Charity

CHARITY, as treated of here, is an act of the will by which we love God for his own sake above all things, and our neighbour for the sake of God. The love of charity, then, is different from the love of concupiscence, by which we love God as our reward exceeding great, and desire to possess him in whom our supreme and perfect happiness is placed. This love of concupiscence is good and belongs to the virtue of hope, but it is imperfect. By charity we rise above the consideration of our own reward and happiness; we see in God the infinite Good, the Source and Origin of all good, and we rejoice in his infinite Perfection. We wish him all honour and glory and every good, and desire, as far as we can, to obtain it for him, because he is infinitely worthy of our wholehearted devotion. So that the formal object of charity, the reason why we love God, is his own infinite goodness and worth; for this reason we love him and our neighbour, for such is his will. He has made us all in his image and likeness; all rational creatures form the great family of God, our common Father; all are capable by grace of eternal happiness with him in heaven.

The most intimate union with God by charity is the end for which we were created, and it is our duty to prepare ourselves for this high destiny by exercising ourselves in charity while on earth. It is the highest and the noblest of virtues, the queen of all the virtues, the seal and bond of human perfection. That we might cultivate charity all the more assiduously God has commanded it in express terms: “ Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.¹ ‘This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” We are bound, then, to love God above all other things, to cling to him, come what may, never to allow ourselves to be separated from him by sin, for: “‘ He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me.”² If we do this, we need have no scruples about our charity; even though we seem to have a tenderer feeling for husband, child, or friend than for God, we may call to mind that charity belongs essentially to the will; if our will is firmly fixed on God, so that we are prepared to suffer the loss of anything rather than of God, we substantially fulfil the greatest of the precepts, on which the law and the prophets hang.

All rational beings that are capable of friendship with God, and of becoming his children by grace, are to be loved for the sake of God in charity. This love of charity towards our fellow-men does not exclude love for them as friends or relatives. Love of others for any honest motive is good and praiseworthy, and may by being supernaturalized become supernaturally meritorious with God. By the precept of charity towards our neighbour we are bound to wish well to all, to pray for all, never to allow ourselves any thought, word, or deed which is incompatible with mutual love, and we are bound to help others in their necessities as far as we can.

¹ Matt. xxii 37.

² John xiv 21.

As charity is the queen of all the virtues, it binds of itself under pain of grave sin, but when the matter is light the sin will be only venial. Sins, then, against charity are grievous of themselves, as we shall see while treating of them separately.

We are bound sometimes to elicit acts of charity, but, as we have already seen, it is very difficult to determine exactly how frequently. Nor is it necessary to attempt the task, for implicit acts such as are contained in a devout recital of the Our Father, sorrow because God is continually being offended by sin, pious meditation on the Passion of Christ, suffice for the fulfilment of the obligation. We must not suppose that it is difficult to love God with the love of charity, for God has commanded it, and his infinite love towards us and the desire he has of being loved by us in return prompt him to give us abundant grace to enable us to comply with his precept. By becoming bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh in Jesus Christ, God has made it especially easy for us to love him, inasmuch as it is easy for us to understand and to appreciate the infinite tenderness and loveliness of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It is of such great merit that an act of perfect charity at once blots out all sin and reconciles the sinner with God.

Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. III, Chapter II. Well-Ordered Charity

THE law of charity is not fulfilled by a general and equal esteem for all mankind. Such a vague and general regard for others would probably he inoperative, and charity is above all things active. Charity, then, to be genuine must be well ordered and discriminating. It must look at the claims which others have on our charity; it must appreciate things at their true value, otherwise in wishing to confer a favour it will do harm to the object of love; it must assist others wisely according to their necessity, otherwise it will foster hypocrisy and produce professional and able-bodied beggars. In other words, as theologians teach, the order of charity has reference to the persons who claim our love, to the advantages which we desire to procure for them, and to the necessity in which they are placed,

God, the fountain and reason of charity, the infinite source of all good, has the first and highest claim on our love. “ He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.”¹ Next to God we must love ourselves with that genuine charity which makes one’s own salvation the first great duty of every man—‘‘ For what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul ?”² We are never justified, then, in committing the slightest sin for the love of anyone or anything whatsoever.

Neither must we without good cause expose ourselves to the proximate occasions of sin. If duty demands it and if proper precautions be taken, we may confidently trust in the protection of God, and expose ourselves to risk for the sake of our neighbour. We may, too, forego a small spiritual advantage which is not matter of precept for the sake of our neighbour. Moreover, we are sometimes called upon to sacrifice our own good of a lower order for the higher good of our neighbour. In this connection we may distinguish a triple order of goods, those which pertain to the salvation of the soul; the intrinsic and natural goods of soul and body, consisting in life, health, knowledge, liberty, etc.; and extrinsic goods consisting in reputation, wealth, etc. Theologians also distinguish three degrees of necessity in which one in need of charity, spiritual or temporal, may be placed. If he is in danger of damnation or of loss of life, or of other good of almost equal importance, and can do nothing to help himself, he is said to be in extreme necessity. If he is in similar danger but can do something to help himself, though not without grave difficulty, he is in grave necessity. Ordinary sinners and beggars who can help themselves without grave difficulty are in common necessity.

¹ Matt. x 37

² Matt. xvi 26.

Every man, as far as he can, is bound to help his neighbour in extreme spiritual necessity even at the cost of his own life: ‘‘ In this we have known the charity of God, because he hath laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.”¹ However, we do not lie under so serious an obligation unless the spiritual necessity of our neighbour is certain, the prospect of our being able to render effective help is equally certain, and no help is forthcoming from elsewhere. Neither should we be bound to risk our lives in order to help another in extreme spiritual need if greater harm would follow from our making the attempt. So that it is not often that ordinary people are bound to expose their lives to fulfil this obligation of charity; the obligation more frequently presses on Bishops and priests who have the cure of souls, and who are bound to execute their charge in justice as well as in charity. These are bound to expose their lives for their flock not only in extreme but also in grave necessity.

Except in the case of extreme spiritual necessity, we are not bound by the precept of charity to risk life or limb or expose ourselves to any serious inconvenience. The reason is because we are not bound to use extraordinary means and suffer serious inconvenience in order to preserve our own lives, and we cannot as a rule be bound to do more for our neighbour than we are bound to do for ourselves, especially as in grave or common necessity he can help himself. We might be obliged to do more for one whose welfare was of public importance. However, when our neighbour is in grave or even in common necessity, we must be prepared to undergo some inconvenience and trouble in order to help him. More precise rules on the subject will be given below.

It is a disputed question among theologians whether one is allowed to sacrifice his own life in order to save the life of another whose welfare is not of public importance. Many deny that it is lawful, for we should love ourselves in the first place when there is question of equal good; charity begins at home. Others, however, more probably teach that it may lawfully be done, and that it is an act of heroic virtue; so that in yielding a plank to another in a shipwreck and permitting himself to be drowned, a man does not prefer the life of another to his own, but he sacrifices his life for the sake of virtue.

¹ 1 John iii 16,

The more important spiritual goods of the soul should be the first objects of our solicitude, then the intrinsic goods of the soul and body, finally the extrinsic goods of reputation and wealth.

With the love of complacency which inclines us to show reverence, honour, and respect to others, we should give the preference to those who are more worthy of it on account of their closer union with God. The love of benevolence, on the other hand, leads us to prefer those who are nearer to us in sharing with them the goods which are specially due to them on account of their union with us. Although no absolute and universal rule can be laid down to guide us as to whom the preference should be given when we cannot help all, yet there is general agreement among theologians that the claims of our neighbour rank somewhat in the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, domestics, those who live in the same place, country, and finally all others.

Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. III, Chapter III. Love of Enemies

Nor even enemies and those who injure us are excluded from the law of charity; in spite of their ill will and malice they remain our neighbours, and our Lord expressly bade us love them: “I say to you: Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you.”¹ We are bound by this precept to put out of our hearts all ill feeling and desire of revenge against those who dislike and wrong us, and furthermore we are bound to show them those common marks of Christian charity which are due to all and may be refused to none. What those common marks of Christian charity are depends much on the usages of time and place, and of the society to which the parties belong. Those marks which are common to members of the same family are not due to outsiders; those which are mutually shown to neighbours of the same social standing are not due to utter strangers or to persons in a lower social position. Among the common signs of charity which may be refused to none are reckoned the following: general prayer for all which we offer up when we say the Our Father, answering a question or returning a salute, selling in open market to all comers, refraining from excluding individuals from general invitations or general benefactions, It is not of precept but of counsel to show one’s enemies unusual signs of forgiveness and charity. Such signs are to pray expressly for an enemy in particular, to visit him, to console him in affliction, to treat familiarly with him.

¹ Matt. v 44.

In certain circumstances, however, we are bound to show even these unusual signs of charity to our enemy, as when they cannot be refused without scandal to others who will think that they are refused through hatred, or when they are required to prevent our enemy from falling into serious sin as, for example, by conceiving a deeper hatred for us. If a former friend asks our pardon for an injury which he has done us, and if the friendship was not a freely accepted union between us, but was more or less required by our mutual relations, we must be ready to show him again unusual signs of charity. If the friendship depended merely on our mutual liking, there will be no obligation to show unusual marks of charity after receiving an offence; what was freely given may be freely withheld, always supposing that there is no ill will. We may for a time even refuse the common and ordinary signs of charity toward another for a good reason. A superior, for example, may do so in order to correct an inferior who has offended him. An equal may do so for a time immediately after receiving an offence while the injury is still rankling in his heart; to require not only repression of ill feeling, but the immediate exhibition of marks of charity for the offender, would be to lay too heavy a burden on poor human nature. It may also be lawful to refuse the ordinary signs of charity for a time toward one who has offended us in lighter matters as a suitable punishment, and as a means of preventing a repetition of such offences in future.

When one who has offended us apologizes and asks for pardon we are bound to forgive him and also at the proper time to show him the ordinary signs of charity. If, however, he has injured us, we have a right to compensation for the injustice, and charity does not compel us to forego our right. We may then require satisfaction for the injury and even bring an action in a court of law to recover it against the wrongdoer, without, of course, indulging any ill will.

With a view to reconciliation between enemies, it is the duty of him who gave the offence to apologize and to ask for pardon, unless a position of superiority makes this inadvisable. As a rule, it will not be necessary to make a formal request for pardon; satisfaction can usually be given to the offended party in a less formal way, and in a way that is less embarrassing to both parties. If both were in the wrong, the one who was most so, or the inferior, should be the first to seek reconciliation.

We sometimes find it difficult to associate with certain people; they try our temper; we can scarcely talk or think of them with patience. This is sinful, of course, if it is voluntary, and if it arises from ill will towards the person in question. It sometimes, however, comes not from ill will towards the person, but from incompatibility of characters and dispositions. We dislike in him some quality or mannerism, or something which we cannot precisely define. It is what theologians call the hatred of abomination, not of enmity, and it may be without fault, as when it leads us to fly his company not in order to wound his feelings, but to escape a trial of temper and probable unpleasantness.

To refuse the ordinary signs of charity so as not to speak to another, or to refuse to have anything to do with him out of ill feeling, and to foster this for a considerable time, is of itself a grave sin. But in estimating the gravity of such a sin in practice, the cause and the strength of the ill feeling should be considered. If the refusal to have anything to do with another come from serious ill will, it will be a grievous sin; otherwise it may be only venial, or if there be no ill will and a just cause, no sin at all,

Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. III, Chapter IV. Almsgiving

ALMSGIVING is here taken in a wide sense for any of the corporal works of mercy by which our neighbour’s necessity is relieved. Inasmuch as the law of charity binds us to help all who are in need as far as we can, almsgiving is obligatory by the law of nature. The obligation is frequently inculcated in Holy Scripture: ‘‘ Defraud not the poor of alms,’’ we read in Ecclesiasticus.¹1 Our Lord in severe terms enjoined on his followers the exercise of the works of mercy.²

¹ Ecclus. iv 1.

² Matt. xxv 41.

In order to measure as precisely as possible the gravity of the obligation of almsgiving, we must consider the necessity in which our neighbour is placed and our ability to help him. We are only bound to help those who are in real need; we should be fostering idleness and hypocrisy, and squandering on unworthy objects what is sorely needed by others, if we distributed our alms to the unneedy.

Theologians commonly distinguish three degrees of necessity, as we saw in a former chapter. Extreme necessity is the condition of one who from want is in danger of death or some equally serious evil, and who can do nothing to help himself. If in similar circumstances he can, though with difficulty, do something to help himself, he is said to be in grave necessity. Beggars and the indigent poor generally are in common necessity. These distinctions cannot be applied with mathematical accuracy; they are necessarily somewhat loose and vague, but they represent real differences which, broadly speaking, are capable of being appreciated without much difficulty, With regard to the ability of him who is called upon to relieve the needy, theologians distinguish between what is necessary to support the lives of a man and his family, what is necessary to support one’s position, and what remains over and above and is superfluous.

Except in the case of extreme necessity, which in ordinary circumstances is rare, there is no obligation to give alms out of what is necessary either for the support of life or position. Charity, as we have seen, begins at home, and it rather forbids us to prefer the needs of outsiders to our own and to the needs of our family. We are, as a general rule, only bound to give alms out of our superfluity, ‘“‘’That which remaineth give alms.¹ Some theologians maintain that this precept imposes an obligation of giving all one’s superfluous wealth to the poor; but others hold that this is only of counsel, that the precept is a general one directed to all the rich, and that it will be fulfilled if each gives something of his superfluity so that the necessities of the poor may be relieved by the common contributions of all. How much must be given according to this opinion depends upon circumstances, and is better left to the judgement of a prudent man after due consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

¹ Luke xi 41.

When our neighbour is in extreme or almost extreme necessity we are under a grave obligation of helping him even out of what is necessary to support our position in life, provided that it can be done without impoverishing ourselves or being compelled to give up our reasonable and justly acquired style of living. We are not obliged to pay large sums of money to ransom a captive from the hands of bandits, or to send a sick pauper to the Riviera for the winter; we should not be obliged to take such extraordinary means even to preserve our own life.

We are also under a grave obligation, according to the common teaching of divines, of helping the poor who are in grave necessity out of our superfluity. It is difficult to reconcile the words of Holy Scripture with any more lenient doctrine on this point.¹ However, we should be slow to decide that in any particular case a rich man has sinned mortally by refusing to help one in grave necessity. For although there be a grave obligation occasionally to help the poor in serious want, it cannot be concluded that a grave obligation binds any one particular person to assist all such; that would be an impossible burden. Furthermore, in practice it is frequently difficult to decide when a man is in grave necessity, and whether he will not be more conveniently helped by someone else. Besides, there are not wanting theologians who teach a more lenient doctrine as to the gravity of the obligation of assisting those who are in grave need.

A rich man cannot be excused from sin who makes it a practice never to give anything in alms on the plea that the poor can go to the workhouse, and that he pays his poor rates. For cases of grave and sometimes of extreme necessity arise where it is practically impossible to seek relief in the workhouse; and wherever there is a case of true necessity there is an obligation to help as far as one can.

¹ Matt. xxv 41; 1 John iii 17.

The rich are also under an obligation of sometimes helping those who are in common necessity, for the texts of Holy Scripture seem to refer to cases of ordinary need such as are commonly met with, and if no one ever helped the poor, their lot would soon become desperate. A man, therefore, who makes it a rule never to give alms to ordinary beggars certainly commits sin; he is not obliged to help all who apply, but out of his superfluity he must help some. It is a disputed point among theologians whether this obligation binds under pain of mortal or venial sin only. The severer view is the more common, but the milder is defended by many approved authors, on the ground that the necessity of the common beggar is tolerable, and is not so irksome as to impose on others a grave obligation of helping him.

Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. III, Chapter V. Fraternal Correction

By fraternal correction is meant a brotherly admonition given out of charity to a sinner to induce him to amend his ways. If such brotherly admonition is likely to do good and have its effect in procuring the amendment of the delinquent, charity requires that it should be given; for if charity obliges us to assist our neighbour when he is in temporal need, much more does it oblige us to do what we can for one who is in spiritual necessity. Our Lord, too, insisted on the fulfilment of this duty: ‘“‘ But if thy brother shall offend against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee thou shalt gain thy brother.”¹ ‘This obligation is of itself grave, as it belongs to the grave precept of charity, and like charity it binds all men. However, as we shall see, there are several conditions to be fulfilled in order that this precept may oblige in the concrete, and in practice private persons are rarely compelled under grave sin to exercise fraternal correction. Bishops, parish priests, and others who have the cure of souls, as well as parents, are more frequently obliged under pain of mortal sin to admonish those committed to their charge.

¹ Matt. xviii 15.

Theologians enumerate the following conditions as requisite in order that there may arise an obligation of giving fraternal correction:

(a) It must be certain that a grave sin has been committed and that the delinquent has not corrected and will not of himself correct his fault, ‘There is no general obligation to correct the venial sins of another according to a very probable opinion; in religious communities, or in other circumstances where uncorrected venial sin might lead to serious relaxation of discipline or other harm, superiors are sometimes bound under grave sin to correct venial faults, or even faults against the rule which are not necessarily sinful. The grave sin must be certain without the necessity of making inquiries, which would be unwarrantable in a private person.

(b) If there is someone else who can and will give the necessary admonition, the obligation will not rest upon me.

(c) There must be a reasonable expectation that the admonition will do good; there is no obligation to do what is useless, Neither should it be given if it is doubtful whether it will do good or harm.

(d) As charity does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience to one’s self, there will be no obligation to correct another if this cannot be done without serious inconvenience. This rule applies to such as are bound only out of charity to correct others fraternally; Bishops and priests are bound to do so also in justice, which obliges more strictly than does charity.

Our Lord not only inculcated the duty of fraternal correction,¹ but he taught that in the first instance it was to be done in private, then in the presence of witnesses, and finally the delinquent was to be denounced to the public authorities in order that public morality might be safeguarded and the sinner more effectually corrected. This order should, of course, be followed per se, for charity and justice demand that our neighbour’s secret fault should not be made known to others except in special cases and for good cause. However, cases are not infrequent in which it is lawful to denounce a delinquent immediately to the superior without first attempting to correct him fraternally. Such cases are the following:

(a) If the sin be public, the sinner’s reputation is not injured unjustly by at once informing the superior, which accordingly may be done.

(b) If the paternal admonition of the superior will in all likelihood be more sure and efficacious than the fraternal correction of a private person, the superior may be immediately informed as a father, whose duty it is to correct his children for their good, not as a judge, whose duty it is to safeguard public interests by punishing crimes.

(c) If harm threatens the community from the action of the delinquent, and it can only be effectually prevented by the intervention of the superior’s authority.

(d) If the delinquent be one of a religious community whose members have voluntarily renounced their rights in this matter, and agreed that anyone who becomes aware of their faults may straightway inform the superior, such a one suffers no injury if the rule be acted on. However, even in this case there must be good reason for making the fault known to the superior, such as the sinner’s correction, the good name of the community, the preservation of discipline. If the sin was committed in the past, and there is now no good reason for making it known to the superior, it would be sinful to make it known to him. Religious have a right to their reputation.

Sometimes members of communities, and boys or girls at school, who know that serious harm to morals is being done by a black sheep among the flock, are bound under penalty of grave sin to give information to superiors so that the suitable remedy may be applied. Such cases require careful treatment from the confessor, who is bound to instruct his penitents concerning their obligations, and to refuse them absolution if they are not prepared to fulfil those obligations which bind them under penalty of grave sin. On the other hand, the seal of confession must be safeguarded at any cost.

¹ Matt. xviii 15

It is the better opinion that private persons are not regularly obliged to admonish another for committing a material sin through ignorance or inadvertence. Sometimes, however, harm would follow even if material sin were to go uncorrected and, inasmuch as charity requires that we should prevent harm when we can, in these cases, admonition should be given. Those also who are placed in authority and have the duty of instructing their subjects, preventing scandal, and maintaining discipline, are bound to correct even the material sins of those under their charge.

Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. III, Chapter VI. Scandal

SCANDAL in its theological sense is any word or action which has at least the appearance of evil and is the occasion of sin to another. This is the received definition of active scandal. Passive scandal is the sin which another is led to commit through active scandal. It is quite immaterial whether passive scandal be a sin of the same species as the scandal which caused it or not; a priest who gets drunk may cause scandal by inducing others to follow his example, or by causing others to speak ill of priests or of the Catholic Church.

Scandal is direct when it is foreseen and intended. If it is intended precisely in order that another may fall into sin, it is called diabolic; if it is intended on account of the advantage it will bring to him who gives it, it is simply direct scandal.

Indirect scandal is foreseen by him who gives it, but it is not intended.

Scandal of the weak is caused by the ignorance or frailty of him who suffers it; pharisaic scandal is caused by his malice, as was the case with the Pharisees taking scandal at the words and actions of our Lord and his Apostles.

Giving scandal is of itself gravely sinful, as it is against charity; and it is a special sin against the precept of fraternal correction which obliges us to do what we can to rescue a fallen brother, whereas one who scandalizes his brother causes him to fall.¹ Although of itself scandal is a grave sin, it is frequently only venial in the concrete. The gravity of the sin is not measured by the malice of the sin which causes scandal, but by the malice of the sin which he who gives scandal foresees will certainly or at least probably be caused in another. Thus a gravely sinful word or act may be a venial sin of scandal, and a venially sinful word or act may be a grave sin of scandal. It is plain, too, that not every sin committed in the sight of others is a sin of scandal, but then only when it is forese n that at least probably it will cause others to commit sin.

¹ Cf. Matt. xviii 7.

There is a twofold malice in sins of direct scandal; such sins are against charity and also against that special virtue which he who suffers scandal violates. So that when A incites B to drink to excess, A sins against charity and against temperance, which not only prescribes moderation in one’s own actions, but forbids one to be the cause of its violation by another.

The question whether indirect scandal in the same manner also contains a twofold malice is disputed among theologians, The negative opinion is probable, for although the virtue of temperance, for example, forbids me to induce another to sin against it, and I violate temperance if I do so, yet temperance does not require of me that I should prevent others from sinning against it; I may sin against charity if I do not try to prevent a sin of intemperance in another, but I do not sin against temperance. And so when indirect scandal is given, thereby causing another to drink to excess, there is a sin against charity; but the sin of scandal does not contain in addition the malice of a sin against temperance.

When A solicits B to commit sin with him and B consents, both sin against charity and also against the virtue which is specially violated; so that although solicitation causes A’s sin to be greater, it does not constitute a specific difference, and need not be confessed.

If I foresee that scandal is likely to be caused by an action of mine which has the appearance of being wrong, but which in fact is perfectly lawful, I am under the obligation of removing the danger of scandal by explaining my conduct, or omitting the action altogether if I can do so conveniently. If I cannot explain or omit the action without serious inconvenience, I am justified in performing the action and permitting the scandal, for charity does not bind to one’s own serious inconvenience.

On the other hand, I am not justified in omitting an action which is prescribed by the natural or divine law on account of the scandal which the action would give, and so when God’s honour or the salvation of my neighbour or my own requires that I should make public profession of the faith, I am bound to make it though my profession will make the enemies of the faith blaspheme.

Even a positive precept does not cease to bind on account of a general fear of scandal; whether it ceases to bind or not on account of scandal in a particular instance is a disputed point. Some theologians maintain that if a woman knows that her presence at Mass is a cause of grave sin to another and she cannot hear Mass elsewhere, she is obliged to abstain from hearing Mass at least for a Sunday or two, because the natural precept of avoiding scandal is more important than the positive precept of hearing Mass on Sundays. Others, on the contrary, hold that inasmuch as the scandal is taken and not given, the obligation of hearing Mass does not cease to bind in such a case. Practically, therefore, one is free to follow either opinion. This disputed question refers to scandal of the weak, for positive precepts do not cease to be obligatory on account of pharisaic scandal.

A good action without any appearance of evil which is not prescribed, and which can without inconvenience be omitted, should be omitted when it would cause scandal. If it cannot be abandoned without some inconvenience, there is no obligation to abstain from it; and so I may receive the sacraments even when they are not obligatory from a priest whom I know to be in a state of sin and unworthy to administer them.

If I suspect the honesty of a servant, I do nothing wrong if I leave a sum of money where I know he will see it with the object of finding out whether he will steal it. If he is an honest man, no harm will follow; if he is a thief, my action does not make him one; I do but furnish the opportunity for him to betray himself, and in my own defence I am justified in doing that. It is of course morally wrong to use agents provocateurs in order to detect criminals; they are the cause of another’s sin, not merely the occasion.

If I know that someone has made up his mind to commit sin and there is no other way of preventing him, I may lawfully induce him to be satisfied with some less offence of God than he was bent on committing. And so if a man was determined to commit adultery, I do nothing morally wrong, but rather the contrary, by persuading him to commit fornication instead. Many theologians, indeed, deny this doctrine on the ground that we must not do evil that good may come of it. But there is no question here of doing evil one’s self; we are not justified in doing a less moral evil instead of a greater; we must abstain from all evil, great and small. The question is whether it is an evil action to persuade someone bent on committing a great sin to be satisfied with a less. This is denied by those who defend the above doctrine. And reasonably so, for it is a good action to persuade another to do less evil than he was bent upon doing. To lessen evil is surely to do good. This is the more probable view, according to St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor., 2, n. 57.

Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. III, Chapter VII. Co-operation in Another's Sin

CLOSELY connected with scandal is the subject of co-operation or participation in the sin of another; indeed, they are often treated of together, but on account of the importance of the latter it seems desirable to devote a special chapter to it.

Co-operation, then, may be formal or material. Formal co-operation is concurrence in the bad action of another and in the bad intention with which it is performed. Material co-operation is the concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention with which it is done.

Co-operation is proximate or remote according as the action of the secondary agent is more closely connected with the action of the principal agent or less so.

One is said to co-operate positively when he does something which influences the action of the principal agent; one is said to co-operate negatively when he does not hinder a bad action which he is bound to prevent.

It is never lawful to co-operate formally with another’s sin, for it is obviously to wish evil, which is always sinful. Nor is it lawful to co-operate materially with the sin of another when the action of the secondary agent is itself wrong, as is also clear. But provided the action of the secondary agent is not itself wrong, but right, or at least indifferent, and he has no evil intention, and furthermore there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent, material co-operation in the sin of another is not wrong. In such circumstances, the secondary agent does nothing that is wrong in itself; he foresees, it is true, that another will take advantage of his action in order to commit sin, but the secondary agent is only bound to prevent this out of charity, which does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience, and this is present whenever there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent. This is merely the application of the principle of a double effect which was laid down in the Book on Human Acts.¹

The cases to which this doctrine may be applied are very 732) numerous, but the safe application is difficult and attended with risk. The chief difficulty lies in determining the gravity of the cause which will justify one in co-operating materially in another’s sin. No general rule can be laid down on the point beyond saying that a graver cause is required when there is question of a graver sin, when the co-operation is more proximate, and when it is more probable that the sin would not be committed at all if the co-operation were denied. The following examples taken from approved authors are given as illustrating the application of the doctrine, and they may be used to show what may be done in similar cases.

(a) I may lawfully ask for the sacraments from a bad priest, though he commits sin in administering them, for he need not sin thereby unless he likes, and his malice should not deprive me of the benefit of the sacraments to which I have a right.

(b) A dealer may sell to all buyers things which are in themselves indifferent, though they can be put to a bad use, as firearms, unless he is certain that they are required for a bad purpose. Even in the latter case a correspondingly serious inconvenience or loss will excuse his selling, especially if his refusal will not hinder the sin on account of the buyer being easily able to procure what he wants elsewhere.

(c) Intoxicating drink may not be sold to one who has already had too much. Many authors, however, allow this to be done when it cannot be refused without provoking to violence and quarrelling. This excuse would rarely avail in England at present, because the law forbids such sale, the strong arm of the law thus being on the side of morality.

(d) It is not lawful to sell things of which the use is ordinarily sinful, except when their lawful use is guaranteed. And so booksellers are not allowed to sell infidel or immoral books except to such as require them for good reasons and with the requisite permission. The same doctrine applies to drugs and instruments used for immoral purposes, as well as to poisons. Publishers, too, sin by publishing books which are dangerous to faith or morals. Compositors and others employed in printing should not work for firms which are known to publish bad books; as they are usually ignorant of the nature of the work which they help to bring out, their ignorance, the remoteness of their co-operation, and the ease with which other workmen can be found to supply their place, will ordinarily excuse them from sin if an odd bad book or two are published by an otherwise respectable firm.

(e) Dancing may be a perfectly innocent amusement and it may be a dangerous occasion of sin. No general rule, therefore, can be given as to when dancing must be avoided. Much depends upon the company who join in the dance, upon the way of dancing, and upon the subjective disposition of the dancers. If there be nothing objectionable in any of these respects, there is no reason why a young man or a young woman should not be allowed to dance with due caution. If there be ground for objection, and especially if sin has already been frequently committed in similar circumstances, there is an obligation to abstain, unless the occasion of sin is necessary and can be made remote by taking proper precautions. If sin only follows occasionally, there will be no strict obligation to abstain from dancing, provided due precautions be taken in future.

(f) The question of theatre-going is settled on similar grounds. There are all sorts of theatres and all sorts of plays represented in them, and.all sorts of actors and actresses. To go and listen to a bad and suggestive play arouses the passions, leads to sin, and encourages evil in many ways. It will, then, as a rule, be grievously sinful to go to the theatre to see such a play. The confessor will usually be able to judge best whether in any particular case it is lawful to go to the theatre by asking whether in the past it has frequently led to sin. If it has done so, it is a proximate occasion of sin, and must be avoided as far as possible. In other cases, unless the play or the theatre is known to be bad, there will be no strict obligation to refrain from going.

¹ St Alphonsus, lib. 2, tract. 3, n. 63.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 24 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Section I. On the Good Act

n. 243.

III. Of the conditions assigned, the second must be developed more fully; in other words, it must be explained what kind of end is good, or to what end in the concrete an act must be referred. Now:

Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually. I said:

a) Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. The proposition is established against the Scotists, who teach that those acts which of themselves are ordered only to some comfort or relief of nature, such as walking, smelling flowers, stroking the beard, those acts, I say, can without sin be directly referred to the lower end alone, namely to comfort or pleasure, provided the ultimate end is not positively excluded.¹ According to the stated authors, one who directly rests in such an end neither sins, because to act for the end of the work alone is not evil, nor acts morally well, because he does not refer the act to an honorable end. Therefore he places an indifferent act. But the contrary opinion is deduced from the fact that every human or deliberated act must be done for that end alone which befits rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

Objection. He who acts for the end of the work alone cannot sin. But the works about which there is controversy are, by their nature, ordered to pleasure alone.

Response. The argument proposed by us proves precisely that he sins who acts for the end of the work alone, if there is question of a work which by its nature is ordered to pleasure alone.

Corollary I. It is illicit to act for pleasure alone, so that an act placed for that end alone not only is destitute of goodness, but is also evil. It is, however, only venially evil, if there is question of a thing licit in itself or venially evil, because the disordered relation of an act licit in itself or slightly evil does not import grave disorder. Except the case in which pleasure would be intended as the ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to act, even, for pleasure, by resting, even, in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem licit, insofar as the honorable act and its delectability constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is licit to act for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it attracts to an act ordered in itself, for instance to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure, considered as such, has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 9, n. 1).

b) Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, whether the end of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived in species or in a vague way. The very end of the work, at least to this extent, does not fall under precept, insofar as there is no obligation of intending it, although there can be an obligation of not impeding it. This being posited, the agent is free to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 927; cf. 882 and 883). Nevertheless several think, as we shall soon note, that the end of the work itself, by the very fact that it is not positively excluded, is at least implicitly intended.

c) It is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually, or that the act be virtually referred to an honorable end, or that the act be placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. For it suffices that the act truly be referred to an honorable end; but it is truly referred to an honorable end if it is placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. There is added that the obligation of an actual relation "would be an unbearable weight and a matter entangled with six hundred scruples" (St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

d) It is disputed whether one who places an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, by that very fact intends the honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this; but it seems it must be denied. For that on account of which an act is distinguished is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the act is performed. But the end of the act is distinguished from the act itself, for example the procreation of offspring from intercourse, as effect from cause; hence in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places, in the due mode and order, an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude this end, commonly positively includes that end, although only confusedly and weakly.

It is disputed whether every human act must, in order to be good, be referred to God, or whether it suffices that it be referable to God.

Some teach that every act must be referred to God, because the dignity of the true ultimate end requires that all acts be referred to him. They add, however, that an implicit relation suffices, and that this is had by the very fact that the act is placed for an honorable end; because every honorable act by its nature is referred to God, the first and fontal honorableness of every particular honorableness.

Others deny that every act must be referred to God, and teach that, for a good act, it suffices that it be referable to God. They think this because acts cannot in any way be referred to God except through charity. But charity is certainly not required in order that a good act be placed; and this is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."² According to the latter opinion, a good act not referred to God is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end (nn. 12 and 13).

A human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nor from another supernaturally known motive; this again is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition just cited.
Although a human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nevertheless to this extent there is an obligation of referring one's acts through an act of charity to God as to the ultimate end, insofar as it is prescribed to elicit an act of charity at certain times. Another precept besides that which is identified with the precept of charity cannot be proved. Hence St. Thomas says: "If it is asked when one must refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when the habit of charity must go out into act, because whenever the habit of charity goes out into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him" (In II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6).

Nor does St. Alphonsus contradict these things when he teaches that acts should be offered to God several times in the day, at least in the morning (V, XLIV). For, as is clear from the context, he does not speak about the relation of acts to God as to the ultimate end, but about the care of referring all one's acts, even those which from the object are indifferent, to a good or honorable end. In order that this be done certainly, a good intention should be repeated more often.

Those who think that, for the goodness of an act, it is not required that it be referred to God as to the ultimate end, since according to their opinion this cannot be done without charity, ask what kind of influence must proceed from charity in order that an act be referred to God.³ Now:

Some require only habitual charity, without its influencing the act, since honorable acts are referred to God as if by their own weight.

Others likewise require only habitual charity; but according to them honorable acts which are placed in that state are always placed under the influence of the intention of God as ultimate end. For every agent, they say, acts from the intention of the ultimate end; but this, in one who is ordered to God, that is, in a just person, is God himself.

Others, besides habitual charity, require an act of perfect charity, by force of which good acts are referred to God. Of these, some say that in itself one act suffices for referring all future good acts to God, with the things that must be posited of course having been posited, namely that one not lose charity in the meantime. I said "in itself," because from another source there is the precept of eliciting an act of charity at certain times. Others think that the act of charity must be repeated at least from time to time. Here, however, it is further disputed whether the act of charity, in order to refer human acts to God, must be their causing principle, or whether it suffices that it be an ordering principle.⁴

Van Roey, who embraces the latter opinion, describes the stated ordering thus: "But if you ask how that virtual ordering of works is conceived, which is not virtual causality, we respond that it is a certain determination left behind from the first intention, some dictate arising from the first dictate, by force of which works are exercised in loving service of God and are determined and specified as friendly offerings made to God. This determination, this dictate, must be perceived as something truly persevering in the will, although here and now it does not occur to thought; the sign, indication, and argument of its real persistence is if someone, self-possessed and acting morally, is in such a disposition of mind that, seriously reflecting upon himself or asked why he does this or that work, finally and ultimately, after perhaps giving other particular motives, he answers that he acts on account of God, to please God, or something similar including explicitly or implicitly the motive of charity.

"If the matter is understood thus, it cannot be denied that the ordering of works is virtual; that is, the preceding intention, when it vanishes from the mind as an explicit intention, leaves behind some power, some determination, some disposition, which suffices so that the works, if they are done, are directed to God."

¹ Therefore they do not apply the doctrine to those acts to which the Author of nature has appointed the certain end of some honorable necessity or utility; such are, for example, eating, conjugal intercourse, etc. Besides, Innocent XI condemned proposition 8: "To eat and drink to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts"; and proposition 9: "The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect" (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1158 and 1159).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

³ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 26 sq.; Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., VIII, n. 639.

⁴ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 232 sq.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Article III. On the Theological Virtue of Charity

n. 363.

I. Notion of Charity. Charity is: a theological virtue inclining man to love God on account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. It is said:

To love God. By these words is indicated the primary material object of charity, while the words and ourselves and our neighbor denote its secondary material object.
On account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbors on account of God. This indicates the formal object of this virtue.

n. 364.

II. Object of Charity. 1. Material object. The material object of charity, or the object to whom we will good, and indeed the primary one, is God Himself. This is clear from Sacred Scripture, which calls the love of God the greatest and first commandment.¹ It is confirmed by reason. For the material object of some virtue is said to be that which primarily stands under the formal object of charity and by reason of which the other things are attained. But God primarily stands under the formal object of charity, and the other things are attained by reason of God; for the formal object of charity is divine goodness in itself, which is essentially in God and participatively in others.

The secondary material object, therefore, is constituted by all things which can be attained by the virtue of charity by reason of God; and by reason of God all rational creatures can be attained, whether the Blessed or those capable of beatitude, since they participate, or at least are able to participate, in God Himself through grace and the light of glory.

Corollary. To the secondary material object pertain: 1. all the Blessed, whether men or angels; 2. all souls in purgatory; 3. all wayfarers, indeed the wayfarer himself in relation to himself; 4. the body of the neighbor and of the lover himself insofar as, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "from the enjoyment of the soul a certain beatitude redounds to the body" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 5, ad 5). But the damned, whether angels or men, cannot pertain to the secondary object; for they are incapable of grace and of the light of glory.

Formal object. The formal object of theological charity is the supernatural goodness of God, lovable in itself and on account of itself. It is said:

a) The supernatural goodness of God, that is, the goodness of God insofar as it is known by the light of faith, so that it may be distinguished from the goodness of God insofar as it is known by the light of reason, which would be the formal object of natural love.

b) Lovable in itself and on account of itself. And thus the distinction is had between the formal object of charity and of hope; for the formal object of hope is the relative goodness of God, while it must be said "that by charity God is loved on account of Himself" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 3, ad 2). In this doctrine all theologians agree, except one or another; but they disagree in assigning what the supernatural goodness of God must involve in order to be the formal object of charity. Two opinions chiefly exist concerning this question. Some say that any divine perfection whatever suffices for the formal object of charity. But others, with St. Thomas,² to whom St. Alphonsus adheres (Theologia moralis, II, 24, conference VI, 436, and Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 9), teach that this goodness is composed of all God's perfections, and therefore of the goodness of the essence and of all the attributes. The reason for this opinion is that by the virtue of charity God is loved as the supreme good; but in order that He can be so loved, He must first be known as the supreme good, according to the saying: nothing is willed unless known. But he who loves God from the motive of one attribute taken separately does not know Him in this attribute as the supreme good; for the attribute contains God as the supreme good only implicitly and virtually. But things which are only implicitly and virtually contained in something explicitly known are not known in such a way that they can be a motive for acting. There is added the fact that the formal object of charity on the way and in the homeland must be the same, since the virtue is specifically the same, as the Apostle bears witness: "Charity never falleth away."³ Now charity in the homeland has as its formal object the goodness of God composed of all God's perfections; otherwise the one loving would not be blessed, because he would not see God as He is.

Corollary I. The desire of possessing God on account of God's own glory, that is, so that He may be loved perfectly by us, is a perfect act of charity; but the desire of possessing God on account of attaining one's own beatitude is an act of hope, or of the love of concupiscence (St. Alphonsus, II, 24, distinction 1).

Corollary II. The love of God on account of His benefits is an act of charity if the one loving looks at the benefits as communications of divine goodness, since then he loves not his own utility, but the goodness of God in itself. But if he looks at the benefits as conferred on us, it is an act of a grateful soul, or of gratitude.

¹ Matt. 22:37.

² Cf. Salmanticenses, disp. 2, dub. 2, §§ 2-3, where they indicate various places of St. Thomas.

³ 1 Cor. 13:8.

n. 365.

III. Subject of Charity. 1. The subject by which and partial of the theological virtue of charity is the will. For theological charity is occupied around the good of God Himself as good to Him; but good is the object of the will. Therefore the virtue of charity has the will as the immediate subject of inherence. And thus it is clear that charity is really distinguished from sanctifying grace, since the latter immediately inheres in the essence of the soul.

The subject which and total of the theological virtue of charity is everyone, and only one, who is supernaturally just. It is said:

a) Everyone who is supernaturally just, because together with justifying or sanctifying grace charity too is infused.

b) Only one who is supernaturally just, because mortal sin, together with justifying or sanctifying grace, also destroys charity; for charity is conversion to God, while mortal sin is aversion from Him; these cannot be present together in relation to the same terminus.

n. 366.

IV. Properties of Charity. Two properties especially of theological charity remain to be briefly explained here: its being the form of the other virtues, and its necessity.

Its being the form of the other virtues. This property consists in this, that every virtue draws its perfection from charity. For the perfection of every virtue consists in attaining the ultimate end. But no virtue immediately attains the ultimate end as ultimate end except charity. Hence it remains that the other virtues have this perfection through charity. Yet this is not to be understood as if charity were intrinsic to the other virtues, "but that which is left in faith (and in the other virtues) from charity is intrinsic to faith," says St. Thomas (De veritate, q. 14, a. 5, ad 4); and in another place he says: "That which is of perfection in faith is derived from charity, so that charity has it essentially, but faith and the other virtues participatively" (ibid., art. 1).
Necessity. a) The habit of charity, or habitual charity, is necessary for salvation for all men by necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But the habit of charity is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means, so also is the habit of charity.

b) In what respect the act of charity, or actual charity, is necessary, we shall say in Book II, where we treat of the cultivation of virtues.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Dissertation III. On the Cultivation of Charity

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 23-29; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, II, 22-80; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, nn. 9-32.)

n. 516.

Charity is a supernatural theological virtue inclining man to love God on account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God (De virtutibus, n. 363).

The primary material object is God; the secondary object is ourselves and our neighbor (De virtutibus, n. 364).

The formal object or motive of charity is the supernatural divine goodness or perfection, lovable in itself and on account of itself (De virtutibus, n. 364).

These things recalled to memory, we shall speak first about the cultivation of charity generally, then, in different parts, about the cultivation of charity toward God, self, and neighbor specifically, and then about the order of charity.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Part I. On the Cultivation of Charity Generally

n. 517.

I. Necessity of means. There can be discussion only of adults; but again a distinction must be made between adults not yet justified and adults justified. Now:

According to some, the act of charity is necessary by necessity of means for adults not yet justified who habitually enjoy the use of reason, insofar as the infusion of grace in the aforesaid never takes place without an act of charity; not as if attrition did not suffice for justification, but, so they say, by the force of the sacrament itself received with attrition only, man is disposed to actual charity, and in the very instant of justification elicits a true act of charity.

"Sanctifying grace," says Hugon, "is infused together with habitual charity into the penitent man, not merely as into one dead, but in such a way that man receives it by a voluntary and free act, and freely consents to the friendship of God. But this actual and free acceptance of grace and consent to the friendship of God, what else is it than an act of charity consequent upon sanctifying and habitual grace itself in the genus of efficient cause, although it can be said to precede it by nature in the genus of material and dispositive cause?"¹

According to others, the act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means for obtaining justification; but this can be acquired through the sacrament with attrition, without an act of charity. For besides the fact that they do not see that an act of charity is necessarily contained in the free acceptance of sanctifying grace, they reason thus: An adult who wished to be baptized, and was attrite, and is baptized while sleeping, obtains justification without eliciting an act of charity. Nor can they admit that an act of charity is virtually contained in the preceding act of attrition, because an inferior act cannot virtually contain a superior act; nor do they understand how a preceding act could, in justification itself, become an act of charity, especially if it is a question of the justification of one sleeping. Nor should it be objected that an act of charity is virtually contained in the preceding volition of Baptism and attrition; for an inferior act cannot virtually contain a superior act.

St. Thomas says thus: "The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He Himself is the one who justifies the ungodly. But God moves all things according to the mode of each one.... and therefore in him who has the use of free choice, movement by God toward justice is not made without a movement of free choice: but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that, together with this, He also moves free choice to accepting the gift of grace in those who are capable of this motion" (I-II, q. 113, a. 3). And elsewhere: "In those having the use of free choice... there does not happen to be an infusion of grace without an actual movement of free choice toward God and toward sin" (III, q. 87, a. 2). Yet it is not clear that St. Thomas understands an act of charity; all the more because the holy Doctor admits that one sleeping, who previously had the sacrament in intention, is justified through Baptism (I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad 1).

The act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means for justified adults. For once justification has been posited, only the continuation of justification is required; for this it suffices that sin be avoided.

¹ De sacramentis in speciali, p. 407.

n. 518.

II. Efficacy of the act of charity. An act of charity or of perfect contrition suffices for justifying man, that is, when that act has been posited, God justifies in the same instant, or infuses sanctifying grace. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him";¹ 2. from the Council of Trent, which "teaches moreover that, although it happens sometimes that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to that contrition without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it";² 3. to this is added condemned Baius proposition 31: "Perfect and sincere charity, which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, can be in catechumens as well as penitents without remission of sins."³

Yet observe that an act of charity or of perfect contrition justifies not in the mode of efficient cause, or of meritorious cause de condigno, or of formal cause, but in the mode of material and dispositive cause, or in the mode of a dispositive cause meritorious de congruo, that is, one which, from the will of God, infallibly obtains the infusion of sanctifying grace.

¹ John 14:23; cf. 1 John 4:7 and 16; Luke 7:47.

² Session 14, chapter 4.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1031.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Part II. On the Cultivation of Charity Toward God

n. 519.

I. The precept of charity. 1. The act of charity, actual charity, toward God, or the act by which we love God on account of Himself above all things, is necessary by necessity of precept. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment";¹ 2. by reason. For it is manifest that infinite goodness or perfection is to be loved, and this on account of itself and above all things. Now: 1. the precept of charity is a special precept, in other words, the formal act of charity is prescribed, so that, for example, mere observance of the precepts does not suffice; 2. it is not a precept of loving God intensively above all things, but it suffices that He be loved objectively or appreciatively above all things (St. Alphonsus, II, 22); 3. an act of charity can be elicited in various ways, for example by rejoicing over the divine goods considered in themselves, by wishing and promoting the external glory of God as a good for Him.

An act of charity toward God obliges:

By reason of the precept of charity itself:

a) "When man has attained sufficient knowledge of God as infinitely good" (St. Alphonsus, II, 23, 1; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89, a. 6).

b) Several times in life; this is clear: 1. from propositions condemned by Innocent XI, namely 5: "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life? We do not dare to condemn";² 6: "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not oblige of itself even in each rigorously taken period of five years";³ 7: "It obliges only when we are bound to be justified and we have no other way by which we can be justified."⁴ 2. To this is added that the homage to be rendered to God seems to require that several times in life we elicit acts of virtues which immediately regard God. Here, however, an act of charity that is not wholly explicit seems to suffice, for example, perfect contrition, a good work performed for pleasing God, the petitions contained in the Lord's Prayer: "Hallowed be Thy name," etc. It is more difficult to determine how often the act of charity must be elicited. St. Alphonsus judges that one satisfies the grave obligation who elicits it each month (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 14).

c) In the article of death, as was said of faith (n. 489) and hope (n. 513); if the precept did not then urge, it would never urge.

d) When someone has held God in hatred (n. 489).

e) When a temptation against charity presses, which someone judges he cannot overcome except by an elicited act of charity (St. Alphonsus, II, 23, 2).

By reason of the precept of another virtue, as was said of faith (n. 489) and hope (n. 513).

Note 1. Charity toward God, unlike charity toward neighbor, rarely brings with it the obligation of an external act, since the internal act is known to God and of itself involves homage. For the rest, compare and apply the notes regarding faith (n. 489).

Note 2. Benedict XIV exhorts bishops that in every parish church on Sundays and feast days the acts of faith, hope, and charity be read aloud to the people.⁵

¹ Matthew 22:37-38.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1155.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1156.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1157.

⁵ Constitution Etsi minime, February 7, 1742.

n. 520.

II. Sins against charity toward God - besides omission of the act prescribed by reason of the precept of charity - are: hatred of God and sloth.

Hatred of God. Hatred taken generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward someone.

Hatred is distinguished as twofold: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity or malevolence, according as someone turns away from someone as an evil to himself, or wills evil to someone. Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity to love of benevolence. Sadness over another's good belongs to hatred of enmity; likewise joy over his evil.

Hatred of abomination, to which every evil deliberate movement against someone is referred, is again twofold, namely of the person himself and of a quality, according as someone turns away from the person himself according to himself, or from an adhering quality of the person. These things noted, I say:

a) Hatred of abomination toward God is grave from its whole genus; for it is clear that he sins gravely who in whatever way whatsoever turns away from God.

b) Hatred of enmity toward God is grave from its whole genus, indeed even the gravest of all sins, because he who wishes evil to God most greatly injures the charity due to God.

Sloth; concerning this, see n. 327.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. III, Section I. On the Precept of Charity Toward Self

n. 521.

I. Existence of the precept. The precept of charity toward self is clear from Sacred Scripture: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself."¹ Likewise it is clear from the intrinsic reason, which St. Thomas presents in these words: "We can speak of charity according to its proper account, namely insofar as it is man's friendship toward God principally, and consequently toward those things which are God's: among which is also the very man who has charity; and thus, among the other things which he loves out of charity as pertaining to God, he also loves himself out of charity" (II-II, q. 25, a. 4).

¹ Matthew 22:39.

n. 522.

II. Act of the precept. Charity toward self obliges to care for welfare both spiritual and bodily. But the duties of spiritual care coincide with the diverse duties to be fulfilled by man; hence we must speak only about care to be taken for temporal welfare. This obligation indeed is presented in these terms: Charity toward self prescribes self-preservation, that is, preservation of life, integrity of members, and health, and this at least by means ordinary for each one's state; there is no obligation of employing extraordinary means. We shall explain the individual points distinctly.

Self-preservation, that is, of life, etc., is prescribed. This is clear first from the fact that charity toward self prescribes that each one preserve that which constitutes himself according to his substance and as entire. Then it is drawn from the fact that life and members have been granted by God for use, namely that by means of them he may promote the honor of God, his own good, and the good of the community; this end is frustrated if they are not preserved.
Self-preservation must be procured at least by means ordinary for each one's state. This is immediately drawn from the preceding proposition. For there is, as we have said, an obligation of preserving life, etc. But he who does not use ordinary means does not preserve life, but neglects it.
There is no obligation of employing extraordinary means. For the life of an individual is not of such value that extraordinary things must be chosen for preserving it. Yet someone is bound, if he can, to use even extraordinary means if his life is necessary or very useful to the common good or to the family, and cannot be preserved without them (St. Alphonsus, III, 372).

Yet note that many means which formerly were extraordinary have already become ordinary, for example some surgical operations.

Corollary I. The obligation of applying ordinary means for preserving life carries with it the obligation of working to obtain the things necessary to oneself, if they cannot be obtained legitimately in another way.

Corollary II. No one of himself is bound: 1. to use medicine that is most costly; 2. to change residence or fatherland; 3. to suffer treatment joined with the greatest pains; 4. to undergo cutting off of members or a grave surgical operation whether dangerous, or - which nevertheless can commonly be forestalled - joined with the greatest pains. Likewise, quite probably, of himself one is not bound to a grave surgical operation which is neither dangerous nor joined with the greatest pains, but nevertheless is regarded as gravely burdensome. Yet I think that it, namely if it is not dangerous and can be performed without very great pains, can be imposed by a superior. Finally, a virgin quite probably is not bound, for preserving life, to permit herself to be treated in the more secret parts by a man, if this would be a cause of great shame to her; yet she is bound to permit herself to be treated by another woman (St. Alphonsus, III, 372). To what extent a mother can be bound to a Caesarean section, as it is called, see in the treatise on Baptism.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. III, Section II. On Sins Opposed to Charity Toward Self

n. 523.

The sins against charity toward self are:

I. Direct killing of oneself. This occurs when the self-killing act, as such, either is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained.

Direct killing of oneself is always prohibited under grave sin. For first, an act of this sort is against natural inclination, "because naturally every thing loves itself; and to this it belongs that every thing naturally preserves itself in being, and resists corrupting things as much as it can" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5). Then self-killing "is against charity, by which each one ought to love himself" (St. Thomas, ibid.). Then the killer "does injury to the community" (St. Thomas, ibid.), because each one, as part of the community, is ordered also to the good of the community. Moreover, it is illicit to destroy what is not yours, but God's alone; and such is life. Hence Sacred Scripture: "You shall not kill";¹ "I will kill and I will make to live";² "You are Lord, who have power of life and death."³

It is indeed reported that some Saints killed themselves; but these things can be explained either through the inspiration of God, who, as Lord of life and death, permitted it, or through good faith (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 361).

It is disputed whether the killing of oneself, by which certainly one sins against charity toward self, also involves a sin against commutative justice; not indeed with respect to oneself - for justice and injustice are toward another - but with respect either to the community or to God, or to both. St. Alphonsus leaves the matter undecided (III, 366); St. Thomas indeed states: "It must be said that homicide is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is contrary to charity, which one ought to have toward oneself: and on this side killing oneself is a sin by comparison with oneself; but by comparison with the community and with God, it has the character of sin also by opposition to justice" (II-II, q. 64, a. 5); but the holy Doctor can be understood of social or general justice, and perhaps he did not intend a sin distinct in species.

Question. Whether it is lawful for one condemned to death, by command or by positive permission of legitimate authority, to kill himself.

Response. More commonly it is denied, because punishment is an act of vindicative justice, which is essentially toward another. Yet St. Alphonsus (III, 369) and others hold it as quite probable that this is lawful, because nothing prevents the condemned man from acting as two persons, namely as the one executing the sentence and as the punished one. Therefore they hold as probable that vindicative justice is not essentially toward a physically different person. Hence practically it is lawful. Yet there is no obligation of satisfying a precept of this sort - and consequently the guilty person cannot be compelled to such an act - because the judge probably cannot impose it, and it is a matter that is arduous (n. 146). "Yet they commonly concede that the guilty person can climb the ladder, fit his neck to the sword, etc.; since these actions tend only remotely toward death" (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

¹ Exodus 20:13.

² Deuteronomy 32:39.

³ Wisdom 16:13.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. IV, Sect. I, Chapter I. On Prescribed Acts Generally

n. 529.

Both internal acts - or those by which we are well affected toward our neighbor and will good to him and rejoice over his good - and external acts are distinguished. Now:

I. With regard to internal acts it suffices to note:

Internal acts of charity toward neighbor are prescribed. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which, by prescribing love toward neighbor, in the obvious sense also regards internal acts;¹ 2. from propositions condemned by Innocent XI, namely 10: "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act";² and 11: "We can satisfy the precept of loving neighbor by external acts alone."³
The internal act obliges:

a) By reason of the precept pertaining to charity, almost as was said about charity toward God (n. 519). For the same reasons hold here with almost the same force, since the formal motive of charity toward neighbor is God Himself (n. 516). Practically, however, satisfaction is commonly made if the internal act is elicited as often as an external act is imposed.

b) By reason of a precept pertaining to another virtue, in practice there is rarely an obligation.

II. Besides internal acts, external acts are also prescribed, as will be clearer from the things to be said. Now from among external acts, some merely exhibit a sign of internal charity, such as greeting; others besides furnish aid or help to one's neighbor.

With regard to mere signs of charity, there is an obligation of exhibiting to all signs absolutely common; and to those specially joined to us, signs relatively common. The reason is that denial of the said signs would involve a signification of enmity. Now signs absolutely common are those which all are accustomed to exhibit to all, of which are counted: to answer one speaking, to return the greeting of one who greets, to sell goods to one asking. Those are called relatively common which persons joined by such a relation are accustomed to exhibit to each other. Thus, for example, blood relatives are accustomed to visit one another sometimes. Signs relatively common are judged special with respect to those who are not so closely joined (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 9; St. Alphonsus, II, 28). To signs relatively common can be reduced the help of itself to be given to those who are in a certain condition, for example in grave necessity; these are relatively common helps. For the rest, in judging signs of charity, attention should be given to the condition of persons and the customs of various places.
We must speak specifically about acts of helping one's neighbor.

¹ Matthew 22:37-39.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1160.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1161.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. IV, Sect. II, Chapter I. On Internal Sins

n. 542.

I. What hatred is and into how many kinds it is distinguished, see n. 520. But the morality of hatred toward one's neighbor is outlined in these points:

Hatred of abomination of the person is a grave sin, since it excludes one's neighbor from common charity. Hatred of abomination of a quality is good, evil, or (at least from the object) indifferent, according as the quality which someone turns away from is good or evil or indifferent (St. Alphonsus, II, 30; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 3).
Hatred of enmity is a sin grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it regards a grave or light evil, or deprivation of a grave or light good (St. Alphonsus, II, 30).

