Faith

3. Notions. 1. To believe signifies to give assent to some thing on account of the testimony or authority of another.

a. Faith differs from opinion, because it holds a thing as true certainly and without fear of erring; it differs from knowledge, because it holds a thing as true not from internal reasons, but on account of the authority of a witness. What we know, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority.²

b. To an act of faith considered in general, the intellect is for the most part moved by the will; but that faith may be rational, the intellect ought beforehand to know that the witness deserves belief, because it understands that the witness can neither be deceived in knowing nor deceive in testifying.

2. The theological virtue of faith can be considered insofar as it is a habit and insofar as it is an act. Habitual faith is permanent and is already had in baptized infants; actual faith is transient and is had in him who elicits an act of faith.

a. Theological faith as a virtue is defined: an infused supernatural habit by which man is disposed to assent firmly to truths revealed by God on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

a. The first words of the definition present the mark which faith has in common with the remaining theological virtues; the words, "to assent firmly," etc., present that which is proper to faith and by which it is distinguished from the remaining theological virtues, namely its material and formal object.

b. The subject of faith, or the power in which the habit of faith inheres, is the intellect: for a habit resides in the same power from which the act is elicited; but the act of faith is elicited by the intellect, which is furnished with the habit for eliciting that very act. Yet because the will also concurs in eliciting the act of faith, namely by commanding the assent, there is also in the will a habit disposing it to elicit the pious affection of believing.

c. The habit of faith is lost only through the sin of infidelity or through the sin of heresy, which is directly opposed to faith: for by an act by which man withdraws from the motive of faith, the habit itself of faith is destroyed. Therefore if someone culpably omits to elicit an act of faith, or if someone only externally denies the faith, he indeed sins gravely against faith, yet he does not lose the habit of faith, because he does not withdraw from the motive of faith.

b. The habit of faith is customarily called the light of faith: for as the intellect by which we know the truths of the natural order is called the natural light, so the power by which we embrace revealed truths is called the supernatural light.

b. Theological faith as an act is defined: the firm assent by which we embrace truths revealed by God on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 1-16. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, nn. 1-19. Laymann, Theologia moralis, bk. 2, tract. 1. John de Lugo, Disputationes scholasticae de virtute fidei divinae, disp. 3, nn. 2-20. Francis Suarez, De fide, disp. 1-8; 12-24. Lacroix, Theologia moralis, bk. 2, nn. 1-115. John Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, nn. 1-39. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1901, I, tr. 2, nn. 1-92. August Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, Freiburg: Herder, 1902, I, nn. 269-404. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, Prato: Giachetti, 1899, II, nn. 1-108. Fr. Ad. Goepfert, Moraltheologie, Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1905, I, nn. 264-282. E. Genicot, Theologiae moralis institutiones, Louvain: Polleunis and Ceuterick, 1905.

² St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, n. 25.

4. Object of faith. a. The material object of theological faith is the word of God: namely, all truths revealed by God constitute it. The primary material object is distinguished, which is God Himself and His perfections; and the secondary material object, which is constituted by other truths distinct from God, which nevertheless have all been revealed in order to God, namely that God and His perfections may be known better, and that man may be able to arrive at God, his eternal beatitude.

b. The formal object of theological faith is constituted by the authority of God revealing, who, since He is first truth, can neither be deceived in knowing nor deceive in speaking. Therefore theological faith rests on first truth, or on two divine perfections: on the supreme wisdom of God, or infallibility in knowing, and on the supreme veracity of God in speaking.

From the formal motive it is clear that faith ought to be universal, that is, that it should extend itself to all revealed truths: for he who denies even one article of faith, by that very fact implicitly denies all, because he denies the formal object of faith, the authority of God revealing, on which all the remaining articles rest.

5. Genesis or analysis of faith. In order that an act of faith may be elicited, reason must first know several truths, which cognitions therefore are called by theologians the preambles of faith.

1. First, it ought to know that God has spoken, or that God has given revelation: for unless it is established that a truth has in reality been revealed by God, we neither can nor ought to believe it with divine faith. Those arguments by which the fact of revelation is demonstrated are called motives of credibility, because they render revelation, that is, the Christian religion, credible. Now these arguments, miracles, prophecies, the wondrous preservation and propagation of the Church, the constancy of martyrs, etc., are indeed not evident, yet they are of such a kind that anyone from them can know the fact of revelation certainly, or without prudent fear of erring.

2. Next, it ought to know that God is supremely wise and supremely truthful, so that He can neither Himself be deceived nor deceive others: for faith by its nature rests upon the authority of God revealing, known with certainty; but authority derives all its force from the knowledge and truthfulness of the witness.

3. From this twofold cognition there arises the judgment: truths revealed by God are credible, that is, they can be believed rationally and prudently, which judgment is called the judgment concerning the credibility of revelation; indeed there arises the judgment: truths revealed by God must be believed, that is, they must be believed absolutely, which judgment is called the judgment concerning the credendity of revelation. Certainly, where it is certain that God, supremely wise and truthful, has spoken, man understands the most grave obligation of believing: for man is bound to believe God demanding faith; but by the very fact of revelation God demands faith. Each of these judgments, concerning the credibility and the credendity of revelation, is altogether evident.

4. Therefore this twofold cognition precedes the act of faith: namely, the cognition of divine authority, that what God reveals is true and must be believed, and the cognition of the fact of revelation, but God has revealed the Christian religion. Yet once these things have been known beforehand, the assent of the mind does not yet immediately follow, therefore the Christian religion is true and must be believed. For since one of the prerequisite cognitions, namely the fact of revelation, is not evident, the mind is not determined by arguments of reason to giving assent to revealed truth, but must be moved and determined by command of the will to giving the assent of faith. Now with this cognition shining beforehand, namely that the will can and ought to command assent, the will itself by a positive act commands the assent of faith to the intellect; this act of the will the Second Synod of Orange calls the affection of credulity. From this command of the will the act or assent of faith finally follows.

5. The assent of faith is free and therefore, the suppositions being supposed, meritorious. But the liberty of faith consists in this, that the assent of faith depends on the free will: for the will itself, with the goodness of that same assent shining beforehand, freely determines itself to command it.

6. Since theological faith, which by the Council of Trent is called the beginning, foundation, and root of all justification,¹ must be a supernatural act, it is elicited not by the powers of nature, but of grace. Therefore the judgment of the intellect by which we know the fact of revelation, the authority of God revealing, and the obligation of believing, proceeds from supernatural illumination; the will through the inspiration of grace conceives the pious affection of credulity; and finally the intellect through the powers of grace assents to revealed truth.

a. Once the nature of faith has been explained, it is now easily understood that by acts of faith we believe God (credere Deo), because by reason of the formal object we believe God revealing; that we believe God (credere Deum), because by reason of the material object we believe God and whatever things have been revealed concerning God; and finally that we believe in God (credere in Deum), because through faith we tend into God, our end.²

b. Although true faith requires from man the sacrifice of the intellect, insofar as he is bound to embrace truths whose internal reason he does not understand, and insofar therefore as he must bring his intellect into captivity unto the obedience of faith, nevertheless true faith is and must be a rational service, insofar as it does not believe and cannot believe unless by the light of reason it knows that all those things which it embraces by faith are absolutely true from divine authority.

¹ Sess. 6, c. 8.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 2.

6. Division of faith. 1. Into habitual faith, which is the habit or virtue of faith described above; and into actual faith, which is the act or assent of faith likewise defined above.

2. Habitual faith is one thing when formed by charity, or living, and another when unformed, or dead, according as it is joined with the habit of charity as in a just man, or is deprived of it as in a sinful man.

Unformed faith is not therefore called dead because it cannot and ought not exercise itself by acts of faith, and those supernatural acts: for it is a true virtue and true faith;¹ but it is called dead because the faithful man not yet justified lacks true supernatural life, which is had only where meritorious acts of eternal life can be exercised.

3. Actual faith is divided into internal faith, which is the assent of faith conceived in the mind; and external faith, which is the external profession of internal faith by words, actions, or other signs.

4. Actual faith is further divided into faith simply divine, by which that is believed which indeed has been revealed by God, but has not also been proposed by the Church to be believed; and into Catholic faith, by which is believed whatever is revealed by God and proposed by the Church to be believed.

a. By the will of Christ the Church has been constituted the means and organ by which revealed truths to be believed are proposed to the faithful; from this it is clear that by Catholic faith only public revelation can be believed, which by the authority of the Church is proposed to all to be believed, but by divine faith even a private revelation can be believed, which is granted to one man alone.

b. Therefore faith is also secondarily founded on the authority of the Church as on an infallible and necessary means by which we know the things which God has revealed. Therefore he who believes an article of faith acknowledges not only the authority of God revealing, but also the infallible authority of the Church; and he who denies an article of faith contemns not only the authority of God revealing, but also the authority of the Church infallibly proposing revealed truths.

c. Hence it is rightly said that theological faith is immediately resolved into the authority of the Church as into the means infallibly proposing truths revealed by God, and is ultimately resolved into the wisdom and veracity of God as into the motive of faith.

5. Actual faith is divided objectively into explicit faith, by which something is believed in itself, whether this happens with the terms known only confusedly or distinctly; and implicit faith, by which something is believed not in itself, but in another in which it is in some way contained.

Now that which is believed can be contained in another in two ways: a. in the truth which is believed, if this truth is general, in which other truths are contained; thus he who explicitly believes all things which God has revealed implicitly believes the Most Holy Trinity, and he who explicitly believes that God is the creator of all things implicitly believes that He is the creator of men; b. in the motive on account of which it is believed, which is the authority of God revealing: for he who explicitly believes some determinate article of faith because God has revealed it, by that very fact implicitly believes all other revealed truths, because their faith rests on the same motive.

6. Finally, actual faith is divided subjectively into formal and virtual, or exercised, faith: the former is faith which is expressly elicited in some truth on account of the authority of God revealing, as if someone believes that God is triune in persons because God, supremely wise and truthful, has revealed it; the latter is faith in some truth which is presupposed by the act of some virtue and accompanies it by its own influence. Thus faith in the Most Holy Trinity accompanies by its influence the act of one forming the sign of the cross and is presupposed by it.

The difference between formal and virtual faith consists in this, that he who elicits formal faith explicitly attends to the motive of faith, while he who elicits virtual faith does not expressly attend to the authority of God revealing nor think reflectively about it. Virtual and exercised faith supposes actual and express cognition of the motive of faith, which cognition, remaining habitually in the soul, flows by its power into the action by which faith is exercised. Thus he has virtual and exercised faith who bends his knees before the Most Holy Sacrament, or receives the sacrament of penance, even if he does not think reflectively about the revelation of God, just as the farmer has virtual and exercised hope of the harvest who scatters seeds from hope of the harvest, even if he does not think reflectively about the harvest.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 28.

_Faith, hope, and charity are called theological virtues because they relate immediately to God, having God for their material and formal object. They thus hold the first place among the Christian virtues; they are of the greatest importance, are most meritorious; and sins against them are the most grievous. In moral theology the acts belonging to these virtues and the sins opposed to them are treated of; the treatment of the virtues is reserved to dogmatic theology. Part

FAITH is here understood in the sense in which it is used by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews¹ and elsewhere in Holy Scripture. It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a proposition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is vouched for by someone who knows and whom we can trust. The word has this sense among others in English. We say: ‘I should not like to pin my faith to such a proposition on that writer’s authority.” Here there is question of human faith resting on human authority. God can manifest the truth to us, and we believe that he has done so. ‘‘ God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son.” Whatever God makes known to us mediately or immediately we are justified in believing on his authority. He can neither deceive us nor be himself deceived; and we are bound to believe all that we know God to have spoken or revealed, otherwise we implicitly accuse God of lying or of ignorance. An act of divine faith, then, is an act by which we believe whatever God has revealed on the authority of God himself. God has taken care that we should know for certain what he has revealed in times past for man’s benefit and guidance by founding the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is the pillar and the ground of truth, whose chief function it is to bear witness to God’s revelation, and to teach it to all men even to the consummation of the world. God’s Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, ever abides with the Church, to enable her faithfully and infallibly to perform her task. Faith, then, considered as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we believe all that God has revealed and the Church proposes to our belief on the authority of God himself. An act of faith is an act of this virtue.

¹ Heb. xi.

God has destined us for a supernatural end of eternal happiness, consisting essentially of the beatific vision of himself, as we know from revelation; he wishes that we should, as rational and free beings, work consciously for the attainment of that end. We cannot do this without believing in God and without believing that he is a rewarder of those who do well and a punisher of those who do ill; faith, then, is the necessary foundation of the Christian life. ‘‘ Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him.”

Faith is, then, necessary for salvation, not merely because it is of precept like the Commandments, but because it is a necessary means to attain the supernatural end to which we are destined by God. Without taking the necessary means the end cannot be attained. Those, then, who have come to the use of reason, so that they can know God and know what he has revealed, are bound to make an act of faith; otherwise they cannot be saved. The habit of faith is infused into the soul together with sanctifying grace at the reception of baptism, and this habitual faith is sufficient for such as have not the use of reason, like children or those who have always been insane.

Our act of faith must implicitly extend to everything that God has revealed; we cannot accept some articles on his authority and reject others which are vouched for by the same authority. But it is not sufficient to make an act of implicit faith comprising all that God has revealed. We are bound to know and believe certain revealed truths explicitly. Some of these truths must be believed explicitly as a necessary means to salvation; explicit belief in others is only of precept, and the want of it, if inculpable, will not be a bar to salvation. Explicit belief in the existence of God, the rewarder of them that seek him, is necessary for salvation, and probably also belief in the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarna‘tion. Explicit belief in these mysteries is certainly of precept.¹ A Christian is bound also to know and believe the substance of what is contained in the Creed, the sacraments which are of obligation, the precepts of God and of the Church, and the Lord’s Prayer. It is sufficient to have implicit faith in other truths of revelation.

¹ Props. 22, 64, condemned by Innocent XI.

It is not sufficient to have believed the necessary articles of the faith once in a lifetime. Our acts of faith must be frequently renewed; we must lead lives of faith, according to the divine precept.¹ This divine precept is sometimes of obligation per se, as when the truths of revelation first become known to a man and he becomes conscious of his obligation; sometimes it is of obligation per accidens, as after a sin against the faith has been committed, or when a duty has to be fulfilled which requires an act of faith. However, for such as have once made their act of faith, it will be sufficient in order to fulfil the divine precept if the act of faith is renewed implicitly, as is done whenever we pray, assist at Mass, or receive any of the sacraments. It is well, however, especially in these days of unbelief, to renew frequently explicit acts of faith according to the wish and practice of the Church. They are acts of very great merit with God.

¹ Props. 16, 17, condemned by Innocent XI.

WE do not fulfil our duty as Christians and Catholics if we keep our religious faith concealed within our own breasts. Our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourselves sometimes requires that we should make open profession of the faith which we hold. When our public profession of the faith would render great honour to God, or prevent great dishonour being shown him, or prevent the true religion from being publicly despised and contemned, we must, even at the risk of great temporal loss, boldly come forward and proclaim our religious belief. We must be ready to do the same if our example would gain others to God or prevent them from falling away from him; for charity towards our neighbour sometimes requires that we should sacrifice our temporal interests for the spiritual good of others. Again, if we never made open profession of our faith, there would be grave danger of its becoming weak and altogether dying away; so we must sometimes perform external acts of our religion in order to keep the faith alive within us. The necessity of doing this is shown by the gradual falling away from their religion of Catholics who have no priests, and no churches wherein to practise their religious duties (Can. 1325, sec. 1).

The positive law of the Church requires that a solemn profession of faith be made by those who are about to be baptized, or received into the Church, or at least in their name if they are unable to make it for themselves. The occasions and persons who are bound by canon law to make profession of faith are laid down in Canons 1406-1408.

It is gravely sinful to deny the faith, or to do or say anything which is equivalent to a denial of it, or which shows that we are ashamed of it. ‘‘ For he that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty, and that of his Father, and of the holy angels.”¹ However, the obligation of professing the faith is affirmative, and so always binds but not for always. In other words, we may never deny the faith, but we are only bound to profess it openly when the divine, or natural, or positive law require it. A man might travel for months among heathen or heretics without making his faith known to anyone. As a rule, it is better openly to profess one’s religion, so that all may know that we are Catholics; but under certain circumstances it might be lawful to conceal one’s conversion to the faith for a time.

A Catholic who on being asked denies that he is one does not necessarily deny the faith. Such an answer might merely be a fitting reply to an impertinent question. It will, however, be a denial of the faith when the circumstances require that an open profession of it should be made. A Catholic who flies from persecution, or disguises himself, or eats meat on days of abstinence in order to avoid detection, does not thereby deny the faith. It is better never to enter non-Catholic places of worship, or be present at non-Catholic religious functions, and this is of obligation whenever such acts would be interpreted as countenancing a false religion, or as showing a spirit of indifferentism, or whenever there would be scandal or danger of perversion, or whenever lawful authority forbids them. Otherwise, merely to enter an heretical place of worship, or to be present at a non-Catholic religious function, such as a burial or a marriage, without taking part in the ceremony, is not sinful, and may be permitted for a good cause (Can. 1258).

¹ Luke ix 26.

All communication with non-Catholics in their religious rites and ceremonies is as a rule forbidden to Catholics. To take part in such rites and ceremonies is to take part in a form of religious worship which is not approved by God and by the Church; it is a virtual adhesion to a false form of worship, or it shows approbation of it. A Catholic, then, may not act as a sponsor in a non-Catholic baptism, or take an active part in 1a non-Catholic marriage or funeral. On certain rare occasions, as when in danger of death and a Catholic priest cannot be had, a Catholic may accept the ministrations of a schismatic or heretical priest, as was done by some Catholic Japanese officers who were captured by the Russians and shot in the Russo-Japanese War.

Inasmuch as: heretics and schismatics are excommunicated, the Church forbids prayers, suffrages, or Masses to be publicly offered for them (Can. 2262).

Experience shows that very little good and much harm may come from disputes and controversies about religion. Ordinarily such disputes leave the parties concerned more obstinate than ever in their convictions.

Grave scandal, too, and great dishonour to God result from the public and contemptuous denials of sacred truths and the ridicule thrown on them in the heat of controversy. ‘The mind of the Church is that, as far as possible, and except for the necessary defence of the faith, such disputes should be avoided whether they be public or private (Can. 1325, sec. 3).

THE chief sins against faith are infidelity, heresy, and apostasy.

All who have sufficient knowledge of the Gospel are bound to embrace and believe it: “‘ He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.¹ A grave sin, then, is committed by one who rejects the faith when it has been sufficiently made known to him with adequate grounds for believing, and this grave sin is called infidelity. This positive infidelity is distinguished from privative and negative infidelity. One who has the opportunity of knowing the faith, and recognizes the obligation of making inquiries about it, but neglects to do so, commits the sin of privative infidelity. This is also a grave sin if the degree of negligence be grave. One who has no opportunity of learning the faith, or who does not advert to the obligation of making inquiries, is in negative infidelity. This is not sinful, but St Thomas² teaches that it is the penalty of sin, inasmuch as if a man were faithful to the light that he has in natural reason, God would take care that he should have an opportunity of knowing the faith even if it were necessary to send him a special messenger, or an angel from heaven, to make the Gospel known to him. If, then, the Gospel is not preached to every man, not God but men are to be blamed for it.

¹ Mark xvi 16.

² De Verit., q. 14, a. 11, ad I.

Heresy is the rejection by one who has embraced the faith of some portion of revealed truth which is proposed by the Church for our belief. If the rejection is voluntary and accompanied with full knowledge that what is rejected is proposed by the Church as an article of faith, the heresy is formal. Otherwise it will only be material.

It is not heresy, though sinful, to reject what is known to have been revealed by God in a private revelation; private revelations are not proposed by the Church for our belief. Nor is it heresy, but disobedience, to reject what is proposed by the infallible authority of the Church for our acceptance, but which forms no part of divine revelation. One who 1 Mark xvi r. denied that a canonized saint is in heaven would not be a heretic, but he would be disobedient to the Church, who assures us with divine authority that he is in heaven, and bids us honour him as a saint. Formal heresy is committed not only by knowingly and wilfully rejecting a revealed truth which is proposed for our belief by the Church, but by wilfully doubting about such a revealed truth. For such a one positively doubts whether a portion of God’s revelation is true, and thereby injures him as much as if he asserted that it was untrue. Similarly one who would not submit to the Church’s decision, even if she defined some doctrine to be of faith, is a formal heretic. Negative doubt, by which assent to a revealed truth is withheld or suspended, and voluntary ignorance of the true Church or of other necessary truths of faith, are sinful, but they do not constitute formal heresy. Great numbers of baptized Christians who were born of schismatical and heretical parents, and who do not know the true Church, are material, not formal heretics. When they begin to doubt about their position, and advert to the obligation they are under of making inquiries, they sin against the faith, more or less grievously according to their negligence, if they remain as they are. They do not become formal heretics until the truth fully dawns upon them, or they are so disposed that they would not submit to the Church even if they knew that she alone is the true Church of Christ.

Heresy is punished by the Church as a crime which attacks the foundations and the very raison d’étre of her existence. In order to incur the penalties inflicted on heresy, the sin must be both formal and external, for the Church in her external forum does not take cognizance of sins of thought. The external act must be such as of its own nature, or from custom, or from the special circumstances, is held sufficient to manifest an heretical mind. The reception of the sacrament in an Anglican church, or being married in a non-Catholic place of worship by a non-Catholic minister, are considered acts of heresy and punished as such by excommunication.

A special form for the reception of converts into the Church, based on various Roman decrees, has been approved by the English Bishops.

Apostasy from the faith is the grave sin committed by one who throws the faith overboard entirely. The apostate not only rejects special dogmas like the heretic, but wholly abandons the Catholic faith, and becomes a free-thinker, atheist, materialist, Mohammedan, Buddhist, etc.

I. Notion of Faith. Faith is a theological virtue inclining man to assent firmly to truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing. It is said:

1. To assent firmly. By this firmness "faith is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, through which there is not a firm adherence of the intellect to something" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 1).

2. On account of the authority of God revealing. For this is the formal object of theological faith, by which it is distinguished both from science, which is assent on account of the intrinsic truth of the thing, and from human faith, by which we assent on account of the authority of man.

II. Division of Faith. Faith is divided:

1. By reason of charity, into formed and unformed faith. It is called formed if charity accompanies it; for charity, although it is not intrinsic to faith and therefore cannot be called its substantial or accidental form, nevertheless that which is left in faith from charity is intrinsic to faith. It is unformed when the virtue of faith is in a faithful subject lacking charity.

2. By reason of object, into explicit and implicit faith. Explicit faith is said to be that by which those things are believed which have been revealed in their proper terms; implicit faith, that by which revealed things are believed which are contained implicitly and formally in what is explicitly revealed.

3. By reason of believers, into Catholic and theological or divine faith. Catholic faith is said to be that which obliges all the faithful, since the object has been proposed by the Church with infallible authority as revealed. Theological or divine faith is that which obliges only those who perceive that the object has been revealed by God, when an infallible definition of the Church proposing it to all as revealed is lacking.

III. Object of Faith. 1. Material object. The material object of faith in general is all and only revealed truths. I say all and only revealed truths, because on the one hand only truths which have been spoken by God can be believed on account of the authority of God revealing; on the other hand, all truths spoken by God can be admitted on account of this authority, whether they have been manifested by public revelation or, as seems altogether to be admitted against a few, by private revelation. Moreover, observe:

a) Revealed truths, or truths manifested by God, are said to be those which God has manifested either explicitly or implicitly formally. Now He has explicitly manifested those which He has revealed in their proper terms; He has implicitly formally manifested those which the human mind deduces by a merely explicative discourse from explicitly revealed truths. But if an illative discourse is required for the deduction of truths, the things so deduced are called implicitly virtually revealed, and since assent to these truths rests in our intellect, they cannot be believed by theological faith. When such conclusions are confirmed by the infallible magisterium of the Church, they must of course be admitted by irrevocable assent; but theologians dispute whether the assent then ought to be called an act of divine faith or of ecclesiastical faith. More probably it must be held to be an assent of ecclesiastical faith, because it immediately rests on the authority of the Church; nevertheless the assent is reduced to the habit of divine faith, since the authority of the Church has been revealed by God.

b) The material object of divine faith is twofold: primary, or that which the virtue of faith attains by reason of itself; and secondary, which the virtue of faith attains only by reason of the primary object.

The primary object is God Himself, the first truth in being. For the primary object of faith, since faith is a participation in divine cognition, is the same as the primary object of divine cognition. And the primary object of divine cognition is God Himself, as the first truth in being (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 171, a. 6).

The secondary object is constituted by all the other revealed things, since these have been manifested by God for this reason, that we may have a fuller knowledge of Him and a more fervent love toward Him.

2. Formal object. As concerns the formal object of the theological virtue of faith, it is of faith that the motive is the authority of God revealing. For the Vatican Council defined: "If anyone says that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral things, and that therefore it is not required for divine faith that revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, let him be anathema."¹ Now:

a) The authority of God arises from His veracity and wisdom. This is clear both from the same Council, which teaches that by divine faith we believe on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive,² and from reason, because the irrevocable assent of faith supposes in the one testifying that he absolutely knew the truth communicated and communicated it without falsity.

But if it is further investigated whether both essentially constitute the formal object, the answer must be given with a distinction. With regard to veracity, it must be said affirmatively. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which assigns the veracity of God as the motive of faith,³ and also from reason; for the veracity of God makes the statement supremely credible, and into it the assent of theological faith is ultimately and formally resolved.

As regards wisdom, it is certain that it is required presuppositively and by connotation for constituting the formal reason which can deserve irrevocable assent; but it is not required for this formally and directly. For supreme veracity, such as divine veracity is, of itself imports absolute conformity both with the mind of the speaker and with the things spoken. If it did not import this absolute conformity, veracity would not be supreme, since a veracity which always testified words conformed to things would be greater. From this it follows that wisdom does not essentially constitute the formal object of theological faith, but nevertheless concurs toward it as a condition without which not.

b) Revelation itself can be considered actively and passively. Active revelation consists in the very will of God to reveal, or is the act of will by which God orders His concepts to men. Passive revelation is the effect immediately produced by God for testifying to some truth, or is the act which manifests divine truth outwardly. Now it must more probably be said that active revelation, like veracity, essentially constitutes the formal object of theological faith. For the assent of faith is the conjunction of the intellect with the thing revealed, constituted by the formal object as by an efficient cause. Now the veracity of God taken simply abstracts from conjunction with the object to which the believer assents; therefore veracity alone cannot efficiently constitute the assent of the believer, but for this there is required veracity testifying to the truth. But this testification is formally constituted by active revelation. Therefore.

I say that it is formally constituted by active revelation; for by this revelation infinite truth enjoys veracity. Passive revelation, however, is necessary only to this extent, that the believer may be able to know that God has in fact ordered His concepts to him, i.e., to the believer, through active revelation. Therefore passive revelation does not enter essentially into the formal object of theological faith, but is a condition without which there is no act of it.

¹ Session 3, canon 2, on faith.

² Chapter 3, on faith.

³ For example, 1 Thess. 2:13; 1 John 5:9 sq.

IV. Subject of Faith. The subject of some virtue is distinguished as twofold: the subject by which and partial, which is the power itself in which the virtue resides; and the subject which and total, which is the person himself who possesses some virtue. Now:

1. The subject by which and partial of theological faith is the intellect. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "bringing every intellect into captivity unto the obedience of Christ."¹ It is also confirmed by reason: for theological faith is the principle of an act which is occupied around revealed truth; but an act of this kind is an intellective act; hence the habit of faith also resides in the intellect (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 2). Although, however, the act of faith is an act of the intellect, nevertheless, in order that it take place, a prior motion of the will is required. For the proper terminus of the intellect is the vision of some truth; but this vision is not had in the act of faith, since that act is always placed on account of extrinsic authority. Therefore, in order that the intellect assent on account of this extrinsic authority, it is required that the will, piously affected by grace toward the object of faith, by a certain weight impressed on the intellect, draw it to firm and perfect assent (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1).

2. The subject which and total of theological faith are: 1. all just wayfarers; for sanctifying grace is always joined with faith; and since the souls in purgatory, with respect to the beatific vision, are still on the way, they too are the subject "which" of faith; 2. all wayfaring sinners who nevertheless have not sinned directly against faith.² This is clear from the Council of Trent.³ Those who are in no way wayfarers, or wayfarers who are formally heretics, lack faith. With regard to the Blessed, this is clear because they have vision; with regard to the damned, it follows from their impossibility of tending toward the supernatural end; with regard to wayfarers who are formally heretics, it is clear from the Council of Trent.⁴

¹ 2 Cor. 10:5.

² Although by sins which are not directly against faith the formal object of faith is not destroyed, and therefore the sinner perpetrating such sins can still believe all revealed things, nevertheless, since all infused virtues flow from habitual grace as properties from a nature, when this is lacking, faith too ought of itself to be lacking. Therefore there is a special law, mercifully established by God, that the virtue of faith remains notwithstanding the loss of grace. But we can know the existence of such a law from revelation alone.

³ Session 6, chapter 15 and canon 28.

⁴ Session 6, chapter 15.

V. Properties of Faith. Five properties of faith are suitably assigned, namely truth, certitude, obscurity, liberty, and necessity. Although these properties immediately pertain to the act of faith, mediately, namely by means of the act, they are also predicated of the habit by whose help the act is placed. Therefore we wish to discuss them briefly here.

1. Truth of faith consists in this, that the act of faith essentially and necessarily is occupied around revealed truth; so that by force of this property, faith can never elicit an act regarding an estimated but not real revelation, whether this estimated revelation is in itself a truth or a falsity. That faith has this property is openly clear from the Council of Trent, which says that the certitude of faith is such that falsity cannot underlie it.¹ Besides, it is clear by reason itself; for what has not been revealed by God cannot be believed on account of His authority; but what has been revealed is necessarily true. Hence it follows that both the formal and the material object of faith are lacking whenever someone admits either some truth not revealed, or, a fortiori, some falsity, as a revealed truth. In either case someone can think that he elicits an act of faith, but he does not truly elicit it.²

2. Certitude of faith consists essentially in this, that the believer assents to what is revealed by an assent firm above all things. Therefore, although the assent of faith excludes every prudent fear, nevertheless the essence of the property of certitude is not to be placed, not even partly, in this negative element; for the exclusion of prudent fear is proper to every certitude strictly so called. The essence of this property is solely in the positive element, namely in firm assent above all things.

Nor is the certitude of faith firmer than every other certitude in the sense that it more strongly excludes every prudent fear; on the contrary, in this respect it can be called weaker, since intellectual vision is more opposed to the possibility of doubt than assent on account of an extrinsic cause, even the firmest, as occurs in the act of faith. But it is more certain than every other certitude in the sense of infallibility and therefore of adherence. This greater firmness or certitude is founded: 1. on the fact that the authority of God revealing is more essentially opposed to falsity than any other cause of certitude. Hence St. Thomas teaches: "As to firmness of adherence, faith is more certain than every act of understanding and science, because the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a stronger cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or science" (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1, ad 7; II-II, q. 4, a. 8). It is founded: 2. on grace, without which an act of supernatural faith cannot be elicited; for grace is never given for assent to falsity. From this we conclude that the believer ought to be so disposed in soul that he rejects as absolutely erroneous any doctrine whatever which is certainly opposed to doctrine certainly revealed.

3. Obscurity of faith consists in this, that the believer in the act of faith assents to the revealed object not on account of the intrinsic evidence of the object, but on account of the extrinsic authority of God attesting the truth of the object. This obscurity, which flows from the formal object, is necessarily joined with every act of faith; and it alone must be called essential. The reason for the former is that without the formal object, which in the act of faith is the authority of God, there cannot be an act of faith. The reason for the latter is that according to the more probable opinion even truths evidently known to reason, or admitted on account of their intrinsic evidence, can be believed by divine faith. Once this is posited, only the obscurity which flows from the formal object of faith is essential; but the obscurity which is often present in the material object, as, for example, in mysteries to be believed, or which proceeds from the non-evidence of the fact of divine testimony, is only accidental.

4. Liberty of faith is that property by which the assent of faith is immune from every necessity. Hermes denied that this is a property of faith, teaching that faith consists in a necessary persuasion induced by compelling reasons, so that when this necessity is lacking, nothing remains except vain credulity.³ The Vatican Council condemned this error: "If anyone says that the assent of Christian faith is necessarily produced by reason, let him be anathema."⁴ This liberty of faith arises from the fact that in the act of faith the intellect assents to the object to be believed not on account of intrinsic evidence. Hence the act of faith is free with the liberty both of exercise and of contrariety. But if you posit a case in which the material object by its own evidence, acquired by reasoning, is present to the intellect, the liberty of contrariety perishes, yet liberty of exercise remains, because either the assent of science or the assent of faith can be chosen.

5. Necessity of faith. a) The habit of faith, or habitual faith, is necessary for salvation for all by an absolute necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But the habit of faith is infused together with sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means for individual men, so also is the habit of faith.

b) In what respect the act of faith, or actual faith, is necessary will rather be explained in Book II, where the discussion will concern the exercise or cultivation of virtues.

¹ De iustificatione, session 6, chapter 9.

² Nevertheless he has the merit of faith from the pious affection of credulity, since he is prepared to subject himself to divine authority.

³ Collectio Lacensis, t. VII, p. 529 (17).

⁴ Session 3, on faith, canon 5.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 1-16; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book II, nn. 1-19; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, nn. 1-15.)

Faith is a supernatural virtue "by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe that the things revealed by Him are true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things, seen by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive."¹ (n. 354)

The material object of faith is truths revealed by God, whether explicitly or formally implicitly, but not truths revealed only virtually implicitly (n. 356).

The formal object of faith is the authority of God, arising from His truthfulness and wisdom (n. 356); all these things have been explained more fully in the places cited.

These things recalled to memory, we shall speak first of the necessity of faith, then of sins against faith, and finally of dangers of faith.

¹ Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution De fide, chapter 3.

The act of faith (actual faith), as is clear, cannot be necessary except for adults. But a distinction must be made between adults not yet justified and adults justified. Now:

I. The act of faith is necessary for salvation by necessity of means for adults not yet justified. And indeed, the act of faith is necessary for obtaining justification. But justification itself is necessary for salvation by necessity of means. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the act of faith.

The major is proved: 1. From Sacred Scripture. "But without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe."² That St. Paul here speaks of actual faith is clear both from the word believe and from the whole context. That the Apostle speaks of supernatural faith is clear from verse 1, where he calls it "the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things that appear not." But that the words must be understood of all men of all times is clearer than the sun from the context from chapter 10:38-39 through chapter 11:1-40 inclusive, where he is wholly concerned to prove, by examples adduced, that all the saints from the beginning of the world were justified by faith, and likewise that all still must be justified by it. 2. From Councils. The Council of Trent says thus: "Without it [faith] justification has never happened to anyone."³ That actual faith is to be understood you may deduce from the fact that the Council speaks of faith which, "conceiving from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing that the things divinely revealed and promised are true."⁴ The Vatican Council teaches the same.⁵ 3. It is confirmed by reason. For it is altogether fitting that, for the justification of an adult, it be required by necessity of means that he tend toward God as his supernatural ultimate end. But this cannot happen unless God is apprehended as the supernatural ultimate end; and this happens through faith.

Corollary. To the question how an adult not yet justified, who lacks a preacher, can elicit an act of faith, St. Thomas responds: "For if someone nourished in such a way⁶ followed the guidance of natural reason in seeking good and fleeing evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as Peter to Cornelius" (De veritate, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1).

II. The act of faith is also in some way necessary for justified adults by necessity of means, namely to the extent that salvation cannot be obtained without supernatural prayer by which the grace necessary for fulfilling the precepts is obtained. Now for prayer of this sort an act of faith is necessarily required. Hence the act of faith is also necessary for justified adults in this sense by necessity of means, so that they may arrive at salvation.

Corollary I. For justification, the desire of faith does not suffice, but a formal act of faith is required, as is deduced from the obvious sense of the documents which we have alleged.

Corollary II. For justification an act of faith strictly so called is required; but faith broadly so called does not suffice, that is, as those few explain who think this faith to suffice,⁷ faith which does not rest on the authority of God revealing, but on knowledge acquired from creatures, yet with supernatural help. The arguments adduced prove that true faith is required, of which sort faith broadly so called is not. There is added that the attacked opinion almost falls into proposition 23 condemned by Innocent XI: "Faith broadly so called from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive suffices for justification."⁸

III. The act of faith, necessary by necessity of means, must be explicit as regards certain dogmas; namely:

1. Explicit faith in God existing and rewarding is certainly required. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "For he who comes to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to those who seek Him."⁹ Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 22: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in a rewarder."¹⁰

In addition, explicit faith in God as rewarder in the supernatural order is more probably required; and according to many, also in God existing as author of the supernatural order. On this account the dogmatic theologians should be consulted.

2. It is disputed whether after the Gospel has been promulgated, explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity and Christ the Redeemer is necessary by necessity of means. I said after the Gospel has been promulgated; for before that, that explicit faith in the aforesaid mysteries was not necessary is drawn from these passages of Sacred Scripture: "The mystery which had been hidden from ages and generations, but now is manifested to His saints";¹¹ "But before the faith came, we were kept enclosed under the law, unto that faith which was to be revealed."¹²

That after the Gospel has been promulgated explicit faith in those mysteries is necessary by necessity of means is taught by St. Thomas, as it seems (II-II, q. 2, aa. 7 and 8), and others. They rest first on these passages of Sacred Scripture: "But the justice of God, that is, our justification, by the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all who believe in Him; for there is no distinction."¹³ "Now this is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent."¹⁴ Add the responses of the Holy Office.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the contrary opinion also is probable, because the aforesaid doctrine is not necessarily deduced either from the nature of the thing, or from Sacred Scripture, or from the testimonies of the Fathers, or from the responses of the Sacred Congregations. Not from the nature of the thing, because in order that man tend toward God as his supernatural end, explicit faith in God existing and rewarding in the supernatural order suffices. But the texts of Sacred Scripture, the testimonies of the Holy Fathers, and the contrary responses are understood by the favorers of this opinion of implicit faith, or of necessity of precept, or of necessity considered according to common and ordinary providence (St. Alphonsus, II, 2).¹⁶

Corollary I. An adult (not perpetually insane) who certainly does not know God existing or rewarding, of himself cannot be baptized even in danger of death, because he certainly lacks faith, which in an adult is required for obtaining justification (under III). Thus theoretically; since practically either ignorance can be driven out or it will not be certain.

Corollary II. An adult (not perpetually insane) who does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of Christ the Redeemer, of himself cannot be baptized or absolved, not even in extremis, unless he is first instructed.¹⁷ But if, with extreme necessity pressing, instruction cannot be undertaken, Baptism and absolution should be conferred, provided the required intention is certainly, or at least with some probability, present.¹⁸ In the former case Baptism should be administered absolutely, in the latter conditionally; but absolution should not be granted except conditionally, because even if the required intention were certainly present, nevertheless supernatural contrition probably is lacking, when knowledge of the mysteries which probably must be believed by necessity of means is lacking.¹⁹

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Annotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis; Bouquillon, De virtutibus theologicis; Van der Moeren, Tractatus de virtutibus theologicis.

² Heb. 11:6. The same is taught at Heb. 10:38; Gal. 2:16; Mark 16:15 sq.

³ Session 6, chapter 7.

⁴ Session 6, chapter 6.

⁵ Session 3, chapter 3.

⁶ That is, in forests.

⁷ Thus Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, VIII, 493 sq.

⁸ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.

⁹ Heb. 11:6.

¹⁰ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1172.

¹¹ Col. 1:26.

¹² Gal. 3:23.

¹³ Rom. 3:22.

¹⁴ John 17:3.

¹⁵ The response of the Holy Office, May 3, 1703 (Collectanea de Propaganda Fide, n. 254, ad 2, and n. 256, ad 2), causes the greatest difficulty. Asked whether an adult in the article of death could be baptized under a promise of learning the truths of Faith if he recovered, it responded: "That the promise does not suffice; but that the missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, such as the principal mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." This response Benedict XIV also reports in the Constitution Postremo mense, February 28, 1747, n. 41; finally the Holy Office, March 30, 1898 (Collectanea de Propaganda Fide, n. 1993), again appealed to it.

¹⁶ Cf. note [16].

¹⁷ Cf. the responses of the Holy Office cited in note [16].

¹⁸ This doctrine is not opposed to the cited responses of the Holy Office, namely those of May 3, 1703, and March 30, 1898. These establish what generally must be done; this does not prevent an exception being admitted in an urgent case of necessity.

¹⁹ Nor is proposition 64 condemned by Innocent XI an obstacle to our doctrine: "A man is capable of absolution however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ" (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1214). For here the speech concerns culpable ignorance, which certainly excludes valid absolution until the penitent grieves over it (St. Alphonsus, II, 2).

Both the internal act and the external act, or profession of faith, are prescribed. Hence:

I. The internal act of faith, that is, the act of believing God revealing, is necessary by necessity of precept. This is clear first from the fact that it is necessary by necessity of means, as we explained above (n. 488). Then, one who does not admit revelation sufficiently proposed does supreme injury to the authority of God. Add these texts of Sacred Scripture: "He who does not believe shall be condemned."¹ - "And this is His commandment: that we believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ."²

II. The internal act of faith, considered according to necessity of precept, must be explicit, not only as regards things to be believed by necessity of means, but also as regards other things which must be known either for thinking rightly, or for living rightly, or for duly using the helps to salvation.³ Hence, by explicit faith there must be believed, besides those things to be believed by necessity of means: 1. the things contained in the Apostles' Creed; 2. the things contained in the Decalogue; 3. the most necessary Sacraments, namely Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist, and, according to many, Confirmation; the others, when someone is about to receive them soon; 4. probably the things contained in the Lord's Prayer, since it involves all the things which Christ taught us to ask for (St. Alphonsus, II, 3). Besides this, note:

1. Besides things to be believed, many other things must be known, such as the precepts of the Church and the duties of each one's proper state. Likewise, at least, it is altogether fitting to know the sign of the Cross, and to retain in memory the Lord's Prayer, the Angelic Salutation, and the Creed (cf. St. Alphonsus, II, 3).

2. As regards the mode of knowing those things which must be believed or known, generally knowledge as to substance suffices, or that which is contained in some concept, however confused and rough. I said generally, because some, considering their state and condition, must possess a more perfect knowledge.

3. One who certainly or probably is ignorant of things to be believed by necessity of means should, before he is absolved, be instructed in the manner in which this can conveniently be done here and now; nevertheless he should be warned that afterward he must try to acquire a more perfect and broader knowledge. One who is ignorant of things to be believed or known only by necessity of precept can be absolved, with the obligation imposed of afterward obtaining the required knowledge (St. Alphonsus, II, 3; Praxis Confessarii, n. 22).

III. The internal act of faith obliges sometimes by reason of the precept of faith itself, sometimes by reason of the precept of another virtue. Therefore note proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII: "At no time in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues";⁴ proposition 16 condemned by Innocent XI: "Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept and according to itself";⁵ and proposition 17 condemned by the same: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life."⁶ Now the internal act of faith obliges:

1. By reason of the precept of faith itself:

a) When someone first has knowledge of revelation made. Hence the following are bound to elicit an act of faith: a) children educated among the faithful, who, having attained the use of reason, apprehend the truths of faith as revealed by God; b) non-Catholic adults to whom the true faith is proposed and becomes known as true (St. Alphonsus, II, 5).

b) Several times in life. Thus St. Alphonsus and many others against some. And indeed, the homage to be rendered to God seems to require that acts of the virtues which immediately regard God be elicited more often in life. Then it is gathered from proposition 17, condemned by Innocent XI and cited above. Finally, it seems to have to be deduced from the fact that, according to what will be said in n. 519, an act of charity must be elicited several times in life. For since faith and charity have almost the same necessity, almost the same thing seems to have to be said of the obligation of each (St. Alphonsus, II, 5, 6, 7).

Objection. The precept of faith obliges indirectly, that is, by reason of another virtue, so often in life that Christ is not considered to have imposed it directly.

Response. That the precept of faith obliges indirectly so often does not prevent the homage to be rendered to God revealing also from requiring that an act of faith be elicited several times in life. Hence Christ is considered to have imposed an act of faith also on account of that motive, that is, directly.

c) In the article of death. Thus many, on account of the reasons adduced under b), which they judge must also be applied to the article of death.

d) When a new definition of faith is proposed, insofar as one who in this case did not elicit an act of faith would at least practically either deny an article of faith, or call it into doubt, or expose himself to the danger of doing so.

e) When someone has fallen into heresy or apostasy; in which case the injury done to the authority of God seems to carry with it the obligation of repairing it by an act of faith at least not long delayed.

f) When a temptation against faith presses, whether against faith in common or against a particular mystery, which someone judges he cannot conquer except by an elicited act of faith. Yet this will rarely have place; rather, ordinarily, it is preferable to fight temptations of this sort by turning away to other things (St. Alphonsus, II, 5; Praxis Confessarii, n. 238).

g) When an external profession of faith must be made (St. Alphonsus, cited place, n. 490).

2. By reason of the precept of another virtue:

a) When someone is bound to place an act of another virtue which cannot be placed without an act of faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 5).

b) When a temptation against another virtue presses, which someone seems to himself unable to overcome without an act of faith (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) When an act of virtue is freely placed which cannot be placed in the due manner without an act of faith, such as sacramental confession or the reception of the Holy Eucharist.

Corollary I. One who neglects an act of faith imposed by reason of another virtue sins against that other virtue, but not against faith.

Corollary II. A man living Christianly should not doubt that he has fulfilled the obligation of eliciting an act of faith from time to time, since so often, both by reason of faith itself and by reason of another virtue or good work, he elicits an act of faith, now in an act signified, now in an act exercised (St. Alphonsus, II, 7).

¹ Mark 16:16.

² 1 John 3:23.

³ Waffelaert, Annotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis, n. 178.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1166.

⁶ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1167.

I. The external act, or profession of faith, is sometimes prescribed. This is clear: 1. From Sacred Scripture. "If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God has raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."¹ 2. From the fact that the Church was instituted by her Author as an external, visible society of believers. But such a society carries with it that believers also profess the faith externally. 3. The majesty of God revealing requires this, for external adherence also is owed to Him. How greatly the obligation of sometimes professing the faith presses is clear, for example, from the fact that the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, on May 28, 1635, responded that "a Mohammedan who wishes, on account of danger to life, to be a hidden Christian and to remain such cannot be admitted to baptism, but must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion."²

II. The external act, or profession of faith, generally obliges the faithful "whenever their silence, evasiveness, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor" (can. 1325, § 1). Specifically, it obliges:

1. By reason of the precept of faith itself:

a) When a baptized infant attains the use of reason, or an adult embraces the faith or returns to it after public departure.

b) Several times in life, as is gathered from the arguments adduced under I. Besides, a man who lives Christianly abundantly satisfies this obligation, since hundreds of times he places acts which contain a profession of faith at least in an act exercised.

c) When the honor of God as Author of faith must be defended (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2); this has place: 1. if someone is questioned by public authority. Hence proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel that he frankly confess the faith as glorious to God and the faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful per se."³ But "if a prince by a general law orders the faithful to disclose themselves, by wearing a sign, or presenting themselves, or otherwise, they are not bound, since no one is bound to speak the truth unless he has been specially asked" (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 50), that is, the obligation of professing the faith presses only when someone is summoned before the law. Make exception if civil authority questions someone about the faith contrary to the prescription of law. Nor is the case present if someone is questioned for a merely political end, for example on the occasion of a census of the people. 2. If the faith is treated contemptuously and someone can conveniently defend it, for example by refuting objections that have been brought forward (St. Alphonsus, II, 11). 3. If, considering the circumstances, omission of profession would be taken for denial of the faith, as if, when several persons have been questioned about the faith and others are professing it, you were silent (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 40); likewise if, when you were questioned about the faith, another, while you were silent, answered for you that you were not a Catholic. I said considering the circumstances, because per se there is no obligation of professing the faith if someone is questioned by a private person (St. Alphonsus, II, 13, 20).

d) When, unless someone professes the faith, there is grave danger that he will deny the faith.

e) When profession of faith has been prescribed by the Church. Now:

alpha) It must be made by an adult to be baptized⁴ and, if an infant is to be baptized, by the sponsors;⁵ likewise by priests in their ordination⁶ and bishops in their consecration;⁷ specifically, by a person past puberty who is to be baptized and who is converted from heresy or schism to the faith.⁸

beta) From can. 1406, those held to the obligation of making profession of faith, according to the formula⁹ approved by the Apostolic See, are:

1. Before the president or his delegate, those who are present at an Ecumenical or particular Council or at a diocesan Synod with either consultative or deliberative vote; but the president before the same Council or Synod.

2. Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the first Cardinals in the order of priests and of deacons, and the Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church, those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity.

3. Before a delegate from the Apostolic See, those promoted to an episcopal see, even a nonresidential one, or to the governance of an abbey or prelature nullius, an Apostolic Vicariate, or an Apostolic Prefecture.

4. Before the cathedral Chapter, the Capitular Vicar.

5. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the Chapter, those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry.

6. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other consultors, those taken into the office of diocesan consultors.

7. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate, the Vicar General, parish priests, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual benefices, having care of souls; the rector and professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in seminaries, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books, of whom in can. 1393; priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.

8. Before the Ordinary or his delegate, the Rector of a University or Faculty; but before the Rector of a University or Faculty, or his delegate, all professors in a canonically erected University or Faculty, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination has been made, are endowed with academic degrees.

9. Before the Chapter or Superior who appointed them, or their delegate, Superiors in clerical religions (can. 1406, § 1).

10. Those who, after having left the prior office, benefice, or dignity, obtain another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again make profession of faith according to the norm of this canon (can. 1406, § 2), that is, can. 1406, § 1.

gamma) From the decree of the Holy Office,¹⁰ the anti-modernist oath, prescribed by Pius X in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum,¹¹ must be made, until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter, and indeed according to the formula attached to the Motu Proprio, which, with their name signed, they shall give to their Ordinary:

1. Clerics to be initiated into major orders; to each of them beforehand let there be handed a copy both of the profession of faith and of the formula for taking the oath, so that they may know them accurately in advance, with the sanction, as below, for violation of the oath added.

2. Priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.¹² These, however, are not bound when their faculties are prolonged or when they transfer to another diocese.

3. Parish priests, Canons, and Beneficiaries before entering into possession of the benefice.

4. Officials in episcopal curias and ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges.

5. Those chosen to deliver sermons during the time of Lent.

6. All officials in Roman Congregations or tribunals before the Cardinal Prefect or Secretary of the same Congregation or tribunal.

7. Moderators of religious families and Congregations before they enter office.

8. Doctors both of seminaries and of religious families, before they enter office.¹³

It is disputed whether those designated under 8 are bound to make the oath yearly. Now it seems it must be answered affirmatively; for the Holy Office declared¹⁴ that the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath must remain in their full force until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter. But, considering the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath, the said oath was to be made yearly by the aforesaid Doctors.¹⁵

Objection 1. The oath is intended as a complement of the profession of faith; and therefore, once the yearly profession of faith has been removed, it should likewise be held as removed. But the profession of faith must be made only at the beginning of the office undertaken (can. 1406, § 1, 7).

Response. The argument adduced seems sufficiently to prove that the reason of complement in the case should not be urged so strongly; in other words, that the anti-modernist oath must be urged even independently of the profession of faith. Besides, there is a special reason for requiring the oath, namely the combating of modernism, and this reason persists and presses, even if the profession of faith is omitted.

Objection 2. The declaration of the Holy Office can regard only the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, which does not prescribe a yearly oath; but not the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, which extends the sense of the said Motu Proprio to each year.

