are stirred up by nature itself to obtaining greater and always greater goods both of soul and of body for ourselves. Nothing prevents us from following this appetite, provided the norms of honesty are observed in all things.² But what goods in particular we are bound to will and procure for ourselves must be derived from the fundamental obligation of tending toward the ultimate end of eternal life, or of willing and procuring eternal beatitude for ourselves.

a. With respect to supernatural goods we are bound: a. to know our ultimate end and those things which by necessity of means and of precept are necessary to know, so that we may be able to live a life worthy of a Christian man; b. to procure for ourselves supernatural life, namely sanctifying grace and the means which are necessarily required for conserving and increasing it, and besides this merits through the observation of the commandments, without which one cannot arrive at God.

But besides those things which are prescribed under grave obligation, we are not bound from charity toward ourselves under grave obligation to acquire for ourselves further merits and a greater increase of grace and glory through good works and the exercise of virtues; yet charity toward ourselves furnishes us an efficacious motive for diligently applying ourselves to the exercise of virtues and good works.

Therefore we are bound also from charity toward ourselves to learn those things which by necessity of means and precept are necessary to know, to acquire for ourselves the state of grace in danger of death, and not to defer conversion for a notable time, because a state of sin protracted for a long time induces almost a certain necessity of increasing sins;³ to exercise those virtues and those good works which are prescribed by precepts obliging under grave matter; but we are not bound under grave obligation to works of supererogation, otherwise they would not be supererogatory.

b. With respect to spiritual goods we are bound to pursue that perfection and cultivation of mind and will which is necessary so that we may be able to obtain the ultimate end without difficulty and fittingly fulfill the duties of our state. But there is not given a strict obligation of acquiring for ourselves further knowledge, although it perfects the intellect and is useful to us: for since such knowledge is not necessary for obtaining the end from precept, there does not exist a precept of acquiring it, but only a counsel. Now it is asked what the obligation is of choosing a certain state of life.

a. Since today, with universal culture increased, individuals can scarcely fulfill their duties unless they have acquired richer knowledge for themselves, they are bound to use an occasion offered to them of acquiring such knowledge through suitable schools.

b. All are earnestly to be exhorted and admonished that they cultivate and perfect their intellectual and moral faculties as much as possible. For in this way they will not only attain the end of this life more suitably and perfectly, but they can also contribute more richly to the utility of others and to the common good. Added to this is that those who are better instructed more easily resist the seductions of unbelievers, provided education of the will and morals is joined with cultivation of the mind.

c. With respect to bodily goods we are bound by ordinary means to conserve our own life and health by procuring food, clothing, and habitation for ourselves.

a. For food, all nourishment fit for sustaining life can now serve man; as to quality, indeed, no distinction being made between clean and unclean foods, taken from vegetables or animals; but as to quantity, the order of temperance must be observed, by which it is provided that from the use of food and drink the health of the body or the liveliness of the mind not suffer harm.

b. Clothing serves a threefold end: that it ward off harmful influence of the air, that it provide for modesty, that it show distinction of sex and state. Any clothing which satisfies these ends as much as is necessary is morally honorable. It is permitted and becoming to follow the customs of one's own age and nation in this matter; yet each excess must always be avoided, which St. Jerome rebukes with these words: "adornment and sordidness are to be fled in an equal manner, because the one smells of luxury, the other of glory."⁴

c. Habitation ought to be suitable for conserving life and health, for protecting modesty, and for conducting domestic life conveniently among the members of the family. Since today from fact it is established that the wretched habitations which the poor and workers everywhere inhabit, especially in great cities, greatly harm both bodily life and moral life, those whom it concerns are to be admonished that they strive to remove these harms through suitable dwellings for workers.⁵

d. Necessary recreations are of the highest moment for conserving and perfecting the life of body and soul; all are licit, provided the laws of modesty and chastity are not violated and, with respect to the circumstances of time, duration, and manner, they are ordered according to reason. From these, bodily games and gymnastic exercises (Sport), especially for young people, ought to be earnestly commended, because these contribute very much to educating and conserving a healthy mind in a healthy body, provided due moderation is guarded in performing them. For games and exercises which are suitably performed with fatigue of the body serve not only for recreation, but also conduce to preserving and increasing the virtues of chastity and temperance. Wherefore there is no reason why pastors of souls ought to shrink back from societies instituted for the sake of playing and exercising (Sportvereine), but rather they should endeavor to promote them and direct them according to the norms of honesty and religion.⁶

d. External goods of the person are honor and reputation. Honor broadly is the good estimation of someone founded on his excellence. Honor strictly is the external testimony of that good estimation. Reputation is the public estimation of someone's excellence.

a. By the law of nature we are bound to have care for our own reputation, by guarding it lest it be lost, and by recovering it if it has been lost.

Reputation is a good of the greatest moment both for the person himself, for since it is the fruit of virtue, it contributes much to preserving virtue and removing vice because of fear of losing good reputation; and for social life, because it conciliates the trust of others, opens access to public offices, and is necessary for fulfilling duties fruitfully. Therefore Sacred Scripture admonishes: Have care for a good name: for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures.⁷ Yet this obligation ordinarily is only light; and since reputation is not the highest good, with a view to a greater good it can licitly be neglected, unless, considering the condition of the man, it is necessary.

b. Without a reasonable cause it is not permitted to defame oneself; but from a just cause, especially of virtue, of itself it is licit, just as from a reasonable cause it is licit to suffer loss of goods of fortune.

To defame oneself without cause is not indeed against justice, because man is master of his own reputation; wherefore by defaming himself he does injury to no one. Nor is it against charity, because charity does not oblige one to conserve external goods except insofar as they are necessary for conserving internal or spiritual or bodily goods; but it is a vice of prodigality against liberality, by excess, which nevertheless does not exceed venial sin. It can be grave either against charity or against justice if reputation is necessary for fulfilling an office or if others suffer harm from it.

e. We are bound to acquire for ourselves those external goods of fortune which we need so that we may conveniently fulfill both individual and social duties: for he who is bound to the end is bound by the same precept also to the necessary means. But besides goods morally necessary for this end, we are held by no obligation to seek a greater abundance of goods and prosperity of life. Yet it is permitted to each one to acquire for himself more abundant goods, provided in the acquisition and use of them he observes moral norms. Since the means of acquiring for oneself necessary external goods is labor, here the occasion offers itself of inquiring whether there exists an obligation of laboring.

¹ Matt. 22:39.

² Mausbach, Kernfragen, III, Weltflucht und Weltarbeit, M.-Gladbach, 1903.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, a. 8.

⁴ Ep. 55, n. 6.

⁵ Cf. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach: L. Pesch, "Reform des Wohnungswesens," 1903, p. 251; "Die Wohnungsfrage in ihren Ursachen," 1903, p. 524.

⁶ Cf. Stohr-Kannamuller, Handbuch der Pastoralmedizin, Freiburg: Herder, 1900, p. 184 ff.

⁷ Ecclus. 41:15.

67. On the obligation of embracing a certain state of life.¹ 1. State, as it is taken here, is a certain condition of life having stability from a permanent cause. Civil and ecclesiastical state are distinguished according as it pertains to civil or ecclesiastical society. Thus a judge, advocate, physician, worker has a civil state, because after an election has been made he obtains a stable, although changeable, condition of life in civil society; a Christian faithful person, a priest, a religious occupies an ecclesiastical state, because, having received baptism or sacred order, or having emitted religious profession, he has embraced a stable, and immutable, condition of life in ecclesiastical society.

2. Since a special vocation of God to a determinate state of life, if one prescinds from the clerical, religious, and virginal state in the world, does not exist, each one can choose that state which, with the qualities of the person and the external circumstances of life, family, and society considered, he judges suitable for himself, so that he may be able to conserve and perfect life and work out his salvation. For the rest, here the question is not what state is to be chosen or how it is to be chosen, for ascetical writers treat of this matter, but concerning the question whether for individual men there exists an obligation of choosing some state, whether ecclesiastical or civil, and of spending life in it.

a. The great utility which comes to men from a certain state of life is manifest, both because a state provides a determinate manner by which man can exercise his activity for his own utility and that of others and can guard against idleness, to which those who wander without a state of life easily indulge; and because it is the best means of working out his salvation: for he who diligently fulfills the duties of the Christian religion and of his state can be secure concerning the salvation of his soul.

b. The obligation of choosing a certain state of life can arise from a twofold head: a. from charity of self, or from the obligation of working out one's own salvation. Hence he who understands that the matrimonial state or the religious state is for him a necessary means of salvation is bound to choose it. b. From piety, or from the obligation of assisting parents placed in need. Hence he who understands that he cannot satisfy his duties unless he embraces the state of his father, farmer, craftsman, etc., is bound to choose it.

Therefore he can sin, though not by injury against human society, who does not use an opportune occasion of acquiring for himself a state of life, who, although he can, does not cultivate his faculties, whether spiritual or bodily, nor learn sciences and arts by which he may make himself fit for a certain state of life.

Note. To satisfy these precepts of charity of acquiring for ourselves necessary goods, whether supernatural or natural, it is not necessary that we act from the motive of charity.

¹ Krier, Der Beruf, Freiburg: Herder, 1899.

70. What these sins are. 1. Any sin whatever is opposed in general to charity of self, because by any sin whatever we bring evil upon ourselves: those who do sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul.¹

2. Against charity of self in particular a sin is committed:

a. by excess, through the sin of egoism, by which someone seeks his own advantage in his actions in such a way that he prefers it even to the divine good, the glory of God, and to the public good.

b. by defect, through hatred of self, concerning which are the words of St. Augustine: if you have loved badly, then you have hated,² namely by this, that a precept obliging from charity of self itself is violated, as if care of eternal salvation or temporal health is neglected, if someone wishes or inflicts evil upon himself against the order of charity, if someone in danger of death does not seek reconciliation with God, if someone remains in the state of sin for a notable time.

3. Sins committed against charity of self in particular are not customarily declared as such in confession, because there is no precept which from charity of self alone obliges under grave matter; hence if the violation of another precept is accused, the violation of charity of self is understood underneath.³

Thus he who accuses himself of a sin against the fifth precept of the decalogue, insofar as this is affirmative, at the same time accuses himself of violation of charity of self, insofar as this prescribes care of bodily life; he who accuses himself of violation of a precept, whether divine or ecclesiastical, at the same time accuses himself of violation of charity of self, insofar as this prescribes care of eternal salvation.

¹ Tob. 12:10. Cf. Ps. 10:6.

² In Ioannem, tract. 51, n. 10.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 156.

_Faith, hope, and charity are called theological virtues because they relate immediately to God, having God for their material and formal object. They thus hold the first place among the Christian virtues; they are of the greatest importance, are most meritorious; and sins against them are the most grievous. In moral theology the acts belonging to these virtues and the sins opposed to them are treated of; the treatment of the virtues is reserved to dogmatic theology. Part

I. Notion. The principles, as St. Thomas teaches, by which man is ordered to supernatural beatitude are called theological virtues, "both because they have God as object, insofar as by them we are rightly ordered to God; and because they are infused into us by God alone; and because only by divine revelation in Sacred Scripture are virtues of this kind handed down" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62, a. 1).

Therefore for a threefold reason these principles are called theological virtues: by reason of object, by reason of cause, and by reason of cognition. The first reason, as being of greatest importance for our scope, will be explained briefly.

In order that a virtue, by reason of its object, may claim for itself as proper the name theological virtue, it must on the one hand have God Himself as its immediate material object. Otherwise moral virtues, which mediately, i.e., by means of an intermediate end, also attain God as the ultimate end, would have to be called by an equal name. From this, however, it does not follow that God must be the adequate material object, but only the primary; for the things which are attained by reason of the primary object are reduced as a secondary object to the same virtue. Thus, for example, one's neighbor must be called the secondary object of the virtue of charity, since he is attained by reason of the primary object, which is God.

On the other hand, God Himself also, or His perfections, must constitute the formal object of theological virtue; for it belongs to the formal object to constitute a virtue in its species. Hence, in order to constitute some virtue in the species of theological virtue, God Himself or His divine attributes must be the formal object of that virtue.

From what has been said it follows that theological virtue is aptly defined: A virtue whose immediate object, both material, at least principal, and formal, is God Himself as author and end of the supernatural order.

II. Number. That the theological virtues are only three in number, namely faith, hope, and charity, the universal Church has always held as certain, and in this sense also interprets the words of the Apostle: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity."¹ For no reason can be assigned why the Apostle enumerates these virtues as three distinct species of one genus, distinct from all other virtues, unless because these three are theological exclusively.² It is also confirmed by reason. For in order that man may arrive at the supernatural end, he must tend stably toward it by operations of intellect and will proportioned to this end. Now for this, three theological virtues are required: faith, namely, which perfects the intellect for knowing the supernatural end; hope, which perfects the will for firmly desiring the same end as possible of attainment and perfective of the one desiring; and charity, which perfects the will for firmly desiring the aforesaid end as a good in itself, to which man must order himself and whatever else.³

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² Cf. Origen, bk. 4, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, c. 4, n. 6; St. Augustine, sermon 27, n. 1; Enchiridion, c. 6, n. 1 and c. 9, n. 2, at the end; St. Gregory the Great, bk. 1, Moralia, c. 27, n. 38.

³ Cf. Salmanticenses, commentary on I-II, q. 62, a. 3; Mazzella, nn. 43-44.

It is useful to set forth beforehand certain notions which recur repeatedly in the matters to be treated, namely concerning necessity of means and of precept, and concerning the modes of eliciting acts of the virtues.

I. Necessity of Means. 1. That is said to be necessary by necessity of means which both positively conduces to salvation, and as positively conducing is necessary for attaining salvation. It is said positively conduces, that is, by way of a cause, whether efficient or formal or disposing, etc.

2. What is necessary by necessity of means is distinguished in two ways, according as the necessity arises either from the nature of the thing or from the free ordination of God. The former is always absolute; thus, for example, the supernatural order being posited, sanctifying grace is absolutely necessary. The other is absolute or hypothetical, according as it has been freely established by God as unsuppleable or suppleable; suppleable, I say, through an extraordinary means instituted by God, which regards the ordinary means, that is, that which must be supplied, and obtains its effect dependently upon it. Thus, for example, baptism of water is the ordinary means of remitting original sin; in an adult this can be supplied through baptism of desire, that is, through an act of perfect contrition or charity. The sacrament of penance is the ordinary means of remitting sins committed after baptism; this can be supplied through perfect contrition or charity. In both cases the extraordinary means regards the ordinary means by desire, and to that extent also produces its effect dependently upon the ordinary means.

Corollary I. The absence of sin is not said to be necessary by necessity of means, because it does not positively conduce to salvation, but only involves the absence of a barrier or obstacle.

Corollary II. An act prescribed under grave obligation, although it positively conduces to salvation, is not called necessary by necessity of means, because insofar as it positively conduces to salvation, it is not necessary for attaining it.

Corollary III. From the fact that something is an ordinary means, it also follows that one who has used the extraordinary or supplying means is still bound, if he can, to use the ordinary or supplied means.

II. Necessity of Precept. That is said to be necessary by necessity of precept which is imposed by law.

Corollary. Everything which is necessary by necessity of means is also necessary by necessity of precept; but not conversely.

III. Modes of Eliciting Acts of the Virtues. Acts of the virtues can be elicited formally and virtually. They can be exercised formally either entirely explicitly, or in an act signified, or in a more confused mode, or in an act exercised. Thus, for example, an act of faith is elicited entirely explicitly if someone professes: I believe the presence of Christ in the Most Holy Eucharist. The same act is elicited in an act exercised by one who genuflects before the Most Holy Sacrament (St. Alphonsus, II, 7). They are elicited virtually if they are contained in the act of another virtue, as, for example, an act of sorrow for sin in an act of charity.

The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.

(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others, neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor, whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.

(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and defect.

(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness, cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what is not due to one’s condition.

Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three groups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most excellent, since they deal directly with man’s supernatural end; (b) By reason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are superior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular goods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as virtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the appetites, they are more properly principles of action.

Good habits, specifically different, are all reducible to seven most general virtues (see 150, 151), and hence in studying these seven virtues, we shall at the same time study all the common duties of man.

The properties of the seven infused virtues are chiefly four:

(a) In the first place, these virtues may be increased: “This I pray, that your charity may more and more abound” (Phil, i. 9). The increase takes place ex opere operato through the Sacraments, or ex opere operantis through meritorious works—that is, whenever sanctifying grace, their root, is increased.

(b) A second property of the infused virtues is that they may be lost: “I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity” (Apoc., ii. 4); “Some have made shipwreck concerning the faith” (I Tim., i. 19). The loss is caused by the contrary of the virtue: faith is lost by disbelief, hope by despair; charity and the moral virtues are lost by any mortal sin, for they are built on sanctifying grace, which mortal sin destroys.

(c) A third property of the infused virtues is that they cannot be diminished directly. If we leave out of consideration their opposites (which, as just said, remove these virtues entirely), there is nothing else that can act directly upon them. Mere failure to exercise them cannot lessen them, since they are caused by divine infusion, not by human exercise; venial sin cannot lessen them, since it does not lessen grace on which they depend.

(d) A fourth property of the infused virtues is that they are diminished indirectly. Failure to practise them or venial sin does diminish the ease and fervor with which the acts of these virtues are exercised; and thus indirectly—that is, by preparing the way for acts that are directly contrary—neglect or venial sin diminishes the habits themselves.

The S. C. de P. F. prescribed: "Public disputations are not to be held with heretics, because for the most part, either because of talkativeness or boldness or the circumstances of an applauding people, truth is oppressed while falsehood prevails; and if at some time disputations of this kind could not be refused, first the S. C. is to be informed of them, which, according to the quality of the time and persons, will prescribe what is to be done." 8 March 1625; 27 May 1644; 18 Dec. 1662; S. I. C. 19 Jan. 1644; S. C. C. 6 March 1625.

"That which from the ancient times of the Church was always customary, that a certain and determinate formula should be proposed to the Christian faithful by which they would profess the faith and solemnly detest the heresies gaining strength in each age, this same thing, after the sacred Council of Trent had happily been completed, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IV wisely accomplished. Hastening to execute without delay the decrees of the Tridentine Fathers, by the Constitution Iniunctum Nobis, issued on the Ides of November 1564, he composed the form of profession of faith to be recited by those who were to be placed over cathedral and superior Churches, or who would have obtained their dignities, canonries, and any other ecclesiastical benefices having care of souls; and by all others to whom it pertains from the decrees of that Council; and also by those whom it happened to be provided over monasteries, convents, houses, and any other places of regulars of whatever orders, even military, under whatever name or title. This, by another Constitution issued on the same day in the year beginning In sacrosancta, he further salutarily extended to all doctors, regent masters, or other professors of any art and faculty whatever, whether clerics or laymen, or regulars of any order, publicly or privately professing in any places whatsoever in any way, or having or exercising any lectures, and finally to those to be adorned with degrees of this kind.

Now, since afterwards the sacred Vatican Council was assembled, before its suspension announced by the Apostolic Letters Postquam Dei munere of 20 October 1870, two dogmatic Constitutions were solemnly promulgated by the same Council: the first, namely, on the Catholic Faith, which begins Dei Filius, and the other on the Church of Christ, which begins Pastor Aeternus. It is not only opportune, but also necessary, that in the profession of faith there should be made, as by the heart so also by the mouth, public and solemn adherence also to the dogmatic definitions of the aforementioned Vatican Council. Wherefore Our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX, having sought on this matter the vote of a special Congregation of the Most Eminent Fathers, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, established, commanded, and ordered, as by the present decree he commands and orders, that in the aforesaid Pian formula of profession of faith, after the words 'especially handed down by the sacred Council of Trent,' there be said 'and by the ecumenical Vatican Council, defined and declared, especially concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff and his infallible magisterium,' and that hereafter the profession of faith be made by all who are bound to make it thus and not otherwise, under the threats and penalties established by the Council of Trent and by the above-mentioned Constitutions of Pius IV of happy memory. Therefore let this be observed everywhere, and by all whom it concerns, diligently and faithfully, notwithstanding," etc. Decree of the S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. You have the formula of the Profession of Faith in Acta S. Sed. Vol. 10, p. 72 ff.

"1. Whether, besides canons, dignitaries, and curates provided with an immovable title, as they say, pastors also removable or succursalists are bound to the profession of faith according to the prescription of the Sacred Council of Trent? 2. And, in the affirmative concerning succursalists, whether they can make the profession before a simple deputy appointed by the Bishop? 3. Whether the aforesaid profession must be renewed as often as all those of whom above are transferred to another benefice? Resp... according to the Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 12, De Ref., and the resolutions issued in similar matters: to the 1st, in the affirmative; to the 2nd, in the negative; to the 3rd, in the affirmative." S. C. C. 15 Dec. 1866.

Cf. the Constitution Ex quo singulari of Benedict XIV, 11 July 1742, on the Chinese rites; Omnium Sollicitudinum, 12 Sept. 1744, on the Malabar rites; Cas. Consc. resol. in Miss. Nankin., Fr. Aloysius Sica, Zi-Ka-Wei, 1881, case 29.

"Whether Missionaries, interrogated by a Tyrant whether they wish to remain in his kingdom, having given pledge that they will not promulgate the Evangelical law, can licitly agree, promise, and accept such a condition? - Resp. They cannot promise this." S. O. 1674.

"Since often and for a long time various cases, under various circumstances of utility, necessity, dangers, vexations, and even persecution to be endured by the Faithful, have been proposed to this Sacred Congregation by Missionaries and Prelates of the East concerning communication in divine things of Catholics with Heretics and Schismatics; and since by this Sacred Congregation it has constantly and uniformly been written back: it is not lawful; the hope had been conceived that the Missionaries of the East would sufficiently and easily understand that some cases could indeed be thought up speculatively in which it would be lawful to tolerate some communication in divine things, but that practically, with all the factual circumstances considered, cases can very difficultly be found in which that communication is lawful; and that it is even morally impossible that another general rule be prescribed, accommodated to every kind of men, every region, and every time, than that which was given to the repeated questions of the Missionaries of the East by this Sacred Congregation in the Instruction issued in the year 1719; namely, based on that doctrinal principle, that communication in divine things with Heretics and Schismatics is regularly to be held illicit in practice, either because of danger of perversion in the Catholic Faith, or because of danger of participation in a heretical and schismatic rite, or finally because of danger and occasion of scandal. These circumstances indeed, just as they are regularly connected in practice with communication in divine things with Heretics, so universally are forbidden by natural and divine law, in which there is no power which dispenses, nor any connivance which excuses; so that no place has been left for devising and proposing new doubts. Hence in that Instruction it was expressly prescribed: Missionaries are to be instructed that they must wholly abstain from acts expressive of a false sect, from communication in a schismatic and heretical rite, from danger of perversion, and from occasion of scandal...

Therefore let it be dear to the heart of each Prelate, Missionary, or Director of souls to teach and stir up the faithful to avoid these dangers, which they regularly undergo, either all or some, in communication in divine things with the Heretics and Schismatics of the East. For although these still for the most part preserve the substance and value of the Sacraments, nevertheless they do not allow Catholics outwardly to show those signs of disapproval and segregation which they ought; from which it comes about that that external conformity in the same worship, and reverence toward the Pseudo-ministers of the Liturgy, cannot free any Catholic, however most firm in faith and abhorring the heretical or schismatic rites by which their worship is infected, from the danger of scandal.

This is confirmed the more also from the fact that scarcely any rite exists among the Heterodox which is not stained by some error in the matter of faith. For in their Churches either the dedication is in memory of some schismatic whom they venerate as a Saint, or images are present, or relics are honored, or feasts are celebrated of those who died in schism and are commonly held as saints, or finally commemoration is made of living Schismatic and Heretical Patriarchs and Bishops, who are commended as Preachers of the Catholic Faith. Therefore, all Catholics who come together in that celebration of rite and prayer and worship, in these factual circumstances, cannot be purged of the guilt of perverse communication, or at least of pernicious scandal. Nor does the pretext of merely material assistance excuse them; for it is excluded by the fact itself, whereby those who are present at these functions of Heretics or Schismatics sufficiently show themselves to agree with them in unity of prayer, in unity of worship, in unity of veneration and submission toward the perverse ministers of heresy and schism.

This is also made clear from the fact that the Orientals themselves daily see with their eyes, hear with their ears, and confess with their mouth that no sectarian hardened in schism comes, is present, or gathers in the Churches of Catholics, whether to hear Mass or to receive Sacraments, for this reason, namely, that, blaspheming the assemblies of the faithful as though of perverse communion, they judge this intercourse pernicious and illicit, and the rite damnable. But when they see Catholics come to their Churches, be present at their rites, and partake of their Sacraments, must it not be believed, or at least feared, that from this very fact they are more confirmed in their errors, and by this example also persuade themselves that they walk on the right path of salvation? From this it follows that the danger of pernicious scandal to the Schismatics and Heretics themselves can very difficultly be avoided; and therefore a Catholic is not safe in conscience if with them he communicates in divine things in this kind of case..." Instr. S. C., in Gury-Cretoni, Note (C).

"... We have received letters by which... you signify that the dear son in Christ, the king of Bavaria, in restoring to you the monastery, placed this condition: that the monks in their Church would be bound to celebrate a funeral for the king himself when he shall die, and then in perpetuity on anniversary days; likewise for the queen his consort and for future kings or queens, both at the death of each one and on the anniversary days which will intervene until the death of the subsequent one.

You add, however, beloved son, that you indeed even then foresaw the difficulty easily arising from the fact that the most serene wife of the king is alien from Catholic sacred rites; but nevertheless, from the counsel of a certain prudent man, as you thought, you resolved to accept that condition with this mind: that if thereafter the same queen should die outside Catholic communion, the Sacrifice of the Mass in her funeral and on anniversary days would be offered for the Catholic royal family universally. But since recently, at the death likewise of the non-Catholic woman, the most serene queen dowager, no light dissensions arose throughout the whole kingdom concerning her funeral, you judged it yours to refer to us concerning that condition and concerning the manner to be held by you and your monks in that case, and to ask our judgment. We therefore, insisting on the rules of the most holy Church, respond that that intention of offering the divine Sacrifice or other prayers for the departed of the Catholic royal family universally is by no means sufficient to render honorable, under the cause of a public funeral, that which was requested by name for a non-Catholic person and is celebrated on the day of her death or annually. And hence we ourselves, although we pursue you, beloved son, and your monks with paternal charity, nevertheless will not approve and confirm those things which pertain to that monastery and its affairs before that condition, incautiously undertaken by you, is restricted to the funerals of Catholic princes alone. For we cannot permit that in any way fraud be made against that prohibition which rests on Catholic doctrine itself, concerning a sacred funeral not to be celebrated for departed non-Catholics. Act therefore, beloved son; expend all your industry and work so that the most serene king, according to his piety, may wholly agree to this... Meanwhile, if before the matter has been arranged with his majesty it should happen, which may God avert, that the most serene queen dies outside the true Catholic faith, you and your monks need much firmness of soul and prudence, so that you indeed in no way violate that most grave prohibition of holy Church, and the pious king may understand that, with the duties of religion preserved, it cannot in any way happen that you comply with him in that matter..." Brief of Gregory XVI, 9 July 1842, to Rupert Feiss, President of the Monks of Scheyern. Cf. also the Letter Officium perlibenter to the Bishop of Augsburg, 13 Feb. 1842.

"Whether Mass can or ought to be celebrated and alms received for a Greek-schismatic, who earnestly asks and insists that Mass be applied for himself, whether with him standing in the Church or remaining outside the Church? - Resp. According to the things set forth, it is not lawful, unless it is expressly established that the alms are offered by the schismatic to obtain conversion to the true faith." S. I. C. 19 April 1837.

"If in that kingdom (of China) it will be lawful for Christians to pray and to make sacrifice to Our Lord God for their departed, who depart from this life in their unbelief? - Resp. If they truly die in unbelief, it is wholly not lawful." S. C. de P. F. 12 Sept. 1645.

"Whether it is lawful for Priests to celebrate Mass for the intention of Turks and other unbelievers, and to receive from them alms for the application of Mass? - Resp. In the affirmative, provided that there is no scandal, and nothing is added in the Mass, and, as regards the intention, it is established that nothing of evil or error or superstition underlies the unbelievers offering the alms." S. I. C. 12 July 1865.

"The Turks dwelling at Chocim in Moldavia, on the occasion of their goods being lost or taken by theft, send certain offerings to the nearby Friars Minor Conventual, urging through their messenger that by the aid of St. Anthony of Padua, whom the Turks of Kamieniec think to be alive, they may be able to recover their lost goods. Therefore three doubts are proposed to be asked: 1. Whether the Friars Minor can receive offerings from Turks? 2. Whether Masses can be celebrated for Turks? 3. Whether they can accept those offerings under the title of alms, for Mass to be celebrated at the altar of St. Anthony according to the need or intention of the offerer? - Resp. In the case of which there is question, it is not lawful." S. I. C. 1779.

"Whether Catholic Missionaries and presbyters, when asked by schismatics, can preach in the Churches of these? - Resp. Either they are invited for the purpose that Catholic truth be preached there without restriction, and even against the errors of those same schismatics, and then in the affirmative; or only that a sermon be made concerning virtues and vices which commonly both Catholics and schismatics ought to embrace and avoid, and then in the negative." S. C. de P. F. 1674.

The Sacred Congregation "ordered that it be written that he should provide that, in the church of St. John of Cartola, Diocese of Cattaro, Catholics not celebrate Divine things with Greek schismatics; for although they use different altars, nevertheless, because of the identity of the church, it is to communicate with schismatics in Divine things." S. C. de P. F. to the Archbishop of Sardis, 13 Aug. 1627.

"Missionaries ought not celebrate Divine things in churches in which Heretics at the same time have their profane and sacrilegious exercises. But so that satisfaction may be made for Catholics, the Holy Sacrifice is to be performed upon portable altars placed in private homes." S. C. de P. F. 21 May 1627.

"Our Most Holy Lord Clement XI, Pope by divine Providence, in a particular audience given to me, Commissary of the Holy Office, said that, for more easily promoting the conversion of schismatics and unbelievers, and for attracting them to embrace the Catholic Faith by the sight of the sacred ceremonies, he benignly granted to the Father Prefect, or Vice-prefect, of the Missionaries for the time being existing in Ethiopia, that according to their judgment and conscience they can dispense with the same Missionaries, and grant them faculty of celebrating the most holy Sacrifice of the Mass in the Catholic Roman rite upon an altar in the temples of heretics or schismatics in Ethiopia; in such a way that the same altars do not serve except as bare tables, and be arranged in the manner of Catholics with a consecrated stone, cloths, and the aforesaid rite of the Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass; never, however, generally, but in particular cases, in which other more suitable places are not available, so that there is urgent necessity for more easily promoting the said conversion, and furthermore for the consolation of Catholics, and for other just and most urgent causes, to be judged by the same Father Prefect or Vice-prefect Missionaries, concerning which he burdened their conscience." 12 April 1704. Cf. Zephyrinus Zitelli, Appar. Iur. Eccl., p. 495.

"In the Churches of Catholics of Rhaetia occupied by heretics, Missionaries can continue their exercises." S. I. C. 13 June 1534.

"Nor is it lawful to permit heretics and schismatics to celebrate in our Churches, even if the consecrated stone has first been removed." S. C. de P. F. 16 Sept. 1695.

"Whether it is lawful for Latin Catholics to concede or permit that, in their churches, priests of the Greek rite, schismatics and heretics, celebrate Mass? - Resp. In the negative; especially since they make commemoration of the Patriarch of Constantinople and celebrate the feast of the infamous Palamas. For this is equivalent to consenting to their heretical rites, and to communicating with them in their sacred rites polluted with schismatic and heretical bran; or at least to providing occasion to Catholics entering Latin churches of communicating with heretics in divine things, or at least of conceiving scandal." S. O. C. 10 May 1755.

"Whether it is lawful for Latin confessors or priests to administer the Sacrament of Penance to Greek Catholics communicating in divine things with Greek schismatics? The same S. O. C. responded on the same day: It is not lawful outside the case of extreme necessity." For fuller Instruction it ordered to be transcribed what Benedict XIV taught in the treatise On the Diocesan Synod, bk. 6, c. 5.

"His Holiness decreed that it is regularly not lawful for Catholics to be present at the sermons, baptisms, or marriages of Heretics or Schismatics. But absolutely it is not lawful, either by oneself or through others, to perform the office of sponsor in baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics." S. O. 10 May 1770.

"As regards the abuse of admitting heretics as Sponsors in the Sacrament of Baptism, the Sacred Congregation ordered that the Decree of the Sacred Council of Trent, sess. 24, De Ref., be recalled to memory for all Apostolic Vicars." S. C. de P. F. 8 Sept. 1869.

"Insofar as schismatics accompanying the funerals of Catholics exhibit a merely material presence, for the sake of civil honor toward the deceased, not mixing themselves with the Catholic prayers or rites by which it is customary to carry out funerals and lead the dead to burial, it can be tolerated; but insofar as in that function they employ their own rites, or mix themselves with ours, it is not lawful and is not to be permitted." S. I. C. 10 May 1753.

Doubts proposed by the Archbishop of Udine, Apostolic Administrator of the Diocese of Mantua. "1. Whether a Catholic Priest, in places where heretics do not have their own ministers, can accompany the corpse of a heretic from the house to the cemetery, even if the corpse is not brought into the Church, nor the bells rung? And in the affirmative, 2. Whether a practice of this kind is permitted or tolerated only in some special places, or can be extended also to our Italy? And in the affirmative, 3. What sacred vestments can the Priest use in this procession, if he must be preceded by the Cross? - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd and 3rd, provided for in the first." S. I. C. 19 Jan. 1886.

S. I. C. responded on 14 Jan. 1818: "It is lawful, if they go from mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred rites, in which case such going is commonly held as a protestation of false Religion; when indeed it appears sufficiently clear that to go in this way also to the temples of heretics is an act indifferent in itself, which becomes evil only from a depraved end, or from circumstances. But it becomes evil: 1. If one who goes to sacred functions of heretics has the intention of assisting at them; 2. Or even in the absence of such intention, if the very entrance into the Church of heretics brings in, or seems to bring in, some communication with those heretics in divine things; hence also it would provide occasion of scandal; 3. Or if such going is required by the heretical government, as a protestation of that same faith and religion between Catholics and non-Catholics; 4. Or finally if it is commonly held, as it were, as a token of one and the same communion of Catholics and non-Catholics. In these cases, therefore, it is never lawful for Catholics to go to the temples of heretics, because it is never lawful to participate in the sacred rites of heretics, nor to simulate one's own faith. But where all these things are absent, and they are moved by curiosity alone to see the temples, they can go to them without fault."

S. I. C. responded: "They are not to be disquieted, provided that scandal is not present and that it is not done in contempt of religion. But let the Bishop take care that, through Missionaries and Confessors, they be opportunely instructed when they ought to abstain from giving their own work in building the churches or synagogues of heretics. Namely, they are bound to abstain from the work: 1. where work of this kind is commonly held as a sign expressive of false religion; 2. or where something is contained in the work itself which directly and uniquely of itself expresses reprobation of Catholic worship and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; 3. or where it is known that Catholic craftsmen are driven to the work or called by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion. Moreover, although outside these cases they are to be left in good faith, nevertheless they must always be admonished not to intend to cooperate with the worship of heretics." 14 Jan. 1818.

Resp. "In the affirmative, but only in order to free themselves and their own temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants." S. Poenit. 1822.

"Can Christians be permitted to construct temples or altars of idols, or to make the idols themselves, in order to avoid exile or deprivation of goods? - Resp. It is not lawful to cooperate in building temples or altars of idols, or to make their statues." S. C. de P. F. 7 Dec. 1626. Doubt concerning Japan.

"In no way is it lawful for Catholic Christians, nor can it be permitted or tolerated by any cause or motive, that they devote their labor to building, restoring, and sweeping temples of a false deity, or temples dedicated to the authors of false sects, or to cleaning their walls and pavements, cleaning altars, and opening and closing doors." S. I. C. 1669.

"There are Christian communities which have already been compelled by the Mandarins to erect a public shrine for idols. Moreover, while the most cruel Tyrant who governs this most wretched Kingdom stands, it will be very difficult to destroy these public shrines... I ask whether, with the above-mentioned things considered, the Christian communities which have erected shrines of this kind can truly be judged immune from superstitions, provided they perform no acts of superstition in those shrines? ... - Resp. Deferred, and inquiry is to be made of the Apostolic Vicar whether the erection of the shrine is held as an expressive act." S. C. de P. F. 10 Aug. 1841. But on 8 Jan. 1851 the same Sacred Congregation, having received an affirmative response from the Apostolic Vicar, wrote back: "It is not lawful for Christians to build temples for idols or to cooperate in their construction; and let the Decree for Japan of 7 Dec. 1626 be given, namely: Japanese faithful cannot, in order to avoid danger of death or exile, build altars for idols or cooperate in their construction." S. I. C. 8 Jan. 1851. Cf. T. A. Gallo, Suppet. Evang. Praeecon., etc., Rome, 1872, Vol. 1, p. 197 ff., 251 ff.

"Christians, servants of Turkish masters, are employed to construct mosques..., to repair their walls..., to whitewash the walls... The Apostolic Vicar asked whether such acts are lawful?... Considering the motives, causes, and circumstances set forth by the Apostolic Vicar, showing the miserable servants placed in the hard necessity of performing such labors, their good faith, invincible difficulties, the further danger of the expulsion of Missionaries and the prohibition of the Ministers of Religion from instructing Christian servants and administering Sacraments to them, it was resolved in these Congregations that, if the Christian servants were not compelled by the Turks to these labors out of hatred for our Religion, or out of contempt of it, in which case they ought rather to sustain death, the Apostolic Vicar ought to leave them in the good faith in which they are, provided they do not have the intention of cooperating with superstition." S. C. de P. F. 31 Aug. and 14 Sept. 1780.

"It is the custom in the Kingdom of Tonkin that the whole community must concur in the building of a temple of idols and in other superstitious things, as also in other public works, by contributing money or other things. But if anyone refuses, the community will inviolably take from his goods much more than the sum fixed for him, or will impose on him a much more grave fine, or even will accuse him before the Magistrates, with danger for the Christian faithful of denying the faith, of prison, and of other grave harms. It is asked: 1. Whether this is lawful? 2. Whether at least it is lawful after a protestation has been made, by which the faithful person declares that he contributes only to avoid the grave harm threatening him, and asks the village that what they contribute be used for other lawful works? 3. Whether it is lawful for the faithful, when they are compelled to cook foods or contribute rice for the sustenance of the workers, to do these things? - Resp. To 1, 2, and 3: It is not lawful, whether a protestation has or has not been made. To 4. Likewise it is not lawful, as above." S. I. C. 5 Sept. 1736; 5 April 1785; 5 July 1854. Cf. Gallo, loc. cit., p. 215 ff.

In other cases the Christian faithful were compelled by grave penalties in mission places to contribute money for superstitious acts and for public festivity. The Sacred Congregation, having been questioned concerning lawfulness, responded: "Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this kind they do not intend to concur in idolatrous and superstitious acts, with the cause supposed which is narrated in the doubt; especially if, should it conveniently be possible, a protestation has first been made that they pay the imposed taxes only in relation to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F. 12 Sept. 1645. "Let Christians first make a protestation that they pay the money taxatively as a mere tribute, provided they do not assist at superstitious rites; and if no one protests against it, they are not to be disquieted." S. C. S. O. 27 April 1847. Cf. Collectan. Const., etc., for the use of Apostolic Workers, Paris, 1880, nn. 1071, 1104, etc.

"1. All those incur excommunication reserved to the Pontiff among the most special cases who, even without the will of adhering to heresy, and only by reason of human respect, give their names to sects of heretics, of whatever denomination. 2. A fortiori they incur the same penalty who are present at non-Catholic functions or services, as it is commonly said, or hear someone preaching with the plan that they may give themselves over to him, insofar as, as they impiously say, they can be persuaded by him. 3. Thus also they incur the same excommunication who, having become promoters of another's spiritual ruin, induce in any way and see to it that others go or come to the halls or temples of heretics to hear conferences. 4. Finally all those are bound by the same penalty who publish in print invitations to the aforesaid conferences and the themes of the same, because of the favor which by such action they furnish to the propagation or confirmation of heresy.

But it is most strictly forbidden, through mere curiosity and knowingly, to enter the halls and temples of Protestants at the time of conferences; and all gravely sin who through mere curiosity listen to the conferences of Protestants and assist, even materially, at non-Catholic ceremonies; and all craftsmen who, even for the sole reason of profit, sing or play instruments in the temples of Protestants; and printers, even secondary ministers, who, lest they be thrown out by their superiors, set type for printing books of heretics. Indeed, if there is question of books of heretics by which heresy is taught and sustained, even secondary printer-ministers incur the major excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Pontiff. Nor are architects, contractors, and master builders excused from mortal sin who contribute their own labor and work to erect some temple of Protestants. As regards other builders and lower workers, they will be able to be excused from sin, provided scandal is absent from their deed, and the work is not done in contempt of the Catholic Religion. But Parish Priests and Confessors will devote diligent work so that they admonish people of this kind that it is necessary to abstain from such material work, insofar as the work is commonly held as an indication protesting false religion; and insofar as the same work carries with it something which alone and directly signifies either reprobation of Catholic worship or approbation of reprobated heretical worship; or when it is certain that the same are forced or called by heretics to work in contempt of the Catholic Religion; and that in no case is the intention of cooperating with heretical worship lawful." 12 July 1878; 28 Sept. 1884. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 11, p. 168 ff.; Vol. 17, p. 164 ff.

"As regards the controversy... whether a Confessor is bound to admonish and teach penitents who invincibly are ignorant of the prohibition of certain superstitious rites, or of the condemnation of the Alexandrian permissions, when he foresees that the penitents, admonished and instructed, will not amend themselves, or whether instead he ought to leave them in good faith: the Supreme Pontiff considers that to leave such ignorant persons in their own ignorance concerning the cases about which there is question is not only the same as to close off every approach for all those Christians, lest they furnish obedience uniform with the Apostolic Constitution, the same as to evade the mind of the Holy See, which prudently commanded that the declarations recounted concerning the aforesaid rites be made known to all Christians; but also that omissions of such instruction tend toward grave scandal of the gentiles and toward public harm to the Christian name in those regions. His Holiness further declares that, although in some cases... Confessors can omit the instruction of penitents... nevertheless in the present case this doctrine has no place... Therefore Confessors and Missionaries ought to admonish and teach not only penitents, but also other Christians who invincibly are ignorant of the prohibition of certain superstitious rites and of the condemnation of the Alexandrian permissions, even if no fruit should be hoped from such admonition; for the instruction of such ignorant persons is incumbent on evangelical Workers, as a proper function of their office enjoined upon them by the aforesaid Apostolic Constitution." Instr. S. C. S. O. 14 Jan. 1753.

“19. The will cannot bring it about that the assent of faith be in itself firmer than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves. — 20. Hence one can prudently reject an assent which he holds to be supernatural. — 23. Faith broadly so called, arising from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive, suffices for justification.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“51. Faith justifies when it operates, but it does not operate except through charity. — 52. All the other means of salvation are contained in faith, as in their germ and seed; but this faith is not without love and confidence.” Propositions of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

“12. When all love is lacking in great sinners, faith also is lacking; and although one may appear to believe, it is not divine faith, but human.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

“I. On God, the Creator of All Things. — 1. If anyone shall deny the one true God, Creator and Lord of things visible and invisible, let him be anathema. — 2. If anyone shall not be ashamed to affirm that nothing exists besides matter, let him be anathema. — 3. If anyone shall say that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same, let him be anathema. — 4. If anyone shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual things, emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence, by manifestation or evolution of itself, becomes all things; or, finally, that God is the universal or indefinite being which, by determining itself, constitutes the universe of things distinct in genera, species, and individuals, let him be anathema. — 5. If anyone shall not confess that the world and all things contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced by God from nothing according to their whole substance; or shall say that God created not by a will free from every necessity, but as necessarily as He necessarily loves Himself; or shall deny that the world was established for the glory of God, let him be anathema.

“II. On Revelation. — 1. If anyone shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through those things which have been made, let him be anathema. — 2. If anyone shall say that it is impossible or inexpedient that man be instructed through divine revelation concerning God and the worship to be rendered to Him, let him be anathema. — 3. If anyone shall say that man cannot be raised divinely to a knowledge and perfection which surpass the natural, but can and ought of himself, by continual progress, ultimately to attain possession of all truth and goodness, let him be anathema. — 4. If anyone shall not receive as sacred and canonical the books of Holy Scripture in their entirety, with all their parts, as the sacred Synod of Trent enumerated them, or shall deny that they are divinely inspired, let him be anathema.

“III. On Faith. — 1. If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded of it by God, let him be anathema. — 2. If anyone shall say that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge concerning God and moral things, and that therefore it is not required for divine faith that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of God revealing, let him be anathema. — 3. If anyone shall say that no miracles can occur, and that therefore all accounts of them, even those contained in sacred Scripture, are to be relegated among fables or myths; or that miracles can never be known with certainty, nor the divine origin of the Christian religion rightly proved by them, let him be anathema. — 4. If anyone shall say that the assent of Christian faith is not free, but is necessarily produced by arguments of human reason; or that the grace of God is necessary only for living faith, which operates through charity, let him be anathema. — 5. If anyone shall say that the condition of the faithful and of those who have not yet attained the one true faith is equal, so that Catholics can have just cause for calling into doubt, with assent suspended, the faith which they have already received under the magisterium of the Church, until they shall have completed a scientific demonstration of its credibility and truth, let him be anathema.

“IV. On Faith and Reason. — 1. If anyone shall say that no mysteries truly and properly so called are contained in divine revelation, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural principles by reason duly cultivated, let him be anathema. — 2. If anyone shall say that human disciplines are to be treated with such liberty that their assertions, even when opposed to revealed doctrine, can be retained as true and cannot be proscribed by the Church, let him be anathema. — 3. If anyone shall say that, according to the progress of science, a sense can at some time be assigned to dogmas proposed by the Church other than that which the Church has understood and understands, let him be anathema.”

“68. Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin.” Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

“28. If the Pope with a great part of the Church should hold an opinion in one way or another, and should not even be in error, it is still not a sin or heresy to hold the contrary, especially in a matter not necessary for salvation, until the one opinion has been rejected and the other approved by a universal Council.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“5. Although it is evident to you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him if you cannot prove it.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

“Whether Ordinaries of dioceses who are not Bishops, such as Capitular Vicars, Apostolic Administrators of cathedral churches, and also Vicars General, and likewise whether Prefects of missions, can reconcile to the Church a repentant heretic, whether appearing before them of his own accord or brought in any manner before the external forum, equally with Bishops, and absolve him for both forums from the censure into which he has fallen because of heresy. — Resp. Concerning Capitular Vicars: in the affirmative with regard to subjects, even with the power of delegating; but as regards exempt persons, they regularly require a faculty of the Apostolic See. — Concerning Apostolic Administrators of cathedral churches: in the affirmative, even with the faculty of subdelegating. — Concerning Vicars General: they cannot by virtue of their office, but they can by delegation of their own Ordinary. — Concerning Prefects of missions: in the negative.” Holy Office, 1 Feb. 1865.

From the Holy Office, 21 Dec. 1895, a Bishop can by ordinary authority absolve in the external forum heretics who appear of their own accord, “after an abjuration juridically made.”

But regarding this juridical abjuration, the same Holy Office declared on 28 March 1900 “that the abjuration can be made before someone delegated by the Bishop as notary and before some persons as witnesses; and let the instruction of 8 April 1786 to the Bishop of Limerick be given.”

The aforesaid instruction reads thus: It is not necessary that those who have defected from the Catholic faith and afterwards desire to return to it first make a public abjuration; it is enough that they abjure privately before a few persons, provided, however, that they keep their promises and in fact abstain from communicating with heretics in spiritual things, or from doing anything expressive of heresy. The same is to be held concerning those who privately abjure the heresy in which they were educated from the beginning.

Cf. n. 364; Instruction for the profession of faith and absolution of heretics in the Collectanea of the S. C. de P. F., n. 1689; M. E., vol. 12, pp. 49–50.

“1. Whether a girl ten years of age dwelling in a monastery can safely be admitted to the profession of the Catholic faith against the will of her father, who is a heretic. — 2. Whether girls dwelling in a monastery can safely be admitted to the profession of the Catholic faith when their heretical parents consent and even promise that they will give them in marriage to Catholic men, although they declare concerning themselves that they are heretics and wish to remain such. — 3. Whether girls can safely be admitted to the profession of the Catholic faith, as in the preceding case, although the parents themselves are not Catholic but indifferent, that is, unbelievers. — 4. Whether girls at present well disposed are to be admitted without delay to the profession of the Catholic faith and reception of the sacraments, or whether their admission is to be deferred until marriage with a Catholic man because of the fear of perversion. — 5. If it is to be deferred, whether they are to be admitted into the monastery in order to be instructed in the Catholic faith, or whether one must wait until the time of marriage with a Catholic man.

“Resp. To the 1st: Let the Apostolic Vicar first strive with all his strength to obtain the consent of the girl’s father. If consent is not obtained, let him consider seriously the disadvantages which are foreseen as likely to arise from the admission of such a girl into the Church, both with regard to the proximate danger of the perversion of that same girl and with regard to grave harm to the Catholic school and mission; and insofar as no disadvantages, or only negligible ones, are foreseen, let him admit her without delay. But insofar as grave future disadvantages are foreseen, let him defer her admission to the formal and public profession of the Catholic faith, unless danger of death is imminent; and meanwhile let him take care to exhort her to persevere in her good purpose and to pray God that He may deign to remove all obstacles; and at the same time let him take care that she continue to remain in the monastery and in this manner complete and perfect her Catholic education. — To the 2nd and 3rd: in the affirmative; and let them take care that the parents stand by their promises. And with regard to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, with this intention: the intention is that suitable inquiries be made concerning the validity of the girls’ Baptism; and insofar as, after these have been made, a probable doubt remains concerning the validity of this Baptism, let the girls be baptized secretly under condition. — To the 4th: in the negative, unless a well-founded hope of their Catholic education shines forth. — To the 5th: provided for by the responses to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd; and if further difficulties arise, let the Right Reverend Apostolic Vicar have recourse in the individual cases.” Holy Office, 21 July 1880.

“97. Faith is necessary for rustic, ignorant, servile men and those not having an elevated intellect, who do not know how to know through reason and delight to know through faith; but a subtle man is more easily drawn to Christian truth through reason than through faith.” Proposition of Raymond Llull condemned by Gregory XI, on the seventh day before the Kalends of February 1376. Cf. nn. 345, 349, 350.