From hatred of enmity must be distinguished the act by which someone in an ordered way wishes evil to his neighbor; namely insofar as it yields to the good of the one wishing, or of the neighbor, or of a third party, or of the community. Hence it is lawful, for example, to desire temporal evil for one's neighbor, so that he may be amended from sins; likewise the penalty of a delict, insofar as it restores the violated order and turns the delinquent and others away from transgressions; likewise "to wish death for a heresiarch or a disturber of public peace, on account of the common good, and of many; according to that saying in Galatians 5:12: Would that... they be cut off. Likewise, to be saddened over the fact that dignities are conferred on the unworthy; or over the health of him who from it takes an occasion of sinning" (St. Alphonsus, II, 30; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, a. 1). Yet it is required that the evil of one's neighbor deservedly be postponed to the good that will follow. Hence there were condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 13: "If you do it with due moderation, you can, without mortal sin, be saddened over the life of someone, and rejoice over his natural death, and seek and desire it by an inefficacious affection: not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage";¹ likewise proposition 14: "It is lawful by an absolute desire to wish the death of one's father; not indeed as the evil of the father, but as the good of the one wishing, because, namely, a rich inheritance will come to him";² likewise proposition 15: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent, perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance."³

Note 1. It is probable that "in confession it is enough if you say that you wished grave evil for your neighbor; nor is there need to explain the species of evil, for example death, infamy, etc., because all are comprehended under one aspect of evil" (St. Alphonsus, II, 30). The opposite must be said of a purpose of inflicting diverse evils (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 297).

Note 2. Penitents rather often confuse illicit hatred with hatred of abomination of a quality, or even hatred with a certain natural and involuntary antipathy.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1163.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1164.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1165.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. IV, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article III. On Certain Other Sins Against Charity Toward Neighbor

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Division · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Properties of the Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Complements of the Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 4. The Virtue of Hope, The Commandments of Hope and of Fear · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, Definition · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, The Excellence of Charity · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, Production of Charity · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, The Object of Charity

Besides the sins explained, there are opposed to charity the acts of withdrawing someone from a more perfect thing, discord, which is in the heart, contention, which is in the mouth, schism, quarrel, duel, war, and sedition, which pertain to work (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 37-42). Concerning quarrel, duel, war, and sedition, it will be said more opportunely elsewhere.

n. 567.

I. Hindering the more perfect thing. He who withdraws someone from a more perfect thing is not guilty of scandal except reductively. Nevertheless he sins against charity, and indeed gravely, if without just cause he withdraws someone from a great good, for example from entering religion; he sins still more, and indeed against justice, if he does this by force or fraud (St. Alphonsus, IV, 77).

n. 568.

II. Discord is a dissent of wills concerning a good which we ought to will from charity. It is a grave sin from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns a good necessarily or not necessarily to be pursued (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 37, a. 1).

n. 569.

III. Contention is discord in words or altercation among several persons, disordered from the fact that truth is attacked or defended in an undue manner. Contention which occurs by attacking truth is a grave sin from its genus, that is, grave or light according as a truth of very great or lesser importance is attacked. Contention which occurs by defending truth in an undue manner is of itself a venial sin; nevertheless a species of grave sin can be joined to it (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 38, a. 1).

n. 570.

IV. Schism. 1. Notion. Schism is a sin by which someone separates himself from the unity of the Church, or "refuses to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, or refuses to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him" (can. 1325, § 2). But "the unity of the Church is considered in two things, namely in the connection of the members of the Church with one another, or communion; and again in the ordering of all the members of the Church to one head" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 39, a. 1). Hence - for evil is from any defect whatever - "schismatics are called: 1. those who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff; and 2. those who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.), that is, as Cajetan explains in this place, those who refuse to operate as part of the Catholic Church, namely to teach or be taught, to govern or be governed, to sanctify or be sanctified; for they break the unity of faith, or of obedience, or of worship.

Corollary. Every heretic is schismatic; but not conversely, although schism regularly does not occur without heresy (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). He who separates himself from his own bishop alone is not by that very fact yet a schismatic; nevertheless he who is separated in an undue manner from a bishop or particular Church will easily withdraw from the Pope and the Church.

Morality. Schism is a grave sin, because through it someone "intends to separate himself from the unity which charity makes" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.), charity, I say, which not only unites persons among themselves, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. Nevertheless infidelity is a graver sin than schism: for "that sin which is contrary to a greater good is, from its genus, graver; as a sin against God is graver than a sin against neighbor. But it is manifest that infidelity is a sin against God himself, according as in himself he is the first truth on which faith rests; while schism is against ecclesiastical unity, which is a certain participated good, and less than God himself is; whence it is manifest that the sin of infidelity from its genus is graver than the sin of schism" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 39, a. 2). Nevertheless, as we have said, a sin against faith is usually joined to schism.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. V, Section I. On the Order of Charity Between God and Creature

n. 571.

I. God is to be loved above all things with charity objectively supreme. For charity commands that we will to each one the good which he has. But God has infinite goodness. Then, a greater extrinsic good, that is, greater glory, is to be desired for God or the Creator than for any creature whatever (St. Alphonsus, II, 22).

II. God is to be loved above all things with charity appreciatively supreme. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment";¹ 2. from reason. And indeed infinite goodness, such as the goodness of God is, must be judged worthier of love than the lower and participated goodness of a creature, and therefore the former must be preferred to the latter (St. Alphonsus, II, 22; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 27, a. 3).

III. Although it is fitting to love God with charity intensively supreme, nevertheless there is no obligation; nor is a certain degree of intensity required. The reason is that intensity does not so much correspond to the dignity of the object as to the subjective disposition and the more vivid apprehension of the one loving (St. Alphonsus, II, 22; VI, 442).

¹ Matt. 22:37-38.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. V, Section II. On the Order of Charity Between Ourselves and Our Neighbors

n. 572.

I. If on each side there is question of spiritual goods, each person is bound to prefer himself to his neighbor, as follows:

Each person is bound to prefer himself to others with respect to those things necessary for the last end.
It is not lawful to commit even a venial sin in order to promote the temporal or spiritual good of one's neighbor, or to prevent his temporal or spiritual evil; both because the true evil of one's own soul must be avoided before all things, and because evils are not to be done that good things may come (St. Alphonsus, II, 26, 2).
Nevertheless sometimes it is lawful, indeed there is even an obligation, to omit an act good in itself or better, or even to expose oneself to danger of sinning, in order to succor the spiritual or even temporal necessity of one's neighbor (St. Alphonsus, II, 26, 1; VI, 453).

II. If there is question of one's own spiritual and temporal goods, hold these things:

If the spiritual necessity of one's neighbor is extreme or quasi-extreme, he must be succored with the loss of any temporal good whatever, even of life² (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3; q. 44, a. 8, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, II, q. 27).

Corollary. Someone is bound, even with danger to life, to baptize an infant if no one else is present who would do it (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 3). Likewise, to confer Extreme Unction on a dying Catholic person deprived of his senses, who is probably judged to be in the state of mortal sin and probably is attrite. Likewise, to absolve a dying person "if he is habitual in sins, and is so uneducated that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition" (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, dic. 2). Many deny this, because no one is so uneducated that he cannot, with the help of grace, elicit an act of contrition. This indeed is true theoretically, but in practice it seems that one must stand with the opinion of St. Alphonsus and others, because, as death approaches, it seems more difficult, and for the man of whom we are speaking most difficult, to elicit an act of contrition. But those who voluntarily expose themselves to danger of damnation, for example by hanging themselves or by attacking an innocent person, must not be succored with danger to life, unless they grieve over the sin, or are judged so uneducated that they do not know how to elicit an act of contrition, or afterward are deprived of their senses.

If it is grave, one must assist with a middling inconvenience; but with a grave one if there is an obligation of piety, as in children with respect to parents; or of special charity, as in parents with respect to children, in spouses with respect to the partner, in superiors with respect to subjects and conversely; with a most grave one, if there is an obligation of justice, as in pastors of souls; likewise, if there is question of a grave and common spiritual necessity. Hence, for example, when plague is raging, even a priest to whom the care of souls has not been committed is bound, if another is lacking, to administer the necessary sacraments with danger to life (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 39, 40).

III. If on each side there is question of temporal goods, in other words, of the temporal necessity of one's neighbor, see what was said on almsgiving (n. 533).

¹ Cf. Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 321 sq.

² Cf. 1 John 3:16.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. V, Section III. On the Order of Charity Among Neighbors

n. 573.

If I cannot succor all whom of themselves I would be bound to succor, this order must be observed:

I. With respect to the act of complacency, after God the holier persons are to be preferred to others, because they participate more in the divine goodness (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, II, 27).

II. With respect to internal affection, likewise a certain order must be observed. "The reason is that, since the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of those principles there be a greater affection of love" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 6).

III. With respect to effects, or with respect to beneficence, these things hold:

Necessity is commonly to be preferred to connection; greater necessity to lesser necessity. The reason is that the obligation of succoring is sought primarily from necessity.
Once equal necessity is posited, likewise a certain order must be observed according to these words of St. Thomas already cited above: "Since the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of those principles there be a greater affection of love" (II-II, q. 26, a. 6), and - in conformity with the whole article, I would add - a greater effect (St. Alphonsus, II, 27). Therefore:

a) Those connected with us are to be preferred to strangers.¹

b) Those connected with us in a different species of connection are to be helped thus:

a) Outside necessity: 1. with respect to common services, there come those connected: a) spiritually, b) carnally, c) civilly; 2. with respect to goods proper to some species of connection, those connected in that species are to be preferred to others; and men also seem to act thus, for they call relatives to weddings (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 8).

b) In extreme or grave necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, those connected carnally are to be preferred to those connected otherwise. The reason is that carnal connection is prior to the others, firmer, and more founded upon benefits. Yet if the carnal connection is remote, the obligation of preferring it is only light, or even - namely if another connection is intimate - none (St. Alphonsus, III, 946).

c) Among those connected in the same species but in a different degree of connection, those more closely connected are commonly to be preferred to those less closely connected. Hence, for example, those connected carnally in different degree are to be helped in this order:

a) Outside necessity there come: 1. spouse, 2. children, 3. father, 4. mother, 5. brothers and sisters, 6. the remaining relatives. In this necessity the spouse and children are to be preferred to parents, because of themselves parents ought to provide for children, not conversely.

b) In extreme or grave necessity there come: 1. father, 2. mother, 3. spouse, 4. children, 5. brothers and sisters, 6. the remaining relatives (St. Alphonsus, II, 27; VI, 939, dub. 2; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 15). - In extreme or grave necessity parents are to be preferred to spouse and children, because life is owed to the former.

Note. To the title of charity or piety, which we had before our eyes in the foregoing, other titles can be added, for example of gratitude, which can bring it about that the order can or must be inverted. Other extraordinary circumstances can bring about the same thing; thus, for example, a stranger who is necessary to the common good must, in extreme necessity, be preferred to a relative.

Inversion of the order is then only a grave sin when there is question both of extreme or grave necessity, and the inversion is notable with respect to neglect of the order, for example if, of two persons placed in extreme or grave necessity, a stranger is preferred to one connected with us, or one more remotely connected is preferred to one closely connected, for example a cousin to parents or children.

¹ Connection is distinguished as threefold: carnal, which arises from the bond of blood, and to it belong the goods of life and family; spiritual, which arises from the bond of religion, and to it belong spiritual goods; civil, which arises from a civil bond, and to it belong civil goods. Civil connection consists in multiple species, for example among citizens, soldiers, etc.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 116 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Division

n. 151.

The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Properties of the Virtues

n. 157.

The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

n. 158.

In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Complements of the Virtues

n. 163.

There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 4. The Virtue of Hope, The Commandments of Hope and of Fear

n. 1103.

Divine Commandments Concerning Fear

Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.—(a) Servile fear was not commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments” (Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, Definition

n. 1105.

Definition

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 23-27.)

Definition.—The word “charity” (carum, what is held dear, highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular sense.

(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for His own sake, and others on account of God.

n. 1106.

Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true good.

(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him towards its possession.

(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or destroy what one loves.

(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the love one has of being entertained.

n. 1107.

The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b) separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it from him.

n. 1108.

Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results, not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own existence;

(b) Sense love (amor) is the attraction that follows on knowledge obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a species of sense love;

(c) Rational love (dilectio) arises from the reflection of the mind, and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the worth of the beloved object.

n. 1109.

Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (amor concupiscentiae), which is affection for an object which one desires for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else (thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence (amor benevolentiae), which is had for an object to which one wishes good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when one wishes to give him food or money).

n. 1110.

The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who is loved does not reciprocate the other party’s affection, they are not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties have common interests and that they delight in each other’s company, which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus, there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen, of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together, and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing special in common.

n. 1111.

Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one’s friend, not for the friend’s sake, but for one’s own advantage or gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus, because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus, on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of each other’s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).

(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the other’s virtue.

n. 1112.

Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God (John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: “I love them that love Me” (Prov., viii. 20); “He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir to glory in which he will share happiness with God.

n. 1113.

Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: “God is charity, and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God” (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as love. Hence, in the Veni Creator He is addressed as “Fount of life, fire, charity, and spiritual anointing.” (b) Created charity is a supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: “The charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created charity.

n. 1114.

Created charity is defined: “A supernatural virtue infused by God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account of God.” Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, The Excellence of Charity

n. 1115.

The Excellence of Charity

The Excellence of Charity.—Human friendship of the lower kind is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship, however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: “These three: faith, hope and charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e., the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the beatific vision to be bestowed by God).

n. 1116.

Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: “The greatest of these is charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

n. 1117.

The other virtues require charity for their perfection.

(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end. Nor are they meritorious without charity, for “if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (I Cor., xiii. 3).

(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues. Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money (false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his family duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).

n. 1118.

The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by various titles.

(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues. This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are; otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of perfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the Last End.

(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii. 17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the sense that it supports and nourishes them.

(c) It is also spoken of as the end and the mother of the other virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and produces their acts by commanding their exercise: “The end of the commandment is charity” (I Tim., i. 5).

n. 1119.

Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil, affirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).

(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in deed: “Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.”

(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such as pride, ambition, greed, anger: “Charity is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.”

(c) It forbids that one harm one’s own soul by thoughts or desires of wrong: “Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.”

(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects, rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: “Charity is patient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.”

(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them: “Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

n. 1120.

Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes them perfect and meritorious.

(a) Actual direction—that is, the intention here and now to believe, or hope, etc., out of love for God—though more perfect, is not required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit would become extremely difficult and rare.

(b) Habitual direction—that is, the mere fact that one has the habit of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope, etc, now made—does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.

(c) Virtual direction—that is, the influence of an intention, once made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes, etc.—at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice, however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of charity, actual or virtual.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, Production of Charity

n. 1121.

Production of Charity

Production of Charity.—The virtue of charity belongs to the appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph., iii. 19).

n. 1122.

The Origin of Charity

The Origin of Charity.—(a) Charity is not caused by nature, nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed, is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).

n. 1123.

The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.

(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were lower, both in nature and in grace.

(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according “to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii. 8; I Cor., xii. 2).

(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, “everyone according to his proper ability” (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).

n. 1124.

Charity may be increased: “I pray that your charity may more and more abound” (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity, for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.

n. 1125.

With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.

n. 1126.

Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the act be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded by charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for God). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward (Matt., X. 42).

n. 1127.

As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place, there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems more probable:

(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act is conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.

(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory, for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude one merited during life. Hence, those who make many—even though less fervent—acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree of reward for them hereafter.

n. 1128.

The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life, when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was predestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II Cor., vi. 11).

n. 1129.

Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same degree in which He is lovable—that is, infinitely; but it is clear that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect charity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17); but it has three degrees:

(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life, consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God and loving Him.

(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just, consists in this, that one gives all one’s time to divine things, as far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.

(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just, consists in this, that habitually one gives one’s whole heart to God, permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.

n. 1130.

Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes: (a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the perfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of their love (Philip., i. 13).

n. 1131.

The Decline of Charity

The Decline of Charity.—(a) Actual charity can decline, in the sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded (Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical habit decrease.

n. 1132.

The Loss of Charity

The Loss of Charity.—(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man’s free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23). (b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a turning to God, the Last End: “He that hath My commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me” (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 5. The Virtue of Char…, The Object of Charity

n. 1133.

The Object of Charity

The Object of Charity.—There is a threefold object of charity: (a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural illumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the chief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): “Thou shalt love the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment” (Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: “And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (ibid, 39).

n. 1134.

The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St. John says: “Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world” (I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity, even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit, and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of one’s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for in both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God Himself).

n. 1135.

Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109), that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.

(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one’s friends. The same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.

(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with charity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or the use of man).

n. 1136.

Love of self is of various kinds.

(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others. Of those who indulge their passions it is said: “In the last days shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves” (II Tim., iii. 1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: “All seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ’s” (Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.) to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one holds him as another self.

n. 1137.

If by “self” we understand the substance and nature of man, as composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by “self” we mean principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor., iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

n. 1138.

Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in beatitude: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (II Cor., v. 4); (e) according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints have shown their hatred of the body’s corruption by the mortifications to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

n. 1139.

Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c) supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of heavenly calling.

…and 76 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 70 passages

Vol. I, On the Precept of Hope · Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, I. On the Necessity of Charity · Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, II. On the Order of Charity · Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, III. On the Love of Enemies · Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, IV. On Alms · Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, V. On Fraternal Correction

Vol. I, On the Precept of Hope

n. 378.

Is it a sin against hope, from weariness, to wish for death?

R. Negatively per se, because it is not to recede from God as from the last end; nor generally is it a grave sin, but only venial, unless there is express rebellion against the order of divine Providence. Cf. 386.

Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, I. On the Necessity of Charity

n. 382.

What is charity? Charity is an act of the will by which, with a love of benevolence and friendship, we love God as the highest good on account of himself, and neighbor on account of God. Of benevolence, because we will good to God; of friendship, because love is with reciprocal love. Neighbor, namely all with whom we can be sharers of eternal blessedness, ourselves, other men, angels. For charity is friendship with God, and every friendship is founded upon some communication of life. Communication of life; for it belongs to charity and friendship to love, and to love is life. Communication of life; for to love is to will good; if therefore the love is mutual, there must be mutual willing of good, and accordingly a common life and a common good. Moreover there is no other communication of life and good with God than eternal blessedness, whose beginning in this life is had through grace. On account of God, i.e., on account of the glory of God. The highest good, on account of himself; and accordingly we love God in all things and above all things, so that we may obtain his promises, not because this is our good, but because it redounds to the good of God, i.e., to the glory of God. Therefore the primary material object of charity is God, the secondary neighbor. But the formal object is the absolute goodness of God. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 23, 25, 27; L. 22; E. M. 377.

Good is that which is fitting. This account being presupposed, the will loves it because it is fitting to it. Moreover, this very thing is most fitting to the will, that God exist; and this good is more fitting to it than its own proper good. And thus the will can rightly be borne toward God by its own act on account of himself, and will that God exist and be endowed with infinite goods and perfections.

n. 383.

Is there given a special precept of charity toward God? R. Affirmatively. Proof: Matt. 22:37, 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment. The same is evinced from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VIII. The precept of charity, as is clear from the cited sacred text, obliges us to love God above all things, not indeed intensively, by a greater effort of the will and a more fervent love which surpasses any other affection of the will, and which also ordinarily redounds into the senses, although this is most becoming; but appreciatively, by reason and rational will preferring God to all things, with a perfect and efficacious will, not only an imperfect and inefficacious velleity and complacency, so that we esteem no creature more than God, and wish rather to lose all things than gravely to offend God. But since love and friendship is the union and agreement of two wills, the nature and precept of charity consist in this, that someone wills those things which God wills, and does not will those things which God does not will, in any grave matter gravely, in any light matter lightly; this finally is true and perfect charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 44; L. 22; E. M. 378.

Hence it is clear that it would be altogether falsely thought almost impossible or exceedingly difficult to elicit an act of charity. For, if it is commanded, God helps us toward it. And if the goodness of men moves us to a love of benevolence and friendship, much more does the infinite goodness of God. If that goodness which is also manifested by benefits moves us most greatly, how much ought the goodness of God the Creator, Redeemer, Rewarder, not to move us? If besides we are in the state of grace, the habit itself of charity persuades us that its act ought not to be difficult, since that habit is infused in a certain connatural mode for eliciting the act. Therefore, if the divine excellence, the infinite perfection of God, the infinite goodness of God having been proposed to him, someone tries with sincere soul to elicit pure charity, he will rightly be able to think that he has elicited that act of charity, and consequently that from charity he has also conceived perfect contrition for sins. Cf. Deut. 6:1-9.

n. 384.

Resolves: It is a mortal and most grave sin, and admits no smallness of matter, since it is opposed to the infinite goodness of God, if someone formally hates God with the hatred of malevolence and enmity, e.g., if someone wishes God not to exist, and himself to be held in hatred by God. - Likewise he sins mortally if someone loves God with a love appreciatively less than creatures. Therefore "any act of mortal sin is contrary to charity." S. Th., 2. 2. q. 24, a. 12. Likewise he sins against the charity of God if someone does not love God on account of himself as the last end of all things, but only on account of something else, e.g., eternal life, or to avoid hell. This is mortal, because namely God would not be loved appreciatively above all things if something other than him were loved by actual intention as the principal end. Principal, because God can be loved on account of the recompense of eternal life, but less principally. By actual intention, because otherwise, by loving eternal life and other gifts of God, by the very fact that such an act is in itself right, eternal life or other gifts of God are always at least implicitly and in actu exercito ordered to God as to the supreme end. L. 23, 24; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 34, aa. 1, 2; Struggl, q. 5, n. 2; Sanch., l. 2, c. 35, n. 3.

n. 385.

Is schism a special sin against charity? - "The sin of schism properly is a special sin, from this, that it intends to separate itself from the unity which charity makes; which not only unites one person to another by the spiritual bond of love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. And therefore properly those are called schismatics who by their own will and intention separate themselves from the unity of the Church.... And therefore those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him.... But schism per se is opposed to the ecclesiastical unity of charity.... It must be said that not to obey precepts with a certain rebellion constitutes the account of schism. But I say with rebellion, when someone both pertinaciously contemns the precepts of the Church, and refuses to undergo its judgment. But not every sinner does this; whence not every sin is schism." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1 ad 2.

n. 386.

When does the precept of charity toward God urge? No precept is given of always acting from the motive of charity. Proof from proposition 8 condemned by Alexander VIII, E. M. 313, and because besides charity there are acts of other virtues, good and meritorious. - But the precept of charity urges more frequently than once in life, or every five years. Proof from propositions 5, 6, 7 condemned by Innocent XI. - When and how the precept of charity urges must be determined by the same rules which we established above concerning faith. Cf. 354. St. Alphonsus judges that one is not excused from mortal sin who defers an act of charity for a month. But this opinion rests on no demonstrative argument, and does not exceed the limits of probability. Besides, the same Holy Doctor thinks it most probable that the precept of charity urges in the article of death. If the speech is about those for whom no other means of justification is available, this is most truly affirmed. But if such necessity is absent, this opinion too does not exceed the limits of probability. But if no other means of justification is available, an act of charity is necessary not only by necessity of precept, but also of means. But the habit of charity is necessary to all by necessity of means; it is inseparable from sanctifying grace, which nevertheless we can obtain also by simple attrition and the sacrament, especially of baptism and penance. Benedict XIV exhorts Bishops to establish that in all parishes, on Sundays and feast days, the acts of faith, hope, and charity be read to the people. C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742, n. 18.

The precept of charity is satisfied by working toward this end, namely of pleasing God, by avoiding sin because it displeases God, by praying that the name of God be sanctified, that his kingdom come, that his will be done, by rejoicing in the divine perfections, by wishing that no one offend God, by eliciting an act of contrition, because contrition includes the motive of charity, but by no means by attrition, because it is not based on the motive of charity, etc. Therefore no one who lives piously ought to be anxious about this precept. Likewise, because of the various opinions of doctors and because of defect of advertence, as in the precept of faith and hope, sin is rarely committed here. John 14:21; L. 8, 23; H. A. 13; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 7-10; E. M. 381.

n. 387.

What does charity toward neighbor import; is there given a precept of charity toward neighbor? - R. To the first. Charity toward neighbor commands love of oneself and of neighbor, but in an ordered way; for not every neighbor is neighbor to us in the same mode. Love of oneself embraces the due care to be had of soul and body. Sins committed against it are implicitly contained and accused in other sins committed and accused in confession. But since even an enemy is neighbor, it also commands love of enemies. Love, namely so that we will good to him. The chief good of man is God. Therefore by charity we will that man possess God, by association in full participation of blessedness. And this is to love neighbor as oneself. Besides interior love, since charity by its nature is not sterile, but active, it also commands exterior works. Therefore besides interior benevolence, charity also commands beneficence, which is the execution of benevolence. The matter concerns the precept of theological charity, which is evidently established from the very words of Christ. "But the second commandment is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21.

Among exterior works alms and fraternal correction hold a special place; these are works of mercy, the former corporal, the latter spiritual. For mercy is the virtue which inclines us to compassionating another's misery, and from compassion to assisting. The same charity, on the contrary, prohibits hatred of malevolence and enmity toward neighbor, which from its genus is mortal. For by it we will evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil for him, which is always inordinate and repugnant to charity. Yet smallness of matter is given, since the evil which we will to neighbor can be great or small. Besides this internal act, it consequently prohibits that by our exterior actions we inflict spiritual harm upon his salvation through scandal, or do other harm to him either as to other goods of soul, or as to goods of body. Concerning this last there will be discussion in the precepts of the Decalogue; here we will speak only of the remaining things.

Benevolence, therefore, and beneficence are acts of charity; to the former belongs willing good, to the latter doing good, according to the common account of good. If the good which someone does to another is taken under a special account of good, beneficence will receive a special account and will pertain to some special virtue. If the good, for example, is owed, it will pertain to justice; if it is for relieving misery, it will pertain to mercy, etc. Therefore the conferring of a benefit in general pertains to charity. In order that the conferring of benefit and beneficence properly be had, it is necessary that there be had a liberal conferring of a gift. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 1.

Charity, about which the speech is properly here, is theological charity, by which neighbor is loved on account of God. But there is also given another charity, a moral virtue, by which neighbor is loved on account of the very honorableness of this love, which per se is a natural virtue. The natural motive of this love does not impede this love also from being supernatural, if it is done from grace and informed by faith. And it is commanded by God: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. 7:12; Job 4:16. Nevertheless the precept of theological charity is not fulfilled by this love. It is indeed praiseworthy and very meritorious that the acts to be exercised toward neighbor be exercised from the motive of the charity of God; nevertheless per se it is not obligatory.

For as the charity of God commands that we observe his commands, but does not also command that we execute them from the motive of the charity of God, so also charity toward neighbor indeed commands that we exercise various acts of beneficence and mercy, but by no means that we effect them only from the motive of the charity of God.

R. To the second. There is given a precept of loving neighbor with a true and internal affection, as is established from John 15:12, 17, and from propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI; and also with external love, 1 John 3:15 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 2. But someone sufficiently satisfies this precept through a certain general love which excludes no one, and accordingly by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and external act. A precept of this sort obliges per se when the precept of charity toward God obliges per se. For it is like to this. Matt. 22:39. Hence he who fulfills the precept of charity toward God, by willing every good to God, at least implicitly fulfills the precept of charity toward neighbor, by desiring salvation for him. But it obliges per accidens: 1. If hatred toward neighbor cannot be repelled unless an act of love is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is obliged to the means. 2. When the neighbor is in necessity; otherwise the precept would be vain; if that necessity becomes known, for no one is bound to inquire whether someone is in need. - L. 8; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25; q. 27, a. 8; q. 30; q. 31; q. 32, aa. 1, 2; q. 34, aa. 3, 4; q. 44; Struggl, q. 6, n. 4; Salm. 17; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 2, n. 81; E. M. 282. Through a certain general love which excludes no one; for care concerning the salvation of neighbor is not incumbent on anyone, unless perhaps in a case of necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5 ad 3. Nor indeed by reason of common charity is there an obligation of inquiring into the necessity of neighbor. For it regards only cases occurring to anyone. "That which is owed to some determinate and certain person... we must expend upon him, not waiting until he occurs to us, but having due solicitude that we seek him out.... But those benefits which are owed not to a certain person, but commonly to all neighbors... we need not seek those upon whom we may expend them, but it suffices that we expend them on those who occur to us." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2 ad 4.

n. 388.

What are the sins opposed to charity? - From the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, they are: 1. Hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to the very love of charity; hatred of God is virtually present in any lethal sin, q. 34. But charity toward neighbor is gravely injured by any grave displeasure caused to neighbor without just reason, which constitutes a grave offense against him. 2. Acedia, which is opposed to the joy of charity concerning divine good, q. 35. Cf. n. 343 seq. 3. Envy, which is opposed to joy concerning the good of neighbor, q. 36. Cf. n. 327 seq. 3. Discord, which is in the heart, and is opposed to the peace of charity, q. 37. Cf. n. 322. - 4. Contention, which is in the mouth, and is also opposed to peace, q. 38.

Cf. n. 322. 5. Schism, quarrel, war, sedition, which pertain to deed, and likewise are opposed to peace, qq. 39-42. Cf. n. 342, 380, 751. 6. Scandal, which is opposed to the beneficence of charity, q. 43. Omission of help, whether spiritual or temporal, when it is owed, attention being paid to the necessity of neighbor and the ability of the one helping, is properly against mercy, and consequently against charity. Injury of neighbor in his temporal goods is properly opposed to justice. But in all sins against justice toward neighbor, charity and justice are injured at the same time, although in sins against charity toward neighbor justice is not always injured.

Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, II. On the Order of Charity

n. 389.

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

n. 390.

Resolves: He sins against charity toward himself, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter, who neglects due care of soul or body. - It is indeed licit, speaking per se, to deprive oneself of spiritual goods not necessary for salvation because of the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, as it would be to omit entering religion, lest there be lacking one who may devote labor either to a parish, or seminary, or mission, or in order to support his parents or children. Indeed someone can wish for and procure for his neighbor greater spiritual goods, not necessary, than for himself, contempt of them being excluded. But it is not licit to sin lightly or gravely, nor to undergo proximate danger of sinning, in order that you may impede another's sin, when your fall appears in some way certain; otherwise, if that danger can become remote, so that you may rightly trust that you will not fall. L. 26; l. 4, n. 78; l. 5, n. 63; l. 6, n. 453; H. A. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 3, 4.

In extreme spiritual necessity, neighbor must be helped even with certain danger to life, provided that these four things are established: 1. that there is equally certain hope of helping him; 2. that the neighbor has no one else by whom he may be relieved; 3. that the neighbor is certainly to be damned unless he is helped by you, so that it is established for you that the neighbor cannot free himself from sin through baptism, through the sacrament of penance, or at least through perfect contrition; 4. that a graver evil is not thence imminent, e.g., if, because someone dies for that cause, the salvation of several others is endangered. - 1 John 3:16; L. 27; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5; Reginald., Prax. For. Poenit., l. 4, c. 25, s. 6, n. 357.

In extreme temporal necessity, neighbor must ordinarily be helped with great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as even for a rich man would be a great largess of money. The reason is that on the one hand the life of neighbor is a more excellent good than some good of ours; and on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo such great inconvenience for others. L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 7.

In grave necessity of either order, no one is bound to help neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, yet title of justice, piety, office, or common harm being excluded. The reason is the same, because namely the good of neighbor can be more excellent than some good of ours; but, since love of self always precedes by force of charity itself, charity does not command procuring the good of neighbor except always with less detriment to ourselves than the harm of neighbor which is urgent. Hence the common saying: Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience. Excluded, etc.; whence by justice pastors, namely Bishops and parish priests, are bound, with danger to life, to minister to their sheep the necessary sacraments, such as baptism and penance, but not others. Nor can the pastor then renounce his office, although he can substitute others with the just permission of the Ordinary. A pastor is also bound, with great temporal harm to himself, to procure great spiritual utility for a subject. L. 27; l. 6, n. 621; S. Th. l. c.

In common necessity of either order, neighbor must be helped with some inconvenience indeed, because love of neighbor requires this, but only a light one; for there can only be a light obligation of charity when the neighbor can fairly easily rescue himself from that necessity, or it is not too burdensome to him. But we are not bound to help all persons placed in common necessity. For this is impossible, and if it could be done, it would no longer be a light inconvenience. L. 32; S. Th. l. c.

n. 391.

Is it against charity to wish death for oneself because of misfortunes of life? - R. Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life or eternal happiness, as is clear of itself; or when life is so troublesome that it is judged harsher than death itself. Phil. 1:21-23; Ecclus. 30:17; 1 Mach. 3:50-60.

R. Affirmatively, if this is done from weariness of life and dejection of soul; yet this does not exceed venial sin, if that desire is inefficacious, and does not wish contrary to the order of divine Providence. For it is a certain pusillanimity and timidity, which fears all things, even light things, and per se is light. Very often also defect of advertence and deliberation excuses. Cf. 373; Struggl, q. 5, n. 12; Viva, in prop. 13-15 Innoc. XI, n. 3; L. 30; l. 5, n. 22; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64, a. 5 ad 3.

n. 392.

In those things which are necessary for life, is it licit to prefer another to oneself? - Some probably deny it, because the order of charity demands that someone, other things being equal, love himself more than neighbor. Yet except if the public good required saving the life of the other. Others probably affirm it, for in these things one does not in reality love neighbor more than oneself, but loves the good of heroic virtue more than life; Tob. 2:3-8; 12:12. But except if he who exposes himself is necessary to the republic or to his own family. Hence it is licit to yield to another the plank from a shipwreck; to give oneself up to enemies for preserving the fatherland unharmed; to defend a prince by interposing one's body against the weapon of an assassin. For this is not to inflict death on oneself, but to permit it. But from a most grave cause it is licit not to withdraw oneself from danger of death, indeed to expose oneself to it voluntarily. And thus it is licit also for a Carthusian gravely ill to meet death rather than eat flesh-meat, from love of virtue, and of faith given to God, or of keeping a vow. - L. l. 3, n. 366; H. A. tr. 8, n. 1; S. Th. 3, D. 29, a. 5 ad 3; Struggl 20, tr. 7, q. 3, n. 8.

n. 393.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

n. 394.

Is it against charity to desire a temporal evil for neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end? - R. Negatively, if the due order of charity is preserved, i.e., if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. R. Affirmatively, if the order of charity is perverted. Confirmation from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI. - To desire; with an inefficacious desire; for it is not licit to inflict evil on neighbor, and therefore neither to desire it efficaciously.

Therefore it is licit to wish temporal evil for neighbor, or to rejoice over it: 1. because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2. because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3. because also of the good of many persons, of much greater moment, e.g., of the family, community, etc. - But it is illicit for a wife to desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, or of her daughter in order to avoid her own trouble, because, on account of deformity or poverty, she cannot marry. - Hence, if it is against charity to wish evil for neighbor, it is also against charity to imprecate evil upon neighbor; and each per se is grave. For if charity commands loving neighbor, it consequently forbids hating him, which is to will evil. - L. 30; l. 5, nn. 21, 22; S. Th. de Carit., q. un., a. 8 ad 10; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4; 2. 2. q. 76, a. 1; Viva, in prop. cit., n. 20; Struggl, q. 5, n. 9; E. M. 389.

Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, III. On the Love of Enemies

n. 395.

Must even enemies be loved? - It is certain that enemies must be loved in some way, since they are neighbors; and this is also established from the Gospel, Matt. 5:43 seqq. This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits that anyone ever pursue his enemy with hatred; but insofar as it is affirmative, it also obliges to positive benevolence and external beneficence according to the measure of the necessity in which he is placed. - Therefore the question is only about the mode of this positive love to be had from precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs.

n. 396.

Any man is bound per se to show to his neighbor, even an enemy, the common signs and benefits of love from precept; but special ones only from counsel, unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere. Per se, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, e.g., by reason of due correction or punishment, of a good effect upon sons or inferiors, or because there is hope that from it he will be amended, or because of a prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of the enemy, or because of a prudent fear that the enemy will abuse those signs, even if common, for inflicting a new injury; likewise because of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc. Neighbor even an enemy: An enemy is not to be loved insofar as he is an enemy; thus rather he is to be hated; but insofar as he is neighbor. For by enemy is understood one who has offended or injured undeservedly, and pursues us with hatred. Common signs and benefits of love are those which by reason of general charity are owed to a Christian by any Christian in common, to a fellow citizen by a fellow citizen, to a relative by a relative, and so forth. - But special ones are those which are not owed by reason of general charity, but are shown to some person by reason of a more special friendship and familiarity. But since this is undertaken by free will, hence those special signs proceed not from the debt of charity, but from the liberality of charity. Unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere, such as would be: 1. fear of scandal from omission; 2. hope of the salvation of the enemy; whence, if by one of these things you can, without your inconvenience, reconcile an enemy to yourself and to God, to omit it would be grave; 3. temporal or spiritual necessity; 4. request for pardon for fault and exhibition of special signs of love. But in this last case, as to special friendship and familiarity, its restoration is not necessarily always to be urged. For that special friendship is not owed even to a friend; therefore a fortiori it is not owed to an enemy, since it is altogether voluntary.

Proof of the first part: 1. from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because to deny those common signs is a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity. Proof of the second part: 1. likewise from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because, since no other union remains for us with an enemy except the sole union of common charity, we are bound to show him only those signs which are common signs of charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 29-31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25, aa. 8, 9; q. 27, a. 7; q. 31, a. 3; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 2; de Carit., q. un., aa. 8, 9; L. 28.

n. 397.

Resolves: It is not licit to exclude an enemy from common prayers, e.g., the Lord's Prayer, and that which is instituted for the community; nor from common alms, the return of a greeting, an answer, the sale of goods exposed for sale, because these are common signs of love. But no one, speaking per se, is bound to loving an enemy by a positive and particular act, nor to greeting him, speaking to him, visiting him when sick, consoling him when sad, receiving him with hospitality, or dealing familiarly with him, etc., because these are special signs of love. Therefore, if any of these, attention being paid to circumstances of places and persons, were a common sign of love, it would no longer be licit to abstain from it, as could easily happen when lodging in the same family, community, college, by reason of consanguinity, common life in religion, common education and study. Struggl, q. 4, n. 36; Sporer, tr. 2, in 1 Pr., c. 6; L. 28.

n. 398.

Although anyone is bound not only interiorly to remit an offense to an enemy legitimately asking pardon, but also to show external signs of remission, nevertheless he is not bound immediately after the offense itself has been inflicted. Nor indeed is he bound to remit satisfaction either for personal injury or for real harm, if he has been harmed. Indeed he is not even bound to accept it if it is offered; but he can also juridically ask for compensation, provided hatred is put aside.

Proof of the first part. As to the internal act: Matt. 5:44: But I say to you: Love your enemies. And ibid. 6:15: If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive your sins. As to the external act: Because otherwise you would be judged to contemn the enemy, and to wish to persevere in hostility. "But if he (the enemy or offender) does not show fitting satisfaction, the offended person is not bound to speak to him, namely when he either does not wish to satisfy at all, or only halfway." S. Antonin., Summ., p. 2, tit. 8, c. 2, § 6. But here one must carefully note whether the offended person, while he refuses certain offices to the offender, inflicts or wishes some grave evil to him. For if this is absent, and no other grave inconveniences can be feared from these offices denied to the offender, someone ought not immediately to be accused of grave fault, so that on account of it the confessor would rightly deny absolution. Cf. 396, 397; Coninck, de Virt. theol., d. 29, n. 60. But the reason of the restriction made is that the matter seems too violent and above human frailty: to compel an injured person immediately to make reconciliation, the disturbance of soul not yet calmed. Whence an opportune time must be awaited, and meanwhile it suffices that the offended person put aside hatred. Indeed it is sometimes licit to omit common signs of love for a time, as was said at the beginning of n. 396. - Offense. A simple offense is the injury of another's will, by which someone causes annoyance to another against his rational will, and as it were gives a certain right to indignation and aversion. Cf. 400.

Proof of the second part. Because charity is not opposed to justice. For charity does not forbid exacting from an enemy fitting satisfaction either for an injury inflicted, or even for damage caused. Indeed this can also be useful for restraining the wickedness of a man. Sporer, l. c., n. 18. Proof of the third part. Because vengeance by public authority is licit. Therefore it is licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and to seek it. - But the reason of the limitation is that "if his intention is borne principally toward the evil of him upon whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, it is altogether illicit; because to delight in the evil of another pertains to hatred, which repugns to charity, by which we ought to love all men. Nor is someone excused if he intends the evil of him who unjustly inflicted evil upon him, just as someone is not excused by the fact that he hates one hating him; for man ought not to sin against another because that person first sinned against him; for this is to be overcome by evil, which the Apostle prohibits in Rom. 12:21, saying: Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil in good. But if the intention of the one avenging is borne principally toward some good, which is reached through the punishment of the one sinning, for instance toward the amendment of the sinner, or at least toward restraining him and the peace of others, and toward the conservation of justice and the honor of God, vengeance can be licit, the other due circumstances being observed." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 108, a. 1.

These things indeed speculatively. Practically, it is certainly difficult for public vengeance from love of justice to be separated from inordinate love of private vengeance, which is illicit, Rom. 12:19 seqq., if the punishment is very grave, e.g., of death, mutilation, and no advantage comes to the injured person from it. Likewise, if the offender satisfies as much as he can, to urge him to that which he cannot do seems against charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 33, 34; L. 28.

To this therefore belongs vindication, which is a certain special virtue, a potential part of justice, through which force or injury, and altogether anything obscure or ignominious, is driven away by defending or avenging oneself. Virtue, and therefore the punishment to be rendered to the evildoer, for the injury inflicted, proportioned, and the order of reason observed, which is that in graver offenses punishment be imposed by public authority. But in lighter offenses it is impossible to have recourse to the judge. Hence by moderate displeasure or by another rational mode which is in our power, to take legitimate vengeance, so that the boldness of the offender may be repressed, peace conserved, or another good procured, is not illicit. - "Two vices are opposed to vindication: one indeed by excess, namely the sin of cruelty or savagery, which exceeds measure in punishing; but the other is a vice which consists in this, as when someone is too remiss in punishing." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 108, a. 2.

n. 399.

Although hatred of enmity, whether of the person according to himself and of the goods which he has in himself, namely by willing evil to him as such, or insofar as it is evil to him, from its genus is mortal, nevertheless hatred of abomination, or of quality, by which we are averse not to the man but to his malice, is licit. - This is clear of itself, and theologians commonly teach it. Hence a private person who, averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him and that it may be ill with him, this is hatred of enmity and sin. But if, wishing no evil, he only flees because the person is discordant with his nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to him, this is hatred of abomination and aversion, and sin if it is irrational; such it will not be if the person is in reality very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and desire of vengeance are absent. - Struggl, q. 4, nn. 26, 28, 37; q. 5, n. 6; L. 30; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 24, a. 3.

n. 400.

Must the offender ask pardon from the injured person? - R. Affirmatively per se; for in the same way in which charity was destroyed, it ought to be repaired; unless nevertheless another means, or a more fitting mode of reconciliation, is available, by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless asking pardon seems likely to profit nothing toward placating the offended person. They also except the case in which the offender is far superior to the offended person, unless perhaps such enormity of injury urged that it would require the petition of pardon even from a subject. Likewise the case is excepted in which the offended person is prudently judged to pardon it. But in reality other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. La-Croix, l. 2, n. 189; Struggl, q. 4, n. 35. Pardon. A simple offense is compensated by reconciliation; an injury by satisfaction. Therefore he who simply offends another, by causing displeasure to him, is simply bound himself to procuring restoration of friendship. But he who has injured not only the will of another, but also his right, is bound to undergo some punishment, humiliation, annoyance, for repairing the injury inflicted; and therefore he is bound to ask pardon.

Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, IV. On Alms

n. 401.

What is alms? Alms, generally, is an act of charity and mercy by which the necessity of neighbor is relieved. One kind is spiritual, another corporal, according as that necessity is spiritual or corporal. We treat here only of corporal alms. The principal question is concerning its precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32. Alms strictly taken, about which the speech is properly here, is the largess of those things which are necessary for the sustenance of life. But taken more broadly, it embraces any help whatever for freeing neighbor from bodily evil. Seven works of corporal mercy are listed: to give food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to lodge travelers, to visit the sick, to visit those detained in prison, to bury the dead.

n. 402.

A true precept of alms is given. - Proof 1. Ecclus. 4:1: Defraud not the poor man of alms; Matt. 25:41, 42: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire... for I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave me not to drink. 2. Because charity commands loving neighbor, and therefore bringing help to him in necessity. Struggl, q. 4, n. 40; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; E. M. 397.

n. 403.

No one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the necessity were of such a person upon whom the safety of the republic depended. Goods necessary for life are called those without which someone, and those whose care he has, cannot be or live. Therefore goods necessary for life are also those which are necessary for feeding and educating children, for supporting a maidservant who watches over infants or attends the sick. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. "That without which," says S. Thomas, "someone cannot be or live, either himself, or those whose care he has, ought not to be spent in alms," 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 4, q. 1. - 2. Because the right order of charity demands this. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 41, 42; Suarez, d. 7, s. 4, n. 6; Valentia, t. 3, d. 3, q. 9, p. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6.

n. 404.

Alms is to be made only from one's own goods, and those of which one has free administration. - For charity must keep justice uninjured. Nevertheless it can be done from the goods of another when neighbor is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, and cannot be helped from elsewhere. Then all things are common. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 7; L. 33.

n. 405.

Note: "When several know the extreme necessity of neighbor, all are bound to help by equal parts; if the others are unwilling, all will be bound in solidum, and all knowing and omitting will sin mortally. If one wishes to furnish the whole by himself, the others will be freed. But if, after the others have been warned about contributing and have refused, one has furnished the whole, he will be able by right to exact from the others their rated parts, or to compensate." Sporer, in 4 Pr., c. 6, n. 50.

n. 406.

Resolves: It is not licit to give alms from goods liable to restitution, e.g., things taken by theft; nevertheless it is licit from things acquired by an illicit work, but not with injustice, e.g., from meretricious gain. It is not licit for children, children of a family, servants, maidservants, to give alms except slight alms, in which namely the will of parents and masters is presumed. For this same reason a wife can make ordinary and common alms according to the custom of her condition; but not extraordinary ones without the consent of her husband, unless from goods altogether her own, of which namely she has both ownership and administration, and receives the fruits. Tutors and curators, who have care of others' goods, can make modest alms from the goods which they administer, such namely as those whose goods they are ought themselves to make; for they act in their place, yet moderately, since they must render an account of expenses. L. 33; l. 3, n. 540; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 7, 8; Struggl, q. 4, n. 49.

n. 407.

In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped even from goods in some way necessary to one's state. Goods necessary to one's state are those which we need in order to live honorably or decently according to our state. But these are the things which are required, according to one's proper condition, for supporting servants, receiving guests, honorable gifts, banquets customarily to be furnished, moderate pomp, the limits of honorable liberality being observed, common events also being considered, future necessity, and attention also being paid to the improvement of an inferior state and honorable ascent to a higher one. Those things which are necessary to one's state do not consist in something indivisible, but have great breadth, and greater breadth for a greater state. In some way, because if you ought to fall out of your state, you are not bound. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians; 2. because the order of charity requires this. For the life of neighbor ought to prevail over a good of ours far inferior. But the extreme necessity of neighbor is regularly driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. - La-Croix 201; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 42, 47; S. Th. 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4; a. 4, q. 1; 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6; L. 31.

n. 408.

In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous to life and state; indeed also, probably, from goods necessary to state, yet with very slight detriment to one's state. Proof of the first part. For the order of charity demands that we will and procure the good of neighbor when on the one hand neighbor is constituted in grave necessity, and on the other hand either no inconvenience results to us, or only a small one. "That which remains, give alms." Luke 11:41. Proof of the second part, by the same reason, but less validly; for simply a slight inconvenience is not really had in the case, but one fairly grave, since the matter is not about extreme necessity, but about grave necessity, which, attention being paid to the conditions of persons, often cannot be driven away without notable inconvenience of the giver. Hence St. Thomas says that it falls not under precept, but under counsel. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6. But if that grave necessity of neighbor is graver, and almost extreme, then an obligation is present of making alms almost as in extreme necessity, from which it is little distant. - L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 6; 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4, a. 4, q. 1, 4 ad 4; Struggl, q. 4, n. 45.

n. 409.

Resolves: Both in extreme and in grave necessity, as much must be given as suffices here and now for relieving this necessity, unless there are others who wish to help him. If therefore neighbor needs only the use of a thing, it is enough to lend it, e.g., if you lend clothing to one stripped by enemies, or a horse to one wounded, until he returns home. Nevertheless no one is bound to spend a great sum of money for freeing a poor man from danger of death, or for procuring extraordinary and costly remedies for him. For no one, attention being paid to the condition of his state, is bound even for his own life to spend as much in procuring extraordinary medicine for himself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; L. 31; La-Croix 215; Struggl, q. 4, n. 48; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 16, nn. 167, 168.

n. 410.

In common necessity, he who has goods superfluous to life and state is sometimes bound to give alms. - Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. Proof 2. both because each one is bound to love neighbor as himself, and because otherwise those poor persons would fall into grave necessity. Proof 3. For the Lord "commands all superfluous things to be shown to the poor, according to that of Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 87, a. 1 ad 4; Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter of 15 May 1891, on the condition of workers. - This indeed is a positive and general precept; and therefore then certainly it urges when "right reason requires," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5, that is, that we assist the necessity of neighbor. S. Th. ibid. Therefore the obligation is not of giving everything superfluous to the poor who are in common necessity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 40, 41, 43; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, aa. 2, 7; Quodl. 8, a. 12; E. M. 405.

n. 411.

Note: "Nevertheless there is not present (for laypersons) an obligation of furnishing the whole superfluity; but it suffices if a fiftieth part of annual revenues which remain be given... and if the revenues are richer, less than a fiftieth part." But this precept does not oblige all in solidum, but commonly all the rich. And if individuals sometimes give something, the common necessities of all are sufficiently helped. L. 32; H. A. tr. 4, n. 19; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 6, 10.

n. 412.

Does the precept of alms oblige under grave sin? - R. Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all. For then certainly a grave precept of charity urges. But in grave necessity, some probably and commonly affirm it, because since in Scripture men are frequently condemned for neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity. But others deny it, and this opinion seems to many at least extrinsically not improbable. Indeed S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, aa. 5, 6, in which he treats expressly of the precept of alms, requires on the part of the giver superfluity according to his proper condition and state, and on the part of the recipient extreme necessity. "Since one person cannot help all those having necessity, not every necessity obliges to precept, but that alone without which he who suffers necessity cannot be sustained.... Thus therefore to give alms from the superfluous is in precept, and to give alms to him who is in extreme necessity." These things in a. 5 c. And ibid. ad 3 the Holy Doctor repeats the same: "It must be said that there is some time in which one sins mortally if he omits to give alms: on the part indeed of the recipient, when an evident and urgent necessity appears... but on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous things according to the present state."

But in common necessity, others also probably and commonly affirm it, as is gathered from the sentence which Christ is about to pronounce on the last day through those words: I was hungry, thirsty, etc. For Christ would not allege hardness toward the poor as a reason for condemning the wicked unless this vice were common and frequent among men, which it would not be if there were no obligation from superfluous things to spend alms on the poor who occur. Confirmation from 1 Tim. 6:17, 18: Command the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate..., where those words, command and easily, seem to indicate a precept even outside grave necessity. And Luke 11:41: That which remains, give alms. But others hold either that there is no obligation, or that the obligation at least is not grave, but only light; nor is this opinion without all probability. For the obligation of alms does not arise from the sole superfluity of goods, on the part of the giver, but also simultaneously from necessity on the part of the recipient, which in poor persons commonly occurring is very small: their condition is sufficiently tolerable for them. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 43, 45-47; Suarez, d. 7, s. 3, nn. 7, 10; L. 31, 32; S. Th. Quodl. 8, a. 12; 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5; q. 71, a. 1; E. M. 407.

The general precept of alms from what is superfluous to life and state, according as it shall have seemed opportune to each one, can be confirmed by the natural order of things itself. For "those things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or divine right. But according to the natural order, instituted from divine Providence, lower things are ordered to this, that from them human necessity may be helped. And therefore by the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human right, it is not impeded that human necessity must be helped from things of this sort. And therefore the things which some have superabundantly are owed by natural right for the support of the poor.... But because there are many suffering necessity, and all cannot be helped from the same thing, the dispensation of one's own things is committed to the judgment of each one, so that from them he may help those suffering necessity." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 7 c.; Quodl. 8, a. 12; L. 32.

From the superfluous. The obligation of giving alms is not had from superfluity if necessity is lacking, nor evidently from necessity if superfluity is lacking; but from the superfluity of the giver and at the same time from the necessity of the recipient. For on the part of the giver "first it is necessary that each one provide for himself and for those whose care is incumbent upon him, and afterward from the residue help the necessities of others.... But on the part of the recipient it is required that he have necessity, otherwise THERE WOULD BE NO REASON why alms should be given to him." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 5. Whence it is evidently clear that the obligation of giving the whole superfluity precisely by reason of the superfluity itself is not present. 1 John 3:17.

From the superfluous. Those rich persons who do not retain their goods idle, but spend them in completing pious or profane works, whether for private or public utility, which consequently also supply necessary support and even profit to many workers, already from those things which they have superabundantly help the necessity of others, and much better, as is clear, than if they distributed them once among the poor.

n. 413.

Resolves: If someone rich and abundant, without any reasonable cause, were to repel all poor persons from himself, he is truly in a bad state. Nevertheless absolution is not easily to be denied to anyone, however rich, who repels all the poor without alms, both because of the disagreement of authors concerning this obligation, and because of the difficulty of judging concerning the superfluity of goods and the necessity of the poor, and because of the presumption that others wish to help, and also because in the present payment of taxes someone also concurs in relieving the poor, for whom public hospices are appointed, and other works of public beneficence are exercised for them. Laym., n. 5; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 44, 50, 51; Diana, t. 4, tr. 7, rr. 8, 42; L. 32; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71, a. 1.

What has been said about alms must likewise be said about all other works of mercy. Hence physicians, advocates, etc., are bound, generally and speaking per se, to devote labor to the poor gratis, because they are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others. If some evil is imminent to neighbor which can be averted without grave inconvenience, it must be averted, e.g., by removing the cause of damage, for instance fire from buildings, by denouncing the author of damage to be inflicted, by opportunely forewarning him to whom damage is imminent.

Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, V. On Fraternal Correction

n. 414.

What is fraternal correction? - Fraternal correction is an admonition by which someone from charity tries to recall a neighbor from sin, insofar as this is a spiritual evil of the one sinning himself. Therefore the end of this fraternal correction is the amendment of the delinquent. Whence fraternal correction is an act of charity and mercy. It differs from judicial correction, because this is done by public authority, and chiefly for the good of others, especially the common good, and at the same time for that of the delinquent himself, and is an act of justice; but from paternal correction, because this is done by the authority of a superior, chiefly for the private good of the delinquent himself, and at the same time of others and the common good, and can be an act of charity and justice. These belong only to particular persons over their subjects, namely Prelates, who not only must admonish, but also correct by punishing; the former belongs to all, since it arises only from the motive of charity, which obliges all. Ecclus. 17:12. Hence, if in a Prelate himself something correctable is found, he too would have to be rebuked charitably and reverently by an inferior fit for this. 1 Tim. 5:1, 2. When denunciation has been made to a prelate as to a father, and as to a person who profits toward the good of neighbor and his amendment, he cannot afterward proceed as judge. S. Th. Quodl. 11, a. 13. - Struggl, q. 4, nn. 52, 60; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 2; q. 33, aa. 1-4; 4, D. 19, q. 2, a. 1; L. 34; E. M. 409.

n. 415.

Is there given a true precept of fraternal correction? R. Affirmatively. Proof 1. from natural law, by which the members of one body by force of charity are bound to help one another mutually. 2. From positive law, Matt. 18:15: If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone; Ecclus. 19:14: Correct thy neighbor... lest perhaps he repeat it. Therefore it must be done secretly, lest perhaps, reputation being lost, by which he was held back from sin, someone become worse. - Struggl, q. 4, n. 53; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2.

n. 416.