Response. Apart from the fact that it is in no way clear that the Motu Proprio does not prescribe a yearly oath, the declaration of the Holy Office is considered to regard the Motu Proprio as it had in fact been in force. But in fact it had been in force according to the norm of the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, whether that declaration is extensive or comprehensive.

Note 1. One does not satisfy the obligation of making profession of faith, established by can. 1406, if he makes it through a procurator or before a layman (can. 1407).

Note 2. Any custom against the canons just cited is reprobated (can. 1408), that is, canons 1406 and 1407.

Note 3. One who, contrary to the prescription of can. 1406, neglects to make profession of faith without a just impediment is to be warned, with a suitable term also fixed beforehand; when this has elapsed, if he is contumacious, he is to be punished even by deprivation of office, benefice, dignity, or function; nor meanwhile does he make his own the fruits of the benefice, office, dignity, or function (can. 2403).

2. By reason of the precept of another virtue, profession of faith obliges:

a) When by professing the faith someone would have hope of converting others to the faith, or by not professing it would be a scandal to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, II, 11).

b) When by neglecting profession of faith someone would expose himself to grave danger of committing some sin other than one against faith itself; which will rarely have place.

¹ Rom. 10:9 sq.; cf. Matt. 10:32 sq.

² May 28, 1635 (Collectanea, n. 84); cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1790 (Collectanea, n. 602).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1168.

⁴ Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 32.

⁵ Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 17.

⁶ Roman Pontifical, On the Ordination of a Priest.

⁷ Roman Pontifical, On the Consecration of a Bishop.

⁸ Roman Pontifical, Order for Reconciling an Apostate, Schismatic, or Heretic; cf. Instruction of the Holy Office to the Bishop of Philadelphia, July 20, 1859.

⁹ This formula is found at the beginning of the Code.

¹⁰ March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).

¹¹ September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655).

¹² Thus the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).

¹³ Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655); Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).

¹⁴ March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).

¹⁵ Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910.

I. Concealment of faith; concerning this note: one converted or returned to the faith per se cannot conceal his conversion; by accident, on account of a grave cause, this is licit for a longer or shorter time, although on account of the honor publicly due to God revealing, to which there is easily added scandal that must be repaired, it is scarcely ever licit to conceal conversion for a long time.¹

If someone placed in danger of death is converted and has a grave reason for concealing his conversion, let him profess the faith before at least two witnesses, who afterward should make the conversion known.²

¹ Cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, May 28, 1635 (Collectanea, n. 84); n. 490.

² Cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1790 (Collectanea, n. 602).

II. Denial of faith is always illicit, even in a case where it would be done only externally. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture (Matt. 10:33) and from the nature of the thing. Denial of faith made only externally is called simulation. Likewise, it is always illicit to be ashamed of the faith (Luke 9:26; St. Alphonsus, II, 12).

III. Dissimulation of faith, that is, an act by which someone signifies neither the true nor a false faith, but expressly hides the true one, is per se illicit; but from a sufficiently grave cause it becomes licit (St. Alphonsus, II, 12). Indeed, sometimes it obliges, namely if on the one hand the necessity of confessing the faith is absent, but on the other hand great harms are to be feared from manifestation of the faith.

Both denial and dissimulation can be done by words, signs, and deeds. Since often it is difficult to distinguish whether denial or dissimulation is had, let this be:

IV. Criterion for distinguishing denial and dissimulation of faith.

1. Things which of themselves or from the circumstances signify internal rejection of faith must be avoided as a denial of faith; of this sort are, for example, "burning incense or genuflection before an idol; likewise taking a heretical supper, etc." (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 8).

2. Things which only indirectly, or by accident, signify internal rejection of faith contain dissimulation of faith, and therefore are licit from a proportionate cause; for example, the clothing and signs of the Turkish nation (St. Alphonsus, cited place, 9).

3. Things which neither of themselves nor from circumstances nor by accident signify internal rejection of faith contain neither denial nor dissimulation of faith, and therefore are per se licit, as if someone says: "I am not a priest"; by accident, because of a reason extrinsic to this precept, they can become illicit. These things noted, it is useful to apply the doctrine set forth to diverse cases.

V. Applications. In making applications we distinguish the diverse things by which both denial and dissimulation of faith can be done, namely words, signs more strictly taken, clothing, and deeds.

1. Words. One who is questioned about the faith, even by a private person, cannot respond in such a way that he must certainly be believed to deny the true faith. Hence he cannot respond, for example, that he is a Calvinist, or that he adheres to the faith of the kingdom, if the kingdom as such professes a false faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 13).

2. Signs more strictly taken. The distinctive signs of Freemasons (nods, movements of hands or fingers, a particular way of signing letters) contain profession of a false sect, since they are equivalent to words by which someone signifies that he belongs to a false sect.¹ Nor do the aforesaid signs seem to lose their signification from the fact that some who do not belong to the sect use them, for example so that they may be treated amicably; for these seem rather to lie than to make the signs lose their signification. Besides, those who use signs of this sort at least proximately intend that they be taken, at least probably, for Freemasons; but to use such a means is illicit.

3. Clothing. Among clothing: 1. Some garments are distinctive of a people or nation, as the cap of the Turks. It is licit to use these from a just cause, because garments of this sort, although they may be worn in a region of unbelievers, nevertheless of themselves do not involve profession of any faith. 2. Other garments are distinctive of a sect. It is not licit to use these, because one who uses them, considering the circumstances, signifies that he belongs to that sect.² Many, however, permit the use of garments "which do not have a peculiar sign of professing error, but are only an indication of more elegant dress, as formerly the cloaks of preachers in Germany; or of a more eminent life among their own, as the robes of bonzes in Japan. The same must be said concerning signs which the Jews used, for example, a yellow ring on the cloak at Frankfurt, etc.; because these are merely political signs and distinctive of one class of men from another, and not properly professive of faith" (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 9).

4. Deeds. a) The eating of meat on a day of abstinence does not contain profession of a false religion. But to eat out of shame is not licit. Likewise it is illicit if someone is provoked to eating in contempt of religion, unless there is a grave cause and the one provoked protests that he is not acting in contempt of religion, but because the Church for a grave cause does not urge the law (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 10).

b) Active assistance³ at the sacred rites of non-Catholics is illicit. The reason is that assistance of this sort either constitutes part of a worship that must be reproved or, as it is taken here, involves proximate cooperation in such worship. Hence can. 1258, § 1: It is not licit for the faithful in any way actively to assist or to have part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics. And can. 2316: Whoever in any way spontaneously and knowingly assists the propagation of heresy, or who communicates in divine things with heretics contrary to the prescription of can. 1258, is suspected of heresy. And so it is illicit, for example, to take a non-Catholic supper; to hear the Mass of a non-Catholic, even if on a feast of precept no other can be heard;⁴ to chant psalms or play the organ in their assemblies;⁵ to perform the office of sponsor in their baptisms;⁶ etc. Besides, compare what is to be said about cooperation (n. 557).

c) Assistance at sermons and merely passive assistance⁷ at sacred functions of non-Catholics contain at most material and remote cooperation, and therefore, considered under this respect, are licit for a just cause. But scandal is easily added and, if more frequent assistance is in question, danger of perversion. Hence the Holy Office⁸ declared that "regularly it is not licit for Catholics to be present at the sermons (baptisms and marriages) of heretics or schismatics" (cf. can. 1258, § 2). If civil authority orders Catholics, for example soldiers, to assist at the sermons and rites of non-Catholics, practically there is a cause excusing, while precautions against danger of perversion must nevertheless be employed.

It is licit, scandal being excluded, to enter the church of schismatics and there privately, not as if acting together with them, to adore the Most Holy Sacrament.⁹ Yet if this were done regularly, it would certainly provide scandal and occasion for religious indifferentism.

Besides this, the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide,¹⁰ to the doubt: "Whether it is licit for Catholics to adore the Most Holy Sacrament, carried by a schismatic parish priest in the public way, whether to a sick person or otherwise," responded: "Not only is it licit, but Catholics must adore the Most Holy Sacrament; nevertheless they must abstain from accompanying it."

Entry into the churches of non-Catholics in order to look at them involves nothing illicit.

d) Passive presence at funerals and weddings of non-Catholics. Passive or merely material presence can be tolerated, for the sake of civil office or honor, on account of a grave reason to be approved by the Bishop in a case of doubt, at the funerals, weddings, and similar solemnities of non-Catholics, provided danger of perversion and scandal is absent (can. 1258, § 2). It is said passive presence; hence if the wedding is entered into before a heretical minister as such, it is not licit to function as witness. Nor is it lawful to undertake the office of paranymph, if this office is as it were to offer the spouses to the heretical minister so that he may join them. It is said provided danger of scandal is absent; now in many regions scandal certainly would be present if there were question of cremating the body or of carrying out burial with the insignia of the Masonic sect.

e) Selection of a non-Catholic sponsor. The Holy Office said "that it is preferable that Baptism be conferred without a sponsor than with a non-Catholic."¹¹ Finally, can. 795, among other things, requires for validity that the sponsor in Baptism "be enrolled in no heretical or schismatic sect."

f) Flight in time of persecution is per se licit, because it involves neither denial nor dissimulation of faith, but only the use of the right to protect one's life. Practically:

alpha) It is illicit if, by your flight, the honor of God or the salvation of souls would suffer detriment; as if pastors of souls, that is, bishops and parish priests, were to flee.

beta) It is licit if your presence is indeed useful, but not necessary, and you cannot remain without grave inconvenience.

gamma) It obliges: 1. if by remaining you would harm rather than benefit the common good; 2. if by remaining you would expose yourself to danger of denying the faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 6).

Note 1. For dissimulating the faith it is more easily licit to omit signs of Catholics than to use signs of non-Catholics.

Note 2. One who is converted to the faith is indeed bound, on the occasion of Baptism, to profess the faith; but if there are grave causes for dissimulating the faith for a time, and for that end for not observing certain precepts of the Church or even for passively assisting at rites of non-Catholics, this is licit (n. 498 sq.). Nevertheless it is preferable to explain the matter to the Ordinary, or even, if the dissimulation of faith will have to endure only for a short time, to defer Baptism. Yet the aforesaid should not per se be applied readily to one who has departed from the faith and desires to return to it, since he is also bound to repair scandal.

¹ According to some, these things are not to be extended to the signs by which Masons usually recognize one another; this does not seem equivalent to a profession of this sect, but is a means so that they may be treated amicably by members of the sect. But signs by which Masons usually recognize one another, if others do not use them, truly signify that someone belongs to the sect; this is and remains profession of the sect, although the said signs may be used as a means so that they may be treated amicably by members of the sect.

² Objection. Garments which are distinctive of a sect are not necessarily protestative of the sect. Now it is licit to use garments non-protestative of the sect, although distinctive, from a grave cause. Thus several authors. Response: Leaving aside the word protestative, I would say: one who uses garments distinctive of a sect signifies that he belongs to the sect; this is profession of the sect and denial of the true faith at least externally.

³ Active assistance is had when the one assisting has a part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics (can. 1258, § 1).

⁴ Holy Office, August 7, 1704 (Collectanea, n. 267).

⁵ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, July 8, 1889 (Collectanea, n. 1713).

⁶ The Holy Office, May 10, 1770 (Collectanea, n. 478), responded that "it is absolutely not licit, either by oneself or through others, to perform the office of sponsor in Baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics"; likewise June 30 and July 5, 1864 (Collectanea, n. 1257).

⁷ Merely passive assistance is had if the one assisting, unlike one actively assisting, has no part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics (cf. can. 1258, § 1).

⁸ May 10, 1770.

⁹ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, December 15, 1764 (Collectanea, n. 458, ad 1).

¹⁰ December 15, 1764 (Collectanea, n. 458, ad 4).

¹¹ May 3, 1893 (Collectanea, n. 1831).

The principal dangers of faith are:

I. Reading of impious writings; concerning this, see the treatise on the precepts of the Church, and on Penance, where occasions of sin are discussed.

Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human conduct as directed by reason to man’s natural end, for Moral Theology uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man’s supernatural end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general conclusions.

The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 1-9.)

The order of the theological virtues here followed is that given by St. Paul in I Cor., xiii. 13—viz., faith, hope, charity. The order of these virtues is twofold: (a) according to dignity the order is charity, hope, faith; (b) according to time, the order is that of I Cor., xiii. The habits of these three virtues are infused at the same time (i.e., at the moment when grace is conferred), but their acts are not simultaneous, and one must believe before one can hope or love.

Excellence of the Virtue of Faith.—(a) Faith is the beginning of the supernatural life, the foundation and the root of justification, without which it is impossible to please God and arrive at fellowship with Him. (b) It is an anticipation of the end of the supernatural life, for by faith we believe that which we shall behold in the beatific vision: “All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth” (Heb., xi. 13).

Utility of Faith for the Individual.—(a) Through faith the intellect receives a new light, which discloses to it a higher world—“the wisdom of God in a mystery” (I Cor., ii. 7)—and which illuminates even this lower world with a heavenly brightness, that man may know more quickly, more surely, and more perfectly the natural truths that pertain to God and duty. (b) The will is strengthened to perform duties valiantly through the motives and examples which faith offers: the patriarchs of old “by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained promises, recovered strength from weakness” (Heb., xi. 33). In adversity faith is a stay and a consolation: “For what things soever were written, were written for our learning, that through patience and the comfort of the scriptures, we might have hope” (Rom., xv. 4).

Utility of Faith for Society.—(a) Domestic society is defended in its security and happiness by faith, which teaches the sacramental character of marriage, which offers the model of the Holy Family to Christian homes, which never ceases to declare in the name of God the duties of husbands and wives, parents and children. (b) Without faith and religion civil society cannot be maintained in strength and prosperity. It is faith in God more than laws or armies that gives security to life, reputation, and property, with order and peace at home and abroad.

The Meaning of Faith.—In Holy Scripture and other religious writings the word faith has various meanings.

(a) Sometimes it stands for a promise, or for the quality of being true to one’s promises. Examples: St. Paul condemns widows who remarry against their word, “because they have made void their first faith (promise)” (I Tim., v. 12). Speaking of the unbelief of the Jews, he says: “Shall their unbelief make the faith (i.e., fidelity to promise or faithfulness) of God without effect? God forbid. But God is true” (Rom, iii. 3, 4).

(b) Sometimes the term faith stands for good reputation, or for confidence in another. Examples: “He that discloseth the secret of a friend loseth his faith (credit, reputation), and shall never find a friend to his mind” (Ecclus., xxvii. 17); “O thou of little faith (trust, confidence), why didst thou doubt?” (Matt., xiv. 31).

(c) Sometimes faith stands for truths or doctrines offered for one’s belief, or for the assent of the mind to the judgment of conscience or to the revelation of God. Examples: “Thou has not denied My faith” (that is, “the truths revealed by Me,” Apoc. ii. 13); “All that is not of faith (i.e., from the firm conviction of conscience) is sin” (Rom, xiv. 23); “Without faith (i.e., assent to the unseen on the word of God) it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe” (Heb., xi. 6).

It is faith only in the last sense that is known as the theological virtue of faith, and hence with it alone we are here concerned. St. Paul describes this faith as follows: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb., xi. 1). This verse is variously interpreted. (a) According to St. Chrysostom, the meaning is: Faith is the subsistence or anticipated existence in the soul of future blessings that are hoped for, through the firm confidence it gives; it is the conviction of the reality of the unseen. (b) According to St. Thomas, the meaning is: Faith is the substance or basis on which is built the hope of blessedness, or on which rests as on its foundation the whole work of justification; it is an argument producing certainty of that which is not seen. The elements of St. Thomas’ interpretation have been incorporated into the Vatican Council’s definition: “The Catholic Church professes that this faith which is the beginning of human salvation is a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and inspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by Him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of these things has been perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived” (Sess. 3, chap. 3, Denz. 1789).

Thus, faith is an intellectual habit and act, but it differs from all other intellectual habits and acts as follows: (a) it differs from science, vision, understanding, for its object is “the things that appear not”; (b) it differs from opinion, doubt, suspicion, for it is a firm “substance,” a certain “evidence”; (c) it differs from human faith or belief resting on man’s word and promises, for it is the pledge, beginning and cornerstone of the happiness promised by God Himself.

Faith will now be considered according to two aspects: (a) objectively, as regards the things that are believed by him who has faith; (b) subjectively, as regards the habit and act of the believer which put him in contact with these truths of the unseen world.

The Object of Faith.—There is a twofold object of faith, viz., material and formal.

(a) The material object, or the truth that is believed, includes all that is contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down by tradition. The principal material object is God Himself as the Deity, or Supreme Truth in Being (prima veritas in essendo); the secondary material object embraces all other revealed truths.

(b) The formal object of faith, or the motive that prompts one to give assent to the material object, is the authority of God, who is Supreme Truth in Knowing and Speaking (prima veritas in cognoscendo et dicendo), and hence He can neither be deceived nor deceive.

The material object of faith includes all truths revealed by God; but, since it belongs to the Church to teach those truths, there is a distinction of truths that are revealed by God but not defined by the Church, and truths that are revealed by God and defined by the Church as revealed. Thus: (a) divine faith is belief in revealed truth that has not been declared by the Church as revealed; (b) divine and Catholic faith is belief in a revealed truth that has been proposed as such by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. Example: Dogmas contained in creeds, definitions of Popes or general councils. The Vatican Council has determined the object of this faith: By divine and Catholic faith all those things must be believed which are contained in the written word of God and in tradition, and which are proposed by the Church, either by a solemn pronouncement or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed (Ibid., Denz. 1792).

The formal object of faith extends to all truths that have been revealed and to no others. Theologians discuss the status of certain truths connected with revelation concerning which the Church is guaranteed infallibility on account of her teaching office. Special difficulties arise in relation to: a) dogmatic facts, that is, definitions concerning particular facts closely related to dogma (e.g., that Anglican orders are invalid; that a particular book contains a sense contrary to revelation; that this Supreme Pontiff, legitimately elected, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy and consequently infallible); b) theological conclusions, that is, deductions drawn from revealed truth.

Many theologians teach that both dogmatic facts and theological conclusions when defined by the Church constitute a special object of faith distinct from divine and Catholic faith, namely, ecclesiastical faith. Accordingly, for them, ecclesiastical faith is the internal assent given to truths connected with revelation and defined by the Church as true, the motive of assent being the infallibility of the Church in her teaching office.

Others deny the existence of such faith and insist a) that dogmatic facts are contained in revealed doctrine implicitly as singulars in universals and hence are believed before definition by divine faith implicitly, and after definition by divine and Catholic faith, b) that theological conclusions before definition are held by theological assent, afterwards by divine and Catholic faith. Some also have maintained that before definition such conclusions belong to divine faith. (For a summary of the various teachings on this problem see Reginaldo-Maria Schultes, O.P., Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum, pp. 46 ff.; Marin-Sola, O.P., L’Evolution homogene du Dogme Catholique).

Private revelations, even when approved by the Church, are not an object of divine and Catholic faith, for they form no part of the revelation given to the whole human race that was closed with the death of the Apostles and committed to the Church. Hence: (a) if they are negatively approved by the Church, the approval means only that such revelations contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, and are useful and edifying; (b) if they are approved positively (as is the case with the revelations of St. Hildegarde, St. Brigit, and St. Catherine of Siena), the approval means that they appear to be true divine revelations and may be prudently accepted as such.

The assent to be given to private revelations, therefore, is as follows:

(a) Such revelations should receive the assent of divine faith, if it is certain that they are genuine. This applies to those to whom and for whom they were given, and probably to others also. It rarely happens, however, that the genuineness of a private revelation can be critically established, and the Church does not require that such revelations be accepted by all the faithful. To refuse assent, therefore, to a private revelation is not generally an offense against divine faith.

(b) Private revelations cannot receive the assent of Catholic faith, since, even when approved by the Church, they are not proposed as a part of the Christian revelation committed to her care. To dissent from them, therefore, is not a sin against Catholic faith, unless in rejecting them one would also reject defined dogma (e.g., by denying the possibility of revelation).

(c) Private revelations are not offered for the assent of ecclesiastical faith, since in approving them the Church does not propose them as necessarily connected with the exercise of her teaching office or under guarantee of infallibility. To dissent from them, therefore, is not a sin against ecclesiastical faith, unless other errors (e.g., against the authority of the Church in matters connected with revelation) are also involved.

(d) Private revelations are offered for the assent of human faith, since the Church proposes them to the faithful, if approved, as matters of pious opinion, which are according to the rules of prudence truly probable on account of traditions in their favor, supported by suitable testimony and documents (Benedict XIV, De Canonizatione Sanctorum, lib. II, cap. 23; III, cap. ult.; Sacred Cong. Rites, May 12, 1877, n. 3419, ad 2). The Church permits, but does not exact belief in these revelations. One would not be excused, however, who rejected them through pride or contempt, or without sufficient reason.

Many tenets of the Church, indeed, have not the prerogative of infallibility—for example, decrees of the Popes not given ex cathedra, decisions of Congregations made with Papal approval, teachings of Bishops to particular members of the Church, doctrines commonly held by Catholics as theological truths or certain conclusions. These decrees, decisions, etc., receive not the assent of Catholic faith, but what is called religious assent, which includes two things, viz., external and internal assent.

(a) External assent should be given such teachings—that is, the homage of respectful silence due to public authority. This does not forbid the submission of difficulties to the teaching authority, or the scientific examination of objections that seem very strong.

(b) Internal assent should be given such teaching—that is, the submission of the judgment of the individual to the judgment of the teacher who has the authority from Christ and assistance from the Holy Spirit. This internal assent differs, however, from the assent of faith, inasmuch as it excludes fear of error, but not of the possibility of error, and it may later on be suspended, called into doubt, or even revoked. Pope Pius X in his Motu proprio, “Praestantia scripturae Sacrae” (Nov. 18, 1907), indicated the binding force of the decrees both of the Pontifical Biblical Commission and of all doctrinal decrees: All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission which have been given in the past and which shall be given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which appertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can they escape the stigma both of disobedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt as often as they impugn their decisions either in word or writing; and this over and above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be the cause before God by making other statements on these matters which are very frequently both rash and false. (Reaffirmed by the Biblical Commission on Feb. 27, 1934.)

The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to the virtue of faith, are as follows:

(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.

(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those given in the Creeds, ex cathedra definitions of the Popes, decisions of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical letters [see Humani Generis, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.

(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical, near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious, suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc. Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book Augustinus, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and “transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the Filioque.

(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses, and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are in this class.

(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.

Faith is divided into explicit and implicit, according as the object believed is unfolded or not to the mind.

(a) Faith is explicit regarding any truth, when assent is given to that truth as known in itself and expressed in terms proper to itself. Example: He has explicit faith in the Eucharist who has been instructed concerning the meaning of the mystery, and who assents to it according to that distinct knowledge.

(b) Faith is implicit regarding any truth, when that truth is not known or not accepted in itself, but is accepted in another truth. Example: He has implicit faith in the Eucharist who has not yet heard of it, but who accepts all the teachings of the Church, even those he does not know.

The points about which explicit faith is required can be reduced to four heads (see Catechism of the Council of Trent). These heads are:

(a) The things to be believed: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth shall be saved” (Mark, xvi. 15). The Gospel doctrine is summarized in the Apostles’ Creed;

(b) The things to be done: “Teach them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 20). The Ten Commandments (see Vol. II) are called the epitome of the whole law;

(c) The ordinances to be observed; “Baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt, xxviii. 19). The Seven Sacraments are the sacred instruments through which the merits of the Passion of Christ are applied to the soul;

(d) The petitions to be made to God: “Thus shall you pray: Our Father, etc.” (Matt., vi. 9). The prayer (see Vol. II) given us by Christ teaches us both the manner of prayer and the requests that should be offered.

Faith in the revelation given by God is necessary for salvation (Heb., xi. 6), but in the usual providence of God faith cannot be had or safeguarded without short formulas of its principal doctrines.

(a) Faith cannot be received without such formulas, because, its doctrines being many and frequently difficult and the study of all scripture and Tradition being impossible for most persons, a list of short and clear propositions of revealed truths (Creed) is needed that the faith may be proposed and accepted.

(b) Faith cannot be retained without such formulas, because, being unchanging in itself and yet for all times and places, its doctrines would be easily corrupted if there were not an official standard (Symbol) by which both truth and error could be at once recognized (I Cor., i. 10; II Tim., i. 13).

The formulas of Christian teaching as summarized in the Creeds, since they must be brief and orderly, are divided into short and connected propositions, which are therefore known as articles. Brevity being the character of Creeds, not all revealed truths are expressed in them as articles, but only those that have the following characteristics:

(a) An article of the Creed deals with one of the two main objects of belief, namely, the end of man, which is eternal life (Heb., xi. 1), and the means thereto, which is Jesus Christ (John, xvii. 3). Other things, which are proposed for faith, not for their own sake, but only on account of their relation to these two main objects (e.g., the wandering of the Israelites in the desert, the details of the journeys of St. Paul, etc.), are not mentioned in the Creeds.

(b) An article of the Creed deals only with those doctrines concerning eternal life and Christ which are in a special manner unseen or difficult, for faith is “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb., xi. 1). Other doctrines which have no special difficulty of their own are considered as implicit in those that express the general mysteries, and hence they are not mentioned. Thus, the three Persons of the Trinity are given distinct articles, because the mysteriousness of the Triune God cannot be reduced to any more general mystery, whereas the Eucharist is not mentioned, as having no mystery that is not implied in the articles on the divine omnipotence and the sanctification of man through Christ.

Has there been an increase in the articles of faith?

(a) If by increase is meant the addition through new revelation of main beliefs not contained in the primitive revelation, there has never been an increase in the articles of faith; for from the beginning God made known His own being, which includes the eternal things of God and the end or happiness of man, and His providence, which includes the temporal dispensations of God and the means for the salvation of man (Heb., xi. 6).

(b) If by increase is meant the addition of new revelations that brought out more clearly and definitely things contained in previous revelation, there was an increase in the articles of faith from the beginning of revelations down to the end of the Apostolic age. Thus, the nature of God and His purpose as regards the redemption of humanity were brought out ever more distinctly by new revelations in Old Testament times (Exod., vi. 2), and were given in final and complete form by the revelation of Christ (Heb., i. 1; Eph., iii. 5; Heb., xii. 27, 28; II Tim., i. 13).

(c) If by increase is meant a clearer and fuller explanation of the revelation once delivered to the Saints, there has been and always can be an increase of articles of faith. Thus, in the Council of Nicaea the Apostles’ Creed was amplified; in the Council of Constantinople the Creed of Nicaea was added to, and similarly today or tomorrow the Pope could add new explanations or developments to the Creed, if new heresies or necessities required that the true sense of revelation already given should be brought out more clearly or fully.

There are three principal Creeds used by the Church:

(a) the Apostles’ Creed, which according to an early tradition was composed by the Apostles themselves before they separated to preach the Gospel. It was in use from the first centuries in the Roman Church, which required that the catechumens learn and recite it before receiving Baptism. It is divided into twelve articles;

(b) the Nicene Creed, which is used in the Mass and was drawn up at the Council of Nicaea (325) against the Arian denial of the divinity of Christ, and was revised by the Council of Constantinople (381) against the Macedonians, who refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Holy Ghost;

(c) the Athanasian Creed, which is used in the Office of Prime and is a resume of the teaching of St. Athanasius on the Trinity and Incarnation. It was composed in the West some time after the beginning of the fifth century.

Summary of the teaching of the First Article of the Creed: “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.”—(a) “I believe,” i.e., I give unhesitating assent to God revealing His mysterious truths; (b) “in God,” i.e., the Supreme Being, one in nature and three in persons; (c) “the Father,” i.e., our Maker and Provider, from whom also we receive the spirit of adoption of sons; (d) “almighty,” i.e., all-powerful, and therefore all-wise and endowed with every other perfection in the highest degree; (e) “Creator,” i.e., who freely produced the world out of nothing, without external model or effort of any sort, and who preserves, rules and moves all creatures; (f) “of heaven and earth,” i.e., of the world of pure spirits, of matter, and of man, who is at the confines of matter and spirit—in other words, of all finite things, visible and invisible.

The Acts of Faith.—According to St. Paul, there are two acts of faith, one internal, the other external: “With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation” (Rom., x. 10). (a) The internal act of faith is the firm and constant judgment of the intellect assenting to divine revelation (II Cor., x. 5), but freely and under the command of the will (Mark, xvi. 16), being moved thereto by divine grace (Eph., ii. 5). (b) The external act of faith is the profession before the world by signs, such as words or deeds, of the internal assent given to divine revelation.

The internal act of faith is one, but it has a threefold relationship: (a) it believes about God, if we consider the intellect as assenting to the material object; (b) it believes God, if we consider the intellect as assenting to the formal object; (c) it believes in God, if we consider the will as moving the intellect to assent, and tending towards God as the Last End.

The truths to which the assent of faith is given are either supernatural or natural. (a) Supernatural truths or mysteries (e.g., the Trinity of Persons in God) are revealed for faith, that man may know, desire and work for the supernatural destiny to which he has been raised. (b) Natural truths (e.g., the Oneness of God) are revealed for faith, so that mankind may obtain more quickly, more generally, and more certainly the knowledge of divine things which reason can afford. It is impossible, however, that an act of faith and an act of knowledge should coexist in the same individual about the same truth, for faith is of things that appear not.

The act of faith is a necessary preliminary to other supernatural acts, for we do not tend towards the supernatural, unless we first accept it by belief; hence, faith is necessary. But the act of faith may also be made after other supernatural acts, like those of hope and charity; and so it may be meritorious. (a) The act of faith is necessary, both as a means and as a precept (see 360). The necessity of means will be treated now, the necessity of precept later, when we speak of the commandments of faith (see 913 sqq.). (b) The act of faith before justification is meritorious congruously and in a wide sense; but after justification it has condign merit (see 110).

For all adults the act of faith is necessary for salvation as a necessity of means (see 360), for the Apostle says: “Without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb., xi. 6). The truths which must be believed under necessity of means are of two kinds. (a) One must believe with implicit faith all revealed truths which one does not know and is not bound to know. An act of implicit faith is contained in the formula: “O my God, I firmly believe all the truths the Catholic Church teaches, because Thou hast revealed them.” (b) One must believe with explicit faith all the truths which one is bound to know. An act of explicit faith in all the truths necessary by necessity of means is contained in the Apostles’ Creed. Other truths that must be explicitly believed on account of a necessity of precept will be discussed in 918, 920.

What specifically are the truths just referred to that all are bound to know as a necessary means? (a) Theologians generally agree that it has always been necessary for adults to know and accept two basic mysteries—God’s existence, as the supernatural End or happiness of man, and His providence as exercised in supplying the means necessary for supernatural salvation (see 768). Without such belief, supernatural hope and charity, at all times necessary, are impossible. (b) A majority of theologians hold, and with greater probability it seems, that since the promulgation of the Gospel it is necessary for adults to know and accept the two basic mysteries of Chrisitanity— viz., that in God, who is our beatitude, there are three persons (the Trinity), and that the way to our beatitude is through Christ our Redeemer (the Incarnation).

Even before the Gospel, it was always necessary as a means that one believe explicitly in God as our supernatural happiness and as the provider of the means thereto. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the ancient patriarchs, says: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him” (Heb., xi. 6). He that would come to God (i.e., be saved), must believe in God as the Author of glory and of grace. Hence, one must believe: (a) that God exists, who is not ashamed to be called our God, and who prepares for us a better, that is, a heavenly country (Heb., xi. 6); (b) that God is a remunerator, from whom must be expected the working out of His promises and the helps to attain the reward, as well as the meting out of justice. In this faith is included implicitly a faith in Christ, and thus in the Old Testament a belief, at least implicit, in the Messiah to come was always necessary: “Man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ” (Gal., ii. 16).

Since the promulgation of the Gospel (see 342, 354), it is also necessary as a means that one believe explicitly in the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. For he who does not accept these, does not accept the Gospel, whereas Christ says: “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth not shall be condemned” (Mark, xvi. 15, 16).

(a) Theoretically, this opinion seems more probable than the opposite opinion; but chiefly on account of the difficulty about negative infidels, which is discussed in dogmatic treatises on Predestination and Grace, many theologians either reject it (e.g., those who say that belief in the two great Christian mysteries is necessary only as a precept, or that implicit faith suffices), or modify it (e.g., those who say that belief in these two mysteries is not necessary as a means for justification, but only for glorification, and those who say that regularly such faith is a necessary means, but that an exception is allowed for invincible ignorance, or for the insufficient promulgation of the Gospel in many regions).

(b) Practically, this opinion is safer, and hence all theologians, even Probabilists, hold that one must act as if it were true and certain, whenever it is possible to give instruction on the Trinity and Incarnation.

Knowledge about the mysteries of faith is either substantial (by which one knows the essentials of a mystery) or scientific (by which one knows also its circumstances and details, and is able to give a more profound explanation of it). Scientific knowledge is required, on account of their office, in those who are bound to teach the faith, but substantial knowledge suffices for salvation. Hence, for an adult to be saved, it suffices that he have the following kind of knowledge about the four great mysteries:

(a) There is a God who has spoken to us, promising freely that He will take us to Himself as our reward. It is not necessary that one understand such theological concepts as the essence of deity, the definition of supernaturality, the formal and material objects of beatitude, etc.; for many persons are incapable of understanding them.

(b) This God, who will be our reward, is one, but there are three divine Persons—the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, really distinct and equal. It is not necessary that one understand the distinction between nature and person, nor subtle questions about the processions and properties.

(c) God provides for us, giving us the helps we need, and also, if we serve Him, the reward He has promised. It is not necessary that one understand the theology of providence, grace, and merit.

(d) Jesus Christ, who is God the Son, became man, suffered and died for us, thus saving us from sin and winning back for us the right to heaven. It is not necessary that one understand scientifically that in Christ there are two natures united hypostatically in the one Person of the Word.

Since Baptism is fruitless without due faith in the recipient, it is not lawful as a rule to baptize those who lack substantial knowledge of the four mysteries just mentioned. (a) Outside of danger of death, it is never lawful to baptize a person, adult in mind, who is in substantial ignorance of any of these four mysteries. Such a person must first receive instruction. (b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about the Trinity and the Incarnation may be baptized conditionally; for it is probable that explicit knowledge of those two mysteries is not a necessity of means (see 789; Canon 752, Sec.2).

Since absolution is invalid if the person absolved is incapable of receiving grace, and since acts of faith in the four chief mysteries are an essential means to justification in adults, absolution given to one who is in substantial ignorance about one of the four mysteries above mentioned is certainly or probably invalid, as the case may be. Absolution certainly invalid is never lawful, but absolution probably valid may in certain cases be regarded as lawful before administration, and as valid after administration. Hence, the following cases must be distinguished:

(a) Outside of danger of death, it is not lawful to absolve one who is in substantial ignorance about any of those four mysteries. Such a person should be sent away for further instruction, or given a brief instruction then and there, if there is time.

(b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about the Trinity and Incarnation may be absolved conditionally, for the reason given in the similar case of Baptism.

(c) After the fact, absolution given to one who was in substantial ignorance of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be regarded as valid, since the opinion that explicit knowledge of these mysteries is not a necessary means, is at least probable. Hence, according to the principles of Probabilism a penitent who made confessions While ignorant of those two mysteries is not obliged to repeat his confessions, since he has probably satisfied his obligation.

In the following cases (which would be rare, it seems) Baptism or absolution cannot be administered, even to the dying who are unable to receive instruction: (a) when it is certain that the dying person is substantially ignorant about the existence of God, the Author of grace and glory; (b) when it is certain that the dying person is substantially ignorant of the Trinity and Incarnation through his own fault, and is unwilling to hear about them.

Practical rules for granting the Sacraments in case of doubt or urgency to those who seem to be indisposed on account of substantial ignorance are the following:

(a) In danger of death, when instruction is out of the question, if there is doubt about his ignorance, the dying person should be given the benefit of the doubt.

(b) In danger of death, and when instruction is impossible, if there is doubt about the mental ability of the dying person and his obligation to have explicit faith, he should receive the benefit of the doubt.

(c) In danger of death or other urgent necessity, when instruction is needed and possible, it should be given briefly as follows: “Let us say the act of faith: I believe in one God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, who has promised to take to Himself after this life all those that love Him, and who punishes the wicked. I hope to have the happiness of being received into His companionship through the help of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who became man and died for my salvation.” This or a similar instruction should be given by the priest or lay person present in baptizing an adult who is about to die. When there is not immediate danger of death, a person who is baptized or absolved after short instruction on account of emergency, should be admonished of the duty of receiving fuller instruction later on.

Faith is the free exercise of the free assent of the intellect to the unseen, an acceptance of obligations and tasks hard to human nature. It is, therefore, an act of homage to the authority of God, and is meritorious: “By faith the ancient patriarchs obtained the promises” (Heb., xi. 33). Is the freedom and meritoriousness of this act of faith lessened if one seeks for other arguments than the authority of God in giving one’s assent to revelation? (a) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened, when one seeks human arguments for the assent of credibility which is prior to the assent of faith; for it is only the part of prudence that one should first assure oneself of the fact that a revelation has been made, before one assents on faith to the doctrines contained in that revelation. Now, the arguments by which one assures oneself of the fact of a revelation are human arguments, such as proofs that revelation is possible and suitable, that there are miracles, prophecies and other signs to guarantee the divine mission of those who delivered the revelation, etc.

(b) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened if one seeks human arguments for the preambles of faith, that is, for those divine truths that can be established by natural reason (such as the existence of God, His infinite knowledge and truthfulness). The person who demonstrates these preambles by philosophical proofs, has knowledge, not belief, about them; but the merit of faith is not lost, if, while knowing these truths, he remains willing to accept them on the authority of revelation.

(c) The merit of faith is not lessened, if one seeks human arguments for the mysteries of faith, that is, for those truths of revelation that are above human reason (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation), provided these arguments are sought not for the demonstration, but for the confirmation or defense of dogma. Nay, a person ought, in so far as he is able, to use his reason in the service of faith, and to do so is a sign, not of little, but of great faith. “Be ready always,” says St. Peter (I Peter, iii. 15), “to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you.” And St. Anselm says: “It appears to me a sign of carelessness, if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not take pains to understand what we believe.” St. Thomas writes: “When a man is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and with regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith, but is a sign of greater merit.”

(d) The merit of faith is lessened if one seeks human arguments as the formal object, that is, as the motive on which faith is grounded; for then one does not wish to believe, or to believe so readily, on the word of God alone, but feels one must call in other testimony to support it.

The attempt to understand mysteries or to establish them by natural reason is opposed to the humble assent of faith: “He that is a searcher of majesty, shall be overwhelmed by glory” (Prov., xxv. 27); “Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability” (Ecclus., iii. 22); “Faith loses its merit, if it is put to the test of reason” (St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxvi).

What is understood by circumstances? - By the circumstances of a human act are understood all those aspects which are accessory to the willed object, and, as it were, accidental to the substance of the act, and which are willed only concomitantly or consequently. "The name of circumstance," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 1, "is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local matters something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, yet pertains to the thing itself, is called its accident. Hence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents."

As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of the human act, morally affecting it in moral being, already constituted from the object. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. Indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of an act that someone, for example, struck another with the right hand or the left, or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter insofar as they offend God more gravely. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2; Suarez tr. 2. d. 5.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What is faith, and how is it distinguished? - Supernatural faith, about which the speech is here, is defined: the most firm assent to things revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. Therefore the material object of faith is every and only truth revealed by God; the formal object is the authority of God revealing. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1. Faith is one kind formal, another virtual. Formal faith is had when someone believes a truth revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. Virtual faith is had when formal faith has been had, and habitually endures, and actually influences another act of virtue, as, for example, when someone, without actually eliciting an act of faith, elicits an act of supernatural charity and contrition.

Likewise faith is one kind explicit, another implicit. Explicit faith is that by which some article of faith is believed in itself, under its own and particular terms, under which it is proposed to us; e.g., he who believes God to be one in nature and three in persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, has explicit faith of the Trinity. True implicit faith is that by which something is believed not in itself, but in another in which it is somehow contained; e.g., he who believes in Christ, God and man, by that very fact implicitly believes in his twofold will, even if he is ignorant of it. - L. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1, aa. 1-7; q. 2, aa. 1, 2, 9, 10; q. 4, 6, 7; Prop. 25 condemned by Decr. S. O. Lamentabili, 3 July 1907; E. M. 345.

What are the sins and vices opposed to faith? - To faith is opposed unbelief, which generally is the lack of faith; and specifically it is the lack of faith in one not baptized; and this is threefold: negative, privative, positive. The first is lack of faith in one who has never heard anything about the true religion. The other is lack of faith in one who neglects to procure for himself knowledge of faith when occasion has been given. The third is lack of faith in one to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it. - Although negative unbelief, as is clear, is not a sin, nevertheless it is a punishment of sin; because if he had done what was in him, God would not have hidden faith from him. But privative and positive unbelief is a most grave sin. The reason is that the former indirectly and virtually, the latter directly and formally, contains grave contempt and injury of the authority of God revealing. Faith besides is the beginning, foundation, and root of justification. Trid. s. 6, C. 8. Therefore he who voluntarily deprives himself of faith likewise deprives himself of justification, and accordingly sins very greatly.

Heresy is also opposed to faith, and it is twofold: formal and material. The first is a voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith proposed by the Church, in one who has received faith. But the other is that by which someone adheres to error against faith, but without pertinacity. Moreover to err pertinaciously here is not sharply and tooth-and-nail to defend one's error, but to retain it knowingly and voluntarily, after the contrary has been sufficiently proposed; or when it is known that the contrary is held by the universal Church of Christ on earth, to which someone prefers his own judgment, whether this is done from vainglory, or from the lust of contradicting, or from another cause. Merely material heresy is not a sin, for that error proceeds from invincible ignorance of the truth. But formal heresy is a most grave sin, as unbelief itself, for the same reasons.

Finally apostasy is opposed to faith, which is total defection from the truth of the Catholic faith. Therefore it is not distinguished in species from heresy. For whether more or less of the material object of faith is rejected, the formal object is always rejected in the same mode. It is reduced to positive unbelief if someone, departing absolutely from faith, passes over to unbelief. And if someone passes over to a sect in which false worship of God is had, he also sins against religion. Non-Catholics are as many as are not Catholics. Their genus is threefold: schismatics, heretics, apostates. More broadly non-Catholics are also infidels.

Heretics and those suspect concerning the faith must be denounced to the Bishop or Inquisitor from C. Noveritis of Nicholas II, and from the natural law, since such a crime tends to common harm. L. l. 4, n. 249 seqq.; l. 7, n. 248. But the Bishop has the faculty of proceeding in a cause of heresy even against regulars, although exempt, C. 9, de Haeret. - Those who wish to be converted from heresy to the Catholic Church before absolution must abjure their heresy and make a public profession of faith, according to what is prescribed by C. Si qui voluerint 8, can. 1, q. 7, and the Roman Ritual. - An abjuration made privately before someone delegated by the Bishop, such as a notary, and some persons as witnesses, suffices. S. O. 8 Apr. 1786; 28 Mar. 1900; Struggl, q. 2, nn. 1, 9; Suarez, d. 16, s. 1; Lugo, d. 16, n. 187, 291 seqq.; d. 18, n. 3 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 5, 10, 11, 12; L. 17 seqq.; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., ed. 1, nn. 1682, 1683, 1689, and ed. 2, nn. 1341, 1496, 2079; E. M. 346.

351 bis. Note: 1. The books of Sacred Scripture whole with all their parts, as the Holy Synod of Trent, s. 4, reviewed them, are divinely inspired, and are sacred and canonical. 2. The heresies of schismatics and Orientals are reviewed in the Epistle of Pius X, Ex quo, 26 Dec. 1910, Acta Apost. Sed., v. 3, p. 117 seqq. 3. Modernism is the collection of all heresies. - Bishops must be vigilant that it be extirpated, if it has been present, and must take precautions lest it be present.

Bishops should impede the writings of Modernists from being published and read; especially they should not be permitted to adolescents in Seminaries and to hearers in Universities. - They should establish a council of vigilance, to meet with the Bishop every other month and on a stated day. It will belong to it to investigate judgments of modernism in books and in teaching; likewise to keep watch over books and periodicals, lest dangerous questions be treated in them with weak arguments and prejudged questions; finally, over all writings concerning social matters. - By Modernism there are condemned rash and false novelties against the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and constantly handed down by the Fathers and Catholic Doctors; but by no means is there condemned any modern invention which is proved by solid reason. - Those who are prone to the errors of modernism are to be excluded from Sacred Orders. Pius X, Enc. Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907.

4. Several errors of Americanism are condemned. Its fundamental and chief error consists in this: "It is opportune, for attracting the wills of those who disagree, if certain heads of doctrine, as if of lighter moment, are passed over, or softened so that they do not retain the same sense which the Church has constantly held." Brief to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, of Leo XIII, 22 Jan. 1899, Testem benevolentiae.

Is he a formal heretic who doubts concerning some article of faith? R. Affirmatively, if he doubts positively, by judging that a truth is uncertain which he knows to be revealed by God and proposed by the Church; for he voluntarily contradicts faith sufficiently proposed, and accordingly there is truly had voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith, which is the definition of formal heresy. - R. Negatively, if he behaves negatively, and suspends assent, whether this is done from formal or virtual contempt of divine revelation, or whether it is done from negligence, or because he wishes to turn his mind to other things, etc. The reason is that since he judges nothing, and affirms nothing against the infallibility of faith, as is supposed, he does not err positively in faith and accordingly is not a heretic; although he sins gravely against faith, either from contempt of the word of God, or from negligence by omitting a commanded act of faith. - Struggl, q. 2, nn. 12, 13.

Is faith necessary? - The internal act of faith is necessary for all adults, using reason, for justification, by necessity of means. For, as the Apostle says, Heb. 11:16, without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him. By necessity of means. Because faith positively influences justification, and if it is not had even inculpably, justification and salvation cannot be obtained. L. 1; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 3-5; E. M. 348.

What things must be believed by necessity of means? - There are two things certainly to be believed explicitly by necessity of means: 1. that God exists; 2. that he is a rewarder. This is established from the same text of Paul just cited and from propositions 22 and 23 condemned by Innocent XI. E. M. 345, 349.

Are the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation also to be believed explicitly by necessity of means? There is a twofold probable opinion: one affirms, the other denies. The reason of the former is that the Incarnation is an object most necessary on the part of the means of our salvation; the Trinity most necessary on the part of the end; and accordingly it is most necessary to believe that God is one and that in him there are three distinct divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and that the Son of God was incarnate, our Redeemer. The reason of the latter is: no argument of reason is present, and no positive document, from which that necessity can be drawn. For in order that man be converted to God, it suffices to believe that he exists, and to hope that he is propitious to him, and consequently to do penance for his own sins. The former opinion is favored in some way, especially for practice, by Resp. S. O. 25 Jan. 1703. Struggl, q. 1, n. 21; L. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 7, 8; E. M. 350.

Can he be absolved who is ignorant of those things which are certainly of necessity of means? - R. Negatively, neither licitly nor validly. The reason is that he, from defect of a means necessary simply, is incapable of justification; therefore he is also incapable of absolution. Besides, no one can have hope of salvation unless he believes God to be a rewarder. Whence from defect of the acts of the penitent, the sacrament is null. - Bened. XIV, C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742.

Can one ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation be absolved? - He cannot licitly be absolved, outside a case of necessity, e.g., danger of death, because the confessor, absolving such a person, exposes the sacrament to danger of frustration of grace. - He probably can be absolved validly if he is in invincible ignorance. The reason is the very probability of the opinion denying the necessity of means for such mysteries. Hence, at least probably, the necessary acts of the penitent are not lacking.

Is the internal act of faith also necessary for adults by necessity of precept sometimes in life? R. Affirmatively. Proof 1. from 1 John 3:23: This is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son, Jesus Christ. 2. From proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII, from propositions 17 and 65 condemned by Innocent XI; from C. Vineam Domini of Clement XI, 16 July 1703. If someone embraces not some heretical doctrine, but a doctrine proscribed, with a lower note, by the Roman Pontiff or by the Roman Congregations, he does not sin per se against divine faith; nevertheless he sins gravely against studiousness and obedience, which is owed both to the Roman Pontiff and to the sacred Congregations. But one can also sin by irreligion and scandal if, for example, propositions have been condemned because offensive to pious ears, because scandalous. Conc. Vatic., Const. de Fide Cath., c. 4; Props. 7 and 8 condemned by Decr. Lamentabili, S. O., 3 July 1907; Motu Proprio of Pius X, Praestantia, 18 Nov. 1907; Mazzella, Trutina Theol. Rosmin. Propos., Pref.; E. M. 353, 356.

Biblical Commission: All universally are bound in conscience by the duty of submitting to the sentences of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters just as to Decrees of the Sacred Congregations approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can those avoid the note both of withdrawn obedience and of rashness, or therefore be free from grave fault, whoever by words or writings impugn such sentences. Pius X, M. P. 18 Nov. 1907.

When does the precept of faith oblige? - The precept of faith urges per se and by reason of itself: 1. After the completed use of reason, for beginning the Christian life, after someone has been sufficiently instructed concerning faith and its necessity. 2. When the truth of our faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult infidel or heretic. 3. In the article of death, according to some, for tending more proximately to God. 4. Several times in life, at least according to many once a year, according to many others in each half-year, quarter-year, or even two-month period; and according to some, each month. But it urges per accidens: 1. When grave temptation is urgent, which cannot otherwise be overcome; and then the obligation arises from the very precept of faith if the matter concerns temptations against faith, but otherwise if it concerns other temptations. 2. By reason of another precept, when, for example, an act of contrition is to be placed in Confession, which, since it must proceed from faith, cannot exist without some act of faith, at least virtual and implicit, concerning its own proper object or motive. 3. After a lapse into heresy, or faith denied, and whenever an exterior profession of faith is to be made. - Struggl, q. 1, nn. 30, 33-35, 46; Suarez, d. 10, s. 2; Lugo, d. 13, n. 23; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 89, a. 6; L. 5-8, 11, 20; E. M. 353, 354.

Note: "Anyone in the first moral instant of the use of reason, if he is sufficiently instructed and adverts to this obligation, is bound by divine precept to elicit these acts..., so that, if he delays for a notable time, he sins gravely against this precept." Mazzotta, de Virt. theol., c. 1, § 1. In those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, generally acts of virtual and implicit faith suffice. Therefore this precept is sufficiently fulfilled by exercising other acts of religion. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucified, prays, makes the sign of the cross, receives the sacraments, and fulfills various obligations of Christian life, which also contain an external profession of faith.

By at least general and implicit faith it is necessary to believe all things revealed by God; namely, it is necessary that all those things be believed generally which have been revealed by God and proposed through the Church. For this the authority of God revealing requires. - Struggl, q. 1, n. 25; L. 7; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 5, 6; Bened. XIV, C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742, § 18.

What things are to be believed explicitly by necessity of precept? - "The object of faith per se is that by which man is made blessed. But all things which are contained in Sacred Scripture as handed down by God are related per accidens or secondarily to the object of faith.... As to the first credible things, which are the articles of faith, man is bound to believe explicitly, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other credible things man is not bound to believe explicitly, but only implicitly, or in readiness of soul, insofar as he is prepared to believe whatever divine Scripture contains," S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, a. 5; q. 1, a. 6 c. ad 1, or divine Tradition.

"Explicitly, by necessity of precept, there must be known and believed, at least in substance: 1. The Apostles' Creed. 2. The Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation. 3. The precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. 4. The sacraments which are necessary to each one, such as baptism, eucharist, and penance; for concerning the others it suffices to have implicit faith, since explicit faith is necessary only to those who receive them." L. H. A. tr. 4, n. 3. Proof from common practice and the common authority of theologians. The reason is that these contain the substantial heads and foundations of Religion, which one must profess; and the necessary precepts according to which one must live. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2, aa. 3-6; E. M. 356, 357.