“22. Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in Him as rewarder.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 345.

“64. A man is capable of absolution, however much he may labor under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ. — 65. It suffices to have believed those mysteries once.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“A Missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one who is dying, provided that he is not wholly incapable, the mysteries of faith which are necessary by necessity of means, such as principally the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.” Holy Office, 25 Jan. 1703; C. 549.

“1. At no time whatever in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“16. Faith is not judged to fall under a special precept in itself. — 17. It suffices to elicit an act of faith once in life. — 18. If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel him candidly to confess the faith as glorious to God and to the faith; I do not condemn silence as sinful in itself.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 350.

Cf. n. 353.

“For even if the matter concerned that submission which is to be rendered by an act of divine faith, it would nevertheless not have to be limited to those things which have been defined by express decrees of ecumenical Councils, of the Roman Pontiffs, and of this Apostolic See; but it would also have to be extended to those things which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and which therefore are held by the universal and constant consent of Catholic theologians to pertain to the faith. But since the matter concerns that submission by which, in conscience, all those Catholics who devote themselves to speculative disciplines are bound, so that by their writings they may bring new benefits to the Church, therefore the men of that same assembly ought to recognize that it is by no means enough for Catholic scholars to receive and venerate the aforesaid dogmas of the Church, but that it is also necessary that they subject themselves both to those decisions pertaining to doctrine which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations and to those heads of doctrine which by the common and constant consent of Catholics are held as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those same heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless merit some other theological censure.” Pius IX, Letter to the Archbishop of Munich and Freising, 21 Dec. 1863.

“The Pontifical Constitutions relating to the Chinese and Malabar rites, and especially the Bulls Ex quo and Omnium sollicitudinum of Benedict XIV of holy memory, are not disciplinary, but doctrinal.” Holy Office, 5 Aug. 1891.

“Let all the children of the Catholic Church learn to hear the Church herself, not only by keeping silence … but also by obeying inwardly, which is the true obedience of an orthodox man … [and let them learn] that the sense of the Jansenian book condemned in the five aforesaid propositions, which their words present … must be received and condemned as heretical by all the Christian faithful, not only with the mouth, but also with the heart….” Clement XI, Constitution Vineam Domini, 16 July 1703.

“Whether it can safely be denied, or at least called into doubt, that the text of St. John in the First Epistle, chapter 5, verse 7, is authentic, which reads thus: For there are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. — Resp. In the negative.” Holy Office, 15 Jan. 1897.

“A penitent presents himself before a confessor and, among other things, declares that he holds the opinion that the fire in hell is not real but metaphorical; that is, that the punishments of hell, whatever they may be, are called fire by a manner of speaking; for just as fire produces the most intense pain of all, so no image is more apt for indicating the most atrocious punishments of hell and for forming an idea of hell. Hence the parish priest asks whether it is lawful to leave penitents in this opinion, and whether it is lawful to grant them absolution. The parish priest notes, moreover, that the matter does not concern the opinion of some individual, but is an opinion generally admitted in a certain village, where it is customary to say: ‘Persuade only the infants, if you can, that there is fire in hell.’

“Resp. Penitents of this kind are to be diligently instructed; and the obstinate are not to be absolved.” Sacred Penitentiary, 30 April 1890.

Cf. n. 345; Canons of the Vatican Council.

“41. It is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is supreme among the other Churches.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned by the Council of Constance. Cf. n. 369.

“C. 1. On the Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in Blessed Peter. — If anyone shall say that blessed Peter the Apostle was not constituted by Christ the Lord as prince of all the Apostles and visible head of the whole Church militant; or that he received from the same Our Lord Jesus Christ directly and immediately a primacy of honor only, and not one of true and proper jurisdiction, let him be anathema.

“C. 2. On the Perpetuity of the Primacy of Blessed Peter in the Roman Pontiffs. — If anyone shall say that it is not by the institution of Christ the Lord Himself, or by divine right, that blessed Peter has perpetual successors in the primacy over the universal Church; or that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of blessed Peter in that same primacy, let him be anathema.

“C. 3. On the Force and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. — If anyone shall say that the Roman Pontiff has only an office of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church diffused throughout the whole world; or that he has only the more important parts, but not the whole plenitude, of this supreme power; or that this power of his is not ordinary and immediate, whether over each and all Churches or over each and all pastors, let him be anathema.

“C. 4. On the Infallible Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff. — We define as a dogma: that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, exercising the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, he defines by his supreme apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore that definitions of this kind of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church. But if anyone—which may God avert—shall presume to contradict this definition of Ours, let him be anathema.”

The 45 articles of John Wycliffe, condemned by the Council of Constance and by Martin V through the Bull Inter cunctas, on the eighth day before the Kalends of March 1418, and the Bull In eminenti of the same day.

The 30 articles of John Hus, condemned by the Council of Constance and by Martin V, as above.

The 9 propositions of Master Peter of Osma, condemned by Sixtus IV in 1479 as scandalous and heretical.

The 41 errors of Martin Luther, condemned by Leo X through the Bull Exsurge Domine, 16 May 1520.

1. Simplicius, an unlearned man, while confessing before Macarius the parish priest, when questioned concerning the things necessary to be believed, is found very ignorant. For he does not know how to recite the symbol of faith, nor to give an account concerning the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation, etc. But the confessor, indignant, scolds and rebukes the penitent, as a man too careless about his own salvation, and, absolution having been denied, dismisses him until he has learned the things which are necessary to be known for salvation.

Q. 1. What things must necessarily be believed? 2. What concerning the manner of acting of Macarius?

To the first, cf. I. M. 349 seqq. To the second: Macarius the confessor is more to be scolded and rebuked than Simplicius the penitent; since he so harshly repels from himself an unlearned man, and deters him from the sacraments. For first, it is not necessary that the penitent know by memory all things to be believed; but it is enough that he know them as to substance. Nor indeed is it necessary that an account concerning the individual mysteries be explicitly given; it suffices to know and believe them. Wherefore, if Simplicius knew at least the principal heads of faith which are contained in the Apostles' Creed, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and the principal sacraments of baptism, penance, and Eucharist as to substance, although he did not know how to give an account of them, he could indeed and ought to have been absolved by Macarius. But if Simplicius was altogether ignorant of these things, and it was to be feared lest, having been dismissed, he would not return further, or would return with the same ignorance, he ought to have instructed him sufficiently as regards the one God and Rewarder, as regards the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation, then eliciting with him a general act of faith; he ought furthermore to have disposed him for absolution, by stirring him to contrition and purpose, also eliciting with him an act of contrition; finally he ought to have exhorted him that thereafter he should wish to learn the same things better, and should also learn the other things which are contained in the Creed, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and the principal sacraments; and thus to impart absolution to him. But if there is a prudent hope that Simplicius will return, then either Macarius himself ought to instruct him gradually on individual occasions, or ought at least to indicate to him, or even procure for him, the means by which he may be instructed by another, and thus gently he ought to send him away for a few days, until he is sufficiently instructed, earnestly asking him to return as soon as possible. If Simplicius knows how to read, it will be very useful to give him some suitable little book which contains and explains a small catechism. Elbel 31 seqq.; G. 186.

2. Politianus, a supporter of civil liberties, who often confesses and approaches Communion, making a journey at paschal time, confesses outside his own parish, lest he be deprived of paschal Communion. But Fabritius the confessor, understanding that he stands for the civil liberty of government, denies him absolution, and declares him unworthy of paschal Communion, because, he says, liberalism is a sin, and all liberals are in a continual state of mortal sin.

Q. What as to the case?

R. The manner of acting of the aforesaid confessor certainly cannot be approved, since there is question, as appears from the case, of an honest man and a good Catholic, who frequents the sacraments of the Church, and bears their deprivation at paschal time with difficulty, since even when established on a journey he is unwilling in any way to omit them. Nor indeed can the doctrine of the confessor be approved, since in its universality it is altogether false. Liberalism is a sin, if that also comprehends errors condemned by the Church. Liberals likewise are in sin if they hold and defend errors of this sort. But if civil liberty imports nothing else than the republican or constitutional form of government, as it is called, and consequently civil liberties of government which are contained within the legitimate limits of justice and of the public good, there is certainly nothing illicit in it in itself, nor has it ever been condemned by the Church in itself. Whence it also cannot be affirmed that those who from this are called liberals are in mortal sin. Hence in the Instruction of the Holy Office, 29 Aug. 1877, to the Canadian bishops, the Sacred Congregation says: "The Church, in condemning liberalism, does not intend to strike all the individual political parties which perhaps are called liberal, since the decisions of the Church refer to certain errors opposed to Catholic doctrine, not to a determined political party." Collectan. S. Congr. de Prop. Fid., n. 1665. And as regards the very form of government,

Leo XIII, in the encyclical letter Quella lunga, 29 June 1881, teaches these things: "Yet it is important to note here, that those who will be placed over the public thing can in certain circumstances be elected by the will and deliberation of the multitude, without Catholic doctrine being contrary or repugnant to this.... Nor is there question here of the modes of public government, since there is no reason why the Church should not approve the principate of one or of many, provided it is just and directed to the common advantage. Wherefore, justice being preserved, peoples are not prevented from procuring for themselves that kind of government which better suits their character, or the institutions and customs of their forefathers." If it were otherwise, it would have to be said that now all those in the Catholic nations of Europe and America who favor modern institutions of governments are in mortal sin and are unworthy of sacramental absolution, which indeed is altogether absurd.

3. Blandina, a pious woman, heard from a preacher that acts of faith, like acts of the other theological virtues, must frequently be elicited. Wherefore she fears vehemently lest she has not satisfied this precept, and has thus gravely offended.

4. Sylvius, a confessor, is not accustomed to ask penitents whether they sometimes elicit acts of faith. He acts thus also with penitents careless for many years about salvation and the sacraments; especially if they are matrons and conspicuous men, whom he does not dare to question.

Q. 1. When does the precept of faith oblige? 2. What as to the cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 354, 355, 376, 381. To the second: Blandina, since she is a devout woman, ought not to be anxious concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of faith, since she is most frequently raised by faith in following the devout life. G. 188.

As regards Sylvius, the confessor is not held specially to ask penitents concerning acts of faith. For they are presumed sufficiently to satisfy the divine precept, unless a special reason persuades the opposite. This certainly holds as regards those who do not neglect the practice of religion, and approach the sacraments. But as regards the others, Lugo excellently admonishes this: since this obligation, as regards the time when it urges, is so uncertain, and since for this very reason it is partly not known, and partly the omission, if ever it were present, is not adverted to, hence it happens that neither among penitents is there a custom of confessing about this, nor among confessors of asking about this. G. 189.

1. In places of the missions, a prince, moving persecution against Catholics, made a public edict by which he commanded that all Christians had to present themselves before the judge within the space of fifteen days; otherwise they were judged to have denied the faith. The faithful of several provinces asked the missionaries what was to be done, and almost all answered that they should flee, or, if it could conveniently be done, that they should hide themselves. Yet some reproved this, opposing proposition 18 condemned by Innocent XI, and ordered all the faithful of their mission to present themselves before the judge.

2. In a region of heretics, it was prohibited by law for religious to celebrate Mass. Mathurinus, a religious, had celebrated Mass there daily for a year. At last, having been caught, he is asked by the judge whether he knew the prohibition of the law, and whether he himself was a priest and a religious. To all these things Mathurinus responded with subtle evasion.

3. Lucianus, a heretical minister, already converted in his heart to the Catholic faith, seized by a lethal illness, calls a Catholic priest so that he may receive from him the sacraments of the Catholic Church. Yet he first asks him that he be willing to come to him clothed in lay garments, lest he introduce any suspicion of himself to others; then, that, if he should die from that illness, he say nothing concerning his conversion, lest perhaps his parents be liable to persecution; but if he should recover, that he himself should await a suitable time for manifesting his conversion, lest his whole fortune be confiscated.

Q. 1. When does the external profession of faith urge? What as to the cases?

To the first, cf. I. M. 364, 365. To the second: the missionaries responded well; nor is the condemned proposition rightly invoked against them. "If only," says Viva on this proposition, n. 13, "in general through an edict it is proposed that, if someone is faithful, he betray himself, when many are hidden, no one, speaking in itself, is held to betray himself." The reason is that, when a tyrant questions concerning the faith, someone is held to respond, not because he legitimately asks, but from this, that through such questioning there arises an article of necessity, for which the precept of confessing the faith obliges. Moreover, in the case, this article of necessity is not had. For flight and hiding, in the case, does not yield to contempt of faith, since on the contrary those who flee and are hidden are rather manifested as Christians and faithful. - "If a prince," says Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 911, "by a general law commands that the faithful betray themselves, by carrying such a sign or otherwise, the faithful are not held to this; since no one is held to tell the truth unless specially asked. Except, unless the circumstances are such that by the very fact that they do not betray themselves they seem to have denied the faith, as, for example, if some were previously known, and then from this they would be thought to have defected from the faith." - Struggl, q. 1, n. 39, 40; Lig. 13, 14; G. 193.

Mathurinus was not held to respond to the judge questioning him, since he had no right, in the case, of juridically questioning a priest. But to dissemble, by mental restriction, knowledge of the aforesaid law, or that he is a priest and religious, is certainly not to dissemble the Catholic faith, and much less to deny it. Wherefore Mathurinus acted rightly. Indeed, without any evasion Mathurinus could have simply denied that he knew anything about the law, understanding namely about a true obliging law; likewise he could deny that he is a priest and religious, understanding namely in order to the illegitimate celebration about which he was being asked, and to the illegitimate questioning of the judge, or that he himself was held to confess. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 12, a. 28; Elbel 62, 63; G. 192, 193.

The Catholic priest could indeed approach Lucianus clothed in lay garments. For this contains nothing against faith; and not rarely Catholic priests, from a reasonable cause, walk as laymen lest they be recognized, for example, in time of persecutions, etc. - But he could not permit Lucianus to dissemble the faith by dying. For there urges, especially in the article of death, for a heretic who is then converted to the faith, the positive obligation of the Church of external profession of faith, which obligation Lucianus was not ignorant of, as appears from the case. Furthermore, it was altogether necessary by that profession of faith to remove scandal and retract the errors which he had taught; otherwise others, either seduced by Lucianus or certainly confirmed in their errors, without doubt would have persevered further in these errors, not without most evident loss of salvation and detriment to divine honor. Wherefore Lucianus ought altogether, at least before two witnesses before he died, to profess the Catholic faith. But if Lucianus had been altogether in good faith concerning this obligation of the Church, which he had entirely been ignorant of, and had not been a heretical minister, but a man from the common people, who had never confirmed anyone in his false sect; since in such a man then neither the honor of God nor the salvation of souls would be endangered, and therefore the natural and divine precept would not then urge concerning externally professing the Catholic faith for removing scandal, then, on account of a truly reasonable and grave cause, the external profession of faith could more easily be dissembled. Nor does it matter that he would be believed by others to have died in heresy; for scandal having been removed and a grave cause standing, that false opinion can be permitted. The other thing could be permitted to Lucianus, namely that, health having been recovered, for some time he dissemble the external profession of the Catholic faith, until he could suitably provide for himself and his affairs. For to dissemble the faith on account of a reasonable cause is not to deny it. Yet he ought altogether to abstain from acts protestative of false religion, as for example, to go on in the exercise of a heretical ministry: for this is to deny the faith. Elbel 67-70; G. 195-198; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1639, 1642, 1643, 1647, 1650-1653, 1686.

4. "How ought a confessor to conduct himself toward apostate penitents placed in the article of death, when he is summoned secretly by them, so that he may absolve secretly? The reason of the difficulty is that in that article they are accustomed to be induced by an infidel family or false priests to acts of false religion, nor can they refuse without danger of death.

R. The Most Holy One judged that the confessor ought to absolve the apostate penitent placed in the article of death, the apostasy having first been abjured in the forum of conscience; and if he should survive for some space of time, and if he can, let him abjure in public before the faithful; but if he cannot, let him leave a written document of his abjuration, signed at least with the sign of the cross; but if he cannot do this either, let him commit to the confessor that he manifest his abjuration to the faithful.

Yet the apostate penitent then placed in danger of life is not held, even with Turks persuading him with danger of life, to confess the Catholic faith which he then embraced after abjuring infidelity, but to elude their persuasions, either by not responding, or by using equivocal words." Holy Office, 25 July 1630. A. S. S., v. 26, p. 642.

1. Marcellinus the missionary proposes the following doubts:

1. Is it licit for Christians to rent houses and workshops to gentiles? The reason for doubting is that the gentiles, in the nobler place of those houses, burn incense, exhibit reverence to an idol, and exercise other superstitious things.

R. "It is licit, if it is established that the houses are sought for inhabiting and the workshops for an indifferent use; yet it is not licit if they are expressly sought for constructing a shrine." S. C. de P. F., 8 Feb. 1806.

2. Is it licit for Christians to lease farms belonging to a temple?

R. Here is in summary the instruction given by the S. C. de P. F., 15 Jan. 1807. 1. It is licit to lease farms belonging to a temple; especially if a cause consonant with reason for contracting concurs; for the thing is of its own nature indifferent. 2. To pay the lease price is a debt of justice, even if the lessee thinks it will be expended for the sake of the temple. 3. Scandal which perhaps arises for Christians from a thing of this sort, insofar as it is born from ignorance, or is scandal of the little ones, must be restrained by protestation and instruction; insofar as it is produced by the malice of the wicked, or is pharisaic, it must be contemned. 4. The lessee is to be exhorted to abstain from the lease if from this some danger of perversion or occasion of scandal is feared.

2. Christians buy territories on which there are idols or oratories of idols. Can they admonish the gentiles, to whom the territory previously belonged, to remove them from the territory?

R. "They cannot, if the ownership of these idols or oratories is annexed to the territory, and passes with the dominion of the land to the buyer, who is held to remove and destroy them, or so change their form that every occasion of superstitious worship is removed, and no appearance of an oratory consecrated to idols appears any longer. But if such idols or oratories are of public right and under the power of the prince, it is not licit for Christians to remove or destroy them, but rather they should abstain from buying those territories in which these profane images and oratories are found." Holy Office, month of May, year 1781.

3. Gentiles who preserve the tablets of the progenitors of the family are converted to the faith. Can they hand over tablets of this sort to pagan relatives, to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them from their house, or hide them, to be handed over afterwards if they are demanded by relatives or by prefects, and they are compelled to this? Likewise, to what are proselytes held who have with themselves the idols of other pagans, which they preserve by way of deposit?

R. "If those superstitious tablets by special dominion belong to the converted gentile, he cannot preserve them at home, nor hand them over to other pagans of the family, but must altogether destroy them; and thus it is to be taught and enjoined by the missionaries. But if these tablets belong jointly to others of the family, the Christian is held to remove them from his house; but he can hand them over to others of the family to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them and take them for themselves; for thus he will confess his faith, and will render to another his own right. By equal right, the idols of pagans which the proselyte preserves for the sake of deposit are to be restored to their owners." Holy Office, 20 Aug. 1778.

4. The bishop of Sergiopolis, Apostolic Vicar of Kiang-nan, proposed a case to the S. C. de P. F.: "Whether Catholics can be permitted, with boats and carrying-chairs, by which they are accustomed indiscriminately to transfer all persons from place to place, also to convey those gentiles who, bringing with themselves incense, idols, and other superstitious things, approach the sepulchers of their ancestors, or other places, so that there they may exercise superstitions."

The S. C. de P. F., 14 Sept. 1868, transmitted the response of the Holy Office, July 1854, given to a similar question:

"Since the actions of which there is discussion are in themselves licit, or at least indifferent, and do not directly influence superstition, provided that scandal is not present, and grave damage is imminent, those Catholics are not to be disturbed; and provided that it is not in contempt of religion, and a protestation is made by the Christian sailors, insofar as it can conveniently be done, that they do not intend toward superstition." Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2195.

5. Marcellus, a missionary, proposes the following doubts:

1. In order to avoid some tumults against Christians, is it licit for Christians to contribute money which is demanded, to be spent in the new year on idolatries of demons, and at the same time on other indifferent demonstrations of the people's joy?

R. "The Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this sort they do not intend to concur in superstitious acts, the cause which is narrated being supposed, especially a protestation having been premised, if it can conveniently be done, that they furnish the taxes imposed only in order to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F., 12 Sept. 1645.

2. Is it lawful for Christians to contribute money which, if one is unwilling to give it, he is prohibited from entry into the market of goods; which money partly falls to the leading men, partly to repairing the market, and partly to burning incense to a false deity?

R. "The payment of the tax can be permitted to Christians, especially with a protestation premised." S. C. de P. F., year 1816; Holy Office, 21 Apr. 1849.

3. What if the tax to be paid is imposed solely for a superstitious end, for constructing pagodas, for making sacrifices to idols, etc.?

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is understood by circumstances? - By the circumstances of a human act are understood all those aspects which are accessory to the willed object, and, as it were, accidental to the substance of the act, and which are willed only concomitantly or consequently. "The name of circumstance," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 1, "is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local matters something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, yet pertains to the thing itself, is called its accident. Hence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents."

As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of the human act, morally affecting it in moral being, already constituted from the object. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. Indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of an act that someone, for example, struck another with the right hand or the left, or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter insofar as they offend God more gravely. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2; Suarez tr. 2. d. 5.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What is faith, and how is it distinguished? - Supernatural faith, about which the speech is here, is defined: the most firm assent to things revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. Therefore the material object of faith is every and only truth revealed by God; the formal object is the authority of God revealing. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1. Faith is one kind formal, another virtual. Formal faith is had when someone believes a truth revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. Virtual faith is had when formal faith has been had, and habitually endures, and actually influences another act of virtue, as, for example, when someone, without actually eliciting an act of faith, elicits an act of supernatural charity and contrition.

Likewise faith is one kind explicit, another implicit. Explicit faith is that by which some article of faith is believed in itself, under its own and particular terms, under which it is proposed to us; e.g., he who believes God to be one in nature and three in persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, has explicit faith of the Trinity. True implicit faith is that by which something is believed not in itself, but in another in which it is somehow contained; e.g., he who believes in Christ, God and man, by that very fact implicitly believes in his twofold will, even if he is ignorant of it. - L. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1, aa. 1-7; q. 2, aa. 1, 2, 9, 10; q. 4, 6, 7; Prop. 25 condemned by Decr. S. O. Lamentabili, 3 July 1907; E. M. 345.

What are the sins and vices opposed to faith? - To faith is opposed unbelief, which generally is the lack of faith; and specifically it is the lack of faith in one not baptized; and this is threefold: negative, privative, positive. The first is lack of faith in one who has never heard anything about the true religion. The other is lack of faith in one who neglects to procure for himself knowledge of faith when occasion has been given. The third is lack of faith in one to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it. - Although negative unbelief, as is clear, is not a sin, nevertheless it is a punishment of sin; because if he had done what was in him, God would not have hidden faith from him. But privative and positive unbelief is a most grave sin. The reason is that the former indirectly and virtually, the latter directly and formally, contains grave contempt and injury of the authority of God revealing. Faith besides is the beginning, foundation, and root of justification. Trid. s. 6, C. 8. Therefore he who voluntarily deprives himself of faith likewise deprives himself of justification, and accordingly sins very greatly.

Heresy is also opposed to faith, and it is twofold: formal and material. The first is a voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith proposed by the Church, in one who has received faith. But the other is that by which someone adheres to error against faith, but without pertinacity. Moreover to err pertinaciously here is not sharply and tooth-and-nail to defend one's error, but to retain it knowingly and voluntarily, after the contrary has been sufficiently proposed; or when it is known that the contrary is held by the universal Church of Christ on earth, to which someone prefers his own judgment, whether this is done from vainglory, or from the lust of contradicting, or from another cause. Merely material heresy is not a sin, for that error proceeds from invincible ignorance of the truth. But formal heresy is a most grave sin, as unbelief itself, for the same reasons.

Finally apostasy is opposed to faith, which is total defection from the truth of the Catholic faith. Therefore it is not distinguished in species from heresy. For whether more or less of the material object of faith is rejected, the formal object is always rejected in the same mode. It is reduced to positive unbelief if someone, departing absolutely from faith, passes over to unbelief. And if someone passes over to a sect in which false worship of God is had, he also sins against religion. Non-Catholics are as many as are not Catholics. Their genus is threefold: schismatics, heretics, apostates. More broadly non-Catholics are also infidels.

Heretics and those suspect concerning the faith must be denounced to the Bishop or Inquisitor from C. Noveritis of Nicholas II, and from the natural law, since such a crime tends to common harm. L. l. 4, n. 249 seqq.; l. 7, n. 248. But the Bishop has the faculty of proceeding in a cause of heresy even against regulars, although exempt, C. 9, de Haeret. - Those who wish to be converted from heresy to the Catholic Church before absolution must abjure their heresy and make a public profession of faith, according to what is prescribed by C. Si qui voluerint 8, can. 1, q. 7, and the Roman Ritual. - An abjuration made privately before someone delegated by the Bishop, such as a notary, and some persons as witnesses, suffices. S. O. 8 Apr. 1786; 28 Mar. 1900; Struggl, q. 2, nn. 1, 9; Suarez, d. 16, s. 1; Lugo, d. 16, n. 187, 291 seqq.; d. 18, n. 3 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 5, 10, 11, 12; L. 17 seqq.; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., ed. 1, nn. 1682, 1683, 1689, and ed. 2, nn. 1341, 1496, 2079; E. M. 346.

351 bis. Note: 1. The books of Sacred Scripture whole with all their parts, as the Holy Synod of Trent, s. 4, reviewed them, are divinely inspired, and are sacred and canonical. 2. The heresies of schismatics and Orientals are reviewed in the Epistle of Pius X, Ex quo, 26 Dec. 1910, Acta Apost. Sed., v. 3, p. 117 seqq. 3. Modernism is the collection of all heresies. - Bishops must be vigilant that it be extirpated, if it has been present, and must take precautions lest it be present.

Bishops should impede the writings of Modernists from being published and read; especially they should not be permitted to adolescents in Seminaries and to hearers in Universities. - They should establish a council of vigilance, to meet with the Bishop every other month and on a stated day. It will belong to it to investigate judgments of modernism in books and in teaching; likewise to keep watch over books and periodicals, lest dangerous questions be treated in them with weak arguments and prejudged questions; finally, over all writings concerning social matters. - By Modernism there are condemned rash and false novelties against the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and constantly handed down by the Fathers and Catholic Doctors; but by no means is there condemned any modern invention which is proved by solid reason. - Those who are prone to the errors of modernism are to be excluded from Sacred Orders. Pius X, Enc. Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907.

4. Several errors of Americanism are condemned. Its fundamental and chief error consists in this: "It is opportune, for attracting the wills of those who disagree, if certain heads of doctrine, as if of lighter moment, are passed over, or softened so that they do not retain the same sense which the Church has constantly held." Brief to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, of Leo XIII, 22 Jan. 1899, Testem benevolentiae.

Is he a formal heretic who doubts concerning some article of faith? R. Affirmatively, if he doubts positively, by judging that a truth is uncertain which he knows to be revealed by God and proposed by the Church; for he voluntarily contradicts faith sufficiently proposed, and accordingly there is truly had voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith, which is the definition of formal heresy. - R. Negatively, if he behaves negatively, and suspends assent, whether this is done from formal or virtual contempt of divine revelation, or whether it is done from negligence, or because he wishes to turn his mind to other things, etc. The reason is that since he judges nothing, and affirms nothing against the infallibility of faith, as is supposed, he does not err positively in faith and accordingly is not a heretic; although he sins gravely against faith, either from contempt of the word of God, or from negligence by omitting a commanded act of faith. - Struggl, q. 2, nn. 12, 13.

Is faith necessary? - The internal act of faith is necessary for all adults, using reason, for justification, by necessity of means. For, as the Apostle says, Heb. 11:16, without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him. By necessity of means. Because faith positively influences justification, and if it is not had even inculpably, justification and salvation cannot be obtained. L. 1; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 3-5; E. M. 348.

What things must be believed by necessity of means? - There are two things certainly to be believed explicitly by necessity of means: 1. that God exists; 2. that he is a rewarder. This is established from the same text of Paul just cited and from propositions 22 and 23 condemned by Innocent XI. E. M. 345, 349.

Are the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation also to be believed explicitly by necessity of means? There is a twofold probable opinion: one affirms, the other denies. The reason of the former is that the Incarnation is an object most necessary on the part of the means of our salvation; the Trinity most necessary on the part of the end; and accordingly it is most necessary to believe that God is one and that in him there are three distinct divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and that the Son of God was incarnate, our Redeemer. The reason of the latter is: no argument of reason is present, and no positive document, from which that necessity can be drawn. For in order that man be converted to God, it suffices to believe that he exists, and to hope that he is propitious to him, and consequently to do penance for his own sins. The former opinion is favored in some way, especially for practice, by Resp. S. O. 25 Jan. 1703. Struggl, q. 1, n. 21; L. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 7, 8; E. M. 350.

Can he be absolved who is ignorant of those things which are certainly of necessity of means? - R. Negatively, neither licitly nor validly. The reason is that he, from defect of a means necessary simply, is incapable of justification; therefore he is also incapable of absolution. Besides, no one can have hope of salvation unless he believes God to be a rewarder. Whence from defect of the acts of the penitent, the sacrament is null. - Bened. XIV, C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742.

Can one ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation be absolved? - He cannot licitly be absolved, outside a case of necessity, e.g., danger of death, because the confessor, absolving such a person, exposes the sacrament to danger of frustration of grace. - He probably can be absolved validly if he is in invincible ignorance. The reason is the very probability of the opinion denying the necessity of means for such mysteries. Hence, at least probably, the necessary acts of the penitent are not lacking.

Is the internal act of faith also necessary for adults by necessity of precept sometimes in life? R. Affirmatively. Proof 1. from 1 John 3:23: This is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son, Jesus Christ. 2. From proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII, from propositions 17 and 65 condemned by Innocent XI; from C. Vineam Domini of Clement XI, 16 July 1703. If someone embraces not some heretical doctrine, but a doctrine proscribed, with a lower note, by the Roman Pontiff or by the Roman Congregations, he does not sin per se against divine faith; nevertheless he sins gravely against studiousness and obedience, which is owed both to the Roman Pontiff and to the sacred Congregations. But one can also sin by irreligion and scandal if, for example, propositions have been condemned because offensive to pious ears, because scandalous. Conc. Vatic., Const. de Fide Cath., c. 4; Props. 7 and 8 condemned by Decr. Lamentabili, S. O., 3 July 1907; Motu Proprio of Pius X, Praestantia, 18 Nov. 1907; Mazzella, Trutina Theol. Rosmin. Propos., Pref.; E. M. 353, 356.

Biblical Commission: All universally are bound in conscience by the duty of submitting to the sentences of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters just as to Decrees of the Sacred Congregations approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can those avoid the note both of withdrawn obedience and of rashness, or therefore be free from grave fault, whoever by words or writings impugn such sentences. Pius X, M. P. 18 Nov. 1907.

When does the precept of faith oblige? - The precept of faith urges per se and by reason of itself: 1. After the completed use of reason, for beginning the Christian life, after someone has been sufficiently instructed concerning faith and its necessity. 2. When the truth of our faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult infidel or heretic. 3. In the article of death, according to some, for tending more proximately to God. 4. Several times in life, at least according to many once a year, according to many others in each half-year, quarter-year, or even two-month period; and according to some, each month. But it urges per accidens: 1. When grave temptation is urgent, which cannot otherwise be overcome; and then the obligation arises from the very precept of faith if the matter concerns temptations against faith, but otherwise if it concerns other temptations. 2. By reason of another precept, when, for example, an act of contrition is to be placed in Confession, which, since it must proceed from faith, cannot exist without some act of faith, at least virtual and implicit, concerning its own proper object or motive. 3. After a lapse into heresy, or faith denied, and whenever an exterior profession of faith is to be made. - Struggl, q. 1, nn. 30, 33-35, 46; Suarez, d. 10, s. 2; Lugo, d. 13, n. 23; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 89, a. 6; L. 5-8, 11, 20; E. M. 353, 354.

Note: "Anyone in the first moral instant of the use of reason, if he is sufficiently instructed and adverts to this obligation, is bound by divine precept to elicit these acts..., so that, if he delays for a notable time, he sins gravely against this precept." Mazzotta, de Virt. theol., c. 1, § 1. In those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, generally acts of virtual and implicit faith suffice. Therefore this precept is sufficiently fulfilled by exercising other acts of religion. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucified, prays, makes the sign of the cross, receives the sacraments, and fulfills various obligations of Christian life, which also contain an external profession of faith.

By at least general and implicit faith it is necessary to believe all things revealed by God; namely, it is necessary that all those things be believed generally which have been revealed by God and proposed through the Church. For this the authority of God revealing requires. - Struggl, q. 1, n. 25; L. 7; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 5, 6; Bened. XIV, C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742, § 18.

What things are to be believed explicitly by necessity of precept? - "The object of faith per se is that by which man is made blessed. But all things which are contained in Sacred Scripture as handed down by God are related per accidens or secondarily to the object of faith.... As to the first credible things, which are the articles of faith, man is bound to believe explicitly, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other credible things man is not bound to believe explicitly, but only implicitly, or in readiness of soul, insofar as he is prepared to believe whatever divine Scripture contains," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, a. 5; q. 1, a. 6 c. ad 1, or divine Tradition.

"Explicitly, by necessity of precept, there must be known and believed, at least in substance: 1. The Apostles' Creed. 2. The Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation. 3. The precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. 4. The sacraments which are necessary to each one, such as baptism, eucharist, and penance; for concerning the others it suffices to have implicit faith, since explicit faith is necessary only to those who receive them." L. H. A. tr. 4, n. 3. Proof from common practice and the common authority of theologians. The reason is that these contain the substantial heads and foundations of Religion, which one must profess; and the necessary precepts according to which one must live. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 3-6; E. M. 356, 357.

Note: As to the Creed. Two things are proposed in the Creed to be believed: the Divinity and Humanity of Christ. Concerning the Divinity there are proposed to be believed: Unity of Divinity, Trinity of Persons, the works of God according to nature, grace, and glory; creation, sanctification, resurrection, eternal life. Concerning the Humanity of Christ there are proposed to be believed: Christ's Incarnation, Conception, Nativity from the Virgin, Passion, Death, Burial, Descent to hell, Resurrection, Ascension, Coming to judgment. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1, a. 8. Suarez and Lugo think not improbable the opinion denying the necessity of explicitly believing the perpetual virginity of Blessed Mary. - Although the Passion of Christ is to be believed explicitly under grave sin, nevertheless that circumstance, under Pontius Pilate, does not pertain to faith to be held explicitly. - Crucified, crucifixion, expressing the genus of death, is to be believed explicitly; for thus 1 Cor. 1:23: We preach Christ Crucified. And indeed the Church constantly preaches to the faithful this genus of death. But the Burial of Christ is to be believed explicitly, but more probably only under light sin, because it is a light circumstance. He descended to hell; more probably this is not to be believed explicitly under grave sin, indeed not even under light according to Suarez, because it is not easily understood by the faithful. But Lugo contradicts him. - But although the Resurrection from the dead is to be believed explicitly under grave sin, because it is a substantial matter, as is established from Paul, 1 Cor. 15, nevertheless that circumstance of time, the third day, is not to be believed explicitly. He sits at the right hand of the Father; probably, according to many, this is not to be believed explicitly, because it is difficultly understood by the faithful; but others affirm that it is to be believed explicitly, as to honor, power, and supreme dominion. - Thence he shall come to judge the living and the dead; these words, the living and the dead, according to Lugo, are not to be believed explicitly, because of the variety of explanations. - I believe in the Holy Spirit; the procession from the Father and the Son is not to be believed explicitly, by necessity of precept, by individual faithful, even though it is of faith. For many things are of faith which ought not to be known by all. The Holy Catholic Church; concerning the Church three things must be known and believed, namely that it is: 1. one on earth under one visible head; 2. governed and conserved by the assistance of the Holy Spirit; 3. infallible in matters of faith and morals, and to be heard by all. Yet this last, although certain and of faith, is not explicitly contained in the Creed. As to its holiness, it suffices to know and believe that it is holy because of its head, doctrine, sacraments, and canonized Saints, because concerning the others diverse persons think diversely. But as to its catholicity, it suffices to profess obedience to it in the person of its visible head. For by this article the universality of the Church is commended, and unity, which is signified when not many but one Church is believed.

Communion of Saints: whether it must be believed explicitly, and as to some communication of prayers only, or only implicitly in the unity of the Church; whether under grave or under light sin, theologians do not agree. Whatever may be the case, in practice all seem to know it sufficiently, since they often say pray for me, and frequently invoke the Saints. Trid. s. 4; s. 6, cc. 4, 12-15; Decr. S. O. Lamentabili, 3 July 1907; Lugo, d. 13, s. 4; Suarez, d. 13, ss. 2, 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1, aa. 6-9; E. M. 356, 357.

As to the Decalogue. It is to be believed explicitly, because the precepts of the Decalogue are revealed so that they may be observed by all; moreover, what is revealed is to be believed by divine faith; and what has been revealed for directing the acts of individuals must be explicitly known by all. Nevertheless several contradict this, because precepts of this sort can be known in another way than through revelation.

As to the Precepts of the Church. These are not to be believed by divine faith, because they have not been revealed by God, at least insofar as they are precepts of the Church. This alone is to be believed, that the Church has the right of making precepts from divine authority. But the chief precepts of the Church must be known by all, whose observance pertains to all the faithful: namely the precept of observing feasts and hearing Mass on them, the precept of annual Confession, of Easter Communion, of fasting and abstinence. To the obligation of knowing the precepts is also reduced this, that individual persons must necessarily know the duties of their own state or condition.

As to the Eucharist. - All must know and believe the real presence of Christ in it. Likewise, according to the common opinion, it must be believed explicitly that Christ is whole under each species, and more probably also that he is offered in sacrifice, since all must assist at the sacrifice of the Mass. But transubstantiation is more probably not to be believed explicitly. Lugo, d. 13, n. 121.

As to the Lord's Prayer. - All must know under grave sin that God is to be prayed to with hope and confidence, and that all goods both of soul and of body, and graces for fleeing the evils of the soul, must be sought from him. In it God is believed as provident, helper, forgiving, rewarding. Likewise there is an obligation, at least under light sin, of reciting it sometime, according to the common opinion. - Lugo, d. 13, n. 133; Suarez, d. 13, s. 4, n. 12; L. 3.

Must the aforesaid things be known by memory? Not all are bound under mortal sin to know the aforesaid things by memory, or in that order, or in those words in which they are proposed, but it suffices to know them in a rough way and as to substance. For custom has explained that the obligation of learning them by memory is not beyond venial; as also it is not beyond venial not to know how to make the cross. And as to the Angelic Salutation, it must be known and recited only from fittingness. - Suarez, d. 13, s. 5, n. 8; de Relig., t. 2, l. 3, de Orat., c. 6, n. 8 seqq.; Lugo, d. 13, n. 132; L. 3; Gury 204.

Can those be absolved who are ignorant of those things which by necessity of precept and under mortal sin must be known? - R. Affirmatively, because although they have sinned by omitting to learn, nevertheless they can be sorry for this, with the purpose of learning. But the parish priest, like a parent his children, is bound under mortal sin, by himself or through another, to teach his sheep at least those things which they are bound under mortal sin to know. L. 3.

Pontifical Constitutions concerning the Chinese and Malabar rites are to be had as doctrinal, by no means as disciplinary; and therefore, except for censures, they still hold force. S. O. 5 Aug. 1891. The doctrine concerning Eschatological Renewal must be reproved. S. O. 2 Mar. 1910. It cannot safely be denied, or called into doubt, that the text of St. John in 1 Ep. c. 5, v. 5, concerning the three giving testimony in heaven, is authentic. S. O. 15 Jan. 1897. Those cannot be absolved who hold that the fire of hell is not real, but metaphorical. S. Poenit. 30 Apr. 1890.

With all reverence and submission of soul, all propositions condemned by the Holy See up to the year 1794, in which the propositions of the Synod of Pistoia were condemned, must be reproved. With like reverence and submission of soul must also be reproved: the Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Errors of our age, 80, condemned in the Syllabus transmitted to the whole Christian world; the 40 Propositions condemned from recently published works under the name of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, Decr. S. O. 7 Mar. 1888, Post obitum, approved and confirmed by Leo XIII; the doctrines of Americanism, condemned by the same Leo XIII, Brief of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore; the 65 Propositions condemned by the Decr. S. O. Lamentabili sane exitu, 3 July 1907, containing the chief errors of reformism or modernism, afterward proscribed by Pius X through the Encyclical Letter Pascendi dominici gregis, 8 Sept., and through the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, 1 Sept. 1904. E. M. 356, 357, 359.

Is there also given a precept of the external act of faith? As to the external act of faith, there is given a negative precept, prohibiting the denial of the true faith or the profession of a false one. Likewise there is given an affirmative precept, obliging sometimes to confess the faith even with danger to life. Proof of the first part. To deny the true faith, or to profess a false one, is to deny God and Christ. But Christ says: He who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. Matt. 10:33. Proof of the second part. For ordered charity, which we owe to God and neighbor, requires that, when God's honor and the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be withdrawn privatively or contrarily, for professing the faith we should sometimes spurn temporal goods and even life. - Privatively, as if therefore great honor to God and great utility to neighbor would cease. Contrarily, as if otherwise God would be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave evil, e.g., if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, depended on it. Suarez, d. 4, s. 2; L. 10; Laymann, c. 11, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, aa. 1, 2; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1647, 1648, 1653, 1657, 1683, 1827.

By positive law all to be baptized are bound to profession of faith, either by themselves or through sponsors; converted heretics; Bishops before consecration, and before the dispatch of letters of their own provision, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; Sixtus V, C. Romanus; Gregory XIV, C. Onus Apostolicae; all regular Prelates, Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis, id. Nov. 1564; nevertheless this Constitution has not been received in use as to those regular Prelates who are not immediately set over government by the Holy See, but either by chapter or by a higher superior, Thesaurus, de Poenis, c. 1, v. Fides, cf. 550; those about to have ecclesiastical benefices, and those who must assemble in a diocesan synod, Trid. l. c.; likewise those provided with a benefice with care of souls, within two months from possession obtained, before the Bishop himself, or if he is impeded, his vicar general, otherwise they do not make the fruits their own; canons and dignities of a cathedral church, who likewise within two months from begun possession are bound to do this also in chapter; otherwise neither do they make the fruits their own, although they can gain distributions for their choir assistance, S. C. C. 1726; Trid. s. 24, C. 12, de R.; Primates, Archbishops, Bishops in the first provincial synod which they attend, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; those to be chosen for the government and chairs of Universities and public gymnasia; and also those to be promoted to scholastic degrees of doctor, master, etc., Pius IV, C. In Sacrosancta, 13 Nov. 1654, § V. But Doctors and Masters of Universities at the beginning of any year must issue a solemn oath by which they are bound to hand down orthodox doctrine, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R. It belongs to the Rector or Prefect to see that this is observed. - Profession of faith can be emitted immediately after institution or collation of a benefice, and before possession, S. C. C. 11 May 1782; but cf. here below, paragraph Non manet, and it must altogether be made in the form proposed by Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis. But a few things are to be added, so that account may also be taken of the Decrees of the Vatican Council, S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. Made otherwise, it will not profit toward avoiding the canonical penalties laid against those who omit this profession. Conc. Rom. Bened. XIII, tit. 1, c. 1; Bened. XIV, Inst. 60; Ferrar., v. Fidei professio; L. 41; Collectan. cit., n. 1670; E. M. 364.

Those who are announced as doctors in Sacred Scripture are bound to furnish an oath according to the prescribed formula approved by the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 29 June 1910. Likewise an oath, according to the prescribed formula, must be furnished by all those who are listed in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910, a profession of faith having been premised; - and also, by reason of office, synodal examiners and parish-priest consultors and those who are listed in C. Sapienti consilio, Order of Service in the Roman Curia, and others, concerning all of whom cf. below n. 550. This obligation of profession of faith seems grave, unless it has been derogated by legitimate custom. The penalty of restoring the fruits probably needs a declaratory sentence of the delict. Sanchez, l. 2, c. 5; Tamburini, l. 2, c. 1, D. 12, n. 4. The faculty made by the Council of Trent no longer remains, by which those provided with any benefices whatever can emit profession of faith within two months from the day of possession obtained; and consequently in the future profession of faith must be emitted before possession of the benefice. S. C. Cons. 1 Mar. 1911.

In external confession of faith and divine worship, the rite of one's own church, Latin or Oriental, is to be observed. Cf. for the Ruthenian rite constituted in the United States of North America, Apostolic Letter of Pius X, 18 Kal. 1907, and for the same rite constituted in the Canadian region, Decr. S. C. de Pr. I., 18 Aug. 1913. E. M. 365.

Blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. For by it man in heart or mouth, according to intellect or affection, attributes to God things which do not befit him, or denies things which befit him. The vice of blasphemy thus pertains to unbelief. Speech concerning it will occur in the second precept of the Decalogue. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 13.

Resolves: - He who, when asked by private authority, either is silent, or responds obscurely, or says that he does not wish to respond, that he is not being asked by right, that he is not bound nor does he wish to tell others what he himself believes, and evades in a similar way, unless the circumstances of things demand otherwise, does not seem to deny the faith, but to be unwilling to betray it. Whence, if he can thus be freed from a troublesome inquiry, it is licit. By private authority; for as to public power, regularly it is not licit. Cf. proposition 18 condemned by Innocent XI; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, a. 2; Suarez, d. 14, s. 3; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 37, 39; Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 30. - He does not deny the faith, but shows it, who flees; and although this is licit, nevertheless not for a Pastor when his sheep need his work; as, on the contrary, if it is more expedient for them that for a time he withdraw himself and reserve himself for their good, he is bound to flee. Lugo, d. 14, nn. 42, 43, 96. When you are not asked about the faith, it is not only licit, but often better, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, to hide the faith than to confess it: as if, coming among heretics, you would do more good; or if from confession more evil would follow, e.g., disturbance, killings, exacerbation of a tyrant, danger of defection if you were tortured. Whence it is generally rash to offer oneself of one's own accord. Struggl, q. 1, n. 41; E. M. 364.

He does not sin against faith who visits the temples of heretics or infidels from mere curiosity, scandal, danger of perversion, or a command prohibiting this being absent, and provided it is not a protestative sign of false religion. At Rome there is a command not to enter the temples of heretics during the time of conferences and offices. - Likewise he does not sin who is present at a wedding banquet or burial of heretics, because these things do not properly pertain to faith, and the aforesaid assemblies are held as merely civil. Likewise he does not sin against faith who, passing through places of heretics, from fear of grave danger eats flesh-meat on a forbidden day, lest he be recognized as a Catholic, because this per se is not a sign of heresy; otherwise, however, if he ate flesh-meat even from fear of death, being impelled to this in hatred of the faith. - Collectan. cit., nn. 1829, 1833, 1843, 1855; Struggl, q. 1, nn. 44, 45; Lugo, d. 14, n. 156 seqq.; E. M. 364, 365.

It is licit to use the signs or clothing of infidels if they are clothing or signs proper to some region and distinctive of nation from nation, although that whole region is infidel, because these things per se are not referred to religion. More probably it is still licit, yet from a grave cause, if the clothing is distinctive of sect from sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondarily for distinguishing a sect. Hence it is licit for a missionary, in order to conceal himself, to put on the garments of ministers of a false religion, so that he appears as one of them. Gur., Cas. 196; L. 15; Struggl, l. c., n. 43; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 70-97. But otherwise, if the clothing or signs are protestative of false religion, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions. Hence neither is the burning of incense licit, nor genuflection before an idol, nor taking a heretical supper, etc., even if these things are done only externally. Collectan. cit., nn. 1640, 1649, 1650, 1651, 1653.

Catholics living among heretics, if by command of the magistrate they contract marriage before a heretical minister, sin against faith, even if they have contracted before or afterward will contract before a Catholic priest; for the contracting person testifies by that ceremony that he recognizes him as a minister of the true faith. This is intrinsically evil, because the authority of the minister, and consequently his doctrine, is increased, and there is concurrence in the heretical rites which the minister exercises in that act. Nevertheless they licitly contract before a civil magistrate, or rather testify that they wish to contract, provided they contract before or afterward in the Catholic rite; because this action has been instituted for a political end, so that they may be held as spouses, and offspring may not be judged illegitimate. - Bened. XIV, C. Ex quo singulari, 1742; L. 12 seqq., 18; Lugo, d. 14, n. 156 seqq.

It is licit per se to attend a merely civil funeral, by reason of office and from a grave cause, and scandal being removed. Yet by a general rule it is illicit to attend funerals of this sort in which, by design and out of contempt for religion, the attendance of priests is excluded. Masonic or anti-Catholic banners can in no way be admitted to funerals and in churches. Indeed in churches only blessed banners are to be admitted, unless otherwise disturbances and dangers are feared. S. R. C. 14 July 1887, ad 1, n. 3679; S. Poenit. 3 Apr. 1887; S. O. 4 Apr. 1887; E. M. 365.

What communication is prohibited to the faithful with Jews? "To the faithful, besides communication in matters of Religion and marriage, with Jews it is prohibited: 1. to dwell; 2. to use their physicians or medicine; 3. by agreement and association, to be present at a banquet or the same bath; 4. to act as servant or nursemaid in their houses; 5. to leave legacies to them in a testament; 6. to commit to them public offices among Christians. Thus from Canon Law. - Moreover, the end of these prohibitions is partly the dignity of the Christian Religion, partly the danger of subversion. Therefore when some communication from those listed is gravely opposed to this end, it is a mortal sin; but when only lightly, it is a venial sin. Besides, because of necessity and another reasonable cause it can happen that some communication with Jews is not even venially sinful," Struggl, q. 2, n. 5; La-Croix, l. 3, n. 89, especially with custom intervening, which today obtains almost everywhere. Scav., l. 2, n. 809; C. Nullus, C. Omnes, caus. 28, q. 1; C. Iudaei de Iud. Sarac. etc.; L. 18; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 7, 9, 10; E. M. 366.

What communication is prohibited with heretics? - Communication is simply prohibited with heretics if they are excommunicated persons to be avoided. - Communication is prohibited with them in divine things, namely by communicating in their rites proper to a heretical sect, but by no means by communicating with them in our rites, if they are tolerated, for example, by hearing Mass in a church with a heretic. The reason is that the former communication in divine things is a certain profession of a false sect, containing scandal and danger of perversion. And since these reasons are scarcely ever absent, therefore it is very rare that the aforesaid communication is licit, although it is not intrinsically evil. It has always been prohibited by the Holy See, which tolerates it only when there are very grave evils which cannot otherwise be avoided. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1797 seqq., 1814, 1845, q. 6.