What is the matter of this precept? Every mortal sin of neighbor per se is sufficient matter, so that this precept obliges under mortal sin. Proof 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. Because since mortal sin removes the spiritual life of neighbor, it induces sufficient necessity of correction. Hence he who can easily impede a mortal sin of neighbor through correction, and neglects it because of vain fear of some temporal evil, sins mortally. Every mortal sin; because although venial sin is matter for correction, nevertheless it does not oblige gravely, nor except if you can do it very easily. Yet except if the speech is about religious orders. For if through venial sins regular discipline seems either to be entirely dissolved or notably diminished, there can be a grave obligation both in Prelates and also in private persons, since each is bound from charity to avert this most grave evil of religion.

Except also if someone through venial sin is constituted in proximate danger of sinning mortally, etc. Per se, because if someone because of fear, shame, pusillanimity, thinks himself not so strictly obliged or less suited for correcting, he seems to sin only venially. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32, a. 2; q. 33, a. 2; L. 34, 35; l. 4, n. 13; Diana, t. 1, tr. 4, r. 8; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 55, 56. Every mortal sin; therefore the obligation of correction is absent if someone sins from invincible ignorance. Yet an obligation of warning can be present per accidens, by reason of charity, because of damage to be averted from the ignorant person himself, or from a third party, or from the community. Cf. 423.

n. 417.

When does the aforesaid precept oblige? - This precept obliges when these circumstances concur: 1. If the sin of neighbor is certainly established for you; but only a superior is bound to investigate. Prov. 24:15. 2. If it is not established that he has amended himself, nor established that he will amend himself, but that he will relapse; because alms must be made only to the needy. - 3. If another equally suitable is not present, who is thought likely to correct. 4. If there is hope of fruit, because, when the end is despaired of, the means cease; unless public damage follows from omitted warning, as, for instance, if others think what is not corrected is licit, or if scandal of others follows.

Public; for if the damage is private, of a third party, although there is no strict obligation of warning, nevertheless it can be done if he is not bound from charity to suffer that damage. For if he can vindicate his own thing for himself, another can warn the possessor about its being restored; for the obligation of charity is equal toward the owner and toward the possessor. And practically some hope is regularly always present that this person may wish to restore another's thing, moved by the obligation of conscience. - 5. If there is a good occasion, a suitable place and time, and you can do it without your grave harm, unless nevertheless someone is bound to correct by reason of office. - But if any one of these is lacking, the precept does not oblige. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, aa. 2, 4-6; L. 36, 42; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 54, 57; E. M. 412.

n. 418.

Resolves: Private persons among themselves are rarely bound to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are familiarly joined to one another, because rarely are all the required conditions found; still more rarely toward superiors because of unsuitability. Prudence generally persuades that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with an unjust mind, they become worse. Scrupulous persons are ordinarily excused from making fraternal correction, because either they are too greatly wearied, or are unfit; for, disturbed by scruples and anxieties, they lack the necessary discretion for correcting, and are not able to attend to excusing causes.

n. 419.

Does the aforesaid precept oblige all equally? - Although the precept of correction obliges all, even subjects, nevertheless it obliges Prelates more. The reason for the first assertion is that all are members of the same body and are bound to furnish external offices of charity to one another. The reason for the latter is that subjects are bound only from charity, but Prelates also from office and justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, aa. 3, 4, 5; L. 40.

n. 420.

Resolves: Prelates, Bishops, pastors, magistrates, are bound, even with great inconvenience to themselves, to impede sins both public and occult of their subjects, because they are obliged from justice to procuring and protecting the common good. - "Correction of the delinquent... pertaining to Prelates, which is ordered to the common good and has coercive force... is not to be dismissed because of the disturbance of him who is corrected: both because, if he does not wish to be amended of his own accord, he must be compelled through punishments to desist from sinning; and also because, if he is incorrigible, through this provision is made for the common good, while the order of justice is preserved, and others are deterred by the example of one." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 6. Superiors are bound from office to watch over subjects and inquire into their sins, yet not greatly concerning some certain person, unless some peculiar reason moves them to this. - Struggl, q. 4, nn. 55, 57, 58; Diana, t. 7, tr. 4, rr. 24, 30; L. 40, 42; E. M. 415.

…and 30 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On Virtues, Chapter III. On Charity

- Charity is a virtue by which we love God as the supreme good on account of himself ¹, and the neighbor on account of God. - Charity is the most excellent of all the virtues, because it reaches God in the most perfect way. Hence, 1. Cor. 13.13: Now there remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three; but the greater of these is Charity.

¹ What it means to love God gratuitously and on account of himself, St. Augustine explains in several places, namely that we should not serve God, nor love or seek him on account of another thing, that is, on account of a temporal reward, on account of a reward outside himself, on account of goods distinct or different from him, but that he himself should be our good, our beatitude, our reward. See De Catech. rud. Cap. 22. n. 39 and Cap. 27. n. 56. - De Gen. ad lit. Lib. 8. Cap. 11. n. 24. - Serm. 91. n. 3. Serm. 165. n. 4. and Serm. 334. n. 3. - In Psalm. 52. n. 10. in Psalm. 77. n. 21. and in Psalm. 85. n. 8. These and other things both of St. Augustine and of other Doctors you will find in Io. Bapt. Faure in the excellent Commentaries on the Enchiridion of St. Augustine, Cap. 7 and 8, and again at Cap. 121, 122.

The formal object of Charity is divine goodness ²; but the primary material object is God, the secondary is the neighbor. - St. Lig. n. 22. et seq.

² Some move questions here (see St. Lig. Lib. 6. n. 436.) whether the formal object of charity is also goodness which shines forth in any divine attribute, for example, mercy, justice, wisdom, etc., or instead only goodness insofar as this comprises all the perfections of God; but they present the first opinion as less probable, and commonly rejected by the Doctors. But these things are owed only to a certain equivocation. For the opinion which is commonly rejected is not that which we have mentioned, but that which holds contrition elicited not from the motive of charity, but from the motive of obedience, religion, penance, etc., as perfect and therefore apt to justify a man before the reception of the sacrament. Concerning this matter see Cardinal De Lugo, De Poenit. Disp. 5. Sect. 1, and also the things which we shall say in the Treatise on Penance (Vol. 2. at n. 441.).

It is distinguished as 1º Love of God supremely intensive or appreciative; 2º Love of benevolence, which regards the proper good of the beloved; love of friendship, which is mutual love of benevolence; and love of concupiscence, which primarily intends the proper good of the lover ³.

³ One must carefully beware lest love which carries us toward God as our good be traduced as foreign to charity. The reason is, 1º because man in reality is not drawn except by divine goodness, and while he seeks the object of beatitude in this rather than in any other good, that love already appears implanted, supremely appreciative, which is proper to perfect charity, and by which (as St. Bonaventure says, 3. Dist. 26. art. 2. q. 3.) he desires God above all things. 2º Because otherwise not even love of friendship would be possible. For as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 26. art. 13. ad 3.): To each one God will be the whole reason of loving, because God is man's whole good. For, if by impossibility it were granted that God were not man's good, there would not be a reason for loving him. Hence also St. Francis de Sales (Treatise of the Love of God, Part 2. Lib. 4. Cap. 10.) refers to chimeras and empty fantasies the love of any good which does not pertain to us and to the object of our beatitude. 3º Finally, because love of God excluding the affection of possessing God as the object of our beatitude, which perfectly satisfies our appetite for happiness, will easily lead to doctrines of pure charity without any admixture of a motive of proper interest, which Innocent XII condemned in several propositions, 12 March 1699, and of which especially the first, fifth, and sixth pertain to the present matter.

The treatment must be 1º concerning the love of God, 2º concerning the love of neighbor.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 83 passages (filed under the subtopics)

28. On Communication with Infidels · 33. On Charity Toward Neighbor · 34. On Love of Enemies · 35. On Almsgiving

28. On Communication with Infidels

Marcellinus the missionary proposes the following doubts:

Is it licit for Christians to rent houses and workshops to gentiles? The reason for doubting is that the gentiles, in the nobler place of those houses, burn incense, exhibit reverence to an idol, and exercise other superstitious things.

R. "It is licit, if it is established that the houses are sought for inhabiting and the workshops for an indifferent use; yet it is not licit if they are expressly sought for constructing a shrine." S. C. de P. F., 8 Feb. 1806.

Is it licit for Christians to lease farms belonging to a temple?

R. Here is in summary the instruction given by the S. C. de P. F., 15 Jan. 1807. 1. It is licit to lease farms belonging to a temple; especially if a cause consonant with reason for contracting concurs; for the thing is of its own nature indifferent. 2. To pay the lease price is a debt of justice, even if the lessee thinks it will be expended for the sake of the temple. 3. Scandal which perhaps arises for Christians from a thing of this sort, insofar as it is born from ignorance, or is scandal of the little ones, must be restrained by protestation and instruction; insofar as it is produced by the malice of the wicked, or is pharisaic, it must be contemned. 4. The lessee is to be exhorted to abstain from the lease if from this some danger of perversion or occasion of scandal is feared.

Christians buy territories on which there are idols or oratories of idols. Can they admonish the gentiles, to whom the territory previously belonged, to remove them from the territory?

R. "They cannot, if the ownership of these idols or oratories is annexed to the territory, and passes with the dominion of the land to the buyer, who is held to remove and destroy them, or so change their form that every occasion of superstitious worship is removed, and no appearance of an oratory consecrated to idols appears any longer. But if such idols or oratories are of public right and under the power of the prince, it is not licit for Christians to remove or destroy them, but rather they should abstain from buying those territories in which these profane images and oratories are found." Holy Office, month of May, year 1781.

Gentiles who preserve the tablets of the progenitors of the family are converted to the faith. Can they hand over tablets of this sort to pagan relatives, to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them from their house, or hide them, to be handed over afterwards if they are demanded by relatives or by prefects, and they are compelled to this? Likewise, to what are proselytes held who have with themselves the idols of other pagans, which they preserve by way of deposit?

R. "If those superstitious tablets by special dominion belong to the converted gentile, he cannot preserve them at home, nor hand them over to other pagans of the family, but must altogether destroy them; and thus it is to be taught and enjoined by the missionaries. But if these tablets belong jointly to others of the family, the Christian is held to remove them from his house; but he can hand them over to others of the family to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them and take them for themselves; for thus he will confess his faith, and will render to another his own right. By equal right, the idols of pagans which the proselyte preserves for the sake of deposit are to be restored to their owners." Holy Office, 20 Aug. 1778.

The bishop of Sergiopolis, Apostolic Vicar of Kiang-nan, proposed a case to the S. C. de P. F.: "Whether Catholics can be permitted, with boats and carrying-chairs, by which they are accustomed indiscriminately to transfer all persons from place to place, also to convey those gentiles who, bringing with themselves incense, idols, and other superstitious things, approach the sepulchers of their ancestors, or other places, so that there they may exercise superstitions."

The S. C. de P. F., 14 Sept. 1868, transmitted the response of the Holy Office, July 1854, given to a similar question:

"Since the actions of which there is discussion are in themselves licit, or at least indifferent, and do not directly influence superstition, provided that scandal is not present, and grave damage is imminent, those Catholics are not to be disturbed; and provided that it is not in contempt of religion, and a protestation is made by the Christian sailors, insofar as it can conveniently be done, that they do not intend toward superstition." Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2195.

Marcellus, a missionary, proposes the following doubts:

In order to avoid some tumults against Christians, is it licit for Christians to contribute money which is demanded, to be spent in the new year on idolatries of demons, and at the same time on other indifferent demonstrations of the people's joy?

R. "The Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this sort they do not intend to concur in superstitious acts, the cause which is narrated being supposed, especially a protestation having been premised, if it can conveniently be done, that they furnish the taxes imposed only in order to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F., 12 Sept. 1645.

Is it lawful for Christians to contribute money which, if one is unwilling to give it, he is prohibited from entry into the market of goods; which money partly falls to the leading men, partly to repairing the market, and partly to burning incense to a false deity?

R. "The payment of the tax can be permitted to Christians, especially with a protestation premised." S. C. de P. F., year 1816; Holy Office, 21 Apr. 1849.

What if the tax to be paid is imposed solely for a superstitious end, for constructing pagodas, for making sacrifices to idols, etc.?

R. That indeed is not licit, even with any protestation premised. For this contribution bears before itself at least external consent with the superstition of the gentiles, which is altogether illicit. Holy Office, 16 Nov. 1769.

By the edict of the king Christians are now compelled to erect shrines to idols and to progenitors. Moreover, in very many places where pagans and Christians are mixed, Christians make an agreement with pagans that they themselves will sustain, according to their choice and as they can, a greater and some special part of public and licit works in the village, provided that the pagans do not disturb them concerning superstitions nor betray and accuse them before the Mandarins, and furthermore handle the superstitious business before the Mandarin for the whole village according to their choice and as they can. By acting thus, the Christians do not intend that the pagans perform superstitious things in their place, but only to free themselves from doing superstitions, and to hide themselves from the Mandarins. Moreover, the pagans do not do more superstitions, either greater or more in number, than they do according to their custom. - Q. Is such an agreement between Christians and pagans licit, with attention to the things said above, with attention also to the reason that, unless Christians make an agreement with pagans in such a way, they will either perform superstitions, or will be compelled to sustain innumerable vexations?"

R. "As it is explained, it can be tolerated, or they are not to be disturbed." S. C. de P. F., 10 Aug. 1841, Vicar Apostolic of Western Tonkin.

"Christians, few in number, cannot avoid using the society of gentiles: they find themselves daily at their tables and banquets; but because pagans have it as a custom that they offer to idols foods prepared not only directly for the worship of idols, but for the ordinary eating of the family, and place them indifferently on the table, Christians who sit there, timid, likewise eat indifferently, because it would be shame to themselves and injury to the gentiles if they refused to use the foods placed there."

"Q. Can those Christians eat of these, when scandal is not given?"

R. "It is licit to eat feasts placed indifferently, although offered to idols, provided that it is not in a temple, nor in a place sacred to idols, and provided that every appearance of worship or veneration of idols and of superstition is absent, and no danger is present of scandalizing the faithful or infidels." Holy Office, 15 Dec. 1768. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1703.

The wives, daughters, and maidservants of pagans are compelled to cook foods for the common meal of the family. But some part of these foods will afterwards be offered to an idol.

Q. In the case, can the aforesaid persons licitly cook foods?

R. "It is generally licit to cook and prepare foods if there is question of ordinary servants and cooks, who through the whole time of the year are assigned to a ministry of this sort; if extraordinary banquets of this sort are made primarily for the joy of the family, for guests, and for other occasions by no means superstitious, although it is not unknown that some part of them is to be offered to idols; if the dishes are not distinguished, so that some are made for a superstitious offering, others for the food of the guests, but the destination depends on the judgment of the father of the family; if no dishes are specially directed and prepared for the idol; if in the division of the feasts, nor in their exposition at the place of sacrifice, or at the table of the idol, they do not cooperate.

"It is not licit for maidservants and children of the family to buy, cook, or in any way prepare extraordinary foods accustomed to be deputed to sacrifice or superstitious offering, when they well know that such foods are destined by masters, husbands, or parents for sacrifice or offering to be made to their deceased. Nor is this licit for the same persons because of grave fear or damage which probably or certainly threatens themselves, even if a protestation is premised, that their mind is altogether alien from superstition. Likewise this is not licit for the same persons even when those extraordinary foods are bought, cooked, etc., in a greater quantity than is necessary for furnishing the said table serving superstition, when the primary end of the said preparation is to make the aforesaid superstitious table, although the part of the foods which remains over serves occasionally and accessorily for licit eating." S. C. de P. F., 13 Jan. 1793.

33. On Charity Toward Neighbor

Christina, having several children, desires that her little son, recently born blind, be snatched by death from the miseries of this world and enjoy paradise. She desires the same grace for another son, five years old, deaf and mute, and for a third son, nine years old, lame in both feet. Likewise she makes a vow that her daughter of marriageable age, but unmarried on account of excessive poverty and deformity, depart from the living, lest she remain exposed to the dangers of sinning. But she fervently prays God that her husband, who often beats her and continually vexes her with many imprecations, and daily and at every hour blasphemes God and the Saints, at last be converted to God and rest in peace.

Leontia, in frequent conversation with a certain friend, is accustomed often to sadden her with words. And although the friend often shows grave sorrow, nevertheless Leontia has no scruple in this matter; for she says that she does this only for joke and recreation, and to cheer the other friends present.

Q. 1. Is there a precept of charity toward neighbor? - 2. Have Christina and Leontia, in the aforesaid cases, sinned gravely against charity?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 382. To the second: Christina in none of the aforesaid cases sins against charity and piety; for she does not desire evil for her children and husband, but, on the contrary, that they be freed from the evil of punishment and from the evil of sin, and possess the infinite good in heaven. Nor indeed, as appears from the case, is she led by weariness, impatience, or hatred toward the children or toward the husband; but she is impelled only by the motive of faith and piety. Wherefore Christina seems to sin neither gravely nor lightly. G. 213.

But what is to be held concerning Christina? Would she sin gravely if she desired death for her husband, so that at last she might be freed from the husband's most harsh vexation and tyranny? This must certainly be denied, the spirit of inordinate revenge being excluded. For, according to the common opinion of the doctors, it is licit to desire death for oneself in order to escape this most harsh treatment. Why then could someone not, from the same end and without sin, desire death for his neighbor? I. M. 374, 386; Elbel 342.

As regards Leontia, she can perhaps be excused from grave sin on account of an erroneous conscience, or on account of a defect of advertence and due consideration. But the thing in itself is grave, against charity. "It is grave against charity," says D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 2, n. 92, "to affect someone with grave sorrow without a grave cause, even short of injustice; whether he is reasonably saddened, which no one doubts; or irrationally, as for example from games, jokes, perhaps because he is of a small and pusillanimous spirit."

34. On Love of Enemies

Leocadia caught her husband shamefully associating with the maidservant. She, asking pardon, at once drives her from the house, and no longer deigns her with conversation or sight. Indeed, if at any time the maidservant meets her in the street and greets her, she turns her eyes in another direction and does not return the greeting. But she scarcely speaks to her husband for a month, and moreover has resolved that she will no longer render the debt to him.

Q. 1. Are enemies also to be loved? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 390 seqq. To the second: Leocadia could at once drive the maidservant from the house without wounding justice and charity, since she had so gravely wounded the right of the marriage bed, and more frequent relapses could deservedly be feared. Nor does it matter that, so suddenly cast out of the house, she perhaps undergoes danger to her reputation; for she ought to impute this to herself. Besides, Leocadia could also prosecute her before a judge, and by this very fact defame her before him. Therefore, all the more, she can cast her from the house and permit her defamation, if perhaps it follows. Nor indeed does Leocadia seem therefore to be disturbed, if she neither looks at nor greets in return the maidservant meeting her, provided nevertheless that she does not do this from hatred of enmity toward the person, but from abomination of the crime, or for her own amendment, or lest there be danger that she come into the house and return, or to show more fully the gravity of the injury inflicted on her, or even for a certain just punishment. For nothing prevents that, in things which merit punishment, yet not such that they be referred to the judge, someone, although a private person, by himself punish the person of another with such a punishment as pertains to the private commerce of persons. Therefore, all the more, if there is question of a graver offense, which could be referred to the judge, it will be licit to punish it by privation of conversation or greeting, which are not common but special signs of charity, to which otherwise one is not held. But otherwise it would have to be said, if Leocadia did this from hatred toward the person herself, and from an inordinate affection of revenge, willing and desiring evil to the maidservant. The same seems to have to be said concerning the privation of conversation of Leocadia with her husband. Since from the case it does not seem that she did this beyond a month, from this it can be gathered that she did this only to show her just displeasure, and also to soothe her sorrow, in so grave a matter. But because she resolved to deny the debt perpetually, she sinned nothing against justice. The reason is that the husband, by committing adultery, lost the right of asking the debt. I. M. V. 2, n. 981. But whether she sinned at least against charity, Elbel 253 affirms; since the husband is thus exposed to the danger of incontinence. But this is commonly denied. For charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, and it is most grave for the wife that she be compelled to keep faith with a husband breaking faith. Besides, if the reason brought forward were valid, never again, neither by private nor by the judge's authority, could divorce be instituted, if not justice, then charity prohibiting it. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 62. Nevertheless, Leocadia is to be counseled that she fully condone the offense to her husband, and then render the debt, lest she expose her husband to the danger of incontinence and of new adultery, and perpetual discords reign between herself and her husband. Elbel 249-253; G. 216, 217.

35. On Almsgiving

Lucretia, pretending that she is poor, burdened by numerous offspring, and has an infirm husband, although she has neither children nor husband, obtains a monthly pension of 60 lire from a certain noble and pious man. Likewise, pretending that she is near childbirth, she obtains a notable sum of money from a certain rich and fervent matron. Using other arts, she obtains other alms from various confessors whom she approaches, and from other priests; indeed she has also obtained a legacy from her parish priest.

Q. 1. Is there a precept of almsgiving? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 396 seqq. To the second: Lucretia sins gravely. The reason is that, with grave fraud, she accepted another's property in grave quantity, the owners being reasonably unwilling. For if these had known Lucretia's fiction, certainly they would never have given alms, and in so notable a quantity. Therefore Lucretia must altogether abstain in the future from such fraud, and she can no longer receive the charitable pensions assigned to her, and other charitable subsidies. Besides, she is held to restitution. What she received in notable quantity must be restored to the proper owners; since surely these are entirely known to Lucretia, and they would not have given alms in so great a quantity to other common poor persons. The legacy must be restored to the heirs or to the new parish priest, so that it may be distributed to another true poor person, or to other poor persons, since the legacy is pious. But moderate alms are to be restored either to the owners themselves, or to other poor persons, especially if they cannot be restored to their proper owners, I. M. 493, from the presumed will of the owners, that, if they had not given to this feigned poor woman, they would have given to other poor persons. She must also restore altogether trifling alms in the same way. Yet there are not wanting those who say that these alms of the least moment are not necessarily to be bestowed upon others, because the owners are less unwilling about them, and because it is piously presumed that the owner wished to give them principally on account of love of God and neighbor, and only secondarily for relieving the need of this or that poor person. Indeed these small alms are more easily given without attention to the persons to whom they are given, and all know that among begging poor persons there are not lacking those who are not truly poor. Elbel 283-285; G. 221, 222.

…and 43 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 6 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On the Theological Virtues

n. 368.

On Cooperation in General with Superstitious Rites

“In relation to cooperation with superstitious rites, this rule is to be held. If the cooperation has been part of the superstitious rite, then it is to be judged formal, intrinsically evil, and can never be done licitly. On the contrary, it is to be judged material if it was not part of the superstitious rite. Some grave harm which would arise to the cooperator if he wished to abstain from this material cooperation will make it lawful, even if scandal is present—what is called scandal of the little ones by theologians—because by the law of charity no one is bound to remove that scandal with grave harm to himself.” S. C. de P. F., 2 July 1827.

n. 368.

“All direct cooperation of Christians with superstitious things is forbidden, and those acts are furthermore prohibited which, according to the common estimation of the people, are referred to worship being exhibited to idols. Nor can acts of this kind be excused because of the intention of the one acting or ministering, on the ground that they direct their mind not toward the superstitious worship of idols but toward some other indifferent service; for the private intention of the one acting does not avail to cleanse from guilt an act which among unbelievers is regarded as directed toward superstitious worship. Likewise, the fact that Christians concur in superstitious things only by slight labor and by remote ministry cannot furnish a sufficiently suitable excuse. For whatever the labor may be that is expended directly for superstitious things, and whatever ministry, however remote, is furnished for worship being exhibited to idols, if in the common estimation it cannot be referred to an indifferent cause, is always illicit and vicious.” S. C. de P. F., 5 April 1785; C. 1713.

n. 376.

On Pure Love

“1. There is a habitual state of the love of God which is pure charity and is without any admixture of a motive of self-interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of rewards has any further part in it. God is not loved any further because of merit, nor because of perfection, nor because of the happiness to be found in loving. — 2. In the state of the contemplative or unitive life, every interested motive of fear and hope is lost. — 3. What is essential in the direction of a soul is to do nothing other than follow grace step by step with infinite patience and subtlety. One must keep oneself within these limits so that God may be permitted to act, and never lead [a soul] to pure love unless God, through inward anointing, begins to open the heart to this word, which is so hard for souls still attached to themselves, and therefore can scandalize them or cast them into disturbance. — 4. In the state of holy indifference, the soul no longer has voluntary and deliberate desires on account of its own interest, except on those occasions in which it does not faithfully cooperate with all its grace. — 5. In the same state of holy indifference, we will nothing for ourselves, all things for God. We will nothing so that we may be perfect and blessed on account of our own interest; but we will all perfection and beatitude insofar as it pleases God to bring it about that we will these things by the impression of His grace. — 6. In this state of holy indifference, we no longer will salvation as our own salvation, as eternal deliverance, as the reward of our merits, as our greatest interest of all; but we will it with a full will as the glory and good pleasure of God, as a thing which He Himself wills and which He wills us to will for His sake. — 7. Abandonment is nothing other than abnegation, or renunciation of oneself, which Jesus Christ requires of us in the Gospel after we have relinquished all external things. This abnegation of our very selves is only with regard to our own interest…. The extreme trials in which this abnegation or abandonment of oneself ought to be exercised are temptations by which the jealous God wills to purge love, showing it no refuge and no hope with regard to its own interest, even eternal. — 8. All sacrifices which are customarily made by souls most greatly disinterested concerning their eternal beatitude are conditional…. But this sacrifice cannot be absolute in the ordinary state. In one case of extreme trials this sacrifice becomes in some manner absolute. — 9. In extreme trials the soul can be invincibly persuaded, by a reflex persuasion which is not the innermost ground of conscience, that it has been justly reprobated by God. — 10. Then the soul, divided from itself, expires with Christ upon the cross, saying: My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me? In this involuntary impression of despair it consummates the absolute sacrifice of its own interest with regard to eternity. — 11. In this state the soul loses every hope of its own interest; but it never loses in the higher part, that is, in its direct and intimate acts, perfect hope, which is a disinterested desire for the promises. — 12. The director can then permit this soul simply to acquiesce in the loss of its own interest and in the just condemnation which it believes to have been imposed upon it by God. — 13. The lower part of Christ upon the cross did not communicate its involuntary disturbances to the higher part. — 14. In extreme trials for the purification of love, a certain separation of the higher part of the soul from the lower takes place…. In this separation the acts of the lower part flow from an altogether blind and involuntary disturbance, for everything that is voluntary and intellectual belongs to the higher part. — 15. Meditation consists of discursive acts which are easily distinguished from one another…. This composition of discursive and reflex acts is the proper exercise of interested love. — 16. There is a state of contemplation so sublime and so perfect that it becomes habitual, so that whenever the soul actually prays, its prayer is contemplative, not discursive. Then it no longer needs to return to meditation and its methodical acts. — 17. Contemplative souls are deprived of a distinct, sensible, and reflex view of Jesus Christ at two different times: first, in the nascent fervor of their contemplation; second, the soul loses the view of Jesus Christ in extreme trials. — 18. In the passive state all the distinct virtues are exercised without thinking that they are virtues. At each moment nothing else is thought than to do what God wills; and jealous love at the same time brings it about that one no longer wills virtue for himself, nor is one ever so endowed with virtue as when he is no longer attached to virtue. — 19. It can be said in this sense that the passive and disinterested soul no longer wills even love itself insofar as it is its perfection and its happiness, but only insofar as it is that which God wills from us. — 20. In confessing, transformed souls ought to detest their sins, condemn themselves, and desire the remission of their sins, not as their own purification and deliverance, but as a thing which God wills, and wills us to will for His glory. — 21. The holy mystics excluded exercises of the virtues from the state of transformed souls. — 22. Even if this doctrine—concerning pure love—were the pure and simple evangelical perfection designated in universal tradition, the ancient pastors did not everywhere propose to the multitude of the just anything except exercises of interested love proportioned to their grace. — 23. Pure love alone itself constitutes the whole interior life; and then it becomes the sole motive of all acts which are deliberate and meritorious.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XII, Brief Cum alias, 12 March 1699.

n. 378.

The Precept of Charity

Cf. n. 353.

n. 381.

Whether We Are Bound Always to Act from Charity

“53. Charity alone makes [actions Christian] in a Christian manner through relation to God and Jesus Christ. — 54. Charity alone is that which speaks to God; it alone God hears. — 55. God crowns nothing except charity; he who runs from another impulse and another motive runs in vain. — 56. God rewards nothing except charity, since charity alone honors God. — 57. Everything is lacking to the sinner when hope is lacking to him; and there is no hope in God where there is no love of God. — 58. Neither God nor religion is present where charity is not present.” Propositions of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

n. 382.

On Charity Toward One’s Neighbor

“10. We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act. — 11. We can satisfy the precept of loving our neighbor through external acts alone.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 1 passage (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion, On the Theological Virtues

n. ¶41.

N. 252. 255. - On Cooperation in General with Superstitious Rites

"In relation to cooperation with superstitious rites, this rule is to be held. If the cooperation has been part of the superstitious rite, then it will be judged formal, intrinsically evil, and can never lawfully be done. On the contrary it will be judged material if it was not part of the superstitious rite. Some grave harm which would arise to the cooperator, if he wished to abstain from this material cooperation, will make it lawful, even if scandal is present, that which is called scandal of the little ones by Theologians, because by the law of charity no one is bound to remove that scandal with grave harm to himself." S. C. de P. F. 2 July 1827.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 127 passages

Vol. II, On the Theological Virtues…, On the Virtue of Charity

Concerning the Virtue of Charity. — Preliminary Things concerning Love and Charity in General.

Among the theological virtues charity stands out, as Paul bears witness: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity."¹ But because charity is a certain kind of love,² a few things concerning love must be noted beforehand.

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² St. Thomas declares this thus (I-II, q. 26, a. 3): "For every dilection or charity is love, but not conversely; for dilection adds to love a preceding election, as the very name sounds; whence dilection is not in the concupiscible, but only in the will, and exists only in a rational nature. But charity adds to love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price, as the very name designates." - In reality the word carus etymologically signifies something of great price (Breal and Bailly, Dict. etymol., p. 36).

n. 730.

1. Concerning the Nature, Causes, and Effects of Love.

(A) Notion and species of love. Love in general is a movement toward good, or the complacency of the appetite in good. A threefold love is usually distinguished: natural, sensible, and rational.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26-29; St. Francis de Sales, Tr. de l'Am. de Dieu (ed. Annecy, 1894), l. I, ch. 1-13; Barre, De virtutibus, t. I, n. 12-20.

(a) Natural love is a certain propensity of any being toward its own proper end: for each thing seeks its own end, and is borne toward it by a certain natural instinct. This exists even in beings lacking liberty, and is not properly a moral act; accordingly we shall not treat it here. (b) Sensible, or sensitive, love is one of the eleven passions described above, n. 100, and can be defined as the complacency of the sensitive appetite in a sensibly apprehended good. It is therefore concerned with qualities which please the senses, and is not borne toward intelligible good except insofar as this kind of good is presented sensibly to the appetite by the imagination. But because these qualities are frivolous and mutable, the love which is born from them is vain and inconstant.⁴ - If it exists between persons of different sex, in order to carnal delights, it is called sexual love, and often passes into a vehement passion.⁵

⁴ "Love founded upon the communication of sensual pleasures is altogether gross, and unworthy of the name of friendship, as also that which glories in certain vain and frivolous endowments perceived by the senses. But I call sensual pleasures those which immediately and principally are concerned with the external senses, such as that pleasure which arises from the sight of bodily beauty, from the hearing of a sweet voice, from soft touch, and others of this kind. But I call frivolous endowments certain vain habits of nature, which the inexperienced and futile call by the name of virtues and perfections... Thus he is judged to be endowed with great virtue who dances elegantly, is most skilled in every kind of game, dresses elegantly, sings, jokes, or converses, and has elegant gestures." (St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, c. 17).

⁵ Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 151-180; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI, 1899, p. 129-137 and 241-248; Ribot, Psychologie des sentiments, Paris, 1896, p. 244-255.

n. 731.

(c) Rational love, or dilection, is the complacency of the will in good intellectually apprehended; it arises from endowments not external and frivolous, but intellectual and moral, for example, knowledge, prudence, kindness, fortitude, and other virtues of this kind. Wherefore it is more constant, because it rests upon endowments which are less mutable; it is worthy of man and honorable, as being founded upon truly human qualities. This likewise is twofold: when we love someone chiefly on account of our advantage, namely because he is good and useful to us, this love is called love of concupiscence; but if, on the contrary, we love him especially because we will good to him, it is called love of benevolence. Usually both motives are joined together, and we love others on account of both our own and their advantage. - Moreover, since man is at once rational and sensible, intellectual love is often found mixed with sensible love.

n. 732.

But love is called friendship when it is mutual, known as such to each lover, and therefore imports a certain communication of goods: "Not every love is friendship: for we can love and yet not be loved, and then there is love, but not friendship, since friendship is a certain mutual and reciprocal love. Secondly, it is not enough that it be mutual, but it is moreover necessary that the friends loving one another know their reciprocal affection; for if they are ignorant of this, they will indeed have love, but not friendship. Thirdly, it is required that there be between them some communication, which is the basis and foundation of friendship. Now, according to the diversity of communications, friendship also is diverse... if the things communicated are false and vain, friendship is false and vain; if they are true and solid, friendship also is true; and the more excellent goods of this kind are, the more excellent is friendship."⁶

⁶ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, c. 17. - Cicero wrote an excellent treatise concerning friendship, Laelius sive de Amicitia.

Ambrose writes splendidly concerning true friendship:⁷ "For it is a solace of this life that you have one to whom you may open your breast, with whom you may share hidden things, to whom you may commit the secret of your heart; that you may place for yourself a faithful man, who may rejoice with you in prosperous things, suffer with you in sad things, encourage you in persecutions... Friendship is the guardian of piety and the mistress of equality, so that the superior shows himself equal to the inferior, and the inferior to the superior... For friendship is not venal, but full of beauty, full of grace. For friendship is a virtue, not gain, because it is not produced by money, but by grace; not by the bidding of prices, but by the contest of benevolence." - Scripture had gone before Ambrose:⁸ "A faithful friend is a strong protection; and he that has found him has found a treasure; nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is worthy to be put in balance against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality."

⁷ St. Ambrose, De officiis, lib. III, c. 22, P. L., XVI, 181-182.

⁸ Ecclus. 6:14-16.

n. 733.

(B) Causes of love.⁹ There are especially three things which induce or increase love: good, likeness, familiar association.

⁹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 27; St. Francis de Sales, Traite de l'Am. de Dieu, l. I, ch. 8; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1892, 6th Conf., p. 217-220.

(a) Good indeed is the principal cause of love, since the appetite, whether sensitive or rational, is naturally borne toward sensible or intellectual good; and generally love is more intense the more perfect the beloved object appears. If evil is sometimes loved, this happens only because it appears under the aspect of good; thus iniquity is not loved except because it offers delight or advantage. - To this cause is referred the beautiful, which is nothing other than the good insofar as it pleases sight.

(b) Likeness between lovers induces love secondarily, according to that saying:¹⁰ "Every living creature loves its like; so also every man loves his neighbor." In reality man naturally loves himself primarily, and therefore, among men, by force of a certain affinity and sympathy, he loves those who are more like himself, for example, those who belong to the same nation or family, or who enjoy similar endowments. Hence friendship either receives equals or makes them. - Yet this likeness, which is the cause of love, does not exclude certain differences; indeed, usually those who, while they are similar in many things, nevertheless differ in a few things, love one another more intensely, so that one seeks in the other a complement of himself; thus one who is gentle but weak is more easily joined in friendship to him who is irascible indeed, but strong and energetic.¹¹ Hence not perfect equality, but a certain proportion between lovers is required.

¹⁰ Ecclus. 13:19.

¹¹ "In this sort the melancholy and the joyful, the sharp and the gentle, sometimes love one another reciprocally, on account of the mutual impressions which they receive from one another, by means of which their humors are mutually moderated. But when this mutual correspondence is joined with likeness, love without doubt is begotten much more powerfully." (St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. I, ch. 8).

(c) Familiar association increases love not a little; for nothing is willed unless it is first known, and therefore goodness, beauty, and likeness do not move to friendship except insofar as they are known. Therefore intimate and frequent conversation and colloquies greatly foster friendship: for thus friends know one another better, thus they are delighted by the presence of the beloved object, and from this double source love grows. To this cause is referred the manifestation of love and being loved in return; for, as Seneca says,¹² "if you wish to be loved, love"; and according to Augustine,¹³ "there is no greater invitation to love than to anticipate by loving, and too hard is the soul which, if it was unwilling to bestow love, is unwilling to repay it."

¹² Epist. IX to Lucilius.

¹³ De catechiz. rudibus, c. 4, P. L., XL, 314.

n. 734.

(C) Effects of love.¹⁴ The principal ones are union, ecstasy, zeal, and the ordering of actions toward the beloved object.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28.

(a) Union indeed; for every love tends to this, that it may join lovers and morally make one out of two or more, according to that saying: "And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul."¹⁵ It effects a twofold union: one affective, by force of which friends strive to will the same things and not to will the same things, and the lover is in the beloved, as considering the goods of his friend his own; thus it is read in Scripture:¹⁶ "The soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul"; - the other real, which consists in the presence and possession of the thing loved;¹⁷ and this, although desired by lovers, is sometimes impeded or delayed by obstacles.

¹⁵ Acts 4:32.

¹⁶ 1 Kings 18:1.

¹⁷ This St. Francis de Sales vividly describes, Tr. de l'amour de Dieu, l. I, ch. 9.

(b) Ecstasy (ekstasis, departure), by which the lover is as it were placed outside himself; this happens by a twofold act, of the intellect and of the will. According to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved; according to affection he is borne outside himself: through love of concupiscence, not content with the good which he has, he seeks another good outside himself by which he may enjoy; through love of friendship, he acts not for himself alone, but wills and works good for his friend, and takes care of him. Wherefore it is of the greatest importance to love only honorable and holy things, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and becomes like the beloved object.¹⁸

¹⁸ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 3; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. I, ch. 10.

n. 735.

(c) Zeal likewise comes from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever is opposed to this propensity. Thus, in love of concupiscence, he who intensely desires something is by that very fact borne against everything which stands in the way of obtaining it or peacefully enjoying it; in love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of a friend is by that very fact vehemently moved against everything which is repugnant to his good.¹⁹

¹⁹ St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

(d) Besides, he who vehemently loves someone orders his actions toward him, namely toward pleasing him and obtaining his friendship; and, since the other passions proceed from love, all movements of the soul are more or less ruled by the predominant love. From this it follows that nothing is more important than rightly ordering one's affections, so that life itself may be rightly established. Therefore they are truly wise who love God from their whole heart; for, as Augustine says, "two loves therefore made two cities: the earthly, namely, love of self even to contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God even to contempt of self."²⁰

²⁰ De Civitate Dei, lib. XIV, c. 28, P. L., XLI, 436.

n. 736.

2. Concerning the Virtue of Charity in General.

Charity, as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we are inclined to love God above all things in the manner in which He loves Himself, and all things which God loves and as He loves them.

This definition is equivalent to that which is usually handed down, namely, it is a theological virtue by which we are inclined to love God above all things for His own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor for God's sake. In order that this may be understood better, it must be explained what the object, motive, and subject of charity are.

n. 737.

(A) The primary and principal object of charity is God Himself, to be loved above all things: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind."¹ But the secondary object is all creatures insofar as they are capable of divine grace and glory: "And the second (commandment) is like to this: thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."² For, since love essentially tends toward good, the primary object of dilection cannot be anything except the supreme and infinite good; but the secondary object is all beings which in some way participate in divine goodness.

¹ Luke 10:27; cf. Matt. 22:37.

² Matt. 22:38.

n. 738.

(B) The proper motive of charity is the absolute goodness of God, in itself and for its own sake infinitely lovable. Thus it is distinguished from the love of hope, whose motive is the relative goodness of God, namely that God is good toward us. For He can be loved in a twofold way: insofar as He is good for us, indeed our supreme good, by the enjoyment of whom we shall sometime be blessed, and this is the love of hope, or of chaste concupiscence; He can besides be loved as good in Himself, or because He is infinitely lovable for His own sake: this is the love of charity.

n. 739.

(a) A few theologians indeed, such as Bolgeni and Ballerini,³ have contended that the love of concupiscence is referred also to charity, and suffices for justification before the actual reception of the sacraments. For, they say, in Sacred Scripture the love of God loved solely for His own sake is never proposed to us, but God is often shown as to be loved insofar as He is our supreme good, the source of all our joy, etc. Besides, the single motive which excites man to acting is self-love, and therefore we do not love God except insofar as we conceive Him as the source of our beatitude. - But theologians commonly reject this opinion as erroneous. (a) For although Scripture does not directly and explicitly teach that God is to be loved for His own sake, nevertheless it insinuates this when it asserts that He is to be loved from the whole mind, from the whole heart, from all the powers, - or when it teaches that charity itself is more excellent than hope,⁴ - or proposes for imitation the charity by which someone lays down his life for his friends.⁵ (b) Otherwise, although man often acts from self-love, nevertheless he does not always act so, nor exclusively; but little by little he rises from the love of God, insofar as He is good to us, to the love of God as lovable in Himself and for His own sake, because he understands that He who is infinitely good in Himself is to be loved in Himself and for His own sake.⁶

³ Bolgeni, Della carita o amor di Dio, Rome, 1788; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. II, n. 135-139; - whom Muzzarelli refuted, Del motivo formale dell'atto di carita, Foligno, 1791; Perrone, op. cit., concerning Charity, n. 29-62; Pesch, n. 537-564; Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, p. 2220.

⁴ 1 Cor. 13:13.

⁵ John 15:13.

⁶ From this opinion the doctrine of St. Francis de Sales differs greatly (op. cit., l. X, ch. 10), asserting that we cannot love God except insofar as we can be joined to Him: "But if, by imagination of an impossible thing, there were an infinite goodness to which we had no sort of belonging, and with which we could have no communication, we would certainly esteem it more than ourselves... but, properly speaking, we would not love it, since love regards union; and much less could we have charity toward it, since charity is a friendship, and friendship can only be reciprocal, having communication for its foundation and union for its end."

n. 740.

(b) But both motives are often found united in one and the same act, and the love of hope in no way impedes the exercise of charity. For, on the one hand, God is supremely good in Himself, and therefore to be loved with love of benevolence, and supremely good to us, and therefore to be loved with the love of chaste concupiscence; but on the other hand, our ultimate end is both the glory of God, which we desire with love of benevolence, and our eternal beatitude, which we pursue with love of concupiscence. Indeed the love of concupiscence rightly ordered leads us to the love of benevolence: for the more we desire to possess God, the more we breathe after His honor.⁷

⁷ Thus St. Bonaventure, in lib. III Sentent., dist. 27, a. 2, q. 2.

Wherefore the proposition by which Fenelon asserted that there is given a habitual state⁸ of the love of God without admixture of a motive of one's own interest was condemned (above, n. 710). For it is psychologically evident that we cannot for a long time, or at least through a whole life, exclude the consideration and desire of heavenly beatitude (above, n. 717). This the pious Bernard lucidly declares, distinguishing four degrees in love:⁹ "First, therefore, man loves himself for his own sake. For he is flesh, and can relish nothing except himself. And when he sees that he cannot subsist by himself, he begins to seek and love God by faith, as necessary to himself. Thus in the second degree he loves God, but for his own sake, not for God's. But truly, when he has begun to cultivate and frequent Him by occasion of his own necessity, by thinking, reading, praying, obeying, by a certain familiarity of this kind God little by little and insensibly becomes known, and consequently grows sweet; and thus, having tasted how sweet the Lord is, he passes to the third degree, so that he loves God, no longer for his own sake, but for God's. Assuredly one stands in this degree, and I do not know whether the fourth is apprehended by any man in this life, namely, that man should love himself only for God's sake. Let those assert this who have experienced it: to me, I confess, it seems impossible."

⁸ According to the common doctrine, however, acts of pure benevolence, or of pure love toward God, can be elicited without any regard of one's own advantage: for if we sometimes love men without any hope of reward, why can we not sometimes love God without any appetite for reward? Wherefore Bossuet went further (Instr. sur les Etats d'oraison) when he contended that there is no act of love of God which excludes every regard for one's own good. (Gosselin, op. cit., p. CXLVI-CLXXXIII).

⁹ St. Bernard, Epist. XI, n. 8, P. L., CLXXXII, 113-114.

n. 741.

(c) The goodness of God, which is the proper motive of charity, must be known not only from natural light, but also and especially from the light of faith; for charity is a supernatural virtue, and accordingly its object and motive must be perceived supernaturally. This divine goodness in itself embraces all the perfections of God. - Yet many theologians think that any divine perfection accepted separately, for example, wisdom, kindness, mercy, is a sufficient motive of charity;¹⁰ and deservedly, as we think, for in God the various perfections are not really distinguished from the divine essence, and any perfection, as infinite, can provoke us to supreme love. In practice, there is no difficulty; for men are not accustomed to establish a distinction between God and His perfections, but love God Himself as infinitely wise, kind, merciful: and this certainly suffices for charity.

¹⁰ Ripalda, disp. XXV, concerning Charity, sect. 1-2; Wirceburgenses, n. 287; Lehmkuhl, n. 315.

The same divine goodness is the motive of charity toward ourselves and our neighbor: "And this commandment we have from God, that he who loves God love also his brother."¹¹ For, through charity, we love our neighbor because he is a son of God, destined to His glory, because he bears His image and likeness, and therefore on account of the goodness of God manifested in him.

¹¹ 1 John 4:21.

n. 742.

(d) The love of gratitude, by which namely we show God a grateful mind for benefits received, is often said to pertain to the perfect love of charity. At least it is certain that benevolent love toward the benefactor himself most easily arises from gratitude; and this love can be held as an act of charity, since it rests upon one of the divine attributes, namely beneficence. Therefore it is often expedient to excite men to gratitude toward God from benefits received - as in reality is usually done in the Scriptures - and then to love of the benefactor Himself: for when He is loved as good to us, He is easily loved as good in Himself.

n. 743.

(e) Likewise love toward Christ, who suffered and was crucified for us, most easily passes into the love of charity: for the faithful believe that Christ is God, and when they love Christ, by that very fact they love God; otherwise, if moved by gratitude they love the divine Redeemer as good to themselves, soon they love the same as simply good and infinitely lovable.¹² Since this way is very easy and accommodated to human nature, preachers and confessors, by excellent counsel, will make the same known to the faithful, so that these may more easily elicit acts of charity and of perfect contrition.

¹² The Apostle used this motive to excite the faithful to the practice of charity: "And walk in love, as Christ also loved us, and delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness." (Eph. 5:2).

n. 744.

(C) The subject of charity is all and only those who possess habitual grace: for charity is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace (above, n. 604). - This virtue inheres properly in the will, since the love of the divine good, which is perceived only by intellect and faith, is elicited by the will;¹³ nevertheless, because nothing is willed unless first known, knowledge and faith contribute much to charity, by providing motives by which the will is enticed to loving; besides, divine love sometimes redounds into the sensitive faculties, and begets in them pious emotions.

¹³ "The object of the sensitive appetite is good apprehended by sense; but the object of the intellective appetite, or of the will, is good under the common aspect of good, insofar as it is apprehensible by the intellect. But the object of charity is not some sensible good, but the divine good, which is known by intellect alone. And therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive appetite, but the intellective appetite, that is, the will." (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 1).

Division. Since the object of charity is twofold, namely God and neighbor, we shall speak: 1. concerning charity toward God; 2. concerning charity toward neighbor.

Art. I. Concerning Charity toward God.

We shall speak: 1. concerning its nature; 2. necessity; 3. sins opposed to it.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23-27; Suarez, concerning Charity, disp. I-VI; St. Francis de Sales, Tr. de l'Amour de Dieu, entire; Muller, § 19-23.

Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Sect. 1, Motive, and Object of Charity · Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Section 2: Necessity of Charity · Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Section 3: Fruits and Effects of Charity · Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Section 4: Sins Against Charity

§ I. Concerning the Nature of Charity.

Charity embraces a twofold species of love, namely love of benevolence, which intends the good of the beloved, and love of friendship, which besides imports mutual love in return.

n. 745.

I. Concerning the Love of Benevolence.

This love consists in this, that, insofar as we can, we will good to God. It embraces three acts, namely joy concerning the divine goods, desire of increasing the same, insofar as this can be done, and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

Joy, or complacency, concerning the goods which God possesses; for when we truly love someone, we have his goods as our own, and therefore we rejoice concerning his goods and take complacency in them, as if they were our own. Christ insinuates this in these words:² "If you loved Me, you would indeed be glad, because I go to the Father," namely because I leave this valley of misery, that I may obtain divine felicity.

² John 14:28.

(a) Wherefore the just rejoice concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in themselves, concerning His power, wisdom, kindness, etc.; indeed they rejoice more concerning the glory of God than concerning their own beatitude. Thus Augustine is reported to have said:³ "Lord God, I love Thee so, that if I were God and Thou Augustine, I would will myself to be Augustine, that Thou mightest be God." Thus likewise St. Francis de Sales:⁴ "O most beloved of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I could wish anything good to Thy majesty, but with my whole heart I take complacency in that supreme degree of goodness which Thou hast, to which neither by desire nor even by thought can anything be added; but, if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else." (b) They rejoice likewise concerning the external manifestation of the attributes of God, and therefore concerning divine providence, which disposes all things sweetly and strongly, concerning the extension of the kingdom of God, concerning the external glory which He receives from the Angels, the Saints reigning in heaven, and also the just on earth fighting for His honor. (c) From this complacency there spontaneously arises praise of God, by which we congratulate Him concerning all things which contribute to His glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise Thee, we bless Thee, we glorify Thee... Thee, O God, we praise, Thee, O Lord, we confess."⁵

³ St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V, ch. 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ In the psalms and liturgical prayers of the Church the divine praises are continually celebrated.

n. 746.

1. The desire of increasing divine goods, insofar as this can be done, or benevolence properly so called.

(a) If there is question of the intrinsic perfections of God, we cannot indeed desire an increase of them absolutely, since nothing good can accrue to the Infinite; but conditionally, as is read in St. Francis de Sales:⁶ "I said to the Lord, Thou art my God, full of immense goodness, who needest neither my goods nor those of anyone else; nevertheless, if it were possible that Thou shouldst need some good, I would never cease to desire it for Thee, and, to procure it for Thee, I would gladly spend my life and all things most dear to me."

⁶ Ibid.

(b) If there is question of the extrinsic glory of God, by love we are induced to promote it both in ourselves and in others: in ourselves indeed, insofar as we are prepared to suffer and do all things in order to make progress in divine love; thus St. John of the Cross, when asked by Christ what he desired for so many and such great labors undertaken for God, answered: "Lord, to suffer and to be contemned for Thee."⁷ But as to others, we sincerely desire that they, who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, may be illumined, and may know, love, and glorify God: "Let the peoples confess to Thee, O God, let all the peoples give praise to Thee... Praise the Lord from the heavens... Praise the Lord from the earth... kings of the earth and all peoples, princes and all judges of the earth."⁸

⁷ Breviary, Nov. 24, lect. 6.

⁸ Ps. 66:4; 148:1, 7, 11.

(c) Thence arises sorrow concerning sins committed by us or by others, insofar as they offend God, the supreme good; and also filial fear lest God be offended; for when we love someone, we suffer with him and grieve concerning the things by which he is saddened.

n. 747.

1. Zeal for promoting the glory of God, or beneficence. For love does not consist in affection alone, but is manifested by work. This happens in two ways: by vehemently repelling those things which are contrary to the honor of God,⁹ and by positively carrying out those things which promote this honor. Therefore those who truly love God labor strenuously to procure the external glory of God: (a) in themselves, by doing all those things which can increase His honor, by better observing the commandments and counsels, by devoting themselves and their things to Him, and by making all works toward pleasing Him. (b) In others, namely by drawing them to Christ by prayer, word, and example.

⁹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 4; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. X, ch. 12.

n. 748.

II. Concerning the Love of Friendship.

Friendship, from what has been said, n. 732, imports three things: love of benevolence, mutual love, and the communication of some good between lovers. Now these three can be found in charity toward God. (a) God certainly embraces us with love of benevolence, for He has gratuitously given us many and very great goods: "And I have loved thee with perpetual charity; therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity...¹⁰ For God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son...¹¹ Who also spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how has He not also, with Him, given us all things?"¹² And truly this love is benevolent, since God is plainly sufficient to Himself and does not need our goods. Otherwise, we too can love God with love of benevolence, in the sense set forth above, n. 745.

¹⁰ Jer. 31:3.

¹¹ John 3:16.

¹² Rom. 8:32.

(b) That this kind of love is mutual and known as such is no less evidently clear; for the Lord many times declared that He loves those who love Him: "I love them that love Me, and they that in the morning watch for Me shall find Me...¹³ If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him."¹⁴

¹³ Prov. 8:17.

¹⁴ John 14:23.

(c) That from this mutual love arises a communication of goods is no less clearly evident; for God has bestowed upon us goods both natural and supernatural, indeed a certain participation of His own life: "By whom He has given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature."¹⁵ On our part, indeed, we are able to add nothing to the divine perfections, but whatever we are and have we can give to God, by carrying out all our actions on account of Him, unto His glory;¹⁶ we can also take complacency in His attributes, and promote His external glory, according to what has been set forth above, n. 746. And thus there comes about a mutual communication of goods, and a mutual friendship, insofar as this can exist between God and men.

¹⁵ 2 Pet. 1:4.

¹⁶ This is expressed very beautifully in this prayer of St. Ignatius (Spiritual Exercises, from the Spanish autograph, Rome, 1854, p. 118-119): "Take, Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my intellect, and all my will, whatever I have and possess: Thou hast given all these things to me; to Thee, Lord, I restore them: all things are Thine, dispose of them according to all Thy will. Give me Thy love and grace, for this is sufficient for me."

Hence Scripture often declares us friends of God; thus Abraham is called the friend of God,¹⁷ and those who cultivate wisdom are sharers in the friendship of God;¹⁸ but especially in the New Testament those who keep His commandments are called friends of God: "You are My friends, if you do the things that I command you";¹⁹ but in a special way the apostles are friends of Christ, because they knew His secrets: "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father I have made known to you."²⁰

¹⁷ Isa. 41:8; Judith 8:22.

¹⁸ Wis. 7:14.

¹⁹ John 15:14.

²⁰ John 15:15.

n. 749.

§ II. Concerning the Necessity of Charity.

That the habit of charity is necessary by necessity of means for salvation is clear from the fact that charity and sanctifying grace are indivisibly joined, n. 597. The question therefore concerns the act of charity. This is not necessary by necessity of means for obtaining justification when the sacraments of baptism and penance are received: for then imperfect contrition, or attrition, suffices, for which the love of charity is not required, as we have explained elsewhere.²¹ But an act of perfect contrition, and therefore of charity, is necessary by necessity of means for adults who are in the state of mortal sin and cannot receive the sacraments.²² Besides, there is a precept of eliciting acts of charity at certain times in life: concerning its existence and extension it remains to speak.

²¹ Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Baptismo, n. 52, and Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenitent., n. 85-92.

²² De Paenitent., n. 86-97.

n. 750.

1. Existence: There is a special precept of eliciting acts of perfect charity toward God at certain times in life.

(A) This precept had already been handed down in the Old Law, and indeed as primary, to be inculcated upon all, even little ones, and always to be kept before the eyes: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart; and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising."²³ - In the New Testament, it is shown as essential, and the sum of the whole law:²⁴ "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment." Therefore it is necessary that we elicit acts of divine love at least at certain times, since a precept of this kind is the greatest of all.

²³ Deut. 6:5-7.

²⁴ Matt. 22:37-38. - The difference between the Old and the New Law is in this, that in the former God is shown especially as Lord, while in the latter He is often shown as Father. Cf. Batiffol, L'Enseignement de Jesus, Paris, Bloud, 1905, p. 94-105.

(B) Indeed a precept of this kind is consonant with reason: for since God is our ultimate end, and at the same time infinitely lovable, nature itself demands that we refer to Him the mind, the will, the whole soul, and also our actions, and therefore that we love Him above all things: for love is the gift of oneself, and he who orders his life unto God by that very fact loves Him above all things. But we cannot furnish this unless at certain times in life we elicit a positive act of love.