Note: As to the Creed. Two things are proposed in the Creed to be believed: the Divinity and Humanity of Christ. Concerning the Divinity there are proposed to be believed: Unity of Divinity, Trinity of Persons, the works of God according to nature, grace, and glory; creation, sanctification, resurrection, eternal life. Concerning the Humanity of Christ there are proposed to be believed: Christ's Incarnation, Conception, Nativity from the Virgin, Passion, Death, Burial, Descent to hell, Resurrection, Ascension, Coming to judgment. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1, a. 8. Suarez and Lugo think not improbable the opinion denying the necessity of explicitly believing the perpetual virginity of Blessed Mary. - Although the Passion of Christ is to be believed explicitly under grave sin, nevertheless that circumstance, under Pontius Pilate, does not pertain to faith to be held explicitly. - Crucified, crucifixion, expressing the genus of death, is to be believed explicitly; for thus 1 Cor. 1:23: We preach Christ Crucified. And indeed the Church constantly preaches to the faithful this genus of death. But the Burial of Christ is to be believed explicitly, but more probably only under light sin, because it is a light circumstance. He descended to hell; more probably this is not to be believed explicitly under grave sin, indeed not even under light according to Suarez, because it is not easily understood by the faithful. But Lugo contradicts him. - But although the Resurrection from the dead is to be believed explicitly under grave sin, because it is a substantial matter, as is established from Paul, 1 Cor. 15, nevertheless that circumstance of time, the third day, is not to be believed explicitly. He sits at the right hand of the Father; probably, according to many, this is not to be believed explicitly, because it is difficultly understood by the faithful; but others affirm that it is to be believed explicitly, as to honor, power, and supreme dominion. - Thence he shall come to judge the living and the dead; these words, the living and the dead, according to Lugo, are not to be believed explicitly, because of the variety of explanations. - I believe in the Holy Spirit; the procession from the Father and the Son is not to be believed explicitly, by necessity of precept, by individual faithful, even though it is of faith. For many things are of faith which ought not to be known by all. The Holy Catholic Church; concerning the Church three things must be known and believed, namely that it is: 1. one on earth under one visible head; 2. governed and conserved by the assistance of the Holy Spirit; 3. infallible in matters of faith and morals, and to be heard by all. Yet this last, although certain and of faith, is not explicitly contained in the Creed. As to its holiness, it suffices to know and believe that it is holy because of its head, doctrine, sacraments, and canonized Saints, because concerning the others diverse persons think diversely. But as to its catholicity, it suffices to profess obedience to it in the person of its visible head. For by this article the universality of the Church is commended, and unity, which is signified when not many but one Church is believed.

Communion of Saints: whether it must be believed explicitly, and as to some communication of prayers only, or only implicitly in the unity of the Church; whether under grave or under light sin, theologians do not agree. Whatever may be the case, in practice all seem to know it sufficiently, since they often say pray for me, and frequently invoke the Saints. Trid. s. 4; s. 6, cc. 4, 12-15; Decr. S. O. Lamentabili, 3 July 1907; Lugo, d. 13, s. 4; Suarez, d. 13, ss. 2, 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1, aa. 6-9; E. M. 356, 357.

As to the Decalogue. It is to be believed explicitly, because the precepts of the Decalogue are revealed so that they may be observed by all; moreover, what is revealed is to be believed by divine faith; and what has been revealed for directing the acts of individuals must be explicitly known by all. Nevertheless several contradict this, because precepts of this sort can be known in another way than through revelation.

As to the Precepts of the Church. These are not to be believed by divine faith, because they have not been revealed by God, at least insofar as they are precepts of the Church. This alone is to be believed, that the Church has the right of making precepts from divine authority. But the chief precepts of the Church must be known by all, whose observance pertains to all the faithful: namely the precept of observing feasts and hearing Mass on them, the precept of annual Confession, of Easter Communion, of fasting and abstinence. To the obligation of knowing the precepts is also reduced this, that individual persons must necessarily know the duties of their own state or condition.

As to the Eucharist. - All must know and believe the real presence of Christ in it. Likewise, according to the common opinion, it must be believed explicitly that Christ is whole under each species, and more probably also that he is offered in sacrifice, since all must assist at the sacrifice of the Mass. But transubstantiation is more probably not to be believed explicitly. Lugo, d. 13, n. 121.

As to the Lord's Prayer. - All must know under grave sin that God is to be prayed to with hope and confidence, and that all goods both of soul and of body, and graces for fleeing the evils of the soul, must be sought from him. In it God is believed as provident, helper, forgiving, rewarding. Likewise there is an obligation, at least under light sin, of reciting it sometime, according to the common opinion. - Lugo, d. 13, n. 133; Suarez, d. 13, s. 4, n. 12; L. 3.

Must the aforesaid things be known by memory? Not all are bound under mortal sin to know the aforesaid things by memory, or in that order, or in those words in which they are proposed, but it suffices to know them in a rough way and as to substance. For custom has explained that the obligation of learning them by memory is not beyond venial; as also it is not beyond venial not to know how to make the cross. And as to the Angelic Salutation, it must be known and recited only from fittingness. - Suarez, d. 13, s. 5, n. 8; de Relig., t. 2, l. 3, de Orat., c. 6, n. 8 seqq.; Lugo, d. 13, n. 132; L. 3; Gury 204.

Can those be absolved who are ignorant of those things which by necessity of precept and under mortal sin must be known? - R. Affirmatively, because although they have sinned by omitting to learn, nevertheless they can be sorry for this, with the purpose of learning. But the parish priest, like a parent his children, is bound under mortal sin, by himself or through another, to teach his sheep at least those things which they are bound under mortal sin to know. L. 3.

Pontifical Constitutions concerning the Chinese and Malabar rites are to be had as doctrinal, by no means as disciplinary; and therefore, except for censures, they still hold force. S. O. 5 Aug. 1891. The doctrine concerning Eschatological Renewal must be reproved. S. O. 2 Mar. 1910. It cannot safely be denied, or called into doubt, that the text of St. John in 1 Ep. c. 5, v. 5, concerning the three giving testimony in heaven, is authentic. S. O. 15 Jan. 1897. Those cannot be absolved who hold that the fire of hell is not real, but metaphorical. S. Poenit. 30 Apr. 1890.

With all reverence and submission of soul, all propositions condemned by the Holy See up to the year 1794, in which the propositions of the Synod of Pistoia were condemned, must be reproved. With like reverence and submission of soul must also be reproved: the Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Errors of our age, 80, condemned in the Syllabus transmitted to the whole Christian world; the 40 Propositions condemned from recently published works under the name of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, Decr. S. O. 7 Mar. 1888, Post obitum, approved and confirmed by Leo XIII; the doctrines of Americanism, condemned by the same Leo XIII, Brief of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore; the 65 Propositions condemned by the Decr. S. O. Lamentabili sane exitu, 3 July 1907, containing the chief errors of reformism or modernism, afterward proscribed by Pius X through the Encyclical Letter Pascendi dominici gregis, 8 Sept., and through the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, 1 Sept. 1904. E. M. 356, 357, 359.

Is there also given a precept of the external act of faith? As to the external act of faith, there is given a negative precept, prohibiting the denial of the true faith or the profession of a false one. Likewise there is given an affirmative precept, obliging sometimes to confess the faith even with danger to life. Proof of the first part. To deny the true faith, or to profess a false one, is to deny God and Christ. But Christ says: He who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. Matt. 10:33. Proof of the second part. For ordered charity, which we owe to God and neighbor, requires that, when God's honor and the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be withdrawn privatively or contrarily, for professing the faith we should sometimes spurn temporal goods and even life. - Privatively, as if therefore great honor to God and great utility to neighbor would cease. Contrarily, as if otherwise God would be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave evil, e.g., if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, depended on it. Suarez, d. 4, s. 2; L. 10; Laymann, c. 11, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, aa. 1, 2; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1647, 1648, 1653, 1657, 1683, 1827.

By positive law all to be baptized are bound to profession of faith, either by themselves or through sponsors; converted heretics; Bishops before consecration, and before the dispatch of letters of their own provision, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; Sixtus V, C. Romanus; Gregory XIV, C. Onus Apostolicae; all regular Prelates, Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis, id. Nov. 1564; nevertheless this Constitution has not been received in use as to those regular Prelates who are not immediately set over government by the Holy See, but either by chapter or by a higher superior, Thesaurus, de Poenis, c. 1, v. Fides, cf. 550; those about to have ecclesiastical benefices, and those who must assemble in a diocesan synod, Trid. l. c.; likewise those provided with a benefice with care of souls, within two months from possession obtained, before the Bishop himself, or if he is impeded, his vicar general, otherwise they do not make the fruits their own; canons and dignities of a cathedral church, who likewise within two months from begun possession are bound to do this also in chapter; otherwise neither do they make the fruits their own, although they can gain distributions for their choir assistance, S. C. C. 1726; Trid. s. 24, C. 12, de R.; Primates, Archbishops, Bishops in the first provincial synod which they attend, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; those to be chosen for the government and chairs of Universities and public gymnasia; and also those to be promoted to scholastic degrees of doctor, master, etc., Pius IV, C. In Sacrosancta, 13 Nov. 1654, § V. But Doctors and Masters of Universities at the beginning of any year must issue a solemn oath by which they are bound to hand down orthodox doctrine, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R. It belongs to the Rector or Prefect to see that this is observed. - Profession of faith can be emitted immediately after institution or collation of a benefice, and before possession, S. C. C. 11 May 1782; but cf. here below, paragraph Non manet, and it must altogether be made in the form proposed by Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis. But a few things are to be added, so that account may also be taken of the Decrees of the Vatican Council, S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. Made otherwise, it will not profit toward avoiding the canonical penalties laid against those who omit this profession. Conc. Rom. Bened. XIII, tit. 1, c. 1; Bened. XIV, Inst. 60; Ferrar., v. Fidei professio; L. 41; Collectan. cit., n. 1670; E. M. 364.

Those who are announced as doctors in Sacred Scripture are bound to furnish an oath according to the prescribed formula approved by the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 29 June 1910. Likewise an oath, according to the prescribed formula, must be furnished by all those who are listed in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910, a profession of faith having been premised; - and also, by reason of office, synodal examiners and parish-priest consultors and those who are listed in C. Sapienti consilio, Order of Service in the Roman Curia, and others, concerning all of whom cf. below n. 550. This obligation of profession of faith seems grave, unless it has been derogated by legitimate custom. The penalty of restoring the fruits probably needs a declaratory sentence of the delict. Sanchez, l. 2, c. 5; Tamburini, l. 2, c. 1, D. 12, n. 4. The faculty made by the Council of Trent no longer remains, by which those provided with any benefices whatever can emit profession of faith within two months from the day of possession obtained; and consequently in the future profession of faith must be emitted before possession of the benefice. S. C. Cons. 1 Mar. 1911.

In external confession of faith and divine worship, the rite of one's own church, Latin or Oriental, is to be observed. Cf. for the Ruthenian rite constituted in the United States of North America, Apostolic Letter of Pius X, 18 Kal. 1907, and for the same rite constituted in the Canadian region, Decr. S. C. de Pr. I., 18 Aug. 1913. E. M. 365.

Blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. For by it man in heart or mouth, according to intellect or affection, attributes to God things which do not befit him, or denies things which befit him. The vice of blasphemy thus pertains to unbelief. Speech concerning it will occur in the second precept of the Decalogue. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 13.

Resolves: - He who, when asked by private authority, either is silent, or responds obscurely, or says that he does not wish to respond, that he is not being asked by right, that he is not bound nor does he wish to tell others what he himself believes, and evades in a similar way, unless the circumstances of things demand otherwise, does not seem to deny the faith, but to be unwilling to betray it. Whence, if he can thus be freed from a troublesome inquiry, it is licit. By private authority; for as to public power, regularly it is not licit. Cf. proposition 18 condemned by Innocent XI; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, a. 2; Suarez, d. 14, s. 3; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 37, 39; Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 30. - He does not deny the faith, but shows it, who flees; and although this is licit, nevertheless not for a Pastor when his sheep need his work; as, on the contrary, if it is more expedient for them that for a time he withdraw himself and reserve himself for their good, he is bound to flee. Lugo, d. 14, nn. 42, 43, 96. When you are not asked about the faith, it is not only licit, but often better, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, to hide the faith than to confess it: as if, coming among heretics, you would do more good; or if from confession more evil would follow, e.g., disturbance, killings, exacerbation of a tyrant, danger of defection if you were tortured. Whence it is generally rash to offer oneself of one's own accord. Struggl, q. 1, n. 41; E. M. 364.

He does not sin against faith who visits the temples of heretics or infidels from mere curiosity, scandal, danger of perversion, or a command prohibiting this being absent, and provided it is not a protestative sign of false religion. At Rome there is a command not to enter the temples of heretics during the time of conferences and offices. - Likewise he does not sin who is present at a wedding banquet or burial of heretics, because these things do not properly pertain to faith, and the aforesaid assemblies are held as merely civil. Likewise he does not sin against faith who, passing through places of heretics, from fear of grave danger eats flesh-meat on a forbidden day, lest he be recognized as a Catholic, because this per se is not a sign of heresy; otherwise, however, if he ate flesh-meat even from fear of death, being impelled to this in hatred of the faith. - Collectan. cit., nn. 1829, 1833, 1843, 1855; Struggl, q. 1, nn. 44, 45; Lugo, d. 14, n. 156 seqq.; E. M. 364, 365.

It is licit to use the signs or clothing of infidels if they are clothing or signs proper to some region and distinctive of nation from nation, although that whole region is infidel, because these things per se are not referred to religion. More probably it is still licit, yet from a grave cause, if the clothing is distinctive of sect from sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondarily for distinguishing a sect. Hence it is licit for a missionary, in order to conceal himself, to put on the garments of ministers of a false religion, so that he appears as one of them. Gur., Cas. 196; L. 15; Struggl, l. c., n. 43; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 70-97. But otherwise, if the clothing or signs are protestative of false religion, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions. Hence neither is the burning of incense licit, nor genuflection before an idol, nor taking a heretical supper, etc., even if these things are done only externally. Collectan. cit., nn. 1640, 1649, 1650, 1651, 1653.

Catholics living among heretics, if by command of the magistrate they contract marriage before a heretical minister, sin against faith, even if they have contracted before or afterward will contract before a Catholic priest; for the contracting person testifies by that ceremony that he recognizes him as a minister of the true faith. This is intrinsically evil, because the authority of the minister, and consequently his doctrine, is increased, and there is concurrence in the heretical rites which the minister exercises in that act. Nevertheless they licitly contract before a civil magistrate, or rather testify that they wish to contract, provided they contract before or afterward in the Catholic rite; because this action has been instituted for a political end, so that they may be held as spouses, and offspring may not be judged illegitimate. - Bened. XIV, C. Ex quo singulari, 1742; L. 12 seqq., 18; Lugo, d. 14, n. 156 seqq.

It is licit per se to attend a merely civil funeral, by reason of office and from a grave cause, and scandal being removed. Yet by a general rule it is illicit to attend funerals of this sort in which, by design and out of contempt for religion, the attendance of priests is excluded. Masonic or anti-Catholic banners can in no way be admitted to funerals and in churches. Indeed in churches only blessed banners are to be admitted, unless otherwise disturbances and dangers are feared. S. R. C. 14 July 1887, ad 1, n. 3679; S. Poenit. 3 Apr. 1887; S. O. 4 Apr. 1887; E. M. 365.

What communication is prohibited to the faithful with Jews? "To the faithful, besides communication in matters of Religion and marriage, with Jews it is prohibited: 1. to dwell; 2. to use their physicians or medicine; 3. by agreement and association, to be present at a banquet or the same bath; 4. to act as servant or nursemaid in their houses; 5. to leave legacies to them in a testament; 6. to commit to them public offices among Christians. Thus from Canon Law. - Moreover, the end of these prohibitions is partly the dignity of the Christian Religion, partly the danger of subversion. Therefore when some communication from those listed is gravely opposed to this end, it is a mortal sin; but when only lightly, it is a venial sin. Besides, because of necessity and another reasonable cause it can happen that some communication with Jews is not even venially sinful," Struggl, q. 2, n. 5; La-Croix, l. 3, n. 89, especially with custom intervening, which today obtains almost everywhere. Scav., l. 2, n. 809; C. Nullus, C. Omnes, caus. 28, q. 1; C. Iudaei de Iud. Sarac. etc.; L. 18; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 7, 9, 10; E. M. 366.

What communication is prohibited with heretics? - Communication is simply prohibited with heretics if they are excommunicated persons to be avoided. - Communication is prohibited with them in divine things, namely by communicating in their rites proper to a heretical sect, but by no means by communicating with them in our rites, if they are tolerated, for example, by hearing Mass in a church with a heretic. The reason is that the former communication in divine things is a certain profession of a false sect, containing scandal and danger of perversion. And since these reasons are scarcely ever absent, therefore it is very rare that the aforesaid communication is licit, although it is not intrinsically evil. It has always been prohibited by the Holy See, which tolerates it only when there are very grave evils which cannot otherwise be avoided. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1797 seqq., 1814, 1845, q. 6.

The latter communication often contains no grave inconvenience, but sometimes it contains scandal and danger of false opinion and error concerning the truth and necessity of the Catholic religion. And thus heretics can be admitted to sacred functions, provided nevertheless that they do not mix themselves into the sacred rites. At Rome they assist at them without any difficulty. But it would not be licit to administer the sacraments to them, nor the sacrament of penance, except in the article of death, and then scandal having been efficaciously removed. It is illicit for Catholics, in the temples of heretics, when false worship is exercised there, to play the organ. S. O. 8 July 1889. But if a Catholic man is lacking to play the organ, a non-Catholic musician can be temporarily admitted to that function in church, scandal or danger of scandal nevertheless being removed. S. O. 23 Feb. 1820.

Communication is prohibited with them also in civil matters, although they are tolerated, whenever scandal and danger of perversion are had from it. Concerning workers' associations, Catholic and mixed, cf. the Encyclical Letter of Pius X, Singulari quodam, 24 Sept. 1912, by which mixed associations of Catholics and Protestants are tolerated and permitted in Germany because of the great inconveniences which otherwise would be had, but in such a way that suitable precautions are used for avoiding the dangers which are present in these associations. - Public disputation with heretics is prohibited to all. S. C. C. 8 Mar. 1658. To laypersons especially it is prohibited to dispute publicly or privately with heretics. C. Quicumque 2, § 1, de Haeret., in 6. Struggl, q. 2, nn. 32, 33; Lugo, d. 22, n. 1 seqq.; Suarez, d. 20, s. 1; d. 21, s. 3, n. 4; Bened. XIV, de Syn., l. 6, c. 5, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 7; Quodl. 10, a. 15; E. M. 367.

What communication is prohibited to the faithful with pagans? - "By law both positive divine and ecclesiastical, under mortal sin communication is prohibited: 1. in those things which pertain to Religion, e.g., in their dogmas, ceremonies, and rites.... The reason... because one communicating in such a way uses signs and exercises actions which per se signify the profession of a false Religion, and accordingly at least externally denies the true faith. - 2. Likewise by divine and ecclesiastical law, it is prohibited to the faithful to enter marriage with pagans, indeed also with Jews. C. Cave 28, q. 1.... 3. - On the contrary, in civil actions by no law is it prohibited to the faithful to communicate with pagans, when danger of perversion is absent." Struggl, q. 2, n. 4; 1 Cor. 10:27. Since the worship of infidels is wholly false, communication in divine things with them in it is intrinsically evil. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1775; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 7, 9, 10; E. M. 368.

Note: "Christian Princes can permit to Jews, pagans, or heretics liberty of conscience only because of the good of Religion and because of hope of conversion, but not because of temporal advantage.... But the Church, and any supreme Prince, can rightly compel Jews and pagan subjects to hear our faith." L. 18. Likewise infidels can be compelled "not to impede the faith of Christ." But "in no way are they to be compelled to the faith so that they themselves believe, because to believe belongs to the will." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 8, 10, 11; q. 11, aa. 3, 4; q. 12, a. 2; E. M. 369.

Whether there is an obligation of restitution from another's thing? It is undoubted that by reason of another's thing there is an obligation of restitution. For this is to restore: to set the owner again in possession of his own thing. Nor indeed is it considered by whom, or by what cause, or whether in good, bad, or doubtful faith, the thing is held. For these do not change the truth that the thing is another's. A possessor is in good, bad, or doubtful faith according as he invincibly does not know the thing to be another's and prudently judges it to be his own; or openly knows it to be another's; or doubts whether it is his own or another's. We shall speak of each gradually and specifically. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, aa. 1, 6; C. A. 826; Inst. l. 4, t. 1, 2; E. M.

What of the office of the minister after Confession? - The confessor has a twofold obligation after Confession. The first per accidens, as regards defects committed that must be repaired. The other per se, as regards the seal to be preserved. L. 618, 634.

186. • Faith in general is assent on account of the authority of one speaking. More precisely for our matter, Faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is defined: A supernatural, infused habit inclining the intellect to assent firmly to truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church, on account of the authority of God revealing. But insofar as it is an act, it is called the firmest assent given to things revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. - St. Lig. n. 2.

Faith is 1º habitual or actual, according as it is a habit or an act.

2º Explicit or implicit by reason of the object, according as this is expressed and unfolded in itself, or only contained in another. Thus, for example, if you say: I believe in the Most Holy Trinity, you elicit an act of Faith explicit in that mystery. But if you say: I believe all things which the Church teaches are to be believed, you elicit an act of Faith implicit in the several revealed dogmas.

3º Formal or virtual, according as faith either is actually elicited, or, persevering in the mind without advertence, by its force influences actions.

4º Formed, or living, or unformed, or dead, according as it is joined, or not, with the works of Charity.

Sins opposed to Faith are 1º infidelity, or the lack of Faith in unbaptized men; 2º heresy, or a pertinacious error in one baptized against a truth of Faith proposed by the Church.

Infidelity, or heresy, is called negative or material in him who labors under invincible ignorance, or to whom the true Faith has not been sufficiently proposed.

The treatment must be chiefly 1º concerning the necessity, 2º concerning the object of Faith.

193. • The formal object of Faith, or the reason on account of which one believes, is the authority of God speaking, as being endowed with infinite wisdom as well as truthfulness. - Thus more commonly.

But the material object, concerning which alone the treatment here is made, consists of the things to be known and believed. Hence one must treat of things to be known and believed both by necessity of means and by necessity of precept.

1. Simplicius, an unlearned man, while confessing before Macarius the parish priest, when questioned concerning the things necessary to be believed, is found very ignorant. For he does not know how to recite the symbol of faith, nor to give an account concerning the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation, etc. But the confessor, indignant, scolds and rebukes the penitent, as a man too careless about his own salvation, and, absolution having been denied, dismisses him until he has learned the things which are necessary to be known for salvation.

Q. 1. What things must necessarily be believed? 2. What concerning the manner of acting of Macarius?

To the first, cf. I. M. 349 seqq. To the second: Macarius the confessor is more to be scolded and rebuked than Simplicius the penitent; since he so harshly repels from himself an unlearned man, and deters him from the sacraments. For first, it is not necessary that the penitent know by memory all things to be believed; but it is enough that he know them as to substance. Nor indeed is it necessary that an account concerning the individual mysteries be explicitly given; it suffices to know and believe them. Wherefore, if Simplicius knew at least the principal heads of faith which are contained in the Apostles' Creed, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and the principal sacraments of baptism, penance, and Eucharist as to substance, although he did not know how to give an account of them, he could indeed and ought to have been absolved by Macarius. But if Simplicius was altogether ignorant of these things, and it was to be feared lest, having been dismissed, he would not return further, or would return with the same ignorance, he ought to have instructed him sufficiently as regards the one God and Rewarder, as regards the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation, then eliciting with him a general act of faith; he ought furthermore to have disposed him for absolution, by stirring him to contrition and purpose, also eliciting with him an act of contrition; finally he ought to have exhorted him that thereafter he should wish to learn the same things better, and should also learn the other things which are contained in the Creed, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and the principal sacraments; and thus to impart absolution to him. But if there is a prudent hope that Simplicius will return, then either Macarius himself ought to instruct him gradually on individual occasions, or ought at least to indicate to him, or even procure for him, the means by which he may be instructed by another, and thus gently he ought to send him away for a few days, until he is sufficiently instructed, earnestly asking him to return as soon as possible. If Simplicius knows how to read, it will be very useful to give him some suitable little book which contains and explains a small catechism. Elbel 31 seqq.; G. 186.

2. Politianus, a supporter of civil liberties, who often confesses and approaches Communion, making a journey at paschal time, confesses outside his own parish, lest he be deprived of paschal Communion. But Fabritius the confessor, understanding that he stands for the civil liberty of government, denies him absolution, and declares him unworthy of paschal Communion, because, he says, liberalism is a sin, and all liberals are in a continual state of mortal sin.

Q. What as to the case?

R. The manner of acting of the aforesaid confessor certainly cannot be approved, since there is question, as appears from the case, of an honest man and a good Catholic, who frequents the sacraments of the Church, and bears their deprivation at paschal time with difficulty, since even when established on a journey he is unwilling in any way to omit them. Nor indeed can the doctrine of the confessor be approved, since in its universality it is altogether false. Liberalism is a sin, if that also comprehends errors condemned by the Church. Liberals likewise are in sin if they hold and defend errors of this sort. But if civil liberty imports nothing else than the republican or constitutional form of government, as it is called, and consequently civil liberties of government which are contained within the legitimate limits of justice and of the public good, there is certainly nothing illicit in it in itself, nor has it ever been condemned by the Church in itself. Whence it also cannot be affirmed that those who from this are called liberals are in mortal sin. Hence in the Instruction of the Holy Office, 29 Aug. 1877, to the Canadian bishops, the Sacred Congregation says: "The Church, in condemning liberalism, does not intend to strike all the individual political parties which perhaps are called liberal, since the decisions of the Church refer to certain errors opposed to Catholic doctrine, not to a determined political party." Collectan. S. Congr. de Prop. Fid., n. 1665. And as regards the very form of government,

Leo XIII, in the encyclical letter Quella lunga, 29 June 1881, teaches these things: "Yet it is important to note here, that those who will be placed over the public thing can in certain circumstances be elected by the will and deliberation of the multitude, without Catholic doctrine being contrary or repugnant to this.... Nor is there question here of the modes of public government, since there is no reason why the Church should not approve the principate of one or of many, provided it is just and directed to the common advantage. Wherefore, justice being preserved, peoples are not prevented from procuring for themselves that kind of government which better suits their character, or the institutions and customs of their forefathers." If it were otherwise, it would have to be said that now all those in the Catholic nations of Europe and America who favor modern institutions of governments are in mortal sin and are unworthy of sacramental absolution, which indeed is altogether absurd.

3. Blandina, a pious woman, heard from a preacher that acts of faith, like acts of the other theological virtues, must frequently be elicited. Wherefore she fears vehemently lest she has not satisfied this precept, and has thus gravely offended.

4. Sylvius, a confessor, is not accustomed to ask penitents whether they sometimes elicit acts of faith. He acts thus also with penitents careless for many years about salvation and the sacraments; especially if they are matrons and conspicuous men, whom he does not dare to question.

Q. 1. When does the precept of faith oblige? 2. What as to the cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 354, 355, 376, 381. To the second: Blandina, since she is a devout woman, ought not to be anxious concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of faith, since she is most frequently raised by faith in following the devout life. G. 188.

As regards Sylvius, the confessor is not held specially to ask penitents concerning acts of faith. For they are presumed sufficiently to satisfy the divine precept, unless a special reason persuades the opposite. This certainly holds as regards those who do not neglect the practice of religion, and approach the sacraments. But as regards the others, Lugo excellently admonishes this: since this obligation, as regards the time when it urges, is so uncertain, and since for this very reason it is partly not known, and partly the omission, if ever it were present, is not adverted to, hence it happens that neither among penitents is there a custom of confessing about this, nor among confessors of asking about this. G. 189.

1. In places of the missions, a prince, moving persecution against Catholics, made a public edict by which he commanded that all Christians had to present themselves before the judge within the space of fifteen days; otherwise they were judged to have denied the faith. The faithful of several provinces asked the missionaries what was to be done, and almost all answered that they should flee, or, if it could conveniently be done, that they should hide themselves. Yet some reproved this, opposing proposition 18 condemned by Innocent XI, and ordered all the faithful of their mission to present themselves before the judge.

2. In a region of heretics, it was prohibited by law for religious to celebrate Mass. Mathurinus, a religious, had celebrated Mass there daily for a year. At last, having been caught, he is asked by the judge whether he knew the prohibition of the law, and whether he himself was a priest and a religious. To all these things Mathurinus responded with subtle evasion.

3. Lucianus, a heretical minister, already converted in his heart to the Catholic faith, seized by a lethal illness, calls a Catholic priest so that he may receive from him the sacraments of the Catholic Church. Yet he first asks him that he be willing to come to him clothed in lay garments, lest he introduce any suspicion of himself to others; then, that, if he should die from that illness, he say nothing concerning his conversion, lest perhaps his parents be liable to persecution; but if he should recover, that he himself should await a suitable time for manifesting his conversion, lest his whole fortune be confiscated.

Q. 1. When does the external profession of faith urge? What as to the cases?

To the first, cf. I. M. 364, 365. To the second: the missionaries responded well; nor is the condemned proposition rightly invoked against them. "If only," says Viva on this proposition, n. 13, "in general through an edict it is proposed that, if someone is faithful, he betray himself, when many are hidden, no one, speaking in itself, is held to betray himself." The reason is that, when a tyrant questions concerning the faith, someone is held to respond, not because he legitimately asks, but from this, that through such questioning there arises an article of necessity, for which the precept of confessing the faith obliges. Moreover, in the case, this article of necessity is not had. For flight and hiding, in the case, does not yield to contempt of faith, since on the contrary those who flee and are hidden are rather manifested as Christians and faithful. - "If a prince," says Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 911, "by a general law commands that the faithful betray themselves, by carrying such a sign or otherwise, the faithful are not held to this; since no one is held to tell the truth unless specially asked. Except, unless the circumstances are such that by the very fact that they do not betray themselves they seem to have denied the faith, as, for example, if some were previously known, and then from this they would be thought to have defected from the faith." - Struggl, q. 1, n. 39, 40; Lig. 13, 14; G. 193.

Mathurinus was not held to respond to the judge questioning him, since he had no right, in the case, of juridically questioning a priest. But to dissemble, by mental restriction, knowledge of the aforesaid law, or that he is a priest and religious, is certainly not to dissemble the Catholic faith, and much less to deny it. Wherefore Mathurinus acted rightly. Indeed, without any evasion Mathurinus could have simply denied that he knew anything about the law, understanding namely about a true obliging law; likewise he could deny that he is a priest and religious, understanding namely in order to the illegitimate celebration about which he was being asked, and to the illegitimate questioning of the judge, or that he himself was held to confess. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 12, a. 28; Elbel 62, 63; G. 192, 193.

The Catholic priest could indeed approach Lucianus clothed in lay garments. For this contains nothing against faith; and not rarely Catholic priests, from a reasonable cause, walk as laymen lest they be recognized, for example, in time of persecutions, etc. - But he could not permit Lucianus to dissemble the faith by dying. For there urges, especially in the article of death, for a heretic who is then converted to the faith, the positive obligation of the Church of external profession of faith, which obligation Lucianus was not ignorant of, as appears from the case. Furthermore, it was altogether necessary by that profession of faith to remove scandal and retract the errors which he had taught; otherwise others, either seduced by Lucianus or certainly confirmed in their errors, without doubt would have persevered further in these errors, not without most evident loss of salvation and detriment to divine honor. Wherefore Lucianus ought altogether, at least before two witnesses before he died, to profess the Catholic faith. But if Lucianus had been altogether in good faith concerning this obligation of the Church, which he had entirely been ignorant of, and had not been a heretical minister, but a man from the common people, who had never confirmed anyone in his false sect; since in such a man then neither the honor of God nor the salvation of souls would be endangered, and therefore the natural and divine precept would not then urge concerning externally professing the Catholic faith for removing scandal, then, on account of a truly reasonable and grave cause, the external profession of faith could more easily be dissembled. Nor does it matter that he would be believed by others to have died in heresy; for scandal having been removed and a grave cause standing, that false opinion can be permitted. The other thing could be permitted to Lucianus, namely that, health having been recovered, for some time he dissemble the external profession of the Catholic faith, until he could suitably provide for himself and his affairs. For to dissemble the faith on account of a reasonable cause is not to deny it. Yet he ought altogether to abstain from acts protestative of false religion, as for example, to go on in the exercise of a heretical ministry: for this is to deny the faith. Elbel 67-70; G. 195-198; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1639, 1642, 1643, 1647, 1650-1653, 1686.

4. "How ought a confessor to conduct himself toward apostate penitents placed in the article of death, when he is summoned secretly by them, so that he may absolve secretly? The reason of the difficulty is that in that article they are accustomed to be induced by an infidel family or false priests to acts of false religion, nor can they refuse without danger of death.

R. The Most Holy One judged that the confessor ought to absolve the apostate penitent placed in the article of death, the apostasy having first been abjured in the forum of conscience; and if he should survive for some space of time, and if he can, let him abjure in public before the faithful; but if he cannot, let him leave a written document of his abjuration, signed at least with the sign of the cross; but if he cannot do this either, let him commit to the confessor that he manifest his abjuration to the faithful.

Yet the apostate penitent then placed in danger of life is not held, even with Turks persuading him with danger of life, to confess the Catholic faith which he then embraced after abjuring infidelity, but to elude their persuasions, either by not responding, or by using equivocal words." Holy Office, 25 July 1630. A. S. S., v. 26, p. 642.

1. Marcellinus the missionary proposes the following doubts:

1. Is it licit for Christians to rent houses and workshops to gentiles? The reason for doubting is that the gentiles, in the nobler place of those houses, burn incense, exhibit reverence to an idol, and exercise other superstitious things.

R. "It is licit, if it is established that the houses are sought for inhabiting and the workshops for an indifferent use; yet it is not licit if they are expressly sought for constructing a shrine." S. C. de P. F., 8 Feb. 1806.

2. Is it licit for Christians to lease farms belonging to a temple?

R. Here is in summary the instruction given by the S. C. de P. F., 15 Jan. 1807. 1. It is licit to lease farms belonging to a temple; especially if a cause consonant with reason for contracting concurs; for the thing is of its own nature indifferent. 2. To pay the lease price is a debt of justice, even if the lessee thinks it will be expended for the sake of the temple. 3. Scandal which perhaps arises for Christians from a thing of this sort, insofar as it is born from ignorance, or is scandal of the little ones, must be restrained by protestation and instruction; insofar as it is produced by the malice of the wicked, or is pharisaic, it must be contemned. 4. The lessee is to be exhorted to abstain from the lease if from this some danger of perversion or occasion of scandal is feared.

2. Christians buy territories on which there are idols or oratories of idols. Can they admonish the gentiles, to whom the territory previously belonged, to remove them from the territory?

R. "They cannot, if the ownership of these idols or oratories is annexed to the territory, and passes with the dominion of the land to the buyer, who is held to remove and destroy them, or so change their form that every occasion of superstitious worship is removed, and no appearance of an oratory consecrated to idols appears any longer. But if such idols or oratories are of public right and under the power of the prince, it is not licit for Christians to remove or destroy them, but rather they should abstain from buying those territories in which these profane images and oratories are found." Holy Office, month of May, year 1781.

3. Gentiles who preserve the tablets of the progenitors of the family are converted to the faith. Can they hand over tablets of this sort to pagan relatives, to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them from their house, or hide them, to be handed over afterwards if they are demanded by relatives or by prefects, and they are compelled to this? Likewise, to what are proselytes held who have with themselves the idols of other pagans, which they preserve by way of deposit?

R. "If those superstitious tablets by special dominion belong to the converted gentile, he cannot preserve them at home, nor hand them over to other pagans of the family, but must altogether destroy them; and thus it is to be taught and enjoined by the missionaries. But if these tablets belong jointly to others of the family, the Christian is held to remove them from his house; but he can hand them over to others of the family to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them and take them for themselves; for thus he will confess his faith, and will render to another his own right. By equal right, the idols of pagans which the proselyte preserves for the sake of deposit are to be restored to their owners." Holy Office, 20 Aug. 1778.

4. The bishop of Sergiopolis, Apostolic Vicar of Kiang-nan, proposed a case to the S. C. de P. F.: "Whether Catholics can be permitted, with boats and carrying-chairs, by which they are accustomed indiscriminately to transfer all persons from place to place, also to convey those gentiles who, bringing with themselves incense, idols, and other superstitious things, approach the sepulchers of their ancestors, or other places, so that there they may exercise superstitions."

The S. C. de P. F., 14 Sept. 1868, transmitted the response of the Holy Office, July 1854, given to a similar question:

"Since the actions of which there is discussion are in themselves licit, or at least indifferent, and do not directly influence superstition, provided that scandal is not present, and grave damage is imminent, those Catholics are not to be disturbed; and provided that it is not in contempt of religion, and a protestation is made by the Christian sailors, insofar as it can conveniently be done, that they do not intend toward superstition." Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2195.

5. Marcellus, a missionary, proposes the following doubts:

1. In order to avoid some tumults against Christians, is it licit for Christians to contribute money which is demanded, to be spent in the new year on idolatries of demons, and at the same time on other indifferent demonstrations of the people's joy?

R. "The Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this sort they do not intend to concur in superstitious acts, the cause which is narrated being supposed, especially a protestation having been premised, if it can conveniently be done, that they furnish the taxes imposed only in order to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F., 12 Sept. 1645.

2. Is it lawful for Christians to contribute money which, if one is unwilling to give it, he is prohibited from entry into the market of goods; which money partly falls to the leading men, partly to repairing the market, and partly to burning incense to a false deity?

R. "The payment of the tax can be permitted to Christians, especially with a protestation premised." S. C. de P. F., year 1816; Holy Office, 21 Apr. 1849.

3. What if the tax to be paid is imposed solely for a superstitious end, for constructing pagodas, for making sacrifices to idols, etc.?

“68. Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin.” Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

“28. If the Pope with a great part of the Church should hold an opinion in one way or another, and should not even be in error, it is still not a sin or heresy to hold the contrary, especially in a matter not necessary for salvation, until the one opinion has been rejected and the other approved by a universal Council.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“5. Although it is evident to you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him if you cannot prove it.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

“97. Faith is necessary for rustic, ignorant, servile men and those not having an elevated intellect, who do not know how to know through reason and delight to know through faith; but a subtle man is more easily drawn to Christian truth through reason than through faith.” Proposition of Raymond Llull condemned by Gregory XI, on the seventh day before the Kalends of February 1376. Cf. nn. 345, 349, 350.

“22. Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in Him as rewarder.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 345.

“1. At no time whatever in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“16. Faith is not judged to fall under a special precept in itself. — 17. It suffices to elicit an act of faith once in life. — 18. If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel him candidly to confess the faith as glorious to God and to the faith; I do not condemn silence as sinful in itself.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 350.

“For even if the matter concerned that submission which is to be rendered by an act of divine faith, it would nevertheless not have to be limited to those things which have been defined by express decrees of ecumenical Councils, of the Roman Pontiffs, and of this Apostolic See; but it would also have to be extended to those things which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and which therefore are held by the universal and constant consent of Catholic theologians to pertain to the faith. But since the matter concerns that submission by which, in conscience, all those Catholics who devote themselves to speculative disciplines are bound, so that by their writings they may bring new benefits to the Church, therefore the men of that same assembly ought to recognize that it is by no means enough for Catholic scholars to receive and venerate the aforesaid dogmas of the Church, but that it is also necessary that they subject themselves both to those decisions pertaining to doctrine which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations and to those heads of doctrine which by the common and constant consent of Catholics are held as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those same heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless merit some other theological censure.” Pius IX, Letter to the Archbishop of Munich and Freising, 21 Dec. 1863.

Cf. n. 353.

Cf. n. 353.

“According to the present discipline introduced by Martin V in the celebrated Extravagant Ad evitanda, Catholics are permitted freely to associate with heretics, provided that they have not been expressly and by name denounced, and to communicate with them in merely profane and civil matters.” Holy Office, 10 May 1873; A. S. S., vol. 27, p. 449 ff.; C. 1816.

“Whether Greek schismatics can visit Catholic churches and there assist only materially at their sacred rites and divine services. — Resp. The access of non-united Greeks to Catholic churches can be permitted, provided that the sacraments are not administered to them, that they do not in any manner communicate in divine things, and that they have not been invited to come in this manner.” Holy Office, 22 Sept. 1763.

It is lawful for Latins to celebrate Mass in the presence of Greek schismatics and to continue it when they arrive. Holy Office, 25 Nov. 1665.

“The Sacred Congregation judged that Missionaries ought not celebrate divine things in churches in which heretics at the same time have their profane and sacrilegious exercises. But so that satisfaction may be made for Catholics, the sacred rite is to be performed upon portable altars placed in private homes.” S. C. de P. F., 27 May 1627.

“The Sacred Congregation ordered that it be written to the Archbishop of Zara that he should provide that, in the church of St. John of Cartola, Diocese of Cattaro, Catholics not celebrate divine things with Greek schismatics; for although they use different altars, nevertheless, because of the identity of the church, it is to communicate with schismatics in divine things.” S. C. de P. F., 13 Aug. 1627.

“With regard to celebrating Mass in the same church with heretics, even when it is divided by an intervening wall, the Sacred Congregation judged that Father Ignatius, Missionary in Rhaetia, and his companions are to be commanded not to do this at all, but to use a portable altar, whenever it shall be necessary to celebrate, according to the privileges granted to the missions.” S. C. de P. F., 13 Feb. 1629.

“Whether the practice which the Catholic parish priests of the fortress of Lastua have of celebrating the sacrifice of Holy Mass in Catholic churches usurped and officiated by Greek schismatics, or even in those which belong purely to the schismatics themselves, is to be tolerated. — Resp. It is to be held as a universally accepted and observed rule that Catholics are not permitted to communicate in divine things with heretics and schismatics. But in certain particular cases this rule admits some exceptions, namely, if in the same church there are separate chapels and altars, of which some serve Catholics alone and others schismatics; or if parts of the same church are separated, and in one only Catholics celebrate, and in the other only schismatics. Then the shared use of the church can be tolerated. But insofar as these things are lacking, the Right Reverend Lord Archbishop can command the parish priests of his diocese to use portable altars according to the faculties imparted to them in the Formula, which His Holiness intends to give and renew again.” Holy Office, 1 Dec. 1757.

“Our Most Holy Lord Clement XI, Pope by divine Providence, … for more easily promoting the conversion of schismatics and unbelievers and for attracting them to embrace the Catholic faith by the sight of the sacred ceremonies, benignly granted to the Father Prefect, or Vice-Prefect, of the Missionaries for the time being in Ethiopia, that according to their judgment and conscience they can dispense with those same Missionaries and grant them the faculty of celebrating the most holy sacrifice of the Mass in the Catholic Roman rite upon an altar in the churches of heretics or schismatics in Ethiopia; in such a way that the same altars serve only as bare tables and are arranged in the manner of Catholics with a consecrated stone, cloths, an image of the Most Holy Crucified One, candlesticks, and other necessary furnishings for the use of the most holy sacrifice of the Mass according to the aforesaid rite; never, however, generally, but in particular cases in which other more suitable places are not available, so that there is urgent necessity for more easily promoting the said conversion, and furthermore for the consolation of Catholics, and for other just and most urgent causes to be judged by the same Father Prefect or Vice-Prefect of the Missionaries, concerning which he burdened their conscience.” Holy Office, 12 April 1704; C. 1808.

“In the Catholic churches of Rhaetia occupied by heretics, Missionaries can continue their exercises.” Holy Office, 13 June 1534.

“15. Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, led by the light of reason, he shall have thought true. — 16. Men can find the way of eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatever and can attain eternal salvation. — 17. At least good hope is to be entertained concerning the eternal salvation of all those who in no way dwell in the true Church of Christ. — 18. Protestantism is nothing other than a different form of the same true Christian religion, in which it is given to please God equally as in the Catholic Church. — 77. In this our age, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion be held as the sole religion of the State, with all other forms of worship excluded. — 78. Hence in certain regions bearing the Catholic name, it has laudably been provided by law that men immigrating there may have the public exercise of each one’s own worship. — 79. For it is false that civil liberty of every form of worship, and likewise the full power attributed to all of openly and publicly manifesting any opinions and thoughts whatsoever, conduces to corrupting more easily the morals and minds of peoples and to propagating the pest of indifferentism.” Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus.

“10. If someone scandalizes others by his own defects, it is not necessary to reflect upon them, provided that the will to scandalize is not present; and to be unable to reflect upon one’s own defects is a grace of God.” Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

"Insofar as schismatics accompanying the funerals of Catholics exhibit a merely material presence, for the sake of civil honor toward the deceased, not mixing themselves with the Catholic prayers or rites by which it is customary to carry out funerals and lead the dead to burial, it can be tolerated; but insofar as in that function they employ their own rites, or mix themselves with ours, it is not lawful and is not to be permitted." S. I. C. 10 May 1753.

614. Presupposing the things which we wrote in Dogmatic Theology concerning the object and act of faith, here we will weigh moral questions:

I. Concerning the nature and excellence of faith;

II. Concerning its necessity;

III. Concerning sins against faith;

IV. Concerning the means of making progress in faith.

615. Divine faith, of which we are treating, must be distinguished both from natural science and from human faith. Natural science, such as Philosophy, is concerned with truths which can be acquired by the light of reason alone, and rests upon intrinsic evidence, which is attained by a deductive or inductive method. Human faith rests upon the testimony of men, and gives us those cognitions which we cannot attain from the intrinsic evidence of things or by our own investigation; thus historical sciences rest upon human testimony. But divine faith is concerned with things divinely revealed, and we assent to them not on account of the intrinsic evidence of the things, nor on account of the testimony of men, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 1-2; Suarez, De fide, disp. I and VII; Lugo, De Virtute fidei, disp. XV, and others whom we cited in Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae, De Fide, p. 10; Newman, University Sermons; idem, Grammar of Assent; whose doctrine concerning the nature and genesis of faith H. Bremond arranged in the work: Newman, Psychologie de la Foi, Paris, Bloud, 1905.

Yet human faith, or the propensity which is in us to accept testimony as one of the sources for investigating truth, is an excellent disposition toward divine faith; for, "if we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater."² For who of sound mind, and free from prejudices, can reject the testimony of God, when he already admits the existence of God infinitely wise and truthful? Therefore the natural propensity of believing men, innate in us, is as it were a preparation for receiving the gift of divine faith.³

² 1 John 5:9.

³ M. d'Hulst, Confer., 1892, 3rd Conf., p. 91.

These things being laid down, we shall briefly gather together what elsewhere⁴ we have already written concerning the definition of faith, the conditions for the act of faith, and its genesis.

⁴ Synop. Th. Dogmat., De Fide, nn. 19-26 and 102-119.

616. 1. Definition. (A) Faith, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is described as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing."⁵ The Vatican Council professes the same,⁶ that it is "a supernatural virtue, by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe that the things revealed by Him are true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things perceived by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive." From this a definition of faith can be drawn, either as a habit or as an act.

⁵ Heb. 11:1. This description Dante expounds poetically, La Divina Commedia, Paradiso, canto 24. From the Pauline definition it follows that faith is concerned with things to be hoped for, namely those which pertain to our supernatural beatitude.

⁶ Sess. III, cap. 3, Denzing., n. 1638.

(B) Faith, as a habit, is usually defined: a supernatural and theological virtue infused, disposing the mind, that is, the intellect and the will, to assent firmly, under the influence of actual grace, on account of the divine authority, to all things revealed by God.⁷ - But the act of faith can be defined: the act by which the intellect, at the command of the will assisted by grace, firmly assents, on account of the authority of God, to all things divinely revealed.

⁷ Recently this definition was attacked because it is not sufficiently psychological, nor does it sufficiently show how supernatural faith rests upon the natural faculty of believing; and therefore this other definition was proposed: the natural faculty supernaturally transmuted by God through grace, disposing the mind to assent firmly, etc. (Pichegut, in Rev. du Clerge francais, t. XXIX, Dec. 1901, pp. 72-76). But this natural faculty supernaturally transmuted presents a very obscure concept: for in what does a transmutation of this kind consist? - Moreover the classical definition, which rests upon the Vatican Council, can be explained psychologically: for it is already signified clearly enough that the virtue of faith is inserted in the intellect and will, with the grace of God cooperating, and in the declaration of the definition, especially where the act of faith is treated, the psychological process of faith can be described. - Concerning the controversies had on this matter between Pichegut and Gayraud, Guillemant, Le Bras, see Rev. du Clerge francais, t. XXIX, pp. 206, 320, 537, 636.

617. 2. Conditions for faith. These are required from a threefold head, namely on the part of the object, of the subject, and of God:

(a) On the part of the object: the revelation of some truth; otherwise nothing could be believed by divine faith; - the proposition of this truth, or its manifestation made to those to whom God did not immediately reveal it; - motives of credibility, or reasons and proofs by which it can be judged with moral certainty that some truth has been revealed, and therefore is credible and to be believed. But that moral certitude is sufficient which excludes a prudent fear of erring.

(b) On the part of the subject: the absence of prejudices; for, especially in a moral matter, nothing more clouds and blinds the intellect than judgments formed a priori without sufficient foundation, such as, for example, these or like ones: a miracle is impossible; preternatural facts cannot be demonstrated; - besides this, a pious affection for believing is desired. For since the truths of faith are often obscure, and are especially opposed to human passions, the intellect, by a certain natural instinct, is prone to deny them, unless it is gently inclined by the will.

(c) On the part of God, there is required actual grace, which precedes man, illumines his intellect so that he may more easily perceive the force of the motives of credibility, and moves the will so that it commands the assent of the intellect. For faith is a truly supernatural act, a special gift of God which is truly gratuitous: "No one, however, can consent to the evangelical preaching, as is necessary for obtaining salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth."⁸

⁸ Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3, apud Denzing., n. 1640.

618. 3. Concerning the genesis of faith. These things being laid down, it can be understood how regularly the act of faith, by a logical process, is elicited by an adult who has not yet embraced the Christian faith. We suppose him to be rightly disposed, so that he is prepared to receive the truth, even when opposed to prejudices or passions; otherwise he will scarcely be able to grasp the force of the arguments. (a) First, he must recognize naturally the existence of God and His infallible truthfulness, either by reasoning, namely by considering the arguments which are set forth in the Philosophical Lectures, or by other natural means, for example, the authority of parents or of more learned men, who propose these truths. For cognition of this kind the natural concurrence of God is sufficient of itself. (b) Afterward, conscious of his own inability to discover all the truths whose knowledge he needs in order to order life rightly, the fact of revelation is investigated, with the help of history and criticism, by considering the motives of credibility, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, which are set forth in the Treatise on True Religion, especially the arguments by which the divinity of Christ's mission is proved. These motives, especially if all are reviewed together attentively and sincerely, generate moral certitude, which excludes a prudent fear of erring. For this also the natural concurrence of God is sufficient of itself, although God is accustomed to assist both the intellect and the will in this study by preternatural help; hence it is very expedient that the help of God be sought by frequent prayer. (c) From this twofold consideration there can now be formed a speculative judgment concerning the possibility and the obligation of believing, or, as they say, concerning credibility and credendity. For if God, infallibly truthful, has revealed certain truths, we are bound to give assent to them. Such a judgment in itself is natural; but, since it is the proximate and positive preparation for the act of faith itself, our faculties are now in fact aided by supernatural grace to form it. (d) There follows upon this an act of the will commanding the assent of the intellect; for since the matter is one in itself not evident, and one which moreover is established only with moral certainty, a certainty excluding prudent doubt, it is necessary that the will command this prudent assent of the intellect. From this there is elicited an act of implicit faith, or the practical judgment of the intellect assenting in a general way to all the truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing. This is truly an act of supernatural faith, elicited by the intellect, under the command of the free will, with the grace of God exciting and cooperating, which illumines the intellect and moves the will: it is therefore a free act, and, the requisite conditions being posited, meritorious. (e) Afterward it remains to be investigated which, in species, are the truths revealed by God, so that they may be believed explicitly. Now one of the truths manifested by Christ is the infallible authority granted to the Church, for authoritatively proposing the truths to be believed: supernatural assent to this truth is an act of explicit faith, elicited by the intellect, under the command of the will and the influence of grace. This being accomplished, the way will now be easy for believing explicitly whatever the infallible Church shall have proposed as of faith.