The latter communication often contains no grave inconvenience, but sometimes it contains scandal and danger of false opinion and error concerning the truth and necessity of the Catholic religion. And thus heretics can be admitted to sacred functions, provided nevertheless that they do not mix themselves into the sacred rites. At Rome they assist at them without any difficulty. But it would not be licit to administer the sacraments to them, nor the sacrament of penance, except in the article of death, and then scandal having been efficaciously removed. It is illicit for Catholics, in the temples of heretics, when false worship is exercised there, to play the organ. S. O. 8 July 1889. But if a Catholic man is lacking to play the organ, a non-Catholic musician can be temporarily admitted to that function in church, scandal or danger of scandal nevertheless being removed. S. O. 23 Feb. 1820.

Communication is prohibited with them also in civil matters, although they are tolerated, whenever scandal and danger of perversion are had from it. Concerning workers' associations, Catholic and mixed, cf. the Encyclical Letter of Pius X, Singulari quodam, 24 Sept. 1912, by which mixed associations of Catholics and Protestants are tolerated and permitted in Germany because of the great inconveniences which otherwise would be had, but in such a way that suitable precautions are used for avoiding the dangers which are present in these associations. - Public disputation with heretics is prohibited to all. S. C. C. 8 Mar. 1658. To laypersons especially it is prohibited to dispute publicly or privately with heretics. C. Quicumque 2, § 1, de Haeret., in 6. Struggl, q. 2, nn. 32, 33; Lugo, d. 22, n. 1 seqq.; Suarez, d. 20, s. 1; d. 21, s. 3, n. 4; Bened. XIV, de Syn., l. 6, c. 5, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 7; Quodl. 10, a. 15; E. M. 367.

What communication is prohibited to the faithful with pagans? - "By law both positive divine and ecclesiastical, under mortal sin communication is prohibited: 1. in those things which pertain to Religion, e.g., in their dogmas, ceremonies, and rites.... The reason... because one communicating in such a way uses signs and exercises actions which per se signify the profession of a false Religion, and accordingly at least externally denies the true faith. - 2. Likewise by divine and ecclesiastical law, it is prohibited to the faithful to enter marriage with pagans, indeed also with Jews. C. Cave 28, q. 1.... 3. - On the contrary, in civil actions by no law is it prohibited to the faithful to communicate with pagans, when danger of perversion is absent." Struggl, q. 2, n. 4; 1 Cor. 10:27. Since the worship of infidels is wholly false, communication in divine things with them in it is intrinsically evil. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1775; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 7, 9, 10; E. M. 368.

Note: "Christian Princes can permit to Jews, pagans, or heretics liberty of conscience only because of the good of Religion and because of hope of conversion, but not because of temporal advantage.... But the Church, and any supreme Prince, can rightly compel Jews and pagan subjects to hear our faith." L. 18. Likewise infidels can be compelled "not to impede the faith of Christ." But "in no way are they to be compelled to the faith so that they themselves believe, because to believe belongs to the will." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 8, 10, 11; q. 11, aa. 3, 4; q. 12, a. 2; E. M. 369.

What is hope? - Hope is an act of the will by which, with a love of concupiscence, we desire God and divine things for ourselves before all other desirable things, and by which from the helping power of God and fidelity in promises we certainly and most firmly expect future blessedness and the means for attaining it. Hence the primary material object of hope is God and eternal blessedness, but the secondary is the divine help of grace and our good works. The formal object of hope, according to its various acts or formalities, of love and desire, of elevation of soul and effort of the will toward overcoming difficulties, and finally of confidence, is the respective goodness of God, the helping power of God, the fidelity of God in promises. "Hope," says S. Th. 2. 2. q. 17, a. 6 ad 3 and ad 8, "makes one tend toward God as toward a certain final good to be attained, and as toward a certain efficacious help for assisting." - Heb. 6:18, 19; Trid. s. 6, c. 31; Struggl, q. 3, nn. 1, 2, 3; q. 4, n. 2; Theol. Wirceb., n. 233 seqq.; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 2, c. 1, n. 6; S. Th. 3, D. 26, q. 1, 2; de Virtut., q. 7 un., de Spe, aa. 1, 3; 1. 2. q. 40; 2. 2. q. 18, aa. 1, 4; L. 20, 21; E. M. 370.

What are the sins opposed to hope? - By reason of love, the first act of hope, there is opposed to it the hatred of abomination of God, by which someone abominates God as hostile to himself because of vengeance for sins, or by which someone is turned away from God, eternal blessedness, and wishes to place his happiness in some other thing than in God. Hence it is also a mortal sin opposed to hope, to love earthly things more with a love of concupiscence than heavenly things; e.g., if someone is so disposed that he desires to remain perpetually in this life, and to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him.

By reason of hope, the other act of the virtue of hope, there is opposed to it flight from God because of the labor and difficulty of attaining him, and despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining blessedness and the means necessary for attaining it. But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining blessedness without the means ordained by God. Presumption is chiefly committed if you presume to obtain eternal life by the proper powers of nature without the help of grace; if you expect it without penance, without labor, from the mercy of God alone; if you expect it above your proper disposition, according to the order of divine providence, e.g., if you should wish to surpass the Blessed Virgin Mary in holiness and glory. Struggl, q. 3, nn. 11, 14-16; Suarez, d. 1, ss. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20; q. 21; L. 20, 21.

Is there smallness of matter in sins against hope? - R. Negatively as to hatred of God and love of creatures, if the act is perfect, as is clear of itself. R. Negatively as to despair, if it is perfect and properly such; for it is most greatly injurious to the divine Mercy. Eph. 4:19. Otherwise, however, if it is imperfect and improperly such, as often happens in sadness and impatience. But here it must be noted that even devout souls are sometimes troubled by almost continuous temptations of despair. It is certainly not easily to be believed that they have sinned gravely, although they think they have given consent to them; just as excessive fear about the danger of salvation must not be confused with despair properly so called. - R. Affirmatively as to presumption, although it is grave from its genus. Bonacina, cited by La-Croix 128, teaches that he sins only venially who from presumption concerning the goodness of God would sin venially, or would defer doing penance concerning a mortal sin until the following day. - Suarez, d. 2, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, aa. 1, 3; L. 20.

Is it a sin against hope, from weariness, to wish for death?

R. Negatively per se, because it is not to recede from God as from the last end; nor generally is it a grave sin, but only venial, unless there is express rebellion against the order of divine Providence. Cf. 386.

Is it presumption to sin under hope of pardon, or to persevere in sin from the same hope of pardon? - "It must be said that to sin with the purpose of persevering in sin under hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 21, a. 2 ad 3. Say the same of him who sins or increases sins, or perseveres in sin from hope of pardon, as from the motive or reason of sinning; namely because God forgives sins, or as easily forgives ten sins as five, now or at the end of life. But it is not presumption to sin from passion and frailty with hope of pardon to be received sometime, and with the purpose of repenting, and in this way obtaining remission of sins; even if this act of hope, whether it is preceding or concomitant, removes a greater fear of sin, and is per accidens an occasion of sinning more freely. Indeed, this "diminishes the sin, because through this he seems to have a will less firmly fixed on sinning." S. Th. l. c. And indeed "while someone actually wills to sin or actually sins, it is good to hope for pardon of the sin and to propose afterward to repent." Struggl, q., n. 17; La-Croix 126; L. 21.

Is it presumption to commit the same sin several times, because committed several times it is as easily accused as once? R. Negatively. The reason is that then someone does not sin from the facility of obtaining pardon, but from the facility of confessing, although this is an altogether depraved disposition. La-Croix 127.

Is hope necessary? Is fear also necessary? R. To the first. Hope in adults is required by necessity of means for salvation. For man cannot arrive at obtaining God, his last end, unless by his own acts and merits he tends toward him; but this cannot happen without hope. The just need hope so that they can ask for grace for persevering. Sinners need hope so that they may be disposed to justification. If faith is necessary by necessity of means, hope also is necessary by necessity of means. The Apostle derives the necessity of faith from the things to be hoped for. Heb. 11:1, 6; Col. 1:23. It is also established from Trid. s. 6, C. 1, 13.

Hope is necessary also by necessity of precept. For there is given a true precept of eliciting acts of hope some times in life. This is established from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII. When and in what way the precept of hope urges must be determined by the same rules which we established above concerning faith. Cf. 354. Moreover, as for the precept of faith, so for the precept of hope no anxiety is to be had practically. For virtual hope suffices for fulfilling it, by praying, receiving the sacraments, exercising other pious works. But those who are lacking in it, since this is ordinarily done without advertence, ought to have no disturbance concerning the past. Yet sin because of omission of acts of faith, hope, charity is easily understood in a man, for example, who confesses that he has lived forgetful of God and Religion, or who confesses that he has prayed nothing, and for a notable time has not approached the sacrament of penance. Suarez, d. 2, s. 1, n. 3; Struggl, q. 3, n. 7 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 22, a. 1; L. 20; E. M. 376.

What is charity? Charity is an act of the will by which, with a love of benevolence and friendship, we love God as the highest good on account of himself, and neighbor on account of God. Of benevolence, because we will good to God; of friendship, because love is with reciprocal love. Neighbor, namely all with whom we can be sharers of eternal blessedness, ourselves, other men, angels. For charity is friendship with God, and every friendship is founded upon some communication of life. Communication of life; for it belongs to charity and friendship to love, and to love is life. Communication of life; for to love is to will good; if therefore the love is mutual, there must be mutual willing of good, and accordingly a common life and a common good. Moreover there is no other communication of life and good with God than eternal blessedness, whose beginning in this life is had through grace. On account of God, i.e., on account of the glory of God. The highest good, on account of himself; and accordingly we love God in all things and above all things, so that we may obtain his promises, not because this is our good, but because it redounds to the good of God, i.e., to the glory of God. Therefore the primary material object of charity is God, the secondary neighbor. But the formal object is the absolute goodness of God. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 23, 25, 27; L. 22; E. M. 377.

Good is that which is fitting. This account being presupposed, the will loves it because it is fitting to it. Moreover, this very thing is most fitting to the will, that God exist; and this good is more fitting to it than its own proper good. And thus the will can rightly be borne toward God by its own act on account of himself, and will that God exist and be endowed with infinite goods and perfections.

Is there given a special precept of charity toward God? R. Affirmatively. Proof: Matt. 22:37, 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment. The same is evinced from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VIII. The precept of charity, as is clear from the cited sacred text, obliges us to love God above all things, not indeed intensively, by a greater effort of the will and a more fervent love which surpasses any other affection of the will, and which also ordinarily redounds into the senses, although this is most becoming; but appreciatively, by reason and rational will preferring God to all things, with a perfect and efficacious will, not only an imperfect and inefficacious velleity and complacency, so that we esteem no creature more than God, and wish rather to lose all things than gravely to offend God. But since love and friendship is the union and agreement of two wills, the nature and precept of charity consist in this, that someone wills those things which God wills, and does not will those things which God does not will, in any grave matter gravely, in any light matter lightly; this finally is true and perfect charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 44; L. 22; E. M. 378.

Hence it is clear that it would be altogether falsely thought almost impossible or exceedingly difficult to elicit an act of charity. For, if it is commanded, God helps us toward it. And if the goodness of men moves us to a love of benevolence and friendship, much more does the infinite goodness of God. If that goodness which is also manifested by benefits moves us most greatly, how much ought the goodness of God the Creator, Redeemer, Rewarder, not to move us? If besides we are in the state of grace, the habit itself of charity persuades us that its act ought not to be difficult, since that habit is infused in a certain connatural mode for eliciting the act. Therefore, if the divine excellence, the infinite perfection of God, the infinite goodness of God having been proposed to him, someone tries with sincere soul to elicit pure charity, he will rightly be able to think that he has elicited that act of charity, and consequently that from charity he has also conceived perfect contrition for sins. Cf. Deut. 6:1-9.

186. • Faith in general is assent on account of the authority of one speaking. More precisely for our matter, Faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is defined: A supernatural, infused habit inclining the intellect to assent firmly to truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church, on account of the authority of God revealing. But insofar as it is an act, it is called the firmest assent given to things revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. - St. Lig. n. 2.

Faith is 1º habitual or actual, according as it is a habit or an act.

2º Explicit or implicit by reason of the object, according as this is expressed and unfolded in itself, or only contained in another. Thus, for example, if you say: I believe in the Most Holy Trinity, you elicit an act of Faith explicit in that mystery. But if you say: I believe all things which the Church teaches are to be believed, you elicit an act of Faith implicit in the several revealed dogmas.

3º Formal or virtual, according as faith either is actually elicited, or, persevering in the mind without advertence, by its force influences actions.

4º Formed, or living, or unformed, or dead, according as it is joined, or not, with the works of Charity.

Sins opposed to Faith are 1º infidelity, or the lack of Faith in unbaptized men; 2º heresy, or a pertinacious error in one baptized against a truth of Faith proposed by the Church.

Infidelity, or heresy, is called negative or material in him who labors under invincible ignorance, or to whom the true Faith has not been sufficiently proposed.

The treatment must be chiefly 1º concerning the necessity, 2º concerning the object of Faith.

187. • I. The internal act of Faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. This is clear from the Epistle to the Hebrews 11.6, where the Apostle says: Without Faith it is impossible to please God. For he who approaches God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him. - And from the Council of Trent, sess. 6. c. 6.

II. It is also necessary by necessity of precept at some time in life. This is clear from Sacred Scripture. For it is said in Epist. 1. John 3.23: This is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ. Likewise from various propositions condemned by Alexander VIII and Innocent XI.

188. Questions. - Q. 1º When does the precept of eliciting Faith bind?

Resp. 1º It binds per se 1º after the complete use of reason, for beginning the Christian life; 2º likewise when the truth of our Faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult infidel; 3º in the article of death, according to some, for tending more proximately to God; 4º more often in life, according to many at least once a year, and according to some each month. Moreover this precept is sufficiently fulfilled by exercising other acts of Religion. - St. Lig. n. 7, Hom. apost. n. 13.

Resp. 2º It binds per accidens 1º when a grave temptation presses, which cannot otherwise be conquered; 2º when a precept is to be fulfilled which requires Faith, for example, that of confession ¹; 3º after a fall into heresy, or after Faith has been denied. - Thus all.

¹ Faith concerning the article which directs the fulfillment of the precept is understood, for example, concerning the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, if you approach Communion, etc.; and indeed a formal act is not required, but an implicit one suffices. Hence some are wholly beside the point when they require from those approaching the Sacrament of Penance acts of the theological virtues, and indeed the customary formula of faith, in which moreover there is nothing that pertains to that sacrament.

Q. 2º Are explicit acts required for fulfilling the precept of Faith?

Resp. In those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, generally implicit acts suffice. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucified, prays, makes the sign of the cross, receives the Sacraments, etc. Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid.

189. • I. There is a negative precept prohibiting the denial of the true Faith, or the profession of a false one. For to deny the Faith is to deny God himself. Hence Christ says, Matt. 10.33: He who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father, who is in heaven.

II. There is also an affirmative precept, obliging at times to confess the Faith even with danger of life. For the honor of Christ sometimes requires that the faithful, in order to confess him, should despise even life. This is clear from the words of Christ himself, Matt. 10.32: Everyone who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father who is in heaven. And Luke 9.26: He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man will be ashamed when he shall come in his majesty. Likewise the Apostle, Rom. 10.10: With the heart one believes unto justice; but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.

III. But the external precept of confessing the Faith by natural right binds then, when otherwise the honor due to God, or the spiritual utility of the neighbor, would be withdrawn in a notable way: for instance, if God would be affected with great injury, and the neighbor with great spiritual evil; or if from the omission of confession there would follow contempt of Religion, scandal, the perversion of others; or even if a great honor toward God, or great utility toward the neighbor, would cease. The reason is that charity, which we owe to God or to the neighbor, requires this. - St. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 3. art. 1. - St. Lig. n. 11.

190. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it ever lawful to dissemble Faith?

Resp. 1º It is never lawful to simulate a false one, because this would be the same as denying the true one externally, which is intrinsically evil. And this is openly clear from the words of Christ just related.

Resp. 2º It is lawful for a grave cause to dissemble or conceal the true Faith, when danger of scandal has been excluded. The reason is that the precept of confessing the Faith does not always bind. - St. Lig. n. 10. 12. - Others commonly.

Q. 2º Can one questioned about Faith use ambiguous words?

Resp. 1º Neg., when evasion or silence is equivalent to denial, or to shame or fear, which in those circumstances necessarily detract from the honor of God, or the utility of the neighbor. For then the conditions explained in Principle III have place. This is confirmed from the constant practice of the Church and the common doctrine of the Fathers. - Moreover, with regard to public power questioning, it is clear from the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, under n. 18, which is of this sort: If anyone is questioned by public power, to confess the Faith frankly, as glorious to God and to the Faith, I counsel; to be silent, as sinful per se, I do not condemn. - St. Lig. n. 13.

Resp. 2º Affirm., when no scandal is created for those present, and no denial of Faith, or fear, or shame appears; because then no obligation to confess the Faith is present. - St. Lig. ibid.

191. • Q. 3º Is it lawful to use the signs or garments of infidels?

Resp. 1º Affirm., if they are garments or signs proper to some region, although that whole region may be infidel; because these of themselves are not referred to Religion.

Resp. 2º But if they are garments and signs of Religion, one must subdistinguish: I still more probably affirm, if it is done for a grave cause, and the garments are not solely distinctive of sect from sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondarily for distinguishing a sect. - But otherwise, if the garments or signs have been instituted solely or primarily for professing a sect, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions. - Salm., Tract. 21. c. 2. n. 1. 10.

192. Resolves. - 1º Someone sins gravely against Faith, even if only externally he bends the knees before an idol, or exhibits other signs of a false Religion, for example, by frequenting the heretical Supper, etc.

2º He does not sin against Faith who visits the temples of heretics or infidels out of mere curiosity, provided nevertheless scandal, danger of perversion, or a law forbidding these things is excluded. - Likewise he who is present at a wedding banquet or burial of heretics; because these do not properly pertain to Faith, and are regarded as merely civil assemblies. - St. Lig. n. 16.

But one must say otherwise if you assist at the Baptism and Supper of non-Catholics; because these pertain to a religious ceremony. This is also clear from the Letters of Pius VI, in which it is declared that to assist at baptism conferred by intruded ministers is illicit on account of cooperation.

3º He does not sin against Faith who, passing through places of heretics, from fear of grave danger, eats meats on a day of abstinence, lest he be recognized as a Catholic; because this of itself is not a sign of heresy; but otherwise, if he were to eat meats, even from fear of death, impelled to this in hatred of the Faith.

4º Nor does he sin against Faith who flees in time of persecution; indeed flight is generally in some way commanded, as is plain from the words of Christ, Matt. 10.23: But when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. But this especially holds if the safety of someone is necessary for the utility of the faithful, or someone fears a fall. - See Cases, n. 192 and following.

193. • The formal object of Faith, or the reason on account of which one believes, is the authority of God speaking, as being endowed with infinite wisdom as well as truthfulness. - Thus more commonly.

But the material object, concerning which alone the treatment here is made, consists of the things to be known and believed. Hence one must treat of things to be known and believed both by necessity of means and by necessity of precept.

194. • It is certain that two things are to be known and believed by necessity of means: 1º that God is: He who approaches God must believe that he is. Hebr. 11. - 2º That he is a rewarder: He must... believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him. Ibid. - But whether other things must be believed explicitly by necessity of means for salvation is controverted: hence concerning them:

195. Questions. - Q. 1º Is explicit Faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation required by necessity of means?

Resp. A twofold probable opinion is given.

I. The OPINION altogether affirms. The reason is:

1º With regard to the Incarnation, because salvation is not given except through Christ; therefore that means must necessarily be explicitly known and believed.

2º With regard to the Most Holy Trinity, because Faith in this mystery is the foundation of our salvation; for Baptism, which is the Sacrament of Faith, must be conferred in the name of the Father, etc. Now that which is the foundation of salvation must be the primary object of Faith, and therefore believed according to itself and explicitly. - Thus Collet, Decal. c. 1. art. 1. - Antoine, c. 1. - St. Lig. says this opinion is more probable, n. 2. ¹.

¹ ** St. Alphonsus does not call this opinion absolutely more probable, but says that it seems more probable.

183. State of the question. (A) To cooperate in general is to operate with another; and therefore, if there is question of an evil matter, cooperation is the concurrence furnished to the depraved action of another. But someone can cooperate with the sin of another in two ways: by influencing the will itself through counsels, examples, flatteries, etc.; this kind of cooperation is properly called scandal, concerning which we shall treat where we treat concerning charity; by helping another, already determined to sin, in the perpetration of the sin: and this is cooperation properly so called, about which we must say something.

² Most theologians treat this matter where they treat concerning charity; thus St. Alphonsus, lib. III, n. 59-80; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, p. 11, n. 361-464; Bouquillon, De virt. theologicis, n. 545-555; cf. Waffelaert, La coopération au mal, 2nd ed., Bruges, 1892; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, XXIII, 1901, pp. 721, 785, 961, 1025, 1073 sq.

(B) But this cooperation can be intentional or formal, or only material: the former is present when the one cooperating knowingly and willingly concurs in the action insofar as it is evil, and therefore truly intends its malice, whether explicitly, or implicitly by exercising a work which is directly ordered to a depraved action; for example, by writing and selling a book which of itself is ordered to corrupting morals. For then he proposes to himself an evil end, and consequently sins,¹ according to the principles given above, n. 150. - It is material when he concurs in the action of another insofar as it is physical, without the intention of cooperating in the sin. Thus he who hands over the keys of a house to a thief, so that the thief can more easily steal, cooperates formally and culpably; but materially, if he does this only for the end of avoiding his own harm, for example death, in no way intending to cooperate in the theft. Here we do not treat of formal cooperation, which is evidently directly evil; but only of material cooperation, which, as is clear from the notion given, falls back into the case of the indirect voluntary. For the one cooperating directly wills his own utility, for example to preserve life, and only indirectly wills the evil action, for example the theft which he foresees as going to follow from the handing over of the key.

¹ That sin has a double malice: one against charity, by inducing one's neighbor to sin; the other against the special virtue which is harmed by the cooperation.

184. (C) This material cooperation can be immediate, if someone has a part in the depraved action itself, for example by helping a thief to carry off a chest in which another's money is contained; or mediate, if the one cooperating concurs only in those acts which precede or follow the sin itself, for example by opening the door of the house to the thief, so that he may be able to enter or leave. - Again mediate cooperation can be more or less proximate, according as by its own nature or from circumstances it is more or less connected with the sin of another; for example, a servant who on Friday cooks meat cooperates less proximately toward the violation of the law of abstinence than an innkeeper who provides the same meats to be eaten by guests.

185. Principles. (A) He who cooperates only materially and mediately, even proximately, in an evil action does not sin, provided the act which he performs is not intrinsically evil and, besides, there is had a proportionate reason for cooperating.

For he who cooperates in this way does not will the evil effect except indirectly and permissively; but, from what was said above, n. 175, this is lawful when a proportionately grave reason is present. - Besides, when a sufficient reason is lacking, it is not lawful to cooperate with sin, even materially; for something inordinate is found in the act by which one concurs toward sin.¹

¹ Wherefore the following proposition (51) was condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "A servant who, with shoulders submitted, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in this by carrying a ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable harm, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." (Denzing., n. 1068; Viva, on this proposition.) For since in this case the cooperation is proximate, a very grave reason is required, which is lacking; for the servant here is supposed to have been able to find another master; he ought at least to have sought another, lest he be forced many times to cooperate in a depraved action.

186. (B) Immediate cooperation is not always and necessarily illicit, but sometimes it is permitted, provided there is present a proportionately grave reason. Thus more probably.

Certain theologians deny this, with Billuart,² because immediate cooperation is intrinsically evil; for does not he who helps a thief to carry off another's money himself steal? - Yet that argument does not hold in all cases. (a) Let the case of theft, concerning which Billuart treats, be taken; if someone cannot avoid death except by helping thieves in carrying off another's money, the taking away of another's thing in these adjuncts is not morally theft. For no one is bound, apart from a special pact, to lose his own life for protecting the goods of fortune of another; for the owner of the thing taken away would be unreasonably unwilling if he demanded this, at least when the one cooperating is not bound by a special pact to guard the thing. (b) Again, when someone asks for the sacraments, on account of a grave reason, from an unworthy minister, he by no means sins, according to the common opinion of theologians, although he is truly and immediately a participant in the action by which the minister sins; the reason is that the whole malice of the act holds itself on the part of the minister, who can, if he wishes, recover the state of grace by an act of contrition; and therefore the cooperation of the one asking in those adjuncts is not illicit.

² Billuart, De Justitia, diss. VIII, art. 13, § 6.

Therefore it cannot be said that in every case immediate cooperation is illicit. - Yet there are many cases in which immediate cooperation is sin; thus it is never lawful to participate immediately in the unjust killing of an innocent person, since such an action taken concretely is intrinsically evil.

The matter, therefore, is to be judged from the very nature of the evil act toward which one concurs, or from the circumstances; namely, if such an act, considered in the concrete, is so intrinsically evil that someone cannot cooperate in its physical perpetration without at least implicitly intending its malice, the cooperation is illicit.

187. (C) To judge whether the reason is proportionately grave, attention must be paid to the gravity of the sin with which one cooperates, to the propinquity and influence of the cooperation, and also to the obligation of impeding the sin.

(a) To the gravity of the sin: the graver the sin toward which someone cooperates is, the greater the excusing reason must be; thus a greater cause is required for someone to cooperate toward homicide than toward theft.

(b) To the propinquity of the cooperation: the more proximate the cooperation is, the greater reason is required; thus remote cooperation is excused on account of a light inconvenience; nearby cooperation, on account of a grave inconvenience; proximate cooperation, from a very grave cause; immediate cooperation, from a most grave cause. Thus he who sells paper to a publisher printing depraved books cooperates only remotely, and is excused from the mere motive of earning money; the worker who moves the machines cooperates nearby, and is excused only on account of a grave inconvenience, for example the loss of notable profit; but he who sets the type cooperates proximately, and is not excused except on account of a very grave cause, for example the greatest difficulty of finding another employer.

188. (c) To the influence of the cooperation; namely if the cooperation so influences the evil effect that, without it, the sin would not happen, a greater cause is required than if the sin would be committed without that cooperation; for example, a lesser reason is required for selling arms to him who is foreseen as going to abuse them, if there are present many other merchants who sell arms in this place.

(d) To the obligation of impeding sin; thus if someone by office of piety, as a father, or of justice, as a magistrate, is bound to impede some sin, a much greater cause is required for him to permit it.

Concerning special cases of cooperation as regards religion, charity, justice, temperance, etc., we shall treat in the course of the work.

614. Presupposing the things which we wrote in Dogmatic Theology concerning the object and act of faith, here we will weigh moral questions:

I. Concerning the nature and excellence of faith;

II. Concerning its necessity;

III. Concerning sins against faith;

IV. Concerning the means of making progress in faith.

615. Divine faith, of which we are treating, must be distinguished both from natural science and from human faith. Natural science, such as Philosophy, is concerned with truths which can be acquired by the light of reason alone, and rests upon intrinsic evidence, which is attained by a deductive or inductive method. Human faith rests upon the testimony of men, and gives us those cognitions which we cannot attain from the intrinsic evidence of things or by our own investigation; thus historical sciences rest upon human testimony. But divine faith is concerned with things divinely revealed, and we assent to them not on account of the intrinsic evidence of the things, nor on account of the testimony of men, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 1-2; Suarez, De fide, disp. I and VII; Lugo, De Virtute fidei, disp. XV, and others whom we cited in Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae, De Fide, p. 10; Newman, University Sermons; idem, Grammar of Assent; whose doctrine concerning the nature and genesis of faith H. Bremond arranged in the work: Newman, Psychologie de la Foi, Paris, Bloud, 1905.

Yet human faith, or the propensity which is in us to accept testimony as one of the sources for investigating truth, is an excellent disposition toward divine faith; for, "if we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater."² For who of sound mind, and free from prejudices, can reject the testimony of God, when he already admits the existence of God infinitely wise and truthful? Therefore the natural propensity of believing men, innate in us, is as it were a preparation for receiving the gift of divine faith.³

² 1 John 5:9.

³ M. d'Hulst, Confer., 1892, 3rd Conf., p. 91.

These things being laid down, we shall briefly gather together what elsewhere⁴ we have already written concerning the definition of faith, the conditions for the act of faith, and its genesis.

⁴ Synop. Th. Dogmat., De Fide, nn. 19-26 and 102-119.

616. 1. Definition. (A) Faith, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is described as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing."⁵ The Vatican Council professes the same,⁶ that it is "a supernatural virtue, by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe that the things revealed by Him are true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things perceived by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive." From this a definition of faith can be drawn, either as a habit or as an act.

⁵ Heb. 11:1. This description Dante expounds poetically, La Divina Commedia, Paradiso, canto 24. From the Pauline definition it follows that faith is concerned with things to be hoped for, namely those which pertain to our supernatural beatitude.

⁶ Sess. III, cap. 3, Denzing., n. 1638.

(B) Faith, as a habit, is usually defined: a supernatural and theological virtue infused, disposing the mind, that is, the intellect and the will, to assent firmly, under the influence of actual grace, on account of the divine authority, to all things revealed by God.⁷ - But the act of faith can be defined: the act by which the intellect, at the command of the will assisted by grace, firmly assents, on account of the authority of God, to all things divinely revealed.

⁷ Recently this definition was attacked because it is not sufficiently psychological, nor does it sufficiently show how supernatural faith rests upon the natural faculty of believing; and therefore this other definition was proposed: the natural faculty supernaturally transmuted by God through grace, disposing the mind to assent firmly, etc. (Pichegut, in Rev. du Clerge francais, t. XXIX, Dec. 1901, pp. 72-76). But this natural faculty supernaturally transmuted presents a very obscure concept: for in what does a transmutation of this kind consist? - Moreover the classical definition, which rests upon the Vatican Council, can be explained psychologically: for it is already signified clearly enough that the virtue of faith is inserted in the intellect and will, with the grace of God cooperating, and in the declaration of the definition, especially where the act of faith is treated, the psychological process of faith can be described. - Concerning the controversies had on this matter between Pichegut and Gayraud, Guillemant, Le Bras, see Rev. du Clerge francais, t. XXIX, pp. 206, 320, 537, 636.

617. 2. Conditions for faith. These are required from a threefold head, namely on the part of the object, of the subject, and of God:

(a) On the part of the object: the revelation of some truth; otherwise nothing could be believed by divine faith; - the proposition of this truth, or its manifestation made to those to whom God did not immediately reveal it; - motives of credibility, or reasons and proofs by which it can be judged with moral certainty that some truth has been revealed, and therefore is credible and to be believed. But that moral certitude is sufficient which excludes a prudent fear of erring.

(b) On the part of the subject: the absence of prejudices; for, especially in a moral matter, nothing more clouds and blinds the intellect than judgments formed a priori without sufficient foundation, such as, for example, these or like ones: a miracle is impossible; preternatural facts cannot be demonstrated; - besides this, a pious affection for believing is desired. For since the truths of faith are often obscure, and are especially opposed to human passions, the intellect, by a certain natural instinct, is prone to deny them, unless it is gently inclined by the will.

(c) On the part of God, there is required actual grace, which precedes man, illumines his intellect so that he may more easily perceive the force of the motives of credibility, and moves the will so that it commands the assent of the intellect. For faith is a truly supernatural act, a special gift of God which is truly gratuitous: "No one, however, can consent to the evangelical preaching, as is necessary for obtaining salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth."⁸

⁸ Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3, apud Denzing., n. 1640.

618. 3. Concerning the genesis of faith. These things being laid down, it can be understood how regularly the act of faith, by a logical process, is elicited by an adult who has not yet embraced the Christian faith. We suppose him to be rightly disposed, so that he is prepared to receive the truth, even when opposed to prejudices or passions; otherwise he will scarcely be able to grasp the force of the arguments. (a) First, he must recognize naturally the existence of God and His infallible truthfulness, either by reasoning, namely by considering the arguments which are set forth in the Philosophical Lectures, or by other natural means, for example, the authority of parents or of more learned men, who propose these truths. For cognition of this kind the natural concurrence of God is sufficient of itself. (b) Afterward, conscious of his own inability to discover all the truths whose knowledge he needs in order to order life rightly, the fact of revelation is investigated, with the help of history and criticism, by considering the motives of credibility, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, which are set forth in the Treatise on True Religion, especially the arguments by which the divinity of Christ's mission is proved. These motives, especially if all are reviewed together attentively and sincerely, generate moral certitude, which excludes a prudent fear of erring. For this also the natural concurrence of God is sufficient of itself, although God is accustomed to assist both the intellect and the will in this study by preternatural help; hence it is very expedient that the help of God be sought by frequent prayer. (c) From this twofold consideration there can now be formed a speculative judgment concerning the possibility and the obligation of believing, or, as they say, concerning credibility and credendity. For if God, infallibly truthful, has revealed certain truths, we are bound to give assent to them. Such a judgment in itself is natural; but, since it is the proximate and positive preparation for the act of faith itself, our faculties are now in fact aided by supernatural grace to form it. (d) There follows upon this an act of the will commanding the assent of the intellect; for since the matter is one in itself not evident, and one which moreover is established only with moral certainty, a certainty excluding prudent doubt, it is necessary that the will command this prudent assent of the intellect. From this there is elicited an act of implicit faith, or the practical judgment of the intellect assenting in a general way to all the truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing. This is truly an act of supernatural faith, elicited by the intellect, under the command of the free will, with the grace of God exciting and cooperating, which illumines the intellect and moves the will: it is therefore a free act, and, the requisite conditions being posited, meritorious. (e) Afterward it remains to be investigated which, in species, are the truths revealed by God, so that they may be believed explicitly. Now one of the truths manifested by Christ is the infallible authority granted to the Church, for authoritatively proposing the truths to be believed: supernatural assent to this truth is an act of explicit faith, elicited by the intellect, under the command of the will and the influence of grace. This being accomplished, the way will now be easy for believing explicitly whatever the infallible Church shall have proposed as of faith.

619. Faith, especially that which is joined to confidence and works through charity, contributes greatly indeed to private and public good.

⁹ Lacordaire, 12th Conference; Largent, Une station de Careme, Paris, 1881, p. 33; Bouquillon, De virt. theologicis, nn. 198-204; M. d'Hulst, Confer. 1892, pp. 123-129; Gay, Vie et Vertus chret., Paris, 1876, t. I, l. III, De la Foi, pp. 142-155.

1. To private good. For (A) faith, taken in a general way, according to Trent,¹⁰ is deservedly called "the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons." It is, namely, the beginning of salvation; for we cannot use the means necessary for salvation unless we have known them; nor are we able to know them except through faith, since they are supernatural: by faith we know God as the ultimate supernatural end, - Christ as Redeemer and mediator, - and all things instituted by Christ for obtaining justification and for increasing and preserving grace. Hence, according to the Apostle,¹¹ the just man lives by faith, is justified by faith, and is saved through faith. Therefore faith is truly the foundation of the whole spiritual building, and as it were the cornerstone without which it cannot stand. It is rightly also called the root of the whole of justification; for as the root not only sustains the tree, but also supplies sap to it, by which it brings forth leaves and fruit, so faith not only sustains spiritual life, but also nourishes it, while it pours into us, as it were, the various and pious affections of fear, hope, and others like these, as a certain sap, from which the fruits of charity spring up.

¹⁰ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 8 (Denzing., n. 683).

¹¹ Rom. 1:17; 5:1; Gal. 3:11; 1 Cor. 15:1-2, etc.

620. (B) If it is considered insofar as it perfects the intellect, it is as it were a new light superadded to the light of reason, by which we are able to attain truths inaccessible to human reason; for, as was said in the Treatise on True Religion, nn. 142-145, there are many problems of the moral order, and indeed of the greatest moment, which the human mind left to itself cannot solve, especially concerning man's origin, nature, ultimate end, and the means necessary for attaining it. Now to all these questions faith gives an answer that is certain, consonant with reason, and adapted to the intelligence of all; thus it frees us from manifold doubt and error, and is as it were a lighthouse showing the path of the right way, amid the rocks of errors, and the port of salvation toward which we tend.

621. (C) With regard to the will, faith is deservedly called a perennial fountain of strength and consolation. (a) Of strength indeed; which the Apostle splendidly declares: after describing the excellent deeds done by the Fathers with faith assisting, he adds these things:¹ "Who through faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained promises... recovered strength from weakness, became mighty in war."

¹ Heb. 11:33-34; let the whole chapter be read.

In truth faith sets before our eyes whatever God has done for our salvation, with what charity He loved us from eternity, how He adopted us as sons, and delivered His Only-begotten Son for the salvation of sinners; - how many and how great benefits Christ bestowed upon us, what torments He willingly suffered to redeem us, what means He benignly instituted for our sanctification, with what unfailing love He follows after us while hidden on the altar; - what eternal rewards or torments are prepared for us, according as we have acted well or badly. Now all these things, and many others which faith suggests, stir men in the best way possible to the love of God and of neighbor, and add new strength to them, so that, despising the vanities of the world and spurning the enticements of pleasures, they may pursue the good strenuously and constantly.

(b) Faith likewise offers the greatest consolation amid the miseries of life; for if every creature groans, by the example of Christ suffering and dying on the cross, and also by the hope of future goods, pains are lightened not a little: "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ... And not only so; but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience; and patience trial; and trial hope... If, however, we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us... And we know that to them that love God all things work together unto good."²

² Rom. 5:1-4; Rom. 8:17-18; Rom. 8:28.

This indeed appears most of all when we lose parents, relatives, and intimately beloved friends: "And we will not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you be not sorrowful, even as others who have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so God will bring with Him those who have slept through Jesus."³ For through death "life is changed, not taken away, and, the house of this earthly dwelling being dissolved, an eternal dwelling in the heavens is prepared."⁴ Meanwhile, by force of the communion of saints, we remain intimately joined to departed friends: we pray for them detained in purgatory, and they, having entered heaven, now secure concerning their immortality, become solicitous for our salvation and intercede for us.⁵

³ 1 Thess. 4:12.

⁴ Missale, Proper for Gaul, Preface for the dead.

⁵ How great a consolation faith offers to the afflicted is eloquently declared by Bougaud, Le Christianisme et les temps presents, t. I, ch. XI sq.; Gay, op. cit., l. XIII, De la douleur chretienne; H. Perreyve, La journee des malades; Ctesse de Flavigny, L'Annee des malades, Paris, 1905.

622. (D) From this it follows that faith is very meritorious, for this is the most excellent homage of our mind, by which we freely subject at once both will and intellect to divine authority. For since the things to which we assent are not evident, but for the most part difficult to believe, and are also opposed to the passions, especially to pride, pleasure, and egotism, it is necessary that our will gently and strongly incline the intellect not only to consider attentively the motives of credibility, but also to offer assent humbly to revealed truths; and no one fails to see that this is very meritorious.

From this also it is gathered that faith is as it were the dawn and foretaste of the beatific vision; for by faith we believe those things which through the light of glory we shall contemplate, and, although we perceive the same things only obscurely, we give certain and firm assent on account of the authority of God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. Therefore of Christians much more than of the patriarchs it can be said: "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers upon the earth."⁶

⁶ Heb. 11:13.

623. 2. To public or social good. (A) Since society is an association of families, it cannot flourish without rightly ordered families. Moreover, it is established no less historically than psychologically that families are not stable except where the unity and indissolubility of marriage flourish.⁷ Now Christian faith teaches and fosters both of these, and through the centuries has furnished the greatest security to families. But when faith decreases, divorces are soon multiplied, family bonds are broken, and from this society is weakened.

⁷ Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Matrimonio, n. 45 and nn. 58-63.

624. (B) Society, moreover, cannot long and peacefully stand without the constant exercise of justice, by which his own is rendered to each, and of charity, which inclines citizens to give mutual help to one another. Now Christian faith constantly inculcates and inspires these virtues, as will be said below; but when faith is diminished, and all the more when faith is removed, the very notion of the just and equitable is gradually obscured, charity languishes and grows cold; soon quarrels, dissensions, and struggles of parties are increased; the rich become harsher toward the poor, and the poor envy the richer and pursue them with hatred, as lamentable experience today establishes; and thus the foundations of society seem to totter.⁸ - Philosophers indeed, both ancient and modern, have sought the norm of the just and equitable, and the foundation of charity, or, as they say, of altruism and solidarity, in various systems, but in vain, as we have shown above, On the Ultimate End, nn. 33-64.

⁸ To the point M. d'Hulst, op. cit., pp. 127-128: "Everyone agrees today that, without justice and without love, the earth would be a hell. There remains, therefore, only one question to resolve: where is the guarantee of justice? where is the source of love? The despisers of Christianity promise us that they will find both the one and the other in the scientific education of instincts. But, since the time when they keep repeating this promise, we see growing among their authentic disciples only the ferocity of egoism and the cult of force. And yet society still lives on the remains of the Christian inheritance. What will it be when it has finished dissipating it? One of those who call our faith an illusion was admitting it recently, mixing a blasphemy with his admission: 'Religious persons,' he said, 'live on a shadow.' This is the blasphemy; here is the admission: 'We, we live on the shadow of a shadow. On what will people live after us?' (Renan, Preface des Feuilles detachees.)" Taine proves the same from those things which happened at the time of the French Revolution: faith having indeed been rejected, the cruelty and lust of pagans soon flourished. (Les origines de la France contemporaine: le Regime moderne, t. II, pp. 118-119.)

625. State of the question. (A) Once man's elevation to the supernatural state has been posited, revelation becomes necessary for manifesting the means conducing to this end; but once revelation has been posited, faith becomes necessary for salvation, as the Vatican Council teaches:² "Since man depends wholly upon God as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason is entirely subject to uncreated Truth, we are bound to render to God revealing the full obedience of intellect and will by faith... But because without faith it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons, therefore justification has never befallen anyone without it, nor will anyone attain eternal life unless he has persevered in it unto the end." It afterward thus defines this obligation of believing: "If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded to it by God, let him be anathema."

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, aa. 3-8; Suarez, De Fide, disp. 12-12; Lugo, disp. XII-XIV; Billuart, De Fide, disp. 3; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, tr. I, De praecepto fidei; Lequeux, op. cit., nn. 145-169; Bouquillon, op. cit., nn. 156-197; Merit, La Foi, Tours, Cattier, 1886, pp. 187-264; Pesch, nn. 426-465.

² Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3 and can. 1 de Fide, apud Denzing., nn. 1638, 1642, 1657.

626. (B) But something can be necessary in two ways, namely by necessity of means and by necessity of precept. (a) That is necessary by necessity of means which is a means, and indeed a necessary means, of justification, and therefore without which, even if it is inculpably omitted, salvation cannot be obtained; in this case, therefore, neither ignorance nor inability can excuse. But something can be necessary by necessity of means in two ways: intrinsically, when by its nature it is ordered as a necessary means to salvation, so that it cannot be supplied by another, for example, the love of God; extrinsically, when it is required for salvation only by the free institution of God, so that, if God wills, it can be supplied by other means: for example, Baptism of water.

(b) That is necessary by necessity of precept which is so prescribed that it cannot be freely omitted without sin; therefore if it is culpably omitted, it is a cause of damnation; but if it is inculpably omitted, on account of ignorance or inability, salvation can be obtained without it. Now that faith is necessary both by necessity of means with respect to some objects, and by necessity of precept with respect to others, will be established from what is to be said.

627. Faith, as an infused habit, is altogether necessary by necessity of means for salvation, as can be gathered from what has already been said. For without the grace of justification no one can be saved, as is clear from the Treatise on Grace; moreover, in the present order of things, justification is not conferred without the infusion of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity (On the Virtues, n. 597); therefore he who lacks the habit of faith by that very fact lacks sanctifying grace.

But the question is concerning the act of faith, and indeed with regard to adults: for infants and others lacking the use of reason, if through baptism they have received the infused habit of faith, are saved without an act of faith, of which they are incapable.³ Therefore concerning adults it must be asked whether and what they are bound to believe by necessity of means.

³ Concerning the state of children who die without baptism, it was said in Tr. de Deo Creante, nn. 201-205.

628. I. Thesis: For adults some act of theological faith is absolutely necessary for justification, and therefore for obtaining salvation. It is certain.

1. Trent clearly teaches this; for concerning sinners it says: "They are disposed to this justice when, aroused and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God." Afterward it adds that the instrumental cause of justification is the sacrament of baptism, "which is the sacrament of faith, without which justification has never befallen anyone." Finally it declares the matter more openly in these words: "But when the Apostle says that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consensus of the Church has held and expressed: namely, that we are said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification: without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons."⁴

⁴ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, 7, 8, apud Denzing., nn. 680, 681, 683.

629. 2. Scripture hands down the same thing in various ways: (a) it asserts that faith is the beginning and foundation of human salvation; thus Christ, in His discourse to Nicodemus, says:⁵ "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life"; likewise, when He sends the Apostles into the world, He addresses them thus: "Preach the gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned."⁶ Hence the deacon Philip replies to the eunuch asking for baptism:⁷ "If you believe with all your heart, you may"; and the Apostles require faith in Christ from the newly converted; thus the jailer at Philippi asks Paul and Silas: "Sirs, what must I do to be saved? But they said: Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you shall be saved, you and your house."⁸ - (b) It declares that works of the law and natural works are insufficient without faith: this the Apostle expressly and often inculcates, especially in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians: "For we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law... But knowing that man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ."⁹ - (c) Finally it is asserted that faith is a necessary means to spiritual life and to pleasing God: "But My just man lives by faith; but if he withdraws himself, My soul shall not be pleased with him... But without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him."¹⁰

⁵ John 3:14-15.

⁶ Mark 16:15-16.

⁷ Acts 8:37. This text, however, is lacking in some manuscripts.

⁸ Acts 16:30-31.

⁹ Rom. 3:28; Gal. 2:16.

¹⁰ Heb. 10:38; 11:6.

630. 3. It is confirmed by reason, once man's elevation to a supernatural end has been supposed. For since an end of this kind so exceeds our powers that we cannot even know it naturally, and moreover the means for attaining it, such as Christ's sacrifice and the sacraments instituted by Him, transcend the natural vision of the mind, it was necessary that all these things be known by faith. - Moreover the end toward which we tend is the perfect vision of God; now it was fitting that we should be led by the hand toward this perfect knowledge through faith, which is as it were an inchoate vision of divine things, insofar as it makes us sharers in divine knowledge:¹¹ for, relying upon divine testimony, we believe those things which He Himself sees, and which we shall afterward see.

¹¹ "Faith... joins man to divine knowledge through assent" (St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. XIV, a. 8).

631. 1. It is certain that it is necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe in God existing and rewarding.

(A) This is declared. Indeed we are bound in a general way to believe all those things which God has revealed; and he who would deliberately deny one truth which he knows to have been divinely revealed would by that very fact be a heretic, as will be explained below. But besides this certain truths must be believed explicitly, or in themselves, in their own proper concept; nor is it enough to believe them implicitly, that is, insofar as they are contained in other truths explicitly believed.

(B) It is proved. (a) The existence of God and His providence with regard to the remuneration of the good and the evil must be explicitly believed, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹² "For he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him." - Moreover, by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, this proposition (22) was condemned: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in the Rewarder."¹³ Therefore explicit faith in both truths is necessary.

¹² Heb. 11:6.

¹³ Denzing., n. 1039; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) This indeed is consonant with right reason. For since God is our ultimate end both in the natural and in the supernatural order, we cannot attain Him unless we know His existence. - Some indeed say that this is sufficient; for, as soon as we know that God is the highest good, we can proceed to an act of perfect charity and contrition, and thus be justified. But, given man's nature and imperfection, he in fact does not arrive at perfect contrition except through fear and hope, namely by considering God as the supreme rewarder, who justly renders punishments to the evil and rewards to the good, according to the laws of equity.

632. (C) But it is asked in what sense we must believe in God the rewarder.

(a) With regard to the existence of God, many Thomists say that there is required faith in God as He is the author of the supernatural order, but not faith in God as He is the author of the natural order; for we know this truth by reason, and moreover what is certainly and evidently known cannot be believed.¹⁴ Yet many others, such as Suarez, Lugo,¹⁵ etc., hold that faith in God as He is the author of the natural order is necessary, or insofar as He is endowed with those perfections which can be known by the natural light: for we can believe by faith what we already know by reason, and moreover St. Paul requires this faith.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, aa. 4-5; Gonet, Clypeus, De fide, disp. I, art. 5-6; Salmanticenses, De Fide, disp. III, dub. 2; Berthier, De locis theolog., n. 504.

¹⁵ Suarez, De Fide, disp. III, sect. 8, and disp. XII, sect. 3, n. 4; Lugo, disp. XII, sect. 5, n. 123; Pesch, n. 445. - Cf. Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, nn. 129-132.

In truth the Apostle makes no distinction, but teaches only that God must first be believed as existing, afterward as rewarding. Moreover he is treating of supernatural faith, namely of that which is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing,¹⁶ and therefore of that which rests not upon human reasoning, but upon divine testimony. But for this faith it is not required that there be a distinct concept of supernaturality, which cannot be demanded from the common people; rather, it is enough that the believer understand that these truths are in some way divinely proposed, whether through external revelation or through an internal manifestation made to conscience.

¹⁶ Heb. 11:1. - Which M. d'Hulst thus explains, Confer. 1892, pp. 113-114: "The second domain of faith is the natural truths which serve as a basis for revelation. Man first discovers them by the effort of his reason, if he is capable of this effort. But, when faith has supervened, it shows him these same truths under a new light, as forming part of divine teaching; and what was matter for reasoning becomes an object of belief. Such are the teachings relating to the existence of God, to His perfections, to the immortality of the human soul... For the cultivated mind, these truths are therefore illumined by a double light, one which comes from nature, the other which is kindled at the hearth of grace."

633. Therefore that faith in the broad sense, resting upon natural discourse, which takes its origin from the testimony and knowledge of creatures, insofar as they manifest the invisible attributes of God, is not sufficient. For this proposition (23) was condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "Faith in the broad sense from the testimony of creatures, or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."¹⁷ For faith arising from the knowledge of creatures alone cannot rise up to the supernatural end, nor beget supernatural charity, which is especially necessary for salvation.

¹⁷ Denzing., n. 1040; Viva, on this proposition.