This precept is special, or distinct from the others, so that it obliges us to distinct acts; this is gathered from the texts cited, and from the documents to be cited below concerning its extension.

n. 751.

1. Concerning the extension of this precept. (A) We ought indeed to love God with our whole heart, with our whole mind, with our whole soul, and with all our powers. St. Thomas declares this thus:²⁵ "It is therefore commanded to us that our whole intention be borne toward God, which is from the whole heart; and that our intellect be subjected to God, which is from the whole mind; and that our appetite be regulated according to God, which is from the whole soul; and that our exterior act obey God, which is to love God from the whole strength, or virtue, or powers."

²⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, a. 5.

n. 752.

(B) By the precept of charity we are bound to love God above all things with a love appreciatively supreme, but not intensively supreme.

(a) With a love appreciatively supreme, insofar as we ought to value Him in our mind more than any other good, so that we are prepared to suffer the loss of all things rather than of His friendship. This is clear from the texts cited, and from these words of Christ:¹ "He that loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me; and he that loves son or daughter above Me is not worthy of Me." - In reality God is the supreme good, infinitely lovable, embracing in Himself all and each of the perfections of creatures, and indeed in an infinitely higher mode and without any imperfection; therefore he would inflict injury upon Him who should value some creature more than God. - But appreciatively supreme love, since it resides in the higher part of the soul, can coexist with a more sensible love of creatures; for creatures, since they are visible, often excite sensible love more than the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God. Hence they do not sin who love parents, friends, spouses more sensibly than God Himself, provided that in mind and will they are prepared to lose all things rather than God's friendship.

¹ Matt. 10:37.

n. 753.

(b) But not with a love intensively supreme; for no degree of love is prescribed in Scripture, except that which excludes mortal and venial sin. - For the understanding of this, it must be known that a threefold degree is commonly distinguished in the love of God: the first degree indeed consists in this, that a man withdraws from mortal sin, and therefore strenuously resists concupiscences which can tear out charity; the second is in this, that he makes progress in good, by withdrawing from deliberate venial sin and by assiduously cultivating virtues; in the third, he chiefly intends this, that he adhere to God and enjoy Him, by eliciting his principal acts under the influence of charity.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 4; St. Bonaventure, De profectu religiosorum, c. 15 (Opera, ed. Vives, t. XII, p. 386); M. d'Hulst, Careme 1892, p. 234-237.

Now, in order to satisfy the precept, it is enough to have the first degree of charity.

n. 754.

(a) When a man, having now attained the use of reason and having been sufficiently instructed concerning the goodness of God, clearly understands the obligation of loving Him above all things; for then he is bound to turn himself toward God: and this is done by an act of charity. (b) Often in life,³ although the time cannot be mathematically determined: some say once a week, others once a month or a year, others every three years; wherefore in practice the faithful are to be exhorted often to elicit acts of charity, whether explicitly, or implicitly by praying devoutly that God's name be sanctified, that His kingdom come, - by eliciting an act of perfect contrition and avoiding sin because it displeases God, - by exercising good works because they please God, etc. (c) More probably, at the moment of death, because at the departure from life we ought to adhere to the ultimate end through charity. (d) If a temptation against charity presses, which can be overcome only by an act of dilection; but often it can be conquered in another way, for example, by diverting the mind to other things.

³ To this belong the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of dilection of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn. - It is probable that not even rigorously every five years does the precept of charity toward God oblige of itself. - Then only does it oblige, when we are bound to be justified and have no other way by which we can be justified." (Denzing., n. 1022-1024; Viva, on the first proposition of Alexander VII).

It obliges by accident:

(a) When someone is in the state of mortal sin and is bound to recover the state of grace, for example, in order to receive or administer a sacrament, and otherwise cannot receive sacramental absolution: for then he cannot be justified without an act of perfect contrition, and therefore of charity. (b) When a grave temptation presses against some Christian virtue, which cannot be removed without an act of charity.

In practice, those who live as Christians and are accustomed assiduously to recite morning or evening prayers are not to be made anxious about this matter, since by these prayers they fully satisfy the precept of charity.

n. 755.

§ III. Concerning Sins against Charity.

Besides sins of omission, which can easily be understood from what has now been said, there are sins of commission against charity toward God. All mortal sins indeed are in some way against charity, since they destroy it. But there are two which are directly and especially opposed to charity: sloth, or sadness concerning spiritual goods, concerning which above, n. 562; and hatred of God, concerning which it remains to speak.

n. 756.

Concerning hatred of God. (A) Hatred in general is an act by which someone turns away from another. It can be twofold: (a) when we turn away from something as evil for us or for our own, there is had that hatred which is called hatred of abomination; this is directly opposed to love of concupiscence; for just as we desire something good for us, so we abominate whatever is evil for us. (b) If we will evil to some person, insofar as it is evil for him, there is had hatred of enmity or malevolence, which is directly opposed to love of friendship or benevolence.

Now hatred of God can be committed in this twofold way: for sometimes men turn away from God and are indignant with Him because He has forbidden such an action, or inflicts punishments upon sinners, or sends adversities:⁴ this is hatred of abomination. - But sometimes they will evil to God, namely with hatred of enmity; for example, they are saddened that He is omniscient, or omnipotent, or just; they wish that God did not exist, or that He were not omnipotent; they strive to diminish His external glory, by persecuting the Church and oppressing the just.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 1.

That such hatred exists, even in our days, is clear from history and experience. In the Sacred Letters there are mentioned many times enemies of God, who hate God and Christ;⁵ but today there are those who would wish the very name of God to be utterly erased, and therefore teach the young atheism, or monism, or positivism, who proclaim that God is evil, and bitterly blaspheme against Him or curse Him.⁶

⁵ Num. 10:35; Deut. 32:41; Ps. 73:23; John 15:24.

⁶ Thus, in a Masonic convention held in the year 1903, F. Delpech exclaimed: "The gods are dying: the peoples, at last disabused, are constrained to recognize, by the light of certain facts, that the gods, no more Christ than Buddha and Mohammed, have kept the promises made to the human races by the priests." (Apud P. Nourrisson, Les Jacobins, p. 253). In the periodical La Raison, Feb. 28, 1904, E. D., a pedagogue, wrote these things: "Let us make a policy of true apaches; let us crush the infamous thing" (Correspondant, June 25, 1904, p. 1027). And these among many things!

n. 757.

(B) Hatred of God is an intrinsically evil sin, and indeed of itself the gravest of all, because it is directly opposed to the most perfect virtue, namely charity, and does injury to the infinite goodness of God. It does not admit smallness of matter, and therefore, provided that it is deliberate, it is a mortal sin of its whole kind.

If the two species distinguished above are compared with one another, the sin of enmity is graver than the sin of abomination, because the former is opposed to the internal goodness of God, while the latter is opposed to an external manifestation of the same.

n. 758.

Conclusion: Concerning the Means of Progressing in the Love of God.

1. Since disordered love of oneself is contrary to divine love, it is necessary first of all to lessen this disordered love and little by little to root it out, so that we may be able to make secure progress in the love of God.

⁷ St. Bonaventure, Stimulus amoris (Opera, ed. Vives, t. XII, p. 631-703); De Imit. Christi, lib. III, c. 5-6; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V-X; Scaramelli, Directorium, Tr. IV, art. 3, c. 3-4; Gay, op. cit., Tr. XII, de la Charite envers Dieu; Faber, The Creator and the Creature, rendered in French, Le Createur et la creature, l. II.

Wherefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we make as much progress in charity as we depress self-love. Hence he who wishes to be a disciple of Christ must first deny himself, according to that saying:⁸ "If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself." These words the pious writer of the book On the Imitation of Christ explains splendidly: "If a man should give all his substance, it is still nothing; and if he should do great penance, it is still little... still much is lacking to him, namely one thing, which is supremely necessary to him. What is that? That, all things being left, he should leave himself, and go out from himself totally, and retain nothing of private love; and when he has done all things which he knows are to be done, let him feel that he has done nothing."⁹ In order to furnish this, let those things be recalled to memory which we said concerning the remedies of pride, nn. 519-521.

⁸ Matt. 16:24.

⁹ De Imit., l. II, c. 11, n. 4.

n. 759.

1. We ought also frequently to consider the motives which can inflame the will to divine love. Psychologically one can proceed thus: God is the lover of us, - God wills to be loved by us, - God is infinitely lovable.

(A) God is the lover of us. From eternity, namely, He loved us, thought of each one of us, and willed to do good to us: among innumerable possibles He chose us that He might bring us to existence. At the opportune time He created us, and whatever being, whatever good is in us, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, He gratuitously and benignly bestowed, "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection by the goods which He imparts to creatures."¹⁰

¹⁰ Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 1.

But when, through original sin, supernatural goods had been lost, God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in Him, with that faith which works through charity, may be saved through Him. He loved us at that time when through sin we were children of wrath and His enemies, and indeed while certainly foreseeing that many would contemn Him. Now, who would not love in return One so loving us? - Besides, one can consider the labors and sorrows of Christ patiently endured for us, but especially all those things which He lovingly suffered in the garden of Gethsemane and on the cross; for when we contemplate Christ crucified, can we not cry out with the Church:¹¹ "For His whole figure breathes love and provokes to loving in return: the head inclined, the hands extended, the breast opened?" From the love of Christ, however, we easily ascend to the love of God.

¹¹ Breviary, on the feast of the Seven Sorrows, response at the first lesson.

By these and other thoughts of this kind the love of gratitude is fostered, which, if it is not the love of charity, easily leads to it (above, n. 742).

n. 760.

(B) God wills to be loved by us: (a) for to this tends the precept set forth above, n. 750, by which we are commanded to love God from the whole mind, from the whole heart, from all the powers: for by such a precept, which is the first and greatest, He clearly shows how much He values our love, and how ardently He desires to be loved by us. Hence Augustine exclaims:¹² "What am I to Thee, that Thou commandest me to love Thee, and, unless I do it, art angry with me, and threatenest great miseries?" (b) The same is gathered from the promises, threats, benefits, and punishments by which God endeavors to allure His people to love of Himself: thus, among the Prophets, He compares Himself to a benefactor, who, for the innumerable benefits which he has conferred, earnestly demands gratitude and dilection; to a father, who wills to be loved by his children; to a spouse, who demands the love of his bride. To those loving Him He promises remission of sins and temporal and spiritual goods; but, on the contrary, He threatens dire punishments to those who contemn His love.¹³

¹² St. Augustine, Confess., lib. I, c. 5, P. L. XXXII, 663.

¹³ Thus, for example, Isa. 1:2-31; 5:3-30; Jer. 2:2-37; 3:1-5; 31:1-39; Ezek. 20:1-44; Joel 2:1-29, etc.

(c) He expressed that desire still more vividly by sending His own Son to earth, who, veiling His majesty and putting on the infirmities of our humanity, by His kindness allures us to divine love: "The benignity and humanity of our Savior appeared."¹⁴ John, the apostle of dilection, splendidly urges this motive:¹⁵ "In this has the charity of God appeared in us, because God sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that we may live through Him... Let us therefore love God, because God first loved us." (d) In reality Christ Himself provokes us to divine love, asserting that God loves those who love Him, and pleasantly remains in their heart:¹⁶ "If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him." He sweetly exhorts the disciples that they remain joined to Him by intimate affection, as a branch remains grafted into the vine:¹⁷ "I am the vine, you the branches... Remain in My love."

¹⁴ Tit. 3:4.

¹⁵ 1 John 4:9, 19.

¹⁶ John 14:23.

¹⁷ John 15:5, 9; the whole passage should be read attentively.

Thence there is an easy transition to the love of God, not only of gratitude, but also of friendship: "Who would not love in return One so loving us?"

n. 761.

(C) From these things it is easily understood that God is in Himself infinitely lovable. For by faith we know that whatever of beauty and whatever of good is in creatures is only an imperfect vestige of divine beauty and goodness. Wherefore, if we admire anything holy, anything heroic, anything powerful and kind in some man, all this is found in God, without any admixture of imperfection, and indeed in an infinitely more perfect degree. Therefore if we are allured to love by the beauty or goodness of creatures, how much more by divine perfection? Likewise, if love ought to be proportioned to the endowments of the beloved object, is not the mode of loving the supreme good to love it without mode? - And this is properly love of complacency, which soon is followed by love of benevolence, and afterward by love of beneficence, or zeal for promoting the glory of God.

Augustine declares this splendidly; he had sought pleasure and felicity in creatures; but having at last returned to better things, he addresses God thus:¹ "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee... What then art Thou, my God? what, I ask, except the Lord God... Highest, best, most powerful, most omnipotent, most merciful and most just, most hidden and most present, most beautiful and most strong, stable and incomprehensible; immutable, changing all things; never new, never old; renewing all things and bringing the proud into old age, and they know it not; always acting, always at rest; gathering, and not needing; bearing, and filling, and protecting; creating, and nourishing, and perfecting; seeking, though nothing is lacking to Thee. Thou lovest, and art not inflamed; Thou art zealous, and art secure; Thou repentest, and dost not grieve; Thou art angry, and art tranquil; Thou changest works, and dost not change counsel; Thou receivest what Thou findest, and hast never lost... My God, my life, my holy sweetness... Late have I loved Thee, beauty so ancient and so new, late have I loved Thee!"

¹ St. Augustine, Confess., lib. I, cc. 1, 4; lib. X, c. 27, P. L., XXXII, 661, 662-663, 795.

n. 762.

1. But charity is especially increased by the frequent exercise of acts of love: (A) Explicitly, namely by eliciting acts of gratitude toward God, an outstanding benefactor, and toward Christ, who loved us and delivered Himself for us; acts of complacency, by rejoicing over the divine attributes and praising them; acts of benevolence, namely by desiring that the name of God be sanctified, that His kingdom come, and that His will be done as in heaven and on earth; acts of beneficence, by promoting the glory of God with all one's powers; acts of perfect contrition, by detesting sins because they offend God, infinitely good.²

² These acts we have already described above, n. 745. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V and VI.

n. 763.

(B) Implicitly, by eliciting acts of the other virtues, which are informed by charity; for example, acts of obedience, which, according to the testimony of Scripture, are deservedly held to be truly acts of dilection: "If you love Me, keep My commandments... He that has My commandments and keeps them, he it is that loves Me."³ - The same can be said of any Christian action; prayer, labor, study, self-denial, mortifications of whatever kind, carried out on account of the love of God, obtain the merit of dilection (above, n. 149), and therefore increase charity.

³ John 14:15, 21; cf. 1 John 2:4; 5:3.

Indeed, since by the divine will we are bound to fulfill the duties of our state, it is necessary that we devote ourselves to the active life, and show our love by works from the deeds of charity.⁴ - Thus even common works become more pleasant, if they are performed from love, according to Augustine himself:⁵ "For in no way are the labors of those who love burdensome, but they even delight, as those of hunters, bird-catchers, fishermen, vine-dressers, merchants, and those delighting themselves with some game. Therefore what is loved matters. For in that which is loved, either labor is not felt, or even labor itself is loved."

⁴ To the point St. Vincent de Paul: "Let us love God, but let it be at the expense of our arms; let it be by the sweat of our faces; for very often so many acts of love of God, of complacency, of benevolence, and other similar affections of a tender heart, although very good and very desirable, are nevertheless very suspect when one does not come to effective love... Several flatter themselves with their heated imagination; they are content with the sweet conversations which they have with God in prayer; they even speak of them like angels: but, on leaving there, if there is question of working for God, of suffering, of mortifying oneself, of instructing the poor, of going to seek the lost sheep, of loving that something be lacking to them, of accepting illnesses or some other disgrace, alas! there is no one any more." (Apud Abelly, La vie de S. Vincent, Paris, 1891, t. I, ch. 19, p. 124-125.)

⁵ St. Augustine, De bono viduitatis, c. 21, P. L., XL, 448.

Among these works the works of charity toward neighbor stand out, which contribute very greatly to the love of God itself.

n. 764.

Art. II. Concerning Charity toward Neighbor. — Preliminary Things concerning Charity toward Oneself.

We cannot rightly love God unless we love His works, especially those in which divine goodness shines forth more perfectly, namely intellectual creatures, which were made to the image and likeness of God, angels and men. Passing over angels and the blessed, concerning whom there is treatment where the communion of saints is discussed, it remains to treat men who are wayfarers. Now we ought to love ourselves and our neighbor.

n. 765.

Concerning love of oneself there is no explicit precept, because, as Augustine notes, man does not need a precept in order to love himself:¹ "Therefore, since there is no need of a precept that each one should love himself and his body... it remained that we should receive precepts both concerning that which is above us and concerning that which is beside us." Nevertheless Christ implicitly commanded this dilection, saying:² "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Naturally indeed man loves himself; this love is not properly friendship, but something greater: for friendship imports a certain union; "but to each one toward himself there is unity, which is more powerful than union toward another; whence just as unity is the principle of union, so the love by which someone loves himself is the form and root of friendship: for in this we have friendship toward others, that we conduct ourselves toward them as toward ourselves."³

¹ St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, c. 26, P. L., XXXIV, 29.

² Matt. 22:39.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 4.

n. 766.

But by force of the divine precept, man ought to love himself supernaturally, for God's sake: (A) first of all his soul, which was created by God, made through grace a sharer in the divine nature, - and also redeemed by the blood of Christ, - the temple of the Holy Spirit, - capable of eternal beatitude.

Hence St. Thomas says:⁴ "And according to this the good love themselves, as to the interior man, because they will that he be preserved in his integrity; and they desire for him the goods which are spiritual, and also spend effort in order to attain them, and delightfully return to their own heart, because there they find both good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods, from which delight is caused." Wherefore we ought to put the salvation of our soul and its sanctification before all things: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added to you."⁵ Therefore we ought to cultivate Christian virtues, and rather die than be defiled; and therefore do good and meritorious works rather than heap up money: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth, where rust and moth consume, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither rust nor moth consumes, and where thieves do not break through nor steal."⁶ Accordingly we ought to esteem grace, and the means for preserving and increasing it, more than temporal helps. - We ought to fear one thing, sin, as we reported concerning Chrysostom, n. 471.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 7.

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

⁶ Matt. 6:19-20.

…and 87 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 61 passages

Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Sect. 1, Motive, and Object of Charity

NATURE OF CHARITY.—a) Charity (caritas theologica sive divina) is a supernaturally infused virtue, by which we love God as the Sovereign Good, above all else, for His own sake, and our neighbor as ourselves.¹ This definition is nominal rather than real, but it clearly indicates the causes, the object, and the motive of the theological virtue of charity.

¹ John XV, 9; Rom. V, 5; VIII, 15; Gal. IV, 6; 1 John IV, 7–16.—St. Augustine, De Doctr. Christ., l. III, c. 10, n. 16: “By charity I mean the movement of the soul toward enjoying God for His own sake, and oneself and one’s neighbor for God’s sake; but by cupidity, the movement of the soul toward enjoying oneself and one’s neighbor and any body whatsoever not for God’s sake.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 72).—Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., l. II, p. 13, c. 6: “Holy Scripture commends to us a twofold charity, namely, that of God and that of our neighbor. The charity of God, that we so love Him as to rejoice in Him. The charity of our neighbor, that we so love him, not that we rejoice in him, but that we rejoice with him in God. This is to love God for His own sake, but our neighbor for God’s sake. God, therefore, is to be loved for His own sake because He Himself is our good. But our neighbor is to be loved for God’s sake because our good is in God together with him.” (P. L., CLXXVI, 528).

In the phraseology of the Church and of the Schoolmen a distinction is made between charity (caritas) and love (amor). Amor is the more general term, embracing all kinds of love, whereas caritas signifies either God Himself, the immediate and proximate object of theological charity,² or the act by which He loves us,³ or that by which we love Him,⁴ or, more commonly, the supernatural habit or theological virtue of charity.⁵ The Scholastics speak of amor concupiscentiae, but never of caritas concupiscentiae, of amor vitiosus, but never of caritas vitiosa, of amor naturalis, but never of caritas naturalis.⁶

² 1 John IV, 8, 16.

³ Jer. XXXI, 3; Rom. V, 8 sqq.; 2 Cor. V, 14; Eph. II, 4; 1 John IV, 10, 16, 19.

⁴ Rom. VIII, 35, 39.

⁵ Rom. V, 5; 1 Cor. XIII, 13; 2 Cor. XIII, 13; Gal. V, 22; Phil. I, 9; 2 Thess. I, 3; 1 Tim. I, 5.

⁶ Cfr. K. Martin, Lehrbuch der kath. Moral, 5th ed., p. 350.

b) To understand the nature of supernatural or theological charity we must study the analogous sentiment of natural love (amor). Love may be directed either to persons or to inanimate objects (temporal possessions, honor, etc.) and comprises (α) a knowledge of the object to which it is directed and pleasure in that object (amor complacentiae); (β) a desire for, or tendency towards, that object on account of its goodness or desirability (amor concupiscentiae), and (γ) a surrender of one’s own personality to the person or object loved (amor benevolentiae sive amicitiae).⁷

⁷ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 26, art. 3 sq.

These three forms of natural love are analogous to the three stages in which charity, or the love of God, our Sovereign Good, unfolds itself towards us. In both cases the higher stages of development pass beyond the lower, elevating and transfiguring, though not suppressing them. As the amor complacentiae and the amor concupiscentiae have their motive not so much in the object towards which they tend, as in the loving subject, such a love is invariably egoistic and therefore imperfect. The love of friendship alone (amor benevolentiae sive amicitiae) is true charity, and, if directed towards God, it is perfect, because its formal object or motive lies entirely within the person to whom it is directed.⁸

⁸ Ps. CXXXVIII, 17; Luke XII, 4; John XV, 14 sq.;—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 7: “Whence man from unjust becomes just, and from an enemy a friend.”

Charity or theological love has its roots in the will and is productive of good. It is therefore a virtue; nay, the highest and noblest of all virtues, superior even to faith and hope,⁹ because it imparts to all the others their tendency towards God. Therefore St. Paul aptly calls it “the fulfilling of the law,”¹⁰ “the bond of perfection,”¹¹ “the end of the commandment,”¹² i. e., the object or purpose of the Gospel. The beautiful description of charity in the first Epistle to the Corinthians¹³ is a classic of religious literature. St. Thomas refers to charity as “the root of faith and hope”¹⁴ and declares that it is the mother or form of all virtues.¹⁵ Charity endures forever, whereas faith is ultimately transformed into vision, and hope into possession.¹⁶

⁹ 1 Cor. XIII, 13.

¹⁰ Rom. XIII, 10.

¹¹ Col. III, 14.

¹² 1 Tim. I, 5.

¹³ 1 Cor. XIII, 1–3, 13.

¹⁴ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 5, ad 2.

¹⁵ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 62, art. 4; cfr. 2a 2ae, qu. 23, art. 3 sqq.

¹⁶ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 390 sq.

THE MOTIVE OF CHARITY.—The motive or formal object of charity is God, or, more specifically, the divine attributes of goodness and amiability (bonitas absoluta) which are identical with His essence. Without this motive theological love could not exist. On the other hand, to love God for His own sake is more perfect than to love Him for our sake. His absolute goodness is the primary motive of charity, but it does not exclude the secondary motive of bonitas communicativa, i. e., the divine goodness in as much as it is communicated to men through the creation and the redemption, sanctification, and beatification of the human race, because this communication presupposes, or is the result of, absolute goodness. In matter of fact we are exhorted to love God for a variety of motives, e. g., because He is our Creator, Redeemer, and chief Benefactor, and because He has sanctified us and promised to make us forever happy in Heaven.¹⁷

¹⁷ Mark X, 45; John III, 16 sq.; XV, 13; Rom. V, 8–10; VIII, 32; 2 Cor. V, 15; 1 John III, 16; IV, 9 sq., 19.—G. Lahousse, Tract. de Virtut. Theol., Bruges 1900, pp. 376 sqq.

THE OBJECT OF CHARITY.—The immediate material object (obiectum materiale) of charity is God Himself; its secondary and mediate object, whatever proceeds from, and is positively related to, Him. Hence love of God must be accompanied by love of fellowmen. We have no true charity unless we love our neighbor, (a) be- cause God commands us to love our neighbor, making obedience to this commandment the distinguishing mark of His disciples; (b) because Jesus in life and death taught us by word and example to love our fellowmen, and (c) because every human being is a child and an image of God, redeemed by the blood of Christ, and called unto eternal salvation.¹⁸

¹⁸ Matt. XXII, 37–39; 1 John IV, 12.—St. Augustine, De Trinit., l. VIII, c. 8, n. 12: “This context [1 John IV, 7, 8, 20] declares clearly enough that this very fraternal love (for fraternal love is that by which we love one another) is proclaimed on such great authority not only to be from God, but also to be God. Therefore, when from love we love our brother, from God we love our brother; nor can it be that we do not chiefly love that very love by which we love our brother. Hence it is gathered that those two precepts cannot exist without each other. . . . From one and the same charity, therefore, we love God and our neighbor, but God for God’s sake, and ourselves and our neighbor for God’s sake.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 958).—IDEM, De Moribus Eccles. Cath., l. I, c. 26, nn. 48–51.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 1: “God is the reason for loving our neighbor, for this is what we ought to love in our neighbor, that he be in God. Hence it is manifest that the act by which God is loved and that by which our neighbor is loved is the same in species. And for this reason the habit of charity extends not only to the love of God but also to the love of our neighbor.”

As for irrational creatures, to love them should cause us to love God, because they manifest His wisdom and goodness in direct proportion to their amiability.¹⁹ This also explains why habitual and unnecessary cruelty to animals is incompatible with true charity or love of God.

¹⁹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 3: “The friendship of charity cannot be had toward an irrational creature. Nevertheless, irrational creatures can be loved from charity as goods which we will for others, namely, insofar as from charity we will them to be preserved for the honor of God and the usefulness of men; and thus God too loves them from charity.”

The love of our neighbor will be treated at length in the fifth volume of this Handbook, which deals with Man’s Duties to His Fellowmen.

As Jesus Christ is true God, one who loves Christ as a Divine Person thereby makes an act of theological charity, and as the goodness of God nowhere manifests itself so splendidly as in the Incarnation, the Passion, and the death of our Lord, the most effective method of eliciting an act of divine charity is to meditate on the goodness which moved God to become our fellowman through His birth, our prize through His death, and our reward through His glory.²⁰

²⁰ Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 63.

READINGS.—Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 27–32 (Migne, P. L., CXCII, 812).—St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 27–30 (Opera Omnia, Vol. III, pp. 558 sqq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 23–24.—F. Suarez, De Caritate, disp. 1–6 (Opera Omnia, Vol. XII, pp. 634 sqq.).—S. Schiffini, S.J., Tract. de Virtutibus Infusis, pp. 423 sqq.—W. Lütgert, Die Liebe im Neuen Testament, Leipsic 1905.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 59 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 416 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 251 sqq.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918.—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 82 sqq.

Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Section 2: Necessity of Charity

Charity, qua love of God, is absolutely necessary to salvation. St. John says: “He that loveth not, abideth in death,”¹ and St. Paul: “If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.”² As a virtue charity corresponds to an express divine command,³ in fact, to “the greatest and the first commandment” given by Christ.⁴ The necessity of charity is, moreover, deducible from human nature itself, for, as St. Augustine says, the human heart finds no rest until it is united with God.⁵

¹ 1 John III, 14; cfr. IV, 16.

² 1 Cor. XVI, 22; cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6 sq.

³ Deut. VI, 5.

⁴ Matt. XXII, 36–38; Mark XII, 29 sq.; Luke X, 27.

⁵ Confess., l. I, c. 1: “Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee.” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 661).

Charity being necessary for salvation, its practice is a grave duty. Christ demanded of His disciples that they love Him more than their nearest kin. “He that loveth his father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me.”⁶ “If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.”⁷ The Apostles insist that we must love Christ.⁸ Now not only does our faith teach that God is the highest or sovereign Good (summum bonum) in every imaginable respect, but the scriptural passages cited above, and especially the wording of the first and greatest command given by Christ Himself, show that our love of God must be the highest of which we are capable. Hence it is a postulate of charity that we must love God as the infinitely lovable Being (infinite diligibilis) above all else, that is, more than any other person or thing.⁹ It is necessary, however, to distinguish between amor appretiative summus and amor intensive summus.

⁶ Matt. X, 37.

⁷ Luke XIV, 26.

⁸ 1 Cor. XVI, 22; Col. III, 14; 1 John IV, 7, 16, 19; Jude 20 sq.

⁹ Matt. XXII, 37.—St. Augustine, De Doctr. Christ., l. I, c. 22, n. 21: “This rule of love was divinely established, that you should direct all your thoughts, your whole life, and your whole understanding toward Him from whom you have the very things that you direct. But when He says, with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, He left no part of our life vacant which ought to give place, as it were, so that it might wish to enjoy some other thing; but whatever else comes into the mind to be loved is swept there, where the whole impetus of love runs.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 27).—IDEM, Confess., l. X, c. 29: “He loves Thee less who loves something together with Thee which he does not love for Thy sake.” (P. L., XXXII, 796).—IDEM, De Moribus Eccles. Cath., l. I, c. 11, n. 18: “No one doubts that the highest good, which is also called the best, must not merely be loved, but must be loved so that we ought to love nothing more; and this is signified and expressed by what was said: with the whole soul, and with the whole heart, and with the whole mind. Who, I ask, would doubt, when all these things have been established and most firmly believed, that there is nothing else best for us, toward the attainment of which we ought to hasten with all other things set aside, than God? Again, if nothing separates us from His charity, what can be not only better but also more certain than this good?” (P. L., XXXII, 1319).—Cfr. Gury, I, n. 191–193.

a) Amor appretiative summus depends on the free determination of the will and consists in appreciating God more highly than anything else and in being ready, for His sake and for the sake of our eternal salvation, to renounce all other advantages rather than lose His grace or offend Him by a mortal sin. Amor intensive summus is the highest kind of emotional love of which a man is capable. It is present in the soul of one who dreads nothing more than to lose God.

b) From the very nature of these two kinds of love it follows that the former alone can be a matter of strict duty. The essential and decisive element in all love is the amor effectivus, i. e., that which manifests itself in deeds, in a strong inclination of the will towards God, a surrender of the soul to Him, obedience to His commands, zeal for His honor and the propagation of His kingdom. “He that hath my commandments and keepeth them,” says Christ, “he it is that loveth me.”¹⁰ “If any one love me, he will keep my word.”¹¹ “He that keepeth his [God’s] word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected, and by this we know that we are in him.”¹²

¹⁰ John XIV, 21.

¹¹ John XIV, 23 sq.

¹² 1 John II, 5; IV, 12, 17.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 8: “The perfection of charity can be understood in two ways: in one way on the part of the object loved, and in another way on the part of the one who loves. On the part of the object loved, charity is perfect when something is loved as much as it is lovable. But God is as lovable as He is good; but His goodness is infinite, and therefore He is infinitely lovable. No creature, however, can love Him infinitely, since every created power is finite. Hence in this way the charity of no creature can be perfect, but only the charity of God, by which He loves Himself. On the part of the one who loves, charity is perfect when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that the whole heart of man is actually borne toward God at all times; and this is the perfection of the charity of the fatherland, which is not possible in this life, in which, because of the weakness of human life, it is impossible always actually to think about God and to be moved by love toward Him. Second, so that a man devotes his effort to being free for God and divine things, setting aside other things except so far as the necessity of the present life requires; and this is the perfection of charity which is possible on the way, but it is not common to all who have charity. Third, so that a person habitually places his whole heart in God, namely, so that he thinks or wills nothing contrary to divine love; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.”—Cfr. in St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 442.—J. Deharbe, S.J., Die vollkommene Liebe Gottes im Gegensatz zur unvollkommenen, Ratisbon 1856.—L. Lessius, De Summo Bono, ed. H. Hurter, Freiburg i. B., 1869.

Moreover, the pious emotions which constitute the so-called amor affectivus are transitory and cannot be elicited at will. We know of great Saints who were unable to banish entirely that state of spiritual dryness which mystic writers call ariditas mentis and which, according to their teaching, God purposely inflicts on His faithful servants in order to test their love and increase their merits. Nevertheless, every good Christian should strive with all his might to make his charity as intensive as possible, first, by ardent prayer, and second by carefully fostering the fire of divine love in his heart. We must therefore not only beware of expelling the Holy Spirit by mortal sin, or weakening His operation in us by committing venial transgressions, but frequently make acts of charity and thereby strive to increase and confirm this all-important theological virtue in our hearts.¹³

¹³ Luke XI, 13; Rom. V, 5; Gal. V, 22; Col. I, 8; Eph. IV, 30; Phil. I, 9; 1 Thess. V, 19.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 10, can. 24.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, artt. 4–7.

How often such acts should be made depends largely on circumstances. It is certain that this duty binds all men in the hour of death, or when life is endangered, or when one, while unable to go to confession, is compelled to make an act of contrition, or in grievous temptations which cannot be overcome by other means. It is perhaps not too much to say that a man cannot progress steadily on the way of perfection unless he makes explicit acts of faith, hope, and charity at least once a day.¹⁴ However, no faithful Catholic need be anxious about this obligation if he strives to lead a good life and has a firm and constant purpose to avoid mortal sin, though all are advised to make explicit acts of charity frequently, in order that they may become more closely united with God and accustomed to such acts as a preparation for death.¹⁵

¹⁴ Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., n. 5: “We do not dare to condemn as sinning mortally one who elicits an act of love of God only once in his life.”—Prop. 6: “It is probable that not even every five years does the precept of charity toward God of itself strictly bind.”—Prop. 7: “It binds only when we are obliged to be justified and have no other way by which we can be justified.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1155 sqq.).—Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 2, qu. 52: “After Baptism the most fierce struggle of concupiscence against the spirit was left behind; yet in this contest it is not fitting for a Christian man to be broken or weakened in spirit, since, trusting in God’s kindness, we ought to rely on the best hope that by the daily practice of living rightly, whatsoever things are chaste, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy (Phil. IV, 8), these same things may also appear easy and pleasant. Let us gladly think these things; let us do these things with a cheerful spirit, that the God of peace (2 Cor. XIII, 11) may be with us.”

¹⁵ Gury, I, n. 193: “Devout faithful persons easily satisfy the precept of charity, because they frequently elicit acts of charity by rejoicing in the divine perfections; by wishing that no one offend Him and that all love and worship Him and observe His commandments; by praying devoutly that His name be sanctified and His will be done; by avoiding sin because it displeases Him, etc. The faithful, therefore, ought not to be anxious about this obligation, provided that they strive after a Christian life and constantly retain a ready will to avoid grave sins. Nevertheless, the faithful should be advised to elicit explicit acts of charity frequently in life, for greater union with God, and so that the soul may be prepared easily to elicit similar acts at death.”

The duty of fostering and promoting charity is a very important one, because charity is the very soul of the spiritual life, and without it good works, nay even miracles and extraordinary graces, would be of no effect. “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not charity, I am become (as) sounding brass or clanging cymbal. And if I have (the gift of) prophecy, and comprehend all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I have all faith, so as to displace mountains, but have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”¹⁶

¹⁶ 1 Cor. XIII, 1–3; cfr. XVI, 14; Col. III, 14.—St. Augustine, Epist., 140 (al. 120), c. 18, n. 45: “Piety is the worship of God, nor is He worshipped except by loving. The highest and true wisdom, therefore, is in that first precept [Matt. XXII, 37], and consequently wisdom is charity.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 559).

Negatively, the commandment of charity forbids all, especially mortal, sins. “He who saith that he knoweth [God], and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.”¹⁷

¹⁷ 1 John II, 4 sq.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 12: “One contrary is removed by another contrary supervening. But every act of mortal sin is contrary to charity according to its proper nature, which consists in this: that God be loved above all things and that man subject himself totally to Him, referring all his things to Him. It therefore belongs to the nature of charity that a person so love God that in all things he wills to subject himself to Him and to follow the rule of His commandments in all things; for whatever is contrary to His precepts is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore has of itself the power to exclude charity.”

It goes without saying that the theological virtue of charity, both because of its nature and on account of its object, must be supernatural,¹⁸ efficacious,¹⁹ and constant.²⁰

¹⁸ Rom. V, 5.—Cfr. Propositiones Damnat. Baii, n. 34: “That distinction of a twofold love, namely, natural, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious and devised for mocking the sacred writings and very many testimonies of the ancients.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1034).

¹⁹ John XIV, 15, 21; 1 Cor. XIII, 4–7; 1 John III, 18; V, 3; 2 John 1 sq., 6.

²⁰ John XV, 9 sq.; Rom. VIII, 35–39; Jude 21.—St. Augustine, De Moribus Eccles. Cath., l. I, c. 11, n. 19: “Let us consider each point briefly. No one separates us thence by threatening death. For that very thing by which we love God in spirit cannot die except when it does not love God, since death itself is not to love God, which is nothing other than to place something before Him in loving and following. No one separates us thence by promising life, for no one separates us from the fountain itself by promising water. An angel does not separate us, for when we cling to God our mind is not weaker than an angel. Power does not separate us; for if by power is meant here that which has some authority in this world, the mind clinging to God is altogether higher than the whole world. But if by power is meant that which is the most upright affection of our own soul, then, if it is in another, it favors our being joined to God; if it is in us, it itself joins us. Present troubles do not separate us, for we feel them the more lightly the more closely we cling to Him from whom they try to separate us. The promise of future things does not separate us, for whatever future good there will be God promises more certainly, and nothing is better than God Himself, who is assuredly already present to those who cling well to Him. Neither height nor depth separates us; for if these words perhaps signify height or depth of knowledge, I shall not be curious lest I be separated from God, nor does anyone’s teaching separate me from Him as though it were driving away error, from which no one at all would err unless separated from Him. But if by height and depth the upper and lower regions of this world are signified, who will promise me heaven so that I may be separated from the maker of heaven? Or who will terrify me with hell so that I may abandon God, whom, if I had never abandoned Him, I should not know hell? Finally, what place will tear me away from His charity, who would not be wholly everywhere if He were contained in any place?” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1319).

READINGS.—G. Lahousse, Tract. de Virtutibus Theol., Bruges 1900, pp. 376 sqq.—J. Deharbe, S.J., Die vollkommene Liebe Gottes in ihrem Gegensatz zur unvollkommenen, Ratisbon 1856.

L. Lessius, De Summo Bono, ed. Hurter, Freiburg i. B. 1869.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 428 sqq.—J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 223 sqq.—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, pp. 83 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 64 sqq.

Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Section 3: Fruits and Effects of Charity

The fruits and effects of charity, or the forms in which this virtue manifests itself, are, broadly speaking, the twelve so-called gifts of the Holy Ghost,¹ more especially joy and peace,² a desire to be made conformable to the will of God, and zeal for His holy cause.

¹ See Vol. I of this Handbook, pp. 280 sqq. Also W. F. Stadelman, C. S. Sp., Glories of the Holy Ghost, Techny, Ill., 1919, pp. 47 sqq. and G. H. Joyce, S. J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, pp. 94 sqq.

² John XV, 9–11; Rom. XIV, 17; 1 Cor. XIII, 4–7; Gal. V, 22 sqq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 28–29.—P. Bürger, Unterweisungen über die christliche Vollkommenheit, pp. 635, 642 sqq.

Joy in God (amor laetitiae) may be defined as pleasure in His presence, delight in contemplating His revelations, and the consciousness of being always an object of His omniscience and benevolent care.³

³ Cfr. Phil. I, 18; 3 John 4.—P. W. von Keppler (tr. by J. McSorley), More Joy, St. Louis 1914.—Seneca, Ep., 23, 4: “Believe me, true joy is a serious thing.”

“The joy of salvation,” says Bishop Keppler, “the joy of the Saviour, whether bleeding in victorious battle against the legions of evil, or risen again amid Easter alleluias, or gloriously ascended to Heaven and reigning there; the joy of the Holy Ghost; the vision of perfect future joy, the reward of Heaven,⁴—all this remained as a precious legacy to the disciples, and has become the precious legacy of every one who is united to the Saviour in faith and love. The inner experience of the Apostle testifies that ‘the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.’⁵ He names joy second among the fruits of the spirit.⁶ He proclaims as the Christian law of life: ‘Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice.’⁷ and, ‘Let the peace of Christ rejoice in your hearts.’⁸ When the first Christian communities were organized, ‘breaking bread from house to house, they took their meat with gladness and simplicity of heart.’⁹ All the trouble, danger, and affliction which came upon the Christians in times of persecution could not cause anything more than a quasi-sadness in the midst of real permanent joy, ‘as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing.’¹⁰ During centuries of the most frightful and bloody persecution, amid pain and torment, in flames and funeral pyres, in rackings and scourgings, in the darkest depths of dungeons, this indestructible joy has always kept up its exultant song.”¹¹

⁴ Matt. XXV, 21; 1 Pet. I, 6–8.

⁵ Rom. XIV, 17.

⁶ Gal. V, 22.

⁷ Phil. IV, 4.

⁸ Col. III, 15.

⁹ Acts II, 46.

¹⁰ 2 Cor. IV, 10.

¹¹ Keppler-McSorley, More Joy, pp. 116 sq.

“The characteristic of all those who have attained to a perfect love of God,” says the most renowned of contemporary Dominican theologians, Fr. Albert M. Weiss, “is an exceptional and imperturbable happiness, a cheerfulness so surprising, so permanent, so frank and childlike, that the prejudiced children of this world are tempted to get vexed at it. . . . Whoever encounters souls of this kind, perceives from their very appearance that their condition does not depend on the world around them, but originates in their own spiritual depths. Their minds are not easily upset by storms, for their lives are built upon God, who is inaccessible to the disturbing influence of the elements. They have nought to fear from God; they are at peace with themselves. Why then, should they not be happy?”¹²

¹² A. M. Weiss, O.P., Apologie, Vol. III, 2nd ed., p. 831; Keppler-McSorley, op. cit., p. 122.

This joy in God and in divine things inspires reverence for His majesty (amor reverentialis). Freely does the faithful Christian acknowledge the majesty and sublimity of God, and gladly does he bow before Him,—not like a slave who dreads the lash, but like a child that confidently trusts in his father’s kindness. “Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he that feareth is not perfected in charity.”¹³

¹³ 1 John IV, 18.—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 118, 25, n. 7: “Perfected charity casts out this fear, by which punishment is feared; it makes men free, not through fear of punishment, but through delight in justice. For that fear by which justice is not loved but punishment is feared is servile, because it is carnal, and therefore does not crucify the flesh. For the will to sin is alive, and appears in deed when impunity is hoped for. But when punishment is believed to follow, it lives hiddenly, yet it lives. For it would rather that what the law forbids were permitted, and it grieves that it is not permitted, because it does not spiritually delight in the law’s good, but carnally fears the evil which it threatens. But with chaste fear charity itself, which casts out this fear, fears to sin even if impunity should follow, because it does not judge that impunity will follow when, through love of justice, it regards sin itself as punishment.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1576).—IDEM, Serm., 161 (al. 18, De Verbis Apost.), n. 9: “Servile fear is that by which you fear to burn with the devil; chaste fear is that by which you fear to displease God.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 883).

To this childlike reverence is added gratitude (amor gratitudinis), which consists in the joyful acknowledgement of innumerable favors received from God without any merit of our own,¹⁴ and is combined with fear of all that runs counter to His will and regret for one’s own weakness, imperfection, and sinfulness (amor dolorosus). If a man’s individual faults are the object of this sorrow, it is called contrition; in all other cases, Christian sadness.¹⁵

¹⁴ 2 Cor. II, 14; Eph. V, 20; Col. III, 15, 17; 1 Thess. V, 18.

¹⁵ Matt. V, 5; Rom. XII, 15; 1 Cor. XIII, 6.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 2.

The tendency to conform one’s will to that of God (amor oboedientiae sive conformitatis) takes the form either of obedience or resignation, according to the manner in which the divine will manifests itself, namely, as a law or as a decree. Both obedience and resignation to the will of God must be universal and willingly rendered. However, it is no sin, but sometimes may be a proof of childlike charity, to desire that this or that particular decree of Providence be changed. Christ prayed on Mount Olivet: “My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me; nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt,”¹⁶—and we are allowed to follow His example.

¹⁶ Matt. XXVI, 39 sqq.

Zeal for the cause of God is such a necessary requirement of true charity that the latter cannot exist without the former. This zelus amoris consists mainly in an earnest endeavor to prevent others from offending God, or to induce them to embrace the true faith, or to do penance for their sins, or to lead a more perfect life. To be genuine, this zeal for souls must be free from egotistic motives, aim only at God and His glory, and employ no means except those which are legitimate in themselves or at least do not hinder the attainment of the end in view. This is but another way of saying that our zeal must be tempered with prudence and should never outrun the bounds of modesty and benevolence. Where these conditions are lacking, even the most ardent zeal is apt to injure rather than to help the cause of God.¹⁷

¹⁷ Ps. LXVIII, 10; Matt. XXIII, 15; Luke IX, 51 sqq.; John II, 17; Rom. X, 2; XII, 9; 2 Cor. XI, 2; Gal. I, 14; VI, 17 sq.; 2 Tim. I, 3; Jas. I, 21.—P. Chaignon, S. J., Le Ciel Ouvert par le Zéle, Angers 1882 (German tr. by M. Hoffmann, Der Seeleneifer, Mayence 1902).

Legitimate means for propagating the kingdom of God are instruction, example, and intercessory prayer. To these may be added almsgiving for the purpose of rendering the poor more receptive for good advice and example. Violence and compulsion are contrary to the spirit of Christianity and therefore forbidden.¹⁸

¹⁸ Epist. ad Diognet., c. 7, n. 3–5 (Funk, Patr. Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 402): “Was it, as one might reckon concerning men, in tyranny and fear and terror? Certainly not, but in gentleness and meekness: as a king sending a royal son, He sent him; as God He sent him; as a man to men He sent him; as saving He sent him, as persuading, not compelling—for violence has no place with God. He sent him as calling, not pursuing; He sent him as loving, not judging.”—Tertullian, Apol., c. 24: “See that this too does not contribute to the charge of irreligion: to take away freedom of religion and forbid the choice of divinity, so that it is not permitted to me to worship whom I wish, but I am forced to worship whom I do not wish. No one will wish himself to be worshipped by an unwilling person, not even a man.” (Ed. E. F. Leopold, p. 1, 96).—IDEM, Ad Scap., c. 2: “It is a right of man and a power of nature for each one to worship what he has thought fit, nor does the religion of one harm or benefit another. But it is not the part of religion to compel religion, which ought to be undertaken voluntarily, not by force, since even sacrifices are demanded from a willing spirit.” (Ed. Leopold, p. 248).—A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche, pp. 192 sqq.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 28.—F. W. Faber, The Creator and the Creature, Book III.—St. Francis de Sales, Traité de l’Amour de Dieu.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 419 sq.—Msgr. Gay, La Vie et les Vertus Chrétiennes, Paris 1876, Tr. XII.

Vol. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Section 4: Sins Against Charity

Mortal sin, both as an act and as a state, is diametrically opposed to the theological virtue of charity, which spells union with God, whereas mortal sin involves separation from Him.¹

¹ Cfr. Prov. X, 12; Luke VII, 47; 1 Pet. IV, 8.—St. Augustine, Tr. in Ioan., I, n. 6: “Pride extinguishes charity; therefore humility strengthens charity; charity extinguishes sins.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1982).—IDEM, De Doctr. Christ., III, c. 10, n. 16: “The more the kingdom of cupidity is destroyed, the more charity is increased.” (P. L., XXXIV, 72).—IDEM, Enchiridion, c. 117: “Carnal cupidity reigns where there is no charity of God.” (P. L., XL, 287).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 10: “Every mortal sin is contrary to charity.”—IDEM, ibid., art. 12: “Every act of mortal sin is contrary to charity according to its proper nature, which consists in this, that God be loved above all things.”—Cfr. this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 16 sqq.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, pp. 14 sqq.

As charity has various degrees, so mortal sin, which is its antithesis, may be more or less grievous.

HATRED AND CONTEMPT OF GOD.—Most directly opposed to charity is hatred and contempt of God.²

² John XV, 18–25.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 34, art. 1: “God can be apprehended by man in two ways: in one way according to Himself, for example, when He is seen through His essence; in another way through His effects [Rom. I, 20]. But God through His essence is goodness itself, which no one can hate, because it belongs to the nature of the good that it be loved; and therefore it is impossible that anyone seeing God through His essence should hate Him. But some of His effects are such that they can in no way be contrary to the human will, because to be, to live, and to understand are both desirable and lovable to all, and these are certain effects of God. Hence also, inasmuch as God is apprehended as the author of these effects, He cannot be hated. But there are certain effects of God which are repugnant to a disordered will, such as the infliction of punishment and also the restraint of sinners by divine law, which are repugnant to the will depraved by sin; and with respect to the consideration of such effects, God can be hated by some, insofar, namely, as He is apprehended as the prohibitor of sins and the inflictor of punishments.”

Hatred of God (odium Dei), in its fully developed form, is the sin of the demons. In men, as a rule, it results only from an immoral life. “To hate God, the giver of all good things,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, “is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every species of that sin.”³

³ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 34, art. 2, ad 1: “Hatred of God is especially a sin against the Holy Spirit, insofar as sin against the Holy Spirit names a certain special kind of sin; yet it is not numbered among the species of sin against the Holy Spirit, because it is found generally in every species of sin against the Holy Spirit.”—Ibid., art. 5: “Hatred which is opposed to this love is not first in the destruction of virtue, which occurs through vices, but last; and therefore hatred is not a capital vice.”

Contempt of God may be direct or indirect. Direct contempt (contemptus formalis) amounts to the same thing as hatred of God, whereas indirect contempt (contemptus practicus) is, strictly speaking, contained in every sin, because every transgression of the divine law implies a preferring of the creature to God.

MORAL INDOLENCE.—Opposed to the love that produces good works (amor effectivus) is sloth or indolence (acedia), which we have defined in a previous volume of this Handbook⁴ as a sluggishness of the soul that makes it dread physical and mental labor in the exercise of virtue. This fault may manifest itself in neglect of prayer and other religious exercises, lukewarmness in matters pertaining to salvation, indifference to virtue and spiritual things (desidia, inertia), distraction and neglect of duty, libertinism, aversion to revealed truth, disgust for religion, ingratitude towards God, and lack of zeal for His holy cause.⁵

⁴ Vol. II, p. 83.

⁵ Matt. XIII, 19; XXIV, 38; 2 Cor. VII, 10.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 35, art. 1–4.

ZELOTRY AND BLIND FANATICISM.—Opposed to charity from still another point of view is false zeal, which employs this virtue as a cloak to hide its egotistic aims. We have in mind particularly the fanaticism of unenlightened even though well-meaning Christians, which so often hinders good causes. It is wrong to pursue selfish aims under the pretext of seeking the glory of God. Those who are guilty of such conduct may believe themselves to be actuated by genuine zeal, but they lack enlightenment and prudence.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Treatise III: On Charity · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Tit. I, Sublimity, Scope, and Easy Exercise of Charity · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Title II: On Charity as It Is Love of God · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Ch. I, Universality, and Order of Love or Friendship · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Chapter II: Corollaries on the Love of Enemies · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Chapter III: On Effective Charity · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Ch. III, Article I: The Procuring of Spiritual Goods · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Ch. III, Article II: The Procuring of Bodily and Temporal Goods

Religious fanaticism sometimes develops into disrespect for God and hatred of those who venture to disagree with the misguided zealot. “Woe to you scribes and Pharisees,” said our Divine Lord, “hypocrites, because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves.”⁶ He prophesied to His disciples: “They will put you out of the synagogues, yea, the hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God.”⁷ We are not permitted to hate any person in the name of religion, though we may and should hate sin, iniquity, and error. “Let love be without dissimulation,” says St. Paul, “hating that which is evil, cleaving to that which is good.”⁸ Therefore every species of pseudo-religious zeal which springs from hypocrisy, selfishness, jealousy, error, or superstition, is wrong and damnable.⁹ Only he who is animated by a pure and an ardent desire for the glory of God and the welfare of his fellowmen, can truthfully say with the Psalmist: “The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up.”¹⁰

⁶ Matt. XXIII, 15.

⁷ John XVI, 2 sq.; Rom. X, 2; Gal. I, 13 sq.; Acts VIII, 3; IX, 1; XXIII, 21; XXVI, 9; Phil. I, 15–17; 2 Tim. I, 3.

⁸ Rom. XII, 9; cfr. Luke IX, 51–56.

⁹ Cfr. Matt. VII, 3–5; XXIII, 13; Luke VI, 41 sq.; John XVI, 2; Rom. X, 2; Phil. I, 15, 17.

¹⁰ Ps. LXVIII, 10; cfr. John II, 17.

…and 21 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 93 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Treatise III: On Charity

Division of the treatise. - This principal treatise on theological charity admits this natural division: that, after a general view of the virtue, we should treat successively of charity as it is love of God, and of charity as it is love of ourselves and of neighbor.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Tit. I, Sublimity, Scope, and Easy Exercise of Charity

Utility. - This is of the greatest use to the moral theologian: that, once the notion of the virtue has been perceived, he may be able to persuade the faithful how noble and at the same time how easy the act of charity is.

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I. Notion, Sublimity, Scope. — To the new and ineffable communion by which, from our supernatural vocation, we shall be made one with God and neighbor in the immediate beatific possession of God, there corresponds a new virtue, at once operative and unitive, by which we love God and, in God, every neighbor together with ourselves, as, with attention given to the present order, it is fitting to love; just as by hope we intend and expect that beatific possession, as it is fitting to expect so great a good; just as by faith we believe God and believe in God revealing, as is fitting.

Therefore the theological virtue of charity is defined: a supernatural, infused habit, by which we are able to love God, as infinitely good in Himself, with the supreme love of friendship, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. In that definition, the formal object of charity is shown to be the infinite goodness of God in itself, that amiability which God lays open to one contemplating His goodness; a twofold material object is assigned: primary, which is God Himself, infinitely good in Himself; secondary, which is ourselves, together with our neighbor. From God there is made to us and to our neighbor a certain extension or diffusion of love: we love ourselves and our neighbor insofar as we are called to participate in the divine nature. That love is of friendship, insofar as it is of mutual benevolence founded in the communication of divine and eternal beatitude. For this communication, although it is not the motive of charity, is nevertheless a necessary condition so that we may be able to love God with the supreme love of benevolence, and so that that love may be one of friendship. It is at the same time supreme, not only insofar as, in our estimation, God by His goodness infinitely surpasses every created good, but also insofar as, founded in the supernatural knowledge of faith and in the supernatural ardor of hope, that love is given by a virtue which is in some way proportioned to the object: we begin to love God as if we saw Him.

Charity, like every true love, loves, unites, operates. - It loves, but with an affection which imitates the infinite love by which God loves His Goodness and, in this Goodness, whatever outside Himself is lovable: and thus no purer and more sublime affection can be conceived. - It unites us with God and neighbor: through that holy friendship, we arrive at a certain communion of cause and unity with God, which divinizes us; through the same friendship, men are joined among themselves by the most perfect bond: it comes about that the good of individuals becomes the good of all, and thus from every good a universal joy is prepared; it comes about that the evil of individuals becomes the evil of all, and thus a beginning is given to universal beneficence. - It operates, by joining our will with the divine will: and thus it leads us to the summit of perfection; it operates, by stimulating every good action: and thus it becomes most fruitful.

We can offer nothing more glorious to God than that we love Him with perfect love; nothing more meritorious for ourselves than that by the free effort of the will we embrace the divine good in affection and effect; nothing more useful to our neighbor than that we comprehend him with the same love with which we love ourselves and God.

Without charity we merit absolutely nothing: and thus charity is the root of every merit; through charity, by which we are joined to God Himself, our works arrive at God: and thus, insofar as they are meritorious, our works are perfected by charity, which becomes the form of all virtues.

No virtue in us, more than charity, is formally divine. For God, who beholds Himself and is present to Himself, formally neither believes nor hopes. Both faith and hope connote a defect either of vision or of the presence of God; but in formal charity, we come together with God.

Hence charity is an eternal virtue: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor. 13, 8).

No exercise is more commanded than that of charity, to which all precepts are directed as to an end. And at the same time none is more free, since charity by spontaneous motion fulfills all the precepts, so that the law is said not to be placed for it (Cf. 1 Tim. 1, 9).

Nothing is more sublime in affection, nothing more fruitful in effect.

The queen of the virtues, charity uses all the others as subordinate instruments.

And insofar as it reduces the whole world with God to the magnificent unity of one beloved object, charity is the joy, splendor, and perfection of the whole created world.