619. Faith, especially that which is joined to confidence and works through charity, contributes greatly indeed to private and public good.

⁹ Lacordaire, 12th Conference; Largent, Une station de Careme, Paris, 1881, p. 33; Bouquillon, De virt. theologicis, nn. 198-204; M. d'Hulst, Confer. 1892, pp. 123-129; Gay, Vie et Vertus chret., Paris, 1876, t. I, l. III, De la Foi, pp. 142-155.

1. To private good. For (A) faith, taken in a general way, according to Trent,¹⁰ is deservedly called "the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons." It is, namely, the beginning of salvation; for we cannot use the means necessary for salvation unless we have known them; nor are we able to know them except through faith, since they are supernatural: by faith we know God as the ultimate supernatural end, - Christ as Redeemer and mediator, - and all things instituted by Christ for obtaining justification and for increasing and preserving grace. Hence, according to the Apostle,¹¹ the just man lives by faith, is justified by faith, and is saved through faith. Therefore faith is truly the foundation of the whole spiritual building, and as it were the cornerstone without which it cannot stand. It is rightly also called the root of the whole of justification; for as the root not only sustains the tree, but also supplies sap to it, by which it brings forth leaves and fruit, so faith not only sustains spiritual life, but also nourishes it, while it pours into us, as it were, the various and pious affections of fear, hope, and others like these, as a certain sap, from which the fruits of charity spring up.

¹⁰ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 8 (Denzing., n. 683).

¹¹ Rom. 1:17; 5:1; Gal. 3:11; 1 Cor. 15:1-2, etc.

620. (B) If it is considered insofar as it perfects the intellect, it is as it were a new light superadded to the light of reason, by which we are able to attain truths inaccessible to human reason; for, as was said in the Treatise on True Religion, nn. 142-145, there are many problems of the moral order, and indeed of the greatest moment, which the human mind left to itself cannot solve, especially concerning man's origin, nature, ultimate end, and the means necessary for attaining it. Now to all these questions faith gives an answer that is certain, consonant with reason, and adapted to the intelligence of all; thus it frees us from manifold doubt and error, and is as it were a lighthouse showing the path of the right way, amid the rocks of errors, and the port of salvation toward which we tend.

621. (C) With regard to the will, faith is deservedly called a perennial fountain of strength and consolation. (a) Of strength indeed; which the Apostle splendidly declares: after describing the excellent deeds done by the Fathers with faith assisting, he adds these things:¹ "Who through faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained promises... recovered strength from weakness, became mighty in war."

¹ Heb. 11:33-34; let the whole chapter be read.

In truth faith sets before our eyes whatever God has done for our salvation, with what charity He loved us from eternity, how He adopted us as sons, and delivered His Only-begotten Son for the salvation of sinners; - how many and how great benefits Christ bestowed upon us, what torments He willingly suffered to redeem us, what means He benignly instituted for our sanctification, with what unfailing love He follows after us while hidden on the altar; - what eternal rewards or torments are prepared for us, according as we have acted well or badly. Now all these things, and many others which faith suggests, stir men in the best way possible to the love of God and of neighbor, and add new strength to them, so that, despising the vanities of the world and spurning the enticements of pleasures, they may pursue the good strenuously and constantly.

(b) Faith likewise offers the greatest consolation amid the miseries of life; for if every creature groans, by the example of Christ suffering and dying on the cross, and also by the hope of future goods, pains are lightened not a little: "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ... And not only so; but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience; and patience trial; and trial hope... If, however, we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us... And we know that to them that love God all things work together unto good."²

² Rom. 5:1-4; Rom. 8:17-18; Rom. 8:28.

This indeed appears most of all when we lose parents, relatives, and intimately beloved friends: "And we will not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you be not sorrowful, even as others who have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so God will bring with Him those who have slept through Jesus."³ For through death "life is changed, not taken away, and, the house of this earthly dwelling being dissolved, an eternal dwelling in the heavens is prepared."⁴ Meanwhile, by force of the communion of saints, we remain intimately joined to departed friends: we pray for them detained in purgatory, and they, having entered heaven, now secure concerning their immortality, become solicitous for our salvation and intercede for us.⁵

³ 1 Thess. 4:12.

⁴ Missale, Proper for Gaul, Preface for the dead.

⁵ How great a consolation faith offers to the afflicted is eloquently declared by Bougaud, Le Christianisme et les temps presents, t. I, ch. XI sq.; Gay, op. cit., l. XIII, De la douleur chretienne; H. Perreyve, La journee des malades; Ctesse de Flavigny, L'Annee des malades, Paris, 1905.

622. (D) From this it follows that faith is very meritorious, for this is the most excellent homage of our mind, by which we freely subject at once both will and intellect to divine authority. For since the things to which we assent are not evident, but for the most part difficult to believe, and are also opposed to the passions, especially to pride, pleasure, and egotism, it is necessary that our will gently and strongly incline the intellect not only to consider attentively the motives of credibility, but also to offer assent humbly to revealed truths; and no one fails to see that this is very meritorious.

From this also it is gathered that faith is as it were the dawn and foretaste of the beatific vision; for by faith we believe those things which through the light of glory we shall contemplate, and, although we perceive the same things only obscurely, we give certain and firm assent on account of the authority of God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. Therefore of Christians much more than of the patriarchs it can be said: "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers upon the earth."⁶

⁶ Heb. 11:13.

623. 2. To public or social good. (A) Since society is an association of families, it cannot flourish without rightly ordered families. Moreover, it is established no less historically than psychologically that families are not stable except where the unity and indissolubility of marriage flourish.⁷ Now Christian faith teaches and fosters both of these, and through the centuries has furnished the greatest security to families. But when faith decreases, divorces are soon multiplied, family bonds are broken, and from this society is weakened.

⁷ Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Matrimonio, n. 45 and nn. 58-63.

624. (B) Society, moreover, cannot long and peacefully stand without the constant exercise of justice, by which his own is rendered to each, and of charity, which inclines citizens to give mutual help to one another. Now Christian faith constantly inculcates and inspires these virtues, as will be said below; but when faith is diminished, and all the more when faith is removed, the very notion of the just and equitable is gradually obscured, charity languishes and grows cold; soon quarrels, dissensions, and struggles of parties are increased; the rich become harsher toward the poor, and the poor envy the richer and pursue them with hatred, as lamentable experience today establishes; and thus the foundations of society seem to totter.⁸ - Philosophers indeed, both ancient and modern, have sought the norm of the just and equitable, and the foundation of charity, or, as they say, of altruism and solidarity, in various systems, but in vain, as we have shown above, On the Ultimate End, nn. 33-64.

⁸ To the point M. d'Hulst, op. cit., pp. 127-128: "Everyone agrees today that, without justice and without love, the earth would be a hell. There remains, therefore, only one question to resolve: where is the guarantee of justice? where is the source of love? The despisers of Christianity promise us that they will find both the one and the other in the scientific education of instincts. But, since the time when they keep repeating this promise, we see growing among their authentic disciples only the ferocity of egoism and the cult of force. And yet society still lives on the remains of the Christian inheritance. What will it be when it has finished dissipating it? One of those who call our faith an illusion was admitting it recently, mixing a blasphemy with his admission: 'Religious persons,' he said, 'live on a shadow.' This is the blasphemy; here is the admission: 'We, we live on the shadow of a shadow. On what will people live after us?' (Renan, Preface des Feuilles detachees.)" Taine proves the same from those things which happened at the time of the French Revolution: faith having indeed been rejected, the cruelty and lust of pagans soon flourished. (Les origines de la France contemporaine: le Regime moderne, t. II, pp. 118-119.)

625. State of the question. (A) Once man's elevation to the supernatural state has been posited, revelation becomes necessary for manifesting the means conducing to this end; but once revelation has been posited, faith becomes necessary for salvation, as the Vatican Council teaches:² "Since man depends wholly upon God as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason is entirely subject to uncreated Truth, we are bound to render to God revealing the full obedience of intellect and will by faith... But because without faith it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons, therefore justification has never befallen anyone without it, nor will anyone attain eternal life unless he has persevered in it unto the end." It afterward thus defines this obligation of believing: "If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded to it by God, let him be anathema."

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, aa. 3-8; Suarez, De Fide, disp. 12-12; Lugo, disp. XII-XIV; Billuart, De Fide, disp. 3; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, tr. I, De praecepto fidei; Lequeux, op. cit., nn. 145-169; Bouquillon, op. cit., nn. 156-197; Merit, La Foi, Tours, Cattier, 1886, pp. 187-264; Pesch, nn. 426-465.

² Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3 and can. 1 de Fide, apud Denzing., nn. 1638, 1642, 1657.

626. (B) But something can be necessary in two ways, namely by necessity of means and by necessity of precept. (a) That is necessary by necessity of means which is a means, and indeed a necessary means, of justification, and therefore without which, even if it is inculpably omitted, salvation cannot be obtained; in this case, therefore, neither ignorance nor inability can excuse. But something can be necessary by necessity of means in two ways: intrinsically, when by its nature it is ordered as a necessary means to salvation, so that it cannot be supplied by another, for example, the love of God; extrinsically, when it is required for salvation only by the free institution of God, so that, if God wills, it can be supplied by other means: for example, Baptism of water.

(b) That is necessary by necessity of precept which is so prescribed that it cannot be freely omitted without sin; therefore if it is culpably omitted, it is a cause of damnation; but if it is inculpably omitted, on account of ignorance or inability, salvation can be obtained without it. Now that faith is necessary both by necessity of means with respect to some objects, and by necessity of precept with respect to others, will be established from what is to be said.

627. Faith, as an infused habit, is altogether necessary by necessity of means for salvation, as can be gathered from what has already been said. For without the grace of justification no one can be saved, as is clear from the Treatise on Grace; moreover, in the present order of things, justification is not conferred without the infusion of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity (On the Virtues, n. 597); therefore he who lacks the habit of faith by that very fact lacks sanctifying grace.

But the question is concerning the act of faith, and indeed with regard to adults: for infants and others lacking the use of reason, if through baptism they have received the infused habit of faith, are saved without an act of faith, of which they are incapable.³ Therefore concerning adults it must be asked whether and what they are bound to believe by necessity of means.

³ Concerning the state of children who die without baptism, it was said in Tr. de Deo Creante, nn. 201-205.

628. I. Thesis: For adults some act of theological faith is absolutely necessary for justification, and therefore for obtaining salvation. It is certain.

1. Trent clearly teaches this; for concerning sinners it says: "They are disposed to this justice when, aroused and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God." Afterward it adds that the instrumental cause of justification is the sacrament of baptism, "which is the sacrament of faith, without which justification has never befallen anyone." Finally it declares the matter more openly in these words: "But when the Apostle says that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consensus of the Church has held and expressed: namely, that we are said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification: without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons."⁴

⁴ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, 7, 8, apud Denzing., nn. 680, 681, 683.

629. 2. Scripture hands down the same thing in various ways: (a) it asserts that faith is the beginning and foundation of human salvation; thus Christ, in His discourse to Nicodemus, says:⁵ "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life"; likewise, when He sends the Apostles into the world, He addresses them thus: "Preach the gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned."⁶ Hence the deacon Philip replies to the eunuch asking for baptism:⁷ "If you believe with all your heart, you may"; and the Apostles require faith in Christ from the newly converted; thus the jailer at Philippi asks Paul and Silas: "Sirs, what must I do to be saved? But they said: Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you shall be saved, you and your house."⁸ - (b) It declares that works of the law and natural works are insufficient without faith: this the Apostle expressly and often inculcates, especially in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians: "For we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law... But knowing that man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ."⁹ - (c) Finally it is asserted that faith is a necessary means to spiritual life and to pleasing God: "But My just man lives by faith; but if he withdraws himself, My soul shall not be pleased with him... But without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him."¹⁰

⁵ John 3:14-15.

⁶ Mark 16:15-16.

⁷ Acts 8:37. This text, however, is lacking in some manuscripts.

⁸ Acts 16:30-31.

⁹ Rom. 3:28; Gal. 2:16.

¹⁰ Heb. 10:38; 11:6.

630. 3. It is confirmed by reason, once man's elevation to a supernatural end has been supposed. For since an end of this kind so exceeds our powers that we cannot even know it naturally, and moreover the means for attaining it, such as Christ's sacrifice and the sacraments instituted by Him, transcend the natural vision of the mind, it was necessary that all these things be known by faith. - Moreover the end toward which we tend is the perfect vision of God; now it was fitting that we should be led by the hand toward this perfect knowledge through faith, which is as it were an inchoate vision of divine things, insofar as it makes us sharers in divine knowledge:¹¹ for, relying upon divine testimony, we believe those things which He Himself sees, and which we shall afterward see.

¹¹ "Faith... joins man to divine knowledge through assent" (St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. XIV, a. 8).

631. 1. It is certain that it is necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe in God existing and rewarding.

(A) This is declared. Indeed we are bound in a general way to believe all those things which God has revealed; and he who would deliberately deny one truth which he knows to have been divinely revealed would by that very fact be a heretic, as will be explained below. But besides this certain truths must be believed explicitly, or in themselves, in their own proper concept; nor is it enough to believe them implicitly, that is, insofar as they are contained in other truths explicitly believed.

(B) It is proved. (a) The existence of God and His providence with regard to the remuneration of the good and the evil must be explicitly believed, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹² "For he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him." - Moreover, by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, this proposition (22) was condemned: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in the Rewarder."¹³ Therefore explicit faith in both truths is necessary.

¹² Heb. 11:6.

¹³ Denzing., n. 1039; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) This indeed is consonant with right reason. For since God is our ultimate end both in the natural and in the supernatural order, we cannot attain Him unless we know His existence. - Some indeed say that this is sufficient; for, as soon as we know that God is the highest good, we can proceed to an act of perfect charity and contrition, and thus be justified. But, given man's nature and imperfection, he in fact does not arrive at perfect contrition except through fear and hope, namely by considering God as the supreme rewarder, who justly renders punishments to the evil and rewards to the good, according to the laws of equity.

632. (C) But it is asked in what sense we must believe in God the rewarder.

(a) With regard to the existence of God, many Thomists say that there is required faith in God as He is the author of the supernatural order, but not faith in God as He is the author of the natural order; for we know this truth by reason, and moreover what is certainly and evidently known cannot be believed.¹⁴ Yet many others, such as Suarez, Lugo,¹⁵ etc., hold that faith in God as He is the author of the natural order is necessary, or insofar as He is endowed with those perfections which can be known by the natural light: for we can believe by faith what we already know by reason, and moreover St. Paul requires this faith.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, aa. 4-5; Gonet, Clypeus, De fide, disp. I, art. 5-6; Salmanticenses, De Fide, disp. III, dub. 2; Berthier, De locis theolog., n. 504.

¹⁵ Suarez, De Fide, disp. III, sect. 8, and disp. XII, sect. 3, n. 4; Lugo, disp. XII, sect. 5, n. 123; Pesch, n. 445. - Cf. Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, nn. 129-132.

In truth the Apostle makes no distinction, but teaches only that God must first be believed as existing, afterward as rewarding. Moreover he is treating of supernatural faith, namely of that which is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing,¹⁶ and therefore of that which rests not upon human reasoning, but upon divine testimony. But for this faith it is not required that there be a distinct concept of supernaturality, which cannot be demanded from the common people; rather, it is enough that the believer understand that these truths are in some way divinely proposed, whether through external revelation or through an internal manifestation made to conscience.

¹⁶ Heb. 11:1. - Which M. d'Hulst thus explains, Confer. 1892, pp. 113-114: "The second domain of faith is the natural truths which serve as a basis for revelation. Man first discovers them by the effort of his reason, if he is capable of this effort. But, when faith has supervened, it shows him these same truths under a new light, as forming part of divine teaching; and what was matter for reasoning becomes an object of belief. Such are the teachings relating to the existence of God, to His perfections, to the immortality of the human soul... For the cultivated mind, these truths are therefore illumined by a double light, one which comes from nature, the other which is kindled at the hearth of grace."

633. Therefore that faith in the broad sense, resting upon natural discourse, which takes its origin from the testimony and knowledge of creatures, insofar as they manifest the invisible attributes of God, is not sufficient. For this proposition (23) was condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "Faith in the broad sense from the testimony of creatures, or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."¹⁷ For faith arising from the knowledge of creatures alone cannot rise up to the supernatural end, nor beget supernatural charity, which is especially necessary for salvation.

¹⁷ Denzing., n. 1040; Viva, on this proposition.

634. Corollary. From this it is understood how God provides for the salvation of those who live among pagans, where they have heard nothing of evangelical faith. According to St. Thomas and theologians commonly, if some pagan "were to follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as He sent Peter to Cornelius."¹ And indeed God, who once spoke to the patriarchs and to others outside the Jewish people, can without difficulty speak inwardly to those who are rightly disposed, so that they understand themselves to be instructed by the supreme Deity.

¹ St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1.

635. 4. It is controverted whether explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity and in Christ the Redeemer is necessary by necessity of means.

(A) It is commonly held that, before the coming of Christ, it was not necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the incarnate Word; for these had not yet been sufficiently revealed to men, as is clear from what was said in the Treatise on the Triune God, nn. 29-36.

(B) But some, supported by the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas,² think that, after the fall of Adam, it was necessary for justification by necessity of means explicitly to believe in some mediator, by whose merits salvation could be obtained. They allege the words of Scripture: "For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved";³ and from this they infer that no one can be saved without faith in Christ, or in some mediator.

² St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. XVIII, cap. 47, P. L., XLI, 610; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 7; Bouquillon, n. 169. - You may see the whole controversy set forth apud Perrone, De virtutibus fidei, spei et carit., Ratisbon, 1865, nn. 344-379.

³ Acts 4:12; cf. 1 Cor. 11:11.

636. (C) Nevertheless today, as more probable, many theologians teach that explicit faith in the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation, or even of Christ the mediator, is not necessary by necessity of means.⁴ For (a) so grave a necessity ought not to be established without a compelling reason; but this reason is lacking. For when the Apostle speaks of the necessity of faith, in the place cited above, he speaks only of faith in God the rewarder; moreover the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance required for justification can be elicited without faith in the Trinity and Incarnation; as soon as we believe that God is, and indeed that He is supremely good and perfect, rendering to each according to his works, there is now nothing to prevent the acts necessary for justification from being elicited. Therefore, from the nature of the thing, even after the supernatural end has been posited, faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is not absolutely required; if it is necessary, this is only by the positive will of God; but this will has not been clearly manifested. (b) Moreover, if this faith is required, the salvation of those who have heard nothing of the Gospel becomes morally impossible, that is, of more than half of the human race; for an extraordinary light would be necessary for pagans to be instructed concerning this twofold mystery, the existence of which most do not suspect.

⁴ Suarez, disp. XII, sect. 4.

Therefore we think it more probable that this explicit faith is not required. But the texts of Scripture concerning the necessity of faith in Christ can be understood of necessity of precept, or of implicit necessity of means, or even in this sense, that no one is saved except through the merits and satisfactions of Christ.

637. Corollary. In practice, since here the question is of a thing necessary for salvation, the safer part must be followed. Therefore: (a) all those who have the care of souls must diligently teach the faithful committed to them not only God existing and rewarding, but also God triune and the Word incarnate and Redeemer. Yet it is not required that a scientific knowledge of these mysteries be handed on to the simple, of which they are incapable; it is enough that it be taught that there are three persons in God, distinct and equal, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that these three are one God, - and that the second person of the Trinity, or the Son of God, made man, redeemed us by His death.

638. (b) Regularly those who labor under ignorance of these mysteries, even invincible ignorance, are neither to be baptized nor absolved;⁵ but, in a case of extreme necessity, if time for instructing the catechumens is lacking, they are to be baptized absolutely, because, where there is question of requisites not for the valid but only for the fruitful reception of baptism, no condition should be placed; if they survive, they should be diligently instructed. But penitents are to be absolved under condition if they are capable, and, if they survive, they must be instructed and absolved again. For on the one hand, where there is question of means necessary for salvation, the safer part must be chosen, and on the other hand, in a case of necessity, where certain remedies are lacking, probable remedies must be used (above, nn. 388-389).

⁵ Hence the Holy Office, Jan. 25, 1703, declared that "a missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are especially the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation" (Collect. P. F. n. 549). This was declared concerning an adult in relation to baptism; but the same reason applies with regard to absolution. - It is established besides from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition 64: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." (Denzing., n. 1081; Viva, on this proposition.)

(c) When there is question of the semi-foolish or the very ignorant, an act of faith in God one and triune, and in Christ the Redeemer, should be suggested to them before they are absolved, so that the validity of the absolution may become safer.

Two things are prescribed: an internal act of faith, and an external profession of faith; concerning these we must speak separately.

639. There is given a divine precept of believing the truths revealed by God, at once negative and positive. Insofar as it is negative, it forbids revealed truths sufficiently proposed and known to be rejected or called into doubt; insofar as it is positive, it obliges us to elicit acts of faith at times. We shall speak concerning the existence and extension of this precept, and also concerning the time at which it obliges.

640. 1. Existence. There is given a divine precept of explicitly eliciting internal acts of faith concerning the principal truths revealed by God.

(a) This Christ Himself taught, when He sent the apostles into the world:¹ "Preach the Gospel to every creature: he who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned"; from which it is clear that faith in the Gospel preached by the apostles, no less explicitly than baptism, is necessary for salvation. The apostles held the same, among whom John equates the precept of faith with the precept of charity:² "And this is His commandment, that we should believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He has given commandment to us": for there it is a question of explicit faith in Christ.

¹ Mark 16:16.

² 1 John 3:23.

(b) And indeed by the very fact that God reveals something, He commands that faith be given to Himself; for he who, revelation having been certainly known, refuses faith, cannot fail to inflict an injury upon the wisdom and truthfulness of God, whether by doubting revealed things or by denying them. - Moreover, if he is unwilling to assent to them, he withdraws himself from the supreme dominion of God. For man is not more independent of the Creator with regard to the intellect than with regard to the will, and therefore God can demand from us the assent of the intellect no less than the obedience of the will.

641. 2. Extension. Here there is question of those things which are to be believed explicitly by all, not of those things which must be known by the more learned, especially by God's ministers, according to their office. In a general way the faithful must explicitly believe whatever is required for feeling and acting as Christians, and therefore, besides the truths necessary by necessity of means enumerated above:

(a) The principal truths which are contained in the Apostles' Creed:³ for there, in a brief and simple way, are set forth the principal articles by which Catholics are distinguished from infidels and heretics, namely those which formerly were proposed to catechumens before the reception of baptism. Indeed articles of this kind gradually increased, but substantially they are already contained in the Scriptures, and the Church by her infallible authority proposes all these to be believed by us.

³ Concerning the Creed we spoke in the Treatise on Theological Sources, nn. 17-18. Today it is not admitted that the individual articles are to be ascribed to individual apostles; the Creed is called Apostles' because the apostles themselves handed down the substance of the dogmas which it comprises. The very word Symbolum Apostolorum is found for the first time in the letter of the Council of Milan to Siricius, toward the end of the fourth century (Migne, P. L., t. XVI, 1125); before that, the confession of faith which catechumens and the faithful professed was called the rule of faith, doctrine, tradition, watchword. How the brief formula of faith in the Trinity, which was recited before baptism, was successively enlarged, so that sprouting heresies might be forestalled, is declared by the authors cited by us (loc. cit.), and besides by S. Baumer, Das apostoliche Glaubensbekenntniss, Mainz, 1893; A. E. Burn, An Introduction to the Creeds, London, 1899; Sanday, Recent Research on the Origin of the Creed, in Journal of Theological Studies, Chicago, Oct. 1899 and Oct. 1901; Semeria, Dogma, Gerarchia e Culto, Rome, 1902; Ermoni, Histoire du Credo, Paris, Bloud, 1903; Vacandard, Etudes de critique, Paris, 1905, pp. 3-68; Vacant, Diction. de Theol., t. I, p. 1660.

The divine precept indeed is not concerned with the very words of the Creed, as they are read today, but with the substance of the dogmas which are expressed by these words. It is altogether expedient that the very words themselves be faithfully committed to memory and recited daily: for thus the truths expressed by these words are retained more effectively. But probably no precept, whether divine or ecclesiastical, is given concerning this.⁴

⁴ Yet, according to St. Alphonsus and Lehmkuhl, I, n. 280, the faithful are bound under venial sin, from custom, to retain the Creed itself by memory.

642. (b) The principal precepts of the Decalogue: for these comprise the principal natural and divine rules of morals; and, since the obligation of observing them is incumbent upon Christians, first they must know and believe them. - The precepts of the Church, as merely ecclesiastical and not revealed, are not indeed an object of faith, but they must be known, so that they can be fulfilled.

(c) The domestic prayer, at least very probably, because it comprises those things which Christ taught us to ask, and which are more necessary for salvation. Besides this, it must be known under grave obligation that prayer in general is necessary for salvation. It is also required that each faithful person know how to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity; to retain a definite formula by memory is altogether expedient. - The Angelic Salutation, or Hail Mary, is indeed of great profit, and it helps to recite it piously; but we are not bound to know it or to believe it explicitly.

(d) The sacraments necessary for all, namely baptism, penance, and the Eucharist: for since all Christians are bound to receive these, they must believe those things which are required for their worthy reception. With regard to the other sacraments, those who receive them are first bound to know and believe the things revealed concerning them.

643. From this it follows that those sin who neglect to learn the aforesaid truths; - and also parents and pastors who, neither by themselves nor by others, do not instruct their children or subjects concerning these things: for they do not fulfill a grave duty.⁵

⁵ Pius X recently urged the fulfillment of this duty, Encycl. Acerbo nimis, Apr. 15, 1905 (Acta S. Sedis, t. XXXVII, p. 613), where, among other things, he established these things, p. 623: "All pastors, and generally all who have the care of souls, on Sundays and feast days, through the space of a whole hour, shall instruct boys and girls from the catechism booklet concerning those things which each must believe and do in order to obtain salvation.... In all and individual parishes there shall be canonically established an association commonly called the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. In it pastors, especially where the number of priests is small, will have lay helpers in handing on catechesis.... In larger cities, and especially in those where universities of studies, lyceums, and gymnasia are open, schools of religion shall be founded for instructing in the truths of faith and the institutions of Christian life the youth who frequent public schools, where no mention at all is made of religious matters." - Let the whole letter be attentively read and faithfully put into execution.

Hence also confessors ought not absolve penitents ignorant of these truths, unless these seriously and sincerely wish to learn them; otherwise they are not rightly disposed, since they are unwilling to fulfill a grave precept.

644. 3. Concerning the time at which the precept of faith obliges. That precept obliges either of itself or by accident:

(A) Of itself, or by force of the precept itself of believing: (a) When some revealed truth has been sufficiently proposed, or when the obligation of believing is manifested to the conscience with moral certainty; likewise when a new definition is proposed, for example, when the decrees of the Vatican Council were promulgated.

The same is to be said concerning children of the faithful, who, having attained the use of reason, have been so instructed in faith that they clearly perceive that such and such a truth has been divinely revealed; and concerning infidels and heretics, as soon as it is morally certain to them that the Catholic religion was instituted by God. For the reverence and obedience which we must offer to God demands that we believe as soon as something is shown with moral certainty to be divinely revealed; otherwise His infallible authority is contemned. Therefore those sin who put off for a long time the act of faith and entrance into the Church after they have clearly perceived the obligation of believing. - But those who apprehend the motives of credibility only probably are not indeed bound to believe immediately, but they must pray, and at the same time seriously inquire, so that the truth may shine more clearly before their eyes: for God does not deny light and grace to those rightly disposed.

645. (b) Often in life, although the times cannot or should not be determined more particularly.⁶ This indeed is clear from the propositions 17 and 65 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life. - It suffices to have believed those mysteries (of the Trinity and Incarnation) once." - Some indeed said that acts of faith must be elicited on feast days, others once a year: but nothing certain can be defined on this matter. Besides, this seems of little utility; for, morally speaking, it cannot happen that a Christian man, who has embraced and retained the Christian faith, does not repeat acts of faith often, whether explicitly, - or implicitly, by exercising supernatural works, resisting temptations, or fulfilling other precepts, which can scarcely be observed without some act of faith.

⁶ Denzing., nn. 1034 and 1082; Viva, on proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII.

646. (c) Probably in the article of death, because then especially we are bound to tend toward God, the ultimate supernatural end. Yet some say that then an act of faith is not necessary of itself, but only if a grave temptation against faith urges.

(d) After the denial of some truth of faith; for he who has become a heretic or apostate must turn himself to God by a positive act of faith. - The same is to be said if a temptation against faith urges which cannot be overcome except through an act of faith; often, however, the temptation is more effectively driven away by diverting the mind to other things.

(e) For repelling those temptations which cannot be overcome without an act of faith, for example, temptations against faith or hope.

647. (B) By accident, or by force of other precepts; namely, as often as we are bound to elicit an act of faith, as often as this is necessary for observing another precept which then obliges: for he who is bound to some end is bound also to use the means necessary for attaining it. This obligation is had: (a) when someone prepares himself for justification, which cannot be obtained without an act of faith; (b) when the precept of hope and charity urges: for neither can be fulfilled without an act of faith; (c) when a grave temptation against some virtue urges, and cannot otherwise be conquered without an act of faith.

We shall speak concerning the existence and extension of this precept.

648. 1. Existence: There exists a divine precept of externally professing faith at times.

This Christ indeed taught:⁷ "Everyone therefore who shall confess Me before men, I also will confess him before My Father who is in heaven. But he who shall deny Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father who is in heaven." Paul inculcates the same:⁸ "For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."

⁷ Matt. 10:32-33; cf. Luke 9:26; 12:8-9.

⁸ Rom. 10:10.

And rightly; for he who, believing in his heart, fears externally to profess faith: (a) is exposed to the danger of losing faith: for by this voluntary omission the firm assent to revealed things is diminished, and little by little doubts arise; on the other hand, by open confession internal faith is strengthened not a little. (b) He commits irreverence toward God, since, on account of vain fear, he refuses to offer the reasonable service owed to the supreme Lord: for by that very fact he seems to prefer human judgments to divine wisdom. (c) Moreover he is guilty of cowardice; for he who is not ashamed to act against his own persuasion of soul by that very fact shows that he is not a man, but a weak immature person, who is deterred by vain fears from fulfilling his duty. (d) Finally he shows himself an unworthy citizen of the Church; for since the Church is a visible society, which demands the visible union of her members, he who does not externally profess faith weakens this external unity, - and is compared to a soldier who is ashamed to defend the banner of his fatherland.

649. 2. Extension. That precept, insofar as it is affirmative, demands confession of faith at times; and insofar as it is negative, forbids that faith ever be denied.

(A) The affirmative precept of professing faith obliges, according to St. Thomas,¹ when "by the omission of this confession the honor due to God would be withdrawn, and also the utility to be bestowed upon neighbors":

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2.

(a) When the honor due to God demands it, namely if, from the omission of this profession, God is dishonored or deprived of the honor due to Him. Thus if someone is questioned publicly or privately by public authority, in a cause of faith, for example, whether he is Catholic, or what he thinks concerning such and such an article of faith, he must confess his faith without hesitation and ambiguity, even with danger to life: this indeed the honor of God demands, and in these circumstances silence would be equivalent to denial of faith. Therefore this proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel him to confess the faith frankly, as glorious to God and faith; to be silent, I do not condemn as sinful in itself."² For although public power has no right to question concerning faith, but only concerning things pertaining to the temporal good of society, yet the faithful person is bound to respond, on account of the honor of God, and in order to avoid scandal, lest from silence it be inferred that the true faith has been denied. Yet make exception if silence, from the circumstances, indicates constancy in faith clearly enough. - The same must be said if someone is questioned, in hatred of the faith, even by a private person, at least in those circumstances in which silence would be equivalent to denial of faith.

² Denzing., n. 1035; Viva, on this proposition.

But if only by a general edict it is commanded that the faithful present themselves before the magistrates, or betray themselves as Catholics by a certain sign, they are not bound to obey; for their silence cannot be held as a denial of faith, when they are not questioned in particular.

650. (b) When the spiritual utility of neighbor demands it: for from charity we are bound to prevent, insofar as this can be done, lest the neighbor incur great spiritual harm. Therefore a profession of faith is necessary whenever, from its omission, someone is turned away from faith or delayed, or is deprived of some great spiritual advantage, provided that the good of neighbor cannot otherwise be provided for; for example, if from such omission the newly converted or the weak in faith would be scandalized.

(c) At times in life: for since we are bound to adhere visibly to the Church, we must at times manifest this adhesion by external profession of faith. But for this it is sufficient to fulfill Christian duties which imply this profession, such as the reception of the sacraments, attendance at Mass, etc.

651. N.B. Besides the divine precept, there is present an ecclesiastical precept imposed upon certain persons, in determined circumstances, of making a profession of faith according to the formula which is called Piana.³ In a general way those are bound to make this who are promoted to some dignity or ecclesiastical office or to the subdiaconate, as is explained in the Code, c. 1324, cited at the end of the work.

³ Which profession of faith, together with the oath prescribed by Pius X to drive away the danger of modernism, must be made by: (a) professors of universities and seminaries, every year; (b) clerics to be initiated into major orders; (c) priests destined for hearing confessions and sacred preachers; (d) pastors, canons, beneficiaries before entering possession of the benefice; (e) diocesan officials and judges; (f) superiors and teachers of religious families. Cf. A.A.S., Sept. 9, 1910.

1. NATURE OF FAITH.—Faith (fides divina) is a divinely infused virtue by which a man firmly believes whatever God has revealed and the Church proposes on His authority.

Faith, therefore, has a twofold object, the one material, the other formal. Its material object (obiectum materiale) are the truths revealed by God; its formal object (obiectum formale) or motive is God’s infinite veracity, which, perceived by the human intellect with moral certitude, produces a deep conviction of the divine authority and a satisfying realization of the content of Revelation.¹

¹ Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. 3: “This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe to be true the things revealed by Him, not because of the intrinsic truth of the things perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself who reveals, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. . . . Moreover, all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal teaching authority, as divinely revealed and to be believed.”—Cfr. can. 2, De Fide: “If anyone shall say that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral matters and that, consequently, for divine faith it is not required that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of God who reveals, let him be anathema.”—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Spiritu et Litera, c. 31 sq. (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 235).—J. Nienhaus, De Actu Fidei Divinae, Münster 1891, pp. 26 sqq.—St. Lederer, Der Glaube als freie Heilserkenntnis, Rodalben 1891.

Faith is elicited conjointly by the intellect and the will, and therefore involves complete subjection of all man’s spiritual faculties to the authority of God. It is a free and therefore a moral act.²

² Cfr. 2 Cor. X, 5; 1 John V, 9.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 3: “We are bound to render by faith the full submission of intellect and will to God who reveals.”—Cfr. Sess. III, can. 5, De Fide.—Cfr. St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioannem, XXVI, n. 2: “Anyone can enter a church unwilling, can approach the altar unwilling, can receive the sacrament unwilling: he cannot believe unless willing.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1607).—IDEM, De Praedest. Sanct., c. 2, n. 5: “To believe is nothing other than to think with assent.” (P. L., XLIV, 963).—Cfr. Saint Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 1.—G. Schmitt, Vernunft und Wille in ihrer Beziehung zum Glaubensakt, Augsburg 1903, pp. 51 sqq.—K. Ziesché, Verstand und Wille beim Glaubensakt, Paderborn 1909.—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Theologische Zeitfragen, 4th series, Freiburg 1908, pp. 12 sqq., 139 sqq.—F. Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 9th ed. (by E. Müller), pp. 3 sqq., 152 sqq.

Faith is opposed to sight (videre), to opinion (opinari), and to knowledge (intellegere). Sight is immediate vision; opinion is inclining to one side in preference to the other, but without certainty; knowledge is based upon perception. By faith we accept as certain the truths which God has revealed, though we have no knowledge of, and perhaps do not understand them.³ “What we know,” says St. Augustine, “we owe to reason; what we believe, we owe to authority; what we hold merely as a matter of opinion, we owe to error.”⁴

³ Cfr. Matt. XI, 25; XVI, 16 sq.; John VI, 70; XX, 29; 2 Cor. V, 7; Heb. XI, 1.

⁴ De Util. Credendi, c. 11, n. 25: “What we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority; what we opine, to error.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 83).—V. Cathrein, S.J., Glauben und Wissen, Freiburg 1903.—Cat. Rom., P. I, c. 2, qu. 2: “The word ‘believing’ in this place does not signify thinking, supposing, or holding an opinion, but, as the sacred writings teach, it has the force of most certain assent, by which the mind firmly and steadfastly assents to God revealing His mysteries. Therefore, he believes—as pertains to the explanation of this passage—to whom something is certain and persuasive without any hesitation.”—J. P. Gury, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, Lyons and Paris 1850, n. 176: “Faith in general is assent because of the authority of the one speaking. More precisely for our purpose, faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is defined as a supernatural, infused habit inclining the intellect firmly to assent to truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church because of the authority of God who reveals. But insofar as it is an act, it is called the most firm assent given to things revealed by God because of the authority of God who reveals.”

The material object of faith consists partly of natural truths (such as the reality of sense perception and the objectivity of the outside world, the data of nature, historical facts, etc.) and partly of truths belonging to the supernatural order. Hence there is a distinction between natural or human faith (fides humana) on the one hand, and supernatural faith (fides divina) on the other.

By the formal object of faith we understand the motive or reason that induces a man to believe. This motive is authority.

Authority is either natural or supernatural. Natural authority may be external or internal. External authority consists in the testimony of others, and the belief it produces is known as fides historica.

Internal authority is based on reasons or arguments existing in the mind of the believer, and the faith produced by it is called philosophical (fides philosophica).

Theological faith (fides theologica), in the strict sense, rests upon supernatural or divine authority.

It follows that fides divina and fides theologica are not synonymous terms. The former has reference to the substance, the latter to the form. Theological faith is always fides divina, because whatever God reveals is supernatural in substance, referring to Himself, or to His relation towards men, or to their relation towards him.⁵ But fides divina is not necessarily always fides theologica because there is a kind of religious faith that is based solely on reason.

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 1, art. 1: “If we consider materially the things to which faith assents, there is not only God Himself but also many other things; these, however, do not fall under the assent of faith except insofar as they have some relation to God, namely, insofar as through certain effects of the divinity man is aided in tending toward the enjoyment of God.”

Fides divina et catholica is the term by which Catholic theologians designate belief in the truths revealed by God and proposed for belief by the Catholic Church.⁶

⁶ Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, cap. 3, v. supra, note 1.

To believe is not to take something for granted blindly, but to accept it as true on the authority of another. A child believes his parents, i. e., accepts as true what they say, because he is convinced that they know the truth and wish to communicate it to him. Similarly, to believe God means to accept as true what He has revealed because He knows the truth and is incapable of deception.

In order to be able to believe rationally, therefore, man must first be certain that God has spoken, and, by implication, that there is a God, who is infinitely wise and truthful.⁷

⁷ Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI, n. 21 (Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 11th ed., by Cl. Bannwart, S.J., Freiburg 1908, n. 1171): “A supernatural assent of faith useful for salvation is compatible with merely probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with fear by which one fears that God may not have spoken.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1038).

Dr. Schell justly expressed surprise at the conduct of those who seek to spread the notion that the religious world-view of savants and scientists is founded upon positive knowledge rather than faith, whereas ordinary Christians and theologians depend upon authority and more or less arbitrarily construed systems. Surely no one believes that the followers of Kant, Hegel, Comte, James, etc., have accepted the systems of their respective masters as the result of independent study and research. Authority is authority, whether it be acknowledged or not, whether it be surrounded by the aureole of sainthood or the glamor of worldly renown, whether it be exercised by a prophet or a philosopher, by a pagan or an Apostle. How few even among the highly educated would have any elaborate world-view of their own if it could be obtained only by personal effort and had to be based entirely on internal reasons, to the exclusion of authority!⁸

⁸ H. Schell, Die göttliche Wahrheit des Christentums, Vol. I, Paderborn 1895, Preface, p. xii; IDEM, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1902, pp. 214 sqq.

2. NECESSITY OF FAITH.—Faith is absolutely necessary to salvation. This necessity is based upon two grounds: first, the positive law of God, and, secondly, the part this virtue plays in the process of justification.

The teaching of Scripture on this point is unmistakable. Mark XVI, 16: “He that believeth not shall be condemned.” John III, 18: “He that doth not believe is already judged.” Heb. XI, 6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” 1 John III, 23: “And this is his commandment, that we should believe in the name of his Son, Jesus Christ.”

Faith is the first, and an absolutely necessary, requirement for every adult man who wishes to enter into vital relationship with God and the divinely appointed order of salvation. In the words of the Tridentine Council, faith is “the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God;” in fine, it is the basis of the whole supernatural life, the beginning and the foundation of all man’s duties to God, of every act of divine worship, internal as well as external.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 8 (cfr. also c. 6).—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 97, 392.

It follows as a necessary corollary that formal unbelief entails the loss of salvation and, therefore, if persisted in, spells eternal damnation.

The value and importance of religious faith may be deduced from the two scriptural truths that faith will gain “the victory which overcometh the world”¹⁰ and that “the end of faith is the salvation of souls.”¹¹

¹⁰ 1 John V, 4; cfr. Eph. VI, 16.

¹¹ 1 Pet. I, 9; Prov. XVII, 6 (Sept.): “The whole world of possessions belongs to the believer, but not even an obol belongs to the unbeliever.”—St. Jerome, Epist., LIII (al. CIII), n. 10: “For the believer the whole world is riches. But the unbeliever lacks even an obol.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 549).

It is not by knowledge but by faith that man is saved. Without underrating the claims of science and philosophy we may say that neither can accomplish what faith has accomplished for the civilization of mankind, and that neither will ever be able to supplant religious belief. It is as true to-day as it was at the time of Clement of Alexandria, that “the wisdom of Christians is to believe in Christ.”¹²

¹² Stromata, II, c. 2; cfr. II, c. 4: “Faith is more sovereign than knowledge and is its criterion.” (Migne, P. G., VIII, 948 A).

The paramount importance of religious faith may easily cause us to overlook the extent to which we live by faith even in worldly matters and the narrowness of the limits that surround the intellectual possessions we have acquired by study, research, and investigation. The historian has faith in his sources; the judge accepts the statements of witnesses; the ruler trusts his officials and advisers; the physician is helpless unless he has the confidence of his patient. The simplest acts of every-day life become difficult, if not impossible, when doubt has sapped faith. Who could prove to me that the waiter who brings me my breakfast is not intent on poisoning me, that the barber who applies his razor to my throat is not a bloodthirsty anarchist, that the engineer of the train on which I travel is not a dangerous lunatic?¹³

¹³ Cfr. J. Mausbach, Einige Kernfragen christlicher Welt- und Lebensanschauung, 7th ed., p. 17.

READINGS.—Peter Lombard, Sent., I, dist. 23–25 (Migne, P. L., CXXII, 805).—St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 23 sqq. (Opera Omnia, III, 469).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 1 sqq.—F. Suarez, De Fide Theol., disp. 1 sqq. (Opera Omnia, XII, 8 sqq., 334 sqq.).—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmat., Vol. VIII, 2nd ed., pp. 49 sqq.—S. Schiffini, S.J., Tract. de Virtutibus Infusis, pp. 17 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 4 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 346 sqq., 354 sqq.—G. Lahousse, Tract. de Virtutibus Theologicis, Bruges 1900.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 100 sqq., 274 sqq.—J. Kirschkamp, Der Geist des Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe, Paderborn 1895.—V. McNabb, O.P., Oxford Conferences on Faith, London 1905.—H. Pope, O.P., art. “Faith” in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 755 sqq. (with an extensive bibliography).—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 71 sqq.—C. Martin, De Necessitate Credendi, Paderborn 1906.—P. P. McKenna, O.P., The Theology of Faith, Dublin 1914.

1. We are obliged to believe whatever God has revealed and the Church proposes to us in matters of faith and morals.

It is not permissible to distinguish between essential and non-essential dogmas (articuli fundamentales aut non fundamentales). To believe some of the truths revealed by God and reject others would be to have no faith at all, because the motive of credibility is the authority of God, who is the absolute Truth.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, l. XVI, c. 3; cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 5, art. 3.

“Our act of faith must implicitly extend to everything that God has revealed.... But it is not sufficient to make an act of implicit faith comprising all that God has revealed. We are bound to know and believe certain revealed truths explicitly.” Hence the distinction between fides explicita and fides implicita.²

² Cfr. Matt. XXVIII, 20; Acts XX, 26 sq.—J. P. Gury, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 176: “Faith is ... explicit or implicit by reason of its object, according as this is expressed and unfolded in itself, or contained only in another. Faith is also called explicit or implicit by reason of the act; thus, e. g., if you say: I believe in the Most Holy Trinity, you elicit an explicit act of faith in that mystery. But if you say: I believe all things which the Church teaches must be believed, you elicit an implicit act of faith in each revealed dogma.”—G. Hoffmann, Die Lehre von der Fides Implicita innerhalb der kath. Kirche, Vol. I, Leipsic 1903, pp. 35 sqq.

Some of the truths that God has revealed must be believed as necessary means of salvation, whereas explicit belief in others is purely a matter of precept.

Which truths must be believed explicitly as a necessary means of salvation?

St. Paul says in his Epistle to the Hebrews: “Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”³

³ Heb. XI, 6.

From this text some theologians have concluded that the only truths which a man must believe explicitly in order to be saved are the existence of God and the fact that He rewards those that seek Him. But this conclusion is unwarranted. For, in the first place, these two truths are not articles of faith in the strict sense, but axioms perceived by unaided reason, and, secondly, the Apostle in the context from which the passage is detached, though speaking of supernatural faith, has no intention of determining the truths which a Christian must hold to be saved. What he wishes to say is that belief in the existence of God and His Providence form part of the disposition required of a heathen to prepare himself for the reception of the Christian Revela- tion, which, besides the existence of God and the fact that He rewards those that seek Him, comprises other truths that are also necessary for salvation, viz.: the divine sonship of Jesus and the Atonement, which in turn involve the doctrine of Christ’s twofold nature, His Incarnation, His Passion and death, the Resurrection, and the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, without which the dogma of the Incarnation would be meaningless.⁴ Without an explicit belief in all these truths it is impossible to be saved, though there may be exceptional cases in which it is morally impossible to know the dogmas of the Incarnation and the Trinity, and consequently an implicit belief in them may suffice for salvation.

⁴ John XVII, 3; Acts IV, 12.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 22: “Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in Him as Rewarder.”—Ibid., n. 64: “A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1172, 1214).—Cfr. the so-called Athanasian Creed, “Quicunque” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 40) and St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 1, art. 8.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 183: “The following must necessarily be known by necessity of means: 1. One God. . . . 2. God as provident for the present life; 3. God as man’s last end for the other life and, consequently, the eternal rewarder of good works and avenger of evil works (Heb. XI, 6). It is disputed, however, whether the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation must also be explicitly believed by the very necessity of means, independently of the necessity of precept. St. Alphonsus and others affirm this as more probable; others, with Suarez, deny it not improbably. . . .”

2. Under normal conditions a Christian is bound to believe fide divina all the truths proposed by the Catholic Church on the authority of God, and to try to gain as thorough and complete an understanding of them as possible. St. Peter says: “Be ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason for the hope that is in you.”⁵ However, this command does not bind all men equally, but each according to his talent, character, and vocation.

⁵ 1 Pet. III, 15.

a) It is absolutely necessary to acquire a knowledge of those religions truths without which one cannot lead a Christian life and receive the Sacraments worthily. This is but another way of saying that every Catholic must know and believe the substance of the so-called Apostles’ Creed and the Decalogue, the Sacraments which are of obligation, the precepts of the Church, and the Lord’s Prayer. Persons who are engaged mainly in physical labor satisfy this obligation by hearing sermons and, if possible, attending other religious instructions. This duty weighs more heavily on those who live amid conditions that endanger the faith. Educated persons, especially if engaged in intellectual pursuits, are in duty bound to study their religion more thoroughly, though no specific rules can be laid down, conditions being so different.

It goes without saying that the duty of studying the truths of Revelation binds in a special manner those who have to instruct others.⁶ Thus a priest should not be satisfied with having completed his theological course, but strive to increase and deepen the knowledge he has gained in the seminary.

⁶ Cfr. Matthew XIII, 52; M. Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, p. 31.

b) Truths that do not strictly belong to the deposit of faith, theological opinions (theologumena), private revelations, pious legends, etc., may be accepted fide humana and should be treated reverently if there are no solid reasons for doubting or rejecting them.⁷

⁷ Cfr. Emil Michael, S.J., Geschichte des deutschen Volkes im Mittelalter, Vol. III, pp. 203 sqq.; F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 7th ed., pp. 295 sq.; J. Zahn, Einführung in die christliche Mystik, pp. 517 sqq., Paderborn 1908.

c) Faith should be frequently renewed by explicit acts (fides actualis), either general or particular.

In making an act of faith it is not necessary to employ any particular formula. All that is required is that the mind be directed to God and give its assent to the truths He has revealed. However, the recitation of an appropriate formula may constitute an act of faith, and the Church has indirectly recommended several such formulas by attaching indulgences to them.

While adults are in duty bound to make occasional acts of faith, the habitual faith infused by Baptism suffices for children.

How often acts of faith should be made cannot be decided by a general rule. “This divine precept sometimes obliges per se, as when the truths of Revelation are first made known to a man, and he becomes conscious of his obligation; sometimes it obliges merely per accidens, as when one has committed a sin against faith, or has to fulfill a duty for which an act of faith is prescribed;”⁸ also, we may add, when a solemn oath is taken, and, finally, in the hour of death. “For such as have once made their act of faith, it will be sufficient, in order to fulfill the divine precept, if the act of faith is renewed implicitly, as is done whenever we pray, assist at Mass, or receive any of the Sacraments.”⁹

⁸ Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 168.

⁹ Ibid.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VII., n. 1: “At no time in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.”—Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 16: “Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept in and of itself.”—Ibid., n. 17: “It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life.”—Ibid., n. 65: “It is sufficient to have believed those mysteries [of the Trinity and Incarnation] once.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101, 1166 sq., 1215).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 178: “When does the precept of eliciting faith bind? Resp. 1. Of itself: 1. after the completion of the use of reason, for beginning the Christian life; 2. at the moment of death, when we are very near to tending toward God; 3. more often in life, at least once a year and, according to many, each month. For the rest, one who lives as a Christian sufficiently fulfills this precept by exercising other acts of religion. Resp. 2. It binds incidentally: 1. when a grave temptation presses, which cannot otherwise be conquered; 2. when a precept which requires faith, e. g., that of confession, must be fulfilled; 3. after a fall into heresy or after the faith has been denied. Thus all. Must acts of faith be elicited explicitly? Implicit acts generally suffice in those who have sufficient knowledge of the truths to be believed. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucifix, prays, makes the sign of the cross, and receives the sacraments.”

d) Every Christian is moreover bound to treasure the precious gift of faith and to increase it to the best of his ability. Col. I, 10: “[We cease not to pray for you] that you may walk worthy of God, in all things pleasing; being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God.”¹⁰

¹⁰ Cfr. 1 Pet. II, 2; 2 Pet. III, 18.—St. Augustine, Epistolae, 120 (al. 222), n. 2: “May you also behold by the light of reason those things which you hold by the firmness of faith.”—IDEM, ibid., n. 3: “Far be it that God should hate in us that in which He created us more excellent than the other animals. Far be it, I say, that we should believe for this reason, lest we receive or seek a reason; for we could not even believe unless we had rational souls.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 453).