634. Corollary. From this it is understood how God provides for the salvation of those who live among pagans, where they have heard nothing of evangelical faith. According to St. Thomas and theologians commonly, if some pagan "were to follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as He sent Peter to Cornelius."¹ And indeed God, who once spoke to the patriarchs and to others outside the Jewish people, can without difficulty speak inwardly to those who are rightly disposed, so that they understand themselves to be instructed by the supreme Deity.

¹ St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1.

635. 4. It is controverted whether explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity and in Christ the Redeemer is necessary by necessity of means.

(A) It is commonly held that, before the coming of Christ, it was not necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the incarnate Word; for these had not yet been sufficiently revealed to men, as is clear from what was said in the Treatise on the Triune God, nn. 29-36.

(B) But some, supported by the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas,² think that, after the fall of Adam, it was necessary for justification by necessity of means explicitly to believe in some mediator, by whose merits salvation could be obtained. They allege the words of Scripture: "For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved";³ and from this they infer that no one can be saved without faith in Christ, or in some mediator.

² St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. XVIII, cap. 47, P. L., XLI, 610; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 7; Bouquillon, n. 169. - You may see the whole controversy set forth apud Perrone, De virtutibus fidei, spei et carit., Ratisbon, 1865, nn. 344-379.

³ Acts 4:12; cf. 1 Cor. 11:11.

636. (C) Nevertheless today, as more probable, many theologians teach that explicit faith in the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation, or even of Christ the mediator, is not necessary by necessity of means.⁴ For (a) so grave a necessity ought not to be established without a compelling reason; but this reason is lacking. For when the Apostle speaks of the necessity of faith, in the place cited above, he speaks only of faith in God the rewarder; moreover the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance required for justification can be elicited without faith in the Trinity and Incarnation; as soon as we believe that God is, and indeed that He is supremely good and perfect, rendering to each according to his works, there is now nothing to prevent the acts necessary for justification from being elicited. Therefore, from the nature of the thing, even after the supernatural end has been posited, faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is not absolutely required; if it is necessary, this is only by the positive will of God; but this will has not been clearly manifested. (b) Moreover, if this faith is required, the salvation of those who have heard nothing of the Gospel becomes morally impossible, that is, of more than half of the human race; for an extraordinary light would be necessary for pagans to be instructed concerning this twofold mystery, the existence of which most do not suspect.

⁴ Suarez, disp. XII, sect. 4.

Therefore we think it more probable that this explicit faith is not required. But the texts of Scripture concerning the necessity of faith in Christ can be understood of necessity of precept, or of implicit necessity of means, or even in this sense, that no one is saved except through the merits and satisfactions of Christ.

637. Corollary. In practice, since here the question is of a thing necessary for salvation, the safer part must be followed. Therefore: (a) all those who have the care of souls must diligently teach the faithful committed to them not only God existing and rewarding, but also God triune and the Word incarnate and Redeemer. Yet it is not required that a scientific knowledge of these mysteries be handed on to the simple, of which they are incapable; it is enough that it be taught that there are three persons in God, distinct and equal, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that these three are one God, - and that the second person of the Trinity, or the Son of God, made man, redeemed us by His death.

638. (b) Regularly those who labor under ignorance of these mysteries, even invincible ignorance, are neither to be baptized nor absolved;⁵ but, in a case of extreme necessity, if time for instructing the catechumens is lacking, they are to be baptized absolutely, because, where there is question of requisites not for the valid but only for the fruitful reception of baptism, no condition should be placed; if they survive, they should be diligently instructed. But penitents are to be absolved under condition if they are capable, and, if they survive, they must be instructed and absolved again. For on the one hand, where there is question of means necessary for salvation, the safer part must be chosen, and on the other hand, in a case of necessity, where certain remedies are lacking, probable remedies must be used (above, nn. 388-389).

⁵ Hence the Holy Office, Jan. 25, 1703, declared that "a missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are especially the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation" (Collect. P. F. n. 549). This was declared concerning an adult in relation to baptism; but the same reason applies with regard to absolution. - It is established besides from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition 64: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." (Denzing., n. 1081; Viva, on this proposition.)

(c) When there is question of the semi-foolish or the very ignorant, an act of faith in God one and triune, and in Christ the Redeemer, should be suggested to them before they are absolved, so that the validity of the absolution may become safer.

Two things are prescribed: an internal act of faith, and an external profession of faith; concerning these we must speak separately.

639. There is given a divine precept of believing the truths revealed by God, at once negative and positive. Insofar as it is negative, it forbids revealed truths sufficiently proposed and known to be rejected or called into doubt; insofar as it is positive, it obliges us to elicit acts of faith at times. We shall speak concerning the existence and extension of this precept, and also concerning the time at which it obliges.

640. 1. Existence. There is given a divine precept of explicitly eliciting internal acts of faith concerning the principal truths revealed by God.

(a) This Christ Himself taught, when He sent the apostles into the world:¹ "Preach the Gospel to every creature: he who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned"; from which it is clear that faith in the Gospel preached by the apostles, no less explicitly than baptism, is necessary for salvation. The apostles held the same, among whom John equates the precept of faith with the precept of charity:² "And this is His commandment, that we should believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He has given commandment to us": for there it is a question of explicit faith in Christ.

¹ Mark 16:16.

² 1 John 3:23.

(b) And indeed by the very fact that God reveals something, He commands that faith be given to Himself; for he who, revelation having been certainly known, refuses faith, cannot fail to inflict an injury upon the wisdom and truthfulness of God, whether by doubting revealed things or by denying them. - Moreover, if he is unwilling to assent to them, he withdraws himself from the supreme dominion of God. For man is not more independent of the Creator with regard to the intellect than with regard to the will, and therefore God can demand from us the assent of the intellect no less than the obedience of the will.

641. 2. Extension. Here there is question of those things which are to be believed explicitly by all, not of those things which must be known by the more learned, especially by God's ministers, according to their office. In a general way the faithful must explicitly believe whatever is required for feeling and acting as Christians, and therefore, besides the truths necessary by necessity of means enumerated above:

(a) The principal truths which are contained in the Apostles' Creed:³ for there, in a brief and simple way, are set forth the principal articles by which Catholics are distinguished from infidels and heretics, namely those which formerly were proposed to catechumens before the reception of baptism. Indeed articles of this kind gradually increased, but substantially they are already contained in the Scriptures, and the Church by her infallible authority proposes all these to be believed by us.

³ Concerning the Creed we spoke in the Treatise on Theological Sources, nn. 17-18. Today it is not admitted that the individual articles are to be ascribed to individual apostles; the Creed is called Apostles' because the apostles themselves handed down the substance of the dogmas which it comprises. The very word Symbolum Apostolorum is found for the first time in the letter of the Council of Milan to Siricius, toward the end of the fourth century (Migne, P. L., t. XVI, 1125); before that, the confession of faith which catechumens and the faithful professed was called the rule of faith, doctrine, tradition, watchword. How the brief formula of faith in the Trinity, which was recited before baptism, was successively enlarged, so that sprouting heresies might be forestalled, is declared by the authors cited by us (loc. cit.), and besides by S. Baumer, Das apostoliche Glaubensbekenntniss, Mainz, 1893; A. E. Burn, An Introduction to the Creeds, London, 1899; Sanday, Recent Research on the Origin of the Creed, in Journal of Theological Studies, Chicago, Oct. 1899 and Oct. 1901; Semeria, Dogma, Gerarchia e Culto, Rome, 1902; Ermoni, Histoire du Credo, Paris, Bloud, 1903; Vacandard, Etudes de critique, Paris, 1905, pp. 3-68; Vacant, Diction. de Theol., t. I, p. 1660.

The divine precept indeed is not concerned with the very words of the Creed, as they are read today, but with the substance of the dogmas which are expressed by these words. It is altogether expedient that the very words themselves be faithfully committed to memory and recited daily: for thus the truths expressed by these words are retained more effectively. But probably no precept, whether divine or ecclesiastical, is given concerning this.⁴

⁴ Yet, according to St. Alphonsus and Lehmkuhl, I, n. 280, the faithful are bound under venial sin, from custom, to retain the Creed itself by memory.

642. (b) The principal precepts of the Decalogue: for these comprise the principal natural and divine rules of morals; and, since the obligation of observing them is incumbent upon Christians, first they must know and believe them. - The precepts of the Church, as merely ecclesiastical and not revealed, are not indeed an object of faith, but they must be known, so that they can be fulfilled.

(c) The domestic prayer, at least very probably, because it comprises those things which Christ taught us to ask, and which are more necessary for salvation. Besides this, it must be known under grave obligation that prayer in general is necessary for salvation. It is also required that each faithful person know how to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity; to retain a definite formula by memory is altogether expedient. - The Angelic Salutation, or Hail Mary, is indeed of great profit, and it helps to recite it piously; but we are not bound to know it or to believe it explicitly.

(d) The sacraments necessary for all, namely baptism, penance, and the Eucharist: for since all Christians are bound to receive these, they must believe those things which are required for their worthy reception. With regard to the other sacraments, those who receive them are first bound to know and believe the things revealed concerning them.

643. From this it follows that those sin who neglect to learn the aforesaid truths; - and also parents and pastors who, neither by themselves nor by others, do not instruct their children or subjects concerning these things: for they do not fulfill a grave duty.⁵

⁵ Pius X recently urged the fulfillment of this duty, Encycl. Acerbo nimis, Apr. 15, 1905 (Acta S. Sedis, t. XXXVII, p. 613), where, among other things, he established these things, p. 623: "All pastors, and generally all who have the care of souls, on Sundays and feast days, through the space of a whole hour, shall instruct boys and girls from the catechism booklet concerning those things which each must believe and do in order to obtain salvation.... In all and individual parishes there shall be canonically established an association commonly called the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. In it pastors, especially where the number of priests is small, will have lay helpers in handing on catechesis.... In larger cities, and especially in those where universities of studies, lyceums, and gymnasia are open, schools of religion shall be founded for instructing in the truths of faith and the institutions of Christian life the youth who frequent public schools, where no mention at all is made of religious matters." - Let the whole letter be attentively read and faithfully put into execution.

Hence also confessors ought not absolve penitents ignorant of these truths, unless these seriously and sincerely wish to learn them; otherwise they are not rightly disposed, since they are unwilling to fulfill a grave precept.

644. 3. Concerning the time at which the precept of faith obliges. That precept obliges either of itself or by accident:

(A) Of itself, or by force of the precept itself of believing: (a) When some revealed truth has been sufficiently proposed, or when the obligation of believing is manifested to the conscience with moral certainty; likewise when a new definition is proposed, for example, when the decrees of the Vatican Council were promulgated.

The same is to be said concerning children of the faithful, who, having attained the use of reason, have been so instructed in faith that they clearly perceive that such and such a truth has been divinely revealed; and concerning infidels and heretics, as soon as it is morally certain to them that the Catholic religion was instituted by God. For the reverence and obedience which we must offer to God demands that we believe as soon as something is shown with moral certainty to be divinely revealed; otherwise His infallible authority is contemned. Therefore those sin who put off for a long time the act of faith and entrance into the Church after they have clearly perceived the obligation of believing. - But those who apprehend the motives of credibility only probably are not indeed bound to believe immediately, but they must pray, and at the same time seriously inquire, so that the truth may shine more clearly before their eyes: for God does not deny light and grace to those rightly disposed.

645. (b) Often in life, although the times cannot or should not be determined more particularly.⁶ This indeed is clear from the propositions 17 and 65 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life. - It suffices to have believed those mysteries (of the Trinity and Incarnation) once." - Some indeed said that acts of faith must be elicited on feast days, others once a year: but nothing certain can be defined on this matter. Besides, this seems of little utility; for, morally speaking, it cannot happen that a Christian man, who has embraced and retained the Christian faith, does not repeat acts of faith often, whether explicitly, - or implicitly, by exercising supernatural works, resisting temptations, or fulfilling other precepts, which can scarcely be observed without some act of faith.

⁶ Denzing., nn. 1034 and 1082; Viva, on proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII.

646. (c) Probably in the article of death, because then especially we are bound to tend toward God, the ultimate supernatural end. Yet some say that then an act of faith is not necessary of itself, but only if a grave temptation against faith urges.

(d) After the denial of some truth of faith; for he who has become a heretic or apostate must turn himself to God by a positive act of faith. - The same is to be said if a temptation against faith urges which cannot be overcome except through an act of faith; often, however, the temptation is more effectively driven away by diverting the mind to other things.

(e) For repelling those temptations which cannot be overcome without an act of faith, for example, temptations against faith or hope.

1. NATURE OF CHRISTIAN SELF-LOVE.—The duties which man owes to himself may be summarized in the proposition that he is obliged to love himself.

Self-love is so powerful an instinct of nature that it is impossible for man to act without it. Self-love not only follows logically from the universal commandment of charity, but is expressly inculcated in Holy Scripture as the standard and measure of that chiefest of all virtues.

Matt. VII, 12: "All things therefore whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. XXII, 39: 'The second [commandment] is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”¹

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, I, c. 25, n. 26: "The manner of loving must be prescribed to man, that is, how he should love himself so as to benefit himself. But to doubt that he loves himself and wishes to benefit himself is the mark of a madman." —Ibid., c. 26, n. 27: "Since the love of God comes first and the prescribed manner of loving Him is evident, so that all other things flow into it, nothing seems to have been said about your love of yourself; but when it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself,’ at the same time your love of yourself was not omitted." (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 28 sq.).—Cfr. Terence, Andr., IV, 3: "Proximus sum egomet mihi."

The second Commandment inculcates self-love, not in the sense of that innate disposition by which man seeks his own gratification, welfare, and advancement, but as a moral virtue.

Self-love as a natural instinct is not capable of governing man's conduct so as to enable him to attain its object, i. e., self-preservation. Moreover, in the debased state in which humanity unhappily exists since the fall of Adam and Eve, this natural instinct is perverted and tends away from, rather than towards, man's true end; in fact it has degenerated into inordinate selfishness, which, in the words of St. Thomas, is "the cause of all sin,"² because it leads to covetousness, pride, blasphemy, disobedience, ingratitude, incontinency, and many other vices.³

² Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 4: "Inordinatus amor sui est causa omnis peccati."

³ Cfr. 2 Tim. III, 1-3. —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XIV, c. 28: "Two loves have made two cities: love of self extending even to contempt of God made the earthly city, but love of God extending even to contempt of self made the heavenly city. The former glories in itself, but the latter in the Lord. For the former seeks glory from men; but for the latter God, the witness of conscience, is its greatest glory." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 436).

Although the moral virtue of self-love derives its rule from the law of God, yet it is based upon or rooted in an instinct of nature.

Christian self-love, therefore, is a virtue opposed to selfishness and necessarily involves self-denial. "If any man come to me," says our Divine Saviour, "and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."⁴ And again: "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world, keepeth it unto life eternal."⁵

⁴ Luke XIV, 26.

⁵ John XII, 25.

To love oneself, therefore, in the Christian and Catholic sense of the term, means to combat selfishness and to seek the glory of God rather than one's own gratification.

Two corollaries flow from this proposition, namely:

a) Man is not his own master, but has control over his actions only in so far as he does not violate the divine order; b) He is in duty bound to regulate his conduct so as to be enabled to reach his divinely appointed end (bonum), and hence must avoid whatever is opposed to that end (malum).

2. THE DUTIES ARISING FROM CHRISTIAN SELF-LOVE.—The principal duty that springs from Christian self-love is that of preserving one's intellectual and moral personality. This means that every man must provide properly for the salvation of his soul and the welfare of his body. The moral and religious life knows no standstill, and hence every Catholic is in duty bound so to exert his mental and physical faculties as to reach what St. Paul calls "the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ,"⁶ and thus, by developing his personality, to achieve both his temporal and eternal destiny.

⁶ Eph. IV, 13.—Cfr. St. Jerome, Epist., 54 (al. 10), n. 6: “Seize the opportunity, I beg you, and make a virtue of necessity. In Christians beginnings are not sought, but the end. Paul began badly but ended well. The beginnings of Judas are praised, but his end is condemned by betrayal. Read Ezekiel: The justice of the just man shall not deliver him on whatever day he sins; and the impiety of the impious man shall not harm him on whatever day he turns from his impiety.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 552).—IDEM, In Epist. ad Gal., II, c. 4: "Blessed is he who walks in the way of the virtues, but only if he reaches the virtues themselves. Nor does it profit to have withdrawn from vices unless you lay hold of the best things, because in good pursuits it is not so much the beginnings that are to be praised as the end." (P. L., XXVI, 381).

This constant striving after perfection is a duty which none may shirk and which, in importance and binding force, surpasses even the obligations we owe to our fellowmen. "For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul?"⁷

⁷ Matt. XVI, 26. —Cfr. A. Lehmkuhl, S. J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 376.

"To govern oneself," says Seneca, "is to exercise the highest dominion."⁸

⁸ Epist., 113, 30: "Imperare sibi maximum imperium est."

The virtue of Christian self-love inspires true self-respect because it is based on self-knowledge, humility, and a sincere desire to save one's soul and keep the body efficient for the attainment of its highest purpose by practicing temperance, diligence, and economy.

Opposed to self-love are, on the one hand, exaggerated self-esteem, selfishness, and egotism, which are destructive of charity, and, on the other, disregard for the dignity of human nature, indifference to spiritual things, and particularly that unnatural hatred of self which results from a wicked life and is almost invariably coupled with contempt for virtue, nay for God Himself, finally culminating in that terrible sin which in a previous volume has been described as "diabolical."⁹

⁹ Koch-Preuss, Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. II, pp. 91 sqq.

"He that loveth iniquity hateth his own soul," says the Psalmist;¹⁰ and the angel told Tobias: “They that commit sin and iniquity are enemies to their own soul."¹¹

¹⁰ Ps. X, 6.

¹¹ Tob. XII, 10.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 72 sqq., Innsbruck 1914.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. II, n. 29-47, Freiburg 1900. —Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th edition, pp. 400 sqq., Freiburg 1910.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 46 sqq., Freiburg 1904.—E. Müller, Theologia Moralis, 7th ed., Vol. II, pp. 86 sqq., Vienna 1894.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 1 sqq., Paderborn 1909.

1. NATURE OF FAITH.—Faith (fides divina) is a divinely infused virtue by which a man firmly believes whatever God has revealed and the Church proposes on His authority.

Faith, therefore, has a twofold object, the one material, the other formal. Its material object (obiectum materiale) are the truths revealed by God; its formal object (obiectum formale) or motive is God’s infinite veracity, which, perceived by the human intellect with moral certitude, produces a deep conviction of the divine authority and a satisfying realization of the content of Revelation.¹

¹ Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. 3: “This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe to be true the things revealed by Him, not because of the intrinsic truth of the things perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself who reveals, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. . . . Moreover, all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal teaching authority, as divinely revealed and to be believed.”—Cfr. can. 2, De Fide: “If anyone shall say that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral matters and that, consequently, for divine faith it is not required that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of God who reveals, let him be anathema.”—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Spiritu et Litera, c. 31 sq. (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 235).—J. Nienhaus, De Actu Fidei Divinae, Münster 1891, pp. 26 sqq.—St. Lederer, Der Glaube als freie Heilserkenntnis, Rodalben 1891.

Faith is elicited conjointly by the intellect and the will, and therefore involves complete subjection of all man’s spiritual faculties to the authority of God. It is a free and therefore a moral act.²

² Cfr. 2 Cor. X, 5; 1 John V, 9.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 3: “We are bound to render by faith the full submission of intellect and will to God who reveals.”—Cfr. Sess. III, can. 5, De Fide.—Cfr. St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioannem, XXVI, n. 2: “Anyone can enter a church unwilling, can approach the altar unwilling, can receive the sacrament unwilling: he cannot believe unless willing.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1607).—IDEM, De Praedest. Sanct., c. 2, n. 5: “To believe is nothing other than to think with assent.” (P. L., XLIV, 963).—Cfr. Saint Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 1.—G. Schmitt, Vernunft und Wille in ihrer Beziehung zum Glaubensakt, Augsburg 1903, pp. 51 sqq.—K. Ziesché, Verstand und Wille beim Glaubensakt, Paderborn 1909.—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Theologische Zeitfragen, 4th series, Freiburg 1908, pp. 12 sqq., 139 sqq.—F. Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 9th ed. (by E. Müller), pp. 3 sqq., 152 sqq.

Faith is opposed to sight (videre), to opinion (opinari), and to knowledge (intellegere). Sight is immediate vision; opinion is inclining to one side in preference to the other, but without certainty; knowledge is based upon perception. By faith we accept as certain the truths which God has revealed, though we have no knowledge of, and perhaps do not understand them.³ “What we know,” says St. Augustine, “we owe to reason; what we believe, we owe to authority; what we hold merely as a matter of opinion, we owe to error.”⁴

³ Cfr. Matt. XI, 25; XVI, 16 sq.; John VI, 70; XX, 29; 2 Cor. V, 7; Heb. XI, 1.

⁴ De Util. Credendi, c. 11, n. 25: “What we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority; what we opine, to error.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 83).—V. Cathrein, S.J., Glauben und Wissen, Freiburg 1903.—Cat. Rom., P. I, c. 2, qu. 2: “The word ‘believing’ in this place does not signify thinking, supposing, or holding an opinion, but, as the sacred writings teach, it has the force of most certain assent, by which the mind firmly and steadfastly assents to God revealing His mysteries. Therefore, he believes—as pertains to the explanation of this passage—to whom something is certain and persuasive without any hesitation.”—J. P. Gury, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, Lyons and Paris 1850, n. 176: “Faith in general is assent because of the authority of the one speaking. More precisely for our purpose, faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is defined as a supernatural, infused habit inclining the intellect firmly to assent to truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church because of the authority of God who reveals. But insofar as it is an act, it is called the most firm assent given to things revealed by God because of the authority of God who reveals.”

The material object of faith consists partly of natural truths (such as the reality of sense perception and the objectivity of the outside world, the data of nature, historical facts, etc.) and partly of truths belonging to the supernatural order. Hence there is a distinction between natural or human faith (fides humana) on the one hand, and supernatural faith (fides divina) on the other.

By the formal object of faith we understand the motive or reason that induces a man to believe. This motive is authority.

Authority is either natural or supernatural. Natural authority may be external or internal. External authority consists in the testimony of others, and the belief it produces is known as fides historica.

Internal authority is based on reasons or arguments existing in the mind of the believer, and the faith produced by it is called philosophical (fides philosophica).

Theological faith (fides theologica), in the strict sense, rests upon supernatural or divine authority.

It follows that fides divina and fides theologica are not synonymous terms. The former has reference to the substance, the latter to the form. Theological faith is always fides divina, because whatever God reveals is supernatural in substance, referring to Himself, or to His relation towards men, or to their relation towards him.⁵ But fides divina is not necessarily always fides theologica because there is a kind of religious faith that is based solely on reason.

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 1, art. 1: “If we consider materially the things to which faith assents, there is not only God Himself but also many other things; these, however, do not fall under the assent of faith except insofar as they have some relation to God, namely, insofar as through certain effects of the divinity man is aided in tending toward the enjoyment of God.”

Fides divina et catholica is the term by which Catholic theologians designate belief in the truths revealed by God and proposed for belief by the Catholic Church.⁶

⁶ Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, cap. 3, v. supra, note 1.

To believe is not to take something for granted blindly, but to accept it as true on the authority of another. A child believes his parents, i. e., accepts as true what they say, because he is convinced that they know the truth and wish to communicate it to him. Similarly, to believe God means to accept as true what He has revealed because He knows the truth and is incapable of deception.

In order to be able to believe rationally, therefore, man must first be certain that God has spoken, and, by implication, that there is a God, who is infinitely wise and truthful.⁷

⁷ Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI, n. 21 (Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 11th ed., by Cl. Bannwart, S.J., Freiburg 1908, n. 1171): “A supernatural assent of faith useful for salvation is compatible with merely probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with fear by which one fears that God may not have spoken.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1038).

Dr. Schell justly expressed surprise at the conduct of those who seek to spread the notion that the religious world-view of savants and scientists is founded upon positive knowledge rather than faith, whereas ordinary Christians and theologians depend upon authority and more or less arbitrarily construed systems. Surely no one believes that the followers of Kant, Hegel, Comte, James, etc., have accepted the systems of their respective masters as the result of independent study and research. Authority is authority, whether it be acknowledged or not, whether it be surrounded by the aureole of sainthood or the glamor of worldly renown, whether it be exercised by a prophet or a philosopher, by a pagan or an Apostle. How few even among the highly educated would have any elaborate world-view of their own if it could be obtained only by personal effort and had to be based entirely on internal reasons, to the exclusion of authority!⁸

⁸ H. Schell, Die göttliche Wahrheit des Christentums, Vol. I, Paderborn 1895, Preface, p. xii; IDEM, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1902, pp. 214 sqq.

2. NECESSITY OF FAITH.—Faith is absolutely necessary to salvation. This necessity is based upon two grounds: first, the positive law of God, and, secondly, the part this virtue plays in the process of justification.

The teaching of Scripture on this point is unmistakable. Mark XVI, 16: “He that believeth not shall be condemned.” John III, 18: “He that doth not believe is already judged.” Heb. XI, 6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” 1 John III, 23: “And this is his commandment, that we should believe in the name of his Son, Jesus Christ.”

Faith is the first, and an absolutely necessary, requirement for every adult man who wishes to enter into vital relationship with God and the divinely appointed order of salvation. In the words of the Tridentine Council, faith is “the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God;” in fine, it is the basis of the whole supernatural life, the beginning and the foundation of all man’s duties to God, of every act of divine worship, internal as well as external.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 8 (cfr. also c. 6).—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 97, 392.

It follows as a necessary corollary that formal unbelief entails the loss of salvation and, therefore, if persisted in, spells eternal damnation.

The value and importance of religious faith may be deduced from the two scriptural truths that faith will gain “the victory which overcometh the world”¹⁰ and that “the end of faith is the salvation of souls.”¹¹

¹⁰ 1 John V, 4; cfr. Eph. VI, 16.

¹¹ 1 Pet. I, 9; Prov. XVII, 6 (Sept.): “The whole world of possessions belongs to the believer, but not even an obol belongs to the unbeliever.”—St. Jerome, Epist., LIII (al. CIII), n. 10: “For the believer the whole world is riches. But the unbeliever lacks even an obol.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 549).

It is not by knowledge but by faith that man is saved. Without underrating the claims of science and philosophy we may say that neither can accomplish what faith has accomplished for the civilization of mankind, and that neither will ever be able to supplant religious belief. It is as true to-day as it was at the time of Clement of Alexandria, that “the wisdom of Christians is to believe in Christ.”¹²

¹² Stromata, II, c. 2; cfr. II, c. 4: “Faith is more sovereign than knowledge and is its criterion.” (Migne, P. G., VIII, 948 A).

The paramount importance of religious faith may easily cause us to overlook the extent to which we live by faith even in worldly matters and the narrowness of the limits that surround the intellectual possessions we have acquired by study, research, and investigation. The historian has faith in his sources; the judge accepts the statements of witnesses; the ruler trusts his officials and advisers; the physician is helpless unless he has the confidence of his patient. The simplest acts of every-day life become difficult, if not impossible, when doubt has sapped faith. Who could prove to me that the waiter who brings me my breakfast is not intent on poisoning me, that the barber who applies his razor to my throat is not a bloodthirsty anarchist, that the engineer of the train on which I travel is not a dangerous lunatic?¹³

¹³ Cfr. J. Mausbach, Einige Kernfragen christlicher Welt- und Lebensanschauung, 7th ed., p. 17.

READINGS.—Peter Lombard, Sent., I, dist. 23–25 (Migne, P. L., CXXII, 805).—St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 23 sqq. (Opera Omnia, III, 469).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 1 sqq.—F. Suarez, De Fide Theol., disp. 1 sqq. (Opera Omnia, XII, 8 sqq., 334 sqq.).—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmat., Vol. VIII, 2nd ed., pp. 49 sqq.—S. Schiffini, S.J., Tract. de Virtutibus Infusis, pp. 17 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 4 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 346 sqq., 354 sqq.—G. Lahousse, Tract. de Virtutibus Theologicis, Bruges 1900.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 100 sqq., 274 sqq.—J. Kirschkamp, Der Geist des Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe, Paderborn 1895.—V. McNabb, O.P., Oxford Conferences on Faith, London 1905.—H. Pope, O.P., art. “Faith” in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 755 sqq. (with an extensive bibliography).—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 71 sqq.—C. Martin, De Necessitate Credendi, Paderborn 1906.—P. P. McKenna, O.P., The Theology of Faith, Dublin 1914.

1. We are obliged to believe whatever God has revealed and the Church proposes to us in matters of faith and morals.

Usefulness. The treatise on Faith, which is the solemn beginning of dogmatic theology, also vindicates for itself no slight moment in moral theology.

For the virtue without which it is impossible to please God ¹ founds the whole Christian life; and while we are instructed concerning its excellence and merit, we have matter from which to arouse or foster spiritual fervor; while it discerns the varied necessity by which revealed things are to be explicitly believed or professed, it supplies us with norms useful in administering the sacraments, especially baptism. Nor are difficult cases lacking to be examined and solved concerning the positive duties of faith. Today also, in so great a disturbance of errors, it is of very great importance that we know how rightly to weigh the guilt of heresy and infidelity, and accurately discern what, in their intercourse with those who err, can be permitted to Catholics and what must be prohibited.

Order of speaking. - After the notion and excellence of Faith have been set forth, we shall treat, in distinct titles, of the duty of believing; of the duty of professing Faith; of infidelity and of sins opposed to Faith; finally of the legal safeguards of Faith.

¹ Heb. 11, 6.

— Faith is a theological virtue by which man is able to believe, as he ought, on account of the authority of God revealing, those things which God has revealed.

The act of faith denotes assent to the first truth; by which assent the believer participates in divine truth. This assent is formally in the intellect. Considering its formal object, which is the authority of testimony, and because the evidence of the primary object, which is God, is lacking, this assent is free; and hence it is commanded by the will under the aspect of good. But we believe as we ought, insofar as no created reason, but the divine knowledge and veracity itself in speaking, constitutes the sole motive of assent; and insofar as the firmness of this assent surpasses the firmness of natural evidence. This greater firmness is to be derived from the benefit of grace alone.

Insofar as we are illuminated by the very light of the divine intellect, faith is our immense dignity; insofar as we take the intellect captive unto the obedience of faith, that is, renounce our own criterion in order to apply the divine criterion, faith is glorious to God; insofar as we furnish this from the command of a free will, faith is greatly meritorious in the just man. Cf. concerning these points the dogmatic treatise on faith.

— The act of faith is distinguished: a) formal and quasi-virtual. It is formal when the motive of faith (the authority of God revealing) explicitly occurs to the mind. But the habitual persuasion which frequent exercise of faith leaves after itself can pass into act without express memory of the motive of faith. Then an assent is made which truly rests upon that motive, and hence is an act of faith; but because the motive of faith has not been explicitly proposed, this implicit assent is improperly called a virtual act of faith. Properly, on the part of the formal object, the act of faith cannot be virtually contained in any other act: in no act of a theological virtue, for hope and charity presuppose faith; in no other act of a moral virtue, for this is of an inferior order. But on the part of the material object, properly virtual faith is had. Thus, by believing whatever things God has revealed, a man virtually believes the individual truths which have come to us by God's speaking.

b) Internal, or contained in the judgment of the mind alone, and external. The latter, made before witnesses, is at the same time a profession of faith, either formal or virtual, according as one directly testifies to his faith, or performs acts which demonstrate faith: as when someone confesses his sins, approaches the sacred table, or devoutly assists at Mass.

Excellence and usefulness of faith. Faith is the beginning and root of all justification. The act of faith is our first free response full of our vocation to the supernatural end. This vocation looks to this, that we will to be wayfarers, making our way toward possessing God in Himself. If we direct our steps to this most sublime goal, we are freed from servitude to present things, and, elevated above earthly things, we begin in some way to understand the mysterious order of this world, mixed with miseries and evils, and we hold the principle of victory over evil desires, and of consolation in any adverse things whatever. At the same time we are impelled to act worthily of so great an end, so that a manner of acting not only honorable but strong, noble, magnanimous, becomes connatural to us. Wherefore not undeservedly does the Apostle (Heb. XI) not hesitate to turn all things gloriously done to the praise of faith. And thus it happens that human life, turned from perishing into immortal, from low into divine, becomes most useful not less to universal human society than to one's own eternal salvation.

Aids for faith to be acquired, preserved, and increased by us. For heavenly gifts, such as Faith is, we can dispose ourselves negatively, by removing obstacles, and, by the facility of acquired habits, can as it were complete and strengthen the infused virtues themselves. But positively we cannot dispose ourselves for Faith without the prevenient and assisting grace of God. Since, however, as is explained at length in the school of dogma, the assent of Faith, most firm above every other assent, pertains elicitively to the intellect and requires the command of the will, for acquiring, preserving, and increasing Faith, the dispositions of the will must be cared for by us no less than those of the intellect.

Therefore let us strive to have a sound mind, alien from cavils, not excessively hesitating, capable of firm judgment or opinion; a will truly loving and zealous for the good, humble, devoted to God. Let that will apply the intellect to the luminous rather than to the obscure aspects of religion, to the direct motives for adhering, more than to solving difficulties. Let us practically cultivate the spirit of faith in our whole conduct, so that according to the norms of faith we may judge, feel, speak, and act. Let us act as if we already possessed great faith. In this way, since the true and the good are one, already by the very experience of good works we shall in a manner prove the truth of our faith.

— I. Faith is defined: a theological virtue by which a man is habitually capable of believing, as he ought, on account of the authority of God revealing, those things which God has revealed.

The assent of Faith, although it is formally in the intellect, is nevertheless free, so that it is commanded by the will, under the aspect of good; it rests upon the divine knowledge and veracity alone in speaking; and, by the benefit of grace, it has a firmness proportioned to the motive, which surpasses the firmness of our natural evidence.

Faith is necessary for man in the present state, honorable to the believer, glorious to God, very meritorious for the just man.

II. The act of faith is distinguished: 1. Formal and virtual. On the part of the material object, we formally believe truths of faith which explicitly occur to the mind; but virtually, truths which are contained in a more general assent: as when we believe whatever the Church proposes to us as to be believed. On the part of the formal object, the act of faith is properly contained, or can be contained, in no other act. Yet because habitual persuasion can pass into act without explicit memory of the motive, there is distinguished formal faith, which exists when we explicitly remember the motive of faith, and quasi-virtual faith, which is that of one adhering to revealed truth without an explicit proposal of the motive of faith;

2. Internal and external: internal is contained in the judgment of the mind alone; external is contained also in external signification. The external, when it is made before witnesses, is at the same time a profession of faith, whether formal, when one expressly affirms his faith, or virtual, when he does those things which per se suppose and demonstrate faith.

III. The excellence and usefulness of Faith is made manifest from this, that from it has its beginning the divine direction of our life, by which, freed from earthly servitudes and made superior to every misfortune, we are rendered ready for doing honorable and magnanimous things.

For faith to be more easily acquired, preserved, and increased by us from the grace of God, obstacles are removed by a mind sound, right, firm; by a will zealous for the good, humble and devoted to God; by attention to the positive motives of credibility; by the custom of acting according to the principles of faith.

What things are to be believed; when they are actually to be believed: these two matters come to be explained in order.

— By the will of not believing with supernatural faith even those things whose revelation has been sufficiently proposed, there is constituted a sin directly contrary to faith, necessarily grave, by which the sinner is despoiled of the habit itself of faith.

But several other sins, of various gravity, can be committed against faith.

1. Sin is committed by omission of the profession of faith prescribed by divine or ecclesiastical law; - by omission of an act of faith to be elicited from divine law; - by omission of diligence in acquiring a relatively sufficient knowledge of faith; - by omission of diligence in seeking the true religion.

These sins, grave in their own genus, can be excused from mortal sin not only by error of conscience, but also by smallness of matter.

Sin is committed by external denial of faith or shame concerning it. Denial is grave in its whole genus; not so shame.

Sin is committed by rashness or imprudence by which faith is exposed to danger.

— You ask in what way he sins who rejects definitions concerning truths not revealed, or defends propositions noted below heresy?

1. From dogmatic theology we know that the infallibility of the Church extends to truths which, although they are not contained in the deposit of faith, are nevertheless so connected with the same that without them that deposit would not be safe. Although these cannot be believed by divine faith, nevertheless the virtue of divine faith renders obedience, even internal obedience, necessary to definitions of this kind. That obedience is called religious-Catholic. The motive of assent is infallible authority, constituted by God, to which we are all subject. Some use the words ecclesiastical faith.

Therefore, he who knowingly rejects an infallible declaration sins gravely by a sin of disobedience or rebellion toward the Church: which sin is opposed to the very virtue of faith, since our very subjection is prescribed for safeguarding faith. Cf. Palmieri, Op. theol., t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 106.

2. A proposition condemned as scandalous, savoring of heresy or error, offensive to pious ears, is not necessarily false. Then directly only the enunciation of the thesis is proscribed. Wherefore he who professes it sins against religion, while he refuses obedience to the religious power: which obedience is necessary from religion; he sins against charity, insofar as he is a scandal to others, or weakens the unity of the Church; finally he sins against the virtue which that proposition directly harms. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 418.

3. Even if the condemnation has proceeded from a non-infallible authority, for example, from a Sacred Roman Congregation, besides the external disobedience against religion which is committed by defending and professing the proscribed theses, for the most part sin is also committed by rashness through internal dissent, except in some rare case where assent can prudently be suspended until infallible authority has pronounced on the matter. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 419, and the things said I, 317. - Suarez, De Fide, d. 19, and Lugo, De Fide, d. 20, n. 133, treat of this question.

N. B. The Code, c. 2317, strikes with grave penalties, but ferendae sententiae, those who pertinaciously, whether publicly or privately, teach or defend doctrine condemned by the Apostolic See (that is, by the Roman Pontiff or by a Sacred Roman Congregation; cf. c. 7) or by a General Council, but not as formally heretical; and c. 2331 § 1 likewise says that he is to be punished with suitable penalties who pertinaciously does not obey the Roman Pontiff or his own Ordinary when they legitimately prescribe or prohibit something.

2. What the individual notes signify is proposed in dogmatic theology. Lehmkuhl, I, 116, sets forth the matter in summary this way: "Erroneous is opposed to a thesis theologically certain, or to one which, by means of another truth (naturally certain), certainly follows from revealed doctrine." He who sustains it is suspected of heresy and is presumed a heretic.

Near to heresy is that which is not only erroneous, but is also opposed to a thesis which is called next to faith, because it is held as revealed by many, yet not by all.

"Near to error is opposed to that which is gathered most probably from revealed doctrine."

Rash is opposed to the common doctrine of theologians, which is deserted without solid reasons and therefore rashly.

— You ask concerning the sin of him who adheres to liberalism.

1. Even setting aside extreme liberalism, which in reality is the same as pantheism or rationalism, objectively he is a heretic who either fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, even that which they call milder, or holds its chief heads: for example, the full independence, in Christian society, of the State from the Church and the subjection of the Church under the authority of the State. For this is altogether repugnant to the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and to the magisterium of the Church here on earth: both of which are dogmas of faith. Cf. Palmieri, Op. theol., t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 107.

2. He who holds only the secondary heads of liberalism will be objectively a heretic or not according to the quality of his error. Thus he will be a heretic who denies that the doctrine concerning the sacrament of matrimony is to be held by faith (cf. propositions 65, 66, 68, 73 of the Syllabus); he will not yet be a heretic if he absolutely defends the present opportuneness of the "modern" liberties against proposition 77 of the Syllabus. In doubt, what is minimum is to be held. Yet he sins against faith, because for the most part he will defend a doctrine reprobated by the infallible magisterium.

3. Subjectively, not rarely, because of ignorance, even though often gravely culpable, the liberal will be excused from formal heresy. In certain points, for example in relations between the Church and the State, he can more easily be in good faith.

4. The confessor, from the subjective state, will judge concerning the guilt and concerning the censure of the penitent. If he has detected good faith in a man who otherwise satisfies the duties of Christian life, the quality of the error under which he labors, the greater or lesser scandal which he has given, the hoped-for fruit and the harm to be feared from the error being denounced will teach him the prudent norm of questioning and admonishing. Cf. Palmieri, l. c. n. 103-108. Cf. the encyclical Libertas of Leo XIII, 20 June 1888.

— A similar question which can be raised concerning socialism is to be solved in almost the same way. There is a certain integral socialism, which sends religion away to private life, rejects authority, and repudiates marriage for free love: and this cannot be defended without heresy.

But restricted to external temporal goods and their possessions, it puts forth some tenets which are certainly condemned by the infallible magisterium of the Church, as if you should deny that external things which are a source of revenues can be justly possessed. But other tenets, by which, the previous order not being reprobated, a new order, a new regime of goods is proclaimed, are to be examined more cautiously. For besides rash and to-be-rejected points, they easily contain points which can either be disputed or even usefully introduced by a legitimate way.

The very coerced adherence of many workers to socialistic societies will move us so that in confession we act prudently, lest we sin either by scandalous connivance or by destructive severity. The instructions of the Ordinaries of places must also be diligently attended to.

— Besides contrary infidelity, which is committed by a will excluding faith, sin can be committed: a) by various omissions of the profession of faith, of acts of faith, of diligence in the knowledge of faith, in seeking the true faith: which sins are grave in their own genus; b) then by denial (always grave) of faith, by shame concerning faith; c) by rashness and imprudence in reading to be done, in frequenting companions by whom faith is exposed to danger.

To the virtue itself of faith is opposed the grave sin of disobedience committed by him who knowingly rejects infallible declarations, even outside faith strictly so called; for the most part he also sins by rashness who internally dissents from doctrinal decrees of a Sacred Roman Congregation, besides the sin of external disobedience, which also is dangerous to faith. He who violates decrees by which the propositions themselves or at least their enunciations are condemned sins variously, but not necessarily against faith.

One adhering to liberalism, even if he is not always objectively a heretic, is convicted of sinning against faith. Yet a prudent confessor will consider the subjective persuasion and all the circumstances, so that from them he may gather the manner of questioning and admonishing.

In almost the same way the question concerning socialism is to be solved theoretically and practically.

General View. — Faith, a precious gift descending from the Father of lights, which the faithful carry in earthen vessels, the Church must fortify with safeguards, and she does not omit to do so.

Already for this end the profession of Faith, the abjuration of modern errors, is prescribed to many, so that rectors and leaders may not be devastators but upright and secure leaders and teachers of the faithful.

Then the laws concerning the censorship and prohibition of books admonish the faithful which writings they may approach safely and with an unoffending foot; which other writings are in no way, or only very cautiously, to be taken up. These laws are explained III, n. 889-906.

To this also pertains the proscription of propositions.

Then by the medicinal penalties themselves of censures, the faithful are taught to guard themselves from heresy and heretics, besides vindictive penalties which, as denounced, restrain heretical audacities.

Finally faith is protected by prohibitions which regard communication with unbelievers and non-Catholics, or disputations with heretics and exhibitions of religions.

Since the other things have already been declared, we must briefly discuss both of the latter arguments.

Utility. - From this treatise the moral theologian chiefly has to gather arguments for raising and increasing the souls of the faithful by perpetual hope and confidence, and criteria by which true despair and presumption contrary to the theological virtue are distinguished from other sins of the same name.

The order of speaking will be this: first we shall explain the notion, necessity, and use of hope; then briefly the sins against hope.

I. Notion. — Hope is a theological virtue by which, relying on the goodness, omnipotence, and fidelity of God in His promises, we are raised in soul to a certain expectation of beatitude and consequently of the means which are necessary for obtaining it. Hope formally consists in that elevation of soul and firm expectation. But we do not hope except for what we have known as desirable and possible of attainment, although difficult. Wherefore hope is said to be of a future, arduous, possible good (St. Thomas, Q. De Spe, art. 1). The infinite perfection of God, by which He Himself supremely befits the creature, declares that He is supremely concupiscible. At the same time, however, He is in Himself altogether inaccessible to us, so that hope of possessing God must rest in no way upon our own powers or actions, but wholly upon divine assistance. Therefore the formal object of hope, or the motive on which it rests, is the Omnipotence of God, His Supreme relative Goodness, and His fidelity in promises. But our merits, if we are adults, are a condition appended to the attainment of the thing hoped for. Moreover, he hopes more perfectly who, in the state of grace, actually has merits than he who only proposes to acquire future ones (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 65, art. 4). Eternal beatitude, or God beatifying, is the primary material object of hope; the means or necessary aids are its secondary material object. That beatitude directly terminates hope as it is objective, or God to be possessed in Himself; yet at the same time, in oblique, the subjective happiness of His possession is intended.

But God is not desired by the one hoping as a means of enjoying another good, but as the very good which the one hoping desires to enjoy; and love of God as relatively good by no means excludes the love by which we love God for His own sake; just as the divine amiability as to us by no means removes, but presupposes, the infinite amiability of God in Himself and for His own sake.

Hope presupposes faith: what we hope and why we hope must suitably be apprehended; theologically I cannot expect what theologically I do not know. It is begun in a theological affection or love of its primary object, or of God, insofar as He is discerned by the light of faith and is believed to be our supreme good, infinitely to be sought. Hope formally gives us a true ambition, proportioned to the thing, for this good. Insofar as we raise ourselves to attaining so arduous a good, hope is an outstanding magnanimity of the Christian; insofar as we dare this, relying on the divine promise and trusting in God, hope is glorious to God; insofar as by free will we cooperate with the inviting grace of God, hope is of the greatest merit for us.

Through hope we participate in the immutable will by which God loves and wills His beatitude; indeed it confers upon us a certain anticipated possession of so great a beatitude; in which sense Paul called us "rejoicing in hope" (Rom. 12, 12). On the part of God, the attainment of the hoped-for good is certain: hence the firmness of hope; on our part, it can fail per accidens: hence the fear and trembling with which, from the Apostle (Phil. 2, 12), our salvation is to be worked out by us.

Confidence itself is "hope strengthened from some firm opinion"; it is a certain mode and perfection of hope (2, 2, q. 129, art. 6, ad 3).

The various things which are controverted concerning the material and formal object of hope we leave to dogmatic lectures.

II. Necessity of Hope. — Without hope there can be no charity, since it is repugnant to our nature that we love what in no way is our good. Therefore both the habit of hope is an essential part of justification for every man, and the act of hope has, in an adult, necessity both of means and of precept.

This precept obliges per se, or from the virtue of hope: 1. At the beginning of moral life, as a part of voluntary conversion to God, our end (thus St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 89, art. 6; but cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 122); - 2. For recovering the habit of hope which has been lost through an act of despair or one repugnant to hope; - 3. For overcoming a temptation of despair, if it is a necessary means; - 4. As many wish, around the end of life, when a conscious man, by an almost necessary inclination, will aspire to heaven, unless he contemns heaven; - 5. Sometimes in life. How often? This cannot be defined. But in fulfilling the duties of Christian life, acts sufficient in number will not be lacking. Cf. the things said concerning faith.

The same precept of hope obliges by accident: 1. As often as acts are imposed which contain a virtual use of hope: prayer, penance, charity; - 2. When a tempted man is in proximate danger of consent, unless he raises his soul by hope: if, however, he is conscious of this connection.

— Detractors of the Catholic faith preach a gratuitous love of virtue, and deny the true moral honesty of an action which is commanded by fear of hell or hope of eternal reward. In this attack of theirs, first, they are shamefully deceived concerning the true nature of hope and fear. They entirely pass over the theological essence of hope; they hold as vulgar cupidity the sublime participation of anticipated divine beatitude; the desired good or reward they thrust down to a certain supreme but vulgar delight, while there is question of the very intrinsic and supernatural perfection of man; they suppose the affection to be human, while it is a communication of that most holy love by which God loves His own beatitude. Then they are ignorant, or pretend to be ignorant, that in Catholic doctrine fear servilely servile is not made honorable, but only that fear which excludes affection for sin; nor is hope praised, or indeed able to subsist, with the exclusion of the superior motive which is love. But by their preaching of gratuitous virtue, they sin against human nature, which by an invincible tendency can love nothing unless it is in some way its own good; logically they would have to condemn all social institutions which, in order to restrain the wicked and stimulate the good, promise penalties for delicts and a just reward for good deeds. Wherefore their preaching is shown to be perfectly sterile.

How much more happily that outstanding exhorter of most perfect charity, St. Paul, keeps the eyes of the Christian athlete intent on the heavenly prize, while he inculcates to him faith which works through charity. Hence R. P. Bover, S.I. (La ascetica de S. Pablo, p. 90), commends this formula of action as Pauline: "Faith works through charity on account of hope."

— I. Hope is a theological virtue by which, relying on the goodness, omnipotence, and fidelity of God in His promises, we are raised in soul to a certain expectation of beatitude, and consequently of the means which are required for obtaining it. In that elevation of soul and firm expectation, hope formally consists. The relative assisting Goodness of God, His Omnipotence and Fidelity in promises, constitute its formal object. God beatifying, connoting the beatific vision, is its primary material object, while the secondary consists in the necessary means or aids. Hope presupposes faith and is begun in the theological affection or love of God (imperfect charity). It is at the same time glorious to God, magnanimous and meritorious for us. On the part of God, the attainment of the hoped-for good is certain; on our part, per accidens, it can fail.

Confidence is a certain mode and perfection of hope, insofar as it is hope strengthened from some firm opinion.

II. Since without hope there can be no charity, its habit is an essential part of justification; and its act has, in the adult, necessity of means and of precept.

III. The precept obliges per se and by accident, almost as was said concerning faith, except that the obligation of an act of hope immediately from the use of reason is controverted. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 122.

IV. Since we wish to enjoy God Himself, and the love of God as good to us by no means excludes, but indeed prepares, love of God for His own sake, hope can fall under no reproach. The preachers of gratuitous love of virtue are deceived by ignorance, and sin against human nature.

I. — Hope is violated by despair, by which the will deliberately ceases from the pursuit of beatitude, which it judges to be morally inaccessible to itself or to be neglected: whether it obstinately at least doubts concerning the divine assistance necessary for overcoming difficulties, or concerning divine mercy because of its sins, or whether it esteems too highly the labor to be endured and fastidiously contemns the reward.

Despair is directly opposed to confidence in God, is injurious to Him, and consequently is mortal from its whole genus. Yet often, for example in grave sadness, imperfection of the act will excuse from grave sin.

II. — Not by defect, as despair does, but by evil excess, man sins against hope by presumption.

Presumption, in general, says a certain confidence concerning a matter before it happens or is known to have happened. In a "pejorative" and more recent sense, it is confidence not founded. But insofar as by vain confidence we in some way sustain or inform our moral life, we act inordinately; we sin by imprudence and rashness of various gravity and species according to the quantity and specific quality of the evil to which we are exposed.