¹ The relative goodness of God is the condition of the love of benevolence which even in the natural order we would have to foster toward God as servants; goodness advanced as far as communion of blessed life gives place to the filial love of friendship.

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Name. — By force of the word itself, charity (Greek agape) is named more nobly than love. For it designates an affection which a) is proper to man here on earth, whereas love (Greek eros) is predicated even of brute animals; b) proceeds more from reason and from a just estimation of the lovable person than from the impulse of passion, whence love arises.

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II. Facility. — Yet let us not imagine that sublime exercise of charity to be difficult for ourselves. Entirely impassable for us without the help of God, its use becomes spontaneous for those who have received the spirit of adoption, that is, for those who, actually turned away from grave sin, possess the infused habit of charity. For what is sufficient so that, made sons of God, we may love Him with actual charity? It is sufficient that we not only desire God with concupiscence, but truly love Him, "as a man loves a friend" (2, 2, q. 17, art. 8, c.). But are we not drawn to this love when, immune from the servitude of sin, we consider either the divine benefits, both those which we have received and those which we expect, or the Passion of Christ, to which we refer them as received? Hope itself, says St. Thomas in the same place, introduces charity ¹. And what grace orders us to do, grace itself helps us so that we can do it.

It is also proper to one who loves that he should seek union with his friend. Wherefore the desire of possessing God, unless it is explicitly thrust down to one's own consequent happiness, is practically an act of charity. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 24.

Indeed God, in every order, is so greatly the good of every creature, that according to St. Thomas (1, q. 60, art. 5; 1, 2, q. 109, art. 3; 2, 2, q. 26, art. 3), every creature naturally loves God more than itself. Besides, it cannot love itself more and better than by loving God, on whose goodness every created goodness essentially depends. But in the natural order, love between God and man would not have been a love of friendship, which demands some equality either of nature or of grace, and therefore communication in the same life.

N. B. Several things which are controverted concerning charity we permit to be defined by dogmatic theology. Now we must treat distinctly of each material object of charity: God and neighbor.

¹ For gratitude, although it is formally commanded by benefits received and, under this respect, pertains to love of concupiscence, nevertheless almost of its own accord impels a grateful man, so that in the benefits themselves he loves the very goodness of the giver, which is proper to charity (Cf. Billot, De caritate. De praeceptis caritatis, p. 427).

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Summary

— I. Theological charity is a supernatural, infused habit by which we are made capable of loving God, as infinitely good in Himself, connaturally with the supreme love of friendship, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. - The formal object of charity is the infinite goodness of God and therefore amiability in itself; its primary material object is God Himself; its secondary object: ourselves together with our neighbor; we love these as actual or potential participants in the divine nature; the condition is the communication of divine and perpetual beatitude; its nature is friendship, founded in this communication, or communion in the same life; its degree is supreme.

II. By the love of charity, imitating the love by which God loves His Goodness and, in This, whatever is lovable, we are made one with God and neighbor; and, the will being joined with the divine will, we work every good. Wherefore nothing is more glorious to God, nothing more meritorious for us, nothing more useful to neighbor than the exercise of charity: without which we merit nothing, and which becomes the form of all virtues. No exercise is more commanded. No virtue is more formally divine and eternal; it is the joy, splendor, and perfection of the created world. - More noble than the name of love is the very name of charity.

III. Nor, for those who are immune from the servitude of sin and have been given the infused habit, does its exercise become difficult. It is sufficient to love God as a man loves a friend. This affection is prepared by the very benefits obtained and hoped for: the goodness of the benefactor is loved in the gifts themselves. Cf. Billot, De caritate, De praeceptis caritatis, p. 427.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Title II: On Charity as It Is Love of God

Utility. - Two things especially must be attended to by us in this title: in what way the precept of loving God is satisfied, and by what reason servile fear and the desire of beatitude are composed with filial love.

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I. The Precept. — The Lord in the Gospel, St. Mark 12, 30, promulgated as the greatest and first commandment the precept of loving God, and that in the words of Deuteronomy 6, 5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, and from thy whole soul, and from thy whole mind, and from thy whole strength." Cf. St. Matthew 22, 37. (Among the Hebrews, the heart signifies intellect and affection.) Those words proclaim to us affective and effective love, the love of the whole man, full in this way, that nothing which disagrees with the love of God is admitted. Cf. the cited writers in Knabenbauer on the alleged places. Therefore in these places a love intensively supreme is not commanded. Such a love is supreme from the subjective force of affection, especially insofar as sensible love concurs with the love of the will: which intensity is most becoming, so far as it is in our power. But only a love of God appreciatively supreme is commanded, or one from the estimation of judgment, so that we place no creature before God and would rather lose all things than God.

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Execution of the Precept. — As was said concerning faith, charity, besides its formal act, finds in acts which suppose that affection a quasi-virtual exercise by which the precept of charity can be fulfilled.

Moreover the precept of charity urges per se: at the beginning of moral life, so that by converting ourselves to God we may direct ourselves to Him, our end (cf. nevertheless the things said, n. 58); - if a temptation of hatred of God cannot otherwise be overcome; - as many wish, at the end of life; - frequently in life. How often? Some say once in a year, others once in a month, others on each Sunday and feast. The things said concerning the act of faith and hope return. What son asks how often he must actually demonstrate his affection toward his parents? Neither he himself nor another can define the number. But a good son is content to foster an affection which will most gladly use many occasions of acts; the less good one, however, bears no solicitude about that frequency.

From another virtue, or per accidens, an act of charity will have to be made if reconciliation with God is to be procured, and there is no supply of the sacrament with which attrition would suffice; - if a temptation against a different virtue cannot otherwise be overcome.

He exercises an act of charity implicitly or quasi-virtually who recites the Lord's prayer from the soul, who rejoices over the divine perfections, who wishes that no one offend God, who grieves over offenses inflicted on God by others, who desires that all worship God, who avoids sins because they displease Him, etc. Gury-Ballerini-Palmieri, I, n. 219.

In this matter, the following propositions were condemned by Innocent XI: 5. "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn." - 6. "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not per se oblige even in individual rigorous five-year periods." - 7. "It obliges only when we are bound to be justified, and we do not have another way by which we can be justified" (2 March 1679 - Denz., n. 1155, 1156, 1157). - Earlier, Alexander VII, 21 September 1665 (Denz., n. 1101), had proscribed this: "Man at no time of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity from the force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues." (The propositions were condemned at least as scandalous; the former also as pernicious in practice.)

Therefore the matter practically returns to this: that we exhort the faithful to eliciting frequent acts of charity, to acting in the spirit of love and from the motive of love, and that we gently inculcate acts of charity upon the gravely sick.

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Necessity of Charity. — The habit of charity is in reality necessary by necessity of means. The same cannot strictly be said of the act of perfect charity, since the sacrament of penance restores the habit of charity, and, although it demands a quasi-virtual use of faith and hope, it can be received fruitfully without an act of perfect charity.

n. 76.

The Sin of Hatred of God. — It is mortal and the gravest of all sins to pursue God Omnipotent and Most High with formal hatred of enmity or malevolence, as if someone should wish that God not exist, or be deprived of some attribute, for example, knowledge, power, etc.

n. 77.

Fear of Hell and Love of Beatitude. — Certainly the present intention of sinning if hell did not exist would be sinful (servilely servile fear); or of not loving God unless there were the reward of beatitude; but he does not sin who, while he elicits an act of charity, has beatitude itself as the end of the one operating. For God is not therefore loved appreciatively less. Does not every right act, such as hope is, already per se direct itself to God as the supreme end? Does not St. Thomas (on this place) understand concerning theological hope itself the saying from St. Paul: Charity... "hopeth all things" (1 Cor. 13, 7)? Does not St. Paul prove these things more expressly: "Hearing your faith in Christ Jesus, and the love which you have toward all the saints, for the hope which is laid up for you in heaven" (Col. 1, 4.5)?

On the contrary, among the propositions condemned and prohibited by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, as respectively rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic and heretical, there was reprobated the proposition which denied that fear of gehenna is supernatural (prop. 14, Denz. 1305); and by Innocent XII, 12 March 1699, among propositions condemned and reprobated... as rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, pernicious in practice, and also respectively erroneous, propositions which called it vicious to act with regard to beatitude (Denz. 1327, 1331, 1332).

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Summary

— I. There is a special precept of loving God with full affective and (in disposition) effective love, and therefore appreciatively, not intensively, supreme. The Lord Himself, in the Gospel of St. Mark 12, 30, promulgated it as the first and greatest commandment.

That precept urges per se, according to St. Thomas, at the beginning of moral life, and, as many wish, at the end of life; then, if a temptation of hatred of God cannot otherwise be overcome; then frequently in life: a frequency which cannot be defined theoretically, but which in practice is procured abundantly by a pious man. Per accidens it urges when, the supply of the sacrament of penance being lacking, reconciliation with God is to be procured, or if a temptation against another virtue cannot be overcome in another way.

II. Charity, moreover, besides its formal acts, is exercised quasi-virtually in acts which suppose the affection of charity.

III. The habit of charity is in reality necessary by necessity of means.

IV. The gravest of all sins is the hatred of malevolence by which one would pursue God. Not the very prevision of future sin, but the present intention of sinning if hell did not exist, would be sinful; nor does he sin who, while he elicits an act of charity, has beatitude itself as the end of the one operating.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Ch. I, Universality, and Order of Love or Friendship

Utility. - It matters very much that we acquire for ourselves a distinct account of the order of charity, and that we understand well the connatural concord between love of ourselves and love of neighbor.

n. 79.

I. Varied Character. — 1. Since every friendship is founded in some communion of life, as many as are the communions, so many will be the genera of friendship. The ineffable communication by which, through supernatural sanctifying grace, we communicate in the divine life, founds a friendship at once most sublime, since it is of charity whose primary object is the divine Goodness itself in itself, and most universal, since it joins even the pure spirits with us and with our neighbor.

Communication in nature begets the universal society and friendship of men whom God has not punished with infernal degradation.

Besides, unequal conjunctions among rational creatures take their beginning from unequal communications in other goods: as in the family and in the state.

Conjunctions which rest upon a communion of lower life can be observed both from charity and from benevolence of a less high honesty.

For since they have been foreseen and willed by the most wise God, charity itself commands their observance. They integrate the order of charity, rather than being repugnant to the law of charity.

And by honestly cultivating the various friendships of the lower order, we exercise virtues which indeed are inferior to charity, but which nevertheless, in a just man, will not lack their own proper merit. Therefore we can observe legitimate conjunctions in a twofold way: insofar as, in the very exercise of charity, we attend to them; and insofar as, from an inferior motive, we show ourselves faithful friends.

No true love consists in exterior action alone: we can honestly offer a good and useful action even to brute animals, indeed to plants.

Wherefore, according to varied exercise, we can distinguish love of the heart, or interior love; love of the mouth, or that which is in signification; and love of work, which is in beneficence. This distinction is to be attended to in the very order of charity.

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II. Universality of Charity. — It is commanded that neighbor be loved even with affection.

A neighbor is only and every rational creature, with the damned excepted. For these, like irrational creatures, are excluded from the beatitude in whose communication charity rests. - He is to be loved even with affection. For there is no true love which is merely exterior. Besides, from internal benevolence proceeds the beneficent action which we exercise toward ourselves. But from the mouth of Christ we have received the second precept, similar to the first, in these words: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore every neighbor is to be cherished with a general affection of benevolence.

To this point pertain both propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, among those condemned and prohibited at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act." - "We can satisfy the precept of loving neighbor by external acts alone" (Denz. 1160, 1161).

That office does not demand that we elicit formal acts of universal love. It is enough that, on a given occasion, the good or evil of any neighbor which we know should excite in us some joy of approbation or some compassion, which demonstrate some general disposition of benevolence or sympathy. It is also manifested and exercised by general prayers, for example, Our Father, Hail Mary, from which we exclude no one.

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III. Order of Charity. — 1. Things to be noted beforehand. Between right love of ourselves and of neighbor there is no opposition per se, but, on the contrary, a wonderful concord. We cannot love our neighbor better than by right love of ourselves, by which we become more perfect and therefore more powerful for helping our neighbor. Indeed, on account of the community of goods which follows friendship, our good is already the good of our neighbor, at least when there is question of those true goods which are not to be divided in such a way that the more one receives, the less can fall to another. And in turn, by loving neighbor we love ourselves, since right love of neighbor is meritorious. Therefore, while we procure spiritual goods for our neighbor, we in no way per se harm our own spiritual good, and we can expect more helps from a better neighbor. But if, for the utility of neighbor, we neglect our temporal goods, indeed life, that detriment of the inferior order is abundantly redeemed by compensation of the superior good (2, 2, q. 26, art. 4). Hence the friend who gives his life for his friend chooses for himself the greater good, and therefore loves himself more than his friend.

Wherefore the true question concerning practical preference, by which we prefer one to another, arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors. For when there is question of others, those whom our beneficence does not help do not obtain of themselves the merit and compensation of the superior order, which he obtains who "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13, 5).

Therefore, without any appearance of "egoism," we can establish, with St. Thomas, that right order demands that from charity we love ourselves more than neighbor, who nevertheless is to be loved equally, because charity as referred to us is founded in our participation of divine beatitude, while others are loved as associates in that participation (2, 2, q. 25, art. 12; q. 26, art. 1 and 4). Besides, according to Sacred Scripture and Christ Himself: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," love of ourselves is the rule for love of neighbor; but the rule is prior to the thing ruled.

Besides the communication in eternal beatitude, upon which theological charity is founded, there are among men unequal communications in other goods, which beget various conjunctions: for example, in the family, in the state. These conjunctions, since they have been foreseen and willed by the most wise God, are not repugnant to the law of charity, but rather integrate the order of charity, so that according to charity itself they are to be observed.

A twofold principle of order. After St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 26, art. 6, we acknowledge a twofold principle of order: one on the part of the object, which is God; the other on the part of the subject, which is the very one who loves; and according to unequal nearness to one or the other principle the very character of love from charity varies. Thus, according to the Holy Doctor, the intensity of affection is taken from the one loving; wherefore with a more intense affection we will more strongly the good which we can wish for and procure for those nearer to us (l. c., art. 7). But always the one loving himself is the principle and, as it were, the rule of loving one near to him.

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— 3. The order of charity. a) As to interior acts. If there is question of simple complacency and approbation, we ought to will to each neighbor the good which he has. "It pertains to charity that it wish the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in beatitude" (2, 2, q. 26, art. 7). Wherefore in this love, which is mixed with estimation and brings with it honor, worship, and reverence, the better, the holier, are to be placed before the less holy, although the latter are more joined with us. For a similar reason, even in the order of lower communion, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those to whom we have done good ¹ (2, 2, q. 26, art. 9-12).

But if there is question of benevolence and desire, by which we wish for another a good not yet possessed, just as the solicitude of providing is increased by subjective nearness, so it will be consonant with order that we desire more the good of those who are bound to us by a closer bond. Wherefore, in this order, the wife who is one flesh with the husband, children who are something of the parents, are preferred to the parents themselves.

b) As to signification. Charity ought also to be manifested by exterior signs. These vary according to the quality of the person and the very conjunction. Observances are owed to superiors, affability to equals, benignity to inferiors. There exist common signs, which are to be denied to no one per se, and special signs, among those who are nearer.

c) As to beneficent action. Finally, true charity ought to be beneficent. In estimating the laudable acts and offices of charity, the order of charity must here be composed with the various necessities.

¹ Nevertheless by natural inclination we love more those to whom we have done good, because something of our own has been placed in them, and thus we love ourselves in them. Hence he testifies humble friendship who accepts a benefit: he consents that he belong in some way to another.

n. 83.

— Moreover necessity is distinguished by a twofold genus: spiritual, which is considered with respect to eternal life (not simply with respect to the life of grace); temporal, which is estimated with respect to temporal life.

Extreme spiritual necessity is that of him who without the help of another undergoes a certain and proximate danger of eternal damnation, so that this ruin is morally certain, for example, a child about to die without baptism. An uninstructed unbeliever is also in a similar necessity, or an uninstructed faithful person who has lived very badly; but not every uninstructed faithful person: for he can help himself by an act of contrition.

Grave spiritual necessity is that which is overcome with difficulty: as when someone is in a sufficiently proximate danger of losing the faith or good morals. - Common spiritual necessity presses sinners or those who are about to sin unless they are taught or corrected.

Extreme temporal necessity is that from which death or an equivalent evil in moral estimation threatens one in need: perpetual servitude, infamy, violation, ruin of health. An evil is said to threaten insofar as it will follow certainly and shortly, for example, within a few months. Cf. Busenbaum, Dubium de eleemosyna; St. Alphonsus, l. 2, 31; Lugo, De Iustitia, d. 16, n. 135; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 222. To this necessity is almost equated that which is called quasi-extreme, when the danger of an extreme evil is less threatening, yet probable, or when an evil threatens which is almost equivalent to death: perpetual weakness, grave positive infamy. - Grave necessity is constituted by a grave evil threatening, by which, however, those goods are not taken away which nature willed per se to belong to all: for example, loss of riches, of office, being cast down from one's state, captivity that is not most grave. - Common necessity is defined by that remote danger of life in which those who have no goods are habitually placed. It is the common lot of beggars; wherefore it is said to be theirs.

In the material description of necessities not all strictly agree. Lugo, d. 16, n. 154, proposes a sufficiently useful rule of formal distinction, so that you call necessity extreme, quasi-extreme, grave, according as privation with moral certitude affects goods which nature willed simply to be present to all, or per se to be available to all, or, on the contrary, granted to some and denied to others. Another formal account is taken from the relation which the good has with the temporal good which is the greatest and fundamental, that is, with life.

n. 84.

The Order of Charity Composed with Various Necessities. — 1. Between ourselves and neighbors, as to beneficent action, these general principles or norms are shown by the very order of charity.

It is lawful for us to postpone necessary spiritual good to no utility of neighbor: wherefore, with certain prevision of mortal sin, no works can be offered to neighbor. - Spiritual good which is not necessary, but certain, we must postpone to office, but to no utility of neighbor whose care has not been imposed upon us. Wherefore neither can a son desert his needy mother, nor can a religious violate obedience, in order to preach the Gospel to barbarians. But it is not to be advised that we redeem the utility of neighbor by the loss of spiritual good. - It is lawful to prefer uncertain spiritual good to the utility of neighbor. What is to be counseled must be gathered from the circumstances. Wherefore, for a probably more perfect life, it is lawful to renounce a very good action among the people, although it is not always more expedient.

But see that you observe that that opposition between our spiritual good and the utility of neighbor is only accidental. Thus, in the classic example of the son who is impeded by the office of piety toward poor parents from entering religion, or from going to foreign missions, the son per se can become no less holy among his parents than in the midst of barbarians. But human frailty brings it about that we yield to the difficulty of the circumstances.

We must postpone our bodily good to the extreme spiritual necessity of an individual neighbor; we can per se, but are not bound to, postpone it to the bodily good of neighbor.
As to external goods, we can per se, but are not bound to, prefer an individual neighbor to ourselves; and therefore, by the same reason by which it is lawful to neglect physical care of the body on account of another temporal utility of our own, by the same reason it will be right to neglect the body on account of the utility of neighbor.
Our spiritual good excepted, when there is question of other goods, common utility ¹ is to be placed before one's own.

These principles are easily shown if you consider: a) that it is fitting that we love ourselves more than neighbor with the love of charity; b) that spiritual detriment is compensated for us by no good, while bodily and temporal detriment admits compensation by a better good; c) that through the body and exterior goods, but not through spiritual goods, we are members or parts of a community; but parts exist for the whole, and therefore their good must yield to the good of the community.

¹ By the name of utility is meant what in Italian or French we would call interesse. Wherefore this word comprises not only useful goods but even especially necessary goods.

n. 85.

— 2. Among neighbors themselves, the same order of charity orders that we first succor private persons more joined to us, and indeed by attending first to those to whom we must bring help per se. Wherefore neighbors come in this order: wife or husband, children, parents, collateral blood-relatives and relatives by affinity, household members and familiars. One exception to that order is admitted: in extreme necessity, parents, because they have given life, are said to be preferred even to wife and children. Cf. Laymann, L. 2, t. 3, c. 3, n. 5.6.

Necessary public good is to be placed before private good; non-necessary public good cannot be preferred to necessary (or obligatory) private good; it can be preferred to non-necessary private good, and this per se is laudable.

n. 86.

Summary

— 1. Various communications in goods beget various conjunctions which can be observed from the supreme friendship of charity; and they also give place to various honest friendships, but of inferior dignity. And, according to varied exercise, interior charity is distinguished, its exterior signification, and its exterior operation.

We are ordered to love neighbor not by exterior action alone but also with affection, since we must love him as ourselves, and no true love can be merely exterior. But the interior affection calls for its connatural manifestation.

Moreover neighbor is only and every rational creature, with the damned excepted. Hence the universality commanded of love, which, besides formal acts which are contained in general prayer (Our Father), requires no other expressly universal acts: it is enough that, when the occasion is given, general benevolence be exercised.

Between right love of ourselves and of neighbor, there is no opposition per se, so that without any appearance of "egoism" we can establish the principle: from charity we must love ourselves before neighbor, who nevertheless is to be loved equally. This is gathered clearly from the words of Christ: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and from the foundation of charity. But the question concerning practical preference arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors. Moreover the principle of order is twofold: on the part of the object, which is God, and on the part of the subject, which is ourselves, as loving.
The order as to interior acts. By simple complacency and approbation, the better are to be preferred in our estimation to the less holy; but by benevolence of desire, those more joined to us are rightly preferred.
As to signification, signs are to be accommodated to the quality of the person and to the conjunction.
As to beneficent action, the order of charity must be composed with various necessities. There is distinguished, with respect to eternal life, spiritual necessity, and temporal necessity with respect to the present life. He is pressed by extreme spiritual necessity whose eternal ruin, without another's help, would be morally certain; by grave spiritual necessity, he who will overcome ruin with difficulty; by common spiritual necessity, he who, unless he is helped, is about to sin or not morally at once about to recover grace. Extreme temporal necessity is that of him who, without another's help, will not escape the danger of imminent death or of an equivalent evil; grave temporal necessity is constituted by an evil absolutely or relatively grave threatening; but a grave evil is one by which the quality of the present life is notably affected, although it leaves intact those goods which nature willed to be common to all. Common necessity is defined by removing that danger in which those who have no goods are commonly placed. Between extreme and grave necessity there lies quasi-extreme, when the danger of an extreme evil is less imminent, or an evil threatens which is almost compared with death.

These things having been posited, these are the norms of effective charity. a) Between ourselves and neighbors: it is lawful to prefer our spiritual good to the utility of neighbor; it is not always expedient; sometimes we must; but we must postpone it to office: nor then can there be question of our necessary good. - We must postpone our bodily good to the spiritual extreme necessity of neighbor; to bodily necessity, per se, we can, but are not bound. In external goods we can prefer an individual neighbor to ourselves but are not bound. Our spiritual good excepted, public or general necessity or utility is to be placed before our own.

For we must love ourselves before neighbor; but, contrary to spiritual detriment, bodily and temporal detriment admits the compensation of a better good. Moreover, through exterior goods and the body, but not through spiritual goods, we are parts of the community; but parts exist for the whole.

b) The norms among neighbors themselves return to this: that we first succor private persons more joined to us, and, among these, those to whom we must bring help per se. In extreme necessity, however, parents, since they have given life to us, are to be preferred to all others.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Chapter II: Corollaries on the Love of Enemies

Utility. - Because the right estimation of cases depends so much on various circumstances that the very responses of approved authors must be adapted to the circumstances and cannot be observed literally, it is greatly necessary to determine the principles themselves from which, in this matter, we can prudently admonish sinners, exhort the timorous to better things, and at the same time free them from scruples.

n. 87.

Who Is an Enemy, and How Manifold. — He is someone's enemy by affection who pursues him with hatred or evil aversion; or by effect who has unjustly injured him in person, reputation, honor, or goods. Christ formally taught us that enemies are to be loved: "Love your enemies" (St. Matt. 5, 43 s.; Luke 6, 27 s.); and this is demonstrated by reason itself, since they are neighbors.

But an enemy who is actually such because of present hatred or offense is to be distinguished from one who was such. This latter again can be held by a present obligation of reparation, or have no office of this kind.

n. 88.

I. By that precept there is prohibited:

Hatred of enmity. Hatred says an aversion of soul which is contrary to the good of another (Cf. 1, 2, q. 29, art. 1 and 2). There is hatred of enmity when someone wills evil to another, in himself or in his goods, insofar as it is evil to him: and this is mortal from its genus. Hatred of abomination does not affect the person himself but his malice. By that hatred we turn away from a person not as such but insofar as he is blameworthy: thus, for example, the Psalmist praises himself because he has had hatred for the wicked, - or insofar as he is harmful to us. And often it signifies that sensible horror or repugnance which we experience when an enemy is seen or heard. Such hatred, conceived concerning enemies of religion or of the state, is plainly honorable; concerning those who are hostile to us, it is for the most part mixed with venial fault, just as it is also per se venial not to overcome or subdue that sensible horror.
Illicit vindication. This principally intends the evil of the offender and rests in that evil. Licit vindication, on the contrary, is that which, the due circumstances being observed, pursues through punishment either the amendment of the sinner, or his restraint and the quiet of others, or the preservation of justice and the honor of God. Much more is it right to demand satisfaction for damage. Indeed, strictly speaking, we are not forbidden not to accept an offered satisfaction and to pursue a juridical action for injuries. Yet this is dangerous: then one easily yields to evil vengeance, and if a very grave penalty awaits the enemy, without proportionate inconvenience of one's own or of others, the fault will easily have been grave against charity.

Therefore the confessor should instruct the penitent concerning licit and illicit vengeance; and propose to him that he be willing to ponder the matter as if it were not his own case but that of some third person.

The exclusion of an enemy from common prayers, for example, from the Lord's prayer; and also, at least if he has ceased from injury and is prepared to make due reparation, from the common signs of love, such as are common alms, returning a greeting, response to his words, sale of exposed merchandise. Wherefore they judge that it is mortal from its genus if someone invites all relatives, with only the enemy excepted; or greets all persons met from the neighborhood or college, only the enemy excluded. It is supposed, as is clear, that the enemy has ceased from injury.

Yet he to whom the right of punishing belongs, as to a father, can deny these for a time, for correction. A denial is also excused which does not manifest hatred, but rather just sorrow because of a recent or atrocious and infamous injury. Conversation from which you fear a greater evil can also be omitted, provided that interiorly you love, and decline or repair scandal among others. Nor are we forbidden, in lighter cases and for a just cause, for example, to blunt audacity, to take a legitimate vindication which can scarcely be sought from a judge.

The sin will be light if either a trifling cause shows that there is no question of grave hatred, as if two nuns, because of a moderate quarrel, break off communication for some days; - or if the distance of the persons removes the gravity of the matter: as if a much greater person does not greet an inferior.

In a few words, the denial of common signs is grave when it proceeds from grave hatred, or gravely offends the enemy, or is a scandal to others. Cf. Noldin, II, 83. And attention is to be given to this more than to material descriptions of the signs of charity which cannot be denied under grave obligation: if the matter bears another interpretation than that of hatred, it will not be grave; but that interpretation is one thing in one place and time, another elsewhere.

For it must be avoided that we pronounce too absolutely concerning concrete cases the responses even of most approved authors, who wrote in another time or region. We shall easily concede that their oracles were true for the customs and circumstances which they contemplated; but for that reason they cannot prudently be inculcated today without a new examination. Today, for example, in many places, he who merely has omitted signs of love, but at the same time abstains from injuries and detractions, and does not refuse to fulfill strict offices of charity, if any arise from necessity, seems for the most part to have to be excused from grave guilt.

For where they distinguish a certain alienation of affection or coldness from true mutual hatred, mortal enmities are rare. And the breaking off of commerce or association, whether because of a light cause of quarrel, or because of the permanent state of an insoluble controversy, or because of an unrepaired offense, or because of a relaxed family bond, by which it comes about that not even among those rather closely joined does a custom of frequent communication always exist, is explained otherwise than by grave hatred.

n. 89.

— Flight by which someone avoids an enemy in order to sadden him must also be well distinguished from flight which is commanded by some remaining aversion without desire of vengeance. The former alone demonstrates hatred of enmity; the latter, if it happens without reason, will indeed be sinful, but, scandal being excluded, does not seem gravely culpable. Antipathy is one thing, hatred another; voluntary hatred is one thing, horror and anger which some experience when the offender is seen or remembered is another, whence they say that they indeed wish to forgive but cannot forget the matter, speak to the man, etc. Such persons, although they are not always to be believed when they say that they lack hatred, can be absolved if the confessor detects that those movements of anger proceed from no deliberate malevolence (Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 180).

n. 90.

— In confession, he who, not by a merely verbal imprecation, which often is nothing but anger, but truly from hatred has willed a grave evil to an enemy, for the most part will not have to declare the species of the evil wished, because he wished it under the confused and common notion of evil, without a special affection flowing down to this or that evil. Lugo, Poen., 16,260.

n. 91.

II. Not to hate an enemy does not suffice for charity; but by the precept of charity we are ordered to love an enemy with interior and exterior love, yet common, not special, unless the spiritual necessity of the enemy or scandal which cannot otherwise be avoided (for example, by a declaration) demands more. But common love is to be estimated with consideration given to the quality and necessity of persons, so that what is common among brothers would be special among strangers. Therefore there must be preserved in the heart the affection which we ought to have commonly toward every neighbor (cf. n. 80) and particularly toward those joined by a greater bond of necessity, together with a soul prompt for reconciliation, if those things are offered by the other which are justly demanded from him; that affection also must be sufficiently manifested, yet prudently, unless just causes dispense; and the offices of charity must be performed which either nearness or necessity imposes.

n. 92.

— To one asking pardon, this is per se to be given; and, lest you betray hatred, you must manifest this even by external signs: you are not bound to grant pardon immediately after the offense has been inflicted, because that thing is violent and above human frailty. Nor, after reconciliation, is the more intimate and spontaneous familiarity which previously existed to be restored. Yet to him who exhibits the offices of peculiar friendship, it is fitting to return similar ones. St. Thomas, in 1. 2 Sent., d. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5.

n. 93.

— The offender must be the first to attempt reconciliation; or, if the offense has been mutual, he who has offended more gravely, or who has offended first. But, unless the matter has been manifest, it is better, yet prudently, to inculcate to each that he procure reconciliation, which otherwise would never be, because of the blinded mind of both, by which one ascribes the fault to the other.

Reconciliation requires that pardon be sought, and indeed per se formally. The one offended sometimes reasonably demands this. Yet often an implicit, virtual petition supplies, which is contained in a gift, an undue service. This is admitted if the offender far surpasses the other in dignity or state; if the one offended does not care for a formal petition for pardon; if full satisfaction has been given in another way. Yet not rarely a Superior who is not ashamed to ask pardon gains for himself confidence and love, nor does he derogate from his authority.

Lest matters become worse, if the injured person does not seem likely to grant pardon, a more opportune time for seeking pardon can prudently be awaited.

Let the confessor beware lest ever, because of an occult delict which would thus be manifested, he impose a formal petition for pardon; and even where the obligation is certain, often he will prudently be silent, lest, without hope of fruit, he disturb good faith. He can merely declare that obligation, but not impose it as a penance, lest he violate the sacramental seal.

n. 94.

Evangelical Persuasion. — Thus far we have tried to declare what minimum must be held in this matter. But the evangelical spirit will persuade both the ministers of Christ and the faithful to a more perfect manner of acting. Grieving over the lawsuits of the Corinthians, the Apostle, from St. Matthew 5, 39; St. Luke 6, 29, wrote these things without hesitation (1 Cor. 6, 7): "Now indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits among yourselves. Why do you not rather take wrong? Why do you not rather suffer fraud?" In the Epistle to the Romans 12, 17; and to the Hebrews 12, 14, he commended these things: "If it can be, as much as is in you, having peace with all men..."; "Follow peace with all men." Indeed he wished that, by his beneficent action, the disciple of Christ should heap "coals of fire" "upon the head of" his enemy, that is, should so overcome evil in good that the enemy, suffused with shame, as if impatient of delay, could not deny love.

Instructed by these documents, the preacher of the Gospel both openly and privately will disapprove those Catholic families which, because of a contention over inheritance, so easily give a little edifying example of division and separation; he will also demonstrate the temporal detriments of discords; he will admonish how the first victim of hatred is the very one who fosters hatred: for that affection indeed nourishes pride, but takes peace and happiness from the heart.

But the faithful also will be skillful in avoiding dissensions, little solicitous about vain honor; ready and prompt in forgiving injuries, so that they may be among the peacemakers who, with the greatest edification of all, will be called sons of God.

They will also be stimulated by this consideration: that, since no exercise is seen to be more free from self-love, there is none which is shown more certainly to pertain to the theological virtue of charity. We love relatives, benefactors, and friends even on account of our own advantage or solace; we love enemies only on account of God.

n. 95.

Summary

— 1. Someone's enemy by affection is he who pursues him with hatred or evil aversion; by effect, he who has injured him unjustly. He can actually be such or have been such, whether an obligation of reparation remains, or only evil aversion survives.

We must love enemies: Christ openly taught this, and they are neighbors. Wherefore we are prohibited from every hatred of enmity, by which we will another's evil as such; from illicit vindication, and from positive exclusion of an enemy from common prayers; indeed, unless a just cause excuses, from common signs of love. The sin is grave in its genus, but admits lightness of matter; and the mere omission of the signification of love will rarely today be able to be condemned as grave. Besides, both by common affection and by effect, the positive offices of charity toward an enemy are to be fulfilled.

Hatred of abomination is to be distinguished from hatred of enmity: the former does not affect the person but his malice; a certain aversion which is observed in sense is also to be separated from hatred.

The species of evil which someone has truly wished for an enemy will often not have to be declared, since it rather was willed under the generic account of evil.
To one asking pardon, pardon is per se to be given, at least after no excessive delay; although more intimate familiarity per se, if it was spontaneous, is not to be restored.

He who alone, or more gravely, or first, has offended must be the first to attempt reconciliation through pardon sought formally or at least virtually. Often the attempt will have to be inculcated to both; yet sometimes it is prudently deferred, and is to be imposed by the confessor only cautiously.

The evangelical spirit will persuade a more perfect manner of acting both to Christ's ministers and to the faithful.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Chapter III: On Effective Charity

Utility and Order of Speaking. - Under this title are explained the daily offices by which, in the evangelical law, brother is ordered and counseled to help brother in necessities both spiritual and bodily and temporal. There follow questions on exhortation and fraternal correction, on edification and scandal; finally on cooperation toward a good and evil action of neighbor. Both the multitude and the importance of matters of daily use ought to make the attention of the moral theologian solicitous. But it will be of the greatest profit to him to know well what necessities press neighbor today, how much the precept of alms is to be urged concerning things which, as to use, ought to remain common, and by what principles cases on cooperation are to be solved. We have at the same time indicated what order of speaking we shall follow.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Ch. III, Article I: The Procuring of Spiritual Goods

n. 96.

— 1. He sins against charity toward himself who neglects his own spiritual salvation: for the most part, however, that sin is sufficiently contained in the accusation of other sins.

There is no good to be obtained, or to be procured for anyone, for the sake of which it is lawful to sin, even venially: for that act, since it is repugnant to the divine good pleasure, is not eligible. Evils are not to be done so that goods may come. Cf. St. Augustine, De mendacio, c. 9, n. 15 (M. 40, 499).

Wherefore, he who would be impeded from religious life by the office of filial piety, for example, of helping parents gravely in need, cannot enter religion.

No one must remain in a proximate occasion of grave sin, on account of any utility or necessity of an individual neighbor or of a community, if he experiences too great a difficulty in converting that occasion into a remote one. The reason is that, as to spiritual goods, each one can or must prefer himself. Wherefore we are not compelled either to serve as soldiers or to relieve the poverty of parents with so great a spiritual loss. Yet if there should be an extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, a very probable danger, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus, will have to be approached or tolerated: then by right and deservedly man can trust in greater grace.
He does not sin who delays entrance into religion or even omits it in order to take care of a parish where he performs most useful work which another can scarcely perform; in order to relieve a less grave want of parents; in order to console their sad loneliness; in order to care for the education of brothers or blood-relatives. For a religious vocation is for the most part not preceptive; and the reasons adduced are among those which must be called honorable and acceptable to God Himself.

But what, in these and similar circumstances, is to be counseled cannot be defined by one general rule. These things chiefly come to be considered: with what innocence, with what zeal of piety and virtue will life outside religion be led? - What goods will a man obtain for himself and others in religious life itself? The apostolic life, especially among unbelievers, will be esteemed far more than the common life of many religious in our regions. What good works will he desert for religious life? What manner of acting will be of greater edification? Cf. the things which we have written on this matter in t. I, On Religious Institutes and Persons.

n. 97.

— To a neighbor who is placed in extreme spiritual necessity, each one must succor even with certain danger of life: provided that there is an equally certain hope of helping him, and that no graver evil threatens from it. In these circumstances the saying from St. John, epistle 1, c. 3, v. 16, is valid: "We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." Hence, if another is not present who will probably do it, we must, with danger of life, baptize or absolve a dying person who morally cannot help himself. A graver evil threatening from it can be the spiritual detriment of a flock which would be deprived of the one sacred minister by whom it is helped. Wherefore it sometimes happens that an Apostolic Vicar forbids a missionary, with too great danger to health, to go to a dying person too far distant. A graver evil can also be the hatred which it would draw upon the Church, if, for example, in a violent way someone should wish in our regions to baptize a dying infant, with the parents resisting. (As is clear, secret administration, as far as there is opportunity, will have to be procured.)

n. 98.

— Grave common necessity is equated with extreme necessity, whether because man, for the common good, as a part, must neglect his own life, or because in grave common necessity several will be in extreme need. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 27. Hence if in time of plague a pastor is lacking, another priest present in the place will per se not be able to desert the sick. He will be bound to remain even more with every inconvenience, if a heretical minister has begun to spread errors, so that there is danger lest the community lose the faith. The pastor himself is forbidden to desert the flock, unless he has substituted for himself someone equally suitable.

n. 99.

— In the grave spiritual necessity of a particular neighbor, only he who from office must care for another's salvation is bound to suffer grave inconvenience. The reason is that it chiefly falls to the neighbor himself to overcome the difficulty.

But if someone can easily succor a neighbor who is pressed by grave spiritual necessity, he has a grave obligation of bringing that help.

n. 100.

Example. — So many are the spiritual harms of boys and adolescents who frequent non-Catholic schools, so many are the ruins of faith and morals which are avoided by the Catholic education of youth, that a grave obligation presses the faithful of striving so that a supply of this kind of education be everywhere available. Wherefore, according to their powers, sufficient alms for this purpose are to be contributed under grave obligation; and, if necessary, even with grave inconvenience. Hence if in some place someone, by taking from goods necessary to his state, would certainly procure Catholic education for several who otherwise would frequent non-Catholic schools, and another means is lacking for averting that evil, he seems to be bound to make this largess.

n. 101.

— You ask why we are not bound to seek far-distant regions in order to succor unbelievers, where so many are in extreme spiritual necessity?

The reason is that the proximate opportunity of succoring is lacking to many who are ignorant of the language, customs, etc.; because the efficacy of the action is uncertain; because it pertains to the common good of the Church, and therefore of those very barbarians, that religion flourish in cultivated regions and suitable workers be able to be prepared. Hence concerning individual persons it cannot be said that they will be more useful there than here.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Ch. III, Article II: The Procuring of Bodily and Temporal Goods

n. 102.

Principles. — 1. From the order of charity, each one can prefer himself to an individual neighbor in an equal cause of necessity. But when there is question of bodily and exterior goods, it is also lawful, as we said above, nn. 81, 84, to give the first place to neighbor from charity, which at the same time promises us the compensation of a better good.

But as long as there is question of individuals, he must prefer persons more joined to him to others toward whom he has no peculiar office of piety. The order to be observed among those persons was indicated above, n. 85.
The republic or perfect society can require from private persons that they postpone their temporal utility to the public cause. And it is also lawful to place the public cause before the private cause, even of neighbors, if elsewhere proportion of utility or necessity is had.
Never, for helping an individual neighbor in need, must anyone sustain that inconvenience or make that expense which, without sin against charity toward himself, he is permitted to deny to his own bodily or temporal safety.
Except for necessity morally extreme, no one is bound to succor the temporal need of neighbor with notable inconvenience of his own. To this pertains that saying: "Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience."

Hence these responses are understood:

…and 53 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 2 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IX. On theological charity and the vices opposed to it

n. ¶83.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 23-46; Quaest. disp. de caritate; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 2, 22-80; St. Francis de Sales, Traité de l'amour de Dieu (Theotimus), which book Pius IX calls "an outstanding and incomparable treatise"; Billuart, Diss. de caritate; Massoulie, Traité de l'amour de Dieu (1703); Bouquillon, De virtutibus theologicis; Tanquerey, Synops. theol. mor. de caritate; O. Schilling, Lehrb. d. Moraltheol. II, § 75 sq.

n. 551.

551. Preliminary notions. Love, friendship, dilection, charity are sometimes taken promiscuously; but strictly speaking they do not signify the same thing. Love extends more broadly than dilection, charity, and friendship; and it can be called the genus under which the three others are contained as species. What, therefore, is love?

Love is defined by St. Thomas as: complacency in the appetible.¹ Love is also called the bond of those loving, or union between the lover and the beloved. A threefold love is usually distinguished: natural, sensible, rational. Natural love is a certain propensity of any being toward an end suitable to itself. This propensity does not arise from its own apprehension, but from the ordination of the Creator. Thus the tendency of a stone downward because of its gravity can be called natural love, and every heavy body is said to love the center of the earth. As is clear, natural love is not a moral act, but a tendency implanted by the author of nature.² Sensible or sensitive or animal love is the first of the eleven passions described above, n. 74, and can be defined: complacency of the sensible appetite in a sensibly apprehended good. Such love is found even in brutes. Rational love is complacency of the will in a good apprehended through the intellect. This rational love is nobler and more constant than sensible love; but it is subdivided into love of concupiscence and love of benevolence. For if the lover principally intends his own advantage, there is love of concupiscence; thus a man loves food, riches, honors, etc. But if the lover principally intends the good and utility of the beloved, there is love of benevolence. Love of benevolence is nobler than love of concupiscence; often both loves are present at the same time. Thus, e.g., a father loves his son with love of benevolence, because he sincerely wills the good of the son; but at the same time love of concupiscence is also present, because a good son increases the happiness of the father.

Friendship is true love of benevolence existing between two persons, who knowingly love each other mutually, communicate something to each other mutually, and converse in a friendly way. Therefore three things are required for true friendship: 1. mutual love of benevolence, 2. knowledge of such love on each side, 3. a certain communication between those loving.³ True and noble friendship is worthy of all praise; hence it is said in Sacred Scripture:⁴ "A faithful friend is a strong protection; but he who finds him finds a treasure; there is no comparison for a faithful friend, and there is no worthy weight of gold and silver against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality."

Dilection adds a preceding election over and above love, as the very name sounds; hence dilection is not in the concupiscible (appetite), but only in the will, or is in rational nature alone.⁵

But charity adds over and above love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price and is dear, as the name itself designates.⁶ - We can speak of love in a bad sense, e.g. of impure love, egoistic love, vicious love, etc.; but never, or very rarely,⁷ do we use the word charity in a bad sense; hence we do not speak of vicious charity, of charity of concupiscence, of egoistic charity, etc.

Causes and effects of love. From those things which St. Thomas⁸ excellently discusses about the causes and effects of love, it is helpful to draw out a few. Love usually arises from a threefold cause: 1. from knowledge of a suitable good, 2. from likeness, and 3. from familiar conversation. For the common adage is: "There is no desire of an unknown thing," or nothing is loved unless it has been foreknown. Therefore love presupposes knowledge; and if the thing known appears good and suitable to the appetite, it is loved. This suitability indeed usually arises from likeness between the lover and the beloved, whence it is said in Sacred Scripture: "Every living thing loves its like, and so also every man his neighbor";⁹ and Aristotle asserts that friendship either finds equals or makes them equal. Yet this equality need not necessarily be perfect, but a certain proportion suffices. If the equality is excessive, sometimes envy arises per accidens, whence it is said: "The potter hates the potter." - But that familiar conversation conduces not a little to fostering love is clear from experience; for by such conversation those loving know one another better and can give one another more signs of friendship.

The effects of love are fittingly enumerated by St. Thomas¹⁰ as five, namely, union, mutual inherence, ecstasy, zeal, and certain injuries. Love is formally affective union, insofar as those loving will the same things and do not will the same things; but it effects real union insofar as this is possible. For those loving seek personal presence and delight in it,¹¹ and even mutual inherence. Therefore it is said: "He who remains in charity remains in God, and God in him."¹² On account of this union with the beloved thing, love of any true and suitable good perfects the lover. Hence, e.g., a man loving God is perfected. But love of an evil or unsuitable thing injures the lover, just as, e.g., love of sin injures man. Love causes ecstasy, i.e. a going forth from the very agent, in two ways, namely, according to the intellect and according to the affection. According to the intellect indeed, because the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved, and the greater the love is, the more he forgets himself and the more often he thinks of the beloved. But according to the affection he does not seek his own good, but the good of the beloved.¹³ Since love draws a man outside himself and renders him similar to the thing loved, it is of the greatest importance to love only holy and honest things. Love causes zeal,¹⁴ because intense love seeks to exclude everything which is repugnant to it, and wishes alone to enjoy the beloved thing.¹⁵ Zeal is sometimes (but not always) good, and so it is said in Sacred Scripture: "With zeal have I been zealous for the Lord God of hosts,"¹⁶ and "The zeal of Thy house has eaten me up."¹⁷ Intense love, since it produces grave bodily changes and leads a man to labor with all his powers, causes injuries or at least weakness of body.¹⁸

We divide the whole treatise on charity into three chapters: 1. on charity toward God; 2. on charity toward ourselves; 3. on charity toward neighbor.

¹ "The first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than complacency in the appetible" (S. theol. 1, 2, q. 26, a. 2).

² S. theol. 1, q. 60, a. 1 ad 5; 1, 2, q. 26, a. 1 ad 3.

³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 23, a. 1 et 2, q. 26, a. 3, where friendship is called as it were a habit. Cf. also 2, 2, q. 80, a. unic. ad 2.

⁴ Eccli. 6, 14-16.

⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 26, a. 3.

⁶ Ib. - Others derive the name charity from the Greek word charis, which signifies grace and benevolence; and therefore they prefer to write in Latin: charitas. Yet the first acceptance seems better. (Cf. Fr. Schaub, Die kath. Caritas 51.)

⁷ St. Augustine speaks of illicit charity. Sermo 349, c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 38, 1529).

⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 27-28.

⁹ Eccli. 13, 19.

¹⁰ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 28.

¹¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 28, a. 1 et 2.

¹² 1 Jo. 4, 16.

¹³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 28, a. 3. Mystical authors distinguish ecstasy from rapture by this, that ecstasy gently, but rapture violently, abstracts the mind from the senses. Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 125, a. 2 ad 1.

¹⁴ Jealousy.

¹⁵ L. c. a. 4.

¹⁶ 3 Reg. 19, 10.

¹⁷ Ps. 68, 10.

¹⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 28, a. 5.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 87 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Treatise III: On Charity

Charity is the end of the precept (1 Tim. 1:5), and the bond of perfection (Col. 3:14). Often, in moral matters, the question is instituted: whether an action is according to or against charity, or against another virtue, for example justice. Hence with particular diligence one must treat: 1. of charity toward God; 2. of charity toward neighbor.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Chapter I: On Charity Toward God

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 23 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, 22 seqq.; ed. G., I, p. 315; H. Ap., tr. IV; Suarez, de Carit., disp. I seqq.; St. Francis de Sales, Traite de l'amour de Dieu (Theotime); Lessius, de Summo Bono; Aertnys, l. 2, n. 29; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 440.

There are three things to be treated in this chapter: 1. the nature of charity; 2. the necessity of charity toward God; 3. sins especially opposed to the love of God.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article I: On the Nature of Charity

n. ¶465.

Things to be noted beforehand. Love, taken generally, is a willing of good. It is distinguished, by reason of the person in whose favor the good is desired: 1. Love of complacency, or willing of good in itself, which equally redounds to the favor of the one loving and of the beloved. 2. Love of concupiscence, or willing of good for the advantage of the one loving. 3. Love of benevolence, willing of good for the advantage of the beloved.

But love of benevolence, if it is a simple act of the will by which we will good to someone, is called benevolence, as if to will well; if it is with election of one good before another, it is called dilection, as if selection; if it is of some good which is esteemed greatly, it is called charity, as if very dear; if finally it is with reciprocal love and some communication of goods, it is called friendship (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 26).

DEFINITION. Charity is a theological virtue by which we love God for his own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God.

The material OBJECT of charity is twofold, namely primary and secondary. The primary is God, whom we are bound to love above all things, as our ultimate end. The secondary is we ourselves, and our neighbor, whom we ought to love as ourselves, because God has prescribed this to us (St. Franc. Sales, Theotim., P. II, l. 4, c. 11).

The formal OBJECT of charity is not some particular attribute of God (as in faith and hope), but "is the infinite goodness of God, according as it is the aggregation of all perfections, or infinite perfection. Hence, from the common sense of the wise, a true act of love is to say: My God, because thou art infinite goodness, or, because thou art infinitely good, I love thee above all things" (II, 24; H. Ap., IV, 9).

From these things you will gather: 1. There is one virtue of charity by which we love God, ourselves, and our neighbor; for the reason of loving is one, namely divine goodness, in itself, and insofar as it is communicated or communicable to us and to our neighbor.

Likewise, charity in the way and in the Fatherland is one and the same; in the Fatherland it is more perfect, yet it retains the same object (Lessius, de Summo Bono, l. 2, c. 14).

The elicited ACTS of charity are many, although they proceed from one motive. The principal ones are: a) Complacency or joy concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in themselves, and concerning all those things which please God or amplify his glory. From this joy proceeds praise of God. b) Benevolence, or desire of divine goods, for example, of the glory of God to be promoted both in us and in others. From this is born full conformity of our will with the divine will. c) Sadness concerning all evils which are opposed to the divine good. From this holy sadness flows zeal, which ardently repels those things which are against the honor and will of God (2.2, q. 27, a. 2).
To these elicited acts add all commanded acts, namely those which are elicited by other virtues from the motive of charity (Muller, l. 2, § 19).

n. ¶466.

PRINCIPLES. I. For the notion of charity it is required that it be love of complacency and benevolence. For it is required that God be loved as Infinite Good in himself and for his own sake, not on account of another. Yet charity by no means excludes love of concupiscence, or hope (cf. n. 461). Thus St. Alphonsus (Vera Sposa, c. 22, § 1, n. 3). Elsewhere (VI, n. 442) he says with St. Francis de Sales: "If someone loved God on account of his own good and were thus affected [by act], that if he hoped nothing from God, he would in no way love him, this man certainly would sin, because he would positively exclude charity." Cf. Perrone, de Carit., n. 32.

n. ¶467.

II. Charity ought to be sincere, complete, and supreme. It ought to be sincere on account of the supernatural perfection and excellence of God; complete, that is, both affective, namely that which is in the heart and by which we will good to the beloved, and effective or efficacious, which puts itself forth in works by doing those things in which the beloved delights; and finally supreme, by which God is loved above all things.

Note. 1. It is not indeed required that it be supreme intensively, namely that we love God before all other things with a greater striving of will and heart. It suffices that it be supreme appreciatively, insofar as we hold God in greater estimation than all other goods, and will a greater good to him than to any others whatsoever (Mazzella, de Virt. infus., n. 1280).

Yet it pertains to the notion of charity that love be predominant, so that man makes no creature of greater value than God, and wills rather to lose all things than to offend God mortally. Whence, "if love is so weak that it does not yet attain the object of charity, namely, does not yet love God above all things, this is not true charity, but the beginning of charity; but if it suffices for the notion of charity, which consists in the love of God above all things, this, however remiss it may be, is true charity" (VI, 442).

n. ¶468.

Corollaries. 1. The desire of POSSESSING GOD is an act of charity. For charity tends into God as ultimate end; and therefore the desire of possessing God, who is indeed our ultimate end, is a proper act of charity, indeed more perfect than others: for the possession of God is consummated charity. Hence the Apostle said: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (Phil. 1:23). And St. Augustine expressly teaches this, writing: I call charity a movement of the soul toward enjoying God on account of himself (de Doctr. christ., l. 3, c. 10, n. 16). Cf. St. Alph., II, 24.

To love divine goodness as convenient TO US is sometimes an act of charity, sometimes not.

If in an act of this kind we regard our own good as the term, such an act is in reality of love of concupiscence, which pertains only to hope. But if we regard our good as the term of the glory of God, by loving divine goodness as convenient to us, because it helps us toward attaining our ultimate end, which is to love God, and on account of which God created us, this is a true act of charity. Cf. St. Augustine on Ps. 134, n. 11.

The same must be said of love of God on account of his benefits. If the benefits are regarded as conferred on us, it is an act of gratitude; but if they are regarded as communications of divine goodness, it is an act of charity (II, 24).

Note. The principal PREROGATIVES of charity are the following: 1. It renders man just, according to that saying (1 Pet. 4:8): Charity covers a multitude of sins. 2. It constitutes true friendship between God and man, according to that saying (Wis. 7:14): They who have used it have been made participants in the friendship of God. 3. It perfects all virtues, renders their acts meritorious of eternal life. 4. It renders the yoke of the Lord sweet and the burden of the law light, etc. Whence the Apostle (Rom. 8:28): To those loving God, all things work together unto good. See the Ascetical writers, for example Alvarez de Paz, de Vita spir., l. 4, throughout.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article II: On the Necessity of Charity Toward God

n. ¶469.

Things to be noted beforehand. It is certain 1. that the habit of charity is necessary for all, both adults and little children, by necessity of means. It is certain 2. that in the New Testament the act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means, except hypothetically, when justification and salvation are not obtained by means of a sacrament or martyrdom. Yet for all adults there is given a negative precept of charity, by which we are prohibited: a) from ever having hatred for God; b) from postponing him to any creature, by doing something which dissolves our friendship with him, namely by sinning mortally.

As regards the affirmative precept of charity, behold what must be established.

n. ¶470.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is given a special precept, or one distinct from others, by which we are commanded to love God. It is established 1. from the words of Christ (Matt. 22:37): Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, etc. This is the greatest and first commandment; 2. from various condemned propositions, notably from the 1st condemned by Alexander VII: "Man, at no time whatsoever of his life, is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues"; 3. from reason: because the other virtues do not attain the ultimate end except through charity (Billuart, de Carit., Diss. 4, a. 7, § 1).

It is said: special precept, and therefore not only effectively, namely by the observation of other commandments, but truly also affectively, that is, by an internal act of the will, ought we to elicit an act of charity; otherwise it would not be a special precept.

n. ¶471.

II. For fulfilling the precept of charity, it is required and suffices that we love God appreciatively above all things. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 27, a. 3). For charity appreciatively supreme, even in a remiss grade, is true and perfect charity (II, 22; VI, 442). Cf. the things said at n. 467.

Hence: 1. It is not a sin if someone loves a creature with a more intense love than God, provided that, by an act of the will, he loves God appreciatively above all things.

These three grades pertain to the greater perfection of charity: a) that from love of God we are prepared to avoid everything which offends him even lightly; b) that we avoid those things which are less pleasing and acceptable to him, but seek above all those things which please him more; c) that we pursue him with a more intense and tender love than any creature whatsoever. See St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., P. II, l. 4, c. 4 and 5.

n. ¶472.

Questions. QUAER. 1. When does the AFFIRMATIVE precept of charity toward God oblige?

Resp. 1. It obliges PER SE: a) At the beginning of the use of reason and of spiritual life, namely when divine Goodness, lovable above all things for its own sake, has been sufficiently proposed to someone, as they commonly teach with St. Thomas. For then man ought to deliberate concerning attaining the ultimate end, and to direct himself and his acts to it: which cannot be done without an act of charity (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 6, n. 7). b) Most probably, in the article of death, because then the safest way must be chosen, and because no one is absolutely certain that he is in the state of grace.¹ c) More often in life; as is established from the 5th and 6th propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the former is this: "Whether he sins mortally who elicits an act of love of God only once in life, I do not dare to condemn"; and the latter: "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not per se oblige even rigorously in each five-year period."