“It appears to me a sign of carelessness,” says St. Anselm of Canterbury, “if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not take pains to understand what we believe.”¹¹ And St. Thomas Aquinas writes: “When a man is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof, and with regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith, but is a sign of greater merit.”¹²

¹¹ Cur Deus Homo, l. I, c. 2.

¹² Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 10: “For when a man has a ready will to believe, he loves the truth believed, reflects upon it, and embraces it if he can find any reasons for doing so; and in this respect human reason does not exclude the merit of faith, but is a sign of greater merit.”

The most effective means of confirming the faith are prayer, explicit acts of belief, devout meditation on the truths necessary for salvation, regular and attentive hearing of sermons and instructions, courageous public profession of the faith when called for, and especially, living up to its requirements.¹³

¹³ Matt. X, 32 sq.; Mark IX, 23; Luke VIII, 15; XVII, 5; John VII, 17; VIII, 47; 1 Tim. I, 19; III, 9.

66. By the superior law, with the quality of the writer more observed, all books of heresiarchs were proscribed, but of heretics at least those which expressly treated religion.¹ Now, in this article, the writer or his mind is not regarded, provided the clause obtains. Now:

What is an apostate

1. An apostate, who, as is clear, is here understood as an apostate from the Christian faith,² is anyone who not only the Catholic but the Christian faith externally (even secretly) and at the same time internally casts away completely, whether he passes over to the "errors of Mohammed, etc.," or merely becomes a perfect "free thinker." Avanzini, loc. cit., p. 8. Think, for example, of E. Renan, Laurent.

What is heresy

2. Understand heresy as an error opposed to a truth sufficiently proposed by the Church, whether through the ordinary magisterium or through a formal definition; namely, that error which, if externally proposed with pertinacity, makes one guilty of heresy in the canonical forum, and is punished by excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved to the Roman Pontiff through the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, n. 1.

Schism

3. Schism, taken perfectly, entails withdrawal from the communion of the universal Church, which practically will happen by rejecting the spiritual authority of the legitimate Supreme Pontiff. For if you refuse subjection to a legitimate Bishop, the schism will not be perfect unless you separate yourself from him because he himself preserves communion with the Roman Pontiff. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 8, n. 12.

To defend

4. To defend says more than to assert, or merely to praise without demonstration; rather, it is to uphold by reasons being added.

Foundations of religion

5. By the very foundations of Religion we understand only the truths which either found natural religion itself, or are necessary for an adult unbeliever so that he may be led to embrace the faith; but not at the same time the principal dogmas of the faith itself. These are less properly called the foundations of Religion, and are already touched by the earlier words of the article.³ These truths are: the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, the force of proof of miracles, the motives of credibility in general, and anything of this kind.⁴

To overturn in any way

6. To overturn in any way, or in whatever way it is done. Therefore by a serious attack, or one made through ridicule; directly or indirectly, for example by defending universal skepticism, from which God can no longer be demonstrated; from formal intention or objectively, from the subject matter of the work. There are so many books of this kind from the philosophy of materialists, positivists, rationalists.

Earlier heretics

7. Already formerly it was likely that by the severe proscription of heretics, books of earlier heretics, such as Tertullian, Pelagius, and those of this kind, were not comprehended, so that the reading of such books was permitted especially to theologians and students of ecclesiastical sciences.⁵

The benign intention of our Constitution allows us to preserve this exception of the law. So the common opinion. Indeed, nothing seems to prevent us from saying the same of other heretics who are not now so ancient, indeed, but whose errors have plainly become obsolete and are merely historically reported without danger of contagion. We would say this of heretics prior to the Protestant Reformation.⁶ For the argument is similar. Of itself the danger has ceased; therefore the reason of the law has been removed, not in some particular case but commonly; indeed, at least in part, it has ceased contrariwise, since the reading of them brings very many advantages for investigating the ancient morals of Christians or philosophical systems.

Collection of Labbe, Migne

Therefore, without scruple, one can have the collections of Councils which take their name from Labbe; the collection of patrology of Migne,⁷ where these works are inserted so that the monuments of ecclesiastical tradition may be possessed more fully.

What of debates of Parliaments?

For a somewhat different reason, that is, because they are not books properly so called, and at the same time with parts which attack the faith they contain others by which it is defended, it is lawful also not to refer to proscribed works the reports of speeches and disputes which are customarily held in Parliaments, as they are set forth in a public periodical (Journal Officiel, Annales parlementaires), or in private collections, such as Questions actuelles. A certain force of usage is added.

¹ From Rule 2 of the Index.

² For they distinguish apostasy from faith, from order (for example the sacred order of the diaconate), from religion (from a regular order).

³ With us Hollweck, op. cit., p. 31; Péries, op. cit., p. 64, note 2; Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, loc. cit., n. 21.3; against Gennari, op. cit., p. 30, note 1; and Piat, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 30, p. 53, n. XIII.

⁴ But not the divinity of Christ, against Pennacchi, who otherwise agrees with us. Op. cit., n. 40.

⁵ Cf. Cardinal de Lugo, De Fide, disp. 21, n. 29.

⁶ Going farther, Boudinhon, op. cit., p. 316, thinks the same should be said of books and writings which defend Jansenism.

⁷ Cf. Pennacchi, op. cit., n. 39.

What non-Catholics are

67. 1. Non-Catholics, taken closely - as if deprived only of the Catholic faith - seem to us to be those who, outside the Catholic Church, contend that they profess true Christianity. They are therefore only baptized persons who, through heresy or schism, are reputed plainly alien from Catholic communion. For the word non-Catholic is opposed not so much to the Christian genus as to the Catholic species. And when the word must receive a broader use, the Pontiff himself indicates this by a word, as he did, for example, in articles 5 and 8, where he treats of non-Catholics of any kind whatever. Besides, they are worthy of special mention both because the Christian truths retained by them create a greater danger that the faithful be deceived and seduced by the honorable appearance of their works, and because they give a greater hope that sometimes certain arguments, even religious ones, for example concerning God, concerning the divinity of Christ, may be treated in a way that can also benefit Catholics. Therefore the Legislator wisely establishes a presumption against their books which expressly treat religion, while at the same time conceding that this same presumption can be destroyed by contrary proof.

Pennacchi,¹ Génicot,² Péries,³ and Ciolli⁴ are with us. Others, however, also include Mohammedans, Jews, unbelievers.⁵

Therefore, in our opinion, books on religion written by an unbeliever or by a rationalist who was formerly Catholic are not governed by this article, nor are they prohibited unless they defend heresy or schism, or overturn the foundations of religion.

Expressly

2. Which expressly, so that religion is, by design, the subject matter, not indeed necessarily of the whole book, but at least of a notable part, for example of one chapter.

On religion

3. On Religion, that is, on sacred matter, on natural or positive religion, on Sacred Scripture, dogmatic and moral theology, liturgy, canon law, ecclesiastical history; on moral philosophy itself, insofar as it embraces duties toward God or religious society, or by its principles seems to attack the dogmas themselves. Suarez;⁶ Lugo;⁷ St. Alphonsus;⁸ Arndt;⁹ Piat.¹⁰

They treat

They treat. To treat, according to Lugo, loc. cit., is not to say one's meaning incidentally, but to defend something, to prove it, to solve the contrary.

How far they are reproved

5. Unless it is established. When they expressly treat religion, they are prohibited from the presumption of an evil character, until it is morally established, for example by the testimony of a trustworthy man, that nothing is contained in them against the Catholic faith. Nothing can be taken morally. Therefore understand: nothing which is of any moment.

What if the mind is not hostile

But what if nothing is said formally, or from a hostile intention, against the faith, yet some things are put forward which are materially opposed to it? Objective opposition seems entirely sufficient. Wernz, n. 111, note 56.

NB. What if Catholic notes have been added to the book of a heretic, or the contrary

NB. Certain Catholic notes added below do not prevent the book from being that of a non-Catholic; nor do certain notes added by a heretic to the book of a Catholic man cause it now no longer to be judged a book of a Catholic writer.¹¹ But if the scholia are so great that the book is judged rather to consist of these, it will receive its denomination from the author of the scholia.

¹ N. 41.

² Op. cit., I, 52, 3.

³ Op. cit., p. 70.

⁴ Op. cit., n. 15.

⁵ So Cardinal Gennari on this article, except that he does not here include schismatics; Hollweck, Das kirchliche Bücherverbot, p. 31; Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, loc. cit., n. 23; and Wernz, loc. cit., n. 111, note 55. The use of this probable doctrine will be this: that you extend the faculty positively made by this article to books of unbelievers which treat a religious subject in such a way that they contain nothing notable against the Catholic faith; but the other opinion gives the faculty of reading books of unbelievers who treat of their own religion and commend it, so long as they do not defend heresies or overturn the foundations of religion.

⁶ De Fide, disp. 20, n. 16.

⁷ De Fide, disp. 21, n. 51.

⁸ Book 7, n. 283.

⁹ Op. cit., pp. 121-123.

¹⁰ Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 30, pp. 55-56.

¹¹ Cf. Laymann, Theologia moralis, book 2, treatise 1, chapter 15, n. 2; Piat, ad Van der Velden, p. 621. Arndt speaks more severely, op. cit., pp. 123-125, n. 103.

Prior law

74. 1. The first part renews the disposition of the prior law, by which, in the General Decrees, § 2, n. 13, all writings of this sort were punished. Cf. Arndt, p. 148, n. 119.

Whether it is required that it be done of set purpose

2. Because words are to be taken properly, and the Legislator is accustomed to express the clause of set purpose wherever he requires it; indeed because in this same article, in the third part, he inserts the expression by designed effort, we cannot agree with the distinguished Pennacchi, who thinks that clause is to be understood here. With us are Génicot,¹ Card. Gennari,² Moureau.³

Yet practically we do not differ much. For, arguing from the inscription of this fifth chapter, "On Certain Books of Special Subject Matter," we think it necessary that the book be injurious to God, etc., sufficiently notably, although not yet of set purpose, so that it can be said to be of this special subject matter.⁴ Otherwise, moreover, contrary to the mind of this Constitution, this condemnation would extend itself to too many books. Finally, as Génicot, cited place, observes, scarcely will those books be apt gravely to wound or diminish the just esteem of God, etc., unless they are books in which the detraction is developed to some extent. But that grave wounding seems altogether necessary. Therefore it is necessary either that the detraction "be made in a notable manner,"⁵ or that from those detractions the work itself be morally reputed impious. Desjardins elegantly translates: "impious works, which attack God," etc.⁶

Wherefore a work in which detraction against the Blessed Virgin Mary is continued through two or three pages, even if in other parts honorable, we judge to be prohibited by this article.

What it is to disparage? Formal detraction is required

3. Furthermore, to disparage is to take away, diminish, the fame or esteem of someone by words. In French you would say: vilipender, dénigrer, discréditer. Thus detraction differs from heresy, by which a dogma is not derided but denied. But detraction is to be taken as formal, flowing from a depraved intention, not merely material or beyond intention.

Examples

4. God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the saints, the Catholic Church, and her worship or sacraments. Pennacchi, cited place, and C. Gennari⁷ report many examples of detractions of this sort, and well selected ones. Yet we do not, with Pennacchi, take the worship of the Church concerning the honor due to the Church, which would make that clause plainly useless, but concerning the divine worship which is exercised through liturgical actions. Thus the obvious sense has it, thus also the structure of the words which joins worship with sacraments: "and her worship or sacraments"; and with us say Desjardins, cited place, Son Culte; Gennari, cited place, Il sacro Culto; Hollweck, Ihr Cult; Planchard.⁸

What worship is

5. Apostolic See. This is not the person of some Pontiff as such. Yet if, from the intention of attacking the Holy See, reproachful narrations against various Supreme Pontiffs are heaped together, the present clause will obtain.

¹ Cited work, I, 452.

² On this place, p. 43.

³ Rev. des Sciences Eccl., t. 6, pp. 100, 101.

⁴ C. Gennari, cited place, sins here by excessive severity: "in whatever measure it is done (provided it is in grave matter)"; and Moureau, cited place: "it suffices that it be [injurious] in fact in some place."

⁵ Wernz, n. 111.

⁶ Études, t. 71, p. 208.

⁷ "He disparages God who blasphemes God or denies His goodness, justice, omnipotence, or any other attribute. He disparages the Blessed Virgin Mary who denies her virginity, divine maternity, sanctity, mercy, or in another way calumniates her excellence. He disparages the Saints who holds them as vicious or useless men, who are unworthy of honors, or who contemns their virtues and supernatural gifts. He disparages the Catholic Church who attacks some note or endowment of hers, or her divine origin, or equates her with other human institutes. He disparages sacred worship who exposes Catholic rites, as divine honors, to mockery, or detracts from their necessity and reasonable fittingness; he disparages the Sacraments who denies that they are necessary or useful, makes them ridiculous, or holds suspect the intentions of the Church administering them (that seems to us rather to be referred to detraction of the Church). He disparages the Apostolic See who contemns its supreme authority, divine institution, sublime and infallible magisterium." Thus nearly C. Gennari, on this place.

⁸ Desjardins, cited work, p. 34; Planchard, Rev. Th. Fr., n. 41.

Former law

125. By this article, in the same words, the Excommunication borne in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, n. 2, of the first series, is repeated. Therefore in itself it will receive a similar interpretation. Hence:

What "knowingly" means

1. Knowingly. By this word the case of any ignorance is excepted, even, probably, affected ignorance. Moreover the word is referred also to those retaining, etc.¹

Reading books. Whether periodic fascicles are books of heretics

2. Reading books, in a notable quantity. Cf. here above n. 57. But who are readers was said in n. 57, 50. Also before, n. 33 and following, we weighed what comes under the name of book, and in what manner periodic publications are to be regarded as books. From this, in order that they be judged to protect heresy as a book, it is required that the periodic publications themselves rather generally stain themselves with this vice.

What apostates are

3. Of apostates. We defined these above as those who entirely cast off the Christian faith externally and internally, whether they pass over to the errors of Mahomet, etc., or simply profess themselves to be perfect "free thinkers." Cf. Avanz., p. 8.

Heretics and a heretical book

4. And of heretics. It is necessary that the heresy be plainly established, either from the heretical sect to which the writer belongs, or, when the book is anonymous, or by an author hitherto Catholic, from manifest doctrine,² and proposed pertinaciously.

Therefore books of this kind are not those which principally belong to a Catholic author, although a heretic has appended scholia, unless these are the greater part of the book; nor those which report some text of heretics "even if you read with the mind of learning heresy." Laym.³ Cf. Piat,⁴ against Arndt.⁵

Nor books of infidels, Jews, schismatics, at least as such.

Nor are books of heretics which pertain to the first centuries of the Church, as now altogether harmless, comprehended here. Lehmkuhl, II, 923. Cf. above n. 66, where we transferred the same rule also to medieval heretics.

To defend heresy

5. Defending heresy. Not merely containing, or briefly defending as if while doing something else, but of set purpose, by bringing forward reasons. But it is not necessary that the subject matter of the book be religious. It is enough that the book defend one heresy in this way.

6. As well as books of any Author prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters. This clause requires:

Through Apostolic Letters

a) Apostolic Letters, or letters proceeding immediately from the Supreme Pontiff: a Brief, Bull, Encyclical, etc. Piat, on V. der Velden, p. 623.

Made by name

b) A prohibition made by name, that is, one by which a book is designated by its proper title. Yet a singular designation, for example of the author, is not demanded. Indeed, a generic indication of title seems to suffice. Hence B. P.⁶ judges that the clause is verified in the Constitution Ecclesiam, by which, in 1821, there were prohibited by Pius VII, under excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, "the catechisms of the Carbonari, the books by which they describe the things which are customarily carried on in their meetings, statutes, codes." But a disposition is not enough by which, for example, Innocent XI condemned all books and writings of Michael Molinos.⁷ Cf. Avanz.-Penn., Appendix III.

It is required that it be made under excommunication reserved to the Holy See

c) A prohibition under excommunication reserved to the Holy See. Thus the common opinion: Avanzini, Lehmkuhl, Bucceroni,⁸ etc. The reason is drawn from the end of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, by which this censure was borne. For Pius IX wished to narrow censures. Therefore it would in no way be likely that under the gravest censure (specially reserved) he prohibited books which his predecessors had condemned without reserved excommunication.⁹ Cf. Avanzini, cited place. Wherefore if, for example, you read without faculty the work of Lamennais, Les paroles d'un croyant, you will have committed no pontifical censure, since the apostolic letters by which it is reprobated contain none. The same is the case with the works of Jacob Frohschammer.

Those which were proscribed under another penalty latae sententiae have now been simply condemned, unless they are heretical and at the same time have defended heresy. Except those which, for the causes indicated elsewhere, have fallen from the Index.

d) Yet it is not necessary that those letters bear the penalty of excommunication specially reserved; otherwise the present clause would effect nothing special. Thus the authors.

e) Finally, the disposition affects future proscriptions equally with past ones.

Therefore in a few words: from article 47, those books which the Supreme Pontiffs formerly proscribed by name through apostolic letters under excommunication latae sententiae reserved to themselves are now prohibited under excommunication specially reserved.

What concerning future proscriptions?

Must it be said in the same way if certain books are hereafter condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs through apostolic letters by name? We think it must be said in the same way.

And Hollweck¹⁰ and Wernz¹¹ judge that in this article no times are distinguished. Nevertheless, since the legislator merely uses the past tense, while he could so easily have said prohibited or to be prohibited, the matter seems uncertain to us.

But if future proscriptions are touched, there is no cause why in these you should require mention of reserved excommunication, unless there is a cause on account of which the Pontiff must be judged to have been unwilling to refer himself to the present article, but to pronounce absolutely concerning the sanction.

What books are touched by this clause?

N.B. Because other apostolic letters by which works are condemned either do not bear the penalty of reserved excommunication, or indeed bear it but one afterwards removed, or do not indicate books by name, in reality this clause today has force only concerning 82 books which in the eighteenth century were proscribed by apostolic letters,¹² concerning the work of Fr. Vigil,¹³ and concerning two books of J. Nuyts,¹⁴ which Pius IX condemned by Briefs of June 10 and August 22, 1857. Wherefore in sentences of this kind inquiry must be made only from the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹⁵

Yet it easily happens that, on account of another cause, because they have been written by a heretic and defend heresy, they are prohibited by law under the penalty of excommunication specially reserved.

When those retaining are punished

7. And retaining the same books: knowingly and in that manner in which it is prohibited under grave obligation. Cf. above n. 51 and 58.

Who those printing are

8. Printing, in the commentaries on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, were understood as all who cooperate proximately, by mortal cooperation, toward "printing." Cf. Lehmk., II, 924.

But, from the general canon which we proposed at the beginning, we are not forbidden, the former law having been put aside, to explain this censure according to the benignity of the present Constitution. Now it seems sufficiently discordant that the same word "Printing" be taken in a different sense in two articles, of which one excepts the other. But in article 48, unless we wish, without a compelling reason, to interpret the words more strictly than formerly, the printer is he who undertakes the work to be printed: namely the impresser, whom in French we properly call l'Imprimeur. From another side it agrees very much with our benign law not to strike with censure those workers who cannot pass judgment on the books toward whose printing they cooperate, will for the most part be ignorant of the penalty borne, and not rarely are excused from contumacy by moral necessity. Wherefore the sentence of Hollweck¹⁶ is not displeasing to us, according to which those printing are only the editor and the "impresser." The corrector, however, will be punished as reading. With us concerning workers is Boudinhon.¹⁷

Those defending. Inefficacious defense suffices

9. And defending in any way. Cf. n. 48 and 55.

Observe, since the censure strikes readers, retainers, printers, and defenders in the same manner, namely directly and principally, defense is considered as a delict consisting in itself. Wherefore it is not necessary that the effect of the defense have been obtained, or that in reality, for example, you snatch the book from the flames. The act is judged consummated by the defense itself. Cf., for example, Lehmk., cited place.

What force special reservation has

10. By the fact itself an excommunication specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover this special reservation operates:

a) So that neither Bishops can for this case, even an occult one, use the faculty which they hold from chapter Liceat of the Council of Trent; nor is the case judged contained in the faculty simply given of absolving from reserved cases.

b) So that he who without faculty shall have presumed to absolve someone from that excommunication commits an excommunication simply reserved to the Holy See from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (after the first series).

c) So that one absolved, even in danger of death, by an inferior (that is, by one who did not have at least delegated faculty), must, under the penalty of falling again into censures, after he has recovered, within a month either seek a new absolution from one having faculty, or, either himself by himself or through the mediation of a Confessor, have recourse by letter to the Holy See and obey its commands.

¹ Cf. Hollweck, Die kirchl. Strafgesetze, sec. 107.

² Lehmk., II, n. 923; Bucc., II, p. 339; B. P., t. 7, n. 424.

³ L. 2, tr. 1, chapter 15, n. 1.

⁴ On V. der Velden, p. 621.

⁵ P. 124, 3, n. 103.

⁶ De Cens., t. 7, 456. Yet against this, Piat, cited work, p. 625, because works published after this Bull cannot be said to be prohibited by name through it.

⁷ Yet this cause has that peculiar thing, that there is only one work of Molinos, Guida spirituale, besides two little works which afterwards were published together with the former work. Nevertheless we judge that the nominal indication is lacking which is required for incurring excommunication. The propositions of the work were proscribed as heretical; but since the writer retracted the errors, the work does not seem to be that of a heretical author.

⁸ Appendix III, pp. 126, 129; II, n. 923; p. 340.

⁹ Nothing prevents our present Constitution, although in itself it softens the former laws, from increasing their sanction accidentally. From September 5, 1757 to November 11, 1784, by seven letters in the form of a Brief, works were proscribed under the penalty of reserved excommunication latae sententiae for laymen, and of suspension latae sententiae for clerics. In the same way, on August 2, 1851, two works of J. Nuyts were proscribed. That suspension is suppressed by our law; but, as it seems to us, now for all, even clerics, who unduly read those works, there remains, from our article 47, the penalty of excommunication which is specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.

¹⁰ Das kirchl. Bucherverbot, in this place.

¹¹ Ius Decretal., t. 3, n. 121, note 117.

¹² Cf. Hilgers, Der Index, p. 90 and following. He diligently explored this matter and afterwards accurately exhibits it in his valuable chronological Index of proscribed works (same place, pp. 418, 475). The same warns that those books can be found with difficulty, so that they can now do little harm.

¹³ Defensa de la autoridad de los gobernios y de los obispos contra las pretensiones de la curia romana (6 vols.).

¹⁴ Institutiones ecclesiasticae; Tractationes in ius ecclesiasticum universum.

¹⁵ Thus Avanzini, cited work, pp. 130, 131.

¹⁶ Cited work, pp. 48, 49, notes 1 and 2.

¹⁷ Cited work, p. 304. Wernz, n. 121, note 118, seems to favor us sufficiently.

Usefulness. The treatise on Faith, which is the solemn beginning of dogmatic theology, also vindicates for itself no slight moment in moral theology.

For the virtue without which it is impossible to please God ¹ founds the whole Christian life; and while we are instructed concerning its excellence and merit, we have matter from which to arouse or foster spiritual fervor; while it discerns the varied necessity by which revealed things are to be explicitly believed or professed, it supplies us with norms useful in administering the sacraments, especially baptism. Nor are difficult cases lacking to be examined and solved concerning the positive duties of faith. Today also, in so great a disturbance of errors, it is of very great importance that we know how rightly to weigh the guilt of heresy and infidelity, and accurately discern what, in their intercourse with those who err, can be permitted to Catholics and what must be prohibited.

Order of speaking. - After the notion and excellence of Faith have been set forth, we shall treat, in distinct titles, of the duty of believing; of the duty of professing Faith; of infidelity and of sins opposed to Faith; finally of the legal safeguards of Faith.

¹ Heb. 11, 6.

— Faith is a theological virtue by which man is able to believe, as he ought, on account of the authority of God revealing, those things which God has revealed.

The act of faith denotes assent to the first truth; by which assent the believer participates in divine truth. This assent is formally in the intellect. Considering its formal object, which is the authority of testimony, and because the evidence of the primary object, which is God, is lacking, this assent is free; and hence it is commanded by the will under the aspect of good. But we believe as we ought, insofar as no created reason, but the divine knowledge and veracity itself in speaking, constitutes the sole motive of assent; and insofar as the firmness of this assent surpasses the firmness of natural evidence. This greater firmness is to be derived from the benefit of grace alone.

Insofar as we are illuminated by the very light of the divine intellect, faith is our immense dignity; insofar as we take the intellect captive unto the obedience of faith, that is, renounce our own criterion in order to apply the divine criterion, faith is glorious to God; insofar as we furnish this from the command of a free will, faith is greatly meritorious in the just man. Cf. concerning these points the dogmatic treatise on faith.

— The act of faith is distinguished: a) formal and quasi-virtual. It is formal when the motive of faith (the authority of God revealing) explicitly occurs to the mind. But the habitual persuasion which frequent exercise of faith leaves after itself can pass into act without express memory of the motive of faith. Then an assent is made which truly rests upon that motive, and hence is an act of faith; but because the motive of faith has not been explicitly proposed, this implicit assent is improperly called a virtual act of faith. Properly, on the part of the formal object, the act of faith cannot be virtually contained in any other act: in no act of a theological virtue, for hope and charity presuppose faith; in no other act of a moral virtue, for this is of an inferior order. But on the part of the material object, properly virtual faith is had. Thus, by believing whatever things God has revealed, a man virtually believes the individual truths which have come to us by God's speaking.

b) Internal, or contained in the judgment of the mind alone, and external. The latter, made before witnesses, is at the same time a profession of faith, either formal or virtual, according as one directly testifies to his faith, or performs acts which demonstrate faith: as when someone confesses his sins, approaches the sacred table, or devoutly assists at Mass.

Excellence and usefulness of faith. Faith is the beginning and root of all justification. The act of faith is our first free response full of our vocation to the supernatural end. This vocation looks to this, that we will to be wayfarers, making our way toward possessing God in Himself. If we direct our steps to this most sublime goal, we are freed from servitude to present things, and, elevated above earthly things, we begin in some way to understand the mysterious order of this world, mixed with miseries and evils, and we hold the principle of victory over evil desires, and of consolation in any adverse things whatever. At the same time we are impelled to act worthily of so great an end, so that a manner of acting not only honorable but strong, noble, magnanimous, becomes connatural to us. Wherefore not undeservedly does the Apostle (Heb. XI) not hesitate to turn all things gloriously done to the praise of faith. And thus it happens that human life, turned from perishing into immortal, from low into divine, becomes most useful not less to universal human society than to one's own eternal salvation.

Aids for faith to be acquired, preserved, and increased by us. For heavenly gifts, such as Faith is, we can dispose ourselves negatively, by removing obstacles, and, by the facility of acquired habits, can as it were complete and strengthen the infused virtues themselves. But positively we cannot dispose ourselves for Faith without the prevenient and assisting grace of God. Since, however, as is explained at length in the school of dogma, the assent of Faith, most firm above every other assent, pertains elicitively to the intellect and requires the command of the will, for acquiring, preserving, and increasing Faith, the dispositions of the will must be cared for by us no less than those of the intellect.

Therefore let us strive to have a sound mind, alien from cavils, not excessively hesitating, capable of firm judgment or opinion; a will truly loving and zealous for the good, humble, devoted to God. Let that will apply the intellect to the luminous rather than to the obscure aspects of religion, to the direct motives for adhering, more than to solving difficulties. Let us practically cultivate the spirit of faith in our whole conduct, so that according to the norms of faith we may judge, feel, speak, and act. Let us act as if we already possessed great faith. In this way, since the true and the good are one, already by the very experience of good works we shall in a manner prove the truth of our faith.

— I. Faith is defined: a theological virtue by which a man is habitually capable of believing, as he ought, on account of the authority of God revealing, those things which God has revealed.

The assent of Faith, although it is formally in the intellect, is nevertheless free, so that it is commanded by the will, under the aspect of good; it rests upon the divine knowledge and veracity alone in speaking; and, by the benefit of grace, it has a firmness proportioned to the motive, which surpasses the firmness of our natural evidence.

Faith is necessary for man in the present state, honorable to the believer, glorious to God, very meritorious for the just man.

II. The act of faith is distinguished: 1. Formal and virtual. On the part of the material object, we formally believe truths of faith which explicitly occur to the mind; but virtually, truths which are contained in a more general assent: as when we believe whatever the Church proposes to us as to be believed. On the part of the formal object, the act of faith is properly contained, or can be contained, in no other act. Yet because habitual persuasion can pass into act without explicit memory of the motive, there is distinguished formal faith, which exists when we explicitly remember the motive of faith, and quasi-virtual faith, which is that of one adhering to revealed truth without an explicit proposal of the motive of faith;

2. Internal and external: internal is contained in the judgment of the mind alone; external is contained also in external signification. The external, when it is made before witnesses, is at the same time a profession of faith, whether formal, when one expressly affirms his faith, or virtual, when he does those things which per se suppose and demonstrate faith.

III. The excellence and usefulness of Faith is made manifest from this, that from it has its beginning the divine direction of our life, by which, freed from earthly servitudes and made superior to every misfortune, we are rendered ready for doing honorable and magnanimous things.

For faith to be more easily acquired, preserved, and increased by us from the grace of God, obstacles are removed by a mind sound, right, firm; by a will zealous for the good, humble and devoted to God; by attention to the positive motives of credibility; by the custom of acting according to the principles of faith.

What things are to be believed; when they are actually to be believed: these two matters come to be explained in order.

— Explicitly or implicitly, whatever things God has revealed are to be believed. He who refuses to give faith even to one point derogates from the supreme truth, and consequently can no longer believe anything on account of God's authority alone. He has preferred the false evidence, or conclusion, of his own mind to this authority.

— Explicitly, some things are to be believed by necessity of means, others by necessity of precept. Each necessity of acts affects adults alone; for they alone are to be saved by their own acts.

Moreover, that is necessary by necessity of means without which man would not have, toward his end, that proportion which by God's ordination he ought to have.

For necessity in order to salvation can be taken either from the nature of the thing or from the obligation of divine law. From the nature of the thing, when there is question of a disposition required so that we may have toward the end the proportion appointed by divine ordination, or of removing an obstacle by which the end would per se be impeded (for example, of removing the state of sin). Necessity of means directly regards this positive disposition or removal of an obstacle; necessity of precept immediately and formally follows moral obligation. Although for adults the necessity of precept is superadded to the necessity of means.

From the notion is gathered the practical criterion by which they are accustomed to distinguish necessity of means from necessity of precept: involuntary omission does not excuse from necessity of means; it excuses from necessity of precept.

Necessity of means is present more strictly when the matter of the necessary thing can be supplied by no act, no disposition. A necessity of this kind is said to be of means, in reality: thus baptism for infants dying without the use of reason. But if God admits that the necessary thing can be supplied by a formal or virtual intention which is contained in some act, the thing is said to be necessary by necessity of means in desire. Thus baptism can be supplied by an act of perfect charity, for adults who do not have the occasion of baptism, or who are ignorant of its necessity.

— Now indeed, by necessity of means, God must explicitly be believed as existing and as remunerator; that is, as the Apostle says, Heb. 11, 6, "he who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him." And the reason itself is at hand.

It is altogether necessary that man, insofar as he is to be saved by his own acts, formally conjoin his will with the divine will through charity. But unless I know that God is my good, I shall not be able to affect union with God, which belongs to charity or love. But in the present order, where theological charity is required, knowledge by faith alone avails to introduce charity. Therefore explicit faith in God existing and in God the supernatural remunerator must have preceded the indispensable act of charity.

But the disputed question whether the very existence of some first cause distinct from the world, which is a preamble of faith, can itself at the same time be the object of faith ¹, can be passed over by us. It suffices that we teach with the Apostle (Heb. 11, 6) that supernatural and explicit faith in the existence of God is necessary by necessity of means insofar as He Himself reveals it, and besides in His remunerating providence which He exercises toward us. Now indeed, He does not reveal Himself merely as existing, but as existing either one, omnipotent, provident, as He was revealed to the Jews; or one and triune, the Father, as He is revealed to Christians (St. Thomas, lect. 2 on chapter XI of the Epistle to the Hebrews).

Wherefore, when God is proposed as to be believed as existing, He is at the same time proposed as to be believed either as one in three Persons, or as endowed with attributes whose faith is impeded by no natural evidence.

¹ In the school of St. Thomas, this is commonly denied. Cf. St. Thomas, on chapter XI of the Epistle to the Hebrews, lect. 2 toward the end; C. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, De fide, thesis XI; Van Noort, De virtutibus infusis, p. 240 ff. (ed. 1906).

— Are these other two points to be believed by necessity of means: the Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God? Some think that this explicit faith is required after the promulgation of the Gospel; more deny this, both because such a necessity is demonstrated from no revealed source, and because that faith is not per se required for an act of perfect charity, and because it seems more consonant with the salvific will of God that He require only that which is, as it were from the nature of the thing, necessary for salvation. Yet because in the Gospel of St. Matthew, last chapter; St. John 3, 16, 18; Acts 4, 12; Rom. 3, 22, faith in Jesus Christ is shown to be a means of justice; because explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity is to be premised to baptism, the opinion of Suarez (De fide, d. 12, s. 4, nn. 18, 19) and Lugo (De fide, d. 12, nn. 106, 107) seems to be preferred, according to whom this faith is necessary, like baptism itself, in reality, or in desire. And so a positive disposition to first sanctification is not present in the adult except because in his act of charity there is contained the desire of believing these things explicitly. Wherefore, even after justification, he preserves the obligation of believing those two points explicitly as soon as he can, just as he preserves the obligation of receiving the sacrament of baptism.

Thence also it is clear why the necessity of means concerning these two points cannot be gathered from this 64th proposition condemned by Innocent XI: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ" (Denz., n. 1214).

— Necessity of precept, as such, denotes a mere condition required for attaining the end ¹, that is, the material observance of the thing commanded is not necessary as a means, but this alone is required, that our will be formally conformed with the divine will and so remain in charity.

But that formal conformity is indicated from conscience (cf. I, 338, 339), and hence cannot be destroyed by inculpable ignorance of precepts.

Now indeed, among the duties of the Christian state this is repeated: that the Christian religion be known as to substance, and that the common duties of Christians not be unknown. And because these are contained in the following documents, these documents are to be known under grave obligation, not indeed, at least per se, so that they can be recited, but at least in a coarse way and as to substance:

a) The Apostles' Creed, except, however, the perpetual virginity of Mary, the burial of Christ, and His descent into hell, which, as being secondary, are to be known under slight obligation; except also the name of Pontius Pilate and the circumstance of the third day as to the resurrection, which may be unknown without punishment.

The sitting at the right hand of the Father and the communion of Saints are to be known insofar as they denote the glorious reign of Christ in the heavens, and the beatitude which the Saints participate with Him.

b) The precepts of the Decalogue and those precepts of the Church which affect all;

c) The sacraments most necessary: baptism, eucharist, penance; others, when one wishes to receive them;

d) The Lord's Prayer: insofar as this at least must be known, that all goods are to be asked from God as from a Father;

e) The acts of faith, hope, charity, contrition, so that the faithful can elicit these.

¹ "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments." But beware lest you infer from this that the good works of the just, among which the free fulfillment of the commandments is eminent, are not at the same time meritorious causes of eternal life.

Corollaries. — 1. Considering the probable obligation of means of knowing the four points:

a) A healthy man, ignorant of these, can be baptized or absolved before he has distinctly believed these things at the suggestion of the minister or confessor: for example, by making the sign of the cross with the unlearned man, let the minister explain the individual words. Yet it is not necessary that he already be able to recite these from memory, but he is to be admonished concerning the obligation of knowing and better learning them, according to his capacity.

b) Even in dying barbarians, as far as can be done, actual faith in these mysteries is to be obtained; but if this cannot be obtained, they will only be baptized and absolved conditionally.

— 2. Considering the moral incapacity of the unlearned to know otherwise the things which are commanded to be known, it must be inculcated with all force that they learn the same things by memory and accurately. Nor can they neglect that without at least venial fault. Yet there are not lacking, at least in certain regions, unlearned persons who are excused by their very incapacity to grasp and retain these things. But they are less excused, or rather are inexcusable, who, learned in other matters, do not care about knowing religion.

— 3. Considering the good of souls for which he must provide, a pastor sins gravely who neglects to teach children and the faithful the things which they ought to know under grave obligation.

4. Considering his office as minister of the sacrament, the confessor ought to teach those things which here and now are necessary so that the sacrament of penance can be received with fruit; but considering the duty of charity, for fulfilling which he has an easy occasion, the confessor ought to indicate some means by which the penitent can dissipate his excessive ignorance: as, for example, that he procure and read for himself a little book in which these things are clearly set forth; that he hear them from a person who is related, friendly, and competent; that he assist at a sacred function under which catechesis is handed down to the people.

5. Today they exercise a most opportune work of spiritual mercy who, whether alone or gathered together, strive industriously to propagate the knowledge of religion.

— I. Object and necessity of the act of faith. All things which God has revealed are to be believed at least implicitly, lest, derogating from the first truth in some point, we place the false opinion of our own mind before divine authority, and no longer believe anything on account of God's authority alone. Some revealed things are to be believed explicitly also by necessity of means; others, by necessity of precept alone; others, by no necessity. That has necessity of means whose influence is required so that man may attain that proportion toward his end which by God's ordination he ought to have: wherefore it is said to be necessary from the nature of the thing; whatever is required by law has necessity of precept. Involuntary omission excuses from no necessity of means, but indeed excuses from necessity of precept. Moreover, necessity of means can be stricter, in reality, when it is supplied by no act or disposition; and broader, or in desire, when it can be supplied by a formal or virtual intention contained in some other act: thus an act of perfect charity can supply baptism for those who are ignorant of its necessity or lack its occasion.

II. What things, by what necessity, are to be believed. 1. By necessity of means, God must explicitly be believed as existing and as remunerator (Heb. 11, 6); it is disputed whether the Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God also must be believed by necessity of means. The opinion of Suarez and Lugo is to be preferred, who affirm necessity of means, in reality or in desire, concerning this faith.

2. By necessity of precept, the Christian religion is to be known as to substance. Wherefore, the principal points of the Apostles' Creed are to be believed explicitly; and the precepts of the Decalogue and the common precepts of the Church are to be known; the sacraments most necessary; the Lord's Prayer; acts of faith, hope, charity, contrition. Per se it is not required that the formulas can be recited.

— The internal act of faith can sometimes become necessary from faith itself, or per se; sometimes from another virtue, or by accident. And the 1st proposition was condemned by Alexander VII and proposition 16 by Innocent XI, which denied that there exists an obligation per se (Denz., nn. 1101, 1166).

— I. From the very virtue of faith, or per se:

1. Children instructed in a Christian manner, when they have attained the perfect use of reason, as if spontaneously believe the mysteries of faith proposed to them, and they ought actually to believe the mysteries whose explicit faith is known by them to be necessary for salvation.

2. Adult unbelievers or non-Catholics, when the Catholic truth has been sufficiently proposed to them, ought actually to believe it. As long as it is held as merely probable, they have this obligation alone: of praying and proceeding in their investigation. For the act of faith supposes and requires a certain knowledge of truth. In what way grace or supernatural illumination is useful or necessary for procuring this very certitude is explained in the school of dogma. - But concerning the reason by which proposition 4 was condemned by Innocent XI, "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity," this was said in fundamental theology, n. 155 b. Wherefore we confess that we do not see how some impose the obligation of embracing, at the hour of death, the more probable religion, if this requires an act of faith firm above all things. - The grace of God will loose that knot otherwise.

3. Those who have fallen into heresy or apostasy, in order that they may repair the injury done to God, ought to elicit an act of faith.

4. When a temptation against faith is urgent, the difficulty objected is generally not to be examined, but rather the mind is to turn itself to other objects. Then, when the storm has been calmed, concerning the occasion of doubt, if it was specious, a learned confessor or another man can be asked, indeed sometimes ought to be asked, with consideration had of the danger of a new temptation. But to elicit with a peaceful mind a simple, general act of faith, without examination, will for the most part help in the temptation itself. They say that the same is necessary if the temptation could not otherwise be conquered: but in what way will this be established?

5. Faith is sometimes to be cultivated in life by its very acts. They are accustomed to ask how often. And some answered for a monthly obligation, others for an annual obligation, others for a lesser obligation, so that Innocent XI condemned proposition 17: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life" (Denz., n. 1167). - To define theoretically the commanded frequency is impassable to us: the use of faith ought to be frequent enough that man not be placed in proximate danger of losing it. But a definition of the necessary frequency is practically useless. For since the acts suffice which we called quasi-virtual, and necessary occasions of such acts abound in Christian life, from the very precepts of the Church which impose hearing Mass, confession of sins, and reception of the Eucharist, all who obey the Church satisfy most amply the precept of eliciting an act of faith; but the less pious, who neglect all these things, will not advert to this obligation.

Therefore it remains that with fervent exhortation we exhort Christians to direct their life according to the precepts and counsels of faith, and that we more often, even in confession, stir the same to the daily recitation of the acts of faith, hope, and charity: which use is most salutary.

— II. From a positive precept or from another virtue, or by accident, faith ought actually to be exercised:

1. As often as an exterior profession of faith is to be made.

2. When another virtue which presupposes faith is to be exercised: for example, when an act of hope, charity, or penance is to be elicited. While that act is made, at the same time the article which pertains to that virtue is implicitly believed. This implicit act is sufficient.

3. If an urgent temptation against another virtue cannot otherwise be overcome. How this is ever established does not appear.

— When the act of faith must be elicited. 1. From the very virtue of faith, or per se, the internal act of faith must be elicited: a) by children after they have attained the perfect use of reason; - b) by adult unbelievers or non-Catholics, when the Catholic truth has been sufficiently proposed to them; - c) by those who have slipped into heresy or apostasy, as a necessary part of necessary conversion; - d) for overcoming a temptation against faith, if, however, the act is a necessary means; - e) sometimes in life. How often? We cannot define this theoretically; practically it is not useful, since pious men abundantly satisfy the precept, but the less pious do not care about that obligation. Yet a greater frequency of acts will be very opportunely recommended to these.

2. By accident, the act of faith obliges: a) when an exterior profession of faith is to be made; - b) when another virtue which presupposes faith is to be exercised; - c) if an urgent temptation against another virtue cannot otherwise be overcome.

— 1. By leading a Christian life, the faithful person in reality sufficiently signifies his faith and makes that profession of it which is called material.

2. From c. 1325 § 1: "The faithful of Christ are bound openly to profess the faith, whenever their silence, evasiveness, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor."

Therefore: formal profession, by the law of nature, is to be made when, unless it were made, great honor due to God or great utility to be procured for the neighbor would be withdrawn, privatively or contrarily. - Privatively, I say, if for that reason great honor of God, or great utility of the neighbor, would cease; which case will be rare. Contrarily, if, because of the omitted profession of faith, God would be affected by injury, the neighbor would suffer grave detriment: for example, religion would be contemned, the neighbor would thereby be turned away from conversion. Charity then commands the profession; indeed faith itself does so, if the detriment would be to faith itself.

Therefore, as often as silence or evasiveness would be equivalent to denial, or would denote fear or inconstancy or shame, faith is to be professed by us, lest we fall into that saying: "He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed when he shall come in his majesty" (Luke 9, 26. From the parallel place itself, Matt. 10, 33, it appears that there is question of shame which is morally equivalent to denial). Wherefore, to signify that necessity of fortitude, the Christian to be confirmed is anointed with sacred chrism on the raised forehead. Cf. Lugo, De fide, d. 14, n. 377. To manifest mere fear is not of itself grave, contrary to giving an indication of denial or inconstancy.

Wherefore they regularly judge that an answer is to be given with open profession of faith to a public authority questioning concerning religion, at least if the legal order is observed by the one questioning. Cf. proposition 18a condemned by Innocent XI: "If anyone is questioned by public authority, I counsel that he ingenuously confess the faith as glorious to God and to faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful per se" (Denz., n. 1168). For if the law itself has forbidden inquiries into matters of conscience, it will be enough to decline an answer for this reason. And a private man who asks about religion can also be repelled.

This doctrine is confirmed by the cited c. 1325 § 1.

— By ecclesiastical law (cc. 1106-1408), a contrary custom being reprobated, the following must personally and according to the formula approved by the Apostolic See (such as is exhibited at the beginning of the Code) profess the faith:

1. Before the presiding officer, or his delegate: all who are present at a council or synod, even with merely consultative vote; but the presiding officer before the same council or synod;

2. Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the first Cardinals in the order of priests and of deacons, and the Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church: those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity;

3. Before one delegated by the Apostolic See: those promoted to an episcopal See, even non-residential, or to the government of an abbacy or prelature nullius, of an Apostolic vicariate, or of an Apostolic prefecture;

4. Before the cathedral chapter: the capitular Vicar;

5. Before the Ordinary of the place, or his delegate, and before the chapter: those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry;

6. Before the Ordinary of the place, or his delegate, and before the other consultors: those assumed to the office of diocesan consultors;

7. Before the Ordinary of the place, or his delegate: the Vicar general, pastors, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual benefices, having the care of souls; the rector, professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in a seminary, at the beginning of each scholastic year, or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books ex officio in diocesan curias (c. 1393); priests destined for receiving confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices;

8. Before the Ordinary or his delegate: the rector of a University or Faculty; but before the rector of the University or Faculty, or his delegate: all professors in a University or Faculty canonically erected, at the beginning of each scholastic year, or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination, are endowed with academic degrees;

9. Before the chapter or the Superior who nominated them, or their delegate: Superiors in clerical religious institutes.

N. B. "Those who, after relinquishing the former office, obtain another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again emit the profession of faith" (c. 1406 § 2).

Although c. 1406 now imposes the direct obligation of professing the faith, nevertheless from the old law it can still be said that the Superiors before whom the profession is to be emitted are primarily held by the obligation of seeing to it that the promise of faith be made (Genicot, 197; Arregui, n. 121). Indeed if they themselves refuse to receive the profession of faith, the subjects will be excused by impossibility.

— From the response of the Holy Office, 22 March 1918, the abjurations of modernism prescribed by the decrees of Pius X continue in force until the Holy See shall determine otherwise. Wherefore, the profession of faith having been premised, the following must abjure modernism and hand over the signed formula of the oath:

To the ordaining Bishop: those to be ordained in sacred orders, at least before the subdiaconate; - to the approving Ordinary: future confessors and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices (but not when the faculty is prolonged for them); - to the nominating Ordinary: pastors, canons, beneficiaries before entering upon possession of the benefice, and consequently as often as they accede to a new benefice; Lenten preachers; - to the Ordinary of the place or to the Cardinal Prefect or Secretary: officials of the episcopal curia, not excepting the Vicar general; of ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the judges; of the Roman Congregations; - to the nominating Superior or chapter: moderators of religious Families and Congregations, before they enter upon the office, and consequently as often as they undertake a new office; - to their own superior: doctors, or lectors, in seminaries and religious institutes, each year, before beginning the lectures. - This obligation primarily affects Superiors: they ought to call those bound to fulfill the obligation. Those who are unwilling to swear are to be reported to the Holy Office at once.

(These things are gathered both from the Motu Proprio, 1 September 1910, and from various declarations of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, 25 September, 25 October, 17 December 1910. - All are proposed in our Periodica, t. 5 and 6).

You ask whether the profession of faith through the formula of Pius IV, with the definitions of the Vatican Council added, must necessarily be premised to the abjuration of modernism.

There is no doubt that this is laudably done. Yet since in the Motu Proprio itself of 1 September 1910 the profession of faith is distinguished from the formula of the oath, and the Code c. 1406 defines by whom and when the profession of faith is to be made, this profession does not seem strictly to be appended to the abjuration, except when the profession of faith itself is prescribed by the Code. Besides, only the oath is mentioned in the declarations of 25 September 1910, by which annual abjuration is prescribed for Doctors who, from the earlier Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, had to swear only at the beginning of their office (Cf. Per., V, 200 and 229).

— In no case, whether by voice or by nod, is it lawful exteriorly to deny the faith.

But when profession is not prescribed, it is per se lawful, and sometimes expedient, to conceal the faith, and consequently to do so honestly and without a lie: as if, hidden among heretics or unbelievers, you could accomplish more good, or if more evil is to be feared from confession: disturbances, killings, the exasperation of a tyrant, danger of defection under tortures. Hence voluntarily to offer oneself to the persecutor is for the most part rash. - Nor must one per se obey a general edict by which the faithful are commanded to betray themselves, except, as has just been said, if he who does not appear is commonly regarded as an apostate. Nor is anyone forbidden to obtain by money that no inquiry be made concerning his faith. Much less does he deny the faith, but rather confesses it, who flees persecution. But the pastor must examine what is more advisable for the good of souls: either by the example of fearless confession, or at least by his presence, to confirm the others; or, on the contrary, to withdraw himself for a time so that from a safe place he may administer the territory and reserve himself for the good of more persons.

— It is no more permitted by clothing than by words or by another sign to profess superstition, or adherence to a condemned sect. Wherefore it is not lawful to use clothing which, neither of itself nor from the circumstances, has another immediate signification. But if the immediate signification is diverse, or this is ambiguous or twofold, there will be place for the prudent use of the principle concerning double effect.

Hence they distinguish sacred clothing from profane; among profane clothing, some garments which, as Lehmkuhl says, I, 405, by showing the inhabitants of an unbelieving region, materially distinguish unbelievers from the faithful; others which bear signs for recognizing unbelievers, and by which therefore unbelievers are formally distinguished from the faithful: as the distinctive garments of the Jews were in the City and in Poland. A graver cause indeed is required for using these latter than for the former profane garments. Yet the wearing of such clothing carries another explanation than apostasy. Wherefore only the garments which are used in superstitious functions fall under a sufficiently absolute prohibition, unless a different explanation is positively present.

Lehmkuhl, l. c., and also Genicot, I, 197, assimilate Masonic insignia to garments of sacred use. But we would wish this also to be understood prudently, when they certainly show adherence to a condemned sect. For garments, since in themselves they are indifferent things, easily have an uncertain signification. What, for example, if, to deceive Freemasons, many others momentarily adopt those signs so that true sectarians are not distinguished from false ones; what if, in a city where he is unknown, some traveler, without any scandal, wears the insignia so that he may observe the sectarians; what if, in a dangerous hour, when life is to be feared for, an unknown Catholic, not specially asked to manifest adherence by this sign, protects himself with those insignia in order to flee persecution? Does not the signification become ambiguous from the circumstances themselves, and consequently will it not be able to be tolerated for a proportionate cause?

This is the rule. The less the signification is definite of itself, the more easily, from the circumstances themselves, it is rendered uncertain. Genicot himself, I, 197, whom others follow, allows that whether to deceive them, or to obtain their benevolence, you may use gestures by which sectarians recognize one another, "because it does not seem equivalent to a profession of the sect."

— Since the eating of meats of itself says no profession of religion, and for various causes meats are eaten even by Catholics on a day of abstinence, it is altogether lawful, for declining grave danger - not however for fleeing mockery ¹ - to dissemble the faith by eating meats. Indeed, to avoid rashness, this per se is to be done. Except if that eating is demanded in hatred of the faith. Then, without protestation, they cannot be eaten. Suppose it to be established by the guests that he who is an enemy of Catholicism should eat meats: it would not be lawful to eat them unless by protesting the faith.

Nor otherwise, if in conversation someone presents you as an adversary of the faith, could you be silent, unless your whole bearing betrayed a different cause of silence.

¹ According to the cause or form of mockery, that shame could be opposed to faith or to religion.