Hence presumption against theological hope is to be distinguished from presumption besides that hope: which presumption can also be called vulgar.

By presumption against hope, man strives to obtain supernatural beatitude by his own powers; or he attributes to the assistance of God what does not befit it, when he dares to hope for pardon without penitence, or glory with final perseverance in sin.

The first genus of presumption removes the formal object of hope; the other changes its material object, as if one wished to believe a non-revealed object. Both these genera are mortal from their whole genus. And St. Thomas judges it graver to wish to exercise hope in false objects than to trust in one's own powers rather than in divine assistance.

Beautifully St. Thomas says that despair is graver than presumption, because it befits God according to Himself to give heaven, but to punish only according to our sins (2, 2, q. 21, art. 2, c.).

Sins of presumption properly so called are scarcely ever committed.

— Practically, by the name of presumptions, men accuse evil confidences by which they expect too much from themselves, even with divine graces, and thus approach dangers rashly, or, abusing divine long-suffering, defer penitence, or add sin to sin, because three sins are accused as easily as one, or because God is no less ready to pardon several sins than one sin, etc.

In acts of this kind they in no way think of relying on the divine promise or of exercising theological hope. Wherefore these presumptions are not against hope but besides hope: these men sin by rashness against charity toward themselves, and by ingratitude toward God. According to the nature and gravity of the danger to which they commit themselves, they will sin gravely or venially. The proposition: God pardons three sins just as easily as one sin, certainly of itself is blasphemous, as if God does not care about the number of sins: but little attention is paid to that blasphemy. Observe also that the divine goodness or mercy is not assumed as a motive of sinning, but rather does not then prohibit from sin (Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 436).

A certain genus of presumption is committed, to be estimated from the gravity of the danger or evil, when someone, esteeming his own powers too highly, casts himself into danger of sinning; or when certain things are expected apart from divine ordination: for example, health without the use of medicine. According to the gravity of the danger or evil, the sin will be grave or light (Cf. the things just said).

III. — Despair is contained in the highest degree in a certain hatred of God, which is called hatred of abomination, by which God is displeasing to us as hostile because of the vengeance of sins, so that man no longer places his happiness in God.

But that sin, rather than being formally opposed to hope itself, is opposed to the love of God which some call the love of hope. That love itself is presupposed to the very elevation of soul which is formal hope, and is better referred to charity (certainly imperfect charity).

— It is mortal to hope for or to love more, with love of concupiscence, these earthly things than heavenly things: suppose someone so disposed that he desires to live perpetually in this life, and would leave heaven to God if He would leave earth to him. Yet for the most part these words do not contain that mortal repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good, but express a mere velleity, which signifies a great affection for the present life, or fear of death because of uncertain salvation, or even a defect of living faith and a certain natural hesitation concerning the future life.

— By every sin by which faith itself perishes, hope is concomitantly taken away. Besides, it is lost by despair: whether you contemn the divine good as not desirable, or you no longer trust that that good is accessible to you; and by the two reasons of presumption properly so called (cf. n. 62): these are directly opposed to theological hope.

— You ask in what way he sins who applies his hope to objects which God can in no way give: moral evil, indifferent things as such. If he wishes to appeal to the very motive of theological hope for obtaining these things, by attributing to the divine promise what in no way befits it, he will have sinned against hope itself, as we said, n. 62, by a sin which can in no way be composed with the habit of hope. Cf. 2, 2, q. 21, art. 1, ad 3. But if he merely prayed to God for that thing, appealing to no divine promise, then an object morally evil is to be distinguished from an indifferent one: he will have sinned gravely, not against hope but against religion, who prays God to assist him in moral evil. That sin is to be ascribed to the genus of superstition. Add that it is objectively blasphemous that you suppose God as favoring moral evil. But those do not sin who merely pray that after the evil has been perpetrated they may escape physically unharmed; nor he who in the very act of sin implores the mercy of God. Although it is also inordinate to ask for indifferent things, as such, since God wills and gives all things insofar as they bear an order to our salvation, nevertheless we do not judge this to be grave.

— I. Sin is committed against hope: 1. by despair, by which someone ceases from pursuing beatitude, whether he at least doubts concerning divine assistance, for example, after sins have been committed, or whether he fastidiously rejects the heavenly reward itself: this is despair less properly so called; - 2. by presumption, by which someone would attempt to obtain eternal life either by his own powers, or would attribute to the assistance of God what does not befit it: pardon without penitence, glory with final perseverance in sin. By both despair and presumption, the formal object of hope is removed and hope itself is lost. But this presumption is scarcely committed; despair not rarely is excused from grave sin by the very imperfection of the act.

But by the name of presumptions there usually come several evil confidences which, according to the various degree, conscience, and created danger, can be a grave or light sin.

It would be grave against hope itself deliberately to rely on the motives of hope for asking from God things which God cannot give because of His infinite holiness: moral evil, indifferent things as such; and it is also grave against religion simply to ask God for assistance toward moral evil (it would be another thing toward escaping unharmed).

II. They are accustomed to oppose to hope a certain hatred of God, conceived from the occasion of the justice by which God punishes sins. Yet this sin rather is opposed to imperfect charity which is presupposed to hope itself.

III. Grave would be the repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good; but words by which someone seems to wish that he always spend life in this life rather contain a venial inordination of too great affection for the present life, or too great fear of death, or not sufficiently living faith.

Division of the treatise. - This principal treatise on theological charity admits this natural division: that, after a general view of the virtue, we should treat successively of charity as it is love of God, and of charity as it is love of ourselves and of neighbor.

Utility. - This is of the greatest use to the moral theologian: that, once the notion of the virtue has been perceived, he may be able to persuade the faithful how noble and at the same time how easy the act of charity is.

I. Notion, Sublimity, Scope. — To the new and ineffable communion by which, from our supernatural vocation, we shall be made one with God and neighbor in the immediate beatific possession of God, there corresponds a new virtue, at once operative and unitive, by which we love God and, in God, every neighbor together with ourselves, as, with attention given to the present order, it is fitting to love; just as by hope we intend and expect that beatific possession, as it is fitting to expect so great a good; just as by faith we believe God and believe in God revealing, as is fitting.

Therefore the theological virtue of charity is defined: a supernatural, infused habit, by which we are able to love God, as infinitely good in Himself, with the supreme love of friendship, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. In that definition, the formal object of charity is shown to be the infinite goodness of God in itself, that amiability which God lays open to one contemplating His goodness; a twofold material object is assigned: primary, which is God Himself, infinitely good in Himself; secondary, which is ourselves, together with our neighbor. From God there is made to us and to our neighbor a certain extension or diffusion of love: we love ourselves and our neighbor insofar as we are called to participate in the divine nature. That love is of friendship, insofar as it is of mutual benevolence founded in the communication of divine and eternal beatitude. For this communication, although it is not the motive of charity, is nevertheless a necessary condition so that we may be able to love God with the supreme love of benevolence, and so that that love may be one of friendship. It is at the same time supreme, not only insofar as, in our estimation, God by His goodness infinitely surpasses every created good, but also insofar as, founded in the supernatural knowledge of faith and in the supernatural ardor of hope, that love is given by a virtue which is in some way proportioned to the object: we begin to love God as if we saw Him.

Charity, like every true love, loves, unites, operates. - It loves, but with an affection which imitates the infinite love by which God loves His Goodness and, in this Goodness, whatever outside Himself is lovable: and thus no purer and more sublime affection can be conceived. - It unites us with God and neighbor: through that holy friendship, we arrive at a certain communion of cause and unity with God, which divinizes us; through the same friendship, men are joined among themselves by the most perfect bond: it comes about that the good of individuals becomes the good of all, and thus from every good a universal joy is prepared; it comes about that the evil of individuals becomes the evil of all, and thus a beginning is given to universal beneficence. - It operates, by joining our will with the divine will: and thus it leads us to the summit of perfection; it operates, by stimulating every good action: and thus it becomes most fruitful.

We can offer nothing more glorious to God than that we love Him with perfect love; nothing more meritorious for ourselves than that by the free effort of the will we embrace the divine good in affection and effect; nothing more useful to our neighbor than that we comprehend him with the same love with which we love ourselves and God.

Without charity we merit absolutely nothing: and thus charity is the root of every merit; through charity, by which we are joined to God Himself, our works arrive at God: and thus, insofar as they are meritorious, our works are perfected by charity, which becomes the form of all virtues.

No virtue in us, more than charity, is formally divine. For God, who beholds Himself and is present to Himself, formally neither believes nor hopes. Both faith and hope connote a defect either of vision or of the presence of God; but in formal charity, we come together with God.

Hence charity is an eternal virtue: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor. 13, 8).

No exercise is more commanded than that of charity, to which all precepts are directed as to an end. And at the same time none is more free, since charity by spontaneous motion fulfills all the precepts, so that the law is said not to be placed for it (Cf. 1 Tim. 1, 9).

Nothing is more sublime in affection, nothing more fruitful in effect.

The queen of the virtues, charity uses all the others as subordinate instruments.

And insofar as it reduces the whole world with God to the magnificent unity of one beloved object, charity is the joy, splendor, and perfection of the whole created world.

¹ The relative goodness of God is the condition of the love of benevolence which even in the natural order we would have to foster toward God as servants; goodness advanced as far as communion of blessed life gives place to the filial love of friendship.

Name. — By force of the word itself, charity (Greek agape) is named more nobly than love. For it designates an affection which a) is proper to man here on earth, whereas love (Greek eros) is predicated even of brute animals; b) proceeds more from reason and from a just estimation of the lovable person than from the impulse of passion, whence love arises.

II. Facility. — Yet let us not imagine that sublime exercise of charity to be difficult for ourselves. Entirely impassable for us without the help of God, its use becomes spontaneous for those who have received the spirit of adoption, that is, for those who, actually turned away from grave sin, possess the infused habit of charity. For what is sufficient so that, made sons of God, we may love Him with actual charity? It is sufficient that we not only desire God with concupiscence, but truly love Him, "as a man loves a friend" (2, 2, q. 17, art. 8, c.). But are we not drawn to this love when, immune from the servitude of sin, we consider either the divine benefits, both those which we have received and those which we expect, or the Passion of Christ, to which we refer them as received? Hope itself, says St. Thomas in the same place, introduces charity ¹. And what grace orders us to do, grace itself helps us so that we can do it.

It is also proper to one who loves that he should seek union with his friend. Wherefore the desire of possessing God, unless it is explicitly thrust down to one's own consequent happiness, is practically an act of charity. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 24.

Indeed God, in every order, is so greatly the good of every creature, that according to St. Thomas (1, q. 60, art. 5; 1, 2, q. 109, art. 3; 2, 2, q. 26, art. 3), every creature naturally loves God more than itself. Besides, it cannot love itself more and better than by loving God, on whose goodness every created goodness essentially depends. But in the natural order, love between God and man would not have been a love of friendship, which demands some equality either of nature or of grace, and therefore communication in the same life.

N. B. Several things which are controverted concerning charity we permit to be defined by dogmatic theology. Now we must treat distinctly of each material object of charity: God and neighbor.

¹ For gratitude, although it is formally commanded by benefits received and, under this respect, pertains to love of concupiscence, nevertheless almost of its own accord impels a grateful man, so that in the benefits themselves he loves the very goodness of the giver, which is proper to charity (Cf. Billot, De caritate. De praeceptis caritatis, p. 427).

— I. Theological charity is a supernatural, infused habit by which we are made capable of loving God, as infinitely good in Himself, connaturally with the supreme love of friendship, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. - The formal object of charity is the infinite goodness of God and therefore amiability in itself; its primary material object is God Himself; its secondary object: ourselves together with our neighbor; we love these as actual or potential participants in the divine nature; the condition is the communication of divine and perpetual beatitude; its nature is friendship, founded in this communication, or communion in the same life; its degree is supreme.

II. By the love of charity, imitating the love by which God loves His Goodness and, in This, whatever is lovable, we are made one with God and neighbor; and, the will being joined with the divine will, we work every good. Wherefore nothing is more glorious to God, nothing more meritorious for us, nothing more useful to neighbor than the exercise of charity: without which we merit nothing, and which becomes the form of all virtues. No exercise is more commanded. No virtue is more formally divine and eternal; it is the joy, splendor, and perfection of the created world. - More noble than the name of love is the very name of charity.

III. Nor, for those who are immune from the servitude of sin and have been given the infused habit, does its exercise become difficult. It is sufficient to love God as a man loves a friend. This affection is prepared by the very benefits obtained and hoped for: the goodness of the benefactor is loved in the gifts themselves. Cf. Billot, De caritate, De praeceptis caritatis, p. 427.

Utility. - Two things especially must be attended to by us in this title: in what way the precept of loving God is satisfied, and by what reason servile fear and the desire of beatitude are composed with filial love.

I. The Precept. — The Lord in the Gospel, St. Mark 12, 30, promulgated as the greatest and first commandment the precept of loving God, and that in the words of Deuteronomy 6, 5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, and from thy whole soul, and from thy whole mind, and from thy whole strength." Cf. St. Matthew 22, 37. (Among the Hebrews, the heart signifies intellect and affection.) Those words proclaim to us affective and effective love, the love of the whole man, full in this way, that nothing which disagrees with the love of God is admitted. Cf. the cited writers in Knabenbauer on the alleged places. Therefore in these places a love intensively supreme is not commanded. Such a love is supreme from the subjective force of affection, especially insofar as sensible love concurs with the love of the will: which intensity is most becoming, so far as it is in our power. But only a love of God appreciatively supreme is commanded, or one from the estimation of judgment, so that we place no creature before God and would rather lose all things than God.

Execution of the Precept. — As was said concerning faith, charity, besides its formal act, finds in acts which suppose that affection a quasi-virtual exercise by which the precept of charity can be fulfilled.

Moreover the precept of charity urges per se: at the beginning of moral life, so that by converting ourselves to God we may direct ourselves to Him, our end (cf. nevertheless the things said, n. 58); - if a temptation of hatred of God cannot otherwise be overcome; - as many wish, at the end of life; - frequently in life. How often? Some say once in a year, others once in a month, others on each Sunday and feast. The things said concerning the act of faith and hope return. What son asks how often he must actually demonstrate his affection toward his parents? Neither he himself nor another can define the number. But a good son is content to foster an affection which will most gladly use many occasions of acts; the less good one, however, bears no solicitude about that frequency.

From another virtue, or per accidens, an act of charity will have to be made if reconciliation with God is to be procured, and there is no supply of the sacrament with which attrition would suffice; - if a temptation against a different virtue cannot otherwise be overcome.

He exercises an act of charity implicitly or quasi-virtually who recites the Lord's prayer from the soul, who rejoices over the divine perfections, who wishes that no one offend God, who grieves over offenses inflicted on God by others, who desires that all worship God, who avoids sins because they displease Him, etc. Gury-Ballerini-Palmieri, I, n. 219.

In this matter, the following propositions were condemned by Innocent XI: 5. "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn." - 6. "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not per se oblige even in individual rigorous five-year periods." - 7. "It obliges only when we are bound to be justified, and we do not have another way by which we can be justified" (2 March 1679 - Denz., n. 1155, 1156, 1157). - Earlier, Alexander VII, 21 September 1665 (Denz., n. 1101), had proscribed this: "Man at no time of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity from the force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues." (The propositions were condemned at least as scandalous; the former also as pernicious in practice.)

Therefore the matter practically returns to this: that we exhort the faithful to eliciting frequent acts of charity, to acting in the spirit of love and from the motive of love, and that we gently inculcate acts of charity upon the gravely sick.

Necessity of Charity. — The habit of charity is in reality necessary by necessity of means. The same cannot strictly be said of the act of perfect charity, since the sacrament of penance restores the habit of charity, and, although it demands a quasi-virtual use of faith and hope, it can be received fruitfully without an act of perfect charity.

The Sin of Hatred of God. — It is mortal and the gravest of all sins to pursue God Omnipotent and Most High with formal hatred of enmity or malevolence, as if someone should wish that God not exist, or be deprived of some attribute, for example, knowledge, power, etc.

Fear of Hell and Love of Beatitude. — Certainly the present intention of sinning if hell did not exist would be sinful (servilely servile fear); or of not loving God unless there were the reward of beatitude; but he does not sin who, while he elicits an act of charity, has beatitude itself as the end of the one operating. For God is not therefore loved appreciatively less. Does not every right act, such as hope is, already per se direct itself to God as the supreme end? Does not St. Thomas (on this place) understand concerning theological hope itself the saying from St. Paul: Charity... "hopeth all things" (1 Cor. 13, 7)? Does not St. Paul prove these things more expressly: "Hearing your faith in Christ Jesus, and the love which you have toward all the saints, for the hope which is laid up for you in heaven" (Col. 1, 4.5)?

On the contrary, among the propositions condemned and prohibited by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, as respectively rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic and heretical, there was reprobated the proposition which denied that fear of gehenna is supernatural (prop. 14, Denz. 1305); and by Innocent XII, 12 March 1699, among propositions condemned and reprobated... as rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, pernicious in practice, and also respectively erroneous, propositions which called it vicious to act with regard to beatitude (Denz. 1327, 1331, 1332).

— I. There is a special precept of loving God with full affective and (in disposition) effective love, and therefore appreciatively, not intensively, supreme. The Lord Himself, in the Gospel of St. Mark 12, 30, promulgated it as the first and greatest commandment.

That precept urges per se, according to St. Thomas, at the beginning of moral life, and, as many wish, at the end of life; then, if a temptation of hatred of God cannot otherwise be overcome; then frequently in life: a frequency which cannot be defined theoretically, but which in practice is procured abundantly by a pious man. Per accidens it urges when, the supply of the sacrament of penance being lacking, reconciliation with God is to be procured, or if a temptation against another virtue cannot be overcome in another way.

II. Charity, moreover, besides its formal acts, is exercised quasi-virtually in acts which suppose the affection of charity.

III. The habit of charity is in reality necessary by necessity of means.

IV. The gravest of all sins is the hatred of malevolence by which one would pursue God. Not the very prevision of future sin, but the present intention of sinning if hell did not exist, would be sinful; nor does he sin who, while he elicits an act of charity, has beatitude itself as the end of the one operating.

Utility. - It matters very much that we acquire for ourselves a distinct account of the order of charity, and that we understand well the connatural concord between love of ourselves and love of neighbor.

459. Theological virtues are those which a) have God as their direct object, formal and final, and which b) are infused into us and revealed by God alone.¹³² Moral virtues are occupied with the means to the supernatural end; but theological virtues directly attain God himself, our ultimate end. There are three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, charity. For first it is required that we know God supernaturally, which is done through faith; second, that we tend efficaciously into the same God, which is done through hope; third, that we be intimately joined with him by affection already on this earth, which is done through charity.

¹³² Ib. q. 62, a. 1.

419. "Preambles to law," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 22, a. 1), "are those things without whose existence law cannot have place. But of this kind are the precepts concerning the act of faith and the act of hope: because through the act of faith, the mind of man is inclined so that it recognizes the author of the law as such, to whom it ought to subject itself; but through hope of reward, man is induced to the observance of the precepts." But charity is the very end of the law, according to that saying (1 Tim. 1:5): The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith not feigned. For it moves to observing the whole law, according to that saying (1 John 5:3): For this is the charity of God, that we keep his commandments; and finally all the precepts tend together toward love of God and neighbor, according to that saying of St. Augustine: "Whatever we are prohibited by God's law, and whatever we are commanded to do, we are prohibited and commanded for this, that we may fulfill these two" (tr. 87, toward the end).

Those three preamble virtues are called theological, because they have God himself for their object; the Apostle commemorates them, writing to the Corinthians (13:13): And now there remain faith, hope, charity. Through FAITH we know God, who has revealed and proposed himself to us as the end to be attained; through HOPE we are raised up into him, so that with confidence we expect beatific possession of him; finally through CHARITY we adhere to him, loving him for his own sake, and our neighbors on account of him.

Therefore there will be three treatises:

TREATISE I. On Faith.

TREATISE II. On Hope.

TREATISE III. On Charity.

622. Threefold species of infused habits. - For operating supernaturally, we need three principles:

1. principles by which we are ordered to the supernatural ultimate end itself: these are the theological virtues;

2. principles by which we are ordered concerning the means to the supernatural ultimate end, to be chosen reasonably under the guidance of reason: these are the moral virtues;

3. principles by which we are ordered to following the guidance itself of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life: these are the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Concerning each one there must be treatment.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62; De Virt., q. 1, art. 10 and 12.

623. Theological virtues are operative principles by which we are immediately ordered to God as supernatural end, so that through their acts the soul immediately attains God the supernatural end and is joined to Him. They are rightly called theological:

1. because they have God Himself, the supernatural end, insofar namely as He exceeds the cognition of our reason, both as the material object which is attained by them and as the formal object or motive;

2. and therefore they are infused into us by God alone;

3. and they can be known by revelation alone (a. 1).

624. Thesis. Theological virtues are necessary, and indeed three. - It is proved:

1. By the reason of St. Thomas: In the natural order man would be habitually inclined to the natural end, radically through the soul, immediately through the intellect knowing the end and judging that one must tend to it, and through the will, which from its nature tends to the end or its proper good. But, since man, from the gratuitous goodness of God, is destined to the supernatural end, the beatific vision, it is necessary that supernatural principles be added to nature by which he is habitually inclined to the supernatural end.¹ There is one substantive principle: sanctifying grace, in the very essence of the soul, and three operative principles: faith, by which the intellect attains God, the supernatural end, as true, and is able to know Him and the other supernatural principles; hope, by which the will tends to God the supernatural end as its good but arduous; and charity, by which it is ordered to Him as good in Himself, and thus through love is supernaturally conformed to Him. Therefore there are three theological virtues (a. 3; II-II q. 17, a. 6).

¹ If nature, St. Thomas notes, does not fail in necessary things, much less grace.

2. By Scripture and Tradition, in which these three virtues are constantly enumerated, so that by a peculiar fittingness they must be connected with one another and distinguished from all the others; whence the Apostle, I Cor. XIII, 13: "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greater of these is charity" (cf. I Thess. V, 8; Col. I, 4, 5).

3. By decrees of the Church. For this is supposed by Innocent III (cap. Maiores), saying that it is disputed among the learned whether faith, charity, and the other virtues are infused even into little children; and by Clement V in the Council of Vienne, establishing that this opinion should be preferred as more probable. But the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, teaches it as certain for faith, hope, and charity, although it does not define it.

625. Among the theological virtues there is order:

A) The order of generation, not indeed 1. according to time, for all are infused at the same time, but 2. according to reason, faith precedes, hope follows, finally charity advances: a) according to acts: for no one hopes or loves what he does not know; but the things which he hopes and loves, he knows through faith; - and similarly, man, by hoping for good from God, also considers Him as his own good and proceeds to loving Him; - b) also according to habits, but in order to acts: for faith is presupposed to hope and hope to charity, just as intellect is presupposed to will, and imperfect love precedes perfect love.

B) But in the order of perfection charity precedes, which is the perfection of all virtues (a. 4).

7. If a man has been duly contrite, every exterior Confession is superfluous and useless for him.

10. It is against sacred Scripture that ecclesiastical men should have possessions.

14. It is lawful for any deacon or priest to preach the word of God without the authority of the Apostolic See or of a Catholic Bishop.

16. Temporal lords can, at their own judgment, take temporal goods away from the Church, when those possessing them are habitually delinquent, that is, delinquent by habit, not only actually delinquent.

17. The people can, at their own judgment, correct delinquent lords.

18. Tithes are purely alms, and parishioners, on account of the sins of their prelates, can take them away at their own pleasure.

25. All those are simoniacs who bind themselves to pray for others when those others assist them in temporal things.

43. Oaths are illicit which are made for strengthening human contracts and civil commerce.

16. The immediate division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious; because if a man is vicious and does anything, then he acts viciously; and if he is virtuous and does anything, then he acts virtuously; because just as vice, which is called crime or mortal sin, universally infects the acts of a vicious man, so virtue vivifies all the acts of a virtuous man.

1. Mortal sins, as to guilt and the punishment of the other age, are blotted out by contrition of heart alone, without order to the keys.

2. Confession concerning sins in species was useful to the Church from some statute, not by divine right.

3. Depraved thoughts ought not to be confessed, but are blotted out by displeasure alone, without order to the keys.

4. Confession ought to be secret, that is, concerning secret sins, not manifest sins.

5. Penitents are not to be absolved unless the penance enjoined on them has first been completed.

8. The Pope cannot dispense in the statutes of the universal Church.

Condemned as scandalous and heretical.

4. The imperfect charity of one dying necessarily carries with it great fear, which by itself is enough to make the punishment of purgatory, and impedes entrance into the kingdom.

5. That there are three parts of Penance, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, is not founded in sacred Scripture, nor in the ancient holy Christian doctors.

6. Contrition, which is prepared by discussion, comparison, and detestation of sins, by which one thinks over his years in the bitterness of his soul, pondering the gravity of sins, their multitude, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the acquisition of eternal damnation, this contrition makes a hypocrite, indeed more a sinner.

7. The proverb is most true, and more excellent than every doctrine concerning contritions given up to this point: henceforth not to do it is the highest penance; the best penance is a new life.

8. In no way presume to confess venial sins, nor even all mortal sins, because it is impossible that you should know all mortal sins. Hence the primitive Church confessed only manifest mortal sins.

9. When we wish to confess all things purely, we do nothing else than that we wish to leave nothing to be forgiven by the mercy of God.

10. Sins are not remitted to anyone unless, when the priest remits, he believes that they are remitted to him; indeed the sin would remain unless he believed it remitted; for the remission of sin and the gift of grace do not suffice, but it is also necessary to believe that it has been remitted.

11. In no way trust that you are absolved on account of your contrition, but on account of the word of Christ: Whatever you shall loose, etc. (Matt. XVI.) Hence, I say, trust, if you have obtained the absolution of the priest, and firmly believe yourself absolved, and you will truly be absolved, whatever may be the case concerning contrition.

12. If, by an impossibility, the one confessed were not contrite, or the priest absolved not seriously, but in jest, nevertheless, if he believes himself absolved, he is most truly absolved.

13. In the sacrament of Penance and the remission of guilt, the Pope or a Bishop does no more than the lowest priest; indeed, where there is no priest, any Christian whatever does just as much, even if it were a woman or a boy.

14. No one ought to answer the priest that he is contrite, nor ought the priest to require it.

23. Excommunications are only external punishments, and do not deprive a man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church.

16. It is not true obedience to the law which is done without charity.

20. No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment.

25. All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices.

31. Perfect and sincere charity, which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith not feigned, can be in catechumens as well as in penitents without the remission of sins.

32. That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins.

35. Everything which a sinner, or servant of sin, does is sin.

38. Every love of a rational creature is either vicious cupidity, by which the world is loved, which is prohibited by John, or that laudable charity by which God is loved, diffused in the heart through the Holy Spirit.

39. What is done voluntarily, even if it is done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely.

40. In all his acts the sinner serves the dominating cupidity.

41. That mode of liberty which is from necessity is not found in the Scriptures under the name of liberty, but only the name of liberty from sin.

43. In penitent men before the Sacrament of absolution, and in catechumens before Baptism, there is true justification; yet separated from the remission of sins.

Sins against God are committed directly against the theological virtues and against religion. The theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, are not formally and expressly proposed in the Decalogue, but are presupposed to it as principles to conclusions, the intention of the end to the ordering of means, and the recognition of the legislator to submission to the law. The virtue of religion is proposed in the first three precepts of the Decalogue, namely as to the three duties of fidelity toward God, reverence, and service.

In the following we shall speak:

1. concerning certain sins against divine faith, which in the present supernatural order is necessary for perfect fidelity toward God revealing;

2. concerning certain sins against reverence for God;

3. concerning the sin against the service of God, or concerning the violation of Sunday.

I. Object of the question. - The sin of infidelity is directly opposed to divine faith; in the baptized this is heresy and apostasy. Many things are indirectly opposed, namely whatever constitutes a danger or an occasion of losing or suppressing faith, such as communication with unbelievers and heretics, especially in sacred things, cooperation toward infidelity and heresy, the publication and reading of writings contrary to faith, and opinions dangerous to faith, concerning which in the Treatise on Faith.¹

¹ Cf. Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, nn. 733-780.

In the present matter there is especially treated: concerning liberalism and socialism, which for the most part constitute an indirect danger to faith from which the faithful are to be kept away; concerning heresy, which is a direct obstacle to faith, from which those who have fallen into it are to be converted; concerning doubt in faith, which can be either one or the other. Hence we shall consider penitents of three kinds:

a) those infected with liberalism or socialism, to be admonished or even dismissed,

b) heretics, to be received into the Church and to sacramental confession,

c) those doubting and wavering in the true faith.

II. Of how much importance it is to meet Liberalism and Socialism. - Not rarely does it happen that certain Catholics are imbued with the spirit of liberalism and adhere in some measure to its theories; similarly, to those of socialism. Therefore it is necessary that the confessor know those errors, and be able to bring forth a prudent judgment concerning the stain of liberalism or socialism by which perhaps penitents are infected, and to set before himself the right mode of acting with penitents of this kind.

For the matter is full of dangers. Ordinarily, indeed, someone does not become a complete liberal or socialist immediately from the beginning. He begins to read newspapers or other writings of liberals or socialists; he associates with their societies, perhaps without an evil intention, or gives them his vote in political elections. Nor for this reason does he necessarily become impious or indifferent in the matter of religion; but ordinarily his faith grows cold and religious practice is gradually diminished. In the sons of men of this kind religious indifference is wont to grow; and their sons are still baptized, make first Communion, enter marriage before the Church, and call a priest at the end of life, but besides these things there is almost no practice of religion. In the third generation there will already be complete indifference, or even hostility toward religion, so that in practical life paganism as it were prevails.

Against these dangers priests must seriously admonish and fortify the faithful, both publicly and also privately in confession.

In present times, indeed, the matter perhaps becomes less practical in our regions, because many liberals no longer frequent the church or the sacraments, nor is the struggle against them so sharp as formerly; nevertheless the principles always hold, and new circumstances could occur in which they would again serve more in practice. Indeed, because of the absence of struggle the dangers are perhaps greater, since the faithful do not so easily perceive the imminence of danger and the greatness of the evil. Hence one must never desist from opportune admonition.

III. Notions concerning Liberalism.² - In general, all those are called liberals who confuse the physical liberty of choosing with independence from God and from those sharing divine authority, which moderns call moral liberty; hence, under the false name of liberty, they pursue a certain absurd and most deadly license or independence.

² Concerning Liberalism, cf. Pius IX, const. Quanta Cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Syllabus; Leo XIII, const. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885, and enc. Libertas, 20 June 1888; Moulart, L'Eglise et l'Etat; Daris, L'Eglise et l'Etat; Villada, Casus Conscientiae; Aertnijs, Th. P., nn. 94-101; Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, n. 246 sq.; Ballerini, Opus Morale, II, tr. 4, n. 164 sq.; Theologia Mechliniensis, de Fide, nn. 44-46. Certain things are also found in Genicot, Th. M., I, n. 205, and in Lehmkuhl and Ferreres, in their respective work: Casus Conscientiae.

A. One kind is doctrinal or philosophical liberalism, which applies in the moral and civil matter the principles of rationalism or even naturalism, which place the principate of human reason, private or public, individual or universal, as the highest principle and judge of truth.

And indeed in such a way that it denies every divine power and law and follows a morality fully independent; or at least denies every revelation and positive and supernatural divine law, but admits a merely natural morality. This is not treated here, because it pertains to those who are not faithful and therefore do not confess.

B. Another kind is merely economic, which denies divine and moral law in economic matters and in the production of riches.

This is not considered in the present matter, because it is opposed more to justice than to faith and religion or to the first precept of the Decalogue.

C. Another kind is merely political, which admits divine law, even supernatural law, for private persons, but not for civil society and its laws; hence it defends liberty of conscience, of cults, of the press, of doctrine, and of association.

Namely, it proclaims the separation of the State and the Catholic Church, and the State's indifference concerning various religious confessions. But by the name of separation from the Church, they understand and signify an absolute divorce between the two powers, all mutual concord and all mutual help being taken away, so that the Church, despoiled of every influence, of all goods, and of all external prerogatives, lives in hiding, while the State governs all things as if the Church did not exist. Hence it professes the separation of marriage from the Church, and its subjection under the civil power; the separation of the school from the Church and its subordination under the direction of civil authority; the abrogation of the immunity of clerics from the burden of undergoing and exercising military service, etc. In one word: it is a political system which professes the full independence of the State from the Church or from religion.³

³ Cf. encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas, 20 June 1888.

In this form of liberalism a threefold grade can be distinguished:

1. Radical liberalism, which so exaggerates this independence that it wishes the Church to be subject to the State. Its watchword is: the Church in the State, that is, the Church subject to the State.

2. Moderate liberalism, which professes the simple separation of the State from the Church and from every religion, using this formula: a free Church in a free State.

3. So-called Catholic liberalism, which professes that from the nature of the thing religion is not to be separated from civil society, but that each power ought to govern the human race by a concordant effort; yet in the general hypothesis of the present age, attention being paid to progress and the condition of men, that it is no longer expedient to desire and defend that conjunction, but that simple separation is to be approved and sought, together with the modern liberties flowing from it, especially those of cults and of the press. Let the words be noted well: in the general hypothesis, to be sought, to be approved; because it is not liberal but truly Catholic to profess that in special circumstances these liberties are to be tolerated in order to avoid greater evils or to obtain greater goods.

Now the errors of liberalism in every grade have been condemned by the authority of the Church;⁴ hence those who knowingly profess such errors sin gravely.

⁴ Cf. the encyclical of Pius IX, Quanta Cura, and the Syllabus; likewise the encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas.

The word liberal is of itself equivocal; hence if in certain regions it is taken in an entirely different sense, or designates a merely political party which in no way defends condemned principles, those things which we have said would not hold concerning such liberalism. Nor do we intend to speak of it, but we speak in the theologically received sense.

IV. Whether there is invincible ignorance of liberalism. - The answer is:

1. As regards the radical form of liberalism, ordinarily this must be denied, because its errors are so open, and so opposed to the fundamental principles of morality, that even the more unlearned cannot fail to recognize its falsity and impiety.

2. As regards the other milder forms, if the unlearned are excepted, most who call themselves liberals are not in good faith, and therefore are to be treated as such by the confessor.

The reason is that the documents of the Holy See condemning Liberalism are publicly known, and have been so propagated that invincible ignorance among most people seems morally impossible: this holds especially and generally concerning those who by reason of office are bound to know the falsity and condemnation of liberalism, such as kings, ministers and counselors of the kingdom, senators, deputies, prefects of provinces and cities, judges, advocates, and similar officials who have a part in making laws or putting them into execution; and also editors of political newspapers.

3. Nevertheless, more unlearned persons and, exceptionally, certain educated persons are found who profess milder Liberalism in good faith.

This happens both because, having been preoccupied by the doctrine of their parents, teachers, and companions, they judge liberalism of this kind harmless, and because they do not know how to distinguish between thesis and hypothesis, and confuse the liberty of evil which is owed by right with the toleration of evil which is done for the sake of avoiding a greater evil or increasing or preserving good.

V. Is the confessor bound to question penitents concerning the sin of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, as concerning other sins. And indeed, if liberals everywhere are admitted to the sacraments without question or admonition, and confessors in the sacred tribunal keep deep silence concerning this matter, the faithful will think the matter is not of great importance and will not sufficiently perceive the depravity of liberalism. Hence, although the matter, as we have noted, has become less practical because of circumstances, nevertheless it is not to be consigned wholly to oblivion: otherwise concerning the evil doctrine and dangers of Liberalism the same will happen as concerning bad readings, which are no longer sufficiently held as evil, because priests have omitted sufficiently to admonish concerning their depravity. Therefore:

1. A penitent is to be questioned, whoever he may be, whether unlearned or learned, whether poor or prince, who is silent about the sin of liberalism of which he is certainly known to be guilty, for example from the confessor's own knowledge or from public knowledge. And if, when questioned, the penitent denies it and appears formally to lie, he can in no way be absolved.

2. Likewise he is to be questioned who is probably thought to be a liberal or a favorer of liberalism, for example if he is held as such by many grave men, or if he belongs to a liberal assembly or party which is opposed to religion or the Church, or if ordinarily he reads truly liberal newspapers without just cause. If a penitent of this kind seriously denies that he is a liberal, ordinarily he is to be believed: unless, because of special circumstances, a grave doubt remains, in which case the principles are to be applied which govern those doubtfully disposed, and he is to be absolved only under condition if a grave cause is present, or absolution is to be deferred if this is not feared to be harmful to the penitent.

3. Nevertheless not all penitents are to be questioned: for a mere suspicion of sin does not suffice, even from rumors of the crowd or from a reputation arising from no certain source, but true and solid probability, or a prudent and grave doubt, is required.

As to the manner of questioning, let the confessor proceed cautiously, beginning by asking generally, for example whether he feels any troublesome temptations against faith or against declarations of the Supreme Pontiffs or bishops or the doctrine of the Church; if the penitent denies this, let him ask further, for example, thus: do you not have relations with enemies of the Church, or sympathy for those who attack her? do you not frequent adversaries of the Church? are you therefore not a follower of liberalism?... From the response it will be clear what sort he is; then, if there is need, let him ask whether he reads liberal newspapers, frequents or supports an assembly of liberals; likewise concerning speaking against the doctrine, ministers, and precepts of the Church and concerning transgression of these.

VI. Must the confessor admonish penitents who seem to be in good faith concerning the malice of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, of itself, that is, unless at some time greater harm would follow from the admonition. Given opportunity, he is bound to admonish them, especially if the penitents are persons who, because of office, learning, or honor, exercise great influence upon others. The reason is both because they are rarely in invincible ignorance, and because the errors of liberalism are very harmful to the liberals themselves as to faith, to their family for the education of children, and to the common good because of public scandal and the depraved influence which they exercise upon others.⁵

⁵ Nor ought it create business for the confessor that such penitents will be deterred from the sacraments in the future; for by admonition precisely this is intended, that either they abstain from the sacraments, by the reception of which they provide scandal to the faithful, or they abandon the sin of liberalism now known to them.

But if, after the admonition has been made, someone refuses to obey and pertinaciously adheres to Liberalism, he is unworthy of absolution, and to grant it would be a great scandal for him and for other faithful.

Virtue, generally, is a habit of acting according to right order. Virtues are distinguished in many ways; for they are 1st. natural or supernatural, according as they are acquired and increased by natural powers, or by the aid of supernatural grace; 2nd. infused or acquired, according as they are infused by God himself, or are acquired by repeated acts of the agent; 3rd. theological or moral, according as they have for their formal object either God immediately, or the honesty of the action.

There are four cardinal moral virtues to which the others are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But since discourse concerning the moral virtues is made here and there throughout this whole Compendium of Moral Theology, here we shall treat specifically of the theological virtues, namely of faith, hope, and charity.

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, from q. 1 to q. 16.)

[Since, as St. Thomas says in the prologue of II-II, all moral matter is reduced to the consideration of the virtues, and all virtues are to be further reduced to seven, the Angelic Doctor divides them into three theological and four cardinal virtues, and he undertakes an ordered treatment of them. Beginning therefore with the first, those virtues are called theological which look immediately to God and in a certain way attain him, insofar as they surpass human and natural aptitude and capacity; and for this reason they are not acquired by our acts, but are infused by God alone. Three, however, are commonly counted, namely faith, hope and charity, which we accordingly undertake to investigate here with the same Doctor from q. 1 to q. 44, proposing and resolving the principal questions that are wont to be raised concerning them.

First there is treated faith, which comes first at least in the order of generation.

We judge it opportune to set before this treatise a brief exposition of faith as outlined by the Vatican Synod itself in the constitution Dei Filius, chapter 3, on Faith.

« Since man depends entirely upon God as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason is subject wholly to the uncreated truth, we are bound by faith to render to God who reveals full obedience of intellect and will. Now this faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with the inspiration and assistance of God's grace, we believe that the things revealed by him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of the things is seen by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not, Hebr., XI, 1.

That nevertheless the obedience of our faith might be consonant with reason, God willed that external arguments of his revelation be joined to the internal assists of the Holy Spirit, namely divine facts, and above all miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of divine revelation and suited to the understanding of all. Wherefore both Moses and the prophets, and above all Christ the Lord himself, performed many and most manifest miracles and prophecies; and of the Apostles we read: But they going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed, Marc., XVI, 20. And again it is written: We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a lamp that shines in a dark place, II Petr., 1, 19.

Although the assent of faith is by no means a blind movement of the soul, no one nevertheless can consent to the preaching of the Gospel as he ought in order to obtain salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all men sweetness in consenting and believing the truth¹. ¹ Synod. Arausican., II, can. 7.

Wherefore faith itself, even when it does not work through charity, is a gift of God, and its act is a work pertaining to salvation, by which man renders free obedience to God himself, by consenting and cooperating with his grace, which he could resist.

Further, by divine and Catholic faith all those things are to be believed which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed.

But since without faith it is impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of his children, therefore no one has ever obtained justification without it, nor will anyone obtain eternal life unless he shall have persevered in it unto the end.

But that we might be able to satisfy the duty of embracing the true faith and of persevering constancy in it, God through his only-begotten Son instituted the Church, and endowed his institution with manifest marks, so that it could be recognized by all as the custodian and teacher of the revealed word. For to the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvelous, that have been disposed by God toward making evident the credibility of the Christian faith. Nay more, the Church by her very self, on account of her admirable propagation, her eminent sanctity and her inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things, on account of her Catholic unity and invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of her own divine legation.

By which it comes about that she herself is like a standard lifted up unto the nations, Is., XI, 12, and she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and makes certain her own children that the faith they profess rests upon a most firm foundation. To this testimony indeed an efficacious succor is added from supernatural virtue. For the most benign Lord arouses and helps by his grace even those who go astray, that they may be able to come to the acknowledgment of the truth; and those whom he has translated out of darkness into his admirable light, he confirms by his grace in this same light that they may persevere, never forsaking unless he is forsaken. Wherefore the condition of those who have adhered to the Catholic faith by the heavenly gift of faith is by no means equal to that of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for they who have received the faith under the magisterium of the Church can never have any just cause for changing that same faith or calling it into doubt. Which things being so, giving thanks to God the Father, who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light, let us not neglect so great salvation, but looking on the author of faith and finisher, Jesus, let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, Hebr., XII, 2 and X, 22. »]

(St. Thomas, q. 1.)

[Faith is taken in various senses: 1° For fidelity in promises, as 1 Cor., X, 13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, and elsewhere. 2° For conscience, Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. 3° For confidence, Jas., 1, 6: Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. Faith understood in this sense is abused by Lutherans and Calvinists, who say we are justified by faith, that is, by the confidence by which we trust that sins are forgiven us through Christ. Which acceptation of faith, although in this sense it is to be rejected, is nevertheless to be admitted absolutely as an effect of faith, indeed even of hope; for from the fact that we believe God and hope in him, confidence in him is born. 4° For veracity or the inclination to speak the truth, 2 Tim., II, 11: A faithful saying: for if we be dead with him, we shall also live with him. 5° For the doctrine itself, that is, the object of faith, Rom., X, 8: This is the word of faith which we preach.]

Faith is here taken 6° and properly for the supernatural virtue by which we believe truths revealed by God; and it is defined by the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1: The substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. But, because every habit is specified by its object, and from that its nature is known, the Author begins this treatise from the object of faith, treating of the habit of faith itself below, q. 4. Adhering to which method,

I say 1°: The formal object which, or, as others call it, the object of attribution of faith, is first truth in being,² or God himself as God, exceeding natural reason; which I add, because God, as natural author, can be known by natural light independently of faith. ² 2ae 2ae, q. 1, a. 1, o.

It is proved.³ That is the formal object of some habit which is principally attained by it, and by reason of which the other things are attained: thus health is the formal object of medicine, because it is principally attained by medicine, and by its reason the other things, pulse, urine, remedies, etc., are attained. Now first truth in being, or God, as true God, is that which is principally attained by faith; but the other things, as those pertaining to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments, and whatever else is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, are attained in order to God as to that which is most excellent among all things, and that he may be known more and more. Therefore. ³ Ibid., et ad 1 et 2.

I say 2°: The formal object by which, or the proper quo, of faith is first truth in speaking, or the divine veracity revealing, connoting first truth in knowing, or the infinite wisdom of God.^{4 4} 1ª p., q. 1, a. 1, o.

It is proved as to the first part. The formal object by which of faith in common is the veracity of the speaker; for in this the assent of faith is distinguished from scientific assent, that the motive of the assent of faith is the authority of the speaker, while the motive of scientific assent is the truth of the principle from which the conclusion is elicited. Therefore the formal object under which of divine faith is the veracity of God speaking and revealing.

It is proved as to the second part. Faith is certain and infallible. Therefore it must rely on an infallible motive. — I subsume. Now the divine veracity revealing does not have that it be infallible unless it connote the infinite wisdom of God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. That the divine veracity revealing be infallible, it does not suffice that it cannot deceive out of malice, but it is required that it also cannot deceive out of ignorance, and therefore that God himself cannot be deceived in knowing. Now that God cannot be deceived in knowing proceeds from his infinite wisdom, by which he knows all things as they are, without any admixture of falsity. Therefore.

I say 3°: The adequate material object of faith is everything revealed by God: God himself primarily, the rest secondarily.

It is proved. The adequate material object of some power or habit is all that which it can attain, as it lies under its object, or under the formal ratio under which: thus every colored body is the adequate material object of the visual power, because it can attain it, as it lies under light, which is its formal ratio under which. Now faith attains everything revealed, as it lies under the truth of God revealing, which is its formal object under which, as was said: God however primarily, the rest secondarily, as was also said in the first conclusion. Therefore.

You will object against the first part of the second conclusion: The formal object by which of faith, or, which is the same thing, the motive of the assent of faith, is that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved. Now that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved is not first truth in speaking, but first truth in being, or the Godhead. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. To one asking why you believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, you rightly answer: « Because God revealed it. » And to one asking further why you believe God revealing, you rightly again answer: « Because he is first truth in speaking. » But finally to one asking why God is first truth in speaking, nothing else remains to answer than: « Because God is, or he is first truth in being. » Therefore.

Nothing else remains to answer, than that because God is, assigning the cause of the thing, I concede; assigning the cause of the assent, I deny. Indeed for this reason God is truthful or first truth in speaking, because God is; but not for that reason do I believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, because God is, or he is first truth in being, but because he is truthful. For the assent of faith (which is to be diligently observed) is not discursive, but simple, and it rests solely in the testimony of the speaker, otherwise it is no longer the assent of faith: thus to one telling me that Rome exists, I assent because he is truthful, and there faith rests; but if you ascend and ask further: « Whence is he truthful? » now you run outside faith. Similarly therefore, to one asking why I believe God revealing, I rightly answer: « Because he is truthful », and there faith or the assent of faith rests, nor could it be asked except foolishly why I believe truth or veracity; but if you ask further why God is truthful, now I shall answer, not as a believer, but as a theologian: « Because God is. »

The question is commonly proposed thus, but it comes to the same as if you asked what the motive of faith is. This can be understood in two ways: either of the motive for assenting to revealed truths, or of the motive or rule for discerning which things are revealed. The first is disputed among Catholics, the second between Catholics and heretics.

[Protestants commonly hold that the motive and rule for discerning revealed truths is sacred Scripture, or the private spirit of each one, that is, the understanding breathed by the Holy Spirit into each one of the Scriptures he inspires.]

I say 1°: The motive for believing and assenting to revealed truths is the authority and veracity of God revealing, not the testimony or proposition of the Church.

It is proved — the first part, from the second conclusion of the preceding article. The motive for believing revealed truths is the formal object quo of faith; for that is called the formal object quo of a habit which is the medium and motive for attaining the formal object quod, as is clear from what has been said. Now the veracity of God revealing is the formal object quo of faith, as was said. Hence, to one asking why I believe God to be triune, I rightly answer: « Because God, who revealed it, is true. »

It is proved — the second part. The proposition or testimony of the Church in no way pertains to the formal object quo of faith. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Because it is something created; but nothing created can enter into the formal object of faith, any more than of hope and charity, otherwise they would not be purely divine and theological virtues. 2° The proposition of revealed truths through the Church is related to faith just as the proposition of goodness is related to love; for just as the will cannot love an object unless it is proposed and known, so the intellect cannot believe unless revealed truths are proposed to it. Now the proposition of goodness, in relation to the will and love, is not its formal object, but only the application of the object and a condition sine qua non. Therefore, similarly, the proposition of revealed truths through the Church, in relation to the intellect and faith.

I say 2°: The rule for discerning revealed truths is not Scripture, nor the private spirit, but the Church alone.

It is proved — the first part. The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be incorruptible; otherwise it would expose one to error. Now Scripture is not incorruptible; for it can be corrupted and is corrupted daily, whether through the carelessness of typesetters or the malice of men; hence nothing certain can be drawn from it so long as it is not proposed by the Church as authentic and as containing the revealed truths. Therefore. The same must be said of the Creed, which, being scripture, is also liable to corruption, and besides does not contain all the revealed truths, any more than sacred Scripture does.

It is confirmed. Scripture is obscure in many places. Therefore another rule must be assigned for drawing out its true and legitimate meaning.

It is proved — the second part. 1° The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be certain, and not doubtful. Now the Spirit breathed by God into each one is not certain, but doubtful; for Calvinists deny that it is in Lutherans, Lutherans in Calvinists, and both in Catholics. 2° A sufficient rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be able to settle controversies in this matter. Now the private spirit of each one not only cannot settle controversies about revealed and non-revealed matters, but rather from it there have continually sprung schisms and dissensions, just as if in civil affairs everyone were constituted judge in his own cause. For if a Calvinist says, from his private spirit, that this article is revealed, a Lutheran will deny it, and a Catholic too will deny it, equally from his private spirit. Who will settle the controversy? Who will be able to instruct and convince the other? And hence so many sects mutually opposed among the heretics themselves. 3° Here we are not dealing with private revelation which God can extraordinarily make to some private person, as he once made to the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles — in which case the interior light given, or the immediate revelation itself, would be the rule for discerning what must be believed; but we are dealing with revelation common to the whole society of the faithful, and therefore the proposition must be common, not private. On both parts of this see more in the following treatise, dissertation III, article 6.

The third part follows from what has been said, and it is proved both from the notes of the Church and the motives of credibility, of which below, and from the Scriptures, from which we have that the Church is directed by the Holy Spirit and infallible: Matt., XVI, 18: The gates of hell shall not prevail against her. 1 Tim., III, 15, she is called the pillar and firmament of truth.⁵ Matt., XXVIII, 20: Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. ⁵ Editor's note: the print reads "I Tim., II, 15", but the verse quoted ("columna et firmamentum veritatis") is I Tim. III, 16; this appears to be a printer's error.