It obliges PER ACCIDENS: a) When someone is bound to be contrite, for example one about to die or about to celebrate, if namely a confessor is lacking to him; the reason is that contrition includes an act of charity. b) When there is danger of falling into hatred of God, or into another grave sin, unless an act of charity is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is bound to the necessary means (II, 23; Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 26).

QUAER. 2. How often, in life, is an act of charity to be elicited?

Resp. One must distinguish the obligation of eliciting an act of charity insofar as it is an excellent virtue, and insofar as it is a MEANS TO THE END, that is, to the observance of the precepts. There is not one opinion of all: some say that it must be elicited under grave obligation once a year; others once a week, or on any feast. But St. Alphonsus speaks thus (H. Ap., IV, 13; Conf. dir., IV, 6): "Concerning the act of charity, the opinion of those who require it once a month is more pleasing to me, since he who does not frequently exercise his love toward God by positive acts will with difficulty be able to observe the divine law." Cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 3; Lehmkuhl, I, 451; Perrone, de Virt. theol., P. 3, c. 5, n. 253.

n. ¶473.

From these things you will resolve: 1. There is no obligation of always acting from the motive of charity; for the precept of charity, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges only at stated times. Recall the things said at n. 307.

A special obligation lies upon those to whom the care of children or of the dying has been entrusted, that they suggest to these and those, at due time, acts of charity (St. Alph., de Assist. morib., § 3). Yet, as regards the dying, exhortation rather than strict admonition is to be used.
Those who remain in the state of mortal sin for months do not of themselves satisfy the precept of charity. Nor do they satisfy it if with attrition alone they receive the sacrament of penance; because attrition does not attain to the notion of true charity (cf. n. 1675).
Those who live Christianly easily satisfy this obligation. "For there is no need that these acts be made reflexively and explicitly, with the intention of satisfying the precept; but it is enough if they are made in an exercised way, although from another end, namely for casting away temptation, for eliciting contrition, if someone wishes to confess. Thus also acts of charity are all acts of uniformity with the divine will and all virtues exercised for the complacency of God" (H. Ap., IV, 3). Likewise, satisfaction can be made through prayer, notably through the Lord's prayer, when it is said from the heart: Hallowed be etc...., thy kingdom come etc...., thy will be done etc.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article III: On Sins Opposed to Charity Toward God

Besides sins of omission against the affirmative precept of divine charity, there are three sins which are opposed to the same charity, namely: inordinate love of a creature; hatred of God; sloth. Concerning sloth we have already spoken in the treatise on Sins (n. 372).

n. ¶474.

PRINCIPLES. I. Every inordinate love of a creature, passing into act, is a mortal sin. Thus Sporer (tr. 2, c. 5, sect. 4, § 4) with the common opinion.

It is said: 1. inordinate, that is, by which a creature is preferred to God; 2. passing into act; otherwise actual sin cannot be given. It is established from the things said concerning the obligation of loving God appreciatively above all things, and from the words of the Lord (Matt. 10:37): He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. Whence here lightness of matter cannot be imagined.

It must be noted: 1. Inordinate love of a creature is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not: a) It is a special sin when someone knowingly and willingly loves a creature so inordinately that on account of it, by actual consent thereafter elicited, he is prepared to transgress any precept whatsoever and mortally offend God. It is, I say, a special sin against charity, because it is repugnant to no precept in particular. b) But it is not a special sin against charity if someone from inordinate love transgresses some precept, for example of justice; but it is the same in number with the transgression of this precept: because charity is always wounded in every grave sin.

Such love is the cause of all sins, even of hatred of God itself. St. Thomas explains this nearly thus (2.2, q. 34, a. 1 and 6): "First, man is inordinately occupied and captured by love of himself or of some creature, or wishes it to be well with himself in such a creature. Then, because often it cannot be well with him thus unless he transgresses the law of God, therefore from love of this creature he consents to sin. Further, because he experiences God as a severe legislator and avenger of sin, the impious sinner proceeds to formal hatred of God."

n. ¶475.

II. Formal hatred of God is a special sin, and indeed the gravest of all. The reason for the first is that any hatred of God whatsoever turns away from God as troublesome to itself; whence it is opposed to the charity of God, and directly and formally destroys it. The reason for the second is that the gravity of fault consists in aversion from God. But that aversion is stronger and greater in hatred of God, in which it is per se and directly, than in other sins, in which it is indirectly and per accidens (2.2, q. 34, a. 2; St. Alph., V, 60).

Note. 1. We said: formal hatred, because in every sin by which divine friendship is dissolved there is found some hatred of God, but virtual and interpretative, by which a special fault is not constituted.

This formal hatred of God is twofold: one of abomination (opposed to love of concupiscence), by which someone hates God insofar as he experiences or apprehends him as contrary to himself; the other of enmity (opposed to benevolence and friendship), by which someone hates God in himself and according to himself, willing evil to him, insofar as it is evil to him. So great a malice is present in this latter hatred that a greater cannot be conceived. Yet hatred of enmity itself and hatred of abomination, with respect to God, do not differ in species; because although hatred of abomination of itself arises from desperation, nevertheless the will cannot come all the way to hatred of God unless God is attacked in himself, by hatred of enmity (II, 20, 24; Lehmkuhl, I, 434).
From hatred of God can proceed blasphemies, execrations, curses, sacrileges, persecutions against the Church, etc. Such hatred adds a species to these sins, as is plain (Sporer, tr. 2, c. 5, sect. 4).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Chapter II: On Charity Toward Neighbor

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 25; St. Alphonsus, II, n. 25; Billuart, disp. V; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 3; Elbel, II, n. 207; Suarez, l. c.; Van Roey, de Natura et Ordine carit.; Steinmuller, die Feindesliebe; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 96.

n. ¶476.

Things to be noted beforehand: 1. That the secondary object of charity comprises ourselves and neighbor was said above (n. 465).

But under the name NEIGHBOR come all who are capable of eternal beatitude, or already enjoy it, that is, Angels, the Blessed in Heaven, souls in Purgatory, and especially men wayfarers, whether just or sinners. Hence that saying of Gerson (Summa, l. 5, q. de Carit.): "Everything which is beatifiable is to be loved from charity." Only the damned are excepted.
The norm of this love of neighbor is supernatural charity which we ought to have toward ourselves. The precept of loving oneself has not indeed been imposed on man in express words, because the tendency of loving oneself is too connatural to each rational being; whence express promulgation of this precept was not necessary. Nonetheless it is a strict and urgent precept.
From this necessity of love there follows that each one is bound to wish for himself and procure those goods which are fitting to himself:

a) Supernatural goods, which are: knowledge of the supernatural end and of the means to the end, sanctifying grace, conversion after sin, sacraments.

b) Spiritual goods, such as: instruction, firmness of will, whence each one can devote himself to those things which are imposed on him by office.

c) Bodily goods, under which are comprehended food, clothing, and habitation. Yet moderation must necessarily be present in these. We are bound to those things which health, modesty, and the state of the family require; but attention must be given to those restrictions which temperance and diversity of condition impose.²

d) External goods of the person, such as honor and reputation. It belongs to charity toward oneself to care for a good name, to seek that it be recovered. But someone can, the things to be posited having been posited, renounce this right.

e) External goods of fortune. This is required by reason of preserving life, or feeding a family, or fulfilling an office. From this arises the obligation of laboring and of embracing a certain state of life (Ami du Cl., 1898, p. 1084). Yet besides necessary riches, we are bound to acquire no riches. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 727; Noldin, II, 66; Tanquerey, I, n. 764.

These things having been premised, the following will be better understood.

n. ¶477.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is given a precept, both affirmative and negative, of loving neighbor. For 1. just as we pursue him with natural love because our image shines forth in him, so we ought to love him with supernatural love on account of that which is of God in him (St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., l. 7, c. 8). 2. It is established from the words of the Lord, saying: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself (Matt. 22:39), and more often repeating that commandment of his, and prescribing love of enemies themselves.

But we ought to love neighbor: a) with affective love; for to love is to will good to someone. This is established from the 10th proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act." b) With effective love, according to that saying (1 John 3:18): Let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and in truth; for the will is always effective of those things which it wills, provided that faculty is present (2.2, q. 25, a. 1, and q. 44, a. 7; St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 12).

n. ¶478.

II. The precept of charity, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges sometimes to an internal act of love, and to an external one according to circumstances; but insofar as it is negative, it forbids, forever, all and each acts repugnant to charity. The general reason is that we are bound to love neighbor as ourselves. But we love ourselves by an internal and external act, according to the demand of circumstances.

But because in charity a RIGHT ORDER, or proportion of love to the lovable, as St. Thomas speaks, ought to be preserved, it follows that one must discuss three things, namely: 1. the order of charity; 2. the acts which charity prescribes; 3. the acts which it forbids.³

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. II, Article I: On the Order to Be Preserved in Charity

ORDER, in general, according to St. Augustine (de Civit. Dei, l. 19, c. 13, n. 1), "is the disposition of equal and unequal things assigning to each its own places." Hence the order of charity, which in some things participates in the virtue of justice, consists in this, that we assign to each lovable object its own fitting place (cf. n. 484).

n. ¶479.

PRINCIPLES. I. Some order in love must altogether be preserved. For not all goods are to be estimated equally, nor are all persons to be loved equally. Whence St. Augustine (de Doctr. christ., l. 1, c. 27): "He lives justly and holily who is an unimpaired estimator of things: and he is the one who has ordered love." St. Thomas teaches the same (2.2, q. 44, a. 8).

n. ¶480.

II. The order to be preserved in love regards both persons and goods. For to love is to will good to someone: therefore love is referred both to persons and to the goods which we will to them.

As regards PERSONS, both comparison to God must be attended to, according to which some are nearer to God than others on account of greater excellence; and comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others (II, 27, resp. 2).
As regards GOODS, each one ought to love and will more those things which are more excellent and more necessary.

But the first place is obtained by supernatural goods; the second, by natural and bodily goods; the third, by external goods. Cf. n. 476. Likewise, other things being equal, the common good is to be preferred to private good; certain good to uncertain good.

Spiritual things of themselves are superior to temporal things, intrinsic things to extrinsic. Yet not on that account does any and every, or even the least, good of a higher order surpass, in moral estimation, any good whatsoever of an inferior order. Thus no one would prefer to suffer the loss of an immense sum rather than suffer a very slight headache for one hour (Genicot, I, 215).

EVIL is opposed to good, by which neighbor is constituted in necessity; whence also the necessity of neighbor must be attended to.

NECESSITY (whether spiritual or temporal) is distinguished as threefold. It is called: a) Extreme, when someone cannot without the help of another free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil nearly equal to it. To this is equated quasi-extreme necessity, when it is very difficult for someone without the help of another to free himself from a very grave evil which will soon happen. b) Grave, when someone, unless he is helped, is able with difficulty to escape danger of the soul, or of bodily life, or of another grave loss of goods or status. c) Common or middling, when someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are placed; but in the temporal order, most poor persons begging (II, 27).

These things having been premised, let us establish the special rules which the order to be preserved in charity prescribes, comparison being made both between ourselves and neighbor and among neighbors themselves.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1. On the Order of Charity Between Ourselves and Neighbor

The order of those to be loved is generally expressed thus: God, our soul, the soul of neighbor, our body, the body of neighbor.

n. ¶481.

PRINCIPLES. I. After God, each one is bound, absolutely speaking, to love himself more than neighbor. Whence that common axiom: Charity well ordered begins from oneself. It is established 1. from natural inclination, which grace perfects; 2. from the words of Christ: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. From these words it is gathered that the love of a man toward himself is as the exemplar of the love which is to be had toward another. But the exemplar is rather than the exemplified (2.2, q. 26, a. 4).

"But the mode of love is assigned when it is said: as thyself; which must not be understood as regards this, that someone should love neighbor equally to himself, but SIMILARLY to himself. And this in a threefold way: first indeed, on the part of the end, namely that someone love neighbor on account of God, so that thus the love of neighbor may be HOLY; second, on the part of the rule of love, namely that someone not condescend to neighbor in some evil, but only in goods, ... so that thus the love of neighbor may be JUST; third, on the part of the reason of love, namely that someone not love neighbor on account of his own usefulness or delectation, but for the reason that he wills good to neighbor, ... so that thus love of neighbor may be TRUE; for when someone loves neighbor on account of his own usefulness or delectation, he does not truly love neighbor, but himself" (2.2, q. 44, a. 7).

n. ¶482.

II. In those things alone necessary for salvation, this principle is to be applied to each one absolutely, that is, without any exception. For the order of charity, and the obligation of preferring oneself, is preserved in this, that each one wills more to himself than to another his own end, that is, the supreme and uniquely necessary good (Valentia, t. 3, disp. 3, q. 4).

Whence it is never licit to sin in order to consult the salvation of neighbor, neither gravely nor lightly; nor to expose oneself to danger of sinning, unless the danger by some reason becomes remote (cf. n. 375).

Hence: 1. Someone can deprive himself of spiritual goods not necessary for salvation, on account of the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, for example by deferring entrance into Religion in order to provide for a parish, or to feed parents or children (II, 26; IV, 78).

Someone can per se, and from the motive of virtue, immolate his own life for preserving another's. "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend," says St. Thomas (3 Sent., D. 29, a. 5, ad 3), "is the most perfect act of virtue: whence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life." It was said that this is licit per se; for per accidens it is sometimes not licit, for example if someone is necessary to children, wife, parents. Cf. n. 753.

n. ¶483.

III. By order of charity we are sometimes bound to procure the good of neighbor, our own good being put after it. It is said by order of charity; for from the title of justice, piety, or office, peculiar obligations can intervene, to be discussed in their own places (2.2, q. 26, a. 5).

But in order that the obligations of charity may be defined more precisely, certain RULES can be established. Yet these have force only with the required conditions posited: that is, a) that equally certain hope of success is present; b) that another is not present who can and wishes to help; c) that a graver evil is not feared from it (II, 27).

RULE 1. In extreme public necessity (that is, of one's own community), even temporal, each one is bound to undergo any inconvenience whatsoever, indeed even loss of life.

This is clear from this, that a member is ordered to the body, a part to the whole, a private person to the community. Hence, a private man is bound to expose his own life to danger for saving the life of a man who is necessary to the Republic. Likewise, in war it is not licit for a citizen, not even for the sake of avoiding death, to indicate to the enemy means by which he can capture the city, etc. (2.2, q. 26, a. 3).

RULE 2. In extreme private spiritual necessity, neighbor must be helped even with danger of life; in the same bodily necessity, he must be helped with great inconvenience.

St. Augustine declares the first thus (de Mendacio, c. 6, n. 9): "A Christian will not hesitate to lose his temporal life for the eternal life of neighbor; for this example went before, that the Lord himself should die for us. For to this he says: This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I also have loved you." Whence, if neighbor would not be saved without our help, that saying urges (1 John 3:16): And we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. The second is clear from this, that the obligation of doing good to neighbor urges when he is placed in necessity (n. 482 and 485, 2); and consequently it urges the more, the greater the necessity is: yet without our being bound, for saving neighbor, to cast ourselves into the same necessity.

Hence: 1. You are bound, with danger of your life, to baptize an infant about to die; likewise, to absolve a dying man habituated in sins, if he is so uneducated that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition. A mother is bound to undergo a dangerous operation so that the infant can be extracted and baptized. 2. You are not bound to save the life of a private person with your greatest inconvenience. Thus, for example, you can, but are not bound from charity to, protect the life of an innocent person with fear of enmities, of public justice, etc. (III, 390).

RULE 3. In grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, neighbor must be helped from charity with only middling inconvenience.

The reason is that when neighbor absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to assist him with great difficulty, since he is not constituted in a case of strict necessity.

Hence: 1. You are not bound, with danger of life, reputation, or fortune, to draw others, even those proximately about to die, back from sins from which they can free themselves by themselves. Nor are you bound to sail for converting the Indians, since there are others who can do this, and otherwise the fruit is uncertain. - Yet you are bound from charity to come to the aid of a neighbor laboring under grave necessity of soul, if you can without grave inconvenience, and hope for fruit.

A simple priest is not bound, with danger of life, to minister sacraments to one constituted in grave necessity, unless it is a public necessity, for example in time of plague or war, and the people is destitute of every priest. For then extreme necessity is presumed to be present for several. Likewise, if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are bound with danger of life to impede him, if you can do this efficaciously, and no one else impedes him (II, 27).

RULE 4. In common or ordinary necessity of either order, neighbor must be helped with light inconvenience.

Indeed one must help; but with light inconvenience, because neighbor himself can fairly easily extricate himself from that necessity; or also because it is not too troublesome to him. Nor are you bound to help all those placed in common necessity: for this would be impossible, or at least too grave.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § 2. On the Order of Charity Among Neighbors Themselves

n. ¶484.

PRINCIPLES. I. With love of complacency, more excellent and holier creatures are to be loved before the rest. "He who is better," says St. Alphonsus with Busenbaum, "is to be loved more, and with that love which is accompanied by joy concerning goods possessed, likewise honor, worship, and reverence. Thus holy men are to be loved more than wicked parents, parents more than children or wife, benefactors more than those to whom we do good" (cf. n. 479).

II. With love of benevolence, those who are nearer to us are to be loved more. But these ought to be preferred to others according to those goods in which conjunction or friendship is founded. The reason is that, on account of the special bonds by which God has bound them to us, we ought to apply greater zeal to providing for them goods not yet possessed, and to forestalling impending evils. Whence the Apostle says thus (1 Tim. 5:8): But if any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever.

Corollaries. A. As regards the application of the rules.

In goods pertaining to preserving nature and bodily life, if the necessity is extreme, or quasi-extreme, on both sides, parents, since they have given life, are to be preferred to wife and children. If necessity on both sides is only grave or middling, help is to be given: a) to wife, because she is one flesh with the man; b) to children, as those for whom by natural right parents are bound to provide more than children are for parents; c) to parents, and indeed to the father before the mother, because the father has the more excellent notion of principle; d) to brothers and sisters; e) finally to relatives, domestics, and familiars.
"In matters pertaining to civil communication, fellow citizens are to be preferred; in military matters, fellow soldiers; in spiritual matters, spiritual sons, fathers, brothers. Yet Bannez probably teaches that carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred before all others: because carnal conjunction is the foundation of other conjunctions."
Per accidens it can happen that he who would naturally be placed after another is to be preferred to him, because attention must be given not only to the conjunction of persons, but also to necessity and to the goods to be procured. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to the household matter, to a useless and clamorous wife (Kon., n. 279). Likewise a friend who snatched you from death is to be loved more than a brother who wished to inflict it on you.

B. As regards inversion of order and gravity of fault.

Inversion of order as regards necessity, if it is a question of grave or extreme necessity, contains grave sin; because it wounds charity in grave matter, by taking away the order itself.
Inversion of order as regards conjunction of persons is a grave sin if the excess is notable; for example, if in grave matter strangers or remotely joined persons are preferred to those proximately joined. It is a light sin if the excess is slight; for example among those proximately joined, as among parents, spouses, and children, among whom it is not openly established who is really to be preferred (Aertnys, tr. 3, n. 45).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. II, Article II: On Acts of Charity Toward Neighbor

Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, CHAPTER III: ON CHARITY · Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON LOVE OF GOD · Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON LOVE OF THE NEIGHBOR

The precept of charity, as was said above (n. 470), obliges to acts both internal and external.

n. ¶485.

PRINCIPLES. I. The internal act is to be elicited from a supernatural motive, more often in life. For if it were not made on account of love of God, or so that we may obey the precept of Christ, there would be no place for the precept: A new commandment I give unto you, that you love one another (John 13:34). - But it is to be elicited, just as the act of charity toward God, more often in life, because both are subject to the same rules. Cf. n. 472.

But he already satisfies the precept who pours forth prayers for all, for example by reciting the Lord's prayer. Likewise, these acts of charity are well exercised on the occasion of avoiding hatred or of giving alms. And since occasions of this kind occur frequently, hence it is morally impossible that the faithful living Christianly should not abundantly satisfy this precept.

II. The obligation of eliciting external acts of charity is to be determined from various circumstances. But it is determined according to the necessity of neighbor, and our faculty of helping him. It is established from the things said at n. 483 seqq.

External acts by which another's necessity is relieved, whether from precept or from counsel, are called WORKS OF MERCY.¹

The corporal works of mercy are numbered as seven, namely: to visit the sick, to give drink to the thirsty, to feed the hungry, to redeem captives, to clothe

the naked, to gather in guests, and to bury the dead. - The spiritual works are likewise numbered as seven, namely: to give counsel to the doubtful, to correct the sinner, to teach the ignorant, to console the afflicted, to forgive injuries to the offender, to bear the troublesome and fastidious, to pray for all. Hence that twofold little verse:

I visit, give drink, feed, redeem, cover, gather, bury.

Counsel, reprove, teach, console, forgive, bear, pray.

Here we shall treat of two principal works of mercy: 1. of almsgiving strictly so called; 2. of the spiritual alms which is fraternal correction.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § 1. On Almsgiving

n. ¶486.

DEFINITION. Almsgiving is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God. Thus defined, almsgiving is an act of mercy, commanded by charity. It can also be commanded by another virtue.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept, grave of itself, of bestowing alms. It is established both from reason, which commands us to do for another what we would wish to be done for ourselves, if we were placed in the same condition; and from the words of Christ (Matt. 25:41): Depart from me, ye cursed...; for I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat...; and from 1 John 3:17: He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother have need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?

n. ¶487.

II. In order that the precept of almsgiving may urge, two things are required: necessity on the part of the one receiving, and superfluity of goods on the part of the one giving. The first is established from the definition itself; the second from the order of charity. For he who has only things necessary for life cannot distribute them without preferring another's life to his own. The words of the Lord Savior are consonant: That which remaineth, give alms (Luke 11:41). Cf. 2.2, q. 32, a. 1; Bouquillon, de Carit., n. 483-90.

Moreover, just as the NECESSITY of one in need is distinguished as THREEFOLD, as was said above (n. 480, 3), so also, on the part of the giver, GOODS are of three kinds: a) things necessary for life, that is, goods without which we cannot preserve our own life, or that of our people; b) goods superfluous for life, but necessary for one's state, that is, goods without which indeed we can preserve life, but cannot live in that manner which befits our state; c) finally, goods simply superfluous, that is, which are necessary neither for life nor for state. And here it must be noted that, by things necessary for the decency of state, generally are to be understood all those things which are required, not only for sustaining children and servants and guests, but also for making honorable donations, banquets, and moderate displays of magnificence (II, 31; confer Kon., n. 484).

n. ¶488.

But in what way, according to the diversity either of necessity or of the superfluity of goods, alms is to be given, will be established by the following RULES, with the things always to be posited being posited, that is: a) that the use alone of the thing does not suffice; b) that the required means are not extraordinary, which men commonly are not accustomed to employ; c) that the common or public good of the community is not brought into danger (II, 31, resp. 3 and 4; Gen., I, 222).

RULE 1. In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for life, even though necessary for state. The reason is clear from the order of charity (n. 483, Rule 2).

Whence no one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the poor man were such that the safety of the republic depended upon him.

RULE 2. In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for state, but with only middling inconvenience. Thus commonly; and the reason is again clear from the order of charity.

But the obligation urges under grave sin, unless it is prudently judged that another will come to his aid; for, "since in Scripture men are frequently condemned on account of neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity" (II, 31). And it seems clearly inferred from the condemnation of the twelfth proposition by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among secular persons will you find what is superfluous to state, even among kings; and thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to state."

RULE 3. In common or middling necessity, neighbor must be aided from goods superfluous for state, but with only light inconvenience. This also the order of charity requires. But whether under mortal sin? Many deny it with St. Antoninus; for the common misery of the poor is usually light and tolerable. But St. Alphonsus affirms, with the more common opinion (II, 32; l. El. qq. ref., n. 4), if it is a question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor person. The principal reason is that, if the rich did not have an absolute obligation of commonly aiding beggars, they could be left by all in their necessity, and thus their necessity would become grave. Therefore, by the words of the Lord (Luke 11:41): That which remaineth, give alms, there is expressed a precept grave of itself, as the Holy Fathers commonly interpret (Sylvius, 2.2, q. 32; Bellarmine, de Bonis Oper., l. 3, c. 7).

The rich are indeed not bound to distribute the whole of what is superfluous; but neither does it suffice to distribute so little, in proportion to the quantity of one's substance, that, if other rich men used the same parsimony, help would be lacking to the poor. - Commonly the rich are judged to satisfy by distributing to the common poor the fiftieth part of the revenues which remain over (or 2 gold-pieces out of 100); but not in the same proportion, if the riches greatly exceed.¹ Except beneficed persons, who are bound to distribute the whole superfluity to the poor or to pious places, as will be seen in its own place (n. 2249).

But, "if some rich and abounding person for a long time refuses all alms, with the intention of giving in a better and more suitable place and time, or to persons in greater need, or of converting it to another pious use, he does not sin, since he has a just cause for refusing. But if such a person, without reasonable cause, inhumanly repels all poor persons from himself, Laymann says that he is in a bad state." Cf. II, 32; H. Ap., IV, 19; Conf. dir., IV, 11; Istr., IV, 19.

From these things you will deduce: 1. Except in the case in which the poor are fed from public stipends, a rich man sins mortally who determines to give no alms in common necessities, or who in this is notably negligent, and accumulates all superfluities for attaining a higher state. Indeed, even in the case in which many things are assigned from public stipends for relieving the poor, the rich man does not act rightly who, by fixed intention, would wish to give nothing further. For in not a few matters the solicitude of the State fails in practice; whence such a rich man's denial would tend to the detriment of many. Nor certainly do modest alms impede anyone from ascending honorably to a higher state.

Physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to expend their labor for the poor gratuitously, when these are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others (2.2, q. 71, a. 1).
"Private men are not bound to seek out the poor. Yet if they doubt concerning someone's extreme need, they are bound to inquire into the truth" (II, 31, resp. 4, ad 1).

n. ¶489.

Questions. Q. 1. To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. It must be given to all who are truly in need, whether they are faithful or unbelievers, natives or foreigners; yet so that, other things being equal, an old man is preferred to a young man, a noble to an ignoble, an invalid to a strong person, a faithful person to an unbeliever, a Catholic to a heretic, a good man to a bad man, a native to a stranger, etc. For this is what the order of charity requires.

There is no obligation of giving alms, and sometimes it would be illicit to give it, to poor persons unwilling to work. Yet one must beware lest those be numbered among the voluntarily idle who have fallen into misery because of lack of work. Moreover, it would be more advisable to furnish work to these, from which they may live (II, 32, ad 5).

Q. 2. From which goods must, or can, alms be given?

Resp. 1. From one's own goods, of which one has free administration.

We say: from one's own. Therefore it is not licit from goods liable to restitution; nor is it licit with harm to creditors; nor is it licit for children from the goods of parents; for servants from the goods of masters. We say: of which one has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods, according to the custom of wives of her condition; and this even if the husband were unwilling, because custom grants her this right (II, 33; III, 540).

From another's goods, if either the poor man is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own; or the owner consents, or is reasonably presumed to consent.

Hence children can bestow small alms, and servants bread and similar things. Likewise tutors and curators can, from goods committed to them, give those modest alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person (II, 33, 2, 3).

Note. 1. Let the confessor of the rich remember the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17): Charge the rich of this world... to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on true life.

Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man refusing alms to common beggars: both because of the doubt and dissent of the Doctors; and because the rich, almost always, bring forward excusing reasons which, in practice, the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty (II, 32, 3).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2. On Fraternal Correction

n. ¶490.

DEFINITION. Fraternal correction is a suitable admonition, given from charity to one's neighbor, for the end that he may be amended from sin, or removed from committing it (II, 34 and 39, query).

It differs both from judicial correction, which proceeds from a judge, for the chastisement of the guilty, on account of the common good; and from paternal correction, by which a Superior, without the form of judgment, rebukes the delinquent, for amending him and for taking away scandal. Concerning this latter we shall say a few things below; concerning the former elsewhere (n. 2256).

n. ¶491.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept of fraternal correction. 1. For from the law of charity we are obliged to aid the soul of neighbor in need. 2. The evangelical law commands (Matt. 18:15): But if thy brother shall sin against thee, go, and rebuke him. It is said: against thee, that is, against thee, or before thee, or with thee knowing, as St. Augustine explains (Sermo 82, c. 7, n. 10).

This precept obliges under grave or under light sin according to the matter. Grave matter is understood as any mortal sin into which neighbor either is about to fall, or has already fallen and in which he perseveres. In practice, a private person is scarcely bound to take notice in light matter, unless he can do so most easily (II, 34, 35).

But matter in this, as in other precepts, can be GRAVE either of itself or on account of circumstances. Thus, for example, if in some religious order it is foreseen that through light violations of the rules the vigor of discipline will be relaxed, there lies upon one a grave obligation of correction, not only upon prelates and confessors, but also upon private persons (IV, 13).

n. ¶492.

II. The precept of correction obliges all, but Superiors more strictly. For the office of charity, of itself, extends itself to all. Yet Superiors are held more strictly, because a special care lies upon them of providing for the spiritual salvation of their subjects (II, 40).

From these things you will deduce: 1. Even inferiors are held by the obligation of admonishing Superiors; yet with modesty, discretion, and reverence, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): Rebuke not an elder, but entreat him as a father. Hence children are bound to admonish parents when they notice that they retain another's goods, do not take care of their eternal salvation, etc. 2. Even sinners are held by this precept. For correction, says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 33, a. 5), pertains to someone insofar as right judgment of reason flourishes in him; but this is not destroyed by sin. Yet if he is a public sinner, ordinarily he ought to abstain from correction; for it is said (Rom. 2:21): Thou therefore that teachest another, teachest not thyself; thou that preachest that men should not steal, stealest... For the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles.

n. ¶493.

III. In order that the precept may urge, it is necessary that the spiritual necessity of neighbor demand it, and that there be a founded hope of amendment, without grave inconvenience threatening. Thus the Doctors commonly.

It is said, 1. That the spiritual necessity of neighbor demand it; for which three things are required: a) That it be certainly established to you concerning the sin of neighbor, or concerning his proximate danger of sinning. For charity is not rash, does not think evil; nor in doubt are you bound to inquire, unless you are a Superior, or unless it is a question of a common evil or of a most grave evil to be averted, for example homicide. b) That correction be judged necessary for the amendment of the guilty party; for if amendment is reasonably hoped for from elsewhere, or if the guilty person has already become wise again, it is clear that no obligation is given. c) That there is not another equally or more suitable person, who is believed about to correct; because then true and absolute necessity is not present.

That there be a founded hope of amendment: because, when the end is despaired of, there is no reason for applying the means. Hence you are not bound to correct if the correction will certainly not be profitable.

But in doubt whether it will be profitable or harmful, you are not bound; unless the one to be corrected is in danger of death, or infection of others in faith or morals is to be feared. Prudence generally counsels that correction be omitted of those whose disposition is wholly unknown, lest, receiving it with an unjust spirit, they become worse.

Without grave inconvenience threatening. For charity does not oblige with such inconvenience, unless the spiritual necessity of neighbor is extreme, or unless there is added an obligation of justice, as in a prelate, pastor, or magistrate toward subjects (II, 38, 39).

Hence you will resolve: 1. Private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are familiarly joined among themselves: because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present. Still more rarely toward Superiors, because of defect of suitability. For the same reason the scrupulous also, at least ordinarily, are excused. See also n. 1202, where correction of one detracting is treated.

He seems to sin lightly who, from fear, pusillanimity, or shame, judges himself not to be so strictly obliged, or less suitable, for correcting his brother. - But he sins gravely who, although he can easily impede the mortal sin of neighbor, omits to do it on account of a vain fear of temporal evil (II, 37; H. Ap., IV, 21).

n. ¶494.

IV. That order in correction is to be preserved which Christ the Lord prescribed (Matt. 18:15). Whence 1. Let correction be made secretly: rebuke him between thee and him alone. But if this does not profit, let it be made 2. before witnesses: take with thee one or two (witnesses). 3. Let the fault

be referred to the Superior: but if he will not hear them, tell the Church. This order obliges of itself under grave sin, since it is a question of consulting the reputation of neighbor. Nor can a Superior exempt from it, because it is founded in the law of charity (II, 41).

We said of itself: for, per accidens, with previous admonition omitted, the matter CAN immediately be brought to the Superior as to a father: 1. If the sin is public, or soon to be public, because the reason for preserving the delinquent's reputation ceases. 2. If the delinquent's amendment, which is the principal end of the precept, is hoped to be able to be obtained more easily or more efficaciously: which case is more frequent in religious communities. 3. If neighbor has yielded his right, as is the case among certain religious; yet this yielding is so understood that the crime is revealed to the prelate as to a father, but not as to a judge (IV, 240, 245).

But the matter MUST immediately be brought to the Superior if, through this evangelical denunciation, the desired fruit is hoped for, which otherwise either could not be obtained, or only with grave inconvenience. This chiefly holds if the sin of neighbor tends to the harm of a third person or of the community, as conspiracy, heresy, corruption of youths, etc. The reason is that then a remedy is to be applied not only to him who has sinned, but also to others to whose harm the crime tends. Hence, in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc., if it is a question of a matter of great importance, it is generally expedient that correction be made by way of denunciation to the Superior as father.

n. ¶495.

Corollaries. The duties of the one denouncing, the duties of a Superior in general, and the duties of a Superior obligated by stipend are to be distinguished.

If it is certainly established that a brother has perfectly amended an occult sin, and from it there is no danger of relapse, or of harm to himself or another, it is not licit to denounce him to a father or prelate, unless the brother expressly consents to that denunciation (II, 42; IV, 244, 245, q. 4).
It is not licit to defer the delict to mediate Superiors if the immediate Superior can correct by himself, and there is no probable suspicion that this one will fail in his office; for the reputation of neighbor is to be consulted as far as can be done (II, 42, 3; IV, 247 fin.).
A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as father, cannot proceed judicially; because the delict was not manifested to him as judge (IV, 246).
Superiors are bound to watch over their subjects, sometimes to inquire into their sins, and to meet their evils even when doubtful; yet not to ask much and curiously concerning some sin in particular, unless someone has given a special sign of it. But voluntary accusers are not easily to be admitted; because they, under the appearance of the common good, often seek themselves (II, 42, 4).
They are bound to correct delinquents, even if a small hope of amendment shines forth, whether for avoiding every appearance of connivance, or, if the correction is public, for casting fear into the rest. Yet where no good can be hoped from correction, it will have to be omitted; for the Church tolerates many things which she in no way approves. - Thus similarly preachers are bound to rebuke public sins, by reason of the common good, even if amendment of the delinquents is not hoped for, provided fruit in the people can be hoped for sooner or later.
If they are stipendiaries, as Bishops, parish priests, magistrates, they are bound both from office and from justice to correct and admonish subjects, even with danger of life, in their necessity not only extreme but also grave, as is commonly taught with St. Thomas (2.2, q. 185, a. 5).
But others, as parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, are not bound with great detriment to themselves: because they are not obligated from strict justice, but only by the office of piety (II, 40; H. Ap., IV, 22).

n. ¶496.

Questions. Q. 1. Whether he who sins FROM IGNORANCE is to be corrected?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If he sins from vincible ignorance, certainly he is to be corrected, because then he is in bad faith, and is not excused from sin.

If he offends from invincible ignorance, he is to be admonished: a) when it is a question of things necessary for salvation, or of avoiding the scandal of others. Nor is correction to be passed over, even if amendment of the delinquent can scarcely be hoped for, lest perhaps others judge that to be licit which is not corrected; b) when, even if only materially, divine law, natural or positive, is violated, and profit from the admonition can be hoped for; for knowledge and observance of a certain law is always a good most greatly to be desired. Thus commonly (Conf. dir., IV, 12).

But whether he who ignorantly transgresses a human law is to be admonished, for example concerning fasting, concerning reciting the Office, is disputed probably on both sides. Yet the affirmative opinion is more probable and more common (II, 36; l. El. qq. ref., 5); because that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, nevertheless, the law being posited, is still evil, and easily becomes formal, or induces a depraved habit, and therefore by admonition, if it can be done, is to be impeded. But certainly those who from office are bound to teach subjects, as prelates, confessors, teachers, ought to take notice of such a delinquent (VI, 610, Obj. 1, and 616).

Q. 2. Whether pupils are to be obligated by the confessor under grave sin to denounce occult corrupters?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the harm of only one or another is feared, the obligation does not seem to be urged with grave inconvenience of the one denouncing, for example if he would thence have to confess his own crime, or incur the infamy of a delator. The reason is that, since there is not extreme necessity of neighbor, charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

If grave common harm is present, namely the corruption of several or the infamy of the house, the obligation of denunciation is to be urged in almost all cases, notwithstanding the grave inconvenience of the penitent, even if the confessor foresees that his admonition will not be profitable or that the denunciation will be without efficacy. The reason is that here the common good urges. Confer St. Alph., Regole pei Sem., § 1, n. 5; Berardi, de Recid., II, n. 273; Lehmkuhl, I, 971; Genicot, I, 221. Behold the words of the Holy Doctor: "It must be adverted that, since here it is a question of a common evil, many times they would by no means be excused from grave inconvenience or harm."

…and 47 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 78 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, CHAPTER III: ON CHARITY

n. ¶275.

- Charity is the virtue by which we love God as the highest good on account of Himself, and the neighbor on account of God. - Charity is the most excellent of all virtues, because it attains God in the most perfect mode. Hence:¹ "Now there remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three; but the greatest of these is Charity."

The formal object of Charity is the divine goodness. But the primary material object is God, the secondary material object is ourselves and the neighbor.¹

There is distinguished: 1° love of God supremely intensive or appreciative; 2° love of benevolence, which regards the proper good of the beloved; love of friendship, which is mutual love of benevolence; and love of concupiscence, which primarily intends the proper good of the one loving.

The discussion must be: 1° on love of God; 2° on love of the neighbor.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON LOVE OF GOD

n. ¶276.

- 1° There is a special precept of loving God above all things both by internal affection, through true love of the heart, and also by external work. - This is established from the words of Christ:² Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart ... this is the greatest and first commandment.

2° This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges to loving God above all things appreciatively, that is, in such a way that in reality He is preferred to all goods, as is clear from the natural law; but not necessarily intensively, that is, by a more intense sensitive affection than anything else, because the essence of charity does not consist in degrees.

n. ¶277.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the precept of charity urge?

Resp. 1° Of itself: a) at the beginning of the use of reason, or when man has obtained sufficient knowledge of the infinitely good God; b) most probably in the article of death, because then not merely the safe way, that is, attrition with the Sacrament of Penance, but the safest way also is to be chosen; c) several times in life. But how often in life, there is not one opinion of all. The opinion of Cardenas is more pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ who teaches that he can with difficulty be excused from mortal sin who defers an act of charity beyond a month; this opinion he thinks must altogether be persuaded as very salutary, since in reality a man can with difficulty live long in a Christian manner, by observing the divine commandments, unless he frequently cherishes and nourishes love toward God; but he will not be able to nourish and cherish it except through acts of charity. Yet Croix notes that all meritorious works exercised from the intention of pleasing God are true acts of love, as almsgiving is. Likewise it suffices if such acts are elicited for fulfilling other precepts, as for confessing; since the precept is fulfilled in exercise, although there is no advertence to it.¹ Indeed as often as those words are uttered from the heart in the Lord's Prayer: hallowed be Thy name; Thy will be done, acts of perfect charity are sufficiently elicited. Therefore timorous faithful ought in no way to be anxious as to the fulfillment of this precept.²

Resp. 2° By accident: a) if there is danger of falling into mortal sin unless an act of charity is elicited, or grave temptation cannot otherwise be overcome; for he who is held to the end is also obliged to the necessary means; - b) when the precept of contrition urges, as if it is necessary for a priest to celebrate when he does not have a supply of a confessor and is conscious to himself of grave sin; for charity is included in the act of perfect contrition.

Quaer. 2° Is the precept of charity satisfied through attrition in the reception of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Negatively, because attrition does not occur principally from love of God, but of oneself, and therefore in it the principal motive of charity is lacking.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON LOVE OF THE NEIGHBOR

The discussion must be: 1° on the precept of love of the neighbor in itself; 2° on works of charity to be fulfilled from it; 3° on vices opposed to charity toward the neighbor.

§ I. On The Precept Of Love Of The Neighbor In Itself.

1° Toward all in general; 2° toward enemies in particular.

Point I. On The Precept Of Charity Toward All In General.

n. ¶278.

Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is established 1° from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, created to His image and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; therefore, just as we must love God, so also we must love the neighbor on account of God. - 2° It is established from Sacred Scripture:¹ "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." - 3° It is also established from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI (see p. XV).

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, as to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts, he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

II. Some order of charity must be preserved in love of the neighbor; for the objects which charity embraces are not equal; therefore neither are they to be loved equally. But this whole order is placed in this, that we assign to each lovable subject its own fitting place, with regard namely both to goods, to necessity, and to persons.

Account must be had of goods, for all goods are not of the same excellence. For this is their order, that the first place be held, and therefore before all things procured, by spiritual goods; the second by intrinsic natural goods, as life, health, integrity of members; the third by extrinsic natural goods, as reputation and honor; to which riches are to be added in the last place as being of an inferior order. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to the private good.
Account must be had of necessity, which can be diverse, whether it is spiritual or temporal. A threefold necessity is distinguished: - extreme, as when someone without the help of another cannot free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil almost equal; - grave, as when someone, unless he is helped by another, can escape the danger of the soul or of the life of the body, or of another grave evil, only with very great difficulty; - common or mediocre, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are situated, who, if they wished to employ some effort, could rise again from the depraved state. But in the temporal order, beggars are generally in this necessity; for them, according to their condition, life is not held as too burdensome.
Account must be had of persons; for the love of diverse persons must be measured according to the diverse reason of excellence and conjunction of the person to be loved.

n. ¶279.

- Special rules of the order of effective charity, or of succor, from the common doctrine of Theologians, are these:

First Rule. Each one is held, absolutely speaking and in equal necessity, to love himself more than the neighbor, as to goods of the same order, according to that: well-ordered charity begins from oneself; for "no one is nearer than each one is to himself"; and this moreover is clear from the natural and invincible inclination of all. And therefore: 1) we are held to love our own soul more than the soul of the neighbor; and for this reason it will never be licit to sin either gravely or lightly in order to consult the salvation of another. Yet it will be licit for a just cause to expose oneself to a probable, not certain, danger of sinning. Thus, for example, it is licit for physicians and priests to read and handle dangerous matters; and in the extreme spiritual necessity of the neighbor, for example if otherwise an infant is certainly about to die without baptism, it will be necessary to expose oneself to it. - 2) We are regularly held to prefer our life to the life of the neighbor. I said: regularly; for a private person a) is held to expose life to certain danger for the republic, or for preserving the life of a person altogether necessary for the public good (n. 278, II, 1); b) can from the motive of virtue expose life for the life of another private person. For the order of charity in this case is not injured, since not precisely the life of the neighbor, but the good of virtue, is then preferred to our life.

Second Rule. 1° If the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, he must be succored even with danger to our life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a more excellent good than our temporal life. Hence you are bound, with danger to your life, to baptize a dying infant. Likewise if you know that someone, existing in mortal sin, is to be killed while asleep or thinking of nothing. Make exception if either a) there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor, whence a mother is not held to undergo danger of life so that the offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether the latter will come through to baptism; or b) another is present who can and wills to succor him; or c) a graver evil is feared from it, as if he who exposes life for a brother is necessary for the common good. The reason for these exceptions is clear of itself.

2° If the necessity of the neighbor is temporal, you are not held to very difficult or almost morally impossible means, for example to spending on him an extraordinary sum of money, although you are rich; because although in a necessity of this sort charity obliges even with great inconvenience, nevertheless not with the greatest, even toward yourself.

Third Rule. If the neighbor is in grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, no one is held of himself to succor him with grave inconvenience; for when another absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to come to his aid with such great difficulty, since then the neighbor cannot truly be said to be in a case of necessity, as being not ineluctable. I said: 1) of himself; for he would be held even with danger to life who was obliged to this either by reason of office, as Pastors of souls are; - or by reason of a delict, as if someone had taught heresy; - or if that grave necessity is public, because a public grave necessity is accustomed always to be joined with the extreme necessity of certain private persons. Hence if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are held to impede him with danger to life, if you can do this efficaciously and no one else impedes him. Likewise if in persecution or hostile incursion some people lacked a priest, and otherwise were exposed to grave dangers of sinning, you are likewise held to assist them with danger to life. I said: 2) with grave inconvenience; for each one is held to assist the neighbor constituted in grave necessity with mediocre inconvenience, as the matter itself says.

Fourth Rule. If the neighbor is situated in common necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, he will indeed have to be helped, because love of neighbor demands this; but speaking of itself there cannot be present except a light obligation, for the neighbor himself can rather easily free himself from such necessity, nor is it so burdensome to him.

Fifth Rule. Finally, if a comparison is instituted among diverse persons, in equal necessity we ought to prefer blood relatives, or those joined in some other way, to strangers; because charity does not change the order of nature, but perfects it. - I said: in equal necessity; for since the obligation of succoring the neighbor does not exist except by reason of the necessity in which he is situated, it is clear that the obligation is greater where the necessity is greater. - But among those joined to us, those more closely joined are always to be preferred according to their various degrees, with regard to the necessity and the goods which are owed to such conjunction and in which it is founded. Hence in grave necessity: 1) the wife is to be preferred, because she is one flesh with the man and the principle of children; 2) children, because they are more closely joined, since they proceed from the substance of the parents; 3) parents, who after those named concur toward the fellowship of life and the increase of the republic; 4) brothers, sisters, relatives, domestics, fellow citizens, and fellow soldiers. I said: in grave necessity; for if the necessity is extreme, more probably not the good of families, but of life, must be attended to. Hence then parents are to be preferred to all because of the eminence of the principle; and indeed the father is to be preferred to the mother, as being the more noble principle; then come children, spouse, etc., as above.⁴

Note. - By accident it can happen that one is to be preferred who naturally would have to be placed after another. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father who is harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to domestic affairs can be preferred to a useless and clamorous wife. This is clear from n. 280, q. 3°, Resp. 1°.

n. ¶280.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Are penitents to be interrogated about due care of the soul or body neglected?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking. For either there is question of damage of the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must no more be expressed than in a sin, for example of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or there is question of the omission of means by which faults are guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins. Lugo.² - But if there is question of damage inflicted on life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself would seem to have to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body, nevertheless since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost never infer grave guilt, unless nevertheless the illnesses have been certainly foreseen from causes, even remote ones.

Quaer. 2° Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself because of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet those do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is estimated harsher than death itself. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever. Yet little women desiring death for themselves because of the smallest troubles are, for the most part, not improbably excused from mortal sin because of defect of advertence and deliberation.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it against Charity to desire temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the due order of Charity is preserved, that is, if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1° because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2° because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3° because of a good even of several persons, of much greater moment, for example of a family, or even of an innocent person.² - Besides, such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor the death of her daughter because she cannot marry because of deformity or poverty. This is established from the condemnation of propositions 13, 14, and 15 by Innocent XI.³ - See p. XV; cf. Vind.⁴

Point II. On The Precept Of Charity Toward Enemies In Particular.

n. ¶281.

Preliminary notes. - 1) By this precept hatred is forbidden. Hatred generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward another: and this can happen in a twofold way; namely, so that he wills evil to him, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him (hatred of malevolence or of enmity); or so that he turns away from him as from an evil to himself or to a loved person (hatred of abomination). But the object of abomination is someone either by reason of himself or as simply evil (for example, as a man), and this is called hatred of abomination of nature; - or only under some respect (for example, as a sinner), while under another respect he remains lovable, and this is called hatred of abomination of quality. Bouq. de Virt. th. n. 507-509.

Signs of love are either common or special. Those are called common which are customarily given to others of the same state; yet they are diverse according as certain persons are bound together among themselves by a diverse reason of conjunction. Hence some are common signs, for example among brothers or among pupils of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; others finally, which man owes to any man from charity.

Special signs are those which are shown particularly to certain persons by reason of some conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all others otherwise of the same condition. Thus not only among men bound by no other bond besides, but also among fellow members of any community or society or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar with one than with another.

n. ¶282.

Principles. - I. Hatred of abomination is not absolutely evil, but can be good. The reason is that it arises from love of oneself or of another, and therefore it is evil only when that love is not ordered. Hence hatred of abomination of nature is gravely evil, and of itself also hatred of abomination of quality, if this quality is good, as if you have someone in hatred because he is pious, just, etc.; but in no way is it evil, but rather praiseworthy, if the quality is evil. This is clear also from Scripture, Ps. 118. 113 and 138. 21; Wis. 14. 9. Yet one must beware lest abomination of the quality degenerate into hatred of the person.

II. Hatred of enmity is absolutely and from its genus mortally evil; for it cannot fail to be a sin to will evil to the neighbor, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him; nor can it be a light sin if the evil thus willed is grave. This is clear also from 1 John II. 11; III. 14, 15; IV. 20. Bouq. ib., n. 515, 516.

Resolutions. - I. Common signs are owed, of themselves, to enemies, because their denial would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity, which is owed also to enemies. Hence:

It is not licit to exclude enemies from prayers, for example from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them if this one means alone were available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred.
It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, from return greeting, from response, from the sale of exposed goods, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly.
Those sin who do not assist an enemy in necessity, or who do not prevent his grave damage, when they can do so easily.

II. Special signs of love are not owed of themselves to enemies, for example to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to visit the sick, to console the sorrowful. For these proceed not from debt, but from liberality. Yet I said: of themselves; for by accident sometimes they are owed, namely 1) if their omission would be scandalous, as if the enemies were Superiors, or had already previously shown such signs to oneself; 2) if grave necessity of the enemy, whether temporal or spiritual, precisely demands them and they can be shown without grave inconvenience; 3) if signs which are customarily enumerated as special, by reason of state or condition or office, are in reality common; as if someone as a physician ought to visit the sick and serve them, or as an innkeeper ought to receive travelers with table and lodging, etc.

III. Not only is an offense to be forgiven to an enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust vengeance is cast away, and common signs of love are not denied; but to one seeking pardon, and furnishing fitting satisfaction for the injury, if any intervened, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking are not altogether to be refused.

Hence those sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices this and is gravely affected by it, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand a greater one than is fitting, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and vengeance.

n. ¶283.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and even to seek it?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if every affection of vengeance is absent; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily exposed to delusion, and ordinarily illicit.¹

Quaer. 2° What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1° He who has offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. I said: of himself; for otherwise one must speak if someone is excused by a legitimate reason, as if the offense was light, or the offended person absent, or he does not care about the deprecation of fault or is not going to accept it, or satisfaction is considered to have been made to him in some other way.

2° If the offense is mutual and equal, he who first offended should first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him precede who offended more gravely. Besides, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered. Thus, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and speak who passes in the presence of another standing or sitting, or who arrives after others. Add that a more opportune time must sometimes be awaited, and ordinarily reconciliation scarcely turns out well except by means of a friend and prudent man, as Gousset aptly observes.

Quaer. 3° Is there given an obligation of greeting an enemy met on the way?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor. Yet one must speak otherwise if adjuncts of state, condition, or other similar things require that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if there is question of a subject toward his superior.²

Quaer. 4° Ought the offender to ask pardon from the injured person?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, unless another means or mode of reconciliation more suitable is available, for example by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems likely to avail nothing for placating the offended person. They make exception also if the offender is far superior to the offended person, or if the offended person is prudently judged to forgive it. But other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix,³ Tambur., etc.

Quaer. 5° Do parents sin who refuse to a son or daughter, although asking pardon, both conversation and sight, because of a marriage contracted by them against their reasonable will?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they refuse for a long time, and intend to refuse in perpetuity, or for a short time only. - If the former, they sin gravely, as is clear of itself. - If the latter, they do not sin in the case in which they act thus for the amendment of the son or daughter, or as a punishment of the fault, or as an example for the other children. Thus Laymann, Diana, and others apud Varceno.¹

§ II. On Works Of Mercy.

Works of mercy are some corporal, as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; - others spiritual, as to correct those sinning, to teach the ignorant, to console the sorrowful, etc. We shall speak specifically only of two: 1° of almsgiving; 2° of fraternal correction, insofar as they are referred to the precept of Charity.

Point I. On Almsgiving.

n. ¶284.

- Principles. I. There is truly given a precept of giving alms to the needy. This is established 1° from the natural law, that is, from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity (n. 278). - It is established 2° from Sacred Scripture: "Defraud not the poor man of alms";² and "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ... for I was hungry and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me not to drink."³

II. Generally, from St. Thomas,⁴ something must be considered on the part of the giver, namely that what is to be spent in alms is superfluous to him; and something on the part of the recipient, namely that he suffers necessity.

III. The superfluous on the part of the giver is distinguished as twofold, namely superfluous to life and to state. Superfluous to life is called that which is not necessary for preserving your life, and the life of others whose care has been entrusted to you. Superfluous to state is that which is not necessary either so that someone, with those whose care has been entrusted to him, may live decently according to the condition of the state in which he here and now is situated, or so that he may render this condition moderately better.

IV. Necessity on the part of the recipient can be threefold, namely extreme, grave, common.

n. ¶285.

Rules. - I. In extreme necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to life; but from those alone. - From things superfluous to life: since the right order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor prevail over a good of ours far inferior. - From those alone: since it does not demand that we prefer another's life to our life and that of our own, as would happen if we were to succor him from things necessary to life.

II. In grave and common necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to state.

I say: 1° He must be succored; for the precept of almsgiving regards not only extreme necessity - which is very rare - and grave necessity - which is rarer - but also, and indeed especially, common necessity, which is frequent. Thus all.

I say: 2° from goods superfluous to state; for besides things superfluous to life there are no others from which the neighbor may be succored.

III. The quantity of alms: - a) sufficient is that by which the neighbor is sufficiently succored according to the degree of present necessity; - b) strictly prescribed in necessity, 1) whether grave or extreme, cannot be called a great sum of money (n. 279, second Rule under 2°); 2) in common necessity, according to St. Alph., a fiftieth part, or 2%, of surplus revenues. For if individual rich persons spent that quantity on the poor, it would already be sufficient for meeting common necessities.

Therefore rich persons sin who, where the poor are not supported by public stipends, always repel them harshly from themselves, and reserve all surplus things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which was recounted above, cannot impede an honest ascent to a higher state. - Likewise physicians, advocates, etc., sin who refuse to expend their service freely on the poor, for whom provision is not made by public authority.

n. ¶286.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of almsgiving oblige under grave sin?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, according to St. Alph.,¹ also in grave necessity, and if there is question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor man, also in common necessity. The reason is that since in Scripture men are frequently condemned because works of mercy were neglected, the grave obligation of these works is not to be restricted to extreme necessity, or a very rare one, nor to grave necessity, or a rare one. - Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man harshly repelling from himself all who are situated in common necessity, since rich persons almost always bring forward excusing reasons, which in practice the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty.¹

Quaer. 2° To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. To the truly poor - yet to those asking - and without excluding strangers or non-Catholics. I say: 1) to the truly poor, but not to those unwilling to labor; for these cannot be said to be pressed by any true necessity. - I say: 2) yet to those asking; namely when they can easily ask. - I say: 3) without excluding strangers or non-Catholics, while preserving, nevertheless, the right order of Charity, and unless in some place there has obtained, for a just cause, a custom or statute of excluding poor strangers from cities, namely so that they may be fed by their own citizens.

Quaer. 3° From which goods ought or can alms be given?

Resp. 1° From one's own goods, of which someone has free administration. I say: 1) from one's own goods. Therefore not from goods liable to restitution; - not with damage to creditors; - not by children from the proper goods of parents; - not by servants from the goods of masters. - Yet tutors and curators can give from goods committed to them those moderate alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person. - I say: 2) of which someone has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of the husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which namely she has both dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods according to the custom of wives of her condition.

Resp. 2° From another's goods, when either 1) the poor person is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own;² or 2) the owner consents or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence children can bestow very small things, and servants bread and similar things.

Point II. On Fraternal Correction.

n. ¶287.

Definition. - Fraternal correction is an admonition by which someone, from charity, endeavors to recall another from sin. It is said: by which someone, from charity; therefore it differs from that which is made from office, which is distinguished as twofold, namely judicial, which is made by public authority and for the common good; the other paternal, which is made by a superior for the private and at the same time public good. That which is made from office obliges only those who discharge that office, namely Bishops, Pastors, Prelates of regulars, Magistrates, Parents, and those who are in their place, and it is to be made only to subjects; - but fraternal correction, like charity from which it proceeds, obliges all and toward all.

n. ¶288.