Illicit Concealment. — Because faith must sometimes be professed, every concealment of faith which betrays the shame concerning which the Lord says in the Gospel is to be condemned: "He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words: of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty and that of the Father and of the holy angels" (Luke 9, 26). Nor is it lawful to receive into the Church someone who would wish to be merely a hidden Christian through his whole life. But the circumstances can be such that even a merely individual exterior profession would give occasion to excessive evil; indeed, that the public good would command silence. As long as such circumstances remain, it will be lawful to be a hidden Christian and to satisfy the debt of Christian profession through a posthumous revelation, committed to a trustworthy man, as soon as this can be done without common or prevailing harm.

— I. Besides the material profession of faith which a Christian life led entails, formal profession is to be made: 1. by the law of nature, when it is required lest God be deprived of great honor or the neighbor of great utility; much more lest God be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave harm. The obligation is of charity, indeed of faith, if the detriment to be avoided would be of faith. Therefore as often as silence or evasiveness would be an indication of denial or inconstancy, faith is to be professed: this regularly happens when public authority, the legal order being observed, asks about religion (cf. c. 1325, § 1); - 2. by ecclesiastical law, a contrary custom being reprobated, those indicated in c. 1406 must personally profess the faith. Moreover, from the response of the Holy Office, 22 March 1918, the abjurations of modernism prescribed by Pius X continue in force until the Holy See shall determine otherwise. The profession of faith must be placed before these abjurations, whenever c. 1406 commands it to be made.

II. It is never lawful exteriorly to deny the faith; to conceal it is per se lawful and sometimes expedient. Wherefore it would be wrong to use garments which neither of themselves nor from the circumstances had another immediate signification than that of superstition. If the signification were ambiguous, the principles concerning double effect will have to be applied prudently. Nearly the same is to be said concerning Masonic insignia. Unless the eating of meats is demanded in hatred of the faith, to dissemble the faith by eating meats is not forbidden. - But, on the other hand, it is not lawful for one converted to the faith to conceal his conversion perpetually, at least from a private cause: he would sin against the obligation of professing the faith.

— Infidelity designates the state of him who does not believe, with an assent of faith at least implicit, the things which have been revealed by God so that they may be believed by him.

With an assent of faith, I say, because an inferior adherence, if there is any, by no means suffices, nor can it in any way supply for the assent of faith.

With an assent at least implicit: because very many, not to say all, of the faithful lack an adequate knowledge of revealed religion; and very many implicitly believe what they explicitly deny: as happened, before the defined dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and Pontifical Infallibility, to those who in good faith denied each truth. And because of their implicit faith, those who mix revealed and non-revealed things in a manner even culpable are very improperly called unbelievers (Cf. Billot, De Fide, before thesis XXIV).

The things which have been revealed so that they may be believed by him: because a revelation not universal, such as that of the Old Law, did not have to be positively believed by one who was not a Jew (Cf. Billot, p. 348, before thesis XXIV). Say the same concerning private revelations of others.

— Infidelity is distinguished as negative and privative. Negative is that of him to whom the truth of faith has not been sufficiently proposed - and this without his fault; privative, or culpable, can be merely privative or indirectly contrary to faith, and directly contrary. Merely privative infidelity, although culpable, does not exclude the will of believing what is sufficiently proposed by God. Wherefore it can be composed with the formal object of faith; it is not directly opposed to faith so that it takes away the habit of faith. Directly contrary infidelity is repugnant to the formal object of faith. For it is an unwillingness to believe the things which are sufficiently proposed as revealed: whether, after one has recognized the credibility, he nevertheless was unwilling to command the act of faith; or whether he impeded the very proposition of the truth, unwilling in any case to believe; or whether he pertinaciously rejected the proposition of truth through the Church.

Now he refuses to believe who deliberately doubts, and consequently has as doubtful or uncertain what is divinely revealed and to be believed.

As opposed to the formal motive itself of the virtue, or of faith considered according to its primary and principal act, this infidelity is a grave sin in its whole genus, and necessarily draws with itself the loss of the infused habit of faith.

Affected ignorance of the motives of credibility, if it is dictated by fear lest you have to believe, is not contrary infidelity.

Various Opinions. — Infidelity, etymologically, designates the state of him who is not faithful. Because, in the present order, faith is due to every man, every infidelity can be called privative. Thus Coninck, apud Lugo, d. 18, n. 4.

Nevertheless most, even in the present state, distinguish a certain negative infidelity from privative. They understand this distinction in different ways. For some, thus the Salmanticenses, tr. 21, c. 3, n. 1, admit only a two-membered division, while most separate privative from contrary infidelity. But others, as Struggl, tr. 4, q. 2, n. 1, understand privative infidelity to be the voluntary omission of the assent of faith in him to whom faith, or an article of faith, has been sufficiently proposed (Struggl thinks this is not exclusive of the habit of faith previously infused, while Ballerini, Opus theol., tr. 5, n. 73, on the contrary, opines otherwise); but positive or contrary infidelity they say is a positive assent contrary or contradictory to true faith.

Suarez, d. 16, sect. I, n. 7, recognizes privative infidelity in men to whom the true faith has not yet been proposed: this sin is committed through negligence alone and is opposed to the precept of hearing the faith; it is negligence in seeking and investigating a sufficient proposition of faith. Whereas by being unwilling to believe the things heard, contrary infidelity is committed.

Lugo, d. 18, n. 3, defines the proper sin of infidelity as "that which from its object is so opposed to actual faith that, as long as it is not retracted, the man cannot have the will of believing by a true and proper act of faith." Therefore it is only an unwillingness to believe opposed to sufficiently proposed faith. Wherefore the will, even gravely sinful, by which someone would be unwilling to hear the faith and Christian doctrine, would not yet be the proper sin of infidelity, because, with that will, there could stand an efficacious will of believing most firmly the revelation, as often as it was sufficiently proposed.

— Contrary infidelity is customarily distinguished as threefold: either that of him who has never received the Christian faith, and it is paganism (under which name Islamism is then also contained); or that of him who received that faith in type, and it is Judaism; or that of him who received the Christian faith in baptism, and it is heresy or apostasy. Yet apostasy signifies a more complete withdrawal from the Christian faith. But so that the infidelity may be contrary, it is necessary that the pagan, the Jew, or the one enrolled in heresy have resisted the truth sufficiently proposed.

On Heresy. — Heresy, in the broadest signification, is an erroneous judgment against faith, committed by him who has received the baptismal character.

By that erroneous judgment, what is false or doubtful is pronounced concerning something which, as revealed by God, he himself must believe: whether it has been proposed by the Church, or not.

Wherefore heresy so accepted is divided into heresy of the forum of God alone and heresy of the exterior forum, or canonical heresy. The former is merely internal heresy, or even exterior heresy, but one regarding revealed truths which have not been proposed by the Church: whether they are in the revealed sources but not yet authentically defined, or whether they have been privately revealed. The latter, or canonical heresy, is committed through external withdrawal from the social magisterium divinely constituted for the authentic proposition of revelation (Cf. Billot, De Fide, at thesis XXIV). This is heresy properly so called, whether it takes place through adherence to a sect separated from the Church, or through full repudiation of Christian revelation (which more strictly is called apostasy), or through the denied assent of faith even to one article which the Church has proposed as a dogma of faith.

Each heresy, both that more broadly and that more properly so called, can be material and formal. Material heresy is that of one erring without pertinacity, without judgment of credibility, and without a will averse from the formal object of faith; formal heresy is that of one erring pertinaciously either concerning some other revealed thing or concerning the authority of the Church; that is, of one erring with a will averse from the formal object of faith, or unwilling to believe what has been sufficiently proposed to him as revealed, or even what would be sufficiently proposed. Hence, c. 1325, § 2: "After baptism has been received, if anyone, retaining the Christian name, pertinaciously denies any of the truths to be believed by divine and Catholic faith or doubts concerning it, he is a heretic; if he totally withdraws from the Christian faith, he is an apostate..."

In the canonical forum, all are presumed formally heretics who knowingly withdraw from the authority of the Church proposing dogma. But the proposition can be made either by the solemn definition of an ecumenical Council or of the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, or by the ordinary and universal magisterium. For: "c. 1323, § 1. All those things are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the written or handed-down word of God and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed. § 2. To pronounce a solemn judgment of this sort belongs both to an Ecumenical Council and to the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra."

Corollaries. — 1. Canonically, a heretic is one who externally indicates as false or doubtful what is proposed by the Church to be believed; or what is undoubtedly believed by the faithful to be contained in Scripture. For the Church proposes the whole of Scripture to be believed.

2. Canonically, he also is a heretic today who, being ignorant of what the Church says is to be believed, utters these words: "Whatever the Church holds concerning this point, I deny it." For by these words he denies the infallibility of the Church, which is a defined dogma.

3. He is a heretic only before God, and consequently immune from censures, who by a merely internal act rejects an article defined by the Church: for example, the Most Holy Trinity; or who even externally denies what he falsely thinks has been defined by the Church: for example, that the Blessed Virgin was virginally conceived by her mother.

4. He is not a heretic who, after hearing some proposition of dogma, turns his mind away and abstains from judgment. Yet he will easily be a heretic before God, insofar as the reason for his silence is this: that, notwithstanding the definition, he virtually esteems the matter doubtful. He who labors under affected ignorance, whether concerning the authority of the Church or concerning an article defined by the Church, insofar as he rejects investigation, will be before God a heretic or not according to the interpretation of his will, which could have been that of believing if he knew the article to be revealed, and consequently merely of fleeing a sufficient proposition, or that of not believing in any case.

5. He who through gravely culpable ignorance or neglected investigation denies what the Church in reality has defined is not formally a heretic, since pertinacity is lacking. Indeed he can be called materially a heretic only improperly, since he preserves the rule of faith and continues to belong to the very body of the Church. Cf. Billot, De fide, before thesis XXIV, p. 348.

6. Heresies among themselves, as such, do not differ in species; neither do heresy and apostasy; nor contrary infidelities. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 413.

7. He who says: "If the Church were to define some such thing, manifestly absurd, I would not believe it," is not a heretic, because he does not act against conscience, unless he wished to affirm that it could happen that the Church define some such thing: which is not to be presumed. Cf. concerning a similar case, Lugo, De fide, d. 17, n. 83; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 91.

Wherefore those who are anxiously troubled about suggestions of this kind can easily be calmed, but they are to be dissuaded from imagining cases of this kind. But the response which such a suggestion manifestly deserves is this: The Church will propose nothing absurd to be believed.

8. He is not a heretic who only exteriorly denies the faith or adores an idol. For he himself does not err. Nor does he incur censures, although in the external forum he is to be regarded as a heretic.

Scholia. — 1. In a man not baptized, the act of faith is necessary so that he may be informed by the infused virtue of faith. Wherefore, whether in a culpable or inculpable way the judgment of credibility is lacking to him, the faith necessary for salvation is wanting in him. But he who, even unconsciously, for example in baptism, has received habitual faith will not be despoiled of this without a will formally contrary to faith. Therefore habitual faith is more easily preserved by an adult than it is acquired.

2. Since, in order that you may elicit an act of faith, to the judgment of credendity there must accede a free act of the will commanding the act of faith, it can happen that someone recognizes the truth of religion, yet refuses to believe, and thus becomes formally a heretic. This formal heresy at the same time contains a great sin of pride, by which someone rejects a supernatural vocation, or is unwilling to subject himself to the authority divinely constituted, or (which seems scarcely possible) is unwilling to believe God whom he knows as revealing.

To deny faith to a truth which is known as revealed is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is rarely committed; but if it is committed, it will also obscure the judgment of credendity. For the most part, however, the very judgment of credibility is absent from the non-believer, or has been destroyed in him. Therefore most unbelievers are guilty of neglected diligence in seeking out the truth, or they have a judgment clouded by passions. But such persons are not formally heretics in the forum of God.

3. They are accustomed to ask whether, without the formal sin of heresy, some Catholic can come to persuasion concerning the falsity of the Catholic Church or of Christian revelation, or whether a formal sin against faith must always precede that apostasy. The matter is disputed.

That "those who have received the faith under the magisterium of the Church can never have any just cause of changing or of calling the same faith into doubt" was defined by the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2 (Denz., n. 1612). But this definition can be restricted to an objectively just cause. Wherefore, after Tanner, De Fide, q. 2, dub. 5, n. 139; Platelius, De Fide, n. 61; Tanquerey, n. 659, thinks that it can happen per accidens that, without a formal sin against faith, imprudence may lead a Catholic to unbelief; indeed he seems to deny the necessity of grave fault itself. Aertnijs-Damen, n. 323, Quaer. 3, concedes the same, abstracting from the gravity of the sin, and alleging Pesch, De Fide, n. 383.

We think that a distinction must be made between doubt and contrary persuasion. That someone, because of objective imprudences of readings and conversations, and because of a less pure life, can come to a state of doubting and of a certain rather universal skepticism, we judge must be conceded; but that someone, without violence done to his own intellect, or without an internal lie which almost necessarily contains contempt of divine authority and consequently the formal sin of heresy, should come to contrary persuasion: this seems to us psychologically impossible. For this seems too much to be repugnant to the force of the arguments for faith and to the testimony of the soul naturally Christian.

Nor, in a man instructed in a Catholic manner and taught concerning his duties, do we think it must be affirmed that this can happen without grave sin.

— This is noteworthy today, because of the subtle investigations which are being made concerning the salvation and psychology of non-Catholics: according to the opinion of C. de Lugo, ibid. n. 200-201, from formal heresy or contrary infidelity there can be excused a man who, from culpable ignorance, yet is truly persuaded that no church, but only private revelation, is to be believed, provided that he preserves the will of believing God as often as His revelation is evidently credible; indeed even one who considers any revelation of God impossible. Such a man certainly cannot elicit an act of faith; yet he can have a conditioned will of believing God if God could reveal something to men. For by this will he is not injurious to the divine veracity. Wherefore, although he is not a Catholic or faithful person absolutely, if he had faith infused in baptism, he has not for that reason lost it, and can be called a Catholic or faithful person conditionally, because of that will. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, l. c. n. 94. But these things, as is clear, are not to be proposed everywhere to the faithful.

— He who has been instructed in a non-Catholic sect does not necessarily lack the supernatural virtue of faith; and, as long as he does not doubt, he is only materially a heretic, is bound by no special obligation, nor is he truly excommunicable. - If he seriously doubts, he ought to inquire; but if he has culpably neglected this, whether through carelessness, or levity of soul, or fear of discovering the truth and apprehension of the difficult duty which would follow from it, he will indeed sin, and per se gravely, against faith, but only privatively, not yet contrarily through heresy. - He will then only be formally a heretic if he neglects inquiry because he absolutely refuses to embrace Catholic truth, even if he recognized it. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 425, 2.

Although, however, in soul, or because of good faith, he is Catholic, nevertheless one enrolled in a heretical sect cannot be admitted to the sacraments before, after the errors have been rejected, he has been reconciled to the Church. This is expressly established by canon 731, § 2, so that the more benign opinion which Laymann, l. 2, t. 1, c. 13, n. 2, and after him Busenbaum, De praec. Fidei, dub. 3, Resolves 5, and Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 97, held concerning the unlearned can no longer be admitted. Yet the severity is tempered in danger of life, in the manner which will be stated; nor is it to be applied to those who wish to come to the Church at an age at which formal abjuration is not yet required by the Church, that is, who have not yet completed fourteen years from birth (S. Off., Nov. 1878, Coll. P. F., 1st ed. n. 660; 8 March 1882, Coll., 1st ed. n. 1680; 2nd ed. n. 1566).

Observe how differently Catholics and most non-Catholics stand when they doubt in the matter of faith or religion. Indeed, not only to cast off faith but even to have it as doubtful is lawful for neither without sin; but doubt concerning the Church, or concerning her authentic magisterium, or concerning an article proposed by the Church, is already, for a Catholic faithful person, doubt concerning faith; while for a non-Catholic of the Protestant Reformation, since, the authentic magisterium being excluded, he admits private interpretation of Sacred Scripture, doubt concerning his church or concerning a point as contained in Sacred Scripture is not yet doubt concerning faith. Now indeed from our human conclusions there is by no means excluded a reason for doubting, which, when there is question of the assent of faith, can never be had. Wherefore, when doubt has arisen concerning the truth of their sect, non-Catholics themselves are logically led to an examination whose fruit, with the help of the grace of God, if serious effort is applied, will easily be recognition of the true Church and conversion.

— Heresy, apostasy, and heresies among themselves do not differ in species; nor do sects, insofar as they err; yet they differ insofar as they exercise diverse superstitions contrary to the virtue of religion, or are insulting to God in diverse ways. Wherefore he who has culpably adhered to a sect must indicate that sect, if, however, he ever thought about those diverse malices ¹.

¹ Already from the fact that it is exercised by non-Catholics as such, divine worship becomes illegitimate (Lehmkuhl, Casus, I, 443). Yet I would not call this superstitious. These things therefore must be distinguished.

— Conversion of a person per se says the will of directing oneself wholly toward one end or term. Therefore the fuller the aberration was, the stricter is the conversion of him who, error having been laid aside, embraces the truth. Hence he who, ignorant of God, cared only for temporal things, is converted most fully when he begins to live for God. A pagan is converted more fully than a Mohammedan or a Jew: these are converted insofar as they intend to serve Christ or to glorify Christ in all things; a Mohammedan or a Jew is converted more fully than a heretic, who only has to convert himself to the Church.

Moreover, for receiving a heterodox person into the bosom of the Church, these things are to be done in order:

1. He is to be instructed in the faith.

2. If, because he was not baptized or received a baptism certainly null, baptism is to be conferred absolutely, no abjuration of heresy is required. If baptism is not to be repeated except perhaps conditionally, first a formal abjuration of the sect and profession of faith is to be made according to the formula which in the City is handed down by the Holy Office, outside the City by the Ordinary. The Ordinary of the place can permit that it be done not publicly but privately before two witnesses. (The minister can be one of the two.)

3. After the profession has been made, if the case demands it, baptism is administered under condition. Sacramental accusation, by which the penitence necessary for baptism is assisted, can be placed before this.

4. Absolution is given, conditioned or absolute, from heresy and connected censures. The form, otherwise not essential, is indicated in the written instruction which the minister will receive.

5. Confession is made, or, if accusation has already been made, it is resumed in a few words, and sacramental absolution is conferred. As is said in the tract on Penance, a probable opinion exempts from complete accusation those whose baptism was truly doubtful, so that with true probability, in the repeated conferral of baptism, the sins prior to it were deleted. Cf. La Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 324; Bucceroni, Theol. moral., III, 672, 672-bis; Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. th., V, 22. Yet the opposite opinion is held by Lehmkuhl, II, 425 sq.; by Noldin, III, 226; by Chr. Pesch, S.I., Prael. Dogm., VII, 394 ss.; by Zitelli, Apparatus, p. II, n. 721 (ed. 1897), etc.

6. If he is an adult, no grave cause standing in the way, let him immediately hear Mass and communicate. Cf. Code c. 753, § 2. (Immediately can be taken morally. A just cause suffices so that this not be done immediately.)

N. B. If any have not completed the age of fourteen years, they are simply admitted, without abjuration, to baptism or other sacraments, and they are not absolved from censures in the external forum.

On Temptations Against Faith. — Properly, only a free faculty is tempted. But it is tempted when it inclines spontaneously, or by an act which is called primo-primus, toward an illicit object. Therefore a temptation against faith is not yet formally had because some difficulty, even without a positive solution, is presented to our intellect; but we begin to be tempted if, because of a difficulty of this kind, the will inclines toward revoking the command by which the most firm assent had been commanded. Therefore those who, from a difficulty of this kind, are cast into fear concerning their faith are by no means actually tempted, since fear rather betrays affection for faith.

But temptation can be prepared by an intellectual difficulty. But when a true temptation of doubting concerning faith has arisen, he who by a contrary act of the will rejects the inclination to doubt or turns the mind away himself merits; he who in a semi-conscious way favors it sins venially; he who assents to it by deliberate doubt or denial becomes gravely guilty of a sin against faith by which faith itself is lost. Nor is it lawful to tolerate that inclination in the will as if by bearing oneself neutrally; but we must positively cast it away, because tolerance of a motion of the will makes that same motion deliberate. Cf. I, n. 72, 2.

He to whom an article to be believed has been proposed, and who experiences a difficulty concerning it, certainly cannot choose a neutral position, or positively suspend assent, or even deliberately and definitively abstain from an act of faith; but to defer the act of faith until he is better instructed, this is indeed lawful for him.

Order of things to be said. Since we have treated of the virtues in general, it is now necessary to treat of the individual virtues in particular. The theological virtues obtain the primacy among all the virtues, as was proved above, n. 467; and therefore one must first treat of the theological virtues. Among the theological virtues in the order of generation (but not in the order of dignity) the first is the virtue of faith; hence first we shall treat of faith, then of hope, and last of charity. After the treatise on the theological virtues, the treatise on the moral virtues will follow.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 1-16; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. II 1-19; Lugo, Tract. de fide; Billuart, Tract. de fide; Bouquillon, De virtutibus theol., 1890; Schiffini, De virtut. infusis, 1904; Noldin, De praecept. pars I.; Gopfert, Moraltheol. I, §§ 44-48; Mausbach, Moraltheol. II, §§ 3-11.

We divide the treatise on theological faith into three chapters, namely: 1. on the nature of faith, 2. on the necessity of faith, 3. on the vices opposed to faith.

We shall treat of three things in this treatise: 1. the nature of faith; 2. the necessity of faith; 3. the vices and sins opposed to faith.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 1 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, tr. 1; ed. G., I, p. 295; H. Ap., IV, 1; Lugo, de Virt. Fid., disp. XV; Suarez, disp. I and VII; Wilmers, de Fide divina; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., p. 70; Scheeben, Dogmat., I, § 38, etc.

420. Things to be noted beforehand. The name faith signifies assent which is given to another's sayings on account of his authority. If this assent is given on account of the authority of man, it is human faith; if on account of the authority of God, it is divine faith. This, if it is considered in act, is called actual; if in habit, it is called habitual.

DEFINITION. Faith is a theological virtue infused by God, inclining us to assent firmly, on account of divine veracity, to all things which God has revealed, and has proposed to us through the Church as to be believed.

In the definition are expressed: 1. the material object of faith; 2. the formal object of faith; 3. the subject of faith. - A few things concerning each.

421. The primary MATERIAL object of faith is God himself, the highest Truth in being; the secondary object is other truths revealed by God to us. To the point, thus the Vatican Council (Const. Dei Filius, III): "All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed."

The Holy Council says 1. Which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down; both to indicate the twofold font of the whole of revelation, that is, Sacred Scripture and tradition; and to exclude any other revelations whatsoever made to certain Saints, which of themselves cannot become the object of Catholic faith.

2. Proposed by the Church as divinely revealed, to indicate the divinely instituted organ by which alone men can be taught what things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith.¹

3. Which are proposed whether by solemn judgment..., to indicate the extraordinary mode which the Church is accustomed from time to time to use in proposing truths to be believed with divine and Catholic faith; when namely, through the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, or through the episcopate gathered in an ecumenical council, it singularly and determinately defines certain points and enjoins them to be believed. Truths thus solemnly proposed are called defined dogmas of faith, and the contrary and pertinacious error is held as heresy. By the same appellation those truths also are to be denoted which appear immediately contained in Sacred Scripture, for example, Christ's birth in Bethlehem, his agony, scourging, etc.; for these truths also become known through the solemn proposition of the Church, namely through that general proposition by which it defined the whole of Scripture to be divinely inspired.

4. Or by ordinary and universal magisterium, to indicate the ordinary mode which the Church uses in proposing truths of faith: when namely, through its pastors and doctors, it universally affirms that certain truths are revealed by God; although they may have been defined by no decrees of councils or of Roman Pontiffs. And points of faith of this kind must be believed with divine-Catholic faith.

Truths which have been revealed by God in a particular mode are to be believed with faith simply divine; but explicitly by those alone to whom they become known in a certain mode, for example, by that theologian alone who evidently finds the truth in Sacred Scripture, by that person alone who has received the divine revelation (VII, 262).

422. The FORMAL object of faith is the authority of God revealing, who, since he is the highest Truth, can neither be deceived nor deceive. Whence the most holy Vatican Council (l. c.) defined: "faith ... to be a supernatural virtue, by which ... we believe the things revealed by him to be true; not on account of the truth of the things seen through by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive."

From these things you will gather: 1. The assent of faith is formally resolved into the first truth revealing, or the very authority of God revealing (Becanus, de Virt. theol., c. 8, q. 8; Tanquerey, II, 618).

We said: resolved formally; for dispositively, it is resolved into the motives of credibility; directively, into the authority of the Church proposing and deciding what is to be believed; effectively, into God and the infused habit of faith. Cf. n. 423.

2. The knowledge of faith is more certain than any natural knowledge. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 5, a. 8, ad 2).

3. Divine and Catholic faith is necessarily universal, that is, comprising all truths divinely revealed and proposed as such by the Church. The reason is that the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing. Therefore he who knowingly rejects one article of faith, for example the eternity of the punishments of hell, cannot have theological faith as regards the others.

423. The SUBJECT of faith is the intellect, which is moved by the will so that it assents to things to be believed. This is expressed in the definition by these words: inclining us to assent.

Faith is in the intellect as in its subject; but because faith pertains to the intellect according as it is moved by the will, there ought also to be a habit in the will, namely charity, so that the act of faith may be perfect, that is, so that it may proceed connaturally from both powers and be meritorious; not, however, so that it may be perfect in the notion of assent: for to this a firm adhesion of the intellect from the pious motion of the will, without the habit, suffices (Billuart, de Fide, Diss. 3, a. 1).

From the things said, the ACT OF FAITH can be defined: An act by which the intellect, illuminated by God through grace, from the command of the will likewise excited and aided by divine grace, assents to things to be believed.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 3-8; St. Alphonsus, II, 2; VI, 505; H. Ap., IV, n. 3; Billuart, de Fid., disp. 3; Pesch, n. 426-465; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., disp. II, c. V, a. 4; Viva, Thes. damn., P. I, prop. I.

424. Things to be noted beforehand. 1. A twofold necessity as regards salvation is distinguished, one of means, the other of precept: a) That is necessary by necessity of precept which, if omitted inculpably, does not harm salvation, as the real reception of the Eucharist. b) That is necessary by necessity of means without which, even if it is omitted inculpably, in the present order of Providence salvation cannot be obtained.

This necessity of means again is twofold: strict, if it can be supplied by no other means; thus sanctifying grace in the last moment of life is strictly necessary for salvation; broad, however, if another means of supplying is present. Thus, for example, charity can succeed into the place of baptism. Cf. n. 1451.

2. It is certain that HABITUAL FAITH is strictly necessary, by necessity of means, for eternal life. For no one can be saved without infused habitual justice. But the habit of faith is either a part or the foundation of this justice. Therefore. But this faith, in baptized infants and the perpetually insane, suffices for salvation, since it is equally certain that all dying with the grace of baptism become partakers of eternal life (Suarez, disp. 12, s. 1, n. 4).

Therefore the whole question concerns ACTUAL FAITH, and indeed the act of faith both internal and external, with respect to adults who enjoy the use of reason.

The internal act of faith can be either explicit or implicit. It is called explicit when one adheres to a revealed Truth apprehended in its own terms: for example, I believe that Christ is the Incarnate Word. It is called implicit when one adheres to a revealed Truth contained in another Truth apprehended in its proper terms: for example, I believe all things which are proposed by the Church as revealed.

425. PRINCIPLES. I. The internal act of faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. It is established from Scripture (Epistle to the Hebrews 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. And from Trent (Sess. 6, c. 6): "Without faith justification never happens to anyone." God does not justify adults unless through their own acts they tend into him.

Nor does faith in desire, or faith improperly or broadly so called, suffice;¹ for faith properly so called (according to Trent, Sess. 6, c. 8) "is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification," and consequently it presupposes nothing in which its desire would be included. Suarez judges this conclusion so certain (disp. 12, s. 2, n. 101) that he denies it can be rejected without error in faith. Yet from this it cannot be inferred that there are men who are in an impossibility, properly so called, of obtaining salvation. For "to him doing what is in him, God does not deny grace."

Whence St. Thomas (de Verit., XIV, a. 11, ad 1): "If someone," he says, "nurtured in forests or among brute animals..., should follow the guidance of natural reason in desiring good and fleeing evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration the things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius." Cf. St. Alph., Gran mezzo della pregh., P. II, c. 4.

426. II. The act of faith is necessary for all by necessity of precept. It is established from Scripture (Mark 16:16): He that believes not shall be condemned. Likewise from the twofold proposition condemned by Innocent XI, namely the 16th: "Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept, and according to itself"; and the 17th: "It is enough to elicit the act of faith once in life."

This obligation of eliciting the act of faith can be either on account of faith itself or on account of another obligation. Concerning the former St. Alphonsus speaks thus: "It is certain," he says, "that man is bound by the natural law to turn himself to God through faith, hope, and charity, and therefore to elicit acts of those virtues, since each virtue lives by its acts" (II, 6).

Hence the PRECEPT OF FAITH urges: 1. Per se, that is, independently from every other circumstance: a) at the beginning of spiritual life, that is, when someone, for example a boy or a non-Catholic, shall have known both those things which must be believed and the obligation of believing (cf. n. 436); likewise when some truth to be believed is proposed by the Church; b) more often in life, at least once in the year, as Doctors admit with sufficient probability (II, 7); c) in the article or danger of death, as is more commonly taught, because then we are especially bound to tend into God as our ultimate end (II, 5; H. Ap., IV, 13; Conf. dir., IV, 6).

2. Per accidens, that is, from a peculiar circumstance: a) when a grave temptation against faith is pressing, which cannot otherwise be conquered; b) when a precept must be fulfilled which requires faith, for example of penance, of profession of faith, of communion, etc.; c) after a lapse into heresy or faith denied; because the injury inflicted upon the First Truth must be repaired. Thus all (II, 5).

Take note: 1. We are never strictly bound to recite the customary formulas of the act of faith. A man who lives Christianly (at least by fulfilling the paschal precept) sufficiently satisfies the precept of faith (and of hope), because in him who has already learned and believed generally the truths to be held by faith, implicit or exercised acts suffice, such as to pray, to adore the crucifix, to sign oneself with the sign of the cross (II, 7). Cf. Ferreres, I, 188.

2. A heretic, so long as he judges his own sect to be more credible, or equally credible, and Catholics to reject and persecute the word of God, is not bound to believe, because the faith is not yet sufficiently proposed to him, and he would act imprudently. Cf. n. 441.

3. "If a doubt about his sect should arise for someone, he is bound to inquire further and to ask light from God: but if he neglects this, he sins against faith. But if afterwards our faith is sufficiently proposed to him, he is bound to embrace it" (II, 9).

427. Questions. QUAER. 1. What things are to be known and explicitly believed BY NECESSITY OF MEANS?

Resp. 1. They are two: a) that God is; b) that he is the rewarder of good, and avenger of evil. For the Apostle (Heb. 11:6) says: He that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. It is established also from the 22nd proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which said: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in him as rewarder" (II, 2; Exam. Ord., n. 131).

2. As regards the mysteries of the Most Holy TRINITY and of the INCARNATION and DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST, there is controversy. The first opinion, sufficiently probable, denies that these must be explicitly believed, supported by this reason: that, after the promulgation of the Gospel had been made, the condition of those who have heard nothing of Christ was not changed for the worse; whence now, as formerly, those can be saved who believe with explicit faith in God as rewarder, and with implicit faith in the Redeemer. Thus very many more recent authors with Lugo, Sylvius, etc. - But the second opinion, which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus, affirms; because many texts of Sacred Scripture and of the Holy Fathers seem to require faith in Christ, so that man may be united to his Redeemer and be justified through this union. Thus more commonly the ancient theologians.

This opinion is favored (especially for practice) by the response of the Congregation of the Holy Office, which, having been asked whether an adult who was in the article of death and who promised that, after health was recovered, he would learn the truths of faith, could be baptized, wrote back, on January 25, 1703: "the promise does not suffice; but the missionary is bound to explain to the adult, even dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are chiefly the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." This decree was renewed on March 30, 1898 (Mon. eccl., X, P. II, p. 30).

Finally, for practice, the 64th proposition condemned by Innocent XI urges: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he may labor under ignorance of the mysteries of faith; and even if, through negligence even culpable, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

From these things conclude: 1. The CONFESSARIUS sins by absolving (outside the case of necessity) one who is ignorant of the aforesaid mysteries, since he exposes the sacrament to danger of nullity. Therefore he ought either first to instruct a penitent of this kind, or to dismiss him until he shall have been instructed. But it is better briefly to teach him, and to elicit with him acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition (Prax., n. 22). 2. A PENITENT who notices that his confession, on account of such ignorance, was probably valid, but also probably null, is bound, after having been taught those mysteries, to repeat the confession. The reason is that "with respect to him who has certainly gravely sinned, the obligation of fulfilling confession not only probably, but certainly valid, always urges and possesses antecedently" (cf. n. 83). Thus St. Alphonsus (II, n. 2, at the end), reforming his former opinion. See ed. G., I, p. 298.

Note. Invincible ignorance concerning the aforesaid mysteries can scarcely be found among us. If someone exists so dull that he cannot grasp them, he is rather to be assimilated to an infant (Aertnys, II, tr. 1, n. 4; Tanquerey, II, n. 438).

QUAER. 2. What things are to be believed or known BY NECESSITY OF PRECEPT?

Resp. "Explicitly, by necessity of precept, there ought to be known and believed, at least in substance, as St. Charles Borromeo teaches (Instr. ad Conf.): the Apostles' Creed; the Lord's prayer and the angelic salutation; the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church; the sacraments which are necessary to anyone, such as baptism, Eucharist, and penance; for concerning the others it suffices to have implicit faith, since explicit faith is necessary only for those who receive them" (H. Ap., IV, 3; Conf. dir., IV, 2).

Hence: 1. They sin (mortally or venially, according to the gravity of the matter) who neglect to learn the aforesaid things;² likewise pastors who do not teach these things to their sheep, as also parents and other Superiors who do not teach them to their children or subjects, either by themselves or through others. 2. He who is ignorant of the aforesaid things even inculpably can indeed be absolved the first time, provided that, after being admonished, he firmly proposes to learn them. But if afterwards he has altogether neglected to fulfill the obligation, he must be treated as a recidivist (cf. n. 1829). 3. He who neglects to learn the same by memory sins venially. But this light obligation chiefly urges the uneducated, because otherwise they can scarcely have sufficient knowledge of them (II, 3; Prax., n. 22).

We ought also to profess faith externally, according to the words of Christ the Lord (Luke 9:26): He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty; and of Paul (Rom. 10:10): With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. There is added the reason that the Church ought to know its faithful.

This precept is at once affirmative and negative.

428. PRINCIPLES. I. The precept of professing faith, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges, in certain circumstances, either by divine right or by ecclesiastical right.

1. By divine (or natural) right there is given an obligation of professing faith externally in a twofold case, "namely, when, through omission of profession, either the honor owed to God or usefulness to be bestowed upon neighbor would be taken away privatively or contrariwise."

We said: a) privatively, as if a great honor toward God or usefulness redounding to one's neighbor would therefore cease; b) contrariwise, as if otherwise God would be affected with injury, or one's neighbor with a grave evil, for example, if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, etc., depended upon it. For then the act of virtue seems prescribed when it is necessary for the end of the precept; and this occurs here, because the end of the precept is charity (II, 10).

Hence, "if heretics trample images and afflict the faith with other injuries, a Catholic is bound to protect it by his confession, if indeed he prudently hopes for profit from this." But otherwise, if the honor of God and the usefulness of neighbor counsel prudent dissimulation (II, 11).

2. By ecclesiastical right some are bound to emit the profession of faith alone, others the profession of faith together with the oath against modernism.

To THE PROFESSION OF FAITH ALONE are bound, besides those to be baptized (who namely are bound through sponsors, if they are infants), and more probably personally, not through a proxy: a) Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops, in the first provincial synod at which they are present (Trent, Sess. 25, de Ref.);³ b) all beneficed clerics who by right are present at the diocesan synod, the first time (ibid.); c) all prelates of religious institutes; likewise all to be promoted as doctors, masters, regents, and professors, where the decree of Pius IV on this matter is in force;⁴ d) heretics returning to the Church, who are bound both to abjure heresy and to emit an express profession of faith before witnesses, as is commonly done, and reason counsels, and right confirms. Cf. n. 1833.

To THE PROFESSION OF FAITH TOGETHER WITH THE OATH AGAINST MODERNISM are bound: a) those to be ordained to major orders, at least before the Subdiaconate; b) priests, before they are given the faculty of hearing confessions or preaching (especially solemnly during Lent), but not as often as the faculty is prolonged; c) pastors (also succursalists), canons, beneficed clerics, without delay before entering into possession of the benefice (the profession of faith is to be renewed when they are transferred to another benefice); d) all officials of episcopal Curias, tribunals, Roman Congregations; e) readers of theology and philosophy in Seminaries of secular clerics and in Colleges of religious, annually before beginning lectures; f) moderators of religious before they enter upon office. Cf. the Motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910; declaration of the S. C. Consist., September 25, October 25, December 17, 1910; February 10, 1911; Vermeersch, Period., V, p. 197, 229, 252, 271; Hilling, die Reform. des Papst. Pius X, I, p. 184.

Note. 1. The obligation of itself is grave. Yet it primarily affects Superiors, who ought to call subjects to professing. 2. The internal assent is diverse for diverse points: it is the assent of faith in the profession of faith; it is assent of a diverse grade of certitude, according to the points assigned in the oath, as is established from the various expressions accompanying the several parts, for example I admit, I acknowledge, I hold, with firm faith I believe, I altogether reject, I hold as certain, etc. 3. The mode of emitting it is that the oath, in writings indeed to be preserved, be given to the respective Superior, namely according to the various title by which one ought to profess. Thus, for example, moderators and readers of religious, as such, ought to profess before the moderator either immediate or major; those to be ordained, even exempt religious, before the Bishop or Vicar general, who previously has himself made the profession of faith. In particular cases, for a just cause, some priest, whether secular or regular, constituted in some dignity or office, can be delegated to receive the profession. 4. An exception has been made in Germany only for those who are Doctors in public Universities of the State, so that, from the benign interpretation of the Pontiff, they use their right by not emitting the oath. 5. There must be denounced to the Holy Office not only those who have violated the oath, but also those who have refused to subscribe to it.

429. II. The precept of professing faith, insofar as it is negative, prohibits: denying the true faith, professing a false faith, or simulating it. It prohibits these three things even if they were done externally (II, 12).

1. Denying the true faith. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:12): If we shall deny him, he also will deny us. - Whence the Church always punished with most grave penalties those who had denied the faith in persecutions. For exterior denial of faith is a lie harmful to one's neighbor and most injurious to the truth of God.

2. Professing a false faith. For this is manifestly to renounce the true faith.

Hence, he sins gravely against faith who, even when questioned by a private person about his religion, replies that he is a Turk, or a Jew, or a Gentile; for this is just as if he denied himself to be Christian. But it would not be mortal nor against faith if someone denied that he was a priest, a religious, or that he had been present at the sacrifice of the Mass (Piscetta, II, p. 22).

3. Simulating a false faith; for it matters very little whether someone lies by word or by deed. Hence Benedict XIV, in the year 1742, declared that it was not licit for Chinese Christians to exhibit external signs of adoration to an idol, although the intention were directed to a cross hidden under the garment (Scavini, l. 2, n. 820, 4; Zitelli, App. Jur. eccl., l. II, App.).

430. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is licit to HIDE faith, or to dissimulate it?

Resp. 1. When the precept of confessing it externally urges, it is not licit, as we said above (n. 428, 1).

Hence deservedly, as being too general, the 18th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is interrogated by public power, I counsel ingenuously confessing faith as glorious to God and to faith; I do not condemn keeping silent as sinful per se." Cf. Viva, P. II, on this proposition.

2. When the precept does not urge, it is licit, for a just cause, to hide faith, or to cover the truth by words or other signs ambiguous and indifferent.

Hence, one interrogated about faith outside the order of law can keep silence, or respond obscurely. "For generally it is not true that one interrogated (even by public authority) is bound positively to profess faith, except when this is necessary lest he seem to those present to have denied faith" (II, 13, 2). Much more will someone be able to refuse a response to those who ask from curiosity, unless, having been asked about the faith in hatred of religion, he would seem to those present to deny the true religion.

Note. He who flees in time of persecution is not considered to hide his faith. Cf. Matt. 10:23. Yet pastors of souls are bound not to abandon their sheep (II, 14).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is licit to use the SIGNS or GARMENTS of unbelievers?

Resp. 1. If the garments or signs are proper to that region, even if the whole region is unbelieving, it is licit; for these, of themselves, are not referred to religion. - 2. If they are religious garments or signs, one must distinguish: either they are common, and then it is licit to use them, provided a grave cause underlies it; or they are ceremonial and indicate profession of religion, and then it is not licit except from a most grave cause (Piscetta, II, p. 23). - 3. But if these garments or signs, from their own nature or from use, are solely protestative of a false religion (as would be the equipment and garments whose use is in sacrifices, or certain signs of the Masonic sect), it is in no way licit, unless necessity makes every religious signification absent, for example in a fire.

QUAER. 3. Whether Catholics, in the intercourse of COMMON and PUBLIC LIFE, are bound positively to profess faith?

Resp. Affirmatively; because also in the order of earthly things, all things must be directed to the highest good as to the ultimate end. Besides, all human actions, at least in the concrete, either agree or disagree with natural and divine right, and therefore are subject to the judgment and jurisdiction of the Church. Yet it suffices if, through an exercised act, in civil life Catholics profess faith and exercise external acts when they ought to be exercised (Mausbach, Kath. Mor., s. 365).

Hence: 1. Catholics, individually or associated, ought to acknowledge the rights of the Church's authority in controversies and social causes, for example concerning hours of work, the manner of wages, voluntary cessation of labor, etc. 2. Societies which primarily and principally pursue the temporal good of one or another order of civil life (such as associations for cultivating letters and arts, for promoting the temporal lot of workers, for sustaining political parties), on account of mixed questions which cannot fail to occur for Catholics, ought of themselves to be confessional. Yet societies of this kind that are interconfessional are tolerated where a just cause counsels it, as would be a great inconvenience to be avoided, provided that suitable cautions are applied for avoiding the dangers to faith and religion to which Catholic men are necessarily exposed in such groups. - 3. The mode by which confessional Catholic and non-Catholic societies can labor together for the common good is to be preferred here: with distinction remaining and special caution being applied, they should rather be joined to one another by an exterior league. Cf. Letter of Leo XIII, May 1892; Letters Graves de Communi (A. S. S., 33, p. 385); Letter of Pius X to the Sillonists, November 22, 1909 and August 25, 1910; Encyclical Letter Singulari quadam caritate, September 24, 1912. Cf. also Mausbach, die Kath. Moral., p. 2, c. 9 and 10; Ami du Clerge, 1913, Les cath. et les oeuvres non confessionnelles; Hiptmair, in the periodical Linz. Quart. Schr., 1914, article Kirchl. Zeitlaufe.

431. From the things said, you will resolve:

A. CONCERNING THE HIDING OF FAITH:

1. "When you are not asked about faith, often it is better, for the honor of God and the usefulness of neighbor, to cover faith than to confess it: as if, hidden among heretics, you do more good; or if from confession more evil would follow, for example the exasperation of a tyrant, danger of defection if you were tortured."

2. "To redeem with money, lest an inquiry be made concerning your faith, is licit; and often it is a great virtue of discretion to preserve life for the glory of God, and to cover faith by licit modes."

3. "Likewise a licit mode is, when a Catholic passes through heretical places, and grave danger threatens him (of life, for example, or of goods), for dissimulating faith, to eat meats on a prohibited day, because the precept of the Church does not oblige under such danger" (II, 14, 15). Cf. nevertheless n. 154, 3.

432. B. CONCERNING COMMUNICATION WITH NON-CATHOLICS.

Things to be noted beforehand: a) The discussion concerns communication in the exercise of divine worship or in those acts of civil life which are consecrated by religion, as, for example, in the celebration of marriage, in funeral rites.

b) This communication can be active, namely when a Catholic is present at the sacred rites of non-Catholics; or passive, namely when non-Catholics, with Catholics consenting, are present at their sacred rites.

c) Again, it can be public or private. It is public if a Catholic is present at sacred rites which a group of non-Catholics celebrates as a group: for example, at sacred rites which take place in a non-Catholics' temple. It is private if he is participant in a sacred thing which is done by a non-Catholic as a private man, not as a minister of a sect; as if, for example, you recite the Lord's prayer with a non-Catholic.

433. Therefore in particular:

I. CONCERNING ACTIVE COMMUNICATION.

1. To hear sermons of heretics generally is not held as a sign of profession of faith; although from these, if there is scandal, danger, or special prohibition, one must certainly abstain. Thus Paul V (Brief, September 16, 1606) forbade the English to obey a law prescribing this (II, 16, 13).

2. To conduct a funeral as far as the doors of the temple or cemetery is considered a civil courtesy. But regularly it is not licit to be present at the religious ceremonies, because ordinarily it has the character of communication in sacred rites, or presents the appearance of it. Except if, from the circumstances of place, time, etc., something else is signified (II, 16; Gury-Cretoni, I, p. 555).

3. To stand by at the celebration of nuptials, for example as a maid of honor, is for the most part assessed as a testimony of respect toward the spouses, without the heretical rites therefore being approved. Moreover, a Catholic who, with contempt of the laws of the Church, contracts nuptials before a minister of a non-Catholic religion incurs excommunication, and no Catholic can approve this by his presence. Indeed parents and those more closely joined by blood are generally bound positively to disapprove this (Kon., 254, 2). Cf. n. 1314.

4. A servant can, after the example of Naaman the Syrian (4 Kings 19), carry his master by carriage to heretical temples, or accompany this man's daughter or wife to them for the sake of guardianship, yet so that he does not participate in the heretical rites; likewise he can carry infants to be baptized and support them on his arm while they are baptized by a heretical preacher. For all these things pertain to service, and attest no partnership of worship (II, 16, 12).

5. He who receives supper or sacred communion from heretical ministers, or from schismatic priests, even in paschal time or in danger of death; or absolution, except in the article or danger of death; or baptism, unless any other Catholic baptizer whatsoever is lacking; or contracts marriage religiously before them, is guilty of mortal sin against faith (II, 16, 14).

6. Those who, for the sake of a religious rite, sing hymns in the temples of heretics, play organs, respond to the minister, plainly become participants of worship, and therefore in some way betray the faith. - Those who build, restore, or sweep temples do not always seem to enter into partnership of religion; but they provide a certain work, from which one must abstain, especially in a Catholic region, unless a most grave cause urges (Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 37; A. S. S., vol. 11, p. 174). Cf. n. 523, 2.

7. It is not licit for schoolmasters to teach boys Protestant hymns, or a heretical catechism, or to use a Protestant version of Sacred Scripture, although parents or rectors of schools demand it (Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 38).

8. It is not licit to go to musical concerts of heretics, if by occasion of the place the concerts put on the notion of worship, or if the profits from these redound to the usefulness of heresy, or otherwise favor heresy (ibid., n. 39).

9. To bend the knees with heretics praying (whether publicly or privately, but not formally) does not seem to be denial of faith; for it is understood to be done for the sake of civility, provided that it be done only occasionally. - But a custom in these matters is altogether to be disapproved, as favoring heresy and full of danger. Therefore it is in no way to be permitted to servants whom masters are accustomed to urge to this. Resolve the same concerning a servant who would be ordered to read Protestant bibles to a master becoming blind, or ill (Kon., n. 254, 5).

II. CONCERNING PASSIVE COMMUNICATION.

This can take place in a twofold mode: merely passively or negatively, or actively or positively, when non-Catholics positively do or contribute something.

1. Negative communication is permitted; for example, a non-Catholic can be admitted to hearing Catholic sermons, to assisting at the sacrifice of the Holy Mass, to participating by his presence alone in ecclesiastical ceremonies.

2. But positive communication is interdicted according to the things said above, because it easily falls back into illicit communication, and, where it is formal, becomes a sign of the unity of two religious confessions.

3. Thus are understood several decisions of the Sacred Roman Congregations concerning the invitation of non-Catholics into choir, the bestowal of the peace, of ashes, of candles, admission to carrying torches and lights, kissing the instrument of peace, carrying the body at funerals or holding the cloth, and even singing separately and not without scandal in the musical choir.

4. It is licit to invite non-Catholics to play the organ.

5. As regards admitting Protestant or schismatic girls into Catholic houses of education, several decrees exist, especially for houses situated in Italy, and prescriptions are given for the Superioresses of the same Institutes. Cf. Ami du Clerge, 1908, p. 445; Monit. eccl., X, 86; XI, 434.

CERTAIN RESPONSES OF THE SACRED CONGREGATIONS.

1. To the doubt: Whether it is licit for Catholics to go to the temples of heretics, the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, on January 14, 1718, responded: "It is licit, if they go for the sake of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred rites, in which such going is commonly held for an act protestative of a false religion; since, just as to go to profane buildings, so also to the temples of heretics, is an act indifferent per se, which becomes evil only from a depraved end or from circumstances."

2. The same Sacred CONGREGATION, on May 10, 1770, decreed: "It is regularly not licit for Catholics to be present at sermons, baptisms, and marriages of heretics or schismatics." To undertake also the office of sponsor in the baptism of heretics is strictly prohibited by the same decree (cf. Intr. Card. Vicar, July 7, 1878, apud Gury-Cretoni, I, p. 554; Lehmkuhl, I, 816).

3. The Sacred Congregation DE PROPAGANDA FIDE, having been asked in the year 1674: Whether Catholic missionaries, asked by schismatics, can preach in their churches, responded: "Either they are invited to the effect that Catholic truth be preached there indefinitely, and even against the errors of the same schismatics, and affirmatively; or only that a discourse be made concerning virtues and vices which commonly ought to be exercised and avoided both by Catholics and by schismatics, and negatively." Scavini, II, n. 911, 14).

4. The Congregation of the HOLY OFFICE, having been asked: "Whether it is licit for nuns having care of the sick in a hospice to call a heretical minister, who for the sake of religion would be sought by a sick heretic; likewise, whether this would be licit for a Catholic in whose house a heretic was sick?" responded on March 15, 1848: According to the things set forth, it is not licit; let them have themselves passively.¹ This response was renewed by the same Sacred Congregation on February 5, 1872, and on December 14, 1898 (N. R. Th., 31, p. 402). - Yet otherwise, as is clear, if, when the sick person asks, greater evils would threaten from the denial, for example, desperation, outcries against the Church, blasphemies, scandal of others, etc. Then the little minister could licitly be called, so that he may visit the sick person (Scavini, l. c., 8; Kon., 313, 3; Monit. eccl., IX and X).

N. B. See other things at n. 447 seqq., where concerning dangers of faith, and n. 523, where concerning cooperation, and apud Lehmkuhl, I, n. 809; Villada, Cas. consc., II, 52.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 10-12; St. Alphonsus, II, 17; ed. G., I, p. 309; Lugo, disp. XVIII seqq.; Aertnys, l. II, n. 9; Lehmkuhl, 1, 410; Tanquerey, II, n. 655; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 205 seq.; Gopfert, 1, § 47.

434. To the virtue of faith is opposed, by EXCESS, rash credulity, by which, from levity of heart, things are believed as belonging to the Christian faith and religion, when they are not such; as, for example, if someone lightly believed and handed on to others private revelations very suspect and doubtful. - Hence St. John warns (1 Ep. 4:1): Dearly beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits whether they are of God. But, the danger of losing true faith being excluded, the aforesaid credulity will be a venial sin, or none.