The heretics have one thing to object, namely that we commit a circle in the resolution of our faith. For, they say, we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, and we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation.

I answer. 1° We believe the authority of the Church not only on account of revelation, but also and primarily on account of the notes of the Church herself and the motives of credibility. Hence in this respect there is no circle. 2° Even if we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation, it is not under the same aspect under which we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, but under a different one. We believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church as applying that revelation; but we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation or divine veracity, as on account of the formal motive of assent; and thus in a different genus of cause. Now it is the ordinary case that causes are causes of one another in different genera. Thus fire depends upon application, as upon a condition, in order to burn, and the application depends upon the combustive power of fire, as upon an efficient cause. From this it is clear that our circle, in this respect, is only material, and not formal, nor vicious; a circle is vicious whose nature is to run from one thing to another and back again under the same aspect.

This twofold answer is usually explained by the familiar and common example of a messenger carrying the letters of a king. When the trustworthiness of the messenger is not certain, his signs are looked into; once it is established, the letters of the king are accepted on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger: but what is contained in the king's letters is believed, not on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger, but on account of the trustworthiness of the king; and if in the king's letters the trustworthiness of the messenger is asserted, it is thereby confirmed and more firmly believed on account of the trustworthiness of the king. Apply this to the case.

The Church proposes that this and that is revealed by God. Concerning the veracity and infallibility of the Church we have certainty from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which these things are accepted and believed to be revealed in Scripture or tradition; but the revealed truths themselves contained in Scripture or tradition we believe on account of the authority and veracity of God revealing. Hence you see that the knowledge of the veracity of the Church, though it is strengthened by Scripture, nevertheless does not depend upon it necessarily; for when the Church was being born, there was no Scripture, and yet the veracity of the Church was noted and certain; but it is had primarily from her notes and motives of credibility, though we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture: and thus, on the one hand, there is no circle at all, and, on the other, there is no formal and vicious circle, in which one returns to the same thing under the same aspect — just as, conversely, happens in the private spirit of the heretics themselves; for they say they know that this Scripture is true, because their private spirit dictates it to them, and they say they know that they have a private spirit, because Scripture says so.

I insist. According to this solution, it follows that the certainty of our faith is not supreme and divine. — It is proved — the inference.

It hangs, as from an antecedent, upon the veracity of the Church, which is had at first only from the notes and motives of credibility. Now the certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent. Therefore.

The most cunning Serpent, bent on utterly destroying the whole human race, attacked the very First-formed themselves, so that, their stock left undealt with, the virus conceived might diffuse itself more widely through all their posterity; in no other way do Heretics — especially in our own age, the most prolific of sectaries — have dared by impious audacity to cast a deadly Aconite into the very fountain of truth itself, so that from where the edifice of the Christian empire has risen the higher,¹ from there it might fall to the ground root and branch; and with faith denied — resting upon the veracity of the First Truth — all the rest might readily be shown suspect of falsehood. Hence they insinuate into the credulous vulgar, in place of faith an empty confidence, in place of hope a presumption to be despaired of, and finally, in place of charity, an Impossibility of loving. So did these eminent little theologians learn to speak of God; thus Luther with his followers, while he grows insolent over his tumid certainty of salvation, concludes by an impious dogma that Christ the Lord underwent the penalties of the Abyss, no less in soul and body than in divinity; for so he proclaims his madness on Psalm 16, as our Boverius notes in his second examination on the unity of faith, article 5. Calvin, indeed, while he swells with the presumption of having justice imputed to himself, cries out that Christ the Savior was desperate in the very vestibule of his glory and amid the heaps of his merits: so he barks on Matthew 26, as Boverius also notes, exam. 1, Atheism 9. Finally, both hold the same view of charity, that with shameless brows they assert it was only ironically that God, as well as the commandments, prescribed it in those words of the Gospel: If you would enter into life, keep the commandments. Very many have professedly taken care to root out these, and others like them, errors, and indeed effectually; but by what means, or by what arguments, will become clear in the course of this treatise, whenever it falls to discuss each opinion or error according to the mind of St. Bonaventure. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'Christiani Iuperij moles'; rendered 'of the Christian empire' ('imperii') because 'Iuperii' is not a Latin word and the antithesis (heretics casting poison into the very fountain from which the Christian edifice rose, that it might collapse from its source) requires 'imperii'.

I. For the human infirmity just described, God has provided two kinds of remedies by which it may be healed: one internal, the other external. The former is called divine grace, which by its own power dissipates the darkness of the mind, raises up the will, moves it, applies it, and out of one unwilling makes one willing; blots out the stains of the soul and heals its wounds; and is infused by God alone. The latter is external, namely the doctrine divinely revealed, which illumines the mind from without, directs it, forms morals, and opens the way by which we must proceed to our Fatherland. This doctrine is enclosed in the divine Books of which sacred Scripture consists.

II. Question I. What is sacred Scripture? Answer: It is the written word of God, or the letter of God to men, as the Fathers teach. In manifold ways has God spoken to men. First, he published the book of nature, as the Apostle Paul says in Romans, chapter 1, where he states: For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. Second, he himself wrote his law on the tablets of hearts, imbuing men inwardly. Third, he consigned to Moses the two tablets of the Decalogue written with his own finger, as is found in Exodus. Fourth, he wrote not only by himself, but also through his Prophets, Apostles, and the other sacred writers, to whom he dictated the whole of sacred Scripture. This sacred Scripture is sometimes called the word of God, because dictated by God; sometimes the Testament of God, because in it he pledges to us an infinite inheritance and declares his will; sometimes divine Scripture, because it was inspired by the Spirit of God; sometimes holy Scripture, because all things contained in it are ordered to sanctification. It is called also the divine Law, because it sets forth the law given to the Jews and to Christians; and finally it is named the Bible — that is, the books par excellence, from the Greek word Βιβλίον.

III. This divine Scripture consists, by the definition of the Church, of seventy-four books, of which forty-seven constitute the old Testament, and the remaining twenty-seven compose the new Covenant. The former are distributed into legal, historical, sapiential, and prophetical books. In the first class is placed the Pentateuch of Moses. To the second belong the books of Josue, Judges, Ruth, the four books of Kings, the two of Paralipomenon, the two of Esdras, the one of Tobias, Judith, Esther, Job, and the two of the Machabees. To the third pertain the Psalter, Proverbs, the Canticle of Canticles, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus. In the fourth are placed Isaias, Jeremias, Baruch, Ezechiel, Daniel, and the twelve minor Prophets. By a similar partition the new Testament is divided: for to the legal books are referred the four Gospels; to the historical, the Acts of the Apostles; to the sapiential, the fourteen epistles of St. Paul, the two of St. Peter, the three of St. John, the one of St. James the Apostle, and the one of St. Jude the Apostle; to the prophetical, the Apocalypse of St. John the Apostle. That these books are canonical was defined in the Council of Trent, Session IV — entire, with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Church, and as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition.

IV. Question II. How manifold is the sense of divine Scripture? Answer: Twofold — the literal, and the spiritual or mystical. The spiritual is divided into the allegorical, the tropological or moral, and the anagogical. The literal sense is that which is signified immediately by the words themselves. The spiritual or mystical is that which the things signified by the words convey. The allegorical is that according to which certain deeds of the old Testament signify something to be done in the new — as the lifting up of the serpent in the desert portended Christ to be lifted up upon the cross. The tropological, or moral, regards integrity of morals. The anagogical signifies those things which look to eternal glory. Of the literal sense, one kind is the grammatical, as in this text, The letter killeth, which is sometimes false, because not intended by the Holy Spirit; the other is the theological, which Theologians consider as intended by the Holy Spirit, and which can never be false. The metaphorical or figurative sense is contained under the improper literal sense. The proper literal sense is that which the words, strictly taken, signify — such as these: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God. The improper, or metaphorical, is that whose words are transferred from their proper to an improper signification — such as these: My sheep hear my voice; the sheep metaphorically represent the faithful people. Again, one allegory is of words, another of things. The four senses recounted are comprehended in these two verses:

The letter teaches deeds; allegory, what you are to believe; > the moral sense, what you are to do; anagogy, what you are to hope.

The word Jerusalem expresses the aforesaid fourfold sense: literally it expresses the city of Palestine; allegorically, the Church; tropologically, the Soul; anagogically, the eternal Fatherland.

V. Question III. Which Scripture is authentic? Answer: No autographs of the sacred Scriptures are found today, but all are apographs, published in diverse languages — Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and the Vernacular. The Vulgate alone has been declared authentic by the Church, and from it the Theologian ought to draw his conclusions; although he is by no means forbidden to approach and weigh the original text as well, both for the sake of easier understanding and for the sake of refuting those who do not admit the authority of the Vulgate.

VI. Question IV. Is the understanding of holy Scripture open to all? Answer: The Lutherans and Calvinists contend that the understanding of holy Scripture is evident and perspicuous to each and every private person, even to mere women, in those things which regard the dogmas of faith and the precepts of morals. This is a delirium at war with the manifest experience of all ages. Has not every one of the innumerable Christian sects boasted that the holy Scriptures stand on its side? For God willed that many things in the divine Scriptures should be obscure and profound, that in searching and meditating upon them he might exercise human talents and repress the audacity and pride of men, and that he might procure veneration and majesty for the divine Scriptures. This first extreme being avoided, the other must be shunned — that of those who, under the pretext of obscurity, neglect the study of the divine Scriptures to the loss of their own salvation. Although some oracles of the Scriptures are obscure, nevertheless in those things which pertain to the rules of morals and of faith the divine Scriptures are commonly plain and perspicuous. Do not even human lawgivers themselves take pains to express their laws in perspicuous words and lucid phrase, that they may remove, so far as can be done, disagreements of interpretation? Do they not to this end select the more erudite and learned men, to consign the Laws to writing in such discourse and choice of words that they can be understood even by the very people for whose government they are enacted? Now to this end God gave his laws: that they might be grasped by the Faithful, who are bound to execute them. Why did the Apostle Paul, with the other sacred Writers, write his Epistles to the Romans, to the Corinthians, and to the other peoples, except to instruct them? He wrote, therefore, with that perspicuity which was suited to the understanding of the peoples, although some things are loftier.

VII. The contrariety of interpretations and opinions frequently declares, not the obscurity of the Scriptures, but the contrary desires and affections of those who opine and interpret, which twist minds into contrary senses. And indeed, what do you think is the reason why the books which they call spiritual agree so much among themselves? Run through Granada, Tauler, Scupoli, à Kempis, Rodríguez, and all the rest, whether Italians, or French, or Spaniards, or Germans: you will find in all absolutely the same doctrine; in these books no disagreement, no battle, but the same maxims, the same rules, precepts, exhortations; the same pronouncements, commands, and counsels. The reason is one alone: that their authors, with a mind empty of passions, sought out the truths, and by fervent prayer begged the knowledge of them, and delivered them with a certain heavenly unction. Hence so great an agreement among them: for they all explain the doctrine that is truly evangelical; they all interpret the Gospels sincerely, and with disputations set aside. Wherefore their doctrine is suited to all Christians. For they err who think that it serves only those souls which aspire to singular and sublime perfection and sanctity. Does not the Gospel comprehend all Christians — does it not bind them? Since, then, the doctrine of such books is evangelical, it obliges all in some measure. And indeed, that all Christians are bound by a most grave precept to yearn for evangelical perfection, I shall expound more fully below.

VIII. But whence, then, come the disagreements, battles, and interminable disputations, so frequent in the volumes of the Casuists? Because very many of them, the doctrine of the Scriptures being set aside, consult human reason, obscured by the fog of its diverse passions. They commonly search out, not what the Gospels teach, but what the earlier Casuists teach. This is the true cause why those books swarm with quarrels, entanglements, battles, and vain little distinctions, and teach not how to live morally, but how to cavil acutely. I except always those who in very deed teach the evangelical doctrine.

IX. Question V. What way is to be followed, that we may attain the genuine sense of holy Scripture? Answer: A profound abasement of soul, fervent prayers, and petitions for the divine light ought to precede the reading of the Scriptures. Prejudices and anticipations must be cast away, and the glory of God alone kept before the eyes, the applause of the world being spurned and every human respect cut off. For a false interpretation depraves the sincerity of Scripture no less than the style or pen with which one either takes words away from the divine Scriptures or adds them, says Tertullian in the book On Prescription, chapter 17: An adulterous sense obstructs the truth and the divine Scripture as much as a corrupting pen. You will object that it is heretics who are the corrupters of holy Scripture, not Catholics. Heretics, I answer, are obstinate depravers of the Scriptures, because they despise the definitions of the catholic Church; Catholics, however, submit their interpretations to the definition of the Church. For the rest, these too, taken singly, can be deceived in their private interpretations. Amid so great a contrariety of opinions in the moral order, more than one cannot be true. The Church tolerates many contrary interpretations. But this tolerance in no way prevents adulteration from being adulteration, and falsity from being falsity. Whether those who are deceived and interpret falsely are free from the crime either of negligence or of a most hidden pride, is known to God alone. When doubts occur, there must be consulted the Fathers of the Church, the definitions of the Councils and of the Roman Church, and the Bishops, whom God has placed to rule his Church.

X. St. Paul, in 2 Corinthians, chapter 2, says: Let us not be as very many, adulterating the word of God, but with sincerity. Not a few, but very many, even in the very time of the Apostles, were adulterating the word of God. If then very many, will they today be few? On this passage, lecture 3, St. Thomas has these words: Adulterating the word of God — that is, preaching either for gain or for the favor of praise ... If therefore your end is gain, if your intention is favor and your own glory, you adulterate the word of God. Both Preachers and Theologians who, in order to promote their own prejudged opinions, to catch the applause of the peoples, and to shine forth more eminently, study to draw the divine Scriptures to themselves by an artifice of distinctions, turn out adulterators of the word of God. Such men are called by the Apostle James, chapter 4, judges of the law, not doers of it, when he says: But if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge. No one boasts himself a judge of the divine law, though very many subject the holy law to their own judgment. Let us hear St. Augustine, who in the book On True Religion, chapter 31, wisely distinguishes these two things — to know the law, and to judge it: It is lawful, then, for clean souls to know the eternal law, but not lawful to judge it. And the difference is this: that for knowing, it is enough that we see that something is so, or is not so; but for judging, we add something whereby we signify that it could also be otherwise — as when we say: it ought to be so, or it ought to have been so, or it will have to be so, as craftsmen do in their works... But manifold is human delectation. Few, therefore, are they who, with clean souls, endowed with humility and a docile spirit, and stripped of self-love, strive to acknowledge the truth of the Scriptures; very many, on the contrary, who, their own passions leading the way, judge the law. For they judge the law as often, says Augustine, as they perversely decide that these opinions are, or ought to be, probable; that this is not, or ought not to be, a sin: and in order to confirm these preconceived opinions, they hunt after testimonies of the Scriptures and bend them to their own senses. The most illustrious Jesuit, Father Miguel de Elizalde, in Book 6, question 14, section 7, sets up this thesis as the title of a paragraph: But the Probabilists most of all become judges, and break asunder all the laws of rightly interpreting the holy Scriptures. This testimony is true, and he proves it by many weighty reasons,¹ and confirms it both by reason and by the authority of the Fathers. For the way of the Scriptures is narrow, and of truth alone; the way of Probabilism is broad and spacious, since it is the way both of falsity and of truth — concerning which St. John Chrysostom says, in Homily 18 on chapter 7 of Matthew: Their will is a law unto them; and they are not under the law, but the law is under them. But the way of life is all justice. And it is said to be narrow, because it is enclosed within the rule of truth and of discipline. The way of truth alone is the way of the Lord; and only they who walk this way are called blessed by David: Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. Psalm 118.

¹ See Tome I, Apparatus, Book I, Disputation 2, chapter 4.

I. Words fail me with which to lay open, as its dignity deserves, the extreme necessity of the study here proposed. If I could impress this single truth more deeply upon your soul, O director of souls, and fully persuade you of it, I should attain the fruit which I have proposed to myself in the labor I have undertaken. Words do not reform the morals of men; but the law of the Lord alone converts souls. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and innumerable others delivered for the most part excellent institutions of morals; yet they recalled no one to a better way of life. Gather from this what fruit so many books, whether old or new, which swarm with the mere opinions of men, are apt to bring forth. Such is the disposition and nature of man, that he refuses to submit to the authority of other men's judgments. It is divine authority that takes the minds of men captive into its obedience, and confines their morals within the paths of virtue. Hence it is that that Theology which does not draw its conclusions from the holy Scriptures deserves to be called not Theology but Battology — vain babbling — utterly unfit for making morals honest.

II. The divine Scripture itself commands the meditation of itself in six hundred places. In Deuteronomy, chapter 6, these words are found: Hear, O Israel, and observe to do the things which the Lord hath commanded thee, that it may be well with thee... Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart: and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising: and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand: and they shall be and shall move before thy eyes: and thou shalt write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house... Take heed diligently lest thou forget the Lord.

III. I beg and adjure you, O director of souls, to bend your serious meditations for a little while upon this divine testimony. Two things are here prescribed: one, the exercise of divine love; the other, the study of the divine law. Could the commandment of divine love be expressed in clearer words and more lucid phrase? Tell me, pray: could it ever have entered your mind that Theologians would be found who would attempt to reduce so most grave a commandment almost to nothing? And yet, as is plain to all, very many have striven to attenuate this first and most grave precept with vain inventions. For some cavil that this precept never of itself binds and presses in the whole course of life; others, only at the point of death; others, incidentally at some time; others, once within five years; and others, once within two years. Gather from this: if a commandment so lucid and expressed with such perspicuity — a commandment which is the basis and foundation of the whole law and the bond of the Christian law, which Christ renewed in his Gospel and imposed more strongly upon Christians — if, I say, many authors have dared to cavil at and elude this precept, with what inventions will they not obscure the other precepts, which are not so perspicuous, but ambiguous, and as it were remote conclusions? What Christian, the prejudices of certain Casuists being removed, reading the law just transcribed, would call into question its morally continuous obligation? You have now comprehended how necessary is the meditation of the divine law; since according to it, and not according to the pleasures of the Casuists, you shall be judged. And the burden by which Theologians — above all the curators and directors of souls — are bound to devote their labor to the study of the Scriptures is the graver, inasmuch as unlettered Christians, ignorant of the Latin tongue, cannot read holy Scripture. The Church has therefore wisely forbidden them this reading, in order that the Pastors may hold out to them this heavenly and divine food pure and refined from every noxious error. Nor may you rejoin that all the Casuists too study the divine Scriptures. Be it so. But from their commentaries upon the law transcribed above it is clearly evident that they read the holy Scriptures loaded with prejudices and anticipations, and distracted by various affections — if indeed they really read them at all, and do not rather transcribe what the earlier Casuists have taught.

IV. Passing over the innumerable Scriptures of the old Testament which inculcate the reading and serious meditation of the holy Law, I shall relate some testimonies of the new Covenant. Christ the Lord reproved the Pharisees for being ignorant of the holy Scriptures, saying in Matthew 22: And Jesus answering, said to them: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. Again, questioned by the Pharisees on another matter, he sends them back, not to the Jewish Casuists and the Rabbis, but to the Scriptures: Search the Scriptures: for you think in them to have life everlasting: and the same are they that give testimony of me (John 6). St. Paul, in Romans 15, commands the unwearied study of the Scriptures: For what things soever were written, were written for our learning: that through patience and the comfort of the Scriptures, we might have hope. Again, writing to Timothy, he first sets before his eyes, in chapter 3, the evils and calamities of the time to come, and then, that he may guard himself against such great evils, he strongly enjoins upon him the reading of the Scriptures: But thou hast fully known my doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, longsuffering, love, patience... But continue thou in those things which thou hast learned, and which have been committed to thee: knowing of whom thou hast learned them. And because from thy infancy thou hast known the holy scriptures, which can instruct thee to salvation, by the faith which is in Christ Jesus. All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work. But what the Apostle immediately subjoins in chapter 4 must be impressed more deeply upon the soul and seriously meditated: Preach the word: be instant in season, out of season: reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine. For there shall be a time, when they will not endure sound doctrine; but, according to their own desires, they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears: and will indeed turn away their hearing from the truth, but will be turned unto fables. But be thou vigilant, labour in all things, do the work of an evangelist, fulfil thy ministry. A time will come, says Paul, when they will not endure sound doctrine. What is sound doctrine? That which consists of truth alone, say all the Fathers. Doctrine is corrupted by the admixture of falsity. That doctrine, therefore, is certainly corrupt which teaches the use of contrary opinions, of which, if one is true, the other must needs be false. The most tremendous of all the punishments with which God threatens is the neglect of the Scriptures, and a reading of them that is burdensome and full of disgust. The time seems already to have come which Amos foretold in chapter 8: I will send forth a famine into the land: not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord... They shall go about seeking the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. The Lord withdraws both the reading and the understanding of the Scriptures from those who either neglect them or strive to elude them with arbitrary inventions. Turn over the innumerable books of the many Casuists which are read by Parish priests and Confessors as masters in the government of souls: scarcely any exhortations of divine Scripture in them, most rare any argumentations drawn from it. If some testimony is alleged, it is frequently twisted to confirm lax opinions, as is evident in this text: My yoke is sweet — which the Probabilists commonly use in order to accommodate Christian Morals to human appetites. Scarcely one of them expounds the evangelical oracle in its genuine sense: namely, that the yoke of Christ is sweet because it is the yoke of divine love, because it is anointed with the unction of charity, because the Christian law is the law of divine love. But divine love wars with the love of the flesh and of the world.

V. The Councils and all the Fathers most deeply inculcate the reading of the Scriptures upon Priests. The Council of Trent, Session 5, chapter 1, commands that Bishops, Archbishops, and Primates, either by themselves — as they are bound by divine law, when they are able — or through a substitute, interpret sacred Scripture to the people. It prescribes that revenues be established from which the men destined for this office are to be supported. Then, many things being passed over, it subjoins: In the Monasteries of Monks also, where it can conveniently be done, let there likewise be a lecture on sacred Scripture... And in the Convents of the others, in which studies can conveniently flourish, let a lecture on sacred Scripture likewise be held. The Fourth Council of Toledo established the following, which is found in the Decretum, distinction 37, chapter 1: Ignorance, the mother of all vices, is to be shunned most of all in the Priests of God, who have undertaken the office of teaching among the peoples: for the Apostle Paul frequently admonishes Priests to read the holy Scriptures, saying to Timothy: Attend etc. Let Priests therefore know the holy Scriptures and the canons, that all their work may consist in preaching. The chief, therefore, and almost the sole occupation of Priests, and above all of Pastors, is the study of holy Scripture. What if Pastors should occupy the greater part of their life in business affairs, in reckoning up revenues, in settling lawsuits, in domestic and economic cares, and should hand over to certain Religious the administering of the food of holy Scripture to the flock committed to themselves, not to others? Such men, assuredly, would be not Pastors, but hirelings and betrayers of their own ministry. Pastors are bound to feed the flock out of their own selves: they may employ ministers and helpers in those things which they cannot themselves perform. They are exceedingly deceived, and shamefully mock themselves, when they believe that they can fulfill their ministry by the labor of others. They must expend all their strength, their studies, their vigils, and their cares in discharging their own ministry; and when they cannot alone fulfill all its parts, then let them take ministers to their aid. Let them commit the government of temporal things to others, that they themselves may be able to devote themselves wholly to God and to the guarding and forming of their flock. Those Pastors run the road of damnation who commit spiritual things to ministers, reserving to themselves the cares of earthly business.

VI. What are the chief sacred books which holy Pastors and directors of souls ought to read and meditate? They are the books of the Psalms, of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the Prophets, from the old Testament. More abundant still will be the fruit which you will gather from the mature reading of the new Testament. You will not stumble there upon petty questions, cases, and disputations; because the Gospels teach how to live holily, not how to dispute subtly. No lawgiver has inserted into his laws the controversies and petty questions which the wits of men are able to devise. The holy Fathers of the Church, who are our Masters — Justin Martyr, Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and innumerable others — settled questions of morals by the holy Scriptures and the divine traditions, and thus governed the peoples committed to them. These men had engraved deep in their soul the oracle of Christ the Lord, who says in John 14: But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind. On this text St. Thomas writes as follows, lecture 6: He will teach you all things: because whatever a man may teach from without, unless the Holy Spirit give understanding within, he labors in vain: for unless he be first present to the heart of the hearer, the discourse of the Teacher will be idle.

VII. I hear many clamoring that these things are theoretical, not practical. Those who do not hear confessions, who write in their chamber and do not handle the business of human society, most easily publish specious rules which serve nothing for practical execution and direction. There is need of good and solid practice. Explain to us where in the holy Scriptures are found the doctrines by which can be resolved those immense volumes of questions which Caramuel, Diana, Sánchez, Escobar, Castropalao, Candido, Zanardi, Sporer, Tamburini, Gobat, and the other recent Doctors have published?

VIII. I answer that by a few oracles of holy Scripture the greatest part of the questions which luxuriant wits have stirred up is struck down and reduced to nothing; concerning which St. Augustine writes as follows in Sermon 143 de tempore: These, my brethren, are the great deliriums of great Doctors. Nor am I one to disapprove all the controversies which the new Casuists agitate; but I say that many are of no moment, and that more can be resolved by the divine Scriptures alone, by the traditions, and by the doctrine of the Fathers. And because not a few appeal to practice, I am willing to obey them. The controversies which the new Casuists have brought in against the first commandment of charity toward God and the Neighbor — are they not dissolved by the mere words in which God expressed it? Those innumerable questions which they discuss concerning impure touches, concerning conjugal matters, concerning sodomy and other most shameful acts, concerning dances, concerning comedies, concerning the promiscuous conversation of men and women, are overthrown by these divine oracles alone: He that loveth danger shall perish in it (Ecclesiasticus 3). Turn away thy face from a woman dressed up (Ecclesiasticus 10 [recte 9]). If thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out... If thy hand scandalize thee, cut it off, etc. (Matthew 5). From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves (1 Thessalonians 5). If these and six hundred other similar divine oracles were consulted with prejudices laid aside, and without the zeal of twisting such commandments to the desires and appetites of men, those most empty little questions and petty distinctions, agitated in our age with such contention for the obscuring of evangelical truth, would go up in smoke. The disputations which the most recent authors have stirred up concerning homicide, concerning the duel as vindicator of honor, concerning the material lie, concerning amphibologies, concerning thefts, concerning compensations, concerning usury, and other matters, and which fill those immense volumes of the Casuists, can be settled by the most lucid testimonies of divine Scripture, if evangelical truth alone be regarded, and that zeal for pleasing men and hunting after human favor be utterly rooted out.

IX. In like manner the commandments of the Church are clear and manifest, and the examples of holy men lie open to all. It is pleasing to hear what St. Augustine writes in Epistle 119: But this I grieve at exceedingly: that many things which are most wholesomely commanded in the divine books are less cared for, and all things are so full of so many presumptions, that he is more gravely rebuked who during his octave has touched the earth with bare foot, than he who has buried his mind in wine. All such things, therefore, as are neither contained in the authorities of the holy Scriptures, nor found decreed in the Councils of the Bishops, nor strengthened by the custom of the universal Church, but are varied innumerably by the diverse customs of diverse places — so that scarcely, or never at all, can the causes be found which men followed in instituting them — I judge, where the liberty is granted, are to be cut away without any hesitation. I pass over many things which the holy Doctor writes in the same place, and I exhibit a few of those which he adds toward the end of the epistle: And I marvel that this escapes you: that not only in innumerable other matters many things escape me, but even in the holy Scriptures themselves I am ignorant of far more things than I know. And therefore I bear a hope, not unfruitful, in the name of Christ; because I have not only believed my God that on those two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the Prophets, but I have also experienced it, and experience it daily. For no mystery, no discourse however obscure, is opened to me out of the sacred writings, where I do not find these same precepts: The end of the commandment is charity, from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith; and, The fulness of the law is charity. Therefore, O Christian, whether these things or others, so read, so learn, as to remember that it was most truly said: Knowledge puffeth up, charity edifieth. But charity envieth not, is not puffed up. Let knowledge, then, be so employed, as a kind of scaffolding by which may rise the structure of charity, which abideth for ever, even when knowledge shall be destroyed.

X. Not only, says Augustine, have I believed my God revealing it, but I have also daily experienced that the whole law and the Prophets are contained in those two precepts of charity. If Christians would seriously meditate these two commandments alone, they would laugh at and despise the innumerable questions and most vain entanglements of certain Casuists. But so far are many of these from referring the questions that arise back to these two precepts, that on the contrary they attenuate these two commandments, restrict and limit the force of their obligation, in order to be able to soften the other laws.

I. One of the chief offices of Priests is the study of the holy Scriptures, as the divine Scripture itself declares in 2 Paralipomenon, chapter 19: And in Jerusalem also Josaphat appointed Levites, and Priests... and he charged them, saying... Every question that shall come to you concerning the law, concerning the commandment, concerning ceremonies, concerning justifications: shew it them, that they sin not against the Lord. The Church has established that Clerics are not to be admitted to sacred Orders unless they have a title, or a patrimony, whence they can live. To what end this? That, freed from the business of the world, they may be able to devote themselves more intently to the study of divine Scripture and to sacred things, as in the place cited, chapter 31, the divine Scripture itself prescribes: He commanded also the people that dwelt in Jerusalem, to give to the Priests, and the Levites their portion, that they might be able to attend to the law of the Lord.

II. What more? Before Bishops promote Clerics to the Priesthood, they pronounce this prayer, and beseech God, that meditating on thy law day and night, they may believe what they shall read, and teach what they shall believe. All craftsmen are examined upon the rules of their own art. The profession of Priests has annexed to it the study of holy Scripture: therefore trial must be made whether they are versed in this study. For how can they meditate the holy Scriptures day and night, if they are ignorant of them? In this our age Priests are more urgently bound to the study of the divine Scriptures: since, vernacular versions being forbidden to the Laity, it belongs to the Priests to explain the divine Scriptures to the people. For at the same time at which the Church took away vernacular readings from the unlettered, she decreed that Priests should devote their labor more intently to the holy Scriptures, that they might be the more apt for interpreting and expounding them.

III. Some Priests, when they must undergo the examination for hearing confessions, turn over and over the immense volumes of Diana, Bonacina, Tamburini, La Croix, and the Salmanticenses; they strive to commit to memory a medley of cases, distinctions, and disputations. With the whole searching of their mind they scrutinize the recent and the ancient Medullae, the Alphabets, the Promptuaries, the examinations of ordinands. What then? Will you disapprove their study? I do not disapprove it. But I say that Priests, and Pastors and directors of souls, ought first to be versed in the divine Scriptures, to meditate them, and to commit them more deeply to their mind. Grant me this: is not the life of Christians to be instituted and formed according to the norm of the divine Law? If those laws are unknown, how is the life of Christians to be recalled to their rule?

IV. The aforesaid Casuists, you will say, interpret the holy Law and the divine Scriptures. Is it indeed so? Scarcely does any divine text recur in their pages; and if some sacred testimonies are at times alleged, they are not rarely eluded by petty distinctions, by arbitrary interpretations, and by opinions more benign than is just. Now if the Priests themselves do not have an ascertained knowledge of the precepts and rules of the evangelical Law, by what way can they discover whether the aforesaid authors interpret them rightly or otherwise? Books of that kind, you rejoin, are approved. True enough. Are they on that account free from errors? From approved books have been culled the condemned theses. What of the fact that the Church herself has decreed that a doctrine is not therefore true and approved because it belongs to some approved author? Greatly are the Pastors of souls deceived if they believe that they can be excused by the authority of this or that Casuist, when they teach doctrines contrary to the divine Scriptures. Or are the Priests ignorant that Christ the Lord, the supreme Judge, will judge souls not at the tribunal of the Casuists, but at that of the Gospels?

V. It is not for all, you will rejoin, to interpret the Gospels. And further: must Parish priests, Confessors, and Theologians learn the Gospels by heart? There is no need that they commit all things to memory; but it is enough that they have the spirit of the Law and its commandments thoroughly examined, and, when difficulties occur, that they consult the sacred books and employ the graver interpreters, and first of all the holy Fathers of the Church. Parish priests and Confessors turn over the thick and immense volumes of Diana, Bonacina, Tamburini, Laymann, La Croix, the Salmanticenses, and Castropalao; with prodigious labor they commit to memory controversies, wranglings, distinctions, subdistinctions, definitions, divisions. Assuredly the divine precepts which are contained in the holy book of the new Testament, of Proverbs, of Wisdom, of Ecclesiasticus, are more easily learned than the interminable disputations of the said volumes. What of the fact that the quarrelsome disputations of these men are not rarely entangled, obscure, full of circumlocutions, hedged about with entanglements and cavils, which often excite anything rather than the fervor of divine love and the zeal of evangelical perfection? On the contrary, the evangelical precepts are splendid, perspicuous, easy; and they teach how to live rightly, not how to wrangle futilely. To this is added that God infuses the light for understanding the holy Scriptures into those who approach the meditation of them with a humble and docile heart. Those divine teachings of Proverbs and of Ecclesiasticus, the evangelical parables, and the epistles of Paul and of the other Apostles, and the single verses of holy Scripture, illuminate more than the innumerable disputations of men. Priests imbued with this knowledge of the holy Scriptures can also read the moral Theologians; because then they are excellently able to discern whether the opinions and judgments of these men are conformed to the evangelical doctrine.

VI. What? Do you dare to disapprove the custom, introduced so many years since, of examining Confessors and Parish priests upon the opinions which the Casuists dispute on both sides? Far be it from me to wish to disapprove customs which are good. With humble deference only do I suggest what seems to me best, and indeed necessary. But this very counsel of mine I submit to the judgment of Superiors and of the Wise. If, the usage which now obtains being abandoned, a new custom had to be introduced, a prodigious labor would have to be undergone, and great disturbance and confusion would ensue. All this is false. Does the reading and meditation of the holy Scriptures beget confusion? Nay rather, it takes away quarrels and intestine disagreements, and in place of disputations introduces the observance of the laws. But, to press the argument more strongly, I ask again: is the study of the Scriptures necessary for Priests, Pastors, and Directors of souls, or not? If you deny it, you gainsay the divine Scriptures. If you affirm it: then the custom must be corrected, and the competence of Pastors and Confessors must be explored in the holy Scriptures as well. The mere knowledge that this examination must be undergone would urge all who desire either to be initiated into the Priesthood, or to undertake the care of souls, or the burden of hearing confessions, to bend all their powers to the study of the Scriptures. Who would deny that Priests would turn out wiser and better-mannered if they spent the good part of that time which they wear away in reading and thoroughly learning the books of Diana, Bonacina, Tamburini, La Croix, and the Salmanticenses, in meditating the holy books? And if, in place of the Medullae, whether ancient or recent, they continually turned the pages of the Pauline epistles?

VII. And in what manner, you ask, ought this examination to be conducted? With the highest moderation and prudence. Let Clerics be asked how many are the books of the old Testament, how many of the new covenant, how many the epistles of Paul; some upon some parable of the Gospel, others upon the epistle to Timothy. Priests ought to be asked what is the spirit of the evangelical Law; what is the image of the Christian life; whether Christians are pressed by a precept of yearning after evangelical perfection; what these words signify: Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect; what these others: If thy eye... if thy hand scandalize thee, pluck it out, cut it off, etc.; He that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple; Lend, hoping for nothing thereby; It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Let them be asked how Saints Augustine and Chrysostom and the other Fathers interpret the testimonies praised and others like them: for these are the masters and the true interpreters of the Scriptures.

VIII. As to those things which regard ecclesiastical institutions, the Catechism of Trent, or the Roman Catechism, must be read; and upon it and upon the Council of Trent they must be examined more severely. When they have been instructed in such doctrine, they can also read the moral authors, especially concerning the ecclesiastical precepts and the other things which regard ceremonies and discipline.

To thee now, Christ Jesus, I turn my humble prayer. Fearful and confounded, I look up at thy most tremendous vengeance upon the sons of men. Trembling, I shudder at the spirit of slumber and of blindness, seized by which men walk the way of perdition; for I know this to be the most deadly of all punishments, which so many ages ago the Prophet Amos foretold in chapter 8: Behold the days come, saith the Lord, and I will send forth a famine into the land: not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord... They shall go about seeking the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. To such a pass of evils has the matter now come, that many neither seek nor find thy word, O Lord. They seek the word of men in the books of men; but they do not seek the word of God in the books of God. If Princes, Kings, Emperors were to write to us, and that in a familiar style; if they were to propose rewards; if they were to invite us to their royal palaces, to their thrones, there to reign with them — with what diligence, with what attention would such letters be read by us! And thy divine Scriptures, which are letters sent to us, and delivered to us — above all to us Priests — to be guarded, read, and explained, we neglect, we treat with disgust; nay, casting them aside, we delight in the acorns and refuse of men? The blindness is darker, and the punishment more deadly, than can be expressed by me in fitting speech. Awake, I beseech you, Priests of God, Pastors and Directors of souls, and in the spirit of contrition and humility seek the word of God in the books of God.

I. Tradition, taken generally, is doctrine which is communicated to another either by voice or by writing, as St. Paul says in 2 Thessalonians 2: Hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word, or by our epistle. Taken more strictly, tradition is doctrine communicated by the living voice. If we regard the author, one is divine, another human. If the matter, one comprehends faith and morals, another discipline, rites, and ceremonies. Again, one is necessary, another free; one immutable and perpetual, another mutable and temporary; one, finally, universal, another particular.

II. Divine tradition is the doctrine of God, not written, but revealed by God to our forefathers, and communicated to their successors from ear to ear. This tradition is wont to be called Dominical, because it was communicated by Christ the Lord to the Apostles, and by these to their successors. Of this kind is the tradition concerning the number of the Sacraments, and concerning the perpetual Virginity of Blessed Mary. Another is the apostolic, which the Apostles, at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, received and communicated to the Church without writing, as the Council of Trent teaches, Session 4.

III. The Heretics of every age have almost all denied the divine and apostolic traditions, that they might the more freely publish their errors. The Heretics of the latest age, the Lutherans and Calvinists, have raged against the traditions beyond the rest, inasmuch as these cut their throats. All Catholics teach that besides the written word there are apostolic-divine traditions, and they prove it by the testimonies both of the divine Scriptures and of the Fathers. The divine Scriptures are ready to hand: Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee (Deuteronomy 32). Again, Ecclesiasticus, chapter 8: Let not the discourse of the ancients escape thee, for they have learned of their fathers. St. Paul says to the Thessalonians, chapter 2: Therefore, brethren, stand fast; and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word, or by our epistle.

IV. In every state of the Church the divine traditions have obtained. From Adam to Moses there was no written law. Whence did the holy Patriarchs — Adam, Abel, Seth, Enos, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the others — learn the worship of God, the rites of the sacrifices, and the mysteries of Religion? Whence did they draw their doctrine concerning the creation of the world, the coming of the Messias, the remedy of original sin, and the future state? From the written word? There was then none. Therefore from the word delivered from mouth to mouth, from ear to ear. After the Mosaic law the divine traditions likewise obtained, as is evident from the testimonies adduced. Did not the Jews believe by divine tradition that the holy books were enrolled in the canon? Christ the Lord sent his Apostles, instructed by his voice alone, to preach his divine law through the whole world. For the space of many years they promulgated this new law without a written word. Matthew consigned his Gospel to letters when he had resolved to go to preach to the gentiles, and after the preaching he had made to the Hebrews. Let the Lutherans and Calvinists explain to us by what doctrine the Church of Christ was governed before the Evangelists delivered the Gospels in writing, and Paul with the other Apostles wrote his epistles. Not, assuredly, by written doctrine. Therefore by doctrine handed down.¹ The testimonies of the Fathers I pass over for brevity's sake.

¹ See Tome 1, Apparatus, Book 3, Dissertation 3.

I. Ecclesia is a Greek word, which in Latin signifies a convocation; under the state of grace it is wont to be described thus: It is a society of men called to the faith of Christ, which is inwardly vivified by faith, hope, and charity; but outwardly is governed by the profession of the same Christian faith, by the communion of the Sacraments, and by the preaching of the divine word by legitimate Pastors under its visible head on earth, the Vicar of Christ and successor of St. Peter. The Church is also taken for the material house itself dedicated to God, where the Faithful assemble, of which Matthew 21 says: My house shall be called the house of prayer. But it is commonly taken for the society of the Faithful; and in this sense Paul speaks to the Galatians, chapter 1: Beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God.

II. Just as in the physical human body certain members are vivified by the soul, while certain others adhere to the body yet are not informed by the soul, so it happens in the moral body of the Church. Some Christians communicate with the society both in the external participation of the sacraments and in the other rites, and also in faith, hope, and charity; and these are vivified by the soul, and are living members of the Church. Others only outwardly profess the faith with the other Faithful, and frequent the Sacraments. These are said to be of the body of the Church, but they are outside her soul. That the Church comprehends both good and bad is evident from Matthew 3 [recte 13], where she is compared with the threshing-floor containing wheat and chaff, and with the net gathering together every kind of fish. Wherefore shamefully erred the Cathari and the Donatists, who excluded from the Church all those stained with fault.

III. Heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated are outside the Church. Children of Heretics who have been baptized are within the Church until the use of reason; and when they have attained it, if they criminally adhere to the synagogue of the Heretics, they become Heretics outside the Church; if they withdraw from it and betake themselves into the bosom of the catholic Church, they become Catholics and members of the true Church.

IV. The marks of the Church are four: One, holy, catholic, and apostolic. She is one by unity of body, because the faithful compose one moral body or society. One body: therefore one head. She is one by unity of spirit, which animates the whole body. She is one by unity of faith and doctrine, by unity of hope, by unity of charity, by unity of the invisible Lord God and of Jesus Christ, and of his visible Vicar the Roman Pontiff. Not even the Heretics themselves dare to deny her unity. One body, one spirit, one faith, one hope, one baptism, one charity, one head they freely admit. But they contend that this head is invisible only — namely, Christ Jesus. But they err shamefully. The body of the Church is visible: therefore the head is visible. In very deed Christ the Lord instituted Peter as the head of his Church, and the successors of Peter. For as he willed the body of the Church to be perpetual, so also its head. Which truth the perennial tradition of the Church confirms.¹

¹ See Tome I, Apparatus, Book 1, Dissertation 3, chapter 4.

V. The second mark of the Church is Sanctity, in that she is consecrated to God, both on account of the sanctity which shines forth in her chief members and on account of the purity of doctrine which she professes. She is named Catholic, or universal, under a threefold title: first, by reason of doctrine, which excludes and execrates all errors; second, by reason of time, because she will endure in unbroken series even to the end of the world; third, by reason of place: Going into the whole world, preach the gospel to every creature (Mark 16). Nor is it required that she extend herself at the same time to all places; nay, Christ himself foretold that his Religion, on account of the crimes of the Faithful, would pass from kingdom to kingdom. From the East it has migrated into the West, and from the West into other parts of the world.

VI. The Donatists objected many things against this universality, and exaggerated the spread of the Arian heresy. The Donatists have been imitated by the Lutherans and Calvinists. The mouths of all these St. Augustine stops, On the Unity of the Church, chapters 13 and 19, and again in Epistle 103. This single epistle grinds to pieces the audacity of the Lutherans and Calvinists.²

² See Tome I, Apparatus, Book 1, Dissertation 3, chapter 4.

VII. The Church is called Apostolic, both because she was founded and propagated by Christ through the Apostles; and because in her there is a perennial and never interrupted succession of Bishops derived from the Apostles; and finally because by the ministry of these the doctrine of the Apostles is kept immaculate.

Titius, a young Catholic who was devoting himself to medical studies, was accustomed to hear everything called into doubt by his companions. One among them openly asserted that pagan morals were preferable to Christian morals, and handed Titius—who defended the contrary with all his strength—a book by a celebrated author in which the following words are read: “In antiquity the virtues that were most admired were almost exclusively those which are distinctively masculine. Courage, self-assertion, magnanimity, and, above all, patriotism were the leading features of the ideal type; and chastity, modesty, and charity, the gentler and the domestic virtues, which are especially feminine, were greatly undervalued. . . . The change from the heroic to the saintly ideal, from the ideal of Paganism to the ideal of Christianity, was a change from a type which was essentially male, to one which was essentially feminine. . . . Pagan sentiment was chiefly a glorification of the masculine qualities of strength, and courage, and conscious virtue, while Christian sentiment is chiefly a glorification of the feminine qualities of gentleness, humility, and love.”¹ Since Titius had no answer to make, he approached a priest who was his friend and asked for help with the difficulties. Hence it is asked:

1 W. H. Lecky, European Morals, vol. ii, pp. 382–384.

1. Is self-assertion a virtue?

2. What is to be said about the pagan conception of magnanimity?

3. Can the distinction between masculine and feminine virtues be admitted, and can the Christian religion be said to favor the latter?

1. Is self-assertion a virtue?

Self-assertion may be understood merely in the sense of defence of one’s own rights and opinions, and in this sense it seems to belong to the virtue of fortitude. But like self-love, which generally implies excess, self-assertion ordinarily means the thrusting of oneself forward unduly, the tendency of a masterful and ambitious character. In this sense it is a vice, and belongs to pride, ambition, or vainglory.

2. What is to be said of the pagan idea of magnanimity ?

Aristotle describes the magnanimous man in a celebrated chapter of the Ethics.¹ The magnanimous man, according to Aristotle, has great gifts and great natural virtues, but these are all spoiled by pride. He is fully conscious of his merits, he considers them his own, without referring them to God, and claims for them great honor as due to himself from men. He knows how inferior other men are to himself, and despises them. Magnanimity has to be seasoned with the Christian doctrine about God and man’s relation to Him, the foundation of Christian humility, before it can become a Christian virtue. This is admirably done by St. Thomas.²

1 Book iv, chapter 3.

2 II-II, question 129.

3. Can the distinction between masculine and feminine virtues be admitted, and can it be said that the Christian religion favors the latter?³

3 Compare Catholic Encyclopedia, under the word “Honor.”

A virtue is nothing but a habit of well-doing, and as both men and women should have, and practise, all the virtues, no distinction can be admitted between masculine and feminine virtues. The type of Christian perfection is Christ Himself, in Whom all virtues are seen in their fullest development and luster, and as both men and women are bound to form themselves after the model which He set them, it cannot be said that Christianity favors the gentler at the expense of the robuster virtues. The Christian type is a harmonious blending of the gentle and robust virtues; a Christian hero, like St. Louis of France, shows the combination in all its perfection; he is gentle and humble, but he is also strong and high-minded; in a heroine like St. Teresa, we have the same harmonious blending in a female saint. This element of truth in Lecky’s observations may be conceded — the Christian religion insists on meekness, humility, chastity, and charity, and defends the weak; while Paganism was too indulgent and condescending to brute force and strength. But while insisting on the gentler virtues, Christianity by no means forgets the more virile. Perhaps it may be allowed, too, that as man still remains to a great extent a savage, the virtues of courage, fortitude, and others of the same kind do not need to be insisted on so much. Perhaps the tendency of unregenerate human nature is to admire them too highly, and so it is not advisable for Christian teaching to stress them as well.

Caius, a missionary priest who is very busy, received several non-Catholics into the Church. He does not labor to instruct them before reception; rather, after a catechism has been given and some instruction received from certain lay people, when they declare that they understand the catechism and wish to be received into the Church, he receives them immediately without delay, saying within himself that the less instructed especially cannot understand difficult questions about the motives of credibility of the Catholic religion, and that they will gradually understand everything necessary. Nevertheless, because of certain things recently discovered by him, he is troubled by scruples about this manner of proceeding, and indeed about the lawfulness of administering the sacraments to some of them; for he heard one of his converts say that he had entered the Church led only by greater probability and that afterward he had not attained greater certainty. Hence it is asked:

1. What dispositions are required in order that non-Catholics may be received into the Church?

2. What motives of credibility of the Catholic religion are required and sufficient so that the less instructed especially may be able to embrace the faith?

3. Is it lawful to absolve one who doubts about the faith?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What dispositions must non-Catholics have to be received into the Church?

They must believe with a firm faith all that the Catholic Church proposes to be believed, and they must have the purpose of performing all the duties which are of obligation for Catholics. With regard to the faith, it is not sufficient to believe everything implicitly. It is necessary as a means of salvation to believe explicitly that God exists, that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him, and probably also the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and of the Incarnation. It is of precept to believe explicitly the articles of the Faith contained in the Creed, the sacraments which the faithful are under the obligation of receiving, the Lord’s Prayer, and the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. Hence the necessity of instruction in all these matters.

2. What motives of credibility of the Catholic religion are necessary and sufficient so that especially the illiterate may be able to embrace the Faith?

The Council of the Vatican teaches that miracles and prophecy are motives of credibility which are suited to the capacity of all. The existence, history, and fertility in good of the Catholic Church is also a motive by itself for embracing and persevering in the Faith, and it is suited to the capacity even of the illiterate. The motives should be such as to render the Catholic religion evidently credible, and, moreover, such as can not be displaced by future experience or learning. On this account, although motives which are respectively sufficient to produce moral certainty in illiterate minds, though not in others, might be sufficient to enable the illiterate to make an act of faith, yet even the illiterate should be furnished with something more solid and stable before being admitted into the Church.

3. Is it allowable to absolve one who doubts about the Faith?

No, it is not. If he positively doubts whether some article of the Faith is true, he is a heretic. If he doubts negatively or suspends his assent, he sins gravely against the Faith, and can not be absolved as long as he remains in that state.

4. The case. Caius, a missionary priest and a busy man, received many converts into the Church. He did not take great pains in their instruction, but gave them a catechism, and after they had received a certain amount of instruction from some pious lay people, on their declaring that they knew the catechism and wished to be received into the Church, he received them, saying to himself, that the illiterate especially could not understand difficult questions about the motives of credibility of the Catholic religion, and that they would by degrees learn all that was necessary.

In this Caius made a mistake. It would have been better to receive a few converts well instructed than many badly instructed. Ignorance of their religion is one of the causes why so many Catholics lead un-Catholic lives, and profess such un-Catholic sentiments. Many ill-instructed converts leave the Church when difficulties arise. Caius should, at least, see that his converts have a good knowledge of the catechism. It is not necessary for them to go into difficult questions about the motives of credibility, but they should have some clear idea why they wish to become Catholics, and in some way that reason should be reducible to one or other of the ordinary motives of credibility.