Principles. - I. There is given a true precept of fraternal correction. This is established 1° from the natural law of Charity, by which we are obliged to remove the evils of the neighbor. - 2° From Sacred Scripture: "Reprove thy neighbor ... lest perhaps he repeat it";¹ and "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother."²

II. For the strict obligation of this precept there is required: 1° that the sin of the neighbor, or the proximate danger of sinning, be certainly established. - 2° That the amendment of the neighbor be more probable than his non-amendment. - 3° That there not be another equally suitable person who is believed to be about to correct him. - 4° That the correction can be made without grave inconvenience of the one correcting. - 5° That it be judged necessary for the amendment of the delinquent, and that there is not at least probable hope that he will amend himself of his own accord. Thus commonly.³

The first is required, lest you act rashly and inflict injury on the neighbor, for example by lending your ears too easily to some rumor. - But in doubt you are not held to inquire about the sin, since this pertains only to those who are held to correction from office.⁴

The second; for the doubtful man only imprudently puts his hand to a moral action.⁵ Hence prudence for the most part counsels that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with a hostile spirit, they become worse. Make exception, nevertheless, if either 1) the one to be corrected, who is not in good faith, is situated in danger of death; or 2) there is question of a danger of perversion in faith or morals to be averted from others.

The third; for then there is not present true and absolute necessity.

The fourth; for charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience unless either the neighbor is situated in extreme spiritual necessity, or, supposing that to the obligation of charity in the one correcting there is also added an obligation of justice, as in a Prelate, Pastor, Magistrate toward subjects, in grave necessity. But parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, although from office (of piety, etc.), nevertheless not from justice, and therefore not with their grave detriment, are held as Prelates, Pastors, Magistrates are. L. II. 40.

The fifth; for since many bear correction with difficulty, it is to be employed only in necessity.

From these things it follows that private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are joined familiarly among themselves; because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present; more rarely still toward Superiors because of unsuitability. - Likewise often you will not be held to correct detractors, at least under grave sin; for in this matter it is most difficult to establish that correction will be profitable; detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; there is danger lest they increase or confirm the detraction; the hearer for the most part does not know whether what is said is notorious, and in doubt there is no reason why he should condemn the detractor (unless he is a lost man); once detraction has begun, often the neighbor is better consulted if this is allowed to be completed; for if it is explained distinctly, often it is not apprehended as so grave as had been conceived at the beginning. L. IV. 979. 981. Cf. what is to be said n. 524. - I suppose that silence is not equivalent to approbation. - Scrupulous persons likewise are ordinarily excused from the office of fraternal correction.

n. ¶289.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of fraternal correction oblige under grave sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if the required conditions are present, and there is question of grave matter. Hence he can sin gravely who from vain fear lest the neighbor be offended somewhat, or lest he himself suffer light detriment from it, omits correction in a grave matter, where he thinks it will more probably be profitable. - Yet he sins lightly who from faintheartedness and bashfulness considers himself less suitable for correcting. - St. Thom.,¹ - St. Alph.²

But matter in this, as in the other precepts, can be grave either from itself or because of circumstances. Thus, if in some religious Order through venial sins the vigor of discipline seems either to be dissolved or even greatly diminished, the obligation of correction can be grave. Likewise if a son or subject often steals small things, or little by little habituates himself to drinking, to dangerous play, although he does not yet sin gravely.

Quaer. 2° Does the precept of correction have place where someone sins from ignorance?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of vincible ignorance, because this does not excuse from sin.

Resp. 2° But if the ignorance is invincible, there is not so much question of fraternal correction as of warning, by which the neighbor is taught about the truth; since correction is an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults. But that warning must be made if the sins are against divine law, whether natural or positive; but if against human law, it is disputed on both sides probably whether private persons are obliged to it under grave sin. Yet the affirmative opinion is the more probable and more common according to St. Alphonsus;³ for that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, with the certain law posited, is always evil, and therefore to be impeded through correction. But certainly it must be made by those who from office are held to teach subjects, as prelates, parents, confessors, teachers.

They generally add that, although no fruit is hoped for and the ignorance is invincible, nevertheless admonition must still be made if there is question of things necessary by necessity of means, or of those things which furnish public scandal, lest namely others think that to be licit which is not corrected.

Quaer. 3° What order must be observed in fraternal correction?

Resp. The order assigned by Christ Himself must be observed, unless circumstances suggest otherwise. - Hence 1° Correct secretly: "Rebuke him between thee and him alone." - 2° Before witnesses, if the first admonition does not suffice: "If he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two." - 3° Refer the matter to the Superior: "Tell the Church."

Sometimes that order can and must be inverted, namely: - 1° if the sin is public or soon to be made public; - 2° if it is gravely harmful to another; - 3° if secret admonition is not judged to be profitable; - 4° if it is better to manifest the matter immediately to the Superior, as it is generally better in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc. Nor can members or fellow residents be absolved who do not consent to a denunciation of this sort where there is question of grave damage to the community. Likewise by natural law corrupting priests, who inflict great spiritual damage on the faithful or seem likely to inflict it, must be denounced to ecclesiastical Superiors; - 5° if the delinquent has yielded his right, as happens in various religious Orders.

Quaer. 4° In what manner must fraternal correction be made?

Resp. Fraternal correction must be made with true charity also as to the manner; therefore it ought to be paternal toward inferiors, kindly among equals, and reverential toward Superiors. - Moreover, it is required that time, place, and other adjuncts be suitably chosen. Therefore he does not sin who puts the matter off to another time, when he can correct either more conveniently or equally conveniently, unless perhaps grave danger threatens from delay.

You will resolve: 1° A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as to a father, cannot proceed judicially, because the delict was not manifested to him as to a judge. L. V. 246. Not. III.

2° Those sin who refer to a superior a defect of a subject perfectly amended.¹

3° Likewise those who refer a delict to mediate superiors while passing over the immediate superior, who can correct by himself and concerning whom there is not probable suspicion that he will not discharge his office, or will not discharge it duly; for the reputation of the neighbor must be consulted.

4° Superiors are held to inquire into the sins of subjects, yet not of some certain subject, unless some peculiar reason moves them to this. - Nor ought they easily to admit spontaneous accusers, and much less immediately to give faith to them. - A grave obligation likewise falls upon them of not manifesting those by whom they were made more certain about someone's fault, if namely the fault is grave, - or, although it is light, if that manifestation, from another cause, ought to be regarded as a grave delict. - They also sin gravely if, when the common good does not demand it, they manifest to those whose counsel or help in correcting the subject they do not need a grave and occult delict of a subject brought to them.¹ But if the manifestation of the delict alone suffices for asking counsel, they sin if they also manifest the delinquent.

§ III. On Vices Opposed To Charity Toward The Neighbor.

The principal ones are hatred, envy, quarrels, scandal, and cooperation in others' sins.

We shall speak only of the two latter, since the matter has already been treated concerning the others in another place, or is to be discussed under the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

Point I. On Scandal.

Section I. Notion Of Scandal.

n. ¶290.

- By the name scandal, Greek rather than Latin, which from its primary signification denotes an obstacle or impediment placed in the way, by which occasion of stumbling and ruin is furnished to one walking ("stumbling-block or stone"), the Sacred Writers, the holy Fathers, and Theologians are accustomed to designate a spiritual obstacle placed before the neighbor in the course of the way of salvation. Hence scandal, accepted in this sense, is rightly defined with St. Thomas² as "a word or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin." From this definition it is clear that for scandal there is required:

a) That it be a word or deed, that is, an external speech or action and known to another; for those things which are merely internal or occult cannot furnish occasion of ruin to another, since in no way are they perceived by him. But under the terms word or deed there must also be comprehended an external omission, that is, a not-said where one ought to speak, a not-done where one ought to do; for, as the Angelic Doctor notes,³ "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act."

b) That it be a word or deed less right, that is, having some defect of rectitude; which can happen in two ways: 1° when the word or deed according to itself is evil, for example a blasphemous word, a lustful deed; and 2° when it carries before itself the appearance of evil, for example if from dispensation you eat meats on a fast day before persons ignorant of the dispensation. Hence for the notion of scandal it is not necessary that the word or deed be of itself a sin; but it suffices that it have the likeness of sin; "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor,¹ "it is fittingly called less right, so that both those things which are sins according to themselves and those things which have the appearance of evil may be comprehended." But as to words or deeds which bear no appearance of evil, as being wholly right, it seems one must say: - they never constitute scandal strictly so called, although perhaps another may take occasion of sinning from them; - yet sometimes even such words or deeds can put on in some way the malice of scandal, and therefore are not undeservedly called scandal broadly so called, or scandal by accident, namely in a case in which, by command of the law of charity, even those words or deeds must be omitted precisely so that the sin of the neighbor may be guarded against.

c) That it furnish to another occasion of spiritual ruin, that is, that it expose another to probable danger of sinning, although nevertheless it is not necessary that the sin of the other actually follow; for scandal of itself is not, nor can be, an efficient cause, but only an occasion of ruin, or, as St. Thomas again says,² "nothing can be for man a sufficient cause of sin ... except his own will; and therefore the words or deeds of another man can only be an imperfect cause" (occasion) "inducing in some way to sin." - Therefore it suffices, but also is necessarily required for the essence of scandal, that it be in some way inductive to sin; and hence Busembaum rightly resolves apud St. Alph.:³ "it is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, with attention to the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that through this act those will be drawn to sin who otherwise would not have sinned." Thus, for example, it is not scandal if someone blasphemes or curses the neighbor in the presence of persons, for whom he notices that no probable danger of sinning will arise from it, as can often happen (provided there is not question of matter of the Sixth), and especially then when the person sinning himself is a man of the lowest condition and of bad reputation, or when the persons present are very upright or very depraved. - From these things also you will understand that Dens rightly warns¹ that the opinion of the common people is false, namely that someone is scandalized when, on occasion of an improper word or deed, he is justly indignant; but then he is not scandalized when he applauds or delights in the impropriety of another; since, on the contrary, in the second case he is scandalized, not in the first. And for this reason, as Suarez notes,² scandals are often said to be committed which properly are not scandals.

n. ¶291.

Division Of Scandal. - Theologians commonly distinguish:

I. Active scandal and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the definition handed down and explained above (n. 290) belongs. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of the scandalized person, or, as it pleases certain Moralists to say, it is the very sin of the neighbor occasioned. But it is established from what was said above that active scandal can exist without passive scandal, just as, on the contrary, it will be established from what is to be said later that passive scandal can sometimes exist without active scandal, for example if there is question of Pharisaic scandal.

II. Division of active scandal. Active scandal is divided into direct (which by another name is called seduction) and indirect.

Direct scandal is when the ruin or sin of the neighbor is intended by the scandalizer. But the sin of the neighbor can be intended in two ways, namely a) precisely so that the neighbor may sin and lose his soul (which is proper to the devil, and occurs more rarely among men, unless perhaps among those given to magical arts or openly impious); or b) so that the sin of the neighbor may serve the proper pleasure of the scandalizer, as happens in the lustful, - or his proper utility, as happens in the avaricious, thieves, etc. In the first hypothesis direct scandal is called diabolical; in the other it is simply called direct.

Indirect scandal is scandal when the sin of the neighbor is not indeed intended by the scandalizer, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited by him without just cause, and therefore to be omitted lest the sin of the neighbor follow. - But when a word or deed of this sort, even if of itself right, must be considered as posited without just cause and to be omitted under the aforesaid title, will be more accurately explained below. Here you will usefully recall the doctrine on the indirect voluntary, n. 6-8.

III. Division of passive scandal. - Passive scandal is divided by St. Alph.¹ into given and accepted. Given, in the sense of the holy Author, is the sin to the committing of which someone is induced from active scandal; but accepted is the sin which is committed under the pretext of active scandal from pure malice of one's own. - Whatever given scandal is called by the holy Doctor scandal of the little ones, by reason of the weakness or infirmity by which those are considered to labor who allow themselves to be induced to sin through the word or deed of another; for scandal can scarcely fall upon the perfect and constant, according to that:² "Much peace have they that love thy law, and to them there is no scandal." Then any accepted scandal is called by St. Alph.² Pharisaic scandal, from the Pharisees, who, according to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, in order to destroy Christ feigned that they suffered scandal from His holy words; just as today false Liberals or Revolutionaries, in order to destroy the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, feign themselves to be scandalized by his most celebrated Syllabus.

n. ¶292.

Malice Of Scandal. - There is not here to be raised a question about the malice of passive scandal, which is nothing other than the very sin of the scandalized person. For it is clear of itself that such a sin has the same malice which it would have if it were committed by one not scandalized; so that the fact of having been scandalized adds to it no new species, indeed not even an aggravating circumstance; unless perhaps there is question of Pharisaic scandal, which can have a new specific malice joined to itself, for example from the fact that the words or deeds of Christ the Lord Himself are sacrilegiously employed as a pretext for sinning with impunity. - Hence in the following there will be discussion only of the malice of active scandal, concerning which let there be a twofold question.

Quaer. 1° How great a sin is active scandal?

Resp. 1° Active scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, since it is gravely opposed to the negative precept of charity: namely, do not harm your neighbor, and much more, do not induce him into sin, which is the gravest of all the damages that can be inflicted on the neighbor. But the guilt of active scandal is the graver:

a) The more the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is intended; and thus, for example, direct scandal is graver than indirect.

b) The more efficaciously active scandal flows into the ruin of the neighbor; and thus, for example, bad example given by clerics and priests regularly tends more efficaciously into the ruin of others than bad example given by laymen.

c) The graver the spiritual damage of the neighbor which is caused through scandal; and under this reason no scandals are more detestable than those by which innocent souls of tender children are corrupted.

Resp. 2° Yet from a threefold head active scandal can be only a venial sin, namely:

a) From defect of sufficient deliberation, as if someone from negligence lightly culpable does not notice the occasion of mortal sin which is furnished to another by his word or deed.

b) From the lightness of the influence which the scandal exercises upon the grave ruin of the neighbor, as if in speaking or acting you commit some light indiscretion, which regularly, unless a special circumstance intervenes, indeed is accustomed to move the neighbor somewhat, but not so much that it could reasonably have been feared that he would fall from it into mortal sin, into which by accident he has fallen.

c) From smallness of matter, namely if to another there is furnished an occasion of committing only venial sin (which nevertheless is not to him a likely occasion of further grave ruin). And this is true even if that occasion of venial sin is furnished through a word or deed according to itself mortally evil; for the malice of active scandal is not to be measured from the malice of the word or deed which furnishes occasion of sin to another, but from the malice of the sin itself for which occasion is furnished; and hence it can happen that some word or deed according to itself is mortal sin and only venial in the reason of scandal; or the contrary, that some word or deed according to itself is venial and mortal in the reason of scandal. Thus, for example, he who inflicts a grave wound on a neighbor whom he knows will only become lightly angry sins mortally by reason of the injury and venially by reason of scandal; on the contrary, he who strikes a light slap on a neighbor whom he knows is to be moved from it to blasphemies sins venially by reason of the injury and mortally by reason of scandal.

n. ¶293.

- Quaer. 2° What kind of sin (that is, of what species) is active scandal?

Resp. Active scandal has at least a twofold specific malice, one against charity and another against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced. And this is generally admitted by theologians concerning direct scandal; but concerning indirect scandal they dissent somewhat. Cardinal de Lugo and others fewer in number think that through indirect scandal one indeed sins against charity, but not against another virtue; so that he who indirectly scandalized another would of himself satisfy by saying in Confession: I gave grave scandal to the neighbor, without declaring in what matter. Yet much more common is the opposite opinion, to which St. Alph.¹ wholly subscribes: namely, that through scandal, even indirect, one sins not only against charity but besides against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced, so that he who scandalized another either directly or indirectly must declare in Confession in what matter, for example of chastity, justice, etc. The solid reasons of this opinion are:

1° Because the case of indirect scandal seems to be one of the cases to which the axiom must be applied: the evil effect (the sin of the neighbor) foreseen from the cause (in scandal) communicates its malice to the cause itself (the scandal itself).

2° Because any virtue of precept seems to demand from us both that we not injure it ourselves and that we not be either directly or indirectly the cause or occasion why it is injured by others.

We have said: Scandal has at least a twofold malice; for often still more malices, whether in species or in number, it can contain, namely because of the proper sin which is committed by the scandalizer whenever he scandalizes another through a word or deed according to itself already evil, for example through blasphemy, detraction, theft, etc.; - or because of the quality of the person scandalizing, as if scandal is furnished to children by parents, or to parishioners by their pastors; for these are held not only from charity, but also from office, to guard against the ruin of their subjects; - or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if someone induces a married person or a person bound by a vow of chastity to shameful acts; - or even because of the number of those scandalized, for more probably there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized.

Note. - The resolution just given concerning the at least twofold malice of active scandal, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ also obtains in the case in which someone furnishes to another the occasion of executing by work a sin for which the other was already prepared and determined, so that for example one seeking fornication from a prostitute prepared for fornicating sins not only against the virtue of chastity, but also against charity. The reason, very powerful to him, is this: that although such a prostitute is in the actual will of sinning, nevertheless by completing that particular sin of fornication in work she certainly brings upon herself a gravely greater ruin; and therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating this sin in work thereby cooperates toward her gravely greater ruin. But to cooperate toward another's gravely greater ruin is without doubt gravely opposed to charity.

n. ¶294.

Conclusions. - A penitent who is guilty of the mortal sin of scandal must explain in Confession:

1° The very word or deed by which he scandalized another, if namely that word or deed according to itself already is a mortal sin, as blasphemy, grave detraction, perfect drunkenness, etc.

2° The species of grave sin for which he furnished occasion to the neighbor, for example that he furnished to the neighbor an occasion of committing a mortal sin of drunkenness, blasphemy, luxury, theft, etc. And this not only if the scandal was direct, but also, from the much more common opinion proved above n. 293, if it was only indirect; so that this simple accusation never suffices of itself: I gave grave scandal to another, but it must always be added in what species of grave sin.

3° The number of persons whom he induced to grave sin, or foresaw could probably have been induced. "He who sows scandals before others," says Dionysius Carth.,¹ "is worthy of so many and such condemnations as from how many and what sort he is seen." But if a certain number cannot be morally determined, as generally happens, then it suffices to assign a probable number.

4° The quality of himself (for example, that he is a father of a family, teacher, pastor, etc.), and the quality of the scandalized person (for example, that the person is married, related by blood, bound by a vow of chastity, etc.), whenever a quality of this sort is a circumstance changing the species in a grave matter.

But it is asked: In sins against chastity which have an accomplice, for example in the sin of fornication, must it be expressed who first solicited? Or, as others propose this question: must the circumstance of induction to fornication and similar things be explained in Confession?

Resp. Sufficiently probably it is not of itself necessary that in Confession of sins of this sort it be explained who first solicited; because one consenting to the solicitation, by this consent itself, is also guilty of grave scandal, and consequently contracts malices specifically the same as those which the one first soliciting contracts, namely grave malice against chastity and against charity. Therefore it can only be said that the first one soliciting sins more gravely, or that the circumstance of solicitation is only a circumstance aggravating in the same species, which does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession. Cf. St. Alph.²

Section II. Principal Classes Of Scandalizers.

n. ¶295.

- Confessors regularly ought of themselves to judge especially the following to be guilty of mortal fault of scandal:

1° Those who have a detestable habit of blaspheming, in the presence of persons of any kind, especially younger persons.

2° Those who compose, spread, or publicly sing impure songs or poems.

3° Those who institute and prolong, whether in clear words or in equivocal words (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers), lascivious conversations. See n. 492, II.

4° Those who write or publish depraved books or other perverse writings.

5° Those who sell the aforesaid irreligious or immoral publications indiscriminately to any person, or rent them for reading; or those who in libraries established for lending books expose to the use of all works which commonly ought to be considered as poisoned cups to be removed from the lips of the faithful.

6° Those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books.

7° Those who hand over to boys or girls books perhaps good in themselves, but treating matter the knowledge of which is reputed of itself an occasion of offense to them, according to their natural innocence and sensibility. Who, for example, would doubt that anatomical and surgical books cannot be handed into the hands of children without scandal!

8° Authors, Actors, and Actresses of Comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances (ballet-dances), in which, by reason of the dress of the dancers, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, the greatest foulness appears, as often happens in those which are made under the name gallop, polka, waltz. - It is certain, says St. Alphonsus,¹ speaking of immodest spectacles, that those representing or composing notably impure comedies are in no way free from grave sin of scandal; nor can gain, however great, excuse them. - But whether and to what extent the spectators of such comedies (who ordinarily stain themselves with several internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles to be established later concerning cooperation. Authors of dances which are called "round dances" are commonly guilty of grave scandal, as manifestly follows from that grave admonition which is contained in the Pastoral Letters which the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore² gave in the vernacular tongue to the clergy and people committed to them: "We consider it to be our duty to warn our people against ... those fashionable dances, which, as at present carried on, are revolting to every feeling of delicacy and propriety, and are fraught with the greatest danger to morals." Cooperation in these dances is treated below. - As to the modern gatherings of boys and girls which are held under the name children's balls, I indeed would not wish to precipitate a judgment, although, relying on testimonies not to be despised, I would almost dare sometimes to compare them to a whirlwind destroying the rising roses of innocence.¹ Therefore let parents see to it that they do not cause one of these little ones to be scandalized! - But concerning those gatherings of diverse sex which are called masked balls, there is scarcely need to say a word; since no one fails to understand that by their character they are for the most part full of danger and scandalous. Those festivities also are often to be called scandalous which are commonly called "Pic-Nics," "Excursions," "Fairs," "in which" (these are the words of the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore in the same pastoral letters²), "as too often conducted, the name of charity is made to cover up a multitude of sins." Wherefore the Fathers proceed: "We forbid all Catholics from having anything to do with them, except when managed in accordance with the regulations of the Ordinary, and under the immediate supervision of their respective Pastors."

9° Painters, Sculptors, and Photographers who, eagerly seizing upon the thesis too much sung today: le chaste c'est le nu ("nakedness is chastity"), exhibit statues or images truly obscene and commonly incentive to lust, for example images in which those parts of the body appear naked (I do not say of an infant, but of an older person), which modesty everywhere among peoples demands to be veiled, and which therefore are called shameful parts. Indeed, generally speaking, we concede that artificial things often move less than natural ones, and therefore that grave scandal can more easily be given through natural nakedness than through artificial; but with the common body of Theologians we altogether deny that the nakedness, although artificial, of the aforesaid parts moves so little that it can be excused from grave scandal. What we have said here about painters, etc., "I think the same," says St. Alph.,¹ "must be said about those who retain such images at home" (Gousset² adds: in museums or gardens) "exposed to the sight of all." And at this time we affirm the same especially of those who circulate wholly immodest photographic cards, especially those which are to be viewed by means of a stereoscope. - Note, however, that in the preceding there is not question of the case in which something obscene must be painted, for example for the assistance of anatomical and obstetrical science.

10° Fabricators of female adornment or dress (milliners, hair-dressers), who in their shops show to the eyes of passers-by samples so adorned and dressed that they are gravely offensive, by which namely women are represented in a manner wholly immodest and greatly provocative to lasciviousness.

11° Women or girls adorning themselves in such a way, as often happens in solemn dinners and evening gatherings (soirées). But here one must distinguish between adornment that of itself greatly excites to lasciviousness - such as enormous uncovering of the breasts or their translucent covering is judged to be - and adornment indeed immodest, but not of itself so lascivious, as perhaps is, for example, the uncovering of those parts more modest. Those assuming adornment of the first kind are not to be excused from grave sin of scandal. But those assuming adornment of the second kind are also not excused from mortal scandal if they introduce the use of such clothing where it is not in force; but if they follow a custom already introduced, certainly not in the least to be praised, indeed severely to be rebuked, yet they are not of themselves to be condemned of mortal sin, provided they intend nothing evil. For customary things, provided they are not altogether lascivious of themselves, are not accustomed to move passion so notably.

To be noted. - What we have observed in the last place about custom once introduced as to clothing not altogether lascivious, seems in some measure to have to be said also as to other matters, not simply obscene, for example as to comedies or equestrian games (circus), not notably impure. Hence I would indeed strive to dissuade from those comedies, etc., and, if it could be done, to root them out; but I would not dare in these provinces, where there is in force no special prohibition or Ecclesiastical censure concerning this matter, as elsewhere there is, to teach publicly that actors and actresses in those equestrian games also or comedies, which are made in a manner not to be praised, yet usual and not irreligious or gravely impure, are of themselves guilty of mortal scandal, and therefore unworthy of the Sacraments unless they abandon their office. Therefore let the pastor and confessor judge concerning individual cases, with account taken of the nature of the representations, of the usage of the places where they are made, and of the persons commonly attending; and regularly let him disapprove their office, but not condemn it as mortal unless this is sufficiently established. - We say the same a fortiori of simple lay spectators of such representations. Meanwhile we carefully warn here that in the preceding we have treated only of grave scandal to others; for if a question is instituted about the proximate occasion in which perhaps the actors themselves, etc., or spectators are situated, it will often happen that abstinence from their office or their attendance, which cannot be imposed upon the same under grave fault by title of grave scandal, nevertheless must be imposed under grave fault by title of their own proximate occasion; concerning which n. 1444, Resp. 2°, 3), will speak more broadly.

12° Finally, we still generally assign as guilty of scandal of themselves: a) clerics who, by retaining at home a person suspected by the people, furnish occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state; cf. Counc. Trent;¹ and the same must be said of a husband as to a maid-servant suspected by his wife not without reason; b) married women who, by admitting their handsome lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; c) parents who permit to their daughters conversations in the evening and in hidden places with betrothed men and lovers; and the same must be said of superiors as to servants and other domestics.

Section III. What Things Must Be Omitted So That Passive Scandal Or The Ruin Of The Neighbor May Be Avoided?

n. ¶296.

Preliminary note. - 1° We are not treating here of omitting direct active scandal, the malice of which is of itself manifest to anyone; but only of those things which are to be omitted under the fault of indirect active scandal, the description of which see above n. 291.

2° Mindful of the Apostolic word:¹ "giving no offense to any man," and at the same time of the exhortation of the divine Master Himself:² "Let them alone; they are blind"; Moralists commonly resolve: it is never licit to give the neighbor scandal, even indirect; but sometimes it can be licit simply to permit that the neighbor, beyond our intention, take scandal. But when someone morally must be judged, whether in a strict or in a certain broader sense, to give scandal; and when he can be judged licitly to permit the taking of scandal: this depends totally on this: whether by the law of charity he is held or not held to omit some word or deed precisely so that the ruin of the neighbor may be avoided. In the first hypothesis namely, he must be judged, in whatever sense finally, to give scandal; in the second hypothesis he can be judged licitly to permit the scandal of the neighbor. Hence of itself there arises the general question proposed in the title of this Section, the solution of which we now approach by parts, by positing four special questions, of which the first will regard things less right, the second indifferent things, the third spiritual goods, the fourth temporal goods.

n. ¶297.

First Question. - Must things less right always be omitted by the law of charity because of passive scandal of the neighbor foreseen from them?

Resp. Affirmatively, without any exception, if the things less right are already evil of themselves; indeed, speaking of itself, affirmatively also if they carry before themselves only the appearance of evil, as is established from the words of the Apostle:³ "from all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Cf. 1 Corinthians,⁴ where the Apostle thus addresses those who reclined in an idol's temple (which was not evil of itself, yet had the appearance of evil for the weak): "Take heed lest perhaps this liberty of yours become an offense to the weak." To this also pertains the very well-known heroic example of the venerable old man Eleazar.⁵

We have said: speaking of itself; for by accident it can be licit to do before others what bears the appearance of evil, namely if you have a legitimate reason of necessity or great utility, and at the same time you take care that, as far as lies in you, you remove the occasion of ruin by teaching, for example, those present (unless from circumstances they already sufficiently recognize it) that you can act licitly, that you can licitly eat meats on a fast day because you are excused from the precept of fasting because of a dispensation, etc. For where after these things scandal still arises or persists, it is generally rightly considered as purely accepted scandal, which from the law of charity (apart from the gravest or extreme necessity of the neighbor) we are not held to avoid with grave inconvenience of our own; unless perhaps at the same time there was question of such damage, for example of a community, of faith, or of religion, that it would have to be guarded against before one's own private damage.

n. ¶298.

Second Question. - From the law of charity must indifferent things be omitted from which the neighbor is thought to be about to accept scandal?

Resp. Affirmatively, as often as they can be omitted without notable inconvenience; because from charity we are held to impede the ruin of the neighbor when we easily can, for example by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. But on the contrary, negatively, as often as they cannot be omitted without such inconvenience; because then charity ceases to oblige. Here, however, one ought to notice with St. Alph.¹ that, other things being equal, a greater inconvenience is required the graver or the more certain the sin of the neighbor which is feared, or the more numerous are those to be scandalized; likewise a greater one is required so that scandal of the little ones may licitly be permitted than Pharisaic scandal, which for the most part, when a reasonable cause stands, is to be cared about little, unless perhaps fruit is hoped for from some easy delay, or unless the evil to be feared from it is far more notable than the good which will be obtained through our indifferent works. Besides, this still deserves to be noted: scandal of the little ones, persisting after admonition made to the little ones, can easily be equated to Pharisaic scandal.

From the given response, by way of example, it will be licit to resolve: Therefore a woman is not held to put aside decent adornment (which she assumes because it is fitting to her state, or to please her husband, or that she may find a spouse) because of the scandal of some indeterminate man; for this is to be reputed too grave for her. But if a woman foresees that some determinate man will fall from it into mortal sin, then for one or another time, if it could be done conveniently, she ought to lessen her adornment or abstain from the sight of such a man, but not for a long time, since this again would be too difficult. But if a woman of this sort, although she does not intend the ruin of such a man, nevertheless led by mere vanity, presents herself to his sight on purpose, she could not be excused from grave sin of scandal, just as she also would not be excused if she were to seek some place which she would not approach unless she knew that a shameful lover was there. Cf. St. Alph.¹ The following resolution, which occurs apud several Authors, can also be referred to this place: A woman or girl is held, when she knows certainly that some man sins gravely when she sits in his sight in church, to choose another place, if she conveniently can. - But from these resolutions, proposed by way of example, it will be licit to judge prudently about other similar cases, with account taken of the response given above.

n. ¶299.

Third Question. - To avoid the scandal of the neighbor, must spiritual goods sometimes be omitted by the law of charity?

Resp. Works good of themselves (under which are understood also omissions good of themselves) are either of counsel or of precept:

a) As to good works which are of mere counsel, the same thing must be established, preserving proportion, which we established in the preceding question about omitting indifferent works.

b) As to good works of precept one must say: they are never to be omitted because of scandal, whether Pharisaic or of the little ones, as often as they are absolutely necessary to salvation, as reception of Baptism before death, - or as often as they are prescribed from the law of nature, here and now urging, and not ceasing because of changed circumstances; for evils are not to be done, even venial ones, that good things may come. But where there is question of works prescribed from positive law alone, especially human law, for example of hearing Mass on Sunday, this distinction must be made: such works generally must not be omitted because of Pharisaic scandal; but whether they sometimes must be omitted because of scandal of the little ones is a question controverted among Authors, concerning which see St. Alph.² The opinion which seems practically able to be safely counseled holds: such works can more advisably and licitly be omitted because of scandal of the little ones, at least sometimes, but regularly they need not necessarily be omitted. - Therefore the confessor in the cases here supposed should proceed by persuading. See L. IV. 331.

n. ¶300.

Fourth Question. - Are temporal goods to be abandoned to avoid scandal?

Resp. Either there is question of temporal goods proper to us, or of another's goods committed to our care:

a) If the former: indeed they can licitly be abandoned, but ordinarily speaking they need not necessarily be abandoned to avoid scandal; for the law of charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not held, for example, to pay more than is equitable to some laborer, even if you foresee that he, notwithstanding your admonition about the justice of the payment, is going to blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often, and thus in the whole complex becomes grave. Similarly also a Pastor of himself is not held to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks forth into various slanders, etc.; for from this a grave inconvenience would happen not only to the pastor himself, but also to his successors.

b) If the latter: they cannot even licitly be abandoned, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed. Cf. St. Alph.,¹ where special warnings are also given to Prelates about ecclesiastical goods committed to their administration.

Section IV. Reparation Of Active Scandal.

n. ¶301.

- From the same law of charity by which we are prohibited from giving scandal to another, we are also commanded to remove or repair scandal once given, in the best way in which it can be done. But for this it is required that the scandalizer, having henceforth omitted the active scandal once given, should besides, as far as he morally can, try to remove its further evil influence, if namely such influence is still reasonably to be feared, as often happens where there is question, for example, of the scandal of a Superior toward subjects, or of scandal given to another through an evil command, an unjust counsel, the spread of a perverse book, and similar things. But by what ways a further effect of this sort can and must be removed, and therefore scandal repaired, must altogether be judged from the circumstances of the diverse cases, and generally it is established rather easily, provided especially that attention is paid to the special character of the scandal given and its publicity, and to the quality of the person scandalizing and the person scandalized.

Thus, for example, he who gave scandal to others through unjust counsels still efficacious will have to render them inefficacious, as far as he can, through diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or by another. A father of a family who scandalized the domestics ordinarily, for repairing the scandal (if it is still judged efficacious), will have to be obliged to manifest to those same domestics his displeasure over his bad example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future. A bad Author who through heretical, immoral, or defamatory writings incited others to sinning will be held, as far as he can, to retract these through new writings. A concubinarian, usurer, or other sinner of this kind who gave public scandal will also have to be constrained to its public reparation, for example that publicly, having first abandoned his wicked commerce or business, he approach the Sacraments with devotion.

As to other ordinary scandals, we think one must say: more commonly, for such scandals a special reparation, at least under grave sin, cannot be imposed; both because often they scarcely have any persisting efficacy, and also because, although they remain efficacious, often nevertheless morally they cannot be repaired otherwise with fruit (and no one is held to what is useless) except by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the furnishing of good example, in prayer for the scandalized person, and similar things. With prudence as guide, judge in this matter, and impose an obligation on no one unless it is sufficiently established.

Note. - To the reparation of scandal there also pertains the obligation of procuring that the scandalized person be recalled to penance or true conversion. Nevertheless this obligation generally of itself does not seem to urge under mortal sin, except in the case in which the scandalized person, because of ignorance or some other cause, does not have in his power the means of penance; for if he has them and does not wish to use them, then he must impute his impenitence to his own malice and not to another. Thus Scavini.¹

n. ¶13.

Point II. On Cooperation In The Sin Of Another.

…and 38 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 58 passages

Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity

INTRODUCTION

S. Th. I-II, qq. 26-28; I, q. 60; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1; C. G. IV, 19; Quodl. I, a. 8.

842. Charity according to the name. - The Latin word charitas is derived either from the Greek word charis, that is, grace, benevolence; or from the Latin word carum, that is, what is of great price. Each sense nearly falls back into the same thing, for one who is loved benevolently is generally esteemed of great price, and he who is held to be of great price is easily loved benevolently. Hence:

Charity originally and primarily signifies a gratuitous, liberal, honorable, benevolent, excellent love toward someone who is highly esteemed.

For although love, dilection, charity, and friendship in a certain sense pertain to the same thing, because they are the appetite of good, nevertheless in the proper and strict sense they are diverse: love and dilection properly signify an act; friendship is as it were a habit¹ or state; charity is said of both. Moreover, love is the most general term: for it signifies either a passion of the sensitive concupiscible appetite, or an act of the will; dilection adds, beyond love, a preceding election by which it happens that one thing is loved before another, whence it is an act of the will alone; charity adds, beyond dilection, some perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved by charity is esteemed of great price and is loved from benevolence. Finally friendship adds, beyond benevolence, mutual dilection or love in return: for it is mutual benevolence, founded upon a certain communication (Eth. VIII, 2; I-II, q. 26, a. 3). Hence St. Thomas says: "friendship is the most perfect among those things which pertain to love" (III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1).

¹ For human friendship is not a virtue but something consequent upon virtue. Q. D. de Virt. 2, a. 2, ad 8.

From the use of speech, however, charity is taken in a stricter sense, and is an eminent love of special friendship, whether natural or supernatural.

But in theological speech and in the strictest sense, only supernatural and divine friendship is called charity, as being more precious than all the others, esteeming God above all other things. Hence St. Thomas says: "friendship toward God is more precious and dear than all" (ibid., ad 7).

The aforesaid senses are handed down in Sacred Scripture: 1. charity is said of the uncreated love of God himself, a) by which he loves us (I Jn. IV, 8), indeed also b) the love of benevolence toward sinners who do not love him (Jer. XXXI, 3; Eph. II, 4); 2. natural friendship among men (II Mach. XIV, 26); 3. the love of supernatural friendship, namely, both a) the act by which we love God on account of himself and therefore our neighbor on account of God (Col. III, 14; Rom. XII, 10); and b) the habit of supernatural friendship toward God (I Cor. XIII, 13).

843. Charity is love. - Love is the coaptation of affection to the beloved good; under this respect knowledge and love differ: for a thing, through knowledge, is in a certain way drawn to the knower, because the agent intellect (by active virtue) acts upon the thing and takes and transforms the thing into itself; on the contrary, through love the lover is drawn to the beloved itself, because the thing acts upon the appetite and transforms the appetite (a passive virtue) into itself (I-II, q. 22, a. 2). Namely, affection or appetite is in some way informed and changed by the apprehended good, - is adapted, conformed, and assimilated to it, - is transformed into it, - and is united to it, one with it; and therefore it adheres to it as fixed in it, and rests in it and is complacent in it because it is fitting to itself; and as a weight it is inclined and tends toward it. Namely, it is the principle and beginning of tendency toward the good, and thus love differs from desire and joy: from desire, which is the movement or perfect tendency toward attaining the good, proceeding from the inclination of love; also from joy, which is rest in a good already possessed, because the complacency of love is completed by possession of the beloved.1 - Love is as it were a weight tending toward the beloved; desire is the weight already falling; joy is the rest of the weight in its proper place, namely, in the real possession and presence of the term.

But a threefold love is found in man. For, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 26, a. 1: Love is something pertaining to appetite, since the object of each is good; whence according to the difference of appetite there is a difference of love. For there is:

A certain appetite not following the apprehension of the one appetizing himself, but of another; and this kind is called natural appetite: for natural things desire what is fitting to them according to their nature, not through their own apprehension, but through the apprehension of the one instituting nature.

But another is an appetite following the apprehension of the one appetizing himself, yet from necessity, not from free judgment; and such is the sensitive appetite in brute animals, which nevertheless in men participates in some freedom, insofar as it obeys reason.

But another is an appetite following the apprehension of the one appetizing according to free judgment; and such is the rational or intellective appetite, which is called the will.

Moreover, in each of these appetites, love is called that which is the principle of the movement tending toward the beloved end:

a) But in the natural appetite the principle of this kind of movement is the connaturality of the one appetizing to that toward which it tends, which can be called natural love: just as the very connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place is through gravity and can be called natural love. Such natural love is in all the powers of the soul, and even in all parts of the body, and universally in all things, since each thing has connaturality to that which is fitting to it according to its nature.

b) Similarly, the coaptation of the sensitive appetite to some sensible good and the complacency of the sensitive appetite in a good apprehended sensibly is called sensible or sensitive love, which is concerned with qualities which please the senses and which are trifling and mutable, whence the love which arises from this is vain and inconstant.

c) Finally, the coaptation of the will to some intelligible good and the complacency of the will in a good apprehended by the intellect is called rational love, which arises from intellectual and moral endowments, such as perspicacity or promptness of mind, rectitude of judgment, wisdom, knowledge, prudence, benignity, fortitude and other virtues, nobility of soul, etc. This love is worthy of man, as being founded upon truly human qualities; and it is more constant, as relying on endowments which are less mutable and more stable.

All these things are taken from St. Thomas. Thus, for example, in I-II, q. 26, a. 2: "Passion is the effect of the agent in the patient. But the natural agent induces a double effect in the patient, for first indeed it gives form, secondly it gives motion consequent upon the form.... Thus also the appetible itself first gives to the appetite a certain coaptation to itself, which is a certain complacency of the appetible, from which follows movement toward the appetible.... For the appetible moves the appetite, making in it in some way its intention, and the appetite tends toward the appetible to be really attained, so that the end may be where the principle was. Therefore the first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than the complacency of the appetible; and from this complacency follows movement toward the appetible, which is desire; and finally rest, which is joy. Thus therefore, since love consists in a certain change of the appetite by the appetible, it is manifest that love is a passion, properly indeed according as it is in the concupiscible power, but commonly and by an extended name according as it is in the will." And in III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1: "Love pertains to appetite; but appetite is a passive power.... But every passive thing is perfected according as it is informed by the form of its active thing, and in this its movement is terminated and rests.... When affection or appetite is altogether imbued with the form of the good which is its object, it is complacent to itself in it and adheres to it as fixed in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of the affection into the thing loved. And because everything which is made the form of something is made one with it, therefore through love the lover becomes one with the beloved, which has been made the form of the lover, and therefore the Philosopher says that a friend is another self; and I Cor. VI, 17: He who adheres to God is one spirit. But each thing acts according to the exigency of its form, which is the principle of acting and the rule of the work. But the good is the end; the end, however, is the principle in operable things.... Whence... the lover, whose affection is informed by the good itself which has the aspect of end... is inclined through love to operating according to the exigency of the beloved." Summarily, in a. 3, ad 2: "Love makes the beloved fitting and connatural to the lover, insofar as it unites the affection of the lover to the beloved...," and a. 1, ad 2: "it is the union itself or bond or transformation by which the lover is transformed into the beloved and in some way converted into it." Cf. I-II, q. 28, aa. 1 and 2; q. 26, a. 2, ad 2.

844. Charity is benevolent love. - For there is a twofold rational love or love of election, namely, of concupiscence or desire, and of benevolence or friendship.1

In the former mode we love something (a thing or person) for our own advantage and utility, namely, on account of ourselves as a good to us or so that good may come to us from it. In the latter we love someone on account of himself, and therefore we will good to him as a good to him or so that good may come to him. To love a horse on account of utility, or food on account of delight, is of concupiscence: for no one has proper benevolence toward a horse or food; and similarly to love a man on account of utility or delight, for example, a master on account of wages. On the contrary, the love of a friend toward a friend or of a mother toward a son is of benevolence.

These differ in many ways:

By reason of the end for whom: for by love of concupiscence we love something on account of ourselves, so that it may be well for us; by love of benevolence we love someone on account of himself, so that it may be well for him.

By reason of the end which (the material object): love of concupiscence intends one's own advantage, namely, the proper good of the lover; love of benevolence, the good of another, namely, the good of the beloved himself.

By reason of the proximate motive (the formal object): by love of concupiscence we love something because it is good to us, insofar as good comes to us from it, so that the love does not rest in the beloved but returns to the lover; by love of benevolence we love someone because he is good in himself, so that the love rests in the person of the beloved because he has in himself the perfection by which he is lovable in himself.

That twofold love: a) relates as perfect and imperfect: the love of benevolence by which we love someone according to himself (as a good in himself), so that it may be well for him, is love in the full and proper sense; but the love of concupiscence by which we love something only on account of ourselves so that it may be a good to us, is love in an imperfect and analogical sense:² for we do not love it on account of itself but only as a good to us, insofar as we love ourselves so that that good may come to us. Hence:

² Benevolence is the principle of friendship, Eth. IX, c. 5.

b) they are always joined in some sense and subordinated to one another: for it is impossible that we covet something unless we will it to someone benevolently and loved on account of himself, and thus in the love of concupiscence by which we wish something for ourselves we also love ourselves benevolently - and vice versa, it is impossible that we love someone benevolently unless we covet some good for him;

c) nevertheless, love of concupiscence and benevolence differ morally: in the love of concupiscence by which we wish some good for ourselves, we also love ourselves benevolently; but because this benevolence is necessary and natural, it is not attended to in moral science, which judges moral and free human acts, and therefore this love is simply called of concupiscence; - on the contrary, in the love of benevolence by which we love someone on account of himself, we also covet and desire goods for him as for ourselves, but because this proceeds from the same benevolent motive, this love is simply called of benevolence.

And thus considered, love of concupiscence and benevolence are distinguished in moral species, according as they principally tend toward this or that proper good of the lover, or toward the good of another loved in himself. For our acts have their species from diverse objects or motives distinct from us.

"Just as a good... simply is that which has goodness itself, but what is a good of another is a good in a qualified sense; and consequently the love by which something is loved so that it may have good is love simply, but the love by which something is loved so that it may be the good of another is love in a qualified sense" (I-II, q. 26, a. 4). Hence Aristotle says, Eth. VIII, c. 3, that useful and delightful friendship are friendship per accidens, according to similitude and analogy, but not properly so called; and St. Thomas, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3: "because the good" (which someone wills to a friend) "is referred further to his own delight and utility, thence it is that useful and delightful friendship, insofar as it is drawn to love of concupiscence, falls short of the nature of friendship." Cf. q. 27, a. 3; Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 3; in Jn. XV, lect. 4.

n. 845.

845. Charity is love of friendship. - Moreover friendship is: a) mutual benevolence or love in return, whence it is said: a friend is a friend to a friend (Eth. VIII); b) mutually known or manifested, for otherwise dilection would be mutual per accidens and would not be true love in return or dilection of another insofar as he too loves; whence it is said: friendship is love in return not hidden (Eth. IV); c) stable and therefore founded upon communication, that is, community of the same goods, in the fellowship of the same life and of one intimate society, so that among friends there is a certain equality, from which by parity they can use familiar commerce, live together amicably in the same life, and enjoy the same happiness. Hence it is said: friendship either finds equals or makes them.

n. 845.

Scripture speaks excellently about friendship, Eccli. VI, 14-16: "A faithful friend is a strong protection; but he who finds him finds a treasure; for a faithful friend there is no comparison, and the weighing of gold and silver is not worthy against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is a medicine of life and immortality."

n. 846.

846. The remote foundation of every love and the condition on the part of the subject is the necessary and natural love of oneself: because we love ourselves benevolently and will supreme perfection or happiness for ourselves, therefore by love of concupiscence we will for ourselves this or that good as something which pertains to our happiness; and by love of benevolence we love others as ourselves and will good to them as to ourselves (q. 27, a. 3).

n. 846.

The proximate foundation of benevolence is some community of goods: for the similitude of the lover with the beloved makes the lover love the beloved as another self, and love good for him as for himself.³ - The proximate foundation of friendship is similitude even to equality, at least of proportion, arisen from communion in the same goods, namely, communication of one's own goodness, association in the same life, or at least destination or aptitude for the same life.⁴

³ In love of another, man imitates love of himself: just as unity in substance with ourselves is the foundation of love toward ourselves, so union in form or similitude with others is the foundation of love toward them. Cf. I-II, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2; q. 27, a. 3; q. 28, a. 1, ad 2.

⁴ Thus conformably to St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3; and d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4; and II-II, q. 25, a. 3.

n. 846.

For experience shows: a) friendship naturally arises among those who lead the same life, but does not arise among those who are greatly distant; b) according to diverse communion of life, friendship is diverse: thus natural friendship is founded upon the communication of natural life through generation; domestic, civil, or military friendship is founded upon communion in the same domestic, civil, or military life, etc.; and the more excellent the goods of some life are, the more excellent the friendship is; c) where the union in the same life is greatest, friendship is greatest, as is clear from the union of husband and wife.⁵

⁵ Communication of goods is not to be taken in the active sense for benefits mutually conferred: this is an effect of friendship, not the foundation. This can be necessary so that community of life may be present, but that is per accidens; it can also preserve and foster friendship. Thus according to the mind of Aristotle, and in this sense the definition is to be understood, as borrowed from him.

n. 847.

847. The remote foundation of every love and the condition on the part of the object is its goodness known as such, that is, insofar as it is proposed as proportioned to us: for it is impossible that someone love that which does not seem good or fitting to him; hence also naturally we love someone first by love of concupiscence insofar as he is our good, than by love of benevolence or friendship (q. 27, aa. 1 and 2).

n. 847.

The foundation or proximate motive, that is, the formal object according to which concupiscence, benevolence, and friendship differ, is that goodness considered in a diverse mode: for the motive of the love of concupiscence is the relative goodness of the thing, precisely as it is good to someone, because apt for perfecting and beatifying him; the motive of the love of benevolence is the absolute goodness of the person in himself, or his perfection, by which he is not only good to the one loving, but also good and lovable in himself; finally, the motive of friendship is the same goodness of the person in himself, but which we have in common with him, and on account of which we are also loved by him.

848. The chief effects of love, according to St. Thomas, are union or mutual inherence, ecstasy, zeal, universal influence upon the activity of the agent and subordination of actions to the beloved object, and wounding (q. 28).

Union, for any love tends to join lovers and from two or more to make one morally, according to that: And of the multitude of believers there was one heart and one soul (Acts IV, 32). It effects a double union: a) one affective, by force of which friends endeavor to will the same things and not will the same things, and the lover is in the beloved as reckoning the goods and will of the friend as his own, and conversely the beloved is in the lover because he loves him as himself. Thus it is read in Scripture (I Kings XVIII, 1): "The soul of Jonathan was glued to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul." Love causes this union formally; - b) another real, which consists in the presence and possession of the beloved; this union love makes effectively. This, however, although desired by lovers, is sometimes impeded or delayed by obstacles.

Ecstasy (ek-stasis, departure), by which the lover is as it were placed outside himself; this happens by a double act of intellect and will: a) according to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved, and love makes this ecstasy dispositively, insofar namely as it makes one meditate upon the beloved; but intense meditation on one thing abstracts from others; - b) according to affection he is carried outside himself: through the love of concupiscence, not content concerning the good which he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself; through the love of friendship, he does not act for himself alone, but wills and works good for the friend, as if carrying care and providence for him on account of the friend himself, not as to his own good but toward the good of the beloved, and love makes this ecstasy directly. Wherefore it is of the greatest moment to love only honorable and holy things, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and is made similar to the beloved.⁶

⁶ Mystical ecstasy is nothing other than the connatural redundancy of the state of the soul and of the higher faculties into the lower faculties and the body, by which namely the higher faculties so altogether inhere in God that the internal senses, or even the external, indeed also the corporeal faculties, are impeded, suspended, or totally bound, and the body preserves the state. Yet God also preternaturally can produce such an external state in those who have not yet arrived at the aforesaid grades of mystical life. - Rapture is nothing other than ecstasy which snatches by a sudden impulse.

Zeal, which comes from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever is opposed to this propensity. Thus, in the love of concupiscence, he who intensely covets something is by that very fact borne against everything which stands in the way of its attainment or quiet enjoyment; and in this way husbands are said to be zealous for their wives. In the love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of a friend is by that very fact vehemently moved against everything which is repugnant to his good; and according to this someone is said to be zealous for a friend, or also for God, when he tries according to his power to repel those things which are against the good of a friend, or against the honor or will of God. Whence Ps. LXVIII, 10: "Zeal for thy house has eaten me." (Cf. III Kings XIX, 14).

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions, IIbis. Questions Concernin…, II. On Sterilization, Question Three: On Cooperation in Sterilization · Ch. II, § B. Concerning Certain Sins Against Neighbor · Ch. II, § B. Concerning Certain Si…, Q. II, Which Is Opposed to Spiritual Goods

Universal influence upon the activity of the agent. Since love of the good (or end) is the cause of all things which the lover does, hence if one love is predominant, all things are done on account of it. And therefore he who vehemently loves someone orders all his actions to him, namely, toward pleasing him and attaining his friendship. From this it follows that nothing is of greater interest than rightly ordering one's affections, so that life itself may be rightly instituted; for, as Augustine says, De Civ. Dei, l. XIV, c. 28: "therefore two loves made two cities: namely, the earthly, love of self even to contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God even to contempt of self."

…and 18 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 144 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions, IIbis. Questions Concernin…, II. On Sterilization, Question Three: On Cooperation in Sterilization

n. ¶1656.

I. Cooperation is called every concurrence afforded to the action of another; in the present case, concurrence afforded to a sterilization to be decreed or performed by another.

n. ¶1657.

It can be given in diverse ways. One kind is cooperation in the broad sense, which occurs through a moral influence upon the will of another, whether directly and positively, as by commanding, counseling, requesting, seducing, consenting, and so forth; or indirectly and negatively, by not admonishing or not impeding, when someone can and ought to admonish or impede. Another is cooperation in the strict sense, which occurs through a real or physical influence, as by assisting, partially causing, supplying means, and so forth. This is immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator executes the work itself with the principal agent, as if he takes away another's property by carrying it together with a thief; or only supplies means by which the other can perform the work, or can perform it more easily. In the latter case the cooperation can be more proximate or more remote, according as the means exercises a greater or lesser influence and is more or less connected with the work of the other.

n. ¶1658.

By reason of intention, one kind of cooperation is formal, when the cooperator consents to the will of the principal agent and intends the latter's work; another is merely material, when he does not consent to the latter's intention, but acts from another intention with foresight that the other will use it to perpetrate his work.

n. ¶1659.

Now the question is asked whether it is licit to cooperate in sterilization.¹ Here the question concerns illicit sterilization; for if the sterilization is licit, it is also licit to cooperate in it, provided this is done by means which are not evil.

¹ Cf. Grosam, Die Sterilisation auf Grund privater Auktorität und auf Grund gesetzlicher Ermächtigung, in Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, 1930.

n. ¶1660.

II. Formal cooperation, which proceeds from an evil intention and from approval of illicit sterilization, is always evil and prohibited. Indeed, it is a sin of the same species as sterilization, as a concurrence formally intending and approving it. Hence it is a special sin against justice.

n. ¶1661.

Such are not only those who spontaneously offer themselves to be sterilized, but also physicians who, on their own initiative and without being bound by a public office, deliberately carry out an illicit sterilization; editors and writers who recommend and propagate it from conviction; deputies who approve by vote a law that sterilization is to be performed; and spouses who consent to the sterilization of their consort. Indeed, negative cooperators could in this way be guilty, namely, magistrates, officials, and agents who knew that evil sterilizations were being performed in their territory, provided they could and by reason of office ought to impede them, and could do so without inconvenience, but did not.

n. ¶1662.

III. Merely material but real cooperation, whether immediate or mediate, proximate or remote. Merely material cooperation is that which, without an evil intention or consent to another's sin, someone freely affords to the action of another, but rather unwillingly, in order, for example, to avoid an inconvenience or loss, or to procure gain for himself.

n. ¶1663.

If it is immediate, it is always evil, because it consists in the execution of the evil action itself. There is an exception when external goods of fortune are involved, to the removal of which the owner can consent; but this exception does not come under consideration in the question of sterilization, to which it is licit for no one to consent unless it were necessary for bodily health. Hence immediate cooperation in the action of decreeing or performing sterilization is intrinsically evil, just as sterilization itself is, and indeed it is a sin of the same species as the work itself.

n. ¶1664.

Thus physicians who perform the operation unwillingly because they are compelled by law themselves cooperate immediately in the execution of a wicked law; or two physicians who together immediately execute the operation of sterilization itself.

n. ¶1665.

Mediate cooperation, however, is that which supplies the means required for performing sterilization, by preparing or assisting. This also is of itself illicit unless there is a grave reason, and indeed a proportionately grave one; that is, a reason graver in proportion as the cooperation is more proximate and in proportion as it is more necessary, that is, as the sterilization would more probably be prevented if the cooperation were refused.

n. ¶1666.

For it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself which has two equally immediate effects: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided there is a proportionately grave reason for acting. But merely material mediate cooperation has immediately a good effect which alone is intended. Therefore it is licit, provided the action is not evil in itself and there is a proportionately grave reason or a sufficient cause for cooperating.

n. ¶1667.

Such cooperators are assisting physicians and nurses; a nurse who, for example, under the direction of a physician, attends to a Roentgen apparatus; subordinate officials who, by writing records or giving some assistance, cooperate in the execution of the law; workers who prepare the instruments or keep them clean or heated; and a fortiori those who hand instruments to the physician during the operation.

n. ¶1668.

Cooperation that is altogether proximate, such as that of assisting physicians or nurses who attend to the apparatus, demands a most grave cause, for example, if they would lose their means of support but nevertheless could not impede the sterilization. It would very rarely be licit for Catholic Sisters, for example, if otherwise they would be expelled from the institution with great harm to religion.

n. ¶1669.

Proximate but more remote cooperation requires a lesser cause, yet one still grave, for example, a grave inconvenience, and a greater cause in proportion as the cooperation is more proximate.

n. ¶1670.