By DEFECT, to the virtue of faith are opposed: 1. Sins of omission, namely negligence in learning truths of faith necessary to know; and omission of acts which the affirmative precept of faith prescribes (cf. n. 428). Yet by these sins the infused habit of faith is not lost. 2. Sins of commission, namely denial of faith, whether external or internal, which the negative precept forbids (cf. n. 429). But since internal denial of faith is made especially through infidelity, heresy, and apostasy, and since the dangers of these sins also are prescribed to be avoided, we shall treat here: a) of infidelity; b) of heresy and apostasy from faith; c) of avoiding dangers of losing faith.

435. DEFINITION. Infidelity properly so called is lack of faith in a man not baptized. For those are called infidels who have not yet received the infused habit of faith.

DIVISION. A threefold infidelity is distinguished: negative, of those who have heard nothing about the faith; privative, of those who from vincible ignorance do not know the truths of faith; positive or contrary, of those who resist faith sufficiently proposed, or contemn it (Instr., IV, 4).

436. PRINCIPLES. I. Negative infidelity is not a sin. The reason is that it is not voluntary; and therefore this 68th proposition of Baius was deservedly condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin." Cf. n. 425.

II. Privative infidelity is a grave sin. For it proceeds from ignorance which is vincible, and therefore gravely culpable.

III. Positive infidelity is a most grave sin; because it contains grave injury and contempt of divine authority. Whence, he who has not believed shall be condemned (Mark 16:16).

The principal SPECIES of positive infidelity are: paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and other sects of unbelievers. To these are numbered atheism, pantheism, deism; finally rationalism, from which is born either incredulity, which rejects all religions as fictions, or indifferentism, which estimates all religions as equal. Yet these, in a baptized man, are rather referred to apostasy and heresy (cf. n. 438).

437. IT IS ASKED. Whether unbelievers can be compelled to receiving faith?

Resp. They cannot be compelled directly, both because the Church has no power over the non-baptized, and because the reception of faith, so that it may be true, ought to be voluntary. This is confirmed by canonical right and by the practice of the Church itself, which has never used coercion, but persuasion (l. V Decr., tit. 6 and c. 3).

We said directly: "for the Church, and any supreme prince, can indeed compel Jews and pagan subjects to hearing our faith" (II, 19). The prince can also prohibit idolatry, since this is repugnant to the natural law; and thus, the Church applauding, Constantine and Theodosius proscribed such impiety. Likewise, he can prohibit, even by arms, that faith be impeded. "And for this reason," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 10, a. 8), "the Christian faithful have frequently waged wars by right against unbelievers."

Three things come to be considered here: the sins of heresy and apostasy, the ecclesiastical sanction against these sins, the reconciliation of heretics.

438. NOTIONS. I. Heresy is a pertinacious error against faith, in one who has received the faith.

For heresy which is punished by canonical penalties there is required: 1. on the part of the person, profession of the Christian religion, and baptism validly received (for a catechumen cannot yet be punished by the Church); 2. on the part of the intellect, error, that is, assent, or a formed judgment; 3. on the part of the will, pertinacity, by which someone knowingly and willingly does not wish to submit his judgment to the Church teaching infallibly (which is characteristic of this sin); yet it is not required that someone adhere tooth and nail and with a delay of time to such error; 4. on the part of the matter, error against Catholic faith, that is, against some point of faith explicitly defined or proposed by the Church; 5. on the part of the act, that the error be externalized, whether by a deed or by a word indicating internal heresy (VII, 300 seqq.).

Before God, anyone is a heretic who rejects some truth which he knows to be revealed, even by voluntarily doubting (cf. 421, 4).

II. Apostasy is total departure from the Christian faith received through baptism.

Note. For the crime of apostasy the profession of some false religion is not required. Therefore, under the name of apostates come also Masons, nihilists, anarchists, more probably socialists properly so called, free-thinkers, rationalists, deists, pantheists, spiritists, and generally all those who, after baptism received, have completely withdrawn from Christian faith, although they have not passed over to Judaism or to another infidelity. Cf. L. Jaugey, de Fide, n. 161; Tanquerey, II, p. 387, note 2; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, vol. 16, die Quellen des Ungl.; vol. 48, Atheismus u. s. Folgen.

Note. There will be discussion of apostasy from Religion or from Sacred Order in Part IV.

DIVISION. Heresy is distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of the sin, it is formal, if someone adheres to error with pertinacity, that is, knowingly and willingly; or material, if there is error in the intellect without pertinacity in the will.

2. By reason of the act, it is internal, if it lies hidden in the mind; or merely external, if someone by mouth, for example by uttering a heretical blasphemy, or by deed, for example by prostrating himself before an idol, denies the faith which he retains in the heart; or externalized or manifested, if it is in the mind and is produced exteriorly.

3. By reason of manifestation, it is occult, if it becomes known to no one or to only a few; and public, if it is known to very many and cannot be concealed (Perrone, de Virt. fid., n. 481-490). Cf. n. 1199.

439. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal heresy, and apostasy from faith, are most grave sins. The reason is: 1. because they contemn the authority of God revealing, and therefore attack God himself; 2. because they directly impede the remission of other sins, since faith is "the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the fellowship of his sons." Trent, Sess. VI, c. 8, and Vatican, Sess. III, c. 3.

440. II. Material heresy, of itself, is free from fault. For it proceeds from ignorance. Yet except if it proceeds from culpable ignorance; because then it will be culpable in the same degree as the ignorance itself, although it does not yet reach formal heresy (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. I, n. 1-6; VII, 301).

The signs of heresy, whether material or formal, are the following:

1. He is considered only materially a heretic, and therefore, from the faith received in baptism, belonging to the Church of God: a) Who is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church when he has recognized the error, although meanwhile he may defend his own opinion tooth and nail. b) Who has known nothing concerning the Catholic faith, and has never doubted concerning his own. c) Who, while doubting, has studied to recognize the truth as much as he could. - But he who culpably procrastinates his conversion to the faith is not for this reason a heretic; nevertheless he sins against the affirmative precept of faith if he puts it off for a long time.

2. He must be considered a formal heretic: a) Who doubts, and from pertinacity or from contempt of the Church refuses to inquire further. b) Who deliberately turns the intellect away from truth sufficiently proposed, so that he may adhere to his own sect or opinion. c) Who, after the truth has been recognized, perseveres in contradicting the Church, as heresiarchs are accustomed to do from hatred of the Pope or of the Church. These are the three principal GRADES of pertinacity, of which the first is founded upon truth studiously neglected; the second upon truth sufficiently proposed but contemned; the third upon recognized truth maliciously opposed (Voit, I, 378-379).

441. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he is a formal heretic who DOUBTS concerning matters of faith?

Resp. 1. If he positively doubts concerning some dogma already defined or proposed by the Church, judging it to be uncertain on account of opposed reasons, beyond doubt he is a formal heretic. In this case, that saying of right strictly holds: "One doubtful in faith is an unbeliever" (c. 1, de Haeret.; cf. H. Ap., XIX, 53).

2. If he doubts negatively, namely by suspending judgment concerning some article of faith, one must distinguish thus: either a) deliberately and pertinaciously he suspends his assent, because he thinks the judgment of the Church is not a sufficient foundation for believing; and then he likewise is a formal heretic; or b) deliberately indeed, but not pertinaciously, he suspends assent; and in this case, although he sins gravely against faith, he is not nevertheless strictly a heretic, because there is not present a pertinacious choice; or c) neither deliberately nor pertinaciously, but from temptation, he remains so suspended that he neither dissents nor assents: in this case he does not sin, or at most only venially, because perhaps he resists the temptation tepidly (II, 19; VII, 302).

QUAER. 2. What is to be thought about those who adhere to opinions which are marked not only by the Sacred Congregations, but by the Church, indeed with a dogmatic censure, yet lighter than heresy?

Beforehand note. DOGMATIC censure, proceeding from the supreme and universal magisterium of the Church, condemns some thesis as heretical, or erroneous, or proximate to heresy or error, or rash. DISCIPLINARY censure, which corresponds rather to the prerogative of government than of magisterium, is not condemnatory of doctrine, as dogmatic censure is, but prohibitory of the same. This is also called ECONOMIC or PRUDENTIAL, when the enunciation of some doctrine is prohibited not on account of an intrinsic cause, but on account of causes or reasons of prudence, namely that dissensions may be removed, peace consulted, scandal guarded against (Konings, n. 268, q. 3).

Resp. Of themselves, they are not guilty of heresy, but certainly they sin mortally. We say of themselves; for those adhering to opinions of this kind as true and licit virtually deny the infallibility of the Church: and if they are conscious to themselves of this denial, they are guilty of heresy (I, 104). Cf. n. 1328.

From these things are to be judged followers of liberalism who embrace various errors concerning liberty, condemned by the Church in the Syllabus, or demand excessive tolerance for favorers of errors. Concerning these below (n. 445). Concerning liberalism cf. Aertnys, Theol. past., P. III, a. 5; Godts, Les droits en matiere d'education: la liberte, Ch. II; Berardi, Exam. Conf., n. 2455 and Casus Consc., a. 1894.

442. PRINCIPLES. I. Heretics and apostates are punished with spiritual and temporal penalties. Cf. n. 438, 1314, 1351.

1. The SPIRITUAL penalties are: a) Excommunication latae sententiae, reserved in a special way to the Supreme Pontiff, which is incurred also by those believing heretics ... and generally all their defenders. b) Irregularity, likewise reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, which is extended also to the sons of those who persist in heresy or have died in it, to the first and second degree through the paternal line, but through the maternal line to the first only (N. R. Th., 22, p. 601; 24, p. 276), even in Germany and in other places where heresies rage with impunity (S. Off., Dec. 14, 1890). c) Incapacity for any ecclesiastical office and benefice whatsoever. d) Privation by the right itself (but after a declaratory sentence) of every dignity, benefice, and office. e) Privation of ecclesiastical burial.

2. The TEMPORAL penalties are: perpetual prison, confiscation of goods, etc.; but these no longer have force (Soglia, Inst. Jur. priv., § 232).

II. There is given an obligation of denouncing heretics and those suspected of heresy.

1. By force of the edicts of the HOLY INQUISITION, the following must be denounced to Ordinaries or to the inquisitors themselves, under penalty of excommunication ferendae sententiae (if someone has neglected to denounce for a month): a) formal heretics, and their favorers; b) all suspected of heresy, such as sorcerers, heretical blasphemers, those abusing the sacraments (for example, those who celebrate or absolve without priesthood), confessors soliciting to base things, those contracting nuptials while a spouse is living or with a solemn vow (III, 123; IV, 251-54; VII, 249).

These decrees indeed are not observed in many places, because on account of the liberty of worship asserted for all, the errors of heretics rage with impunity, and therefore the denouncing of them imposed by the law of the Church by no means obliges. Yet clerics seem to have to be denounced in every case, so that the Bishop may meet the harm both of the people and of the clergy specially committed to himself (Scavini, II, 845, 3).

2. By force of the natural law, one must denounce either heretics or those suspected of heresy, as often as it is a question of avoiding grave harm of souls, to which the Superior can bring a remedy.

Let it be noted: 1. This obligation from the natural law will be able to urge even in places where heretics are everywhere mixed with Catholics, for example, if it is a question of an unusual danger which threatens the Catholic religion through them, the Superior being unaware, and to which the Superior can provide in at least some way. 2. Formal heretics, even if they are not dogmatizing, anyone is bound to denounce, even with danger of grave harm; even a blood-relative, brother, indeed wife, son, or father. The reason is that heresy is so harmful a plague that it has a remedy with difficulty and easily turns to common harm. 3. Those suspected of heresy generally are not bound to be denounced by blood-relatives or others fearing grave harm from it. The reason is that since in those suspected there is only doubtful heresy, only a doubtful evil can be feared from it, and the danger of common harm is considered remote (IV, 249-50).

443. I. ANY CONFESSOR can absolve both those guilty of merely internal heresy and also heretics who have incurred no censure.

II. The BISHOP, or INQUISITOR, can in the external forum, by himself or through another, absolve notorious heretics. It matters little whether they were denounced or appeared spontaneously. Yet abjuration must be premised before a notary or someone delegated by the Bishop for this (S. O., March 28, 1900) and witnesses. Thus from the Bull Cum sicut of Clement VII, January 15, 1530 (Anal. eccl., VIII, p. 191); cf. Coll. de Prop. Fide, n. 1682.

Note. 1. Nevertheless it is granted by the aforesaid Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide that sometimes abjuration be made before a few witnesses, without a notary (Coll., n. 1686 and 1681).

2. In places of mixed religion, Bishops are accustomed commonly to have and communicate a delegated faculty of absolving. - The formula of abjuration is that which the Holy Office composed on July 20, 1859.

3. Any confessor can absolve from the sin of heresy those guilty persons thus absolved from censure (VII, 83; H. Ap., XX, de Privil., 39).

III. ONLY THE ROMAN PONTIFF can absolve (by himself or through another) heretics whether notorious or occult. It is supposed that they have not yet presented themselves to the judicial forum of the Ordinary, either from delation or spontaneously (Bened. XIV, Const. Pastor bonus, 1744).

Hence: 1. Protestants, or other notorious heretics, who wish to abjure their heresy, can be absolved by the Bishop or by his delegate. For their heresy, in every case, must be brought to the external forum.

2. The contrary must be said of a Catholic who privately fell into heresy, or lived in some sect so occultly that his heresy became known to only a few. For he would be in a case of occult heresy, nor could he be absolved by the Bishop,

so long as his delict had not been brought to the judicial forum. Whence, if he refuses to manifest his heresy in the external forum, he will need an indult of the Holy See (that is, of the Major Penitentiary) to obtain absolution (Bouix, de Episc., II, p. 222). See nevertheless the things to be said at n. 1314.

Note. The MODE of reconciling heretics will be treated at n. 1832 seqq.

There are especially three things which bring danger to faith, namely: 1. liberty of worships conceded by a prince; 2. communication with heretics or unbelievers; 3. reading of depraved books.

In voluntarily incurring these dangers there is given a fault of imprudence, which nevertheless is not always mortal, nor opposed to faith; and therefore it does not necessarily expel the habit of faith (Tanquerey, I, 655-659). If the imprudence is against faith, from the fact that someone proximately exposes himself to danger, there will be present a grave sin of infidelity.

444. Note beforehand. That liberty or equality of worships lies greatly in ambush against the Catholic faith, nothing is more evident than this. For through it there is brought into Catholic kingdoms that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, "of the indifference of any religion whatsoever, which, after every distinction of truth and error has been taken away, boldly asserts that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever," and thus it casts peoples down into the abyss of incredulity (Pius IX, Enc., November 9, 1846).

445. PRINCIPLES. I. Liberty of worships, considered as doctrine, is a false principle of liberalism, which a Catholic legislator ought to impede by all the ways in which he can. Reason: he who cannot favor lesser vices, how much more ought he to resist those things which tear out the foundations of the commonwealth (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. 1, n. 4; opusc. Fedelta dei vassalli).

Liberalism is a politico-religious system which professes an independence of the State from the Church so complete that the State rules itself, no respect being had to Religion, as if this did not exist, and all religions were in reality equal in themselves.

Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have always reprobated this liberty and equality of worships: "What more insane can be devised?" exclaims Pius VI in the Letter to Cardinal La Rochefoucauld (on March 10, 1791). Gregory XVI, in the Encyclical Mirari vos; Pius IX, in the Encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864) and in the Syllabus (propositions 77, 78, and 79); Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Libertas (June 20, 1888), condemned this system by their supreme authority. The same Pontiff spoke thus concerning this doctrine in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: "If it differs from Atheism in name, in reality it differs not at all."

Note. But what kind of sin against faith he commits who professes liberalism was said above at n. 441.

II. Liberty of worships and of conscience can sometimes be tolerated where the prince cannot impede it without graver detriment to the true religion and commonwealth. Thus the Angelic Doctor teaches (2.2, q. 10, a. 11): Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits some evils to be done in the universe which he could prohibit, lest, by their being removed, greater goods be taken away, or even worse evils follow. St. Alphonsus is plainly consonant with the Angelic Doctor (II, 18). Cf. Zigliara, Summa Phil., p. 247.

III. Liberty of worships, existing in fact, creates a twofold danger for the faithful, both of embracing the theoretical error concerning the equal value of religions, and of confusing political tolerance with dogmatic tolerance (Villada, Casus Consc., I, p. 59).

The matter is clear. From this twofold danger it must always be discerned whether someone in reality has fallen into a sin opposed to faith, or has only undergone the danger of falling into it, and whether the matter is one of doctrinal liberalism, or only of political parties.

446. From these things you will resolve: A. As regards liberalism, as it is doctrine:

In order to determine what sin against faith he commits who professes this liberalism, one must carefully inspect (as Genicot says) what he understands by the sentence to which he gives assent, since among those who have not completely turned aside to atheism or rationalism and who wish to remain Catholics, this word liberalism is taken with manifold variety; then one must see how far, by reason of ignorance and good faith, each one is excused from formal sin.

Hence: 1. He is a heretic who: a) fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, that is, the full independence of the State from the Church, or (what is worse) the subjection of the Church to the authority of the State. For some subordination of the State to the Church is manifestly contained in the full power with which Christ furnished Peter and his successors; b) the same must be said of those liberals who pertinaciously hold certain particular doctrines which are also adverse to divine faith, for example, that by force of a merely civil contract there is given among Christians a true marriage. Cf. Sarda y Salvani, Le liberalisme est un peche.

2. They are excused from heresy, but expose themselves to danger, who defend these errors on account of ignorance for the most part culpable, and yet do not bear the mind of retaining them when they shall have known them to be reprobated by the Church. Likewise, by defect of religious assent, they sin gravely against prudence or reverence owed to the Church who hold only some secondary error, but one by no means contrary to divine faith, for example the 76th proposition of the Syllabus, concerning progress going to follow for the Church from the abrogation of the civil empire. But here some good faith can easily be admitted.

B. As regards liberalism, as it denotes political parties.

Before all things one must examine whether those who adhere to such parties nevertheless otherwise seem to fulfill the offices of good Catholics. Then it must prudently be explored whether they themselves admit something evil in doctrine or manner of acting, or without sufficient reason cooperate in the evil counsels of others; and according to these things let them be judged.

Concerning cooperation of this kind a question often occurs when there is question of schools, assemblies, and other social works.

447. Communication is either RELIGIOUS or in sacred rites, or CIVIL or political. The former is prohibited by reason of itself, by divine and ecclesiastical right, on account of scandal and cooperation in sin; namely insofar as it is simulation of false faith, or approbation of false religion (see n. 432). - The latter is prohibited chiefly by reason of the danger of perversion which it induces.

PRINCIPLES. I. Civil communication with unbelievers, heretics, and apostates is forbidden by the natural and divine law, if it is dangerous to those communicating. This is established from the things said at n. 374, and from several places of Sacred Scripture, for example the Epistle to Titus (3:10): Avoid a heretical man, and Romans (16:17, 18): Decline from them. For men of this kind do not serve Christ our Lord, but their own belly: and by sweet speeches and blessings they seduce the hearts of the innocent (cf. de Prohib. lib., c. 1).

Note. 1. From civil communication a threefold danger arises: a) lest the Catholic religion suffer detriment; b) lest someone make shipwreck of his own faith; c) lest others take scandal.

2. Apostates, free-thinkers, and heretics entice more to their errors than unbelievers do; because their speech creeps like a cancer (2 Tim. 2:17), and because Satan, so that he may more easily deceive the simple and unwary, with their help and work, is transfigured into an angel of light. The danger grows in places of heretics or unbelievers where there does not exist some church with a Catholic priest to whom it is free to exercise our rites publicly.

3. Formerly a more severe prohibition, even general, was had against civilly communicating, without just cause, with heretics and others denounced by name (cf. n. 1295). It was forbidden to Christians (cf. title de Judaeis in Canon Law) to dwell with Jews in the same house, to be present at banquets, to use a common bath, to employ them as physicians ... or to serve Jews. But these things, says Tanquerey, have passed more or less into desuetude, and today attention must rather be given to the danger of perversion (II, n. 677, note). Cf. Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 210; D'Annibale, I, n. 110.

4. For ITALIANS Clement VIII, Const. Cum sicut, established: a) That under whatever title they dare not dwell in places of heretics where there does not exist a church with a Catholic priest. b) That they not depart to dwell in the aforesaid places except after opportune admonitions have been received from the Ordinaries or inquisitors for guarding against the danger of subversion. c) That they not use heretical physicians if a suitable Catholic is present (Scavini, II, n. 820).

448. II. Religious communication with unbelievers, heretics, and apostates is of itself illicit and prohibited by the Church. It is established from reason and from the decisions cited above.

Note. 1. The prohibition is absolute in those things which contain heresy, as happens in active, public, and formal communication; it is only conditioned in those things which are administered in the Catholic rite, for example in mixed marriages, provided the dangers of religion are absent and ecclesiastical prohibition does not urge (cf. D'Annibale, l. c.; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 209). The reason is clear, for the first is the same as truly to deny the true faith, to profess and simulate a false one (cf. n. 429), which is never licit; the other contains only the appearance of adhesion to a condemned sect, although it brings danger; yet all these things can and ought sometimes to be removed.

2. It can more easily be admitted that heretics communicate with us in our rites; for this has less danger than if we communicate with them.

3. It is more strictly prohibited to communicate in sacred rites with unbelievers, because besides other inconveniences there is almost always present participation in superstitious worship (cf. D'Annibale, l. c., and above n. 432).

449. IT IS ASKED. Whether DISPUTATION with heretics is prohibited?

It must be noted beforehand. A twofold disputation is given: public, which, with day and hour fixed, has place before a multitude and judges appointed; private, which is made before a few hearers.

Resp. 1. For laymen, Alexander IV (c. 2, § 1, de Haeret., in Sexto) established thus: "We prohibit that it be licit for any lay person to dispute publicly or privately concerning the Catholic faith. But he who shall do contrary, let him be bound by the snare of excommunication" (excommunication ferendae sententiae). The law is founded on the presumption that laymen are not sufficiently taught. Therefore exception must be made if the controversy is made by learned men with the Bishop's permission, or in a case of great usefulness, or of introduced custom, as in Germany.

2. "Disputation is prohibited to clerics by no right, provided that they are suitable, and from the circumstances a happy outcome can be hoped; but public disputation with heretics cannot be made without permission" (namely, of the Supreme Pontiff). Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Council, March 6, 1625, and several times the S. C. Prop. Fide. Yet in a case of necessity, if there is danger in delay, the Ordinary of the place can grant this license (Konings, n. 255).

Disputations with socialists are subject to the same rules, the Sacred Congregation for extraordinary affairs declared, January 27, 1902 (A. S. S., 38, p. 107. Cf. Canon. Cont., XXV, p. 335; Etudes, August 20, 1905, p. 480; Ami du Clerge, 1905, p. 354).

450. From these things you will resolve: 1. Marriages with heretics and unbelievers, as being generally dangerous for the Catholic party and offspring, are, regularly speaking, gravely illicit. Yet sometimes, for a grave cause, and every danger being removed, the Church permits marriages of this kind to avoid a greater evil (II, 19). See the treatise on Matrimony (n. 1986).

2. It is not licit to serve heretics when there is danger of perversion. The same must be said if the servant is for the most part impeded from fulfillment of the precepts of the Church; but otherwise if he is only rarely impeded.

3. To send little children, young men, or girls into schools of heretics or of impious men is a great sin and a very great evil, ordinarily never repairable (cf. n. 713 seqq.). See the Instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar to the pastors of the Fair City, July 12, 1878 (A. S. S., vol. 11, p. 176). Likewise, parents sin gravely who for the sake of gain send their still tender children, or allow them to go, to places of heretics, without any necessity and due cautions.

4. Also with the greatest caution must young people be permitted to frequent associations called scholastic or postscholastic, or associations of Popular Universities, because often faith runs into danger there. See the things said at n. 432.

248. • Faith in general is assent on account of the authority of one speaking. More closely to our matter, Faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is defined: a supernatural, infused habit, inclining the intellect to assenting firmly to truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church, on account of the authority of God revealing. But insofar as it is an act, it is called a most firm assent given to things revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing.²

Faith is 1° habitual or actual, according as it is a habit or an act.

2° Explicit or implicit by reason of the object, according as this in itself is expressed and unfolded, or is contained only in another thing. Thus, for example, if you say: I believe in the Most Holy Trinity, you elicit an act of Faith explicit in that mystery. But if you say: I believe all things which the Church teaches are to be believed, you elicit an act of Faith implicit in the individual revealed dogmas.

3° Explicit (formal) or implicit (virtual) by reason of the act, according as it is actually elicited, or by its force flows into actions.

4° Formed or living, or unformed or dead, according as it is joined, or not joined, with sanctifying grace.

The sins opposed to Faith are 1° infidelity, or lack of Faith in men not baptized; 2° heresy, or error in one baptized against a truth of Faith proposed by the Church. - Each is either formal or material, according as the baptized person adheres pertinaciously or not to an error against the Faith, or the non-baptized person is vincibly or invincibly ignorant of the Faith.

The discussion must chiefly concern 1° the necessity, 2° the object of Faith.

249. • I. The internal act of Faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. This is established from the Epistle to the Hebrews,¹ where the Apostle says: Without Faith it is impossible to please God. For he who approaches God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him. - And from the Council of Trent:² "without faith justification has never happened to anyone."

II. It is also necessary at some time in life by necessity of precept. This is established from Sacred Scripture. For it is said in the First Epistle of John:³ This is His commandment, that we believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ. Likewise from condemned propositions, namely the 1st by Alexander VII (p. XIII), and the 16th and 17th by Innocent XI (p. XV).

250. Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the precept of eliciting Faith urge?

Resp. 1° It urges of itself: 1° after the use of reason, once the obligation of the precept has been sufficiently known; 2° likewise when the truth of our Faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult unbeliever; 3° in the article of death, for tending more proximately to God; 4° several times in life, at least once in a year.⁴

Resp. 2° It urges by accident: 1° when a grave temptation urges which cannot otherwise be overcome; 2° when a precept must be fulfilled which cannot be fulfilled without faith. Thus contrition cannot be elicited unless an act of faith precedes or accompanies it; 3° after a fall into heresy, or after Faith has been denied, because the injury inflicted on the First Truth must be repaired by a contrary act.

Quaer. 2° Are explicit acts required for fulfilling the precept of Faith?

Resp. In those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, implicit acts generally suffice. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucifix, prays, forms the sign of the Cross, receives the Sacraments, etc. - Thus commonly.¹

251. • I. There is a negative precept prohibiting the denial of the true Faith and the profession of a false one. For to deny the Faith is to deny God Himself. Hence Christ² says: He who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father, who is in heaven.

II. There is also an affirmative precept obliging sometimes to confess the Faith even with danger to life. For the honor of Christ sometimes requires that the faithful despise even life for confessing Him. This is established from the words of Christ Himself:³ Everyone who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father who is in heaven. And:⁴ He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words, the Son of man will be ashamed of him when He shall come in His majesty. Likewise the Apostle:⁵ With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.

The precept of confessing the Faith outwardly obliges by the law of nature as often as otherwise the honor due to God, or the spiritual utility of others, would be withdrawn in a notable way, either contrarily or privatively. Contrarily: as if, by omitting confession of Faith, God would be affected by great injury, or contempt of Religion, or scandal, or the perversion of others would follow. Privatively: if namely a great honor toward God, or a great utility for others, would cease. - The reason is because the charity which we owe to God or to the neighbor demands this. - St. Thomas,⁶ St. Alphonsus.⁷

252. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it ever licit to dissemble the Faith?

Resp. 1° It is never licit to simulate a false faith, because this would be the same as outwardly denying the true one, which is intrinsically evil. - But this is openly established from the words of Christ just cited.

Resp. 2° It is licit for a grave cause to dissemble or hide the true Faith, when the danger of scandal is excluded. The reason is because the precept of confessing the Faith does not always urge.¹

Quaer. 2° Can one who is questioned concerning the Faith use ambiguous words?

Resp. 1° Negatively, when evasion or silence is equivalent to denial, or to shame or fear which in those circumstances necessarily detract from the honor of God or the utility of the neighbor. For then the conditions set forth in the preceding number have place. This is confirmed from the constant practice of the Church and the common doctrine of the Fathers.²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when no scandal is created for those present, and no denial of Faith, or fear, or shame appears; because then there is no obligation of confessing the Faith.³

253. • Quaer. 3° Is it licit to use the signs or garments of unbelievers?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they are garments or signs proper to some region, although this whole region be unbelieving; because these of themselves are not referred to Religion.

Resp. 2° But if they are garments and signs of Religion, a subdistinction must be made. More probably still affirmatively, if it is done for a grave cause, and the garments are not solely or primarily distinctive of the sect from the sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondary for distinguishing the sect. - But otherwise, if the garments or signs are solely or primarily instituted for professing the sect, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions.⁴

254. Resolves. - A. From principle I.

1° Someone sins gravely against Faith if, even only externally, he bends the knee before an idol, or exhibits other signs of false Religion, for example if he were to receive the heretical supper; - if in this region he contracted marriage before a heretical minister, since this person among us is not a witness civilly necessary, and so cannot be approached except insofar as he is a sacred minister; - if clothed in the garments of the Quakers, or even not clothed in them, for nowadays the Quakers themselves scarcely wear distinctive garments, he were silently to consider in their assembly, like the others, as though meditating; - if he were to go to the places in which those are received who profess the so-called conversion in the assemblies of Presbyterians, Methodists, or others, and among the others were to sit or bend the knees, as though about to pray; - if, asked whether he is a Romanist or Papist, he were to answer that he is not, unless nevertheless from the accompanying circumstances it can easily be gathered that he denies it because of those terms as invidious and full of contumely. The same today, after the Syllabus and the Decrees of the Vatican Council, seems to have to be said if someone should deny that he is an Ultramontane.

2° He does not sin against Faith who visits the temples of heretics or unbelievers from mere curiosity, yet with scandal, danger of perversion, or a law forbidding this excluded. - Likewise he who is present at a wedding banquet, since this does not pertain to Faith, or, without participating in the rite, at the burial of heretics, since this is done for the sake of civil honor. Kenrick¹ with others says the same concerning those standing by the celebration of nuptials contracted before a heretical preacher, since this for the most part is not estimated as approval of a heretical rite, but as an indication of respect toward the spouses. But whether the same can be said of those who on this occasion perform the office of bridesmen, I leave to wiser men to decide; much in this matter must be attributed to the common estimation prevailing among the people; for what, with no participation at all in the rite of heretics, is judged only a civil respect, cannot be held as profession of false religion. But where a Catholic enters nuptials before a minister, it is not fitting, says the same Kenrick,² for Catholics, especially parents and those more closely joined by blood, to approve this by their presence. Yet this resolution of the very celebrated Theologian seems a little milder; indeed we judge that this not only is not fitting, but generally is not licit (see below, n. 308), at least for parents and those who are held from office to disapprove this.

3° It is licit for servants to carry infants to be baptized and to hold them on the arm while they are baptized by a minister; for this is held as pertaining to service, and not as fellowship in worship.³ Say the same of attendance at a baptism of this sort and a fortiori at a baptismal banquet, where that attendance is judged civil respect. For the Declaration of Pius VI, namely that it is illicit to be present at baptism conferred by intruders, that is, Frenchmen, cannot be said certainly to comprehend our case. For the attendance of which Pius VI treats, considering the special circumstances then obtaining, could not fail to be, or at least be judged, an approval of those very intruders; but in our case no approval of the minister is commonly apprehended. A case similar to the case to which the declaration of Pius VI pertains would be if there were a question of attendance at baptism conferred by some German so-called Old Catholic.

"But absolutely it is not licit, neither by oneself nor through others, to perform the office of sponsor in Baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics," the S. Congregation of the Office responded on Thursday, May 10, 1770,¹ and Kenrick teaches this.²

4° Paul V, by Brief of September 22, 1606,³ declared to the English that it is not licit to obey the law prescribing to Catholics, even under most grave penalties, that they go to the temples of heretics, frequent their assemblies, and be present at their sermons. But now on the ships of our Government, as also in forts and other public places for the most part, in certain workhouses and prisons, all are compelled to attend prayers and a sermon, those who refuse being beaten. Therefore it is asked whether for Catholics in this region, where it is provided by laws that the secular power should usurp no right of involving itself in sacred matters, it is licit to provide attendance of this sort?

Resp. Since this attendance is demanded on account of order rather than favor toward the sect, and no one is compelled actually to furnish worship, the case must be said to be different from that of which the cited Brief speaks; and those are to be excused who, to avoid punishment or from some other sufficiently grave cause, present themselves, provided nevertheless that otherwise they openly profess the Catholic faith and avoid every fellowship in worship.⁴ Yet the matter is by no means free from danger, namely of perversion. Cf. Second Plenary Council of Baltimore.⁵

5° "To bend the knees with heretics praying," says Kenrick,¹ "whether publicly or privately, does not seem to be a denial of faith; for it is understood to be done for the sake of humanity," provided, I would add, that this is done only on some occasions. Moreover Kenrick himself adds: "Besides, the custom must altogether be disapproved; for it favors heresy, and has danger of perversion and bad example. Therefore it is by no means to be permitted to servants whom masters are accustomed to press to this." I resolve the same concerning a servant who would be ordered to read aloud Protestant bibles to a blind or sick master. "But they can," Kenrick continues, "drive their masters to the temples of heretics, or accompany the daughter or wife of their masters to them, for the sake of protection, without taking part in their rites." I would say the same is licit for a Catholic husband with respect to a heretical wife, as is commonly accustomed to be done in rural places, without Catholics being scandalized by it.

6° As regards those who in Protestant temples give an address, or in mixed assemblies, in which a minister presides or even pours forth prayers, give a speech, or are otherwise present, distinguish in about this way.

Either a) there is a question of a priest about to preach in a temple of the sects, and then the following response of the S. Penitentiary must be attended to; when asked whether Catholic Missionaries and priests, requested by schismatics, could preach in their churches, in the year 1674 it resolved: "Either they are invited to the effect that the Catholic truth be preached there indefinitely and also against the errors of those same schismatics, and then affirmatively; or only that a sermon be made concerning virtues and vices which commonly must be embraced and avoided both by Catholics and by non-Catholics, and negatively."² From this response applied to our regions I conclude that a priest is not to be blamed who, although not invited, indeed even asking this permission, in some place where a Catholic church or another suitable place, for example a courthouse, is lacking, would announce Catholic truth in the temple of sectarians. Outside this case it is better to abstain, so that every appearance of fellowship in matters of religion may be avoided, and lest the faithful go to the churches of sects for any cause whatever.³

Or b) there is a question of a layman who is going to give an address in the same churches of sects concerning temperance, liberty, or other things of this sort, according to the custom of this region. This certainly must be vehemently dissuaded, especially if non-Catholics on that occasion are also going to speak; for in matters of this sort they are scarcely not accustomed to run beyond just limits and to mix in very many things contrary to faith, to which the Catholic speaker either will contradict or will not. - If the former, the matter will have the appearance of a public disputation concerning faith, which is forbidden to a layman.¹ A layman besides will scarcely fail to enter the danger of not rightly answering objections. - If the latter, the silence of the Catholic will easily be held in place of approval, or certainly will harm religion as though it cannot be defended.

Or c) there is a question of an address to be given either in a church of the sects or in a profane place or under the open sky, with a minister presiding, or at least about to pour forth prayers before or after the address. If the former, it will scarcely be licit for a Catholic to give an address, since in circumstances of this sort he would seem in some way to enter into a society of religion; if the latter, it will be licit when, for example, an address is to be given on the occasion of a national feast or of some civil solemnity, as, for example, the dedication of a new municipal courthouse, or the anniversary of some battle at the graves of those slain, although a minister at the request of others pours forth prayers; for in those circumstances he who performs his part by giving an address is not judged to enter into fellowship of religion; otherwise speakers in legislative assemblies would also have to be blamed, for at the beginning of individual sessions a minister is accustomed to pour forth prayers. What has been said concerning those who in this latter case give an address, resolve the same concerning those present, whether they are individuals or, when there is a question of some national feast or civil solemnity, Catholic societies; for those societies, even in the case in which they are present with insignia or banners which exhibit the image of the Saint under whose invocation they exist, are present only civilly.

7° Those who sing publicly outside temples, or at least outside every occasion and appearance of worship, as is accustomed to happen in a concert of many persons, do not seem to sin against faith, even if certain hymns concerning sacred matters have Protestant authors, provided nevertheless that they have nothing adverse to faith; for in those circumstances they are referred only to the delight of the ears. But they would sin if they furnished their work so that money to be collected from it should yield to Protestant uses.¹

8° He does not sin against Faith who, passing through places of heretics, from fear of grave danger, eats meat on a day of abstinence, lest he be recognized as a Catholic; because this of itself is not a sign of heresy. Otherwise, however, if he ate meat, even from fear of death, impelled to this in hatred of the Faith.

9° Nor does he sin against Faith who flees in time of persecution; indeed, generally flight is in some way prescribed, as is clear from the words of Christ:² But when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. But this especially holds if someone's safety is necessary for the utility of the faithful, or someone fears a fall.

255. Resolves. - B. From principle II.

1° This proposition (18th) was indeed rightly condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel him frankly to confess the Faith as glorious to God and the Faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful of itself." Yet from this you would not rightly conclude that always and everywhere one must answer public authority questioning concerning faith. For since he who is questioned by a judge contrary to the order of law, although otherwise legitimate, is held by no obligation of answering; and our laws will that no account of the religion or faith of citizens be had, no response is owed of itself to a question of this sort. Much more can someone be unwilling to satisfy the curiosity of private persons.³

It is said: of itself, and to curiosity. For an answer certainly is owed if, according to the principle enunciated above, the honor due to God or the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be notably diminished or even cease by not answering, by evading, or by equivocating; as, for example, if taciturnity, evasion, or equivocation were, or seemed to those present, a denial of faith, or yielded to contempt of faith or to grave scandal.

2° Although faith must sometimes be professed publicly, nevertheless public controversy with heretics concerning matters of faith is prohibited by the Decree of the S. Congregation of the Council dated March 6, 1625, except with the permission of the Supreme Pontiff. But whether this decree is in living observance, as they say, among us, can rightly be doubted. Besides, in a case of necessity and when there is danger in delay, the Ordinary of the place, according to the things said at n. 154, 2°, will be able to concede this license.

Note. - Other resolutions connected with the precept of faith, see n. 313 sqq., where cooperation in the sacred rites of heretics is discussed.

256. • The formal object of Faith, or the reason on account of which one believes, is the authority of God speaking, as endowed with infinite wisdom and veracity.

But the material object, of which alone the discussion here treats, consists of the things to be known and believed by necessity both of means (which being omitted, even inculpably, salvation is not obtained) and of precept.

§ I. On The Things Necessarily To Be Known And Believed By Necessity Of Means.

257. • It is certain that two things are to be known and believed by necessity of means: 1° that God is: He who approaches God must believe that He is;¹ - 2° that He is a rewarder: He must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him.² - But whether other things must be believed explicitly by necessity of means for salvation is controverted; hence concerning them:

258. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is explicit Faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation required by necessity of means?

Resp. There is given a twofold probable opinion.

The first opinion affirms altogether. The reason is:

1° As to the Incarnation, because salvation is not given except through Christ; therefore that means must necessarily be explicitly known and believed.

2° As to the Most Holy Trinity, because Faith in this mystery is the foundation of our salvation; for Baptism, which is the Sacrament of Faith, must be conferred in the name of the Father, etc. ... But what is the foundation of salvation ought to be the primary object of Faith, and therefore to be believed according to itself and explicitly. - Thus Collet, Antoine.³ - Concerning this opinion St. Alphonsus⁴ says that it is more common and seems more probable.

The second opinion, which also seems sufficiently probable to St. Alphonsus,⁴ denies. The reason is because before Christ implicit Faith in these mysteries sufficed; therefore even after His coming it ought to suffice. For Christ did not change the means. - Thus Suarez,⁵ Lugo.⁶ Nor does the proposition condemned by Innocent XI under n. 64 stand in the way, they say; it sounds thus: A man is capable of absolution however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ. It does not stand in the way, they say; for it could rightly be condemned by reason of the first part, in which it is asserted that a man is capable of absolution however much he generally labors under ignorance of the mysteries of Faith. See p. XVII.

There are those who think that each opinion can be reconciled in this way. They teach, namely, that explicit faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation now, that is, after the coming of Christ, is required by necessity of means hypothetically, or secundum quid; namely, for all to whom the Gospel has been sufficiently announced and who are not so dull that in no way can they perceive these mysteries, explicit faith in these mysteries is absolutely necessary by necessity of means; but for those to whom the Gospel has not been preached, implicit faith in them is necessary by necessity of means, which implicit faith they recognize in him who believes that God will save men through means known to Himself; which faith, they say, certainly includes Christ the Redeemer, and consequently the Most Holy Trinity. And with this distinction indeed they say the words of Acts⁷ must be understood: In every nation, he who fears Him and works justice is acceptable to Him. With the same distinction employed, there is, they say, no necessity of a miracle for saving observers of the natural law who lack explicit knowledge of these mysteries, nor by any reason will it be possible to say that the condition of the human race after Christ was changed not for the better but for the worse, since before Christ implicit faith in these mysteries sufficed.

Quaer. 2° Can he be absolved who is ignorant of those things which are certainly of necessity of means?

Resp. Negatively. Neither licitly nor validly. Thus all. The reason is because that person, through defect of a means simply necessary, is incapable of justification; therefore he is also incapable of absolution. Otherwise no one can have hope of salvation unless he believes that God is a rewarder.

259. • Quaer. 3° Can one ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation be absolved?

Resp. 1° He cannot licitly be absolved outside a case of necessity which altogether urges; the reason is because a confessor absolving this person exposes the Sacrament to danger of nullity, as is clear from the preceding Question 1. - Hence the confessor ought either first to instruct the penitent, or dismiss him until he has been sufficiently instructed.¹ Yet observe with St. Alphonsus² these words of St. Leonard of Port Maurice: "It is not good counsel to dismiss such ignorant persons, that these things may be taught them by others, because no other fruit will be hoped for except that they so remain ignorant; and therefore it is expedient to teach them briefly the principal aforesaid mysteries, causing at the same time that they elicit with him acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition, obliging them nevertheless that in the future they have themselves instructed perfectly concerning the other mysteries necessary to be known by necessity of precept."

But if the question concerns penitents of this sort to whom it would be a great embarrassment or offense to be interrogated about these things, it will be fitting for the confessor simply and clearly to propose these mysteries to them, and then to elicit an act of faith with them.

Resp. 2° Speculatively it can be doubted whether he can validly be absolved who is situated in invincible ignorance of these mysteries. The reason is deduced from the things said in the second opinion of the first Question. But in practice confessions performed in good faith with such ignorance will have to be repeated (see the things said at n. 67, 2°). But whether in a case of necessity he can licitly be absolved can be doubted, since the S. Congregation of the Office on May 10, 1703 declared that "a missionary," before he confers Baptism on "an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable," is held to "explain to him the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, such as," it says, "the principal mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." Nevertheless in necessity, but under condition, he concerning whom it is doubted whether he perceives these things and can perceive them must be absolved,¹ as also the dying person who is altogether incapable here and now of perceiving them. But if there is not certainty concerning his present incapacity, and death is not altogether proximate, he will have to be instructed briefly; but if after absolution, conferred without previous instruction because of death which was thought altogether proximate, he survives, after brief instruction he will have to be absolved again.

§ II. On The Things Necessarily To Be Known And Believed By Necessity Of Precept.

260. • Any faithful person, in order to establish a Christian life, when he has come to the use of reason, besides those things which he must know by necessity of means, is also held, by necessity of precept, explicitly to believe and to know, at least in a rough mode, summarily and as to substance - in such a way indeed that he who did not know them in that mode would sin mortally, unless invincible ignorance or incapacity excused him - 1) the Symbol of the Apostles: as the Christian profession itself demands, because in it is compendiously contained whatever concerning God, concerning Christ, and concerning the Church must chiefly be believed; the practice of the faithful and the Roman Catechism confirm this; - 2) the Lord's Prayer; for this was commanded by Christ and contains all things to be sought from God. They add the Angelic Salutation from the use of the faithful, but under light obligation according to the common opinion; - 3) the Precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, for that the individual ones may be observed, the individual ones must be known; - 4) the Sacraments especially necessary, as Baptism, Eucharist, and Penance; the others, when one is about to receive them, that he may rightly receive them.

I said: 1° At least in a rough mode, summarily and as to substance, from St. Charles Borromeo;² for not all are held under mortal sin to know the aforesaid things by memory, or in that order and with those words by which they are proposed in the Catechism; but as to the Symbol, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and the Sacraments, it suffices that, when asked, they answer sufficiently to the individual points. - As to the Lord's Prayer it suffices if they know that all good things are to be sought from God; for the Doctors say that not to hold it by memory is only venial, provided when asked they know how to answer in general.

I said: 2° Unless invincible ignorance or incapacity excuses; thus those are excused for whom either a teacher was lacking, or to whom the obligation of learning such things never came into mind, or who are so rude that they can in no way comprehend them or retain them by memory; for there is no obligation of impossible things.

I said: 3° When he has come to the use of reason; for then begins the obligation of learning them, since the obligation begins of directing oneself through them to the ultimate end.

261. • Quaer. Can those who are ignorant of those things which must be known by necessity of precept be absolved?

Resp. Affirmatively. If they are sorry, in the case in which the ignorance was gravely culpable, with the purpose of learning them, and have not otherwise, after being admonished, neglected to learn them - in which case they are to be treated as recidivists - they can immediately be absolved. If otherwise, let them learn these things first before they are absolved.

262. • Each virtue has vices opposed to itself; therefore Faith also. But vices are opposed to the virtue of faith insofar as they either impede it from being acquired, and this is infidelity; - or extinguish it once acquired, either in part, and this is heresy; - or in whole, and this is apostasy, which is also called perfidy.

§ I. On Infidelity.

263. Definition. - Infidelity, taken generally, is the lack of Faith in a man not baptized. For those are called infidels who have not received the habit of Faith through Baptism.

Division. A threefold infidelity is distinguished, namely positive, negative, and privative.

1° Positive or formal infidelity is the lack of Faith in him to whom it has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it.

2° Negative or material infidelity is the lack of Faith in him who has never heard anything concerning the true Religion, or to whom revelation indeed has been proposed in some way, yet not yet so sufficiently that he is now held to believe, although perhaps he can be held to inquire.

3° Privative infidelity is the lack of Faith in him who, once the occasion has been given, neglects to procure for himself knowledge of the Faith.

The chief species of infidelity are: Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and other sects, to which can be joined Deism, Atheism, Pantheism, and Rationalism, which in our times spreads so widely.

264. Principles. - I. Infidelity, both positive or formal, and also privative if, after at least suspicions concerning the necessity of inquiry, gravely culpable negligence has been present in inquiring, is a most grave sin. The reason is because the former explicitly, the latter virtually, contains grave injury and contempt of the First Truth, or the authority of God revealing.

II. But negative or purely material infidelity, in itself, is not a sin, but only a punishment of sin. The reason is because there cannot be sin where there is invincible ignorance. - Moreover this is established from the condemnation of the 68th proposition of Baius, proscribed by Pius V and Gregory XIII. See p. XII. - Yet unbelievers, even negative ones, are most wretched, since they wander far from the way of salvation. Nevertheless, that the way which lies open through baptism of desire is not closed to them, St. Thomas excellently intimates.¹

§ II. On Heresy.

265. Definition. - Heresy, properly taken, is voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of Faith proposed by the Church, in him who has received the Faith.²

266. Division. - Heresy is distinguished:

1° Formal, which is heresy properly so called, or in the strict sense; or material, by which someone adheres to error without pertinacity.

2° Internal, or external or manifested, or purely external, according as it is held internally, or externally only, or in both modes.

3° Occult, or notorious, according as it is known to no one or only to few, or to many.

Apostasy is referred to heresy; it is a total defection from the Christian Faith. Concerning it, as concerning formal heresy, the things to be stated must be said.

267. Principles. - I. Formal Heresy is always a most grave sin, as infidelity itself is. The reason is: 1° Because the virtue of Faith, as being theological, is one of the chief virtues, and therefore a sin directly opposed to it is most grave. 2° Faith is the foundation of justice, without which it is impossible to please God; therefore heresy, by expelling Faith, deprives man of all justice. 3° Because heresy is contempt of the authority of God revealing, and thus directly and immediately against God.

II. Purely material heresy is free from every fault. The reason is clear from its definition: for someone here and now is supposed to err from invincible ignorance; but sin with such ignorance is impossible. Therefore, etc.

268. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the signs of material and formal heresy?

Resp. to the first. The following are judged signs of material heresy only: 1° He who is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church when the error is removed. - 2° He who never knew anything true and certain concerning the Faith, and concerning his Religion never doubted. - 3° He who, doubting, strove to know the truth as much as he could.

Resp. to the second. Formal heretics are judged: 1° he who, after the truth has been known, still contradicts the Church; - 2° a sectarian doubting and not inquiring, or turning away his ears through malicious intellect from the motives of authority; - 3° he who by act is so disposed that, even if the truth should occur to his mind, he would nevertheless confirm his soul in the false sect, for the sake of persevering in his own sect. - But if someone with Catholic intention has not so compared his soul, but through affected ignorance, because he would not dare to oppose himself to the authority of the Church in some other matter, and in the meantime wills to be ignorant, so that he may cling without obstacle to his own opinion, he sins indeed, but is not a heretic, since he has the will of believing if the doctrine revealed is sufficiently proposed to him.¹

Quaer. 2° Is he a formal heretic who doubts concerning some truth which he knows to have been revealed by God and proposed by the Church?

Resp. Affirmatively; because thus doubting is to be uncertain concerning whether God commands one to believe as certain; therefore he equally denies the highest truth of God with him who judges false what God commands to be believed as certain. L. VI. 302.

659. Faith according to the name (pistis from peitho, peithomai, I trust, I have been persuaded) primarily and according to origin designates voluntary trust or confidence, given either to the authority (or truth) or testimony of another through our intellect,¹ or to his goodness or promise through the will itself.²

¹ Heb. XI; I Cor. XIII, 13; I Thess. I, 8; II Thess. II, 12; II Cor. V, 7.

² Jas. I, 6: "Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering"; John II, 23; Matt. VI, 30; VIII, 26; IX, 2; XIV, 31; Eccli. VII, 28; XXVII, 17; I Cor. IX, 17, and often in the Scriptures, though not always, as the Protestants falsely assert.

From the derivation of this latter signification, faith is also taken: a) for fidelity in promises;³ b) for the promise itself and vow;⁴ c) for the things promised.⁵

³ Rom. III, 3; Matt. XXV, 21; Luke XIX, 17; I Cor. IV, 2.

⁴ I Tim. V, 12: "they have made void faith (that is, the promise of chastity)."

⁵ For example, to keep the faith of marriage.

From the derivation of the former signification, faith is also taken: a) for truth in testifying;⁶ b) for the very things testified, for example, for the doctrine to be believed, as in Eph. IV, 5: "One Lord, one faith," and the Athanasian Symbol: "This is the Catholic faith...";⁷ c) for trust given either to one's own opinion, when full evidence is not present, or to the dictate of one's own conscience, as in Rom. XIV, 23: "That which is not from faith (that is, from persuasion of conscience) is sin"; in which sense also someone is said to be of good or bad faith.

⁶ Apoc. III, 14: "the faithful and true witness"; Jer. VII, 28.

⁷ Acts VI, 7; Apoc. II, 13; Gal. III, 25.

660. Faith taken in the strict sense is said of the voluntary assent of the intellect (actual faith), or of the habit inclining to furnishing such assent (habitual faith), on account of the authority or testimony alone of another. If that authority is human, it is called human faith; if it is divine, it is called divine faith.