Caius began to have scruples about his method of dealing with converts when he heard one of them say that he came into the Church because he thought that more probably it was the true Church of God, and that he has never had greater certainty than that. Caius had reason to be troubled, for this convert had never been a Catholic at all, inasmuch as he never had the Faith, as we gather from the twenty-first proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Supernatural assent of faith useful for salvation stands with merely probable knowledge of revelation, even with a fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Caius may not administer the sacraments to such as these until they are better instructed and until they firmly, without any doubt, believe the Catholic faith.

Caius, an Anglican minister who was dying, summoned Titius, a Catholic priest, and asked to be received into the Catholic Church, which he firmly believed to be the one Church of Christ. As to other matters, Titius found him excellently disposed; nevertheless, he wished absolutely that his reception into the Church be kept secret, lest his wife and children be deprived of the pension to which widows of Anglican ministers have a right. Titius, however, doubted whether he could receive him under this condition or not. Hence it is asked:

1. Is it ever lawful to deny the faith?

2. Must the faith be professed externally, and when?

3. What must be done in the reception of converts?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Is it ever lawful to deny the Faith?

No, it is never lawful to deny the Faith: “He that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven.”¹

1 Matt. x. 33.

2. Must the Faith be openly professed, and when?

Yes, it is at times necessary to profess the Faith openly; it is not sufficient to believe merely internally. This is required by the natural and divine law, as well as by positive law. A solemn profession of faith must, by positive law, be made by converts on their reception into the Church, by bishops at their consecration, by priests at their ordination, and by certain ecclesiastical functionaries on their assumption of office. We are chiefly concerned in this case with profession of faith which is required by natural and divine law. Like all positive precepts it always obliges, but not for always; in other words, there are certain occasions when the precept must be fulfilled; it does not oblige on all occasions whatever. The general rule is that the Faith must be openly professed whenever the honor of God, the spiritual good of one’s neighbor, or one’s own good requires it.

3. What is to be done in the reception of converts?

Inquiry must first of all be made about the baptism of the convert, he must be instructed, and where the bishop requires it, the leave to receive him must be obtained from the bishop. If the convert has not been validly baptized, he is only required to make a profession of faith, and he is baptized according to the Ritual with the longer form, unless an indult has been obtained to use the shorter form prescribed for infants. If he was baptized before, but the validity of the baptism is doubtful, he must make a profession of faith, and then conditional baptism is conferred (in England privately with holy water and without the ceremonies); then he is conditionally absolved from censures, and after making a general confession of his whole life he receives sacramental absolution conditionally. If he was validly baptized, he makes profession of his faith, is absolved from censures, and then makes his confession and is absolved. Youths before puberty are not absolved from censures.

4. The case. Caius, an Anglican minister, called Titius, a Catholic priest, and asked to be received into the Church. Caius was dying. Titius found him well disposed in other respects, but he desired that his conversion should be kept secret for fear lest his wife and children should be deprived of a pension to which they would have a right as the widow and children of an Anglican minister. Titius doubted whether this could be allowed.

No; Caius could not be received on that condition. The conversion of one in his position is likely to give great honor to God and to the true religion, and to be a cause of conversion to others.¹ In all probability the society which granted such pensions as are mentioned in the case would never dream of depriving Caius’ widow and children of theirs because of his conversion on his death-bed. Perhaps, through some friendly source, assurance on this point could be obtained and communicated to Caius, who might then be received unconditionally.

1 Cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F., nn. 44, 84. 2d ed.

In a certain town, when the Anglican elementary schools needed money, the Anglicans decided to sing, on a certain Thursday in their church, the oratorio which is called Messiah, to the hearing of which the people would be admitted for a price, and the proceeds would be applied to the needs of the schools. But since the Anglican singers were not sufficient, they asked certain Catholics, among others Caius, to furnish help.

To Caius, who asked whether any religious function was to be performed at the same time, the reply was made that the Anglican minister would pour forth a general prayer at the beginning, and that nothing else besides Messiah would be done. Caius does not wish to deny help to his fellow citizens, especially since they themselves often help Catholics; nevertheless, he does not know whether in this case it is lawful to assent to the request. Hence it is asked:

1. What is participation in sacred rites, and to what extent is it prohibited with heretics?

1. It is the difference between sensible apprehension and intellectual knowledge, that the former seizes upon a particular object and it only, as this sweet: the latter takes its object as the type of a class of similars, this and the like of this, this sweet as one of the class of sweet things. In like manner the love of passion, which is the love of sense, regards one sole object. Titius is in love with Bertha alone, not with woman in general. But an intellectual love is the love of a type of beauty or goodness, of this object and of others as they approach in likeness to it. Whoever loves William from an intellectual appreciation of his patriotism, in loving him loves all patriots. Every animal loves itself with a brute, sensible love, not a love to find fault with, nor yet a noble and exalted sentiment—a love purely self-regarding, quite apart from the good that is in self, but embracing self simply as self, and self alone. This is the first love of self even in man. But over and above this animal and sensible love, which no man lacks, there is in all men worthy of the name a second self-regarding affection of an intellectual cast, whereby a man loves himself as discerning with the eye of his soul the excellence of his own nature—"how noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals." Intellectual self-complacence overflows from self to similars. It is not self-love, it is love of the race, "the milk of human kindness," philanthropy.

2. But man is a disappointing creature, after all a mere "quintessence of dust," unless he can rise above himself by relation with some superhuman being, and make his final fortune in some better region than this world. Reason requires that we love ourselves, and love our fellow-men, for and in order to the development of the highest gifts and capacities that are in us. These are gifts and capacities divine, preparing us to find our everlasting happiness in God. (Ethics, c. ii., s. iv., n. 2, p. 22.) The love that we bear to ourselves and our neighbour, in view of our coming from God and going to God, is called the love of charity. Charity differs from philanthropy in looking beyond the present life, and above creatures. A materialist and atheist may possess philanthropy, but not charity.

3. Beside the twofold love, animal and intellectual, which we bear ourselves, we may also and should love ourselves with the love of charity, seeing God's gifts in us, and desiring the perfection of those gifts in a happy eternity occupied with God. The charity which we should thus bear to ourselves is the model of that which we owe to our neighbour, whom we are to love as ourselves, not with the same intensity, but with the same quality of love, wishing him the good, human and divine, temporal and eternal, which we wish for ourselves, though not so earnestly as we wish it for ourselves. Our love for ourselves is stronger than for our neighbour: for, if love comes of likeness, much more does it come of identity. But by reason of the vast preponderance of the good that is rational and eternal over that which is material and temporal; and also by reason of the principle laid down by St. Thomas, that "as to the sharing together of (eternal) happiness, greater is the union of our neighbour's soul with our soul than even of our own body with our soul" (2a 2æ, q. 26, art. 5, ad 2),—we are bound to love our neighbour's eternal good better than our own temporal good, and in certain special conjunctures to sacrifice the latter to the former. We have no duty and obligation of loving his temporal good above our own temporal good. But it is often matter of commendation and counsel to sacrifice our temporal interest to our neighbour's. This sacrifice is no breach of the order of charity, beginning at home: since what is resigned of material and perishable profit is gained in moral perfection. Especially commendable is the surrender of private good for the good of the community. Charity, or philanthropy, taking this form, bears the name of patriotism and public spirit.

4. Charity, like material forces, acts in a certain inverse ratio to the distance of the object. Other considerations being equal, the nearer, the dearer. Nay, nearness and likeness to ourselves goes further than goodness in winning our love. This is natural, and charity presupposes nature, and follows its order. As we have more charity for ourselves than for others whom we acknowledge to be better men, so likewise for our kinsmen and intimate friends. We may put the matter thus. Charity consists in wishing and seeking to procure for a person the good that leads to God. One element is the intensity and eagerness of this wish and search; another is the greatness of the good wished. Now we wish those who are better than ourselves to be rewarded according to their deserts with a greater good than ourselves: but this wish is but lukewarm compared to the intensity of our desire that we and our friends with us may attain to all the good that we are capable of.

5. The Christian precept to love our enemies is merely the enforcement of a natural obligation. The obligation stands almost self-evident as soon as it is cleared of misunderstanding. The love of enemies is not based on the ground of their being hostile and annoying us. It would be highly unnatural to love them on that score. Nor are we in duty bound to show to one who hates us special offices of friendship, except we find him in extreme need, e.g., dying in a ditch, as the Good Samaritan found the Jew: otherwise it is enough that we be animated towards him with that common charity, which we bear to other men who are not further off from us than he is. If Lucius offend Titius, there being no other tie between them than the tie of friendship, Titius may, where the offence is very outrageous, henceforth treat Lucius as a stranger. The question of scandal has sometimes to be regarded, but that is an extrinsic circumstance to our present subject. Nor are we concerned to say what is the better thing for Titius to do, but to say all that he is bound to do. He is bound to render himself as void of wilful malice, and as full of ordinary courtesy and good feeling towards Lucius, as he is in the case of Sempronius, a man whom he never heard of till this day. But if there be some other antecedent tie between them besides the tie of friendship,—for instance, if Titius and Lucius are two monks of the same convent, two officers in the same regiment, two partners of one firm,—Titius is no longer justified in treating Lucius as a stranger. He must regard him with ordinary charity; now ordinary charity between two brother-officers, or two fellow-monks, is not the same as between men who have no such tie one with another. This is why we laid it down that we must be animated towards him who has offended us "with that common charity, which we bear to other men who are not further off from us than he is."

6. This then being the exact obligation, the same is easily established. We must love our enemies, because the reasons given for loving all mankind (nn. 1, 2) are not vitiated by this or that man having treated us shamefully. The human nature in him still remains good actually, and still more, potentially; and if good and hopeful, to that extent also lovable. Nor is this lovableness a mere separable accident. Rather, it is the offensive behaviour of the man that is the separable accident. At that we may well be disgusted and abominate it. But the underlying substance remains good, not incurably tainted with that vicious accident. We must attend to the substance, which is, rather than to the accident, which happens, and may be abolished. Let us endeavour to abolish the accident, still so that we respect and regard the substance. Let us seek for redress under the guidance of prudence according to the circumstances of the case, but not for the ruin of our enemy. Let us not render evil for evil, but even in exacting a just satisfaction, make it of the nature of that compensatory evil, which is by consequence good. Let us be angry with our enemy, but sin not by hating him. (Ethics, c. iv., s. iv., n. 3.) We may seek satisfaction for any wrong we have suffered: in grave cases we must have recourse to the State for that: but the sin, if any, of our adversary is not our concern to punish or to seek vengeance for. (Ethics, c. ix., s. iii., n. 4.)

7. The same reasoning holds good even of public enemies, tyrants, persecutors, anarchists, assassins. We must include them in our prayers, wish for their conversion, and, though their case appear hopeless, we must not damn them before their time. If we found one of them dying by accident of cold or asphyxia, we should be bound by a grave obligation to use all ordinary efforts to bring him round and recover him. Still we may use our best efforts to bring them to justice, even to capital punishment, according to the procedure of public law established in the country, and not otherwise. We may also with an inefficacious desire, that is, a desire that finds no vent in action, desire their death under an alternative thus, that either living they may cease to do evil, or that God may call them away to where the wicked cease from troubling. But we must not desire, nor be glad of, their death by any unlawful means, for that were to sympathise with crime.

8. Real charity shows itself in action, succouring a neighbour in need, which is sometimes a counsel, sometimes a duty. It is an axiom, that charity is not binding with grave inconvenience. The gravity of the inconvenience in prospect must be measured against the urgency of the need to be relieved. A neighbour is technically said to be in extreme need, when he is in imminent peril of deadly evil to soul or body, and is unable to help himself. We are under severe obligation of charity to succour any whom we find in this plight.

9. By charity we give of our own to another: by justice we render to another that which is his. Charity neglected calls for no restitution, when the need that required it is past away: justice violated cries for restitution, for what we have taken away from our neighbour remains still his. The obligations of justice are negative, except for the fulfilment of contracts: obligations in charity are largely positive. (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 7, p. 108.)

Readings.—C. Gent., III., 117; 2a 2æ, q. 26, art. 4; ib., art. 7; ib., art. 8; 2a 2æ, q. 25, art. 8; ib., art. 9; ib., art. 6; Ferrier, Greek Philosophy, Socrates, nn. 13, 26, 27, 29. (Remains, vol. i., pp. 227, seq.)

John Smith, a wealthy and prominent Catholic, accuses himself in Confession of being on very bad terms with one of his children. It appears that one of Mr. Smith's sons, a young man of rather unsteady habits, married, over a year ago, a vaudeville actress, anon-Catholic, and from all accounts a young woman of Bohemian antecedents and proclivities. As Mr. Smith and his whole family were very much opposed to this marriage, and did all in their power to stop it, but to no purpose, they feel very much grieved by it, and refuse to have anything to do with the young man or his wife. Mr. Smith has cut the young man off in his will, has forbidden him his house, recently refused to allow him to be present at the parents' golden wedding, although all the other relatives were present; refuses to recognize the young man either in public or in private, to return his salutations or to permit any advances to be made toward a reconciliation, either by the young man himself, or by his friends.

Quaeritur: Is Mr. Smith's conduct justifiable before God, or is it sinful?

Principles: This case comes under the heading "de amore inimicorum." The law of charity imposes a twofold obligation on us in regard to our enemy. First, we must not wish him evil; second, we must wish him well.

First: We must not wish our enemy evil; that is, we must not repay evil with evil, nor cherish a spirit of revenge toward him. We must pardon the personal offense when requested, not always immediately. Sometimes there may be just cause for deferring pardon in order to manifest the pain we suffer by reason of the offense. Sometimes, even, we may be obliged to make the first advance toward a reconciliation, to prevent scandal or to save our enemy from sin, when we can do so without much trouble to ourselves.

Second: We must wish our enemy well; that is, we must include him in our prayers. We must succor him in his needs, as we would any one else. And if we exercise charity indiscriminately toward a large number, we must not exclude our enemy, for this would be a mark of revenge; and if special ties of blood, etc., unite us, we are bound to give such evidence of good will toward our enemy as we give to others who are bound to us by the same ties. But special marks of friendship that we owe to no one in particular, either by reason of their personal condition or the customs of the country, we are not obliged to show to our enemy.

Here we must remark that it is one thing to harbor a spirit of revenge, and quite another thing to desire the reparation of outraged rights. It is perfectly legitimate to desire the restoration of our good name, or the restitution of our stolen property, and to take action at law to obtain them; yes, even to take criminal proceedings against the offender to have him punished. If this is done out of love for justice, it is quite in keeping with the law of charity. If it is done from a spirit of revenge, it is, of course, sinful. Once satisfaction has been made, we must forgive the personal offense. Until satisfaction has been made, this is not required of us.

Regarding the question of saluting those who have grievously offended us, the doctrine of St. Ligouri, Tamburini, Mazotta, and others may be summed up as follows: We are not obliged to salute those who have wrongly offended us, unless they make the first advances, unless it be question of a superior, or unless to refrain from saluting our enemy for a long time could be interpreted as a mark of hatred. But if our enemy greets us first, we are bound to greet him in return, except once or again we might be justified in refusing to recognize a greeting in order to show our feelings have been hurt. In a word, the omission of the ordinary greetings and marks of good will that pass among men must be taken, sometimes on account of circumstances, not as a sign of hatred or revenge, but as a "manifestatio justi moeroris tantum." If, therefore, on account of the circumstances, the denial for a time of the ordinary salutations and greetings must be interpreted as a manifestation of wounded feelings, and if in fact the denial proceeds from no spirit of hatred or ill will, such denial is not sinful. If, however, under the circumstances, the denial of the ordinary marks of good will must be interpreted as a sign of hatred or revenge, "pro manifestatione vindictae et inimicitiae," then such denial is sinful, even though it do not arise from feelings of hatred or revenge.

Application of principles: Mr. Smith's son had become his enemy. He had given his father just cause for feeling hurt and outraged. He had done his father and his family a grievous wrong. Although an enemy, we must not forget the special ties of blood that unite them. Was Mr. Smith's conduct toward his son justified in every instance? We must take each separate count by itself.

First, Mr. Smith cuts off his son in his will. Is this act "contra justitiam," or only "contra charitatem," or wholly blameless? Whether this cutting off of children by parents in their wills be contrary to the virtue of strict justice does not appear. Some theologians think it is; others that it is not. Fr. Genicot thinks that it is not. Fr. Lehmkuhl thinks that it is. Genicot says: “Nor would I think that a parent who without just cause favored one son over the others would sin gravely, as Lehmkuhl thinks.” (I. n. 677).

“If anyone out of hatred wished to leave his children only their lawful portion, or altogether to pass over brothers who were not in need, he would be bound under grave obligation to put aside this hatred, but only urged to leave them something more; for he is using his right” (ibid.).

Lehmkuhl thinks that where there is no "clara et justa causa," parents sin against justice in preferring some children to others (I. n. 1155).

De Lugo thinks that it is not against justice: “Therefore, a confessor ought to compel a dying person who is unwilling to leave anything to his brothers, or anything but the lawful portion to his children, to put aside hatred if perhaps he is moved by hatred or revenge, and also to urge him to provide for them; nevertheless, he ought not on that account to deny absolution to one who is unwilling, unless the need is of such a degree that he ought to assist persons so closely joined to him.”

(disp. 24. n. 175).

Mr. Smith's action, therefore, in cutting off his son, is not evidently against justice. Is it against charity? If it is prompted by hatred or revenge, it is and grievously so. If it is not prompted by hatred, but by the fear that the son may abuse his inheritance, it is not. The laws of this country leave the father free in bequeathing his goods to his children. In this case the evidence favors the father. The son's past history promises poorly for the future. The son will, in all likelihood, be the better for being disinherited. The father's act, therefore, can hardly be interpreted as evidently against charity. Still it were much wiser if the father made some provision for his son, an annual allowance that could not be abused. In regard to forbidding the young man his house, we must distinguish. If the young man has reformed or is trying to reform, Mr. Smith may forbid him his house for a time, to give expression to his outraged feelings. But a year is certainly a safe limit. The young man has a home of his own now, and no longer the same claim on his father's house. Still, to continue to refuse him admission savors of hatred and revenge, and the father must desist under pain of being denied absolution. As long as the son refuses to reform, the father is not obliged to receive him.

That Mr. Smith refused to invite the son to his golden wedding may have been simply a measure of prudence. The son's presence would very likely have caused trouble, recriminations, and perhaps a general scandal; certainly if his wife were to attend.

If, however, the young man and his wife had both turned over a new leaf, this would have been an excellent occasion for bringing about a good understanding, and unless serious difficulties were apprehended, Mr. Smith could hardly have refused them an invitation without committing sin.

The same is to be said about Mr. Smith's refusal to recognize his son in public or in private. If the son continues in an evil course, Mr. Smith may continue to give expression to his sorrow by refusing to recognize him. If the son has reformed, Mr. Smith is obliged in conscience to recognize him. He may refrain for a time, say for a few months, from recognizing the son, but to continue to do so must be interpreted in the light of hatred or revenge. And his continued refusal to return his son's greetings or to open the way for a reconciliation renders Mr. Smith unworthy of absolution. It seems evident from the case that Mr. Smith is of a stern character, and no more should be required of him than is absolutely necessary. But what is required by the law of God should be insisted on with great firmness, because a man of this character easily deceives himself by believing his conduct to be prompted by a love of righteousness and justice, whereas it is prompted by a spirit of animosity and revenge.

Titius, a young man of otherwise good parts, is becoming very much addicted, of late, to the use of strong drink. His friend Cajus, a young man of the same standing as Titius, perceives this growing habit with alarm, and considers seriously within himself what may be his conscientious duty in the case. Cajus has, on several occasions, taken Titius to task for his excessive drinking, but only in a mild way and with considerable hesitation. Titius' father, a good man, knows that he drinks, and many of Titius' young men friends know it. But they have neglected, up to the present, to remonstrate with him about it, and, in the meantime, the case is becoming more and more aggravated. Cajus is beginning to have qualms of conscience about his duty of correcting Titius, under the circumstances. Is Cajus bound, under pain of mortal sin, to admonish and correct Titius, or may he leave the burden of correcting Titius to Titius' father and friends?

Solution.—Our Saviour imposes on us the precept of fraternal correction, when He says: “If your brother sins against you, correct him” (Matt. xviii.), charity demands of us that we rescue our neighbor from grievous evil whenever we can do so without serious inconvenience or damage to ourselves. There is no question here of obligations arising from justice or piety; as, for instance, between pastor and people, or between parent and child. There is question here of an obligation arising from charity, as between private individuals. Now drinking to excess is a grievous evil and a mortal sin, and although mortal sin can not be committed except by the free will and consent of the sinner, still, 1, it may be difficult for the sinner to reform, if left to himself, either because he does not reflect, or does not realize his condition; 2, the sinner may be led into sin by reason of external causes, from which it may be very difficult for him to extricate himself, unless admonished and assisted by others. There is a graver obligation of saving our neighbor from mortal sin than there is of saving him from serious temporal loss into which he is plunging of his own free will. And yet we are bound, sometimes even under mortal sin, to save our neighbor from worldly loss, into which he is rushing knowingly and willingly, when we can do so, without serious damage to ourselves. By much the more reason, therefore, are we obliged to save our neighbor from serious spiritual injury.

However, in order that there be created a grave obligation to correct our neighbor, the following conditions must exist: 1. We must be sure that our neighbor is committing grievous sin, or at least that he is in danger of committing it. 2. There must be little or no probability that our neighbor, if left to himself, will correct himself. 3. We must have hope of effecting some good by our correction. 4. There must be no one else more fit or equally fit to admonish, and who will, in fact, administer the admonition. 5. There must be no danger of our incurring any serious risk by reason of our admonitions.

If these conditions are verified, then, from the very nature of the case, and according to the unanimous opinion of theologians, there arises a grave obligation of correcting our brother.

However, even here, it must be observed, there is not so much question of correcting a past sin as of preventing a future sin; that is to say, we are obliged to prevent our neighbor committing grave sin or repeating it, and we are obliged to prevent him remaining along time in a state of spiritual damnation. Therefore it follows that we are not obliged to correct our brother as soon as he sins, not only because, as a rule, the above conditions will not be verified but also because the sinner himself is not obliged to repent directly he has fallen, but may wait some time; and therefore neither are we obliged to admonish him immediately upon his fall.

Now, on the other hand, there are circumstances which excuse us from the obligation of correcting our neighbor.

1. If there is hope that our brother will rescue himself, in a short time, or that he will not fall again, our obligation ceases.

2. If our correction would only make matters worse we are excused from correcting, except where damage is being done to others or to religion, etc.

3. If it be probable that parents or superiors will administer the correction, then those who are of equal standing with the sinner are released from the obligation.

4. In like manner, if I can prudently judge that some one else, more fit than I, will admonish the delinquent, I am excused.

It is rare that we are obliged to correct some one whom we do not know, because we can not judge what may be the result of our correction. A private person, of easy-going nature or indolent disposition or who is timid and backward, who thinks himself unfit to administer a correction, and therefore omits it, but who is, nevertheless, willing to act, if he thought it quite necessary or profitable, would commit a venial sin, by not correcting. Indeed, private persons are rarely obliged to administer a correction, unless they be more or less intimately acquainted, because it is rare that all the conditions creating a grave obligation are present. And seldom, if ever is an inferior obliged to correct a superior. Scrupulous persons are, as a rule, exempt altogether from the obligation of administering fraternal correction, because they are incapable of distinguishing when there is an obligation to admonish and when there is none. Moreover, on account of their scrupulous nature, they would commit a great many imprudences and torment themselves beyond measure. As a rule, therefore, it is better that they should not correct others, except in extraordinary and very evident cases.

Here we wish to lay stress on a point of considerable importance, in this matter, and that is that it is neither the duty nor the privilege of private individuals to pry into the lives of their neighbors, with a view to correcting them. All writers on this matter call attention to this point. Even superiors are admonished to be moderate and conservative in their scrutiny of the lives of those under them. We are obliged to administer a correction only in those cases that fall under our notice, without our seeking them.

Let us now apply these remarks to the case in hand.

1. If there is any hope at all that Titius' father or his other friends will administer the necessary correction, then Cajus is not obliged to do so.

2. If there is only slight hope or likelihood that an admonition coming from Cajus will do any good, then there is no obligation to give it.

3. If Cajus is scrupulous or overnervous or inclined to exaggerate, it were better that he abstain from correcting.

4. If Cajus fears harm for himself or for those connected with him, resulting from the correction, as, v. g., enmities, loss of position, breaking of a marriage engagement, then he is not obliged to act.

5. But if Cajus is a prudent man, whose admonitions will likely be heeded, and if he feels convinced that no one else will administer the necessary correction, and if he has nothing to fear from it, except that Titius may feel sore about it, etc., then Cajus is bound in conscience to administer a prudent, earnest, and charitable correction to Titius, in order to save him from the great evil that is destroying him. Cajus must make it evident to Titius that he is acting, not from motives of fault-finding or recrimination or personal indignation, but in a spirit of true, disinterested Christian charity.

A convert to the Catholic faith is a knight of Pythias. He was a knight for many years before he became a Catholic. He carries a few thousand dollars life insurance in the order. As he is a poor man, it would be a great hardship for him to quit the order and forfeit this insurance. What shall he do about it?

Answer.—There are two categories of so-called secret societies, forbidden to Catholics: (a) societies, like the Masons, that are forbidden under censure, i. e., under pain of excommunication; (b) societies, like the Knights of Pythias, that are forbidden under pain of sin, but not under censure.

On October 11, 1869, Pope Pius IX issued his famous Bull, Apostolicae Sedis, in which among many other censures, reserved to the Holy See, is the censure of excommunication pronounced against “those giving their names to the Masonic or Carbonari sect, or to other sects of the same kind, which plot either openly or secretly against the Church or lawful authorities; and likewise those furnishing favor of any kind to those sects and not denouncing their hidden leaders and chiefs, until they have denounced them.”

Two qualifications are required in order that a society or organization fall under the bann of excommunication: (a) its members must constitute a sect, that is, they must be united very closely together by the profession of the same principles, that the society as a body professes and advocates; (b) it must war against the Church or against the State, even though it exist for other purposes also.

The societies generally understood to possess these two qualifications and therefore to be forbidden under pain of excommunication are:

Summary : The precise object of private tolerance, some evil which offends or annoys us.—The virtues exercised in this tolerance.—It is a source of light and progress for the person who practises it.—The words of St. Augustine.—The influence of Christianity on the practice, even the heroic practice of tolerance.— The example of missionary priests and nuns.—All outward tolerance is not virtuous, or even honourable. —The conditions of virtuous tolerance.

All tolerance is practised in respect of some evil, or some error ; but it is not every evil, or every intellectual error, or every kind of misconduct, that puts our tolerance to the test. There are evils that do not affect us, errors that we share, faults to which we give our consent or in which we participate. Such evils, such errors, such faults as these can neither hurt nor annoy us. If we remark their existence in others, they excite only our compassion ; in ourselves we regard them with complacency. Only those acts or conditions are the object of tolerance which affect us disagreeably, which cause us suffering, uneasiness, or displeasure. When we are contradicted in our opinions, opposed in our desires, thwarted in our plans, and, above all, when an adversary insolently attacks our most firmly established convictions, our most cherished beliefs, or the honour and reputation of which we are justly jealous, such conduct causes disgust, depression, fear, impatience, or anger ; and trials of this kind bring out the tolerance of a man who has control over his passions, and remains constant in his own goodness and justice.

Can we wonder that tolerance in individuals is so universally commended ? Self-control and moderation, which tell of strength and victory, are pleasing to all; and to us, as Christians, this tolerance presents itself with all the charms of three eminent virtues—justice, charity, and humility. It is justice because it respects the inviolable rights of man among his fellow-men : persuasion is the only way in which I can legitimately induce my neighbour to share my opinions. It is charity, for St. Paul tells us that that queen of virtues “ is patient, is kind . . . beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things ”1—that, in short, it inspires us with all those sentiments from which the most perfect tolerance springs as naturally as a flower from the branch that is created to bear it. Lastly, it is humility, for a prudent distrust of himself, the consciousness of his own liability to error, the knowledge of his own weakness, keep a man from showing contempt or irritation at the opinions of others.

In tolerance among our fellow-men we recognize a fruitful principle of light and progress. We may¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 4, 7. always derive instruction from listening to others, and by allowing them full freedom of speech we learn to know ourselves better, and to correct our own faults. St. Augustine was fully convinced of this when he wrote : “ My opinion is not expressed with such authority that it may not be contradicted. I admit that I endeavour to be among those who write in proportion as they progress, and progress as they write ; but if my prudence or my knowledge is at fault, and if capable judges subject me to criticism, whose justice I must sooner or later recognize if I progress, what is there to wonder at or complain of ? Pardon me rather, and congratulate me, not on having fallen into error, but on having my mistakes corrected.”1

¹ Ep. 143 (Migne, P.L., t. 33, cols. 585, 586).

This is what religion enables us to find in tolerance, practised, not as a means of exciting the empty admiration of others, but as a help to a consistent and honourable life. It helps us by the most express and touching exhortations to subject our whole life to the glorious and gentle rule of humble and charitable justice ; it forbids all hatred and pride ; it commands us to love all men, not excepting strangers and our enemies, and a fortiori not excepting the guilty—that is to say, the weak, and those who persist in error, that is to say, who have gone entirely astray.

This Christian law would neither approve of the massacre of pagans, nor allow us, like the Mahome- dans, to treat those who profess another religion as dogs. The great doctors of the Catholic Church teach us to be kind in our treatment of others, generous in our appreciation, ready to make allowances or excuses for them, always willing to help or befriend them ; and the best and truest Christians are most generous with their sympathy and their prayers and offers of service, which is the best proof of good-will; they are always ready to believe in the repentance of sinners, and rejoice over it. And how many good Christians sacrifice themselves entirely to their tolerant generosity ! In our own cities we see the nursing sisters at the bedsides of the most malignant enemies of their religion, of the most foul-mouthed infidels ; and everyone knows that in non-Christian countries the most bigoted Mahomedan is sure to receive the devoted attention of the admirable White Sisters.¹ What tolerance is required in a true Catholic missionary ! He refuses to use violence or compulsion ; he faces the most repulsive spectacles, making up his mind to endure them without irritation or complaint; no rebuffs wear out his patience or his courage ; and his hope of making converts does not arise from any desire for power.¹ His desire is to give, not to receive: he willingly gives up health, home, friends, even life itself to gain souls—that is, not to enslave them or exploit them for his own advantage, but to lead them to God, to truth, and happiness.

¹ Madame Marcelle Tinayre, a woman of letters, who does not profess to be a Catholic, was struck with the difference between the two religions (Christianity and Ma- homedanism). She was visiting a hospital in Constantinople shortly after the revolution of the Young Turks, and met with a young lady of good family, named Selika, who was attending some of the wounded from Thessalonica. Madame Tinayre asked her : “ Have you attended the reactionaries also ?” Selika’s beautiful black eyes grew hard as she answered : “ No. I had my choice, because I came as a volunteer. I do not nurse any but the good men.” “ Oh, my little Selika !” says Madame Tinayre, “ brave and charming as you are, you would be willing to die at once if your death could insure the triumph of the constitution. Little Selika, whom I admire so much, you have no idea what an abyss there is between us ! No Christian woman, even if she did not practise her religion, but if she were a Christian by birth and education, would stop to think that there are good and bad among the sick ” (Notes d’une Voyageuse en Turquie. Premiers jours d’un Nouveau Règne, p. 274, sixth edition).

¹ Among Mahomedans, as an impartial author remarks, “ the Holy War is intended not to bring about the conversion of unbelievers, but to destroy their political power. Whether the vanquished embrace Mahomedanism or not is their own affair. Sometimes even the Arab chiefs look with an unfavourable eye upon conversions ” (Chantepie de la Saussaye, Manuel d’histoire des religions, p. 284).

The Catholic thus finds in his religion all the principles of the best kind of tolerance. What more does he need to be really tolerant ? Balmes wisely remarks : “If we have a little experience of men, and are brought into contact with those who differ from us, we shall understand better the prejudices and illusions stored up in the human mind, and shall be less surprised at the resistance offered to faith ; we shall mistrust all such things as tempt us from the path of duty ; we shall appreciate the influence of environment on principles and action, knowing that, if we were in the unbelievers’ place, we should perhaps be more perverse and more sceptical than they ; and all these considerations will increase our gratitude to God, the giver of life and grace, and our compassion for the misfortunes of others.”

How well Salvian in the fifth century was able to put himself into the place of those in error, and in what modern language is his tolerance expressed ! Speaking of the ignorant Arians, the holy priest excuses them thus : “ They are heretics, but without knowing it; though heretics in our eyes, they are not so in intention ; they think they are such good Catholics that they can call us heretics. What they are in our eyes we are in theirs ; the truth is on our side, but they persuade themselves that it is on theirs; they are in error, but their error is accompanied by good faith ; what their punishment will be at the day of judgment the Supreme Judge alone can tell.”¹

¹ De Gubernatione Dei, l. 5, chap. ii. (M.P.L., t. 53, cols. 95, 96).

Are we to infer, from the universal praise bestowed on private tolerance and the Christian inspiration that we recognize in it, that all patience, all indulgence, all insusceptibility to injury from external things, is commendable ? No, for in its outward manifestation it is capable of a double explanation. The man who bears pain may be brave, or he may be under the influence of a drug ; ignorance of danger, as well as courage, may make a man face death calmly. The paralytic has no more thought of running away from the enemy than the bravest of soldiers. Similarly, in the moral and intellectual order there are various kinds of blindness and torpor, of paralysis and incapacity, which prevent a man from feeling anger and resentment. The man who does not think at all can never enter into any conflict of ideas with another, for there is no rivalry except between men of the same profession. What does tolerance cost a sceptic, or a man who takes no interest in any great cause ? There is a kind of tolerance, induced by weakness or vanity, which is merely a distaste for struggles and discussions ; for struggles require strength, and discussions expose a man to the risk of being beaten. In short, besides the tolerance which is commendable, there is a tolerance which is entirely vicious ; an affectation of good-nature assumed in order to conceal ignorance or carelessness, a selfish love of ease which leads to compromise with error, an indulgence which degenerates into complicity.¹

¹ Madame de Chantal showed magnanimity when she held at the baptismal font the child of the man who had unintentionally killed her husband ; so also did the noble widow of the Governor of Belgian Luxembourg, who, after the assassination of her husband, made her children pray first for the father whom they mourned, and then for the man who had made them orphans. Madame Zola displayed only a contempt for morality when, on the occasion of the marriage of an illegitimate daughter of the deceased novelist, she associated herself with the mother of the girl in issuing the invitations ; and certain newspapers only showed their stupidity by going into ecstasies over this deplorable and scandalous compliance, as if it had been an act of tolerance worthy of admiration. Why does a moral abyss separate the actions of the saint and her imitator from that of this other widow ? The two great Christian women overcame their own feelings of natural resentment, but they did not approve anything reprehensible. Madame Zola forgot that she represented the rights and the inviolability of the home, and her action ratified a long-continued and shameless contempt of those rights.

Before estimating tolerance at its true value, it is necessary to examine the reasons and motives for it, and even to see who practises it; for it is only in a man devoted to truth and justice that tolerance denotes strength, and may be a virtue ; and it will be a virtue when, inspired by noble motives, it displays a moderation that is free from fear or weakness, and placed under the prudent guidance of justice and charity.

Summary : The restraint imposed upon the father of a family.—Prudent tolerance of Christian parents towards an erring child.—Assertion of rights to education of children.—Resistance to official interference.—Duties of tutors and educators.—Duties of masters and employers.—Preference shown to honest persons and friends of religion.—Relations with non-Catholics.— Attitude in religious controversies, and towards writers suspected of heterodoxy.

Hitherto we have dealt with private tolerance as practised among our fellow-citizens, but in private life we have to consider also the family, where the father’s authority is sacred. The father of a family is bound to watch over his children as over himself, and is responsible for all that takes place under his roof; and however indulgent he may be to the errors and faults of others, he has no excuse for admitting persons or opinions that he considers mischievous or pernicious. Since there are intellectual and moral perversions as well as organic corruptions, since the soul may be poisoned as well as the body, it is a father’s duty to take the same care of the morals of his family as of their bodily health. This obligation, however, is often sadly neglected by timid or injudicious parents. Who can say how much harm is done by this lamentable indifference ? But, on the other hand, the obligation is often per-fectly understood and scrupulously observed in our country, where parental affection quickens the sense of duty. Hitherto public opinion has always respected and encouraged this prudent severity in the heads of families, for the boldest critic cannot find fault with a wisdom which, while encouraging the utmost freedom of familiar intercourse in the home, is always on guard against danger from without.

Parents, without being considered intolerant, are allowed in the interests of religion to be judiciously strict in the proscription of books and newspapers which endanger the purity of the home, to watch for the first germs of corruption, and, in short, to establish a sort of domestic index or inquisition.

But the most assiduous vigilance is often frustrated. Man’s will is always free, and always accessible to temptation, and sometimes even the most carefully brought up children declare for evil. What a period of sorrow and anxiety begins when Christian parents see one of their children lose his faith or fall into evil ways ! Their hearts bleed at the sight, and their minds are tortured with anxiety to find a way, while condemning the evil, to bring back the erring one, and preserve the innocent members of the family from corruption. And this trouble may often recur, and sometimes last even during their whole lives. Their Christian profession forbids parents to -connive at scandalous conduct ;¹ Christian charity discourages excessive severity, but Christian prudence condemns any toleration of immorality. The guilty person is a son who has a right to his father’s affection and support. If unfortunate, he is to be pitied ; but if he is perverse, he deserves punishment; and if he becomes dangerous to others, he must be rendered incapable of doing mischief. What, then, should be the father’s ruling principle ? When in doubt, he seeks refuge in prayer, that he may have wisdom to do all that duty requires without exasperating the offender. In this analysis of what may be a most cruel trial to a Christian parent, there is nothing to suggest anything like fanatical intolerance ; on the contrary, all his actions are prompted by kindness and affection.

¹ Especially such things as debauchery and concubinage, even when they are not condemned by the Civil Law, or even when they receive a legal sanction, as in the case of civil marriage after divorce.

Nor can a father be reasonably charged with intolerance because he offers a determined resistance to the invader of his home who attempts to corrupt his children by deceit, threats, or seduction. In an age which boasts of its liberty, attempts have been made, as in the republics of ancient Greece, to claim children in the name of the State, the law, or national unity, and the public funds have been used for the purpose. The parents who dared to assert their independence or their authority, and deny to the State all authority over the soul, or to the human law all power to interfere with the sacred right of a father, were not intolerant, but were resisting the intolerance of others ; and in rejecting offers of money, they simply refused to degrade themselves by a shameful bargain.¹

¹ It is too much, indeed, that, after all the discussions and all the disclosures that have taken place, an attempt should still be made to delude the public as to the meaning of neutral education, secular education, compulsory education. Neutrality is a myth, and secularism means atheism ; compulsory education with neutrality and secularism is simple tyranny. There is no such thing really as neutral education, because various branches of study do not lend themselves to neutral treatment, and the great object of education is to elevate and form the mind. Neutral education so-called can only be sceptical, indifferent, and in plain contradiction to religious duties. Secularism closes the school to all supernatural or Divine influence. The compulsory neutral school is an institution forced upon Catholic fathers, the acceptance of which obliges them— the poor especially—to do violence to their consciences. The existence of the free unsubsidized school, supposing it to be tolerated, does not remove the grievance. What would be said of a State which compelled its subjects to attend either a Christian Church or a masonic lodge at their own choice, and which contented itself with building masonic lodges, leaving the people to build churches for themselves ? Would it be fair to say that the State was bound to build only a lodge in order to show its impartiality to the different Christian bodies ? Would it prove its impartiality by allowing the discontented to build themselves a church ? The masonic lodge and the neutral school are as much alike as mother and daughter : their morality is the same. In refusing to build or subsidize any but neutral schools, the Government declares indifference to be the religion of the State. Cicero was very clear-sighted when he congratulated the Roman Republic on having escaped from official teaching and the uniformity of systems of education (De Republica, iv. 3).

The principles by which enlightened parents regulate and measure their tolerance should also guide those who are called upon to take their place or share their authority, such as tutors and instructors. No consideration for the weakness of others should ever make them forget their high and holy mission of keeping safe and sound the souls committed to their charge, in whom they are bound to foster a love of truth and justice. Similarly, it is the duty of persons who have the administration of affairs or the direction of great business undertakings to exercise a vigilant charity. The influence and authority of masters and employers, though not so sacred as the authority of a parent, are not mere words, and it is right that the servants, even of full age, who submit to that authority, should feel the benefit of it. It is unjustifiable, under pretence of tolerance, to permit in our homes, our offices, or our workshops, language and habits which make these places dangerous for the persons employed therein, while charity obliges us to protect and encourage virtue.

These considerations seem enough to distinguish between the wholesome and the vicious tolerance as practised by superiors to inferiors in private life.

Tolerance among equals, however simple the rules appear, is liable to be misunderstood, and is sometimes called for out of season, for tolerance can never interfere with the demands of charity. Who will blame me for preferring a fellow-countryman to a foreigner ? The preference of one involves no hatred or ill-will to the other. Shall we be considered intolerant if we offer help and relief to our comrades in arms before others, especially such help and relief as, if given to our adversaries, would be used to the detriment of religion and virtue ? If Catholics unite together to give their patronage or custom to honest people recommended by their religion, is there any reason for calling them intolerant ? And are we narrow-minded or bigoted if we take precautions for the future use of our property, to prevent it from being squandered, or used for the purposes of a war against the faith ? We speak here of property which forms our own patrimony, but it is possible that we may be en-trusted with the administration of other property. The Catholic statesman is forbidden by his conscience to deal with the funds of the State with the same freedom as if they were his own, or to dispose of public offices as if they were posts in his own household. His appointments and subsidies will be regulated by prudent and impartial justice, according to the government and constitution of the society. The Catholic statesman will take care not to be exclusive, but he must take care also not to be imposed upon. On the contrary, he should be so firm that the fear of reprisals may act as a check on anti-Catholic administrations, and compel them to have some regard for administrative justice and equitable moderation.

If we leave the economic order, and raise our thoughts to consider the interests of religion and morality, we remark that prudence requires each man to show for himself the same care and circumspection that a father exercises over his family. Consideration for others which makes us careless of ourselves, outward indulgence of others which may do us infinite harm, are the result of a vicious tolerance which is not virtue, but weakness of character, cowardice in the face of duty. Let our relations even with those who reject our faith and despise our moral codes be always correct, and even cordial; let our demeanour be always marked by Christian charity. So far, so good ; but how frequent and how intimate should these relations be, and is there any reason for their existence at all ? These questions remain to be answered, for we cannot visit everyone, or be on terms of intimate friendship with the whole world. The true solution is in taking good advice, and endeavouring to fulfil the great Christian commandment : “ Be good thyself, and spread all the good thou canst around thee.”

It is a delicate question, how we ought to behave in the philosophic or religious controversies in which we take part, and the problem becomes extremely perplexing when our adversary declares that he shares the faith for which we write or speak. This embarrassing subject requires some remarks which will fitly conclude the first part of this work.

A man may err in good faith, or he may make profession of belief without sincerity. Ambiguous or obscure language may be used to conceal a clever trap, or may be the result of ignorance or carelessness. The profession of religious faith reveals the inmost soul, but a false profession of faith may be made to cover the most insidious designs. Freemasonry formerly numbered priests among its members, and not half a century ago it filled the confraternities of Brazil. About 1850 at Brussels it was able to command religious services. If it is wicked to calumniate, or disseminate unjust suspicions, it is necessary at times to have the sense and courage to cry “ Wolf!” before it is too late.

A private individual has no right to accuse another of being in error—by which is meant religious error—except after mature deliberation. He has no right to speak in the name of the Church. He is not infallible, and cannot without presumption claim for himself any special orthodoxy. He must avoid the self-conceit which sometimes disguises itself as religious zeal, the attachment to his own opinions which may be the motive of his ardour in preaching submission. Does it not seem sometimes—in the case of the condemnation of a published work, for example—as if the writer cared less about being on the side of authority than having authority on his side ? On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the decisions of the Church or the Holy See lay down directions which must not be exaggerated or overstrained, but which a loyal Catholic will refuse to evade by quibbles or minimizing interpretations.

In the perplexities which arise in such circumstances, how useful it is to listen to the counsels of toleration ! Be just, they say to each of us, and see if the man or the work in which you detect errors does not show too much Catholicism to fall under suspicion. Be equitable, and in case of doubt give your brethren the benefit of that presumption of correctness which is laid down in the oldest laws, and of which St. Ignatius writes in these express terms in the beginning of his spiritual exercises : “ Every good Christian is more eager to justify than to condemn a statement of his neighbour ; and if he cannot justify it, he asks the author for an explanation. If the author explains it ill, he corrects him with charity; and when that is not enough, he endeavours to the best of his power to find an acceptable meaning which will save the proposition.” History itself attests the opportuneness of this caution : rigorous judgments, though long accepted, are reviewed by the light of fresh study. A more careful examination sometimes shows that time- honoured imputations of heresy rest on expressions badly used, badly understood, or badly trans-lated.¹ Be kind ; do not seek the malicious satisfaction of having discovered an additional enemy to the Church. The bitterness of some men’s writing is very exasperating, and irritation will sometimes bring down a tottering structure which a little kindness might have saved. What would have become of Abelard without the gentleness of Peter the Venerable ?² Charity has good, not evil, for its object ; it would rather win hearts by gentleness than humiliate them by an assumption of superiority. Be courteous; in the fight against error treat your adversary with deference. And, above all, be scrupulously truthful.³ To all, friends and foes alike, give that serious attention which does not misrepresent any opinion, does not distort any statement, does not mutilate any quotation.

¹ See, for example, the doctoral dissertation of Professor Lebon on certain Monophysites (Le Monophysisme Severien, Louvain, 1909). The panegyric dedicated by St. Gregory Nazianzen to St. Athanasius is worth reading. The holy doctor relates how, in the fourth century, the whole world was nearly rent in twain by a quarrel over syllables : the Easterns drew a distinction between substance and hypostasis, while the Westerns used the same word for the two ideas. The dispute was carried on with great bitterness, but St. Athanasius calmly weighed what each side had to say, and showed at the Synod of 362 that both sides were perfectly agreed on the main point. And “ at this time of disputes and controversies,” said St. Gregory, “ it would be a great pity not to draw attention to an example, which our contemporaries would do well to follow ” (M.P.G., t. 35, cols. 1125, 1126).

² See, in the dictionary of Vacant-Mangenot, the article “ Abelard,” by Father Portalié, S.J.

³ “ Be truthful in all things ; be scrupulously sincere. You will deserve to be faithful on important occasions, if you have been faithful in things that seem unimportant, [sincere children of God]. The love of truth is a great grace, only obtained by fervent prayer” (Ruinart, Abridgment of the Life of Dom. J. Mabillon, 1709, p. 392).

We need not fear to serve the cause of Christ less efficiently by putting on His spirit. In our own day especially, when men love to make a show of sincerity, and when so many honest but mistaken souls are yearning for the truth, let us count Christian loyalty as one of the most powerful influences to induce men to accept the gift of faith. Defective arguments weaken sound propositions ; false statements embitter disputes, perpetuate controversies, multiply misunderstandings, and give an opening for crushing rejoinders. An arrogant and uncompromising tone in an author makes men reluctant to listen to his arguments, and anxious to see him proved to be wrong. We do not establish a truth by showing that there is little evidence to support it; we cannot eradicate error by making it look like truth ; and we cannot hope to persuade a reader if we begin by exciting his antipathy. There is much sound sense as well as humour in the words of St. Augustine : “ Wolves sometimes disguise themselves in sheep’s clothing, but that is no reason why sheep should change their skins.”¹ Those victories alone give glory to Christ which are won by the weapons of Christ, for these are the weapons of justice.² To wish for no other victory, we need great self-control, perfect confidence in the ultimate triumph of truth, zeal untainted by unworthy motives ; and this self-control, this confidence, this zeal, enhance the private virtue of tolerance, and invite the admiration of all men.

¹ De Sermone Dei in Monte, l. 1, chap. ii., n. 41 (M.P.L., t. 34, col. 1287).

² Per arma justitiæ—By the armour of justice, on the right hand and on the left (2 Cor. vi. 7).

129. Thesis III. All men are obliged to accept Divine Revelation, when it has been made known to them, and to believe the mysteries which it may contain.

Explanation. We know indeed that a supernatural Revelation has been given to mankind. This, however, it is the province, not of Philosophy, but of Theology and kindred sciences to prove and discuss. Prescinding, therefore, from the actual state of things, we examine, from the standpoint of natural reason, what man's duties are in regard to Revelation if the latter should be made.

Part 1. Man is obliged to accept Divine Revelation. Proof. God is the Supreme Lord and Master of all His creatures. He has the right, therefore, to enjoin upon us the acceptance of certain truths which natural reason by itself is incapable of discovering, and to command the performance of certain acts of worship. This right connotes, on our part, the duty of accepting such truths and of performing such acts, when God's will in these matters shall have been made known to us. Now this is to accept Divine Revelation. Consequently, we are obliged to accept Divine Revelation when it has been made known to us.

Part 2. Man is obliged to believe in revealed mysteries. Proof. A mystery is a truth which human reason cannot comprehend. We may understand the meaning of the subject and the predicate of the proposition in which the incomprehensible truth is enunciated; we may know that such a predicate belongs to such a subject, but we cannot perceive how or why they are thus connected. Even in the natural order, many of the physical phenomena are incomprehensible truths, and may, therefore, be called, in a certain sense, natural mysteries. Revealed or supernatural mysteries are those truths which can be learned only by Divine Revelation; for example, that the three Divine Persons are one God. Now, God's infinite knowledge necessarily includes truths which surpass our finite understanding; such truths He is surely able to make known to us, and He has the right to demand our belief in the same as an homage of our understanding. Therefore, we are under obligation to believe the mysteries which God may be pleased to reveal.

130. Objections.

1. It is unworthy of a man to believe what he does not understand. Answer. If such belief were without a sufficient reason, yes; but if it is supported by the best of reasons, namely, the infallible authority of God, belief is truly worthy of man, and the contrary course would be most unreasonable.

2. Dogmatic teaching enslaves the intellect. Answer. An entire reliance upon authority in every science would be detrimental to intellectual development. But to reject the momentous truths of Revelation, because they come from authority, would be more unreasonable than to refuse belief in the existence of the Roman Empire, because we must depend ultimately for our knowledge of this historic fact upon human testimony.

3. The knowledge of mysteries is useless. Answer. On the contrary, it is most useful; besides giving us an occasion to honor God by the homage of our intellect, it wonderfully and consolingly expands our knowledge of God and of our own destinies.