Cooperation can be altogether remote, for which the reason of one's office itself suffices. Thus it is licit for servants to keep the operating room or chamber clean or heated.

n. ¶1671.

In a case in which there is not a sufficient reason for mediate cooperation, there is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the action of the principal agent; in the present case, against justice, because it is to assist in injuring justice by an unjust sterilization, although the sin is not of the same most specific species or the same gravity. Moreover, scandal, which can arise, is to be avoided; concerning it only those who know all the circumstances of places and persons can judge. This is not always easy. Hence, if it is doubtful whether scandal is to be feared in the concrete case, judgment concerning it in determinate circumstances pertains to the local Ordinaries, who are able to know and estimate all the circumstances.

n. ¶1672.

IV. Moral cooperation is especially that by which someone positively influences the will of him who does evil, and it coincides with direct scandal or scandal inducing one to sin. It is committed, for example, by commanding, counseling, praising, requesting, protecting the sin, in the present case sterilization, or consenting to it.

n. ¶1673.

This is a sin against charity, because it is scandal; and at the same time against the virtue which it induces one to violate, because it directly induces one to this. In the present case it is against justice, which is injured in a special manner whether by private sterilization or by public sterilization.

n. ¶1674.

Such are those who by private authority decree that someone is to be sterilized; those who summon a physician and request sterilization for another; those who command sterilization or invite another to it; and those who report the sick in order that they be sterilized.

n. ¶1675.

V. Observation. Illicit cooperation is not only a sin against the virtue or precept to whose violation concurrence is afforded; it is also against charity when the sin would be prevented if the cooperation were omitted.

n. ¶1676.

VI. Applications. From the foregoing it follows:

n. ¶1677.

It is illicit to recommend or counsel sterilization, to request it or formally consent to a request for it, to present a report or vote concerning persons infected with hereditary disease in order that they be sterilized, or to summon a physician for this purpose; because to recommend, counsel, request, or in any way procure a thing intrinsically evil, and so forth, is likewise intrinsically evil. But merely to report or explain the law of sterilization without approval, merely to indicate diseases or merely to report sick persons while nevertheless knowing that they are to be sterilized, and to summon a physician without saying anything, are not intrinsically evil. Hence, by these means, merely material cooperation can be licit for a grave cause and with scandal excluded. Scandal, however, could easily arise from a public explanation of the law made ex officio.

n. ¶1678.

It is illicit for physicians to perform the operation of sterilization or to take active parts in carrying out the very act of sterilizing, because this is to do something intrinsically evil. On the contrary, to be present or assist during the operation, to hand over instruments, or to watch over the patient is not of itself intrinsically evil. Wherefore, merely material cooperation in this manner can be licit, but only for a graver cause, because it is altogether proximate cooperation.

n. ¶1679.

Likewise, it is illicit for a physician to persuade patients to present themselves for the execution of sterilization, even if he acts thus from the obligation of a public office or of the law, and after the tribunal has pronounced a sentence of sterilization, because to counsel a thing intrinsically evil is always intrinsically evil. Nevertheless, perhaps it would not be illicit to say, "You know the provisions of the law," and merely to declare them without adding persuasion, but only for a graver cause, because this is proximate cooperation.

n. ¶1680.

Likewise, it is illicit to present oneself voluntarily for sterilization, because this is to request and consent to a thing intrinsically evil, even if it is done lest a person, after the sentence of the tribunal has already been pronounced, suffer force through compulsion. Rather, he ought not yield except to violence. It is sufficient, however, that force begin to be applied, for example, if an official places his hand upon the shoulder, or if he declares that he has come to employ the force of compulsion. It is not necessary to offer further resistance, because it is then evident to all that the person does not proceed voluntarily but yields to compulsion.

n. ¶1681.

Likewise, it is illicit for anyone to permit sterilization to be performed upon himself; rather, he ought to avoid it insofar as is morally possible for him, and to withdraw himself from the sterilization to be imposed.

n. ¶1682.

Likewise, it is illicit to compel the sick by force to present themselves for sterilization, even if someone acts thus after the sentence of the tribunal has been pronounced and from the obligation of his office, because this is to compel another to a thing intrinsically evil. This is to be understood of officials who act by their own authority and according to their own judgment, but not of altogether subordinate agents who merely ministerially execute orders by leading persons to a determinate place, and who do not always understand the nature of the thing prescribed or to be executed. These appear to be excused by reason of their office, unless something were demanded of them out of hatred of religion or something manifestly dishonorable.

n. ¶1683.

Likewise, it is illicit to discharge the office of judge in a special tribunal instituted solely to treat cases of sterilization. A fortiori, it is illicit to pronounce a decretory sentence that sterilization is to be executed, because this is to command a thing intrinsically evil.

n. ¶1684.

Let it not be thought that the judge only pronounces that the conditions indicated in the law have been verified, upon the presence of which the law itself commands sterilization. On the contrary, the judge does not merely declare the law, but as a superior applies the law by his authority to particular cases and persons. For these he commands in the concrete, authentically intimates the obligation to them, and renders them liable to sterilization, since the law commands that they be rendered liable. Hence he establishes and introduces a new obligation, wherefore his sentence is like a particular law.² But directly to command a thing intrinsically evil and to oblige one to it is illicit.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 67, a. 1.

n. ¶1685.

The judge, namely, cannot licitly apply an iniquitous law; iniquitous, I say, not only by reason of incompetence, because it is enacted concerning things not subject to the civil power, for in that case the Church could sometimes concede this or renounce its right; but iniquitous by reason of the matter or the thing prescribed, because it commands against the natural law. It is never licit, namely, to command a thing intrinsically evil and contrary to natural right.³

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 5, ad 1.

n. ¶1686.

You will object: a. The judge does not act spontaneously and freely, but is compelled by the force of law. Therefore he is not responsible for the effect of the law. One who is compelled appears to afford only merely material cooperation, which can be licit for a grave cause.

n. ¶1687.

Response. He is compelled not by physical force but by moral violence which leaves freedom. What is done from fear is involuntary in a qualified respect, because it is done with repugnance, but is voluntary simply. The judge acts as an agent, while the legislator gives the mandate. Just as the legislator is responsible for the mandate of the law, so the judge is responsible for the execution of the mandate or law. And just as it is not licit to command something intrinsically evil, neither is it licit to execute it. Thus the judge cooperates immediately in the execution of the iniquitous law; and he formally moves another toward a thing intrinsically evil by commanding it, which is direct scandal.

n. ¶1688.

b. St. Thomas says that it is licit for a judge to condemn an innocent man whom he knows by private knowledge to be innocent, but who publicly and juridically has been convicted of a crime.⁴ In judgment he ought to be directed not according to what he himself knows as a private person, but according to what becomes known to him as a public person.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 67, a. 2, and q. 64, a. 6, ad 3.

n. ¶1689.

Response. It is one thing to apply a law which is just in itself and favors the common good but which per accidens has an evil effect; it is another to apply a law unjust according to itself. It is one thing to compel him who has been juridically convicted of a crime according to laws just in themselves; it is another to compel him who is plainly manifest to be innocent and whom iniquitous laws alone intend to oblige to something intrinsically evil. This latter plainly cannot be licit, whereas the former could appear licit in certain circumstances.

n. ¶1690.

c. According to many, it is licit for a judge to pronounce a civil divorce, which nevertheless is intrinsically evil.

n. ¶1691.

Response. Those who think thus say that civil divorce is not intrinsically evil, because it does not dissolve the marriage but only the civil contract, and removes civil protection from the marriage, and consequently the opposition of the law to new civil nuptials. It is altogether another thing to command something intrinsically evil, which is never licit. Hence, if the pronouncement of civil divorce were evidently intrinsically evil, neither could it ever be licit.

n. ¶1692.

No solid probability belongs to these and other similar little arguments which could be adduced. Wherefore it is in no way probable that it is licit for a judge to pronounce the execution of sterilization.

Ch. II, § B. Concerning Certain Sins Against Neighbor

n. ¶4686.

Sins against neighbor are opposed to charity or justice with their annexed virtues. But they can harm the neighbor in his various goods: in the internal goods of his own person, whether of body or of soul; in the goods of marriage, as regards the person joined to him; in the external goods of fortune; in the goods of reputation and honor, and of friendship and peace. To these various goods diverse sins are opposed.

Ch. II, § B. Concerning Certain Si…, Q. II, Which Is Opposed to Spiritual Goods

n. ¶4759.

I. Notions. - Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, or an external action (or omission), whether evil in itself or having the appearance of evil, because, namely, it is apt to induce and draw the neighbor into sin.¹

¹ There may be consulted St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43; St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. II, n. 33-58; Aertnijs, Th. M., I, l. II, n. 57 sq., II, l. VI, n. 316-321; Noldin, Th. M., II, n. 102 sq.; Berardi, opusc. De Occasionariis.

n. ¶4760.

This definition is of scandal which is active or given. For passive scandal, or scandal received, is the spiritual ruin itself or sin of the neighbor, into which he has fallen by occasion taken from another's word or deed; and this is either received because given, when it arises from active scandal, or from the less right word or deed of another, or received only, when someone takes occasion from another's action altogether right: whether this happens from his own weakness, i.e., from ignorance or frailty, and then it is called scandal of the little ones, as if a young man from the modest adornment of a girl takes occasion of desiring her; or whether it happens from malice, and then it is called pharisaical, as if someone from the good works of another takes occasion of detracting from him or of hating him.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 1, ad 4.

…and 104 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 1 passage

Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter III. On the Virtue of Charity

n. 165.

Charity is the virtue by which we love God as the supreme good on account of himself, and our neighbor on account of God. Hence there is a twofold material object of charity, namely God as the primary object, and neighbor as the secondary object. Here it will be necessary to treat distinctly concerning each.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 53 passages

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity in Itself · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity in Itself, Comprising all that concerns charity in itself · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity toward the Neig…, Whether man ought from charity to love himself, his own body, and sinners? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity toward the Neig…, Whether enemies are to be loved from charity, and signs and works of charity shown to them?

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity

(St. Thomas, qq. 23 to 46.)

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity in Itself

(St. Thomas, q. 23.)

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity in Itself, Comprising all that concerns charity in itself

[Charity is also called love. Love is an inclination toward good. For the good proposed to the appetite moves and inclines it toward itself like a weight, according to the most famous saying of Augustine, book XIII of the Confess., ch. 9, n. 10 : « My weight is my love ; by it I am carried wherever I am carried. » This inclination of the appetite toward good is called love or complacency. If it is with the election of one good over another, it is called dilection. If it is of a good that is esteemed at a great price, it is called charity. If finally it is with mutual affection, it is called friendship. Love therefore extends more widely than dilection, charity and friendship.

Love is threefold : 1° natural, by which each thing, even non-cognitive, appetites the good suitable to itself; thus a heavy body is said to love the center. 2° animal or sensitive, which follows the apprehension of the senses, and is found also in brutes. 3° rational, which follows the apprehension of the intellect, and this again is twofold, namely of concupiscence, which tends to the object that is loved; and of benevolence, which tends to the person for whom it is loved, and if in addition there be a return of affection on the part of the person loved, it will be the love of friendship. What is loved with the love of benevolence is loved simply and in itself; but what is loved with the love of concupiscence is not loved simply and in itself, but is loved for another. Hence the love of benevolence is love simply, and the love of concupiscence is love in a certain respect.]

Habitual charity is usually defined thus : « A virtue divinely infused, by which God is loved for Himself and the neighbor for God. »

You will ask 1° whether charity is properly called friendship with God.

I answer. Charity is true and properly called friendship between God and man¹²³ ¹²³ Here q. 23, a. 1, o.

Proof. 1° from Scripture¹²⁴ : Christ, John, XV, 14 et 15, says to the Apostles : You are my friends, and : I will no longer call you servants. But I have called you friends. James, II, 23 : Abraham was called the friend of God. Ps., CXXXVIII, 17 : Exceedingly magnified are thy friends, O God. Now nothing can be assigned whereby men are the friends of God except charity. ¹²⁴ Ibid., o.

Proof. 2° For true and properly so-called friendship three conditions are commonly required¹²⁵ : first, that the love be of benevolence, whereby we wish good to someone for his sake; not of concupiscence, whereby we wish good for our own sake. The second condition is that the love be mutual; for a friend is a friend to his friend, and is called as it were one who loves back (amicatus), so that such love is as it were a bond between two. The third condition is that this mutual love be founded on some sharing; for those who share in nothing have no union with one another. Now these three conditions are found in the love of charity. Therefore. ¹²⁵ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

n. 8.

It is proved 1° By charity man loves God for Himself as last end, and God loves man for his sake, not as for His last end, but for his benefit, or as for the subject to whom He wills eternal beatitude, and thus on both sides it is love of benevolence. 2° It is mutual love; for by charity we love him who loves us, according to that text, Prov., VIII, 17 : I love them that love me, and, John, XIV, 21 : He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him. 3° There is a communication of beatitude here through grace in right and in hope, in heaven in fact. Therefore.

n. 9.

You will ask 2° what is the object of charity.

n. 10.

I answer. 1° It is certain that God is the thing loved by charity, that is, its material, principal and primary object, and in this respect its formal object quo. For by charity we understand nothing else than the dilection of God, according to that text, Matt., XXII, 37 et 38 : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.... This is the first and greatest commandment. Likewise it is certain that the neighbor is the secondary material object of charity; because charity is, as we said, the friendship of man with God. But the law of friendship requires that we love not only the friend, but all who specially belong to him. Hence that text, ibid., 39 : Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

n. 11.

I answer. 2° The formal object quo, or the motivating formal reason of charity, is uncreated goodness as lovable in itself and for itself, knowable in the supernatural light¹²⁶ ¹²⁶ Here q. 23, a. 5, o and ad 2 ; q. 25, a. 1, o.

n. 12.

Proof. Charity 1° is love. But love is not of anything except under the reason of good. 2° It is love of God. Therefore it is of God under the reason of divine good. 3° It is love, not of concupiscence, which generates hope ; but of benevolence. Therefore under the reason of divine good, not as advantageous to us, but as it is in itself and lovable for itself.

n. 13.

I said : « Knowable in the supernatural light ; » because to love God for his goodness as known by the natural light would be natural love, not supernatural, such as charity is.

n. 14.

You will ask 3° whether God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species.

n. 15.

I answer. God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species : God for Himself, the neighbor for God¹²⁷ ¹²⁷ Here q. 25, a. 1, o.

n. 16.

Proof. The act whereby God is loved for Himself and the act whereby the neighbor is loved for God are of the same species¹²⁸. Therefore the habit of charity is of the same species. — The consequence is plain, because habits are specified by acts. — Proof of antecedent. The act which bears on the reason of an object and the act which bears on an object under such a reason are of the same species : just as the vision whereby light is seen and the vision whereby color is seen are of the same species; for the species of the act is taken from the object according to its formal reason. Now the formal reason for loving the neighbor is God; for this is what we must love in the neighbor, that God may be in him, that he may cling to Him as to the last end, and thence God may be loved, praised and glorified for His infinite goodness and perfection : and thus it is plain that the formal reason for loving the neighbor is the infinite goodness of God, lovable in itself and for itself. Therefore. ¹²⁸ Ibid.

n. 17.

You will conclude 1° that to love the neighbor from another motive, say for benefits received, for his outstanding qualities, whether natural or supernatural, inasmuch as they are his perfections, is not the love of charity; because he is not thus formally loved in reason of the divine goodness : but it is natural love. Nor does it matter that perhaps they are supernatural qualities; for supernaturality there plays a material role, if the reason for loving is not supernatural : thus e. g., the impenitent sinner, who knows heaven by the light of faith, loves it with natural love.

n. 18.

I said : « Inasmuch as they are his perfections ; » because, if they are considered as participations of the divine perfection, it seems that they are even thus loved with the love of charity; for, although they are infinitely distant from the infinite perfection of God, yet it is not so much he himself as the very perfection of God in them that is loved : just as in an image the prototype is loved, who is the whole reason for loving the image.

n. 19.

You will conclude 2° that charity is one virtue whole in species¹²⁹; because, if from any head it were divided into several species, especially from this head, that it is concerned with God and the neighbor. But from this head it is not diversified, as has been proved. Therefore. ¹²⁹ Here q. 23, a. 5, o.

n. 20.

You will ask 4° how charity stands in relation to the other virtues.

n. 21.

I answer. 1° Charity is more excellent than the other virtues.

n. 22.

Proof. 1° from the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 13 : And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greater of these is charity. 2° Faith and hope are compatible with sin, charity is not. 3° Hope and faith involve imperfection : hope, one's own advantage; faith, obscurity; neither of these is in charity of itself.

n. 23.

I answer. 2° Without charity there can be true virtue, but imperfect¹³⁰; because without charity there can be a good quality which is a steadfast principle of a good act, consequently true virtue. But because without charity it does not order to the last end, nor make one act meritoriously for eternal life, it is not perfect virtue. See the treatise on the Virtues, dissert. II, a. 4, § 3, where we treated this matter ex professo. ¹³⁰ Ibid., a. 8, o.

n. 24.

I answer. 3° Charity is the form of the other virtues, not intrinsically and essentially, otherwise all virtues would be of the same species; but extrinsically and accidentally, inasmuch as by it they are referred to the supernatural last end, by which as it were by an ornament they are formed in the supernatural order.

n. 25.

That charity is distinguished from grace we proved in many ways in the treatise on Grace, dissert. IV, a. 1, You will ask 4°. Let the reader consult it.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity toward the Neig…, Whether man ought from charity to love himself, his own body, and sinners?

1° : Man must love himself out of charity¹⁴⁴. ¹⁴⁴ This q. 23, a. 4, sol.

It is proved. Man must love his neighbor as himself, Matt., XIX, 19. Now he must love his neighbor out of charity. Therefore also himself.

It is confirmed. 1°. God, as infinitely good, is worthy to be loved by all with the love of friendship. Therefore man must, on account of God, will this love to himself. Now this is to love oneself with the love of charity. Therefore.

It is confirmed. 2°. The friendship of charity is founded in the communication of beatitude. Therefore those are to be loved out of charity to whom we will beatitude. Now man must will beatitude to himself. Therefore.

I say 2° : Man must love his own body out of charity¹⁴⁵, not only as what he wills to his friend as a good, but even as that to which he wills good. The reason of the first part is that our body can be an instrument of good works by which God is honored. The reason of the second part is that, although our body is not capable of eternal beatitude consisting in knowing and loving God, it is nevertheless capable of a participated beatitude which overflows from the glorified soul into it. ¹⁴⁵ Ibid., a. 5, c., and ad 2.

I say 3° : Sinners are to be loved out of charity according to nature, not according to guilt¹⁴⁶. The reason of the first part is : partly because sinners, according to nature, are capable of beatitude, which we must will them for God's sake ; and partly because a sinner does not cease to be a neighbor, according to that word, Matt., XVIII, 15 : If thy brother sin against thee. If brother, then neighbor. Finally, we are commanded to love our enemies, as will presently be proved. Therefore also sinners ; for sinners are enemies. The reason of the second part is evident ; for guilt is contrary to God and is an impediment to beatitude. Whence David said, Psal. CXVII, 113 : The wicked I have hated. ¹⁴⁶ Ibid., a. 6, sol.

You will say : Holy men imprecate evils upon sinners, as Psal. IX, 18 : Let the sinners be turned into hell. Psal. CIII, 35 : Let the sinners fail from the earth, and the wicked, so that they be no more. Isa., VI, 10 : Blind the heart of this people, and make his ears heavy. Therefore.

n. 8.

I answer.¹⁴⁷ Imprecations of this kind are to be understood either by way of foretelling, not of wishing. Thus is understood that word : Let the sinners be turned into hell, that is, they will be turned; and this : Blind the heart of this people, that is, thou shalt blind. Or indeed by way of wishing ; yet so that the desire is not referred to the punishment of men, but either to the justice of God punishing, so that it becomes as it were an approbation of the divine justice, or to the removal and destruction of guilt : in which sense is understood : Let the sinners fail from the earth, and the wicked, so that they be no more ; that is, according as they are sinners and wicked, or according to guilt. ¹⁴⁷ Ibid., ad 3.

n. 9.

[Hence you will gather that it is not lawful to wish eternal damnation upon anyone still living in this world : partly because it cannot be a means toward obtaining a greater good, or avoiding a greater evil ; partly because it is contrary to the end for which we must love our neighbor out of charity ; and finally because no man is to be despaired of while he lives. Nor is it even lawful for anyone to desire that another sin, because to sin is simply evil. It is permitted, however, according to many, to wish that God permit some to sin, so that from it they may rise again humbler and more cautious ; for then sin is not desired as an evil, but insofar as God can draw forth a good from it, or rather there is desired the good which is hoped to arise from it, should it please God to procure that good by this means.]

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On Charity toward the Neig…, Whether enemies are to be loved from charity, and signs and works of charity shown to them?

1° : Enemies are to be loved out of charity, not as enemies, for that would be to love sin, but as men ; certainly with a common love, not a special one, speaking per se¹⁴⁸. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid., a. 8, o.

Proof. 1° From that text, Matt., V, 44 : Love your enemies. And so that Christ may prove it to be a precept for all, he adds, ibid., 45 : That you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven. But it is necessary for all unto salvation to be children of the heavenly Father¹⁴⁹. ¹⁴⁹ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

2° In the Lord's Prayer, Matt., VI, 12, we ask God to forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. Therefore it is a precept to forgive enemies, otherwise forgiveness is not given to us. Likewise, ibid., 15 : If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins.

3° There is a precept that we love our neighbor. Yet the enemy is a neighbor ; for the reason of neighbor consists in this, that one be made to the image of God and can be a partaker of eternal beatitude. Therefore.

…and 13 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 1 passage

Bk. III, Dissertation II — On charity towards God

The last place among the theological virtues charity occupies, because it is their end and goal. This is the bond of Christian perfection, without which all the rest profit nothing, and with which all things profit unto eternal life. But — what cannot be sufficiently lamented — not a few Casuists have attempted, by their lax opinions, as it were to extinguish this virtue above the rest, and to reduce its exercise almost to nothing, as will become plain from the following theses.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 2 passages

Tr. I, Disputation VIII: On Charity

ON CHARITY, the Seraphic Bonaventure left monuments of his divine nature indeed brilliant and worthy, written as if with solar rays, that they might gleam in the eyes of all, everywhere in his Opuscula, and in other books; but especially in the Diaeta salutis, tit. 5. c. 2. he illustrates it with various comparisons, by which he symbolically epitomizes whatever he has said of it more fully elsewhere, reducing the whole to its figurative Type, its virtual act, and its final fruit.

Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 1. Almsgiving · Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 2. Scandal · Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 3. Scandal and Co-operation · Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 4. Fraternal Correction and Race-suicide

TRULY, since these things serve more for inflaming the affections than for Scholastic erudition, I refer the reader to that place, where he will admire Charity as gold proved, most precious; as burning iron, everywhere Ductile; as wine seasoned, always sweet. He will also behold it as a noble bird, ever flying upward and touching the earth only by necessity of sustenance; as a laden ship, sailing over the sea of this world by the breath of the Holy Spirit alone; as, finally, death slaying the wicked sense of the flesh, or Carnality. But here, as the gift of the school, we shall discourse on Charity, as the Seraphic Doctor handed it down in the various distinctions, on the books of the Sentences.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 70 passages

Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 1. Almsgiving

Titius, a workman who lived in a certain town, had sought in vain for several weeks for work by which he might support himself and his family. The money which he had was already spent, and the family lived on food given by a certain good woman. Yet for several weeks no rent due to the landlord on account of the letting of the house had been paid, and unless it is paid this Saturday, the house will have to be left. Since Titius knew that other housing could scarcely be obtained by a poor man, he went to Caius, a sufficiently wealthy Catholic to whom he was known, and asked him to help toward paying the rent. Caius, however, refused, on the ground that the poor rates were already sufficiently heavy and because he had determined with himself that he would never give alms unless it were necessary for saving someone’s life, since it is established that most beggars are pretended poor persons. But afterward, touched by a scruple because he knew that Titius was placed in true necessity, Caius asked his confessor whether in such a case he was bound to give alms. Hence it is asked:

To what does charity oblige in general?

What is the obligation of giving alms, and of what kind is it?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

To what in general does charity oblige us? Charity, in general, obliges us to love God above all things, for His own sake, and our neighbor as ourselves, for the sake of God. Love here does not designate a feeling, but an act of the will by which we are determined to cling to God and not to be separated from Him by sin, because we esteem Him above all other things whatever. The first material object of charity is God Himself; the second is our neighbor. Charity for our neighbor obliges us to both internal and external acts. Internally we are bound by the law of charity to wish well to all, to pray for all, and never to allow ourselves any thought, word, or deed, to the injury of any one. This internal love shows itself in deed by helping our neighbor in his necessities as far as we can.

Of what sort is the obligation to give alms?

Alms is help given to the indigent in their necessity, and that there is an obligation to help the indigent as far as we can follows from the nature of charity, and from the express words of Holy Scripture in many places.¹ In order to measure the gravity of this obligation, we must consider the necessity in which he who is to be helped is placed, and the capacity of helping him of the person who is to be bound by the obligation. Theologians distinguish three degrees of necessity. A poor man is in extreme necessity when he is in danger of dying from starvation, and can do nothing to help himself. If one is in the same danger, but can, with difficulty, do something to help himself, he is in grave necessity. Ordinary beggars are in common necessity. The goods out of which alms can be given are either necessary for the support of one’s own life and the lives of those who are dependent on us, or are necessary to live in the style suitable to one’s condition in life, or they are superfluous. As a general rule, we are bound to give alms only out of our superfluity. This obligation is grave when we find a neighbor in extreme, or in grave necessity; in the common necessity of another it is probably only light.

1 Compare 1 John iii. 16.

The case. Titius was a workman in a certain town, but he had been out of work for several weeks. All his savings had been spent, and his family lived on food given them by a good neighbor. The rent for his house was in arrears and the landlord gave him notice to quit unless the rent was paid by the end of the week. He knew that there was little chance of getting other lodgings in the circumstances, so he went to Caius, a well-to-do Catholic to whom he was known, and asked him for help toward paying his rent. Caius refused on the ground that the poor rates were heavy and because he had made a resolution never to give alms unless to one in extreme necessity. However, Caius was afterward uneasy about what he had done and asked his confessor whether there was an obligation to give alms in such a case.

His confessor will doubtless tell Caius that there is a grave obligation to give alms in such a case as is here given. Titius and his family were in grave necessity, as they were in danger of being thrust out of their home without the prospect of being able to find lodgings elsewhere. Caius knew that this case at any rate was genuine. There was no indication of the help required being obtainable from some other source. Caius could afford what would have been sufficient to relieve the distress of Titius. Under these circumstances Caius was strictly bound by a grave obligation to help a poor fellow-Catholic.¹ The reasons why some theologians allow that grave sin may not be committed by refusing alms in such cases are excluded by the circumstances of this case. It is no excuse to say that the man and his family might have gone to the workhouse. A respectable workman would not unfrequently rather die than subject himself and his family to such a disgrace and moral danger, and such feelings claim our respect and consideration.

1 Compare Matt. xxv. 42.

Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 2. Scandal

Julius, an English commander in India, when he saw that very many soldiers were being rendered unfit for war because of venereal diseases contracted from common prostitutes, expelled from the camps all the prostitutes infected with disease, and asked Caius, a subordinate officer and a Catholic, to provide healthy women for the use of the soldiers. Although Caius knew that according to the laws of the army Julius could not enforce the command, he acquiesced and procured several healthy women. Wounded and returned to England, while confessing to a priest, he asked whether he had acted lawfully. Hence it is asked:

What is the sin of scandal, and how are direct and indirect scandal distinguished?

Whence arises the obligation of abstaining from scandal, especially direct scandal?

Is it the sin of scandal to induce to sin someone already prepared for it?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

What is the sin of scandal and what is the difference between direct and indirect scandal ?

Scandal is any word or action having at least the appearance of evil which is the occasion of sin to another. When another’s sin is intended by him who gives scandal, this scandal is direct; when it is foreseen but not intended, it is indirect.

Whence arises the obligation of abstaining from direct scandal especially ?

We are obliged to abstain from giving scandal in the first place because it is against charity, and against the special obligation of fraternal correction which has its root in charity. He who gives scandal is the cause of sin to his neighbor, whereas he should do what he can to prevent the sinner from falling into sin, and to recover him when he has fallen. Direct scandal is also against that special virtue which is violated by him who sins through scandal. Thus he who incites another to drink to excess sins against charity and against temperance.

Is the sin of scandal committed by one who invites another to sin who was already determined to commit that sin?

St. Alphonsus teaches that at least with regard to those things that are intrinsically evil, such as fornication, the sin of scandal is committed by inviting another to execute what he was already determined on doing. The reason is because the execution of an evil purpose constitutes with that purpose a complete and perfect sin, distinct in species from the merely internal and habitual intention of sinning.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book ii, treatise 3, no. 47.

The case. From the answer to the last question it is clear that Caius was not justified in acting as he did. His superior officer had no authority to give him such an order according to the regulations of the British army, and in any case Caius could not execute it without committing sin. In reality he became procurer for the soldiers. This solution does not preclude the medical examination of prostitutes so as to guard against the infection of the soldiers.

Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 3. Scandal and Co-operation

Agatha and Lucy, the former a Catholic, the latter an Anglican of the church called High, were joined to one another by the bond of friendship. They often helped each other in works of charity; indeed, not rarely Lucy brought help to Agatha in works of religion, and in particular acted the part of a saleswoman in selling smaller goods of every kind (took a stall at a bazaar), so that the Catholic church might be built more splendidly. A little later, the Anglican church which Lucy frequented was to be restored by employing the same means, and Agatha was asked by her friend that she herself should perform the similar part of saleswoman for the Anglican church. Not knowing how to refuse, Agatha assented; indeed, she herself contributed some things to be sold as a testimony of a grateful spirit toward Lucy. The Catholics, however, were not a little scandalized, and accordingly Agatha afterward relieved her troubled conscience to her confessor. It is asked:

When is someone obliged to avoid the scandal of others?

When is cooperation in another’s sin lawful?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

When is one obliged to avoid giving scandal to others ?

We must of course avoid giving scandal to others by doing anything wrong ourselves which will lead them into sin. We are also obliged to omit any action which is indifferent or good but not of precept by which scandal would be given to the weak or ignorant, if we can do so without serious inconvenience. We may not omit in this case an action which is prescribed by natural law; whether we are bound to omit what is prescribed by positive law is a disputed question among theologians. We are not bound to avoid pharisaic scandal by omitting an action which is good or indifferent and which has no appearance of evil.

When is co-operation in another’s sin lawful?

Formal co-operation in another's sin is never lawful; material co-operation is lawful provided that the action by which co-operation is given is good or at least indifferent, and provided that there is a good and proportionate reason for the co-operation (see p. 152).

The case. Agatha, a Catholic, and Lucy, an Anglican of the High Church party, were friends. They often helped each other in works of charity, and Lucy often helped Agatha in what she did for religion, taking a stall when a bazaar was held to raise funds for making an addition to the Catholic church of the place. When the Anglican church was to be restored, Lucy asked Agatha to take a stall for her, and Agatha not only consented but gave some objects to be sold at the bazaar as a mark of her gratitude. At this Catholics were scandalized, and so Agatha told what she had done when she went to confession.

There was no harm in the two friends working together in deeds of charity, and Lucy’s help could be accepted in the Catholic bazaar. But Agatha should have shown her gratitude to her friend in some other way than by taking a stall and giving things to be sold at the Anglican bazaar held for the restoration of the Anglican church. For this is a religious object, and a Catholic is not at liberty to help and show favor to a non-Catholic religious object. It naturally gave scandal to other Catholics. Agatha, therefore, was guilty of material wrong-doing as she seems to have acted in good faith, and she should avoid such actions in future, as a general rule. There might be exceptional circumstances which might excuse a Catholic who contributed to the restoration of an Anglican church because it was an ancient historical monument, if it could be done without scandal. In the case we suppose no such special circumstances to exist.

Slater, Cases I, Charity, Case 4. Fraternal Correction and Race-suicide

Paula, a Catholic matron, asked her confessor whether the things which censors of public morals say about race suicide were true. The confessor, however, asked for a fuller explanation of the question. Then Paula acknowledged that for several years she had been accustomed to wash the vagina with medicated water after marital intercourse, since she was too weak to have offspring; and since her daughter had become engaged to an officer who would suddenly be sent to a distant colony and could not support a family on his meager salary, Paula taught her how she could conduct married life without danger of offspring. With her husband’s consent, the daughter still successfully puts into practice the method taught by her mother. Having heard these things, the confessor is uncertain what he ought to say to Paula. Hence it is asked:

Is it lawful, after intercourse has taken place, to impede conception in any way whatsoever?

Is there an obligation of fraternal correction, and of what kind is it?

What is to be said about the obligations of the confessor and of Paula in the case?

Solution

Is it ever allowed to take means to prevent conception ?

St. Alphonsus says: “Never is it lawful for a mother, on account of any danger whatsoever, to take a potion to prevent conception.”¹ And the doctrine remains the same, whatever means are taken for the purpose.

1 Theol. Mor., lib. iii, n. 394.

Is there an obligation to give fraternal correction?

Yes, there is. This follows from the general obligation of charity which binds us to do what we can to help our neighbor in his necessity, whether spiritual or corporal. Hence if we know that another is in mortal sin and that he is not likely to correct it of himself, and there is nobody else who can or will do it better than ourselves, and there is good hope of succeeding, we are bound at a suitable time to do what we can to assist our neighbor to arise from his state of spiritual death.¹

1 Compare Matt. xviii. 15.

The case. The confessor is bound in the first place to tell Paula that what she has been doing is wrong, and she must promise not to do it again. Moreover she is responsible for having taught the practice to her daughter, and besides the latter’s husband she is probably the only person who knows of the daughter’s practice. She is, then, under the additional obligation of telling her daughter that what she taught her is wrong, and of doing what she can to induce her to abandon the practice for the future. The practice is harmful to her who employs it and is destructive of the race, so that it is rightly called race-suicide. The confessor, therefore, should explain to Paula the obligation she is under. Even if the means adopted sometimes failed in the desired effect, the act would always be gravely sinful on account of the intention with which it was done.

…and 30 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 9 passages

Pt. III, Chapter IV. Of Charity

It is the difference between sensible apprehension and intellectual knowledge, that the former seizes upon a particular object and it only, as this sweet: the latter takes its object as the type of a class of similars, this and the like of this, this sweet as one of the class of sweet things. In like manner the love of passion, which is the love of sense, regards one sole object. Titius is in love with Bertha alone, not with woman in general. But an intellectual love is the love of a type of beauty or goodness, of this object and of others as they approach in likeness to it. Whoever loves William from an intellectual appreciation of his patriotism, in loving him loves all patriots. Every animal loves itself with a brute, sensible love, not a love to find fault with, nor yet a noble and exalted sentiment—a love purely self-regarding, quite apart from the good that is in self, but embracing self simply as self, and self alone. This is the first love of self even in man. But over and above this animal and sensible love, which no man lacks, there is in all men worthy of the name a second self-regarding affection of an intellectual cast, whereby a man loves himself as discerning with the eye of his soul the excellence of his own nature—"how noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals." Intellectual self-complacence overflows from self to similars. It is not self-love, it is love of the race, "the milk of human kindness," philanthropy.

But man is a disappointing creature, after all a mere "quintessence of dust," unless he can rise above himself by relation with some superhuman being, and make his final fortune in some better region than this world. Reason requires that we love ourselves, and love our fellow-men, for and in order to the development of the highest gifts and capacities that are in us. These are gifts and capacities divine, preparing us to find our everlasting happiness in God. (Ethics, c. ii., s. iv., n. 2, p. 22.) The love that we bear to ourselves and our neighbour, in view of our coming from God and going to God, is called the love of charity. Charity differs from philanthropy in looking beyond the present life, and above creatures. A materialist and atheist may possess philanthropy, but not charity.

Beside the twofold love, animal and intellectual, which we bear ourselves, we may also and should love ourselves with the love of charity, seeing God's gifts in us, and desiring the perfection of those gifts in a happy eternity occupied with God. The charity which we should thus bear to ourselves is the model of that which we owe to our neighbour, whom we are to love as ourselves, not with the same intensity, but with the same quality of love, wishing him the good, human and divine, temporal and eternal, which we wish for ourselves, though not so earnestly as we wish it for ourselves. Our love for ourselves is stronger than for our neighbour: for, if love comes of likeness, much more does it come of identity. But by reason of the vast preponderance of the good that is rational and eternal over that which is material and temporal; and also by reason of the principle laid down by St. Thomas, that "as to the sharing together of (eternal) happiness, greater is the union of our neighbour's soul with our soul than even of our own body with our soul" (2a 2æ, q. 26, art. 5, ad 2),—we are bound to love our neighbour's eternal good better than our own temporal good, and in certain special conjunctures to sacrifice the latter to the former. We have no duty and obligation of loving his temporal good above our own temporal good. But it is often matter of commendation and counsel to sacrifice our temporal interest to our neighbour's. This sacrifice is no breach of the order of charity, beginning at home: since what is resigned of material and perishable profit is gained in moral perfection. Especially commendable is the surrender of private good for the good of the community. Charity, or philanthropy, taking this form, bears the name of patriotism and public spirit.

Charity, like material forces, acts in a certain inverse ratio to the distance of the object. Other considerations being equal, the nearer, the dearer. Nay, nearness and likeness to ourselves goes further than goodness in winning our love. This is natural, and charity presupposes nature, and follows its order. As we have more charity for ourselves than for others whom we acknowledge to be better men, so likewise for our kinsmen and intimate friends. We may put the matter thus. Charity consists in wishing and seeking to procure for a person the good that leads to God. One element is the intensity and eagerness of this wish and search; another is the greatness of the good wished. Now we wish those who are better than ourselves to be rewarded according to their deserts with a greater good than ourselves: but this wish is but lukewarm compared to the intensity of our desire that we and our friends with us may attain to all the good that we are capable of.

The Christian precept to love our enemies is merely the enforcement of a natural obligation. The obligation stands almost self-evident as soon as it is cleared of misunderstanding. The love of enemies is not based on the ground of their being hostile and annoying us. It would be highly unnatural to love them on that score. Nor are we in duty bound to show to one who hates us special offices of friendship, except we find him in extreme need, e.g., dying in a ditch, as the Good Samaritan found the Jew: otherwise it is enough that we be animated towards him with that common charity, which we bear to other men who are not further off from us than he is. If Lucius offend Titius, there being no other tie between them than the tie of friendship, Titius may, where the offence is very outrageous, henceforth treat Lucius as a stranger. The question of scandal has sometimes to be regarded, but that is an extrinsic circumstance to our present subject. Nor are we concerned to say what is the better thing for Titius to do, but to say all that he is bound to do. He is bound to render himself as void of wilful malice, and as full of ordinary courtesy and good feeling towards Lucius, as he is in the case of Sempronius, a man whom he never heard of till this day. But if there be some other antecedent tie between them besides the tie of friendship,—for instance, if Titius and Lucius are two monks of the same convent, two officers in the same regiment, two partners of one firm,—Titius is no longer justified in treating Lucius as a stranger. He must regard him with ordinary charity; now ordinary charity between two brother-officers, or two fellow-monks, is not the same as between men who have no such tie one with another. This is why we laid it down that we must be animated towards him who has offended us "with that common charity, which we bear to other men who are not further off from us than he is."

This then being the exact obligation, the same is easily established. We must love our enemies, because the reasons given for loving all mankind (nn. 1, 2) are not vitiated by this or that man having treated us shamefully. The human nature in him still remains good actually, and still more, potentially; and if good and hopeful, to that extent also lovable. Nor is this lovableness a mere separable accident. Rather, it is the offensive behaviour of the man that is the separable accident. At that we may well be disgusted and abominate it. But the underlying substance remains good, not incurably tainted with that vicious accident. We must attend to the substance, which is, rather than to the accident, which happens, and may be abolished. Let us endeavour to abolish the accident, still so that we respect and regard the substance. Let us seek for redress under the guidance of prudence according to the circumstances of the case, but not for the ruin of our enemy. Let us not render evil for evil, but even in exacting a just satisfaction, make it of the nature of that compensatory evil, which is by consequence good. Let us be angry with our enemy, but sin not by hating him. (Ethics, c. iv., s. iv., n. 3.) We may seek satisfaction for any wrong we have suffered: in grave cases we must have recourse to the State for that: but the sin, if any, of our adversary is not our concern to punish or to seek vengeance for. (Ethics, c. ix., s. iii., n. 4.)

Vol. I, Case XXXV: May a Catholic Girl Act as Bridesmaid at a Non-Catholic Marriage? · Vol. I, Case XLV: Marks of Friendship Toward an Enemy

The same reasoning holds good even of public enemies, tyrants, persecutors, anarchists, assassins. We must include them in our prayers, wish for their conversion, and, though their case appear hopeless, we must not damn them before their time. If we found one of them dying by accident of cold or asphyxia, we should be bound by a grave obligation to use all ordinary efforts to bring him round and recover him. Still we may use our best efforts to bring them to justice, even to capital punishment, according to the procedure of public law established in the country, and not otherwise. We may also with an inefficacious desire, that is, a desire that finds no vent in action, desire their death under an alternative thus, that either living they may cease to do evil, or that God may call them away to where the wicked cease from troubling. But we must not desire, nor be glad of, their death by any unlawful means, for that were to sympathise with crime.

n. 8.

Real charity shows itself in action, succouring a neighbour in need, which is sometimes a counsel, sometimes a duty. It is an axiom, that charity is not binding with grave inconvenience. The gravity of the inconvenience in prospect must be measured against the urgency of the need to be relieved. A neighbour is technically said to be in extreme need, when he is in imminent peril of deadly evil to soul or body, and is unable to help himself. We are under severe obligation of charity to succour any whom we find in this plight.

n. 9.

By charity we give of our own to another: by justice we render to another that which is his. Charity neglected calls for no restitution, when the need that required it is past away: justice violated cries for restitution, for what we have taken away from our neighbour remains still his. The obligations of justice are negative, except for the fulfilment of contracts: obligations in charity are largely positive. (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 7, p. 108.)

Readings.—C. Gent., III., 117; 2a 2æ, q. 26, art. 4; ib., art. 7; ib., art. 8; 2a 2æ, q. 25, art. 8; ib., art. 9; ib., art. 6; Ferrier, Greek Philosophy, Socrates, nn. 13, 26, 27, 29. (Remains, vol. i., pp. 227, seq.)

The Casuist

Various; ed. S. Woywod, O.F.M., and J. A. McHugh, O.P. — 132 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Case XXXV: May a Catholic Girl Act as Bridesmaid at a Non-Catholic Marriage?

Bertha in Confession asks her confessor if it would be sinful for her to act as bridesmaid for her friend Stella, who is a Protestant, about to marry a Protestant, and in a Protestant church. The confessor replies that in his opinion Bertha would not sin, inasmuch as the contracting parties' action is not sinful, scl., marrying coram ministro; and, since the contracting parties are the ministri, Bertha is only a witness to the contract, and, strictly speaking, does not take part in heretical services any more than the other friends present to see Stella married. The witnesses take no part actively in the religious ceremony—they are only passive witnesses to it. However, the confessor advises Bertha that it is not expedient for her to act as bridesmaid, since it might possibly give scandal, and she promises not to do so.

Afterward, in discussing the case with some brother priests, the confessor is condemned for his opinion that Bertha would not sin; on the contrary, it is asserted that the confessor would have done wrong to give Bertha absolution in the event of her refusing to follow his advice. It was asserted that a case was referred to a certain seminary faculty, where a young lady wished to act as bridesmaid for Protestants; and it was alleged that a negative was given, and absolution forbidden if she did so.

It was also stated that in Germany, in some dioceses, it would be excommunication to act as witnesses to a Protestant marriage. The confessor still maintains his opinion that absolution is not to be denied if the penitent persists in her design of acting. And he maintains that as the other friends are not held in these parts to commit any sin in going to the church to witness the wedding in pews, so Bertha, a more prominent witness, is taking no more real part in heretical worship than they in the body of the church.

The principle which governs the solution of this case is the principle laid down by all theologians, that it is not lawful for Catholics to take part in a false worship. If acting as bridesmaid at a non- Catholic wedding in a non-Catholic church in this country is considered a "communicatio in divinis," then it is not lawful for a Catholic to act in such capacity. If, however, acting as bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding in a non-Catholic church—in the United States—is not generally considered a "communicatio in divinis," then it may be lawful for a Catholic to act as such, provided it does not become unlawful for some other reason, v. g., on account of the scandal it might occasion, or the danger of perversion, or because it has been forbidden by the statutes of the diocese.

About the principle that it is not lawful for a Catholic to take part in a false worship, there is no dispute. The difficulty lies in determining whether the case before us comes under the principle.

We do not deny that in a very special case it might be evidently unlawful for a Catholic to act as bridesmaid at a non-Catholic marriage, because such conduct could scarcely be viewed in any other light than as a "communicatio in divinis," owing to the distinctly religious coloring given to the ceremony by the religious opinions of the contracting parties and the officiating minister. But the case before us is this: Is the marriage of non-Catholics in this country, though performed by a minister and in a Protestant church, generally looked upon as a religious rite, or is it considered merely as a civil contract? The mere fact that a marriage is performed by a minister of the Gospel, or in a Protestant church, does not make it a religious rite. It is made a religious rite by the beliefs and intentions of the contracting parties and the minister, as well as of the religious denomination to which they belong, and the view that the public takes of it. If these perform it as a religious rite, and view it as such, then indeed it becomes a religious rite, and consequently a false worship. If, however, they do not consider it or perform it as a religious rite, then the mere fact that it is performed by a preacher, or in a non-Catholic church, does not constitute it a religious rite. The question, therefore, is reduced to this: Are non-Catholic marriages in this country looked upon, either by the parties contracting them or by the religious denomination to which such parties belong, or by the community generally, as a religious rite?

To this question American theologians answer in the negative. Non-Catholic marriages in the United States, although performed by a minister in a Protestant church, are not looked upon, as a general rule, as anything else than a civil proceeding, a serious social contract.

Archbishop Kenrick (Th. Mor. tr. XIII. n. 33) says: “To be present at the celebration of a wedding is generally regarded as a mark of courtesy toward the spouses without the heretical rite being approved.”

Father Konings (I. n. 254) says:

“Kenrick likewise says that it is not a sin to be present with others at the celebration of a wedding contracted before a heretical minister, since this is generally regarded not as approval of a heretical rite but as a mark of courtesy toward the spouses. Whether the same can be said of those who on this occasion perform the office of paranymph (groomsman or bridesmaid), I leave to wiser men to decide; much in this matter must be attributed to the common estimation prevailing among the people, for what is judged to be merely civil courtesy, with no participation whatever in a heretical rite, cannot be regarded as a profession of false religion.”

Father Sabetti, S.J., (Am. Eccl. Rev. June, 1890) says: “The same solution must be given concerning attendance at a marriage; for an action of this kind is regarded among us as a merely civil office and a sign of friendship. Nor should the circumstance that Veronica acted the part of the principal assisting girl (first bridesmaid) cause any difficulty; for those girls are ordinarily chosen for such an office who, on the one hand, are more suited to fulfill it by reason of age and civil condition, and, on the other, are borne toward the bride by greater friendship and a closer bond of goodwill. This shows that according to our customs an office of this kind is not regarded as religious and does not entail any participation in worship.”

That the vast majority of non-Catholics in the United States look upon the marriage contract as a purely civil contract, possessing no sacramental or religious character, is a statement that hardly admits of question. All legislation concerning it is handed over to the State, and the minister performing the ceremony considers himself as acting for and in the name of the State, and marries all persons, who are allowed by the State to contract marriage, whether they belong to his particular religious denomination or another, or to no denomination at all. He marries believers and unbelievers alike, baptized and unbaptized, only solicitous that they be authorized by the civil law to marry. "The fact that weddings are usually ratified in a church is due partially to a traditional instinct which retains the solemnity of a sacred function for an act regarded merely as a grave social and civil contract" (Am. Ecc. Rev., Vol. vi., p. 465).

n. ¶13.

European theologians take a somewhat stricter view of this question, influenced, no doubt, by conditions of society obtaining in Europe.

n. ¶14.

Thus Genicot, SJ. (I., n. 200), says: “Moreover, one must abstain from those functions which involve recognition of a sect, for example, the office of a witness who lends authority to the marriage contract.”

n. ¶15.

Lehmkuhl (I. 295) says: “But to attend the wedding or burial of a non-Catholic, since it is regarded merely as a civil honor, is commonly lawful.

n. ¶16.

Nevertheless, even in these actions attention must be paid to whether, because of the circumstances, scandal, danger of perversion, or a special prohibition is present.”

n. ¶17.

Ballerini-Palmieri (n. 96) says: “Is it lawful for Catholics to attend the weddings of heretics, which the heretics celebrate validly indeed, but before a heretical minister and with a heretical rite? A distinction must be made between those who are simply present and those who, performing the office of witnesses, lend authority to the contract. For the latter communicate with heretics in their sacred affair and implicitly recognize the authority of that sect and its ministers, which, as we have said, is not lawful.”

n. ¶18.

It may be interesting to quote an author of as long ago as Lugo, though times and conditions have undergone vast changes since his day. Lugo, in his tract on faith (no. 157), says about acting as groomsman or bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding:

n. ¶19.

“Thirdly, it may be doubted whether a Catholic may not only lawfully attend the weddings of heretics, but also in the same cases perform the office of paranymph, when paranymphs are used at the solemnities, who customarily conduct the spouses to the churches. I answer from what has been said that one must consider what the office of the paranymph is, who is called a pronubus by others and an auspex by the ancients. If it belongs to him only to hand the bride over to the groom, or conversely, after they have been lawfully joined, nothing unlawful appears in that office, since it is a merely civil action. But if his office is, as it were, to bring the spouses to the minister so that he may join them, then he seems to participate in the rites by which the heretical minister joins them, to have recourse to him as a minister of the Church, and to approve his ministry, which is unlawful.”

n. ¶20.

In the year 1719, the Propaganda laid down the general rule for missionaries, “that communication in sacred things with heretics and schismatics is regularly to be regarded in practice as unlawful, either because of the danger of perversion in the Catholic faith, or because of the danger of participation in a heretical and schismatic rite, or finally because of the danger and occasion of scandal.”

n. ¶21.

On May 10, 1770, the Congregation of the Holy Office answered, “His Holiness decreed that Catholics are not regularly permitted to attend the sermons, baptisms, or marriages of heretics or schismatics.”

n. ¶22.

We are inclined to think, therefore, that as far as the United States is concerned, non-Catholic weddings are not, as a rule, religious affairs, but rather mere civil contracts, and to assist at them or to act as groomsman or bridesmaid is not a "communicatio in divinis," and is not, therefore, on these grounds, unlawful for Catholics. In a given instance, as we have remarked above, a non-Catholic marriage may be a religious rite, and, in that case, it would not be lawful for Catholics to take part in them as groomsman or bridesmaid.

n. ¶23.

But on other grounds it may be unlawful for Catholics to act as groomsman or bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding, namely, where such conduct would give scandal or create danger for the Catholic's faith, or where it has been forbidden by the diocesan authorities. And as these dangers may exist in any given case, each case should be considered on its own individual merits.

n. ¶24.

Where there is a good reason for a Catholic girl, for instance, to act as bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding, and where the marriage ceremony can not be considered a sacred rite, and where no scandal is given and no risk taken for her faith, a priest in the United States is justified in permitting such a girl to take part in the wedding, and would scarcely act wisely in refusing her absolution, if she would not promise not to take part.

n. ¶25.

But where there is no serious reason for a Catholic girl to act as bridesmaid at such a marriage, and where she may decline without serious inconvenience to herself and to others, we think it the part of prudence for a confessor or pastor to induce her to decline.

Vol. I, Case XLV: Marks of Friendship Toward an Enemy

John Smith, a wealthy and prominent Catholic, accuses himself in Confession of being on very bad terms with one of his children. It appears that one of Mr. Smith's sons, a young man of rather unsteady habits, married, over a year ago, a vaudeville actress, anon-Catholic, and from all accounts a young woman of Bohemian antecedents and proclivities. As Mr. Smith and his whole family were very much opposed to this marriage, and did all in their power to stop it, but to no purpose, they feel very much grieved by it, and refuse to have anything to do with the young man or his wife. Mr. Smith has cut the young man off in his will, has forbidden him his house, recently refused to allow him to be present at the parents' golden wedding, although all the other relatives were present; refuses to recognize the young man either in public or in private, to return his salutations or to permit any advances to be made toward a reconciliation, either by the young man himself, or by his friends.

Quaeritur: Is Mr. Smith's conduct justifiable before God, or is it sinful?

Principles: This case comes under the heading "de amore inimicorum." The law of charity imposes a twofold obligation on us in regard to our enemy. First, we must not wish him evil; second, we must wish him well.

First: We must not wish our enemy evil; that is, we must not repay evil with evil, nor cherish a spirit of revenge toward him. We must pardon the personal offense when requested, not always immediately. Sometimes there may be just cause for deferring pardon in order to manifest the pain we suffer by reason of the offense. Sometimes, even, we may be obliged to make the first advance toward a reconciliation, to prevent scandal or to save our enemy from sin, when we can do so without much trouble to ourselves.

Second: We must wish our enemy well; that is, we must include him in our prayers. We must succor him in his needs, as we would any one else. And if we exercise charity indiscriminately toward a large number, we must not exclude our enemy, for this would be a mark of revenge; and if special ties of blood, etc., unite us, we are bound to give such evidence of good will toward our enemy as we give to others who are bound to us by the same ties. But special marks of friendship that we owe to no one in particular, either by reason of their personal condition or the customs of the country, we are not obliged to show to our enemy.

Here we must remark that it is one thing to harbor a spirit of revenge, and quite another thing to desire the reparation of outraged rights. It is perfectly legitimate to desire the restoration of our good name, or the restitution of our stolen property, and to take action at law to obtain them; yes, even to take criminal proceedings against the offender to have him punished. If this is done out of love for justice, it is quite in keeping with the law of charity. If it is done from a spirit of revenge, it is, of course, sinful. Once satisfaction has been made, we must forgive the personal offense. Until satisfaction has been made, this is not required of us.

Regarding the question of saluting those who have grievously offended us, the doctrine of St. Ligouri, Tamburini, Mazotta, and others may be summed up as follows: We are not obliged to salute those who have wrongly offended us, unless they make the first advances, unless it be question of a superior, or unless to refrain from saluting our enemy for a long time could be interpreted as a mark of hatred. But if our enemy greets us first, we are bound to greet him in return, except once or again we might be justified in refusing to recognize a greeting in order to show our feelings have been hurt. In a word, the omission of the ordinary greetings and marks of good will that pass among men must be taken, sometimes on account of circumstances, not as a sign of hatred or revenge, but as a "manifestatio justi moeroris tantum." If, therefore, on account of the circumstances, the denial for a time of the ordinary salutations and greetings must be interpreted as a manifestation of wounded feelings, and if in fact the denial proceeds from no spirit of hatred or ill will, such denial is not sinful. If, however, under the circumstances, the denial of the ordinary marks of good will must be interpreted as a sign of hatred or revenge, "pro manifestatione vindictae et inimicitiae," then such denial is sinful, even though it do not arise from feelings of hatred or revenge.

Application of principles: Mr. Smith's son had become his enemy. He had given his father just cause for feeling hurt and outraged. He had done his father and his family a grievous wrong. Although an enemy, we must not forget the special ties of blood that unite them. Was Mr. Smith's conduct toward his son justified in every instance? We must take each separate count by itself.

First, Mr. Smith cuts off his son in his will. Is this act "contra justitiam," or only "contra charitatem," or wholly blameless? Whether this cutting off of children by parents in their wills be contrary to the virtue of strict justice does not appear. Some theologians think it is; others that it is not. Fr. Genicot thinks that it is not. Fr. Lehmkuhl thinks that it is. Genicot says: “Nor would I think that a parent who without just cause favored one son over the others would sin gravely, as Lehmkuhl thinks.” (I. n. 677).

“If anyone out of hatred wished to leave his children only their lawful portion, or altogether to pass over brothers who were not in need, he would be bound under grave obligation to put aside this hatred, but only urged to leave them something more; for he is using his right” (ibid.).

Lehmkuhl thinks that where there is no "clara et justa causa," parents sin against justice in preferring some children to others (I. n. 1155).