4. Dogmatic teaching begets intolerance. Answer. Truth begets a theoretic intolerance, or a firmness of conviction which is intolerant of error. But we deny that such a state of mind, whether it rests upon authoritative teaching, or upon demonstration, causes practical intolerance, or an unjust interference with civil and religious liberty. The persecution of the Church in recent times, carried on in many lands by the opponents of Revelation, shows what begets intolerance.

131. If God deigns to bestow a Revelation upon us, He must necessarily give us the means of recognizing it as such. Chief among these means are miracles and prophecies. Miracles are effects perceptible by the senses, which transcend the powers and the order of all nature. We have demonstrated (Ment. Phil., Cosmol., Chap. III.) that miracles are possible, and can be known as such with certainty. Prophecies are accurate predictions of such future events as depend upon free causes, and cannot be known in advance with certainty, except by the omniscient God.

132. Thesis IV. Miracles and prophecies are infallible proofs of a Divine Revelation.

Explanation. In this thesis we maintain that if, unmistakably, miracles have been worked or prophecies been made in confirmation of a doctrine, that doctrine is thereby known to be approved by the Creator as His own Divine Revelation. The immediate inference from the thesis would be that such a doctrine must be accepted by all men.

Proof. A true miracle can be wrought by God alone. Hence, it is a Divine seal, stamped as it were upon the doctrine, in express confirmation of which the miracle is worked. The Divine origin of such a doctrine, therefore, is infallibly true, because it is impossible for God to affix His seal to a falsehood.

A prophecy is an accurate prediction of a future event that is not dependent upon necessary causes. But God alone is the author of such a prediction, for He alone can possess such knowledge. Therefore, prophecies made in confirmation of a doctrine which is published as coming from God, are infallible proofs that such a doctrine is a Divine Revelation.

133. God is at perfect liberty to choose the manner of His Revelation. As a matter of fact, however, He has chosen to manifest it to the vast majority of men, not immediately, i. e., by directly acting upon the intellect with an overpowering illumination, but mediately, i. e., through the medium of other men whom He has commissioned to publish His revealed truths. Thus, the evidence of Revelation does not overmaster the rational faculties, but leaves a man free to accept it, and, in this manner, to increase his merit. This acceptance is an act of the highest prudence, while the rejection of Divine Revelation would be unreasonable and a grievous wrong. Indeed, from man's complete dependence upon God, and his consequent duty to reverence the Divine teachings and to accept them with loving promptness, it follows, logically, that every one who conceives a well-grounded suspicion that a Divine Revelation has been made, is obliged in conscience to inquire into the matter with more than ordinary diligence.

134. Thesis V. Indifference in the matter of religion is a grievous wrong.

Proof. This indifference may be theoretical or practical Theoretical indifference is an opinion that all systems or forms of religion, though contradictory to one another, are equally pleasing to God and useful to man. This doctrine is false, and an insult to God. It is false, because all truth, and, a fortiori, revealed truth, is one and not self-contradictory. It is an insult to God, because it represents Infinite Truth as pleased with error. Practical indifference is a refusal to give God the homage which man owes Him essentially (Thesis I.). As both kinds of indifference imply a great moral disorder, they are both grievously wrong.

135. It is evident:

1. That God cannot make contradictory revelations. Therefore, there can be only one true religion in the world; for all systems of religion contradict one another on some points of doctrine.

2. That God cannot be glorified or pleased by falsehood. In this, as in other matters, He overlooks mistakes that are caused by invincible ignorance. Nevertheless, once a reasonable suspicion concerning this matter exists in the mind, a man is obliged to do his utmost in order to discover the truth about supernatural Revelation, namely, whether a Revelation has been made and where it may be found.

3. That, if God has made a Revelation to direct men to their last end, He must, in His infinite wisdom, have provided reliable means to distinguish it from all false systems usurping its place.

136. Objections.

1. One does enough, if he is an honest man. Answer. A man who does not practise religion is not an honest man, for he defrauds God of the worship which is justly His due.

2. Among so many jarring creeds, it is impossible to discover the true religion. Answer. Still, one form of religion is divinely true, which alone can be pleasing to God. Now, God's providence and goodness are doubted by thinking that the true form of religion is beyond the reach of an earnest mind seeking the truth and at the same time humbly asking God's aid to find it.

3. No one should change his religion. Answer. Certainly not, unless his religion is false.

4. Then every man on earth ought to set about inquiring into the truth of his religion. Answer. Only those need inquire who have good reason for doubting the truth of their religion.

137. History attests and Theology confirms the facts, that a Revelation was made to mankind in the very beginning; that this was subsequently amplified and developed by further revelations; that it was finally perfected by the teachings of the Son of God Himself, and that this Christian Revelation has been entrusted, in its completeness, to an infallible Church, to be preserved and expounded until the end of time. These are truths beyond the reach of Philosophy. Nevertheless, Reason leads us by the radiance of her own natural light to the portal of supernatural religion, and is there met by a Heavenly guide, with a brightness of illumination so dazzling that all natural lights in its presence must pale to dimness. In that sacred temple, across whose threshold she may pass with man, Reason finds many truths above her grasp, which she calls mysteries, yet none are opposed to her own inherent principles. There she may abide in peace under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, who rules there.

138. Was a Divine Revelation necessary for mankind? That form of Revelation which declares the Beatific Vision to be man's supernatural destiny and teaches him the supernatural means to secure it was not necessary for the attainment of a merely natural end. Absolutely or intrinsically considered, the latter could be attained by reason unassisted supernaturally: it would be physically possible; but, for the overwhelming majority, such an event would be morally impossible. This, too, is the lesson taught by History on its every page. The nations of the earth, even the most highly civilized, had fallen, despite the teachings of primeval Revelation, into the grossest idolatry. Besides, how strangely and wildly some of the most rarely gifted minds have erred in matters of the greatest importance! In our own times also we are made painfully aware of the deplorable tendency of self-sufficient souls to mistake the truth respecting man's duties to God. False philosophies, — Pantheism, Positivism, Agnosticism, Materialism, — are, alas! too widespread and too notoriously prominent in the world of thought to leave us ground for thinking that mankind could have reached even a natural end without the assistance of a supernatural Revelation.

139. Although there should exist many philosophical teachers holding perfectly correct doctrines on the duties of man, still, countless multitudes could not, by this natural means alone, become truly enlightened. Such enlightenment can be accomplished in only two ways, by reasoning and by proclaiming truths with infallible authority. In neither way, however, could the desired effect be brought about for the masses. It could not be done by reasoning, since few, comparatively, would be able to follow the required processes of thought. Nor could authority be of avail, in the hypothesis of a purely natural order. Other men, holding false doctrines, might claim equal authority, and then how could the dispute be settled by natural means to the satisfaction of the people? What natural sign would mark the authoritative teachers of mankind and distinguish them from the propagators of error?

140. Love is an act of the will by which we tend to good. We render to God the due homage of our will by loving Him above all things, just as by valuing His word above all other testimony we offer Him the homage of our understanding. Our love is well ordered when it tends towards an object according to the measure of true good which the intellect perceives in that object. Now, God is the highest good, not merely relatively, but absolutely the highest good, for He is the Infinite Good. Therefore, if we love God according to the measure of His goodness, we must love Him as the Supreme Good, and for His own sake, because He deserves infinite love. This perfect love for God is the love of benevolence or friendship; a friend being one to whom we wish well, not for our own satisfaction only, but for his sake.

141. Yet we also understand that God is the source of immeasurable good for us. This happens in many ways, but chiefly because our ultimate happiness consists in possessing Him for eternity. To love God for our own sakes is a love of desire or hope. It is well ordered, however, since it fulfills the requirements stated above. Our intellect, indeed, perceives that God is not only the highest good in Himself, but also the good most conducive to our own happiness. Still, this love is imperfect; for, in tending towards God, it does not regard the highest good, namely, God's supreme excellence. Moreover, to be acceptable to God, our love for Him, whether perfect or imperfect, must always be a love of preference, that is, a love which prefers God to all things else. We need not, however, constantly perform acts of love for God, this duty being founded upon the positive precepts, which oblige us to act only at certain times.

146. Man has duties towards God and towards himself; in regard to his fellow-men he has both duties and rights. We are still speaking of man as an individual and not as a member of society. According to this view we shall next consider his duties to other men and his right to possess property.

147. Thesis VII. We must love our fellow-men as we love ourselves.

Explanation. We do not say as much or as intensely as we love ourselves, for this would be impossible, but "as ourselves," that is, in a similar manner, by wishing them good things of the kind we desire for ourselves.

Proof. Right order, which is the foundation of all morality, requires the creature to conform his will to the will of the Creator. Now, the Creator wills the good of all men, namely, that they shall, of their own free will, attain their last end, and that they shall have all the necessary means to do so. This same, therefore, we must desire for our fellow-men; and this is to love our fellow-men as we love ourselves.

Right order requires also that every one shall make it his first duty to work out his own salvation; he is immediately and directly responsible for this. Hence, he must seek primarily to procure with most special care all things tending to this object, which is his own greatest good. Consequently every man must love himself more than he loves other men.

My love for other men is based on the fact of our common nature. All other men have the same specific nature as myself, but not the same identity or individuality; therefore, my love for all other men must be the same specifically, or of the same kind, as my love for myself; but it need not, in truth it cannot, be so intense, because I cannot be so completely identified with another person as with my individual self.

148. But according to the foregoing principle, does not heroism, by which men sacrifice themselves for the good of others, violate the rule of well-ordered love? Even here the principle holds true; for, though the hero may risk or sacrifice his life to save another person, yet he thereby endeavors to gain for himself a higher good than life. His heroic act of charity merits a greater reward in the next world than a prolonged life of ordinary virtue. Hence, he really seeks his own greater good, preferring a spiritual good to one that is temporal.

149. From the argument of the preceding thesis, it is apparent that, even in the natural order, our love for our fellowmen is based for its motive upon our love for God. Hence, we perceive that all our rights and duties are referred directly or indirectly to our dependence upon God.

The dictates of this general love may be thus expressed "Never do to others what you would not wish them to do to you," and "do unto others as you would have others do unto you." The negative dictate of this law obliges always; the positive dictate obliges us to act on special occasions only, when others are in uncommon need of assistance. Our duty to render such assistance becomes urgent when they are in extreme necessity.

The Churchmen’s Union was inaugurated at the Church House, Westminster, on October 31st, 1898, for the advancement of Liberal religious thought. The members of the Council of this Union are well-known and representative clergymen and laymen belonging to the Church of England. They state that among the chief objects of the Union are the following: —

To maintain the right and duty of the Church to restate her belief from time to time as required by the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit. And to give all support in their power to those who are honestly and loyally endeavoring to vindicate the truth of Christianity by the light of scholarship and research, and while paying due regard to continuity, to work for such changes in the formularies and practices in the Church of England as from time to time are made necessary by the needs and knowledge of the day.

In furtherance of these objects a Quarterly Review, The Liberal Churchman, was started in November, 1904. The brief prospectus which was issued with the Review puts the objects of the Union in still clearer light. I transcribe it in its entirety.

The Liberal Churchman has been established in order to widen and develop the religious life of the community by advocating and ventilating the claims and principles of liberal religious thought within the Church of England and among English-speaking people as a whole. The object of liberal religious thought is to emancipate the Christian religion from a rigid subservience to the literal forms and theories in which it has been historically expressed and explained; and to re-express and explain the essential facts of the Christian faith in the terms of contemporary thought. There is no dislike to the principle of doctrinal forms; but there is a dislike to the assumption that doctrinal forms which were coined in bygone ages under a totally different set of ecclesiastical, social, and mental conditions are, and must always be, the best and the only forms for commending the Christian conception of life to the mind and conscience of the present time. The religious, moral, and intellectual temper of the modern Christian community has outgrown many of these forms; it does not find itself adequately expressed in them, and it is becoming more and more impatient of the rigid subservience which it is too often asked to accord to them by the official exponents of the Christian creed. It is hoped that the objects of The Liberal Churchman will commend themselves to those who feel that the traditional presentation of Christian truth is no longer adapted to meet the intellectual, ethical, and religious needs of the modern mind.

In the opening article of the Review, Dr. Morrison, the President of the Union, explains its object at greater length, and under the title— The Task of Liberal Theology, develops what is said in the prospectus.

This clearly defined object of the Churchmen’s Union has the sympathy of many earnest and intelligent men of our time. Thus, Mr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge begins an article in the Hibbert Journal for January, 1905, with this sentence: — Most open-minded laymen probably view with unqualified satisfaction the desire recently evinced on the part of the more progressive clergy of the Established Church to restate upon a basis of rational criticism the received dogmas of Christianity.¹

¹ Page 253.

Sir Oliver Lodge has more than once of late tried his hand at a restatement or re-interpretation of Christian doctrine. The following is the first paragraph of an article by this distinguished scientist in the Hibbert Journal for April, 1904, entitled, Suggestions towards the re-interpretation of Christian Doctrine.

Now that religion is becoming so much more real, is being born again in the spirit of modern criticism and scientific knowledge, may it not be well to ask whether the formal statement of some of the doctrines which we have inherited from medieval and still earlier times cannot be wisely and inoffensively modified? There is usually some sort of forced sense in which almost any statement can be judged to have in it an element of truth, especially a statement which embodies the beliefs of many generations. But when the element of truth is quite other than had been supposed, and when the original statement has to be tortured in order to display it, it may be time to consider whether without harm its mode of expression can‘ be reconsidered and re-drafted—to the ultimate benefit indeed of that religion of truth and clearness which we all seek to attain.²

² Page 461.

More than one of the papers read at the Church Congress, held last autumn in Liverpool, were contributions towards the same object of restatement and re-interpretation of dogma.

This also constitutes one of the main objects which Liberal Catholics of our time have in view. Professor Mivart in the Nineteenth Century for January, 1900, attempted to prove that as a matter of fact, through the labors of Catholic theologians in the past, there had been a process of gradual restatement of Catholic doctrine; he concluded his article in these words : —

My aim has been to strengthen Catholicity, and to that end I have enumerated the most striking modifications in the belief of Catholics I could find, to show how many and great changes the Catholic body can undergo without injury to its vitality.³

³ Page 72.

Several of Mivart’s instances of change of Catholic belief in the past certainly belong to matters of faith, but he regarded them as mere preludes to still greater changes in the future. In explanation of the reasons why he wrote his article he says: —

I am convinced that the great changes herein referred to are but preludes to far greater changes in the future— changes which will be most salutary, if duly foreseen and prepared for. They will take place surely sooner or later, as a new generation of mankind is sure anyhow to succeed the present one. But just as the certainty of that fact does not make the function of the accoucheur less useful, so the sure advent of new conceptions and beliefs does not render useless the work of those who would prepare for and facilitate their safe delivery into the world of ideas.⁴

⁴ Ib., p. 71.

And so Mivart’s object was to facilitate the restatement, and re-interpretation of Catholic dogma by showing how in his view of history the process had been continually going on in the past.

Similarly the writer or writers who under the pseudonym Voces Catholicæ wrote on the Abbé Loisy and the Catholic Reform Movement in the Contemporary Review for March, 1903, claim as the chief merit of the French exegete the successful restatement by him of worn out Catholic beliefs in the terms of modern historical criticism.

On one side, they write, are the formulas, avowedly drawn up for our intellect, yet shaped by old-world men whose mental equipment, so far as it was dependent upon acquired knowledge, was utterly unlike our own; and on the other side is the modern scientific spirit pressing violently against the barriers raised by those formulas and panting for an outlet into the region of light and life. M. Loisy claims to have found an issue which leads not beyond the pale of Catholic faith, but only to its calm and salubrious heights. Placing the definitions of Councils and Popes in the full light of historic experience he virtually says: We owe to them the same degree of respect and credence which we display to the words of the Saviour; and this we can continue to pay without refusing to science what is admitted to be her due. If the course of events, against which it is folly to argue, compels us to deepen, to spiritualize the words of Jesus which the Church for ages construed literally, and if we can—because we must— carry out the process without failing in our duty to God or our neighbor, what is there to show that the dogmas fashioned by men are less plastic? It is impossible to rebut the argument—which is but one of many—and it would be suicidal arbitrarily to condemn the conclusion without first providing some other means of adapting a structure built by the ancients to the wholly different needs of a new generation.

Long before M. Loisy came forward critics had eagerly thrown themselves upon salient facts in Church history; which, turn them how one might, would not dovetail with the dangerous claim to immutability advanced by certain theologians for the dogmas of the Church. Exposed to the fierce light of science, which they were never meant to endure, many of those old-world propositions seemed to shrivel up and harden, to the grave detriment of their religious contents. The French theologian is the first to show how by reverently approaching the formulas of past ages, which were admirable presentments of Christian doctrine as reflected in the minds of Christians of those generations, we can take over the fundamental and comprehensive truths which they embodied, without vainly straining to view them from a standing point which has receded from us forever. Far from loosening our hold on the substance of Jesus’ teachings, this needful process of spiritualization imparts to them a firm cohesion and harmonizes them with ideas of a scientific order from which it is impossible to withhold our assent.⁵

⁵ Pages 401-402.

In spite of what this writer says about the claim of Loisy to be a pioneer in the field of the re-interpretation of dogma, it is well known that he took this idea with much else from the French Protestant minister, A. Sabatier. Indeed, A. Sabatier seems to have been the common source from which English Protestants and liberal Catholics alike have largely drawn. For many years Sabatier was the recognized leader of a certain school of theology in France, and the Abbé Loisy is said to have attended his lectures in Paris. A very slight acquaintance with Sabatier’s writings will convince the reader of the justice of his claim to have led the way in the restatement of Christian dogma. I need do no more here than give a short extract from an article which he contributed to the Contemporary Review for November, 1899, on Christian Dogma and the Christian Life.

Hence it becomes an incontestable truth that no theologian of our day repeats and professes the dogmas of the great councils in the same sense they had for those who saw their birth or origin. Every one accommodates them, more or less consciously, to his own use, translates them into his language, takes or leaves portions as it pleases him; in a word, re-thinks them in his mind, and in rethinking them, interprets and transforms them! Well, modern theology invites us simply to do with reflexion and truthfulness that which we all do more or less and which we cannot help doing. And do we not see that far from being the death of dogma, this faculty of transformation by a new exegesis is the only way by which dogma can be rejuvenated and revived, the only way for us to reap its internal or spiritual substance, the Christian reality by which our religious life can and ought to be nourished? Shall we hesitate resolutely to enter on this path? 6

In another passage of their article in the Contemporary Review for March, 1903, Voces Catholicæ admit that Loisy is not original.

Most of the fruitful ideas [they write] with which his little volume teems have been in the air for some years past. They cannot, therefore, be said to be original. But they have been uttered by non-Catholic critics whose writings and names have remained hitherto unknown to the bulk of our co-religionists.

Any reader of Loisy who knows how constantly he refers to Protestant theologians and rationalistic 6 Page 737.

critics will corroborate this testimony that his views are not original. In this instance, as in so many others, the views of liberal Catholics are seen to be a more or less close approximation to those of heretics and rationalists. Since the condemnation of Loisy’s works by the Holy See there has been a lull in the activity of liberal Catholics, and the present seems to be a favorable opportunity for reviewing our position. Let us try to gain a clear idea of the crisis of Liberalism through which we have been passing. The process cannot fail to be useful to us.

And first of all let us pay a tribute to the vigilance of our bishops who betimes perceived the danger and faithfully fulfilled their office. In their joint Pastoral of 29th December, 1900, they say, after quoting the teaching of Leo XIII: —

Very different from this is the theory of progress or development excogitated in recent times, and approved by certain writers on the continent, and even in England. They make the progress of Christian doctrine to consist in real change. They argue that certain truths of revelation may become obsolete and die out; that, having served their time, higher truths will supplant them, in accordance with some real or fancied progress of natural science. They even suggest that higher perceptions in natural science will reduce mysteries to the level of natural phenomena; and that the development of Christian doctrine really means the reception into the deposit of faith of a number of extraneous truths, which will in course of time bring the Church into perfect conformity with modern ideas. There are even Catholics who imagine that they can save their orthodoxy by holding the creeds and definitions of faith, not according to the Church’s constant understanding of them, but according to their own. They profess to believe that the Church’s teaching may receive new light to illuminate it, so that the traditional sense, given by the Church to her formularies, shall give way to other meanings partially or wholly different. Against errors of this kind the Church, in the Vatican Council, has launched her formal anathema: ‘‘If any one shall say that it may ever be possible, with the progress of science, for a sense to be given to the doctrines proposed by the Church, other than that which the Church has understood and understands, let him be anathema.’’

So that the task which liberal theology sets itself is heretical, and this new heresy differs fundamentally in nothing from former heresies. Men imbued with modern subjective phenomenalism and the theories of evolution wish to apply their philosophical opinions to the interpretation of the doctrines of the Christian faith. This is precisely what St. Paul warned the Colossians against (ii. 8): “ Beware, lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit; according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ.”

A long catena of passages from the Fathers might be quoted to show the practice of heretics in all ages. One or two will be sufficient for my purpose. St. Athanasius writes : —

After adopting some impious principle as a canon, in accordance with this principle they proceed to corrupt all the sacred Scriptures.⁷

⁷ Orat. II., p. 176.

Faustinus in his treatise De Fide against the Arians (circ. 380) writes: — The Arian heresy when it makes its profession of faith confesses much in the same words indeed as we do but not in the same sense. For in the same words as we do, it proclaims God the Father and God the Son, and that by the Son all things were made by God the Father, and that the Son was begotten before time was. But although it agrees with us in using these words, nevertheless, by a sacrilegious interpretation of them it departs from the orthodox sense of the Catholic Church, calling God Father, but not in the sense that He begot the Son; making use of the word Son also, but meaning Son by adoption not by nature, in the sense that He was reckoned as such, not really begotten by the Father.⁸

⁸ Migne PP. Lat. xiii., p. 38.

One is tempted to wonder how Catholic priests and intelligent Catholic laymen could possibly suppose that the proposed restatement of Catholic dogma does not “lead beyond the pale of Catholic faith.” That the dogmas of the Faith are immutable, that all Catholics are bound to believe Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus; that in matters of faith Nil innovetur, nisi quod traditum est; Non nova, sed nove, Explodenda novitas, retinenda antiquitas; this belongs to the very rudiments of Catholic doctrine. The Catholic Church has always claimed to teach what she received from the apostles, that it is which constitutes the sacred deposit committed to her faithful keeping; if her claim is unfounded, if while professing to teach with divine authority the immutable divine truth entrusted to her keeping, she has all the while been stealthily accommodating and changing it to suit the fashions of the day, then is she indeed an impostor, her stupendous claims make her ridiculous, and the sooner she is shoveled out of the way the better.

But, say the liberal Catholics, there is no use arguing against facts, it is a fact that changes in dogma have taken place in the past, why should they not take place in the future?

This, of course, is the common Protestant and rationalistic objection against the immutability of Catholic dogma; if the liberal Catholic were as well read in the Catholic theology as in modern infidel literature, he would know how to answer the difficulty.

But, persists the liberal Catholic, in spite of the traditional answer of Catholic theologians to the difficulty — and here it is usual for him to introduce a sneer at scholasticism — it remains true that Catholic dogma has changed; LE pur si muove, as in a not dissimilar context asserted Galileo, that venerable confessor of the Faith, as Mivart called him.

One of the classical instances by which Loisy strives to show this, is the transition from the conception of the kingdom of God, as preached by the living Jesus, to that of the Catholic Church, brought about after the Resurrection of Our Lord. Loisy adopts the modern rationalistic view, according to which the Christ of history merely conceived of Himself as the Messias whom the Jews were expecting, whose office it was to preach repentance and thereby the forgiveness of sin, as the preparation for the immediate advent of His earthly but glorious kingdom. In the mind of Jesus there was no place and no need for the Christian Church, and He can only be said to be its founder inasmuch as He unwittingly sowed the seed from which the Church grew by the thought, labor, and adaptation of St. Paul and other great thinkers of the first two centuries of the Christian era. Then, of course, follows the conclusion — if there could be such restatement and re-interpretation of dogma in the first ages of Christianity, why should the process not continue on similar lines?

In answer to this I will quote the recent utterances of two non-Catholic writers. Mr. W. H. Mallock wrote in the Nineteenth Century for December, 1904: —

I will not pause to ask why that subjective experience, which was of no value in attesting the superhuman nature of Buddha, should be accepted as indubitable evidence of the superhuman nature of Christ. ... Nor does what I am going to say apply to neo-Anglicans only. It applies equally to men like Professors Harnack and Sabatier, and to liberal Catholics, such as the Abbé Loisy and Baron F. von Hügel. All these thinkers have come to the same conclusion, that if principles like the Bishop of Worcester’s are to be applied to the interpretation of the Gospels, our conception of the divine character of Christ must, in one respect at all events, undergo a profound change. We can no longer regard His incarnation of the Godhead as complete. We must regard Him, says the Bishop of Worcester, as ‘‘having refrained from the divine mode of consciousness’’ to such an extent that His knowledge, in many respects, was no better than an ignorant man’s. I do not know how far the Bishop may realize the scope of this admission; but, as other thinkers have shown, who are no less devout than he, it compels us to recognize that Christ was not only ignorant of many things, but was actually subject to very serious delusions—chief amongst these being the delusion that His own second coming would be immediate. Such being the case, as Baron F. von Hügel observes, the question has to be faced of how, under these conditions, Christ could have had any intention of founding an earthly Church.⁹

⁹ Page 920.

The Rev. Professor James Denney, of Glasgow, writes in the February number of the Expositor, 1905:—

He (Loisy) holds with that recent school of New Testament scholarship which lays the whole stress in the Gospels on the eschatological representation of the Kingdom. He rejects, unceremoniously, the idea that not what Jesus inherited is of value in Christianity, but only what is His own; nothing was more truly His own, nothing had greater value to Him than what He had inherited—the ancient revelation and the hopes it had inspired. He gets rid of the texts on which Harnack bases his spiritual conception of Christianity by methods which some will describe as exegetical and critical, others as the unscrupulous use of the rack and the knife. Perhaps it is enough to say that they are quite unconvincing.¹⁰

¹⁰ Page 115.

In other words this crucial instance of the apostolic restatement of Christian dogma, this undoubted result of modern criticism, this certain conclusion arrived at by the scientific historical method, is at best the opinion of a particular school of rationalistic scholars, arrived at by denying the authenticity of some texts in our authorities, by torturing others out of their obvious meaning, and by putting aside as unhistorical all supernatural phenomena like prophecies and miracles.

Again; in this question of the development of doctrine, it is all important to distinguish between what is of faith and what is merely theological speculation about the faith. And yet Mivart, in the article from which I quoted above, rides roughshod over this all important distinction.

WE are told that modern thought grows more and more secularist and less and less religious. There is a strong tendency to exclude religion from public life altogether. If religion is to be tolerated at all, it must be kept to its proper sphere of private life and the individual conscience. Into those sacred precincts nobody else has any right to intrude. In the privacy of that inner shrine a man may cultivate religion if he pleases and if he finds it of any help to him. But there is no place for religion in public life. Education, business, social, political, and international questions should be kept free from it. That is the doctrine which finds favour in many quarters to-day. Sometimes the modern attitude is contrasted with that of the ages of faith. The ages of faith looked upon pestilence as a scourge sent by God in punishment for sin, and prayed to be delivered from it. The modern seeks to destroy the germs of disease by sanitation and strives by prophylactics to protect the human subject from any germs that escape his vigilance. In such contrasts there is not unfrequently an element of misrepresentation. Whatever may be the teaching of other religions, the Christian religion has never taught that human effort may be dispensed with. St. Ignatius' rule was—Work as if everything depended on yourself, trust in God as if everything depended on Him. Our Lord's own rule was—Seek first the kingdom of God and His justice. He did not say—Seek only—but—Seek first. Other duties and cares come after the first. The blessing of God on the work is necessary if it is to prosper, but God has given us energies and talents to use ourselves, and He expects and commands us to use them. God helps those who help themselves. The Christian is encouraged to use all the means which modern science or anything else puts at his disposal, but he still finds room for putting his ultimate trust in God. I never heard of anyone who wanted a house built falling on his knees in prayer and expecting the house to rise like an exhalation from the ground, though all true Christians acknowledge and profess that —"Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it." Sometimes secularists express hostility against religion because, they say, it distracts man's attention from his material interests, the only interests which matter. Questions of fact are involved in this accusation against religion. If God exists, if man has an immortal soul, if man's will is free so that it is in his power to save or lose his soul, then man's material interests are not the only things that matter, nor are they man's chief interests. I touched upon those questions of fact in the first chapter and I cannot go back and again discuss them here. If man has higher than mere material interests, sound common sense tells us that we should give due attention to what is higher even if the lower interests suffer somewhat thereby. But here I wish to insist on a consideration to which sound common sense also leads us. It is well that man should have something to distract him from being absorbed in his material interests alone. After all, life is more than the meat, life is more than the material means by which it is supported.

If a man becomes too much absorbed in his material interests, he subordinates the higher to the lower, and he degrades himself in the process. He becomes materialised, too much of a piece with the inorganic, senseless, and irrational elements to which he prostitutes the wonderful cosmos that man is. Any large town will afford us plenty of examples of what the process leads to. Even if religion did not rest on realities, even if its doctrines were nothing better than poetic fancies, and its worship nothing more than harmless indulgence of the aesthetic faculties, there would still be room for it. It would help to prevent people from becoming materialised and degraded below the level of the brute beasts. Besides, men who care for nothing but their material interests cannot be formed into peaceful, prosperous, and progressive societies. They inevitably become too fond of money and of the indulgences and pleasures which money can buy. Their cupidity grows by what it feeds on, and it leads them to fight for what they cannot get otherwise. That is the real source and origin of the social unrest which is one of the worst and most widespread of modern maladies. That too is the real cause of modern wars, not excluding the last and the greatest of them all. Modern States do not go to war merely for the sake of conquest, or for some religious idea. Modern wars are brought about by economic causes; they are struggles for the markets of the world; they are fights for wealth. It is quite useless to attack militarism, to assert that it is the enemy, and to propose to destroy it and so prepare the way for universal peace. Militarism is only a means to an end, and that end in modern times is access to, and command of, the markets of the world. A nation that is shut out from the sea and surrounded by economic rivals is severely handicapped in the struggle for wealth. If it wants to have a good share of the commerce of the world it must break through the ring fence that surrounds it and somehow get a seaboard. If material interests are the only things that matter rival nations will bar the way by force; there will inevitably be war, and the war will be a life and death struggle. Do we not all of us recognise that that is the position that confronts us? If material interests are the only things that matter, if religion is relegated to the inner world of the private conscience, then might is right, and the place in the sun with all its advantages belongs to the strongest. If we want permanent peace we must go deeper and attack the roots of militarism. The Prince of Peace taught us what to do. He taught us that avarice, pride, lust of power must be attacked and that their overthrow and permanent subjection is the only way to secure peace. In other words, religion must be restored to its rightful position in public life. I use the words advisedly. Religion has just as good a right to its position in public life as it has to its position in private life. Religion is nothing more than giving God the worship which is His due. Worship is due to Him because He created us and gave us all that we have. Just as we owe reverence, obedience, and love to our parents because under God we owe our being to them, so we owe reverence, obedience, and love to God because in a far truer sense we owe our being to Him. A child does not satisfy its obligations to its parents by merely internal reverence, submission, and love. Merely internal dispositions would be mistrusted unless they sometimes showed themselves outwardly. Even if they existed they could not be lasting unless they were sometimes exercised. Merely internal obedience will not satisfy our obligations in cases where external acts are needed and commanded. Just in the same way merely interior religion will not satisfy our obligations towards God. Both body and soul came from Him, and both should take part in worshipping their Creator and Lord. As man is not a solitary but a social animal, and cannot live a decent life such as his nature requires except in the society of his fellows, and all this is God's ordinance and comes from Him, so man owes God not only private and external worship but social and public worship as well. As long as God is publicly acknowledged and worshipped there is some guarantee that His laws will be respected and obeyed by all. Isolated instances of atrocious crimes may occur, but they will meet with universal reprobation, nor will they be defended by anyone. But if God and religion are banished from public life the State and its temporal interests become the sole arbiter of right and wrong. The universal standard applicable to all nations and individuals is destroyed. Atrocities hitherto universally condemned are hailed with rapturous applause by those to whom they bring temporal advantage. Solemn treaties are regarded as mere scraps of paper, Lusitanias filled with helpless women and children are sunk, wells are poisoned, asphyxiating gases and other horrible means of destruction are used, Hague conventions are laughed at, diabolical hatred of the foe is fostered and encouraged. The justification of these things is that they succeed at any rate for the time being. They bring some temporal advantage, they serve material interests which are the only things that matter, says the secularist. The conclusion is the refutation of the secularist's position. It shows that even if God and religion were not the supreme realities that they are, the best interests of mankind would demand that they should be treated in public and in private with honour, respect and reverence.

PHILOSOPHERS are our professional thinkers.

It is their duty to make themselves acquainted with all the newest knowledge, and to tell us what to think of things in its light. Especially in times of change and upheaval like the present it might be thought that philosophy would be able to guide us safely out of our difficulties. One might expect that philosophy would have its answer to those deeper questions on the solution of which all else depends. What are we? What is this strange universe in which we find ourselves placed? Obviously, everything is in motion; where is it going to? What does it all mean? We cannot give a satisfactory answer to the smaller difficulties of everyday life till we have found a satisfactory answer to those great and fundamental questions. Can philosophy give a satisfactory answer to them?

With this question in my mind I obtained a copy of Contemporary British Philosophy, a book issued under the editorship of Professor Muirhead. It contains contributions on the fundamental problems of philosophy by sixteen leading British philosophers. After reading the book I laid it aside with disappointment. There is no hope in philosophy. It has not pleased God to save his people by philosophy.

One after another the writers assert that they have nothing that is certain to tell us. At most they can offer more or less plausible views and opinions. Many expressly affirm that the attainment of truth and certainty is impossible for the human mind. Apparently by way of warning, the editor tells us that philosophies are not like scientific discourses, they are rather comparable to the creations of the artist and the poet, embodying his idea, expressing his feeling, instinct with his personality. In other words, philosophies are subjective impressions of truth rather than the very truth itself. With great caution Lord Haldane tells us in his essay that “on the whole he thinks that Hegel has come nearer to the ultimately true view than anyone since the ancient Greeks.” There is not much to be hoped for from the Pantheistic idealism of Germany. Mr. Bertrand Russell says bluntly: “If we could hope for certainty in philosophy, the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can see such a hope would be chimerical.” Mr. Carveth Read says emphatically: “Every student of the history of philosophy must have learnt that whatever he thinks it is probably wrong.”

Mr. Schiller affirms: “Thus no truth is eternal; every truth has its day. But this does not matter so long as sufficient for the day is the truth thereof,” On such a fundamental question as to whether the soul is material like the body or immaterial, Mr. Lloyd Morgan affirms that the affirmative view and the negative are alike incapable of proof.

If, then, we are to believe these experts, we cannot trust to philosophy for guidance in the many doubts and difficulties in which we are involved. If the blind lead the blind they will both fall into the ditch. To tell the truth, modern philosophy makes no pretension to be the guide of life. The modern philosopher is not the blustering braggart of the time of St Augustine or even of Molière. He has learnt modesty. So Professor Muirhead assures us.

But if philosophy is incapable of acting as the guide of life, perhaps science will do. This is what some scientists used to assert, and some of them occasionally re-echo the claim still. However, if we give the matter a moment’s thought we shall perceive that physical science is less capable of acting as the guide of life than philosophy. It is infected with the same or with greater uncertainty. The conclusions of science are only provisional and hypothetical, they are not final and certain. They are relative and progressive, and, in fact, are changed every few years. Moreover, the ultimate questions on the answers to which the conduct of life depends lie outside the sphere of physical science. Physical science collects facts and phenomena, compares them, classifies them, and thus discovers empirical laws. It cannot tell us whence we came, or whither we are going, or for what purpose we are here, and without clear and certain knowledge on those questions there is no guidance for human life. Where, then, are we to look?

There is only one clear and satisfactory answer to that question. Early on Holy Saturday morning, while as yet there were few in the church, the Catholic Church gave that answer in unfaltering tones. With all the solemnity which the Catholic Church knows so well how to use, a procession entered the church, headed by the Cross. A triple branched candle was carried in the procession. One branch was lighted at the entrance from the fire which had been struck from the flint and solemnly blessed. “The Light of Christ,” sang out the deacon. All knelt and then moved forward up the aisle. In the middle of the church the second branch was lit; again the deacon sang out, “The Light of Christ,” and again all knelt. The procession then moved forward to the altar steps; the third branch was lit; a third time the deacon sang out, “The Light of Christ,” and a third time all knelt. By such striking ceremonial the Catholic Church does all she can to bring home to all the saving knowledge of the only true Light of the World and Guide of human life.

Of course, Catholics do not deny that philosophy can attain to a certain knowledge of ultimate truths, but they also maintain that revelation is necessary in order that those truths may be known easily, with certainty, and without error by all men.

The occasion of the reproach made against the Jesuits, that they release men from the obligation of loving God, and the foundation of all the invectives that have been made and are still made every day on this subject against their Society, was a book entitled The Defense of Virtue. The author of this book was a Jesuit named Antoine Sirmond, who is not the famous Sirmond, so well known and so esteemed by learned men, without excepting even those of the heretical party. This one was a very obscure man; but everything is dug up when it is a question of causing trouble for the Jesuits.

The design of the Author in this treatise on the defense of virtue is to examine whether it is permitted to act through fear, or through hope, or through some motive other than that of the pure love of God. And there he combats the error condemned by the Popes and renewed by the Innovators, who maintain that every action that does not have the motive of charity for its principle is a sin.

In order to disentangle this matter, and to make more clearly seen the difference between the sentiment of this Author and that of his Society, from which he departed, it is necessary to make in a few words some observations on this subject, observations that were already made some years ago in another Work. [In the Reply to the Provincial Letters.]

First, there has never been a Theologian who absolutely denied that we had a precept of loving God, the observance of which was necessary for salvation. But after making, in order better to clarify matters, the distinction of various kinds of precepts in this matter, the Doctors find themselves divided on some points.

They say that this precept is at the same time a general precept and a particular precept. It may be regarded as a general precept, because it is impossible to fulfill its entire extent without observing all the other commandments, not one of which can be violated without destroying charity. It is regarded as a particular or special precept because it commands the acts of one certain virtue in particular, that is to say, acts of love, which in their species are altogether different from the acts of the other virtues by which the other precepts are observed.

Thirdly, the precept of charity is negative and affirmative. A precept is called negative when it is considered with respect to the things which it forbids one to do. It is called affirmative when it is considered with respect to the things which it commands one to accomplish. Thus the precept of the love of God is negative insofar as it forbids hating the sovereign good; which is understood not only of formal hatred, which is scarcely anything but the sin of the devil, but also of every other sin, because every sin contains an estrangement from God. This precept is affirmative insofar as it commands us on certain occasions to make acts of the love of God: for example, at the hour of death, and, according to the Thomists, at the time when, upon leaving childhood, we begin to know ourselves and to make use of our reason, which represents God to us as our last end.

Moreover, the Theologians teach that a precept can oblige either of itself or accidentally; these are the terms they use, per se, per accidens. It obliges of itself when, independently of every other precept, it commands me to make an act of the particular virtue to which it relates. Thus the precept of charity will oblige me of itself if, independently of every other precept, it obliges me to make acts of the love of God. A precept obliges me accidentally when I have to discharge some duty or to repel some temptation, and when the one or the other cannot be done without an act commanded by that precept. Thus, finding myself in some circumstance obliged by the precept of penance to make an act of perfect contrition, the precept of charity obliges me on that occasion accidentally, because, the act of contrition being nothing but a detestation of sin from the motive of the love of God, I cannot fulfill the precept of penance without making an act of the love of God.

Finally, all the Theologians agree that there is a precept of loving God; that this precept is negative, because it contains the prohibition against doing anything against God, and that it is also affirmative, because it obliges us to certain duties. Moreover, they agree that this precept is general and extends to the observance of all the other commandments; that there is also a special one which obliges at least accidentally, as in the case of the necessity of contrition and in some others. All the Theologians agree on all these points, and Father Antoine Sirmond agrees with them throughout the Treatise in question. Nor was it on this that he was accused; but, in accusing him of something else, it was concealed that he had even taught this, which alone would suffice greatly to diminish the horror that people endeavor to spread over his entire doctrine. The sole question that can therefore be asked here with respect to the doctrine of this Theologian in particular is to know whether, supposing all these other obligations upon which everyone agrees, this precept, insofar as it is special and affirmative, obliges us, in addition, not only accidentally but of itself, to make formal acts of love, by which one says to God: My God, I love you with all my heart.

The sentiment of this Doctor is that there is a precept of effective love which obliges one to observe all the other commandments under pain of damnation, whether through the motive of the virtue of hope, through the motive of the virtue of religion, or through that of some other virtue; but that there is no precept of affective love which obliges us of itself to make interior, formal, and proper acts of the virtue of charity. It is on this that a Writer lashes out in these terms against the Jesuits: They have gone so far as this impiety, of maintaining that the interior act of the love of God was only counseled, not commanded; and it was proclaimed everywhere that they wished to abolish the first and the principal of God’s Commandments.

To answer this horrible accusation, the Jesuits did not undertake the defense of the doctrine of Father Antoine Sirmond; but they endeavored only to excuse him, saying that if he had failed on this occasion, it was only after great Theologians. In fact, I find in the Book of a Doctor of Louvain named Dubois, Royal Professor of Holy Scripture, who wrote on the propositions of Moral Theology censured by Pope Alexander VII in 1665 and 1666 - I find that this Doctor, who is in no way of this opinion, having caused a search to be made for the Authors who had held it, places among them Bannez, a famous Theologian of the Order of Saint Dominic; Cardinal Cajetan, of the same Order; Marchantius; Jean Sanchez (who must not be confused with the Jesuit of the same surname); Jansenius, Bishop of Ghent; and Molanus, another celebrated Doctor of Louvain. I also find in another Author who gives himself the name Florimond du Plessis, Saint Antonin, Sylvester, Almaïn, an ancient Doctor of Paris, the learned Tostat, Gerson, and several others cited in favor of this doctrine. But this is not what the Jesuits of today principally wish people to consider. They will be content merely to point out that, if this doctrine is not attributed to the Order of Saint Dominic, nor to the University of Louvain, nor to the Faculty of Paris, although it was taught by one or more Doctors of these celebrated Societies, there is scarcely any justice in wishing it to be regarded as the doctrine of the Body of Jesuits because it is found in the Book of one of their Writers.

Whether, then, this doctrine was taught by others or was not; whether it was suffered with impunity in non-Jesuit Doctors and censured only in the Book of a Jesuit - this is not the matter at issue. What the Jesuits claim here solely is to make known, as they declare aloud, that they reprove this doctrine and that it was never that of their Society.

But in order to show that it is not, so to speak, after the fact that they make this declaration, as though the clamor raised against them on this occasion had caused them to change their sentiment on this subject and to return, despite themselves, to sound doctrine, it will now be shown, by the citation of a great number of their most celebrated Doctors, that the doctrine of their Society has at all times been such as they declare it to be today concerning the indispensable obligation of the precept of the love of God. Here are the extracts from these Theologians.

Cardinal Bellarmine. [Tom. 4, l. 6, De grat. & lib. arbitr., cap. 7.] Holy Scripture does not say only that charity is a gift of God, but in addition it commands us to love God. Now it does not command us merely to preserve the infused habit of charity, but it obliges us to love God with all our heart; for laws have for their object the acts of virtues and not the habits.

Cardinal de Lugo. [Disput. 7, sect. 12, num. 250.] The precept of loving God is absolutely of natural law. Even if there were no positive command of God, this precept would oblige us to it.

Suarez. [Tract. ult. De Charitat., disp. 5, De praecepto Charitatis.] First, I say that this precept is for all men. This is evident from the sixth Chapter of Deuteronomy: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart; and from the tenth of Saint Matthew: This Commandment is the first and the greatest of all. The reason for my conclusion is that this love is a means necessary for salvation; now such means are always of an obligation of precept.

Suarez, continued. [Sect. 3.] I say, secondly, that this precept sometimes obliges of itself. For the rest, it is difficult positively to determine the time when it obliges. On this one must say what is said of the precept of restitution: that one is obliged not to delay very long.

And elsewhere. [T. 2, De Relig., lib. 1, De Orat., cap. 30.] One may give this general rule for all these affirmative precepts: that the acts they command must not be long delayed, and that these acts must be reiterated from time to time.

Molina. [Tract. 5, De Justit. & Jure, disp. 59, p. 3165.] I am persuaded that we are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, by virtue of the precept of the love that we owe to God, to undertake the defense of his interests; to oppose what might wound his honor and his glory; to do what we believe can be useful for this; and that we must do it at the peril of our life. This does not prevent there being (he says again two pages later) a particular precept of the love of God, as of a thing which is owed to him, and this love being commanded to us as a means necessary to obtain the possession of God and eternal life.

Laymann. [Libro 2, tract. 3, cap. 2.] The precept of loving God above all things, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges only at certain times. The first time is when man has attained the use of reason, God, through the lights of Faith, being sufficiently represented to him as his last end. According to Suarez (he adds), man is obliged often during the course of his life to produce acts of charity toward God.

Becan. [De Sacr., cap. 35, q., num. 4.] There is a double precept of loving God. The first is a general precept, which is comprised in the whole Decalogue and obliges us to keep the Law of God. The second is particular and positive, which obliges us to produce the act of charity, whether that act is a movement of love toward God or of detestation of sin insofar as it offends God.

Thomas Sanchez. [In Decal., l. 2, c. 3.] It is certain that there is a commandment to love God. The reason is that the act of the love of God is necessary for Salvation. He who does not love, says Saint John, remains in death. Now everything that is necessary for Salvation is commanded.

Tannerus. [In 2. 2, d. 2, De Spe & Charit., q. 4, d. 4, n. 48.] The precept of the love of God obliges at the point of death, and when, after having attained the age of reason, one is capable of penetrating the truths that engage us to love God above all things and to refer everything to him. This is the common sentiment of the Doctors.... Moreover, the precept of loving God above all things imposes on us the obligation to produce from time to time acts of love toward him, although one cannot precisely determine in particular the times of this obligation.

Arriaga. [Disp. 36, De charit., sect. 3, n. 10.] In view of the motives for this love that I have marked above, when I proved the obligation that this precept imposes on us, it is saying little to maintain that one is obliged at least once a year to renew its act.

Filliucius. [Tr. 2, c. 9, n. 287.] It appears to me that the fulfillment of the obligation which this precept imposes on us cannot be better determined as to time than it is in the third opinion, where there is marked for this the beginning of the use of reason.... the point of death.... and, in the third place, the time of life that passes between these two extremes, during which there is an obligation to make from time to time acts of the love of God.

Hurtado de Mendoza, after marking the beginning of the use of reason for the first fulfillment of this precept, adds: [d. 174, sect. 5.] I say, secondly, that one is obliged to make acts of it in the course of life, and every year; and it is asking scarcely anything to limit this obligation there.

Gregory of Valencia, after proving the possibility and the necessity there is for salvation of fulfilling this precept, and determining with the other Theologians the obligation to make the act of the love of God above all things at the beginning of the use of reason and at the point of death, notes still several other cases in which one is obliged to it, as when one receives some singular benefit from God, etc. [In 2.20, disp. 3, q. 19.]

Finally, I do not believe that, among the very great number of Jesuit Theologians who have printed courses of Theology, a single one can be shown who ever denied the necessity of the act of the love of God for salvation. An infinity of them applied themselves to proving it when they had occasion to do so. The Theologian of Louvain whom I have already cited, Dubois, took the trouble to gather as many as thirty and to transcribe their passages. Only the most famous of the Society have been reported here, in order not to weary the Reader with a multitude of extracts which all say nearly the same thing. After which the Jesuits will find themselves sufficiently exculpated before the public tribunal from the calumny that people do not cease to impose upon them even every day, by publishing everywhere that they exempt the faithful from the obligation of loving God.

It is surprising that their calumniators are so readily listened to on this subject. For, although in order to justify them not everyone can have recourse to the Books of their Theologians, which are not within the reach of an infinity of persons, who is there in the world, provided he has some affection for Books of devotion, who has not read or been able to read the Books of Rodriguez, of Saint-Jure, of Hayneuve, of Suffren, of Dupont, and a quantity of others which are in the hands of all persons of piety? One has only to open the Books of these Jesuits to see on every page that they recommend nothing so much as the exercise of divine love. And whoever wished to take the trouble to consult the Bibliography of their Writers would see, from the titles alone, that no Society has ever labored more to inspire this excellent virtue in Christians.

What is most bizarre here is that, at the same time as people continued in these latter years to decry the Jesuits on this article, they accused them of being too zealous partisans of pure and disinterested love, and it did not depend upon a thousand people that they should not be made to pass for Quietists. And what is still more admirable is that this same Father Sirmond, who was the occasion of so much clamor only by denying the indispensable necessity of affective love, understood nothing else by this affective love than pure and disinterested charity, of which since then not only the necessity but even the possibility has been called into doubt.

The Jesuits, in order perfectly to exculpate themselves on the subject in question, add that they condemn with all their heart certain particular propositions that relate to it and that are among those which Popes Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII condemned. They are the following five Propositions.

1. There is no obligation, by virtue of the divine precepts which concern Faith, Hope, and Charity, to produce any act of these virtues at any time of life whatsoever.

2. We should not dare to condemn of mortal sin one who in his whole life should make only one act of the love of God.

3. It is probable that the precept of Charity does not of itself oblige, in rigor, to make an act of it every five years.

4. This precept obliges only when we are bound to be reconciled with God and have no other means of returning to his grace.

5. Man is not obliged to love God either at the beginning or in the course of his moral life.

The Jesuits therefore say anathema to these five propositions. They declare that this is not, and that this has never been, the doctrine of their Society; they do not even believe that these propositions can be shown in the books of any of their Theologians such as they are in the censure of the Popes.

The Doctors, in view of the great difficulty, or, to speak more accurately, the impossibility, of determining surely all the times and all the conjunctures in which the precept of charity obliges to the act it commands, have had very different sentiments on this subject. The Jesuits followed the doctrine which they found common in the School in this matter, as in all the others. The Popes did not believe they ought to determine anything concerning it; and they contented themselves with censuring the propositions in question, which departed too visibly from the truth, without touching several others whose truth or falsity was not evident to them.

These are the things of which the Jesuits believed they ought to inform the public, seeing themselves so unjustly accused on a point of this importance. If after this calumny were still to prevail, they would console themselves before God and would regard this oppression as a disposition of Providence which they would adore and to which they would endeavor to submit with an entire resignation. I pass to the second point, which concerns the doctrine of philosophical sin.