Divine faith could be given concerning merely natural things; nevertheless, in the present order in which we are destined to a supernatural end, it concerns supernatural and divine things (and other things in order to eternal life), and therefore it is more strictly divine, not only by reason of motive but also by reason of matter, whence it is called theological.

661. Theological faith is described by the Apostle, Heb. XI, 1: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. It is said:

1. the substance of things to be hoped for, that is, the first inchoation of beatitude in us, and the first foundation (which stands under the others and therefore founds the others), as St. Thomas explains; or, more conformably to the Greek text: the firm and certain subsistence (hypostasis) of beatitude in our mind, insofar as faith makes us so certain of the things to be hoped for as if they were already present and possessed by us;

2. argument (elenchos) metonymically for its effect itself, namely, the conviction which it causes;

3. of things not appearing (ou blepomenon); faith is an argument, that is, a full conviction, a certain persuasion of things which are seen neither by the senses nor by the mind, but are admitted on account of the authority of God.

St. Thomas shows that this description is a true definition, II-II, q. 4, a. 1 (cf. De Verit., q. 14, a. 2), whence from his time it is customarily explained in the schools as the classic definition. For by this definition faith is distinguished from all other things:

a) by the fact that it is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from faith commonly so called, for example, from human faith, which is not ordered to hoped-for beatitude;

b) by the fact that it is called an argument, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, by which the intellect is not fully convinced nor firmly adheres to any truth;

c) finally, by the fact that it is said to be of things not appearing, it is distinguished from science and from the understanding of principles, by which things appear to the intellect. Whence if someone wished to place the doctrine of the Apostle in the form of a definition, he could say: "faith is a habit of mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing."

662. The Vatican Council explains the definition of the Apostle, while it expounds the nature of faith (Dei Filius, c. 3): "This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue by which, with the grace of God inspiring and helping, we believe the things revealed by Him to be true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things, seen by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance..." There is indicated:

1. the genus to which faith pertains: supernatural virtue;

2. the act proper to the virtue of faith, by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we believe things to be true;

3. the matter concerning which it is concerned: things revealed by God;

4. the motive of faith: on account of the authority of God revealing;

5. the cause of faith: with grace inspiring, that is, preventing, and helping.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise.⁸

⁸ For doctrine on faith, the following can usefully be consulted: throughout, St. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate 14; and II-II, q. 1-16, with the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, the Salamancans, Gotti, and Billuart; likewise Billot, De Virtutibus infusis; - also sometimes, though less safely: Suarez, Lugo, Franzelin; - likewise Scheeben, Heinrich, Mannens, Tanquerey, Van Noort in their Dogmatic Theology; - Brouwer, De Fide divina; Bouquillon, De Virtutibus theologicis, with annotations by Waffelaert; Mazzella and Schiffini in their respective treatise De Virtutibus infusis; Theologia Mechliniensis, De Virtutibus; Masi, De Virtute Fidei; Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione; Lumbreras, De Fide; - likewise Goudin, Philosophia, p. 4, diss. 2, q. 4, a. 5; R. Martin, De Necessitate credendi et credendorum; Gardeil, Credibilite et Apologetique; Bainvel, La Foi et l'acte de foi; Lefebvre, L'Acte de Foi d'apres S. Thomas; Ansgar Stolz, Glaubensgnade und Glaubenslicht; Al. Janssens, Het Geloof; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Foi; Harent in Dict. de Theol., art. Foi; - for the more practical part: St. Alphonsus and other more recent moralists: Lehmkuhl, Ballerini, Aertnijs, Marc, Haine, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, and Vermeersch.

But the treatise on faith does not pertain, as it has seemed to some, to dogmatic theology, but to moral theology. For to believe is a human act by which one must tend to the supernatural end. And therefore, although the more principal objects of faith are merely speculative or dogmas only to be believed, which are explained in Dogmatic Theology, nevertheless faith itself is something practical, which is to be known to the extent that at the same time it is to be done and led into practice. Whence the whole treatise, as great as it is, pertains to moral theology.

663. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on faith comprises five parts:

The first part treats of the object of faith, which is more known than the act of faith, whence it must also be explained first: 1. concerning the formal object; 2. concerning the material object: a) concerning the material object in itself; b) concerning its conditions; c) concerning its evolution; d) concerning the Church proposing it.

The second part treats of the act of faith, which is more known than the habit of faith: A. concerning the interior act: 1. concerning its essence; 2. concerning its analysis, namely, both a) of the act of faith itself, and b) of the pious affection of credulity, and c) of the judgment of credibility, that is, concerning the preambles of faith; 3. concerning the necessity of the act of faith; B. concerning the exterior act or confession of faith.

The third part treats of the habit of faith: 1. concerning faith itself: a) relative to the subject, b) relative to the other supernatural virtues, c) relative to the other intellectual virtues; 2. concerning those who have faith; 3. concerning the cause and effects of faith; 4. concerning the gifts corresponding to faith.

The fourth part treats of opposed vices and sins: 1. concerning sins directly opposed to interior faith: a) concerning infidelity; b) concerning heresy and apostasy; 2. concerning sins indirectly opposed to faith: a) concerning communication with unbelievers and heretics; b) concerning cooperation in infidelity and heresy; c) concerning the reading or dissemination of prohibited books; d) concerning the admission or profession of doctrine which is dangerous for faith; 3. concerning blasphemy, which is directly opposed to the confession of faith.

The fifth part treats of the precept of faith.

II. Those wavering in Faith. - "As if for our time St. Hilary already long ago wrote: 'For there are many who, simulating faith, are not subject to faith, and rather constitute faith for themselves than receive it, being puffed up by the sense of human vanity, while they understand what they will, and are unwilling to understand what is true.' How many laymen cultivated in doctrine are found today who seem to be Catholics, but in reality do not have faith! Therefore it ought not seem wonderful if some among them are found who, from a human motive, do not fear to receive Easter Communion without faith in the presence of Christ.

"Since faith is the root of justification, it is manifest that those who are unbelieving concerning the truths of the Catholic faith or call them into doubt are not only unworthy of sacramental absolution but also incapable of it, unless they wish to come to their senses and elicit a true act of faith. But even then, if they have externally uttered heresy and have not been ignorant of the censure, they first need absolution from the excommunication contracted and specially reserved to the Pope.

"Moreover, concerning those fluctuating in faith or unbelieving in this way, attention must carefully be given to the sources of unbelief. The principal are: 1. defect of solid instruction in Religion; which defect in our age is for the most part to be imputed to parents, because they have committed their children to neutral schools, and have neglected Christian education, indeed have sown religious indifferentism in them by word and example. Due instruction must be procured for the ignorant of this kind by the living voice, books, etc. If they desire to be taught, perhaps they fluctuated inculpably; but if they refuse instruction, they are by no means immune from grave fault. - 2. Sensualism or materialism, by which worldly men gape only after pleasures of the senses, riches, and honors; whence there arises a hidden hatred of truth, which, as contrary to their depraved affections, is rendered hateful to them. Therefore, to lull the anxieties of conscience, they follow doubts against the faith, take complacence in the same, gladly hear and read whatever is opposed against the truths of faith, and although truth is solidly proposed to them, nevertheless suspend assent. - 3. Swollen pride, which they decorate with the specious title of emancipation of the human race or independence of human reason. Such persons, boasting themselves enlightened, wish to rise above the common people, and contemn whatever exceeds their grasp. Both these sources are accustomed to help each other. Not a few are also found who, from ostentation, from desire of persuading themselves of errors, utter unbelief, yet believe in heart.

"As regards remedies, the principal, lest I say the only one, is prayer. Then they are to be dissuaded from conversation with men who scatter doubts and errors, and from reading liberal books and periodicals. Disputation with them concerning the truths of faith is everywhere to be avoided, unless they sincerely desire to be taught; nor are books of controversies to be persuaded to them; for otherwise they continue to reason concerning faith, are strengthened in the opinion that one must arrive at faith by reasoning, and, what is worse, their vanity is nourished."²

² For their instruction and confirmation in Faith, among other works the following deserve to be commended, for cultivated persons: Van Gestel, Het geloof van den christen; Famulus, Heeft God werkelijk tot de menschen gesproken?; Dekkers, Roomsch-Katholieke Godsdienstleer (Dogmatics - Morals - Doctrine of Grace); Apologie; Laforet, Les dogmes catholiques; Aug. Nicolas, Etudes philosophiques sur le christianisme; Deschamps, Demonstration catholique; De Segur, Opuscules; Hugueny, Critique et catholique; Verelst, Apologetique (Dutch translation), Dogmatique, Morale; Hettinger, Apologetik (French translation); Wilmers, Lehrbuch der Religion (Dutch and French translation); Mausbach, Religion, Christenthum und Kirche; Die Katholische Moral und ihre Gegner.

Sins against God are committed directly against the theological virtues and against religion. The theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, are not formally and expressly proposed in the Decalogue, but are presupposed to it as principles to conclusions, the intention of the end to the ordering of means, and the recognition of the legislator to submission to the law. The virtue of religion is proposed in the first three precepts of the Decalogue, namely as to the three duties of fidelity toward God, reverence, and service.

In the following we shall speak:

1. concerning certain sins against divine faith, which in the present supernatural order is necessary for perfect fidelity toward God revealing;

2. concerning certain sins against reverence for God;

3. concerning the sin against the service of God, or concerning the violation of Sunday.

I. Object of the question. - The sin of infidelity is directly opposed to divine faith; in the baptized this is heresy and apostasy. Many things are indirectly opposed, namely whatever constitutes a danger or an occasion of losing or suppressing faith, such as communication with unbelievers and heretics, especially in sacred things, cooperation toward infidelity and heresy, the publication and reading of writings contrary to faith, and opinions dangerous to faith, concerning which in the Treatise on Faith.¹

¹ Cf. Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, nn. 733-780.

In the present matter there is especially treated: concerning liberalism and socialism, which for the most part constitute an indirect danger to faith from which the faithful are to be kept away; concerning heresy, which is a direct obstacle to faith, from which those who have fallen into it are to be converted; concerning doubt in faith, which can be either one or the other. Hence we shall consider penitents of three kinds:

a) those infected with liberalism or socialism, to be admonished or even dismissed,

b) heretics, to be received into the Church and to sacramental confession,

c) those doubting and wavering in the true faith.

II. Of how much importance it is to meet Liberalism and Socialism. - Not rarely does it happen that certain Catholics are imbued with the spirit of liberalism and adhere in some measure to its theories; similarly, to those of socialism. Therefore it is necessary that the confessor know those errors, and be able to bring forth a prudent judgment concerning the stain of liberalism or socialism by which perhaps penitents are infected, and to set before himself the right mode of acting with penitents of this kind.

For the matter is full of dangers. Ordinarily, indeed, someone does not become a complete liberal or socialist immediately from the beginning. He begins to read newspapers or other writings of liberals or socialists; he associates with their societies, perhaps without an evil intention, or gives them his vote in political elections. Nor for this reason does he necessarily become impious or indifferent in the matter of religion; but ordinarily his faith grows cold and religious practice is gradually diminished. In the sons of men of this kind religious indifference is wont to grow; and their sons are still baptized, make first Communion, enter marriage before the Church, and call a priest at the end of life, but besides these things there is almost no practice of religion. In the third generation there will already be complete indifference, or even hostility toward religion, so that in practical life paganism as it were prevails.

Against these dangers priests must seriously admonish and fortify the faithful, both publicly and also privately in confession.

In present times, indeed, the matter perhaps becomes less practical in our regions, because many liberals no longer frequent the church or the sacraments, nor is the struggle against them so sharp as formerly; nevertheless the principles always hold, and new circumstances could occur in which they would again serve more in practice. Indeed, because of the absence of struggle the dangers are perhaps greater, since the faithful do not so easily perceive the imminence of danger and the greatness of the evil. Hence one must never desist from opportune admonition.

III. Notions concerning Liberalism.² - In general, all those are called liberals who confuse the physical liberty of choosing with independence from God and from those sharing divine authority, which moderns call moral liberty; hence, under the false name of liberty, they pursue a certain absurd and most deadly license or independence.

² Concerning Liberalism, cf. Pius IX, const. Quanta Cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Syllabus; Leo XIII, const. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885, and enc. Libertas, 20 June 1888; Moulart, L'Eglise et l'Etat; Daris, L'Eglise et l'Etat; Villada, Casus Conscientiae; Aertnijs, Th. P., nn. 94-101; Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, n. 246 sq.; Ballerini, Opus Morale, II, tr. 4, n. 164 sq.; Theologia Mechliniensis, de Fide, nn. 44-46. Certain things are also found in Genicot, Th. M., I, n. 205, and in Lehmkuhl and Ferreres, in their respective work: Casus Conscientiae.

A. One kind is doctrinal or philosophical liberalism, which applies in the moral and civil matter the principles of rationalism or even naturalism, which place the principate of human reason, private or public, individual or universal, as the highest principle and judge of truth.

And indeed in such a way that it denies every divine power and law and follows a morality fully independent; or at least denies every revelation and positive and supernatural divine law, but admits a merely natural morality. This is not treated here, because it pertains to those who are not faithful and therefore do not confess.

B. Another kind is merely economic, which denies divine and moral law in economic matters and in the production of riches.

This is not considered in the present matter, because it is opposed more to justice than to faith and religion or to the first precept of the Decalogue.

C. Another kind is merely political, which admits divine law, even supernatural law, for private persons, but not for civil society and its laws; hence it defends liberty of conscience, of cults, of the press, of doctrine, and of association.

Namely, it proclaims the separation of the State and the Catholic Church, and the State's indifference concerning various religious confessions. But by the name of separation from the Church, they understand and signify an absolute divorce between the two powers, all mutual concord and all mutual help being taken away, so that the Church, despoiled of every influence, of all goods, and of all external prerogatives, lives in hiding, while the State governs all things as if the Church did not exist. Hence it professes the separation of marriage from the Church, and its subjection under the civil power; the separation of the school from the Church and its subordination under the direction of civil authority; the abrogation of the immunity of clerics from the burden of undergoing and exercising military service, etc. In one word: it is a political system which professes the full independence of the State from the Church or from religion.³

³ Cf. encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas, 20 June 1888.

In this form of liberalism a threefold grade can be distinguished:

1. Radical liberalism, which so exaggerates this independence that it wishes the Church to be subject to the State. Its watchword is: the Church in the State, that is, the Church subject to the State.

2. Moderate liberalism, which professes the simple separation of the State from the Church and from every religion, using this formula: a free Church in a free State.

3. So-called Catholic liberalism, which professes that from the nature of the thing religion is not to be separated from civil society, but that each power ought to govern the human race by a concordant effort; yet in the general hypothesis of the present age, attention being paid to progress and the condition of men, that it is no longer expedient to desire and defend that conjunction, but that simple separation is to be approved and sought, together with the modern liberties flowing from it, especially those of cults and of the press. Let the words be noted well: in the general hypothesis, to be sought, to be approved; because it is not liberal but truly Catholic to profess that in special circumstances these liberties are to be tolerated in order to avoid greater evils or to obtain greater goods.

Now the errors of liberalism in every grade have been condemned by the authority of the Church;⁴ hence those who knowingly profess such errors sin gravely.

⁴ Cf. the encyclical of Pius IX, Quanta Cura, and the Syllabus; likewise the encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas.

The word liberal is of itself equivocal; hence if in certain regions it is taken in an entirely different sense, or designates a merely political party which in no way defends condemned principles, those things which we have said would not hold concerning such liberalism. Nor do we intend to speak of it, but we speak in the theologically received sense.

IV. Whether there is invincible ignorance of liberalism. - The answer is:

1. As regards the radical form of liberalism, ordinarily this must be denied, because its errors are so open, and so opposed to the fundamental principles of morality, that even the more unlearned cannot fail to recognize its falsity and impiety.

2. As regards the other milder forms, if the unlearned are excepted, most who call themselves liberals are not in good faith, and therefore are to be treated as such by the confessor.

The reason is that the documents of the Holy See condemning Liberalism are publicly known, and have been so propagated that invincible ignorance among most people seems morally impossible: this holds especially and generally concerning those who by reason of office are bound to know the falsity and condemnation of liberalism, such as kings, ministers and counselors of the kingdom, senators, deputies, prefects of provinces and cities, judges, advocates, and similar officials who have a part in making laws or putting them into execution; and also editors of political newspapers.

3. Nevertheless, more unlearned persons and, exceptionally, certain educated persons are found who profess milder Liberalism in good faith.

This happens both because, having been preoccupied by the doctrine of their parents, teachers, and companions, they judge liberalism of this kind harmless, and because they do not know how to distinguish between thesis and hypothesis, and confuse the liberty of evil which is owed by right with the toleration of evil which is done for the sake of avoiding a greater evil or increasing or preserving good.

V. Is the confessor bound to question penitents concerning the sin of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, as concerning other sins. And indeed, if liberals everywhere are admitted to the sacraments without question or admonition, and confessors in the sacred tribunal keep deep silence concerning this matter, the faithful will think the matter is not of great importance and will not sufficiently perceive the depravity of liberalism. Hence, although the matter, as we have noted, has become less practical because of circumstances, nevertheless it is not to be consigned wholly to oblivion: otherwise concerning the evil doctrine and dangers of Liberalism the same will happen as concerning bad readings, which are no longer sufficiently held as evil, because priests have omitted sufficiently to admonish concerning their depravity. Therefore:

1. A penitent is to be questioned, whoever he may be, whether unlearned or learned, whether poor or prince, who is silent about the sin of liberalism of which he is certainly known to be guilty, for example from the confessor's own knowledge or from public knowledge. And if, when questioned, the penitent denies it and appears formally to lie, he can in no way be absolved.

2. Likewise he is to be questioned who is probably thought to be a liberal or a favorer of liberalism, for example if he is held as such by many grave men, or if he belongs to a liberal assembly or party which is opposed to religion or the Church, or if ordinarily he reads truly liberal newspapers without just cause. If a penitent of this kind seriously denies that he is a liberal, ordinarily he is to be believed: unless, because of special circumstances, a grave doubt remains, in which case the principles are to be applied which govern those doubtfully disposed, and he is to be absolved only under condition if a grave cause is present, or absolution is to be deferred if this is not feared to be harmful to the penitent.

With those things wholly omitted which are handed down at length by dogmatic theologians concerning the nature, division, and formal object of faith, all of which you may see, if you please, in Mazzella, de Virtutibus Infusis, disp. 2 and 3, here it will be said only concerning the necessity of faith, concerning its material object, and concerning the vices opposed to it.

The material object of faith, concerning which alone we treat here, is that which we believe by divine and Catholic faith, or, as is clear from canon 1323, § 1, all those things which are contained in the written or handed-down word of God, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed. - But it is not required that all revealed truths be believed explicitly, provided that all are believed implicitly. Indeed, among those truths themselves to be believed explicitly, those which are of necessity of means must be distinguished from those which are of necessity of precept. - Cf. Mazzella, disp. 2, art. 7, § 1.

I Say 1st. It is certain that these two things must necessarily be believed by necessity of means for salvation, namely that God exists, and that he is the Rewarder. The first is clear from the fact that it is impossible to obtain salvation, namely the ultimate end, unless we tend toward him; but we tend through faith, and this cannot be had unless before all things the existence of God is believed. The other is clear from proposition 22 condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in the Rewarder." But both are confirmed from the Apostle, Hebr. xi, 6: "One approaching God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him." - Cf. Mazzella, disp. cited, § 3, nn. 864 and seq.

I say 2nd. By necessity of precept all the faithful are bound explicitly to believe 1st. all those things which are contained in the Apostles' Creed, and 2nd. the divine efficacy of the principal sacraments, namely Baptism, Penance, and the Eucharist, and also of the other sacraments when they are proximately to be received. The reason for the first is that the very nature of Christian profession which is contained in the Creed demands this. It is clear also from the practice of all the faithful. - But the reason for the second is that the sacraments cannot be received worthily unless their divine efficacy is known, and this cannot be known by any other account except through faith, since they are of positive institution.

Question 1. Is explicit faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation required by necessity of means?

Response. It is controverted, but the negative opinion is certainly probable. The reason is that before Christ implicit faith in these mysteries sufficed; therefore also after his advent it ought to suffice; for justification ought not to be said to have been made more difficult. Besides, only that faith is required which is necessary and suffices for justification, or for an act of love of friendship: but implicit faith in these mysteries suffices for this. Therefore. - Nor does the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, under n. 64, stand in the way, which lies thus: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith; and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ": it does not stand in the way, I say; for deservedly it could be condemned by reason of the first part, in which generally, or in every case, it is asserted that a man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 2. - Suarez, disp. 12, sect. 4. - Lugo, disp. 12, n. 91. - Mazzella, disp. 3, n. 875.

Question 2. Can a penitent invincibly ignorant of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation be licitly absolved?

Response. Negatively, outside a case of necessity, for example, danger of death. The reason is that the opinion affirming that explicit faith in these mysteries is required by necessity of means is probable, indeed to some, such as St. Alphonsus, it seems more probable; and therefore the confessor absolving a penitent of this kind would expose the sacrament to danger of nullity. Hence the confessor ought either to dismiss him until he has been sufficiently instructed, or, what in many cases would be better, to instruct him, at least as much as is enough for eliciting an act of faith here and now, namely by clearly proposing those two mysteries and seeking assent to them.

But if the penitent were certainly in a state of vincible ignorance of these mysteries and did not wish to learn them, or invincibly ignored those things which are certainly of necessity of means, he could in no way be absolved even in danger of death, because he would be altogether incapable of receiving justification. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 3. - Baller., (a) and (b), p. 165.

Question 3. Is there an obligation of believing explicitly the precepts of the Decalogue?

Response. Many affirm this, because the precepts of the Decalogue were revealed that they might be observed by all; but several rightly contradict it, both because precepts of this kind can be known in another way than through revelation, and because these precepts were given not for believing, but for acting. - Nor should you say that the sacraments also were given for acting rightly; for the response is that they cannot be received worthily unless they are first believed to have been divinely instituted.

For the rest, although these precepts need not necessarily be known through faith, nevertheless they must be known under grave obligation; not indeed in order and as to the individual words, but as to substance. The same must be said concerning the precepts of the Church and concerning the Lord's Prayer, and some add also concerning the Angelic Salutation.

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, from q. 1 to q. 16.)

[Since, as St. Thomas says in the prologue of II-II, all moral matter is reduced to the consideration of the virtues, and all virtues are to be further reduced to seven, the Angelic Doctor divides them into three theological and four cardinal virtues, and he undertakes an ordered treatment of them. Beginning therefore with the first, those virtues are called theological which look immediately to God and in a certain way attain him, insofar as they surpass human and natural aptitude and capacity; and for this reason they are not acquired by our acts, but are infused by God alone. Three, however, are commonly counted, namely faith, hope and charity, which we accordingly undertake to investigate here with the same Doctor from q. 1 to q. 44, proposing and resolving the principal questions that are wont to be raised concerning them.

First there is treated faith, which comes first at least in the order of generation.

We judge it opportune to set before this treatise a brief exposition of faith as outlined by the Vatican Synod itself in the constitution Dei Filius, chapter 3, on Faith.

« Since man depends entirely upon God as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason is subject wholly to the uncreated truth, we are bound by faith to render to God who reveals full obedience of intellect and will. Now this faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with the inspiration and assistance of God's grace, we believe that the things revealed by him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of the things is seen by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not, Hebr., XI, 1.

That nevertheless the obedience of our faith might be consonant with reason, God willed that external arguments of his revelation be joined to the internal assists of the Holy Spirit, namely divine facts, and above all miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of divine revelation and suited to the understanding of all. Wherefore both Moses and the prophets, and above all Christ the Lord himself, performed many and most manifest miracles and prophecies; and of the Apostles we read: But they going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed, Marc., XVI, 20. And again it is written: We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a lamp that shines in a dark place, II Petr., 1, 19.

Although the assent of faith is by no means a blind movement of the soul, no one nevertheless can consent to the preaching of the Gospel as he ought in order to obtain salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all men sweetness in consenting and believing the truth¹. ¹ Synod. Arausican., II, can. 7.

Wherefore faith itself, even when it does not work through charity, is a gift of God, and its act is a work pertaining to salvation, by which man renders free obedience to God himself, by consenting and cooperating with his grace, which he could resist.

Further, by divine and Catholic faith all those things are to be believed which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed.

But since without faith it is impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of his children, therefore no one has ever obtained justification without it, nor will anyone obtain eternal life unless he shall have persevered in it unto the end.

But that we might be able to satisfy the duty of embracing the true faith and of persevering constancy in it, God through his only-begotten Son instituted the Church, and endowed his institution with manifest marks, so that it could be recognized by all as the custodian and teacher of the revealed word. For to the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvelous, that have been disposed by God toward making evident the credibility of the Christian faith. Nay more, the Church by her very self, on account of her admirable propagation, her eminent sanctity and her inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things, on account of her Catholic unity and invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of her own divine legation.

By which it comes about that she herself is like a standard lifted up unto the nations, Is., XI, 12, and she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and makes certain her own children that the faith they profess rests upon a most firm foundation. To this testimony indeed an efficacious succor is added from supernatural virtue. For the most benign Lord arouses and helps by his grace even those who go astray, that they may be able to come to the acknowledgment of the truth; and those whom he has translated out of darkness into his admirable light, he confirms by his grace in this same light that they may persevere, never forsaking unless he is forsaken. Wherefore the condition of those who have adhered to the Catholic faith by the heavenly gift of faith is by no means equal to that of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for they who have received the faith under the magisterium of the Church can never have any just cause for changing that same faith or calling it into doubt. Which things being so, giving thanks to God the Father, who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light, let us not neglect so great salvation, but looking on the author of faith and finisher, Jesus, let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, Hebr., XII, 2 and X, 22. »]

I answer : The mysteries of our faith are evidently credible¹⁰, according to that of Psal., XCI, 5 : Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible. ¹⁰ Below, q. 5, aa. 1 and 2, o.

It is proved. 1° That is evidently credible — with evidence, namely, not metaphysical but moral, excluding reasonable doubt — which is proved by competent witnesses, signs, and other extrinsic arguments. But the mysteries of our faith are of this kind. Therefore. — The minor will be clear from the motives of credibility to be set out below. — The major also is evident; for credibility, like truth, is not taken from within, from the connection of predicate with subject, or from what the thing is, but from extrinsic arguments, namely testimonies, signs, etc. Thus from the fact that competent witnesses affirm something at a trial, there is evidence, not that it is so — for they may lie — but that it is so credible and judgable, without reasonable fear of the other side.

2° Nothing is knowable without the evidence of knowability, nor probable without the evidence of probability. Therefore neither is anything believable without the evidence of credibility.

^{11 11} Ibid., a. 4, ad 2.

3° The assent of faith ought to be prudent; for it is an act of virtue. And prudence dictates that nothing is to be believed except what is credible: For he that quickly believes, that is, rashly, is light of heart. Eccli., xix, 4. But we are commanded to believe most firmly the mysteries of faith. Therefore they are supposed to be evidently credible, or worthy of faith.

[You will object 1° : What is evidently credible is evidently true. But the mysteries of faith are not evidently true. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major. For truth, as was said, is sought from within, or from what the thing is; but credibility from testimonies and extrinsic motives.

I insist. What is evidently credible is evidently possible. But, in divine things, to be possible and to be true are the same. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; because possibility, like truth, is sought from within. Hence it sometimes happens that false things are more credible and more probable than true ones.

You will object 2° : If the mysteries of faith were evidently credible, all to whom they are equally proposed would believe. But the consequent is false. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the consequence, both because not all attend to them as they ought, but either from perversity of affection, or from carelessness for salvation, or because of the difficulty of the things to be believed in particular, remove their mind from examining them, and because they place an obstacle in the way of interior illumination, as was said elsewhere.

You will object 3° : The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° They cannot be understood by reason. 2° They have no agreement with reason. 3° They can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason apparently, I concede; truly and really, I deny. For true and real opposition cannot occur except between things of the same order, one of which directly excludes the other. But our reason is shut up within natural things, while the objects of faith are above nature. There cannot therefore be between them an opposition. true, whereby they would exclude one another, but only in this, that among the ideas of reason there is none that either clearly represents the truths of faith or even evidently excludes them: which opposition is merely apparent. Wherefore it must be diligently noted that it is one thing for something to be above reason, that is, that it is neither understood nor can be understood through the ideas of reason, or that it exceeds and surpasses the grasp of our reason; another thing for it to be against reason, namely that it be evidently excluded through the ideas of reason, which exclusion would be wholly required for true and real opposition. Now the case stands thus between the mysteries of faith and reason, that reason simply does not grasp them. Hence, although they are above, they are not however against reason, nor can they be held by reason to be false.

To the first proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries cannot be understood by reason as to what they are and how they are, I concede; that they are and have a real object, I deny. Also in natural things there are many whose intrinsic mode of subsisting we by no means know, and yet we are certain that they truly exist.

To the second proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries have no immediate agreement with reason, I concede; mediate, I deny. It is not denied that in every cognition some agreement with reason is necessary; for reason is the universal medium of all cognitions. But this agreement is mediate or immediate. In natural things, it is immediate, because reason is of itself apt to know them. But in things placed above nature, recourse is had in vain to the light of reason, which is not proportionate; an immediate agreement is undeservedly demanded which the essence of things does not allow. Recourse must therefore be had to mediate agreement, which consists in this, that on account of the infallible authority of God revealing we know many things that are not contained proximately in the ideas of reason, yet are understood by the light of reason to be most certain, since nothing is more consonant with reason than that full faith be given to God speaking.

To the third proof, I distinguish. That revealed truths can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason, apparently. I concede; truly and really, I deny. For a universal answer let it suffice that, since it has been proved that the opposition between supernatural truths and the ideas of reason is merely apparent, the arguments brought from the principles of reason against the revealed mysteries cannot be truly and really insoluble, but only apparently. Let III Contra gentes, c. 7 be read on this question, where D. Thomas proves by several arguments what he asserts, namely: « Although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless those things which reason naturally has indwelling cannot be contrary to this truth. »]

You will ask 1° by what light the knowledge of credibility is had: by a supernatural or by a natural light?

I answer. It is more probably held to be had by natural light aided by some supernatural Light, namely the actual illuminations by which God illumines their intellect to perceive and judge the things that are of God; and it comes about that they attend to those things that are said and preached, as Act., XVI, 14: The Lord opened the heart of Lydia, to attend to those things which were said by Paul; and that in them they observe and judge there to be divine credibility, to which faith finally follows.

You will ask 2° whether, in order that he believe something, it must necessarily be evident to him that the mysteries of faith are credible.

I answer. Affirmatively. It is clear from what has been said; otherwise indeed he would believe imprudently. However, an equal evidence is not necessary for all; for sometimes the mere voice of the preacher suffices, with an interior light persuading the credibility of his words, as is clear in children and ruder believers believing the words spoken by pastors whom they know to speak in the name of the Church, in India believers believing missionaries preaching without miracles, in the Apostles following Christ at his mere call, before they had seen his miracles.

1°: Faith remains in a sinner who does not commit the sin of unbelief.

It is proved, firstly, from the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 2, where he says: If I should have all faith..., but have not charity, I am nothing. By these words he plainly supposes that charity can be separated from faith while faith remains, and thus that faith can be in a sinner.

Secondly, from Trent, session VI, canon 28, defining thus: « If anyone shall say that when grace is lost through sin faith is always lost with it, or that the faith which remains is not true faith, though it is not living...; let him be anathema. » Hence this conclusion is de fide. To this point tends this proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, the 12th: « When in great sinners all love fails, faith also fails, and even if they seem to believe, it is not divine faith, but human. » Likewise this 52nd of Quesnel: « All other means of salvation are contained in faith, as in its germ and seed; but this faith is not without love and confidence. »

Thirdly, by reason. Not every sin is contrary to faith, nor does it destroy the formal reason of its object: thus one who steals does not for that reason cease to believe that God is the first and infallible truth in speaking. Therefore.

But when the holy Fathers say that there is no faith or any virtue without charity, they speak of living faith and of the virtues in their perfect state of being, as we have already noted.

I say, secondly: In demons and the damned there does not remain infused and supernatural faith ³⁰. ³⁰ This work, q. 5, a. 2, c, and ad 2.

It is proved. Demons and the damned are stripped of all gratuitous gifts, especially those ordered to beatitude, which they neither hope for nor can hope for. Now faith is a gratuitous gift by its nature ordered to beatitude; for it is, according to the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1, the substance of things to be hoped for, and according to the Council of Trent, session VI, cap. 8, « the beginning of salvation, the root and foundation of justification. » Therefore.

It is confirmed. For supernatural faith there is required a pious motion of the will, or a good affect of credulity toward the first truth revealing. Now there is in demons and the damned no pious motion of the will, no good will, since it is fixed in evil; and although what they do is sometimes good from its proximate object, yet they always do it from a depraved intention of the end, and thus it is always evil.

The SUN is not seen otherwise than by the light which it itself gives; nor does God suffer himself to be seen by another's light: Faith alone points the way from where it itself has come. This is that light created first in the first Microcosm, separating night from day, indeed the first-born of the heavenly virtues, and therefore to be set forth in the first place: On one side it shines forth, and on the other it darkens, like that pillar of cloud, bright indeed to the Israelites, but dark to the Egyptians: It is indeed a Mirror, veiled with much obscurity, yet with no stain of error, exhibiting the great in a small form: It is also that triangular Shield, which, showing God to us as three and one, extinguishes all the darts of the most wicked one: Taking it up in all things, we shall resist valiantly in faith, defending it with those reasons which it itself brings forth, in place of the virtues.

§ St. Thomas, quaest. 7. in two articles.

St. Thomas enumerates twin effects of faith, namely Fear and the Purification of the heart. He gathers each from Scripture: Fear indeed from 2. of James: The demons believe, and tremble: Purification, from 15. Acts: Faith purifying hearts.

But St. Bonaventure more elegantly, serm. 1. de pluribus Martyribus, considering that chapter 11. ad Hebr. where the Apostle places the definition of faith, and establishes it as the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice, shows that almost all good things are derived from faith.

He PROVES it, however, because Every cause, the more first it is, so much the more universal for producing all effects, as is had in the book de causis. But he confirms this with examples; for the supreme Pontiff inflows more into the Church than the Archbishop; and the latter more than the Bishop; and he more than the Archdeacon. Similarly the heavens, the higher they are, the more universal causes of effects. Finally the root inflows more than the Trunk; and the latter more than the branches for producing fruits. Since therefore faith is the foundation and root of the virtues, it must have very many effects.

FIRST therefore he asserts with the Apostle ad Ephes. and Hebr. 11. The saints by faith conquered kingdoms, etc. that faith is a Shield for resisting the adversary, and conquering him. This encomium of faith St. Cyril of Jerusalem ascribes catech. 5.

THEN he says that good works arise from faith: Whence it is said Hebr. 11. They wrought justice, that is, good works, which he enumerates at length in the Saints with an amphitheater erected. Thirdly faith is said to be the beginning of salvation: They obtained the promises.

Fourthly, he asserts faith to be illuminative of the intellect, and purgative of the affect, and fortificative of effects, and thus to rule all the potencies, which are sufficiently divided into the Cognitive, Volitive, and Operative.

It is THEREFORE illuminative, like a ray of the Sun. But as the ray more illuminates the subject that is disposed, e. g. the air than water; water than earth, and a golden tablet more than a silver one, and silver more than wood; so also faith; whence Peter 2. cap. 1. having related the glorious transfiguration of the Son of God in the figure of the Sun, says: We have the more firm prophetic word: whereunto you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts. The Holy Doctor continues, that the sun illuminates and warms more quiet bodies, because man becomes wise and understanding while the soul rests, as Aristotle says 7. Phys. t. 20. Therefore the Sun warms quiet water, not flowing. Thus therefore he illuminates and warms quiet minds with the ray of faith. From which he infers that heretics, because they are unstable and unquiet, are never illuminated or warmed. See the Seraphic Doctor wonderfully eloquent in his discourse.

Wherefore he says that that blind man Lucae 18. received light from Faith: Look, your faith has made you safe. For this is the first Light to salvation. Therefore Hebr. 11. it is said: It is the argument of things not appearing.

SECONDLY he proves Faith to be purgative. And he proves it with St. Thomas first from that Act. 15. Then, because the soul, since it is the most noble image of God, drinks in impurities while it is mixed with earth through faults, and unlike God, appears monstrous. But Faith, like the Sun, purges the earthly dregs, raises the humors to heaven, resolves them into showers, and sends forth the flowing ones into rains, to adorn the earth with flowers and enrich it with fruits, and vivifies it lying half-dead with horrible rigidity in winter. Therefore it is said Rom. 1. to give life: The just lives by faith; for Faith is, let it be said, the Dawn, fleeing the shadows of nights. Whence also Baptism, which is the Sacrament of light, as is said in the same epistle ad Hebr. and regeneration, is called the Sacrament of faith. See the Holy Doctor.

THIRDLY he shows faith to be operative; for the more a virtue is first, and root, and foundation, so much the more does it inflow into operation. So (he says) the virtue of the heart, which is the root or foundation of all the members, inflows most, and makes the part more robust into which it inflows from nearer, and thus renders the right part stronger, whence the right arm is stronger for fighting. From which Aristotle says lib. 2. de hist. animalium cap. 2. that the Lion first moves the right foot to walking; And the woman who is pregnant with a male, when suddenly called, first moves the right foot rather than the left. Now faith is the foundation or substance Hebr. 11. because as substance is the foundation and basis of all accidents; so also Faith, of the virtues. Hence in the chapter brought forward the highest and glorious works of the Saints are enumerated: The saints by faith, etc. See the Seraphic Doctor, whose words I am reluctant to transfer, discoursing at length loc. cit.

He PROCEEDS indeed to show that Faith is the principle of Fear; Servile fear indeed has Inform Faith as its principle; for through faith we fear the eternal punishments believed; but the beginning of Filial fear is Formed Faith, which proposes to us the benefits of God, his goodness, promises, etc.

St. Augustine enumerates the fruits of Faith serm. 10. de verbis Apostoli. Ambrose serm. 8. in Psalm. 118. and other Fathers as at St. Bonaventure in Pharetra lib. 2. cap. 23. and in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 3. and tit. 8. cap. 5. and p. 1. Brevil. cap. 2. and the following: and lib. 5. Compendii Theologicae veritatis, from cap. 19. to 21. In these places he says marvelous things, which it would be difficult to report worthily, unless transcribed word for word. Nor does he set forth less splendid things in the sermons of the Hexaemeron 2. 6. 8. Similarly also in other little works, which if I were to report, I would fill very many leaves; but I deliberately send you back to the Fountain, whence you may drink the veins of Paradise. I return to that sermon, in which the Holy Doctor seemed to concede Inform Faith to the demons; but he understands it, according to what was said by us with him quaest. 26.

I. For the human infirmity just described, God has provided two kinds of remedies by which it may be healed: one internal, the other external. The former is called divine grace, which by its own power dissipates the darkness of the mind, raises up the will, moves it, applies it, and out of one unwilling makes one willing; blots out the stains of the soul and heals its wounds; and is infused by God alone. The latter is external, namely the doctrine divinely revealed, which illumines the mind from without, directs it, forms morals, and opens the way by which we must proceed to our Fatherland. This doctrine is enclosed in the divine Books of which sacred Scripture consists.

II. Question I. What is sacred Scripture? Answer: It is the written word of God, or the letter of God to men, as the Fathers teach. In manifold ways has God spoken to men. First, he published the book of nature, as the Apostle Paul says in Romans, chapter 1, where he states: For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. Second, he himself wrote his law on the tablets of hearts, imbuing men inwardly. Third, he consigned to Moses the two tablets of the Decalogue written with his own finger, as is found in Exodus. Fourth, he wrote not only by himself, but also through his Prophets, Apostles, and the other sacred writers, to whom he dictated the whole of sacred Scripture. This sacred Scripture is sometimes called the word of God, because dictated by God; sometimes the Testament of God, because in it he pledges to us an infinite inheritance and declares his will; sometimes divine Scripture, because it was inspired by the Spirit of God; sometimes holy Scripture, because all things contained in it are ordered to sanctification. It is called also the divine Law, because it sets forth the law given to the Jews and to Christians; and finally it is named the Bible — that is, the books par excellence, from the Greek word Βιβλίον.

III. This divine Scripture consists, by the definition of the Church, of seventy-four books, of which forty-seven constitute the old Testament, and the remaining twenty-seven compose the new Covenant. The former are distributed into legal, historical, sapiential, and prophetical books. In the first class is placed the Pentateuch of Moses. To the second belong the books of Josue, Judges, Ruth, the four books of Kings, the two of Paralipomenon, the two of Esdras, the one of Tobias, Judith, Esther, Job, and the two of the Machabees. To the third pertain the Psalter, Proverbs, the Canticle of Canticles, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus. In the fourth are placed Isaias, Jeremias, Baruch, Ezechiel, Daniel, and the twelve minor Prophets. By a similar partition the new Testament is divided: for to the legal books are referred the four Gospels; to the historical, the Acts of the Apostles; to the sapiential, the fourteen epistles of St. Paul, the two of St. Peter, the three of St. John, the one of St. James the Apostle, and the one of St. Jude the Apostle; to the prophetical, the Apocalypse of St. John the Apostle. That these books are canonical was defined in the Council of Trent, Session IV — entire, with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Church, and as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition.

IV. Question II. How manifold is the sense of divine Scripture? Answer: Twofold — the literal, and the spiritual or mystical. The spiritual is divided into the allegorical, the tropological or moral, and the anagogical. The literal sense is that which is signified immediately by the words themselves. The spiritual or mystical is that which the things signified by the words convey. The allegorical is that according to which certain deeds of the old Testament signify something to be done in the new — as the lifting up of the serpent in the desert portended Christ to be lifted up upon the cross. The tropological, or moral, regards integrity of morals. The anagogical signifies those things which look to eternal glory. Of the literal sense, one kind is the grammatical, as in this text, The letter killeth, which is sometimes false, because not intended by the Holy Spirit; the other is the theological, which Theologians consider as intended by the Holy Spirit, and which can never be false. The metaphorical or figurative sense is contained under the improper literal sense. The proper literal sense is that which the words, strictly taken, signify — such as these: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God. The improper, or metaphorical, is that whose words are transferred from their proper to an improper signification — such as these: My sheep hear my voice; the sheep metaphorically represent the faithful people. Again, one allegory is of words, another of things. The four senses recounted are comprehended in these two verses:

The letter teaches deeds; allegory, what you are to believe; > the moral sense, what you are to do; anagogy, what you are to hope.

The word Jerusalem expresses the aforesaid fourfold sense: literally it expresses the city of Palestine; allegorically, the Church; tropologically, the Soul; anagogically, the eternal Fatherland.

V. Question III. Which Scripture is authentic? Answer: No autographs of the sacred Scriptures are found today, but all are apographs, published in diverse languages — Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and the Vernacular. The Vulgate alone has been declared authentic by the Church, and from it the Theologian ought to draw his conclusions; although he is by no means forbidden to approach and weigh the original text as well, both for the sake of easier understanding and for the sake of refuting those who do not admit the authority of the Vulgate.

VI. Question IV. Is the understanding of holy Scripture open to all? Answer: The Lutherans and Calvinists contend that the understanding of holy Scripture is evident and perspicuous to each and every private person, even to mere women, in those things which regard the dogmas of faith and the precepts of morals. This is a delirium at war with the manifest experience of all ages. Has not every one of the innumerable Christian sects boasted that the holy Scriptures stand on its side? For God willed that many things in the divine Scriptures should be obscure and profound, that in searching and meditating upon them he might exercise human talents and repress the audacity and pride of men, and that he might procure veneration and majesty for the divine Scriptures. This first extreme being avoided, the other must be shunned — that of those who, under the pretext of obscurity, neglect the study of the divine Scriptures to the loss of their own salvation. Although some oracles of the Scriptures are obscure, nevertheless in those things which pertain to the rules of morals and of faith the divine Scriptures are commonly plain and perspicuous. Do not even human lawgivers themselves take pains to express their laws in perspicuous words and lucid phrase, that they may remove, so far as can be done, disagreements of interpretation? Do they not to this end select the more erudite and learned men, to consign the Laws to writing in such discourse and choice of words that they can be understood even by the very people for whose government they are enacted? Now to this end God gave his laws: that they might be grasped by the Faithful, who are bound to execute them. Why did the Apostle Paul, with the other sacred Writers, write his Epistles to the Romans, to the Corinthians, and to the other peoples, except to instruct them? He wrote, therefore, with that perspicuity which was suited to the understanding of the peoples, although some things are loftier.

VII. The contrariety of interpretations and opinions frequently declares, not the obscurity of the Scriptures, but the contrary desires and affections of those who opine and interpret, which twist minds into contrary senses. And indeed, what do you think is the reason why the books which they call spiritual agree so much among themselves? Run through Granada, Tauler, Scupoli, à Kempis, Rodríguez, and all the rest, whether Italians, or French, or Spaniards, or Germans: you will find in all absolutely the same doctrine; in these books no disagreement, no battle, but the same maxims, the same rules, precepts, exhortations; the same pronouncements, commands, and counsels. The reason is one alone: that their authors, with a mind empty of passions, sought out the truths, and by fervent prayer begged the knowledge of them, and delivered them with a certain heavenly unction. Hence so great an agreement among them: for they all explain the doctrine that is truly evangelical; they all interpret the Gospels sincerely, and with disputations set aside. Wherefore their doctrine is suited to all Christians. For they err who think that it serves only those souls which aspire to singular and sublime perfection and sanctity. Does not the Gospel comprehend all Christians — does it not bind them? Since, then, the doctrine of such books is evangelical, it obliges all in some measure. And indeed, that all Christians are bound by a most grave precept to yearn for evangelical perfection, I shall expound more fully below.

VIII. But whence, then, come the disagreements, battles, and interminable disputations, so frequent in the volumes of the Casuists? Because very many of them, the doctrine of the Scriptures being set aside, consult human reason, obscured by the fog of its diverse passions. They commonly search out, not what the Gospels teach, but what the earlier Casuists teach. This is the true cause why those books swarm with quarrels, entanglements, battles, and vain little distinctions, and teach not how to live morally, but how to cavil acutely. I except always those who in very deed teach the evangelical doctrine.

IX. Question V. What way is to be followed, that we may attain the genuine sense of holy Scripture? Answer: A profound abasement of soul, fervent prayers, and petitions for the divine light ought to precede the reading of the Scriptures. Prejudices and anticipations must be cast away, and the glory of God alone kept before the eyes, the applause of the world being spurned and every human respect cut off. For a false interpretation depraves the sincerity of Scripture no less than the style or pen with which one either takes words away from the divine Scriptures or adds them, says Tertullian in the book On Prescription, chapter 17: An adulterous sense obstructs the truth and the divine Scripture as much as a corrupting pen. You will object that it is heretics who are the corrupters of holy Scripture, not Catholics. Heretics, I answer, are obstinate depravers of the Scriptures, because they despise the definitions of the catholic Church; Catholics, however, submit their interpretations to the definition of the Church. For the rest, these too, taken singly, can be deceived in their private interpretations. Amid so great a contrariety of opinions in the moral order, more than one cannot be true. The Church tolerates many contrary interpretations. But this tolerance in no way prevents adulteration from being adulteration, and falsity from being falsity. Whether those who are deceived and interpret falsely are free from the crime either of negligence or of a most hidden pride, is known to God alone. When doubts occur, there must be consulted the Fathers of the Church, the definitions of the Councils and of the Roman Church, and the Bishops, whom God has placed to rule his Church.

X. St. Paul, in 2 Corinthians, chapter 2, says: Let us not be as very many, adulterating the word of God, but with sincerity. Not a few, but very many, even in the very time of the Apostles, were adulterating the word of God. If then very many, will they today be few? On this passage, lecture 3, St. Thomas has these words: Adulterating the word of God — that is, preaching either for gain or for the favor of praise ... If therefore your end is gain, if your intention is favor and your own glory, you adulterate the word of God. Both Preachers and Theologians who, in order to promote their own prejudged opinions, to catch the applause of the peoples, and to shine forth more eminently, study to draw the divine Scriptures to themselves by an artifice of distinctions, turn out adulterators of the word of God. Such men are called by the Apostle James, chapter 4, judges of the law, not doers of it, when he says: But if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge. No one boasts himself a judge of the divine law, though very many subject the holy law to their own judgment. Let us hear St. Augustine, who in the book On True Religion, chapter 31, wisely distinguishes these two things — to know the law, and to judge it: It is lawful, then, for clean souls to know the eternal law, but not lawful to judge it. And the difference is this: that for knowing, it is enough that we see that something is so, or is not so; but for judging, we add something whereby we signify that it could also be otherwise — as when we say: it ought to be so, or it ought to have been so, or it will have to be so, as craftsmen do in their works... But manifold is human delectation. Few, therefore, are they who, with clean souls, endowed with humility and a docile spirit, and stripped of self-love, strive to acknowledge the truth of the Scriptures; very many, on the contrary, who, their own passions leading the way, judge the law. For they judge the law as often, says Augustine, as they perversely decide that these opinions are, or ought to be, probable; that this is not, or ought not to be, a sin: and in order to confirm these preconceived opinions, they hunt after testimonies of the Scriptures and bend them to their own senses. The most illustrious Jesuit, Father Miguel de Elizalde, in Book 6, question 14, section 7, sets up this thesis as the title of a paragraph: But the Probabilists most of all become judges, and break asunder all the laws of rightly interpreting the holy Scriptures. This testimony is true, and he proves it by many weighty reasons,¹ and confirms it both by reason and by the authority of the Fathers. For the way of the Scriptures is narrow, and of truth alone; the way of Probabilism is broad and spacious, since it is the way both of falsity and of truth — concerning which St. John Chrysostom says, in Homily 18 on chapter 7 of Matthew: Their will is a law unto them; and they are not under the law, but the law is under them. But the way of life is all justice. And it is said to be narrow, because it is enclosed within the rule of truth and of discipline. The way of truth alone is the way of the Lord; and only they who walk this way are called blessed by David: Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. Psalm 118.

¹ See Tome I, Apparatus, Book I, Disputation 2, chapter 4.

I. Words fail me with which to lay open, as its dignity deserves, the extreme necessity of the study here proposed. If I could impress this single truth more deeply upon your soul, O director of souls, and fully persuade you of it, I should attain the fruit which I have proposed to myself in the labor I have undertaken. Words do not reform the morals of men; but the law of the Lord alone converts souls. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and innumerable others delivered for the most part excellent institutions of morals; yet they recalled no one to a better way of life. Gather from this what fruit so many books, whether old or new, which swarm with the mere opinions of men, are apt to bring forth. Such is the disposition and nature of man, that he refuses to submit to the authority of other men's judgments. It is divine authority that takes the minds of men captive into its obedience, and confines their morals within the paths of virtue. Hence it is that that Theology which does not draw its conclusions from the holy Scriptures deserves to be called not Theology but Battology — vain babbling — utterly unfit for making morals honest.

II. The divine Scripture itself commands the meditation of itself in six hundred places. In Deuteronomy, chapter 6, these words are found: Hear, O Israel, and observe to do the things which the Lord hath commanded thee, that it may be well with thee... Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart: and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising: and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand: and they shall be and shall move before thy eyes: and thou shalt write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house... Take heed diligently lest thou forget the Lord.

III. I beg and adjure you, O director of souls, to bend your serious meditations for a little while upon this divine testimony. Two things are here prescribed: one, the exercise of divine love; the other, the study of the divine law. Could the commandment of divine love be expressed in clearer words and more lucid phrase? Tell me, pray: could it ever have entered your mind that Theologians would be found who would attempt to reduce so most grave a commandment almost to nothing? And yet, as is plain to all, very many have striven to attenuate this first and most grave precept with vain inventions. For some cavil that this precept never of itself binds and presses in the whole course of life; others, only at the point of death; others, incidentally at some time; others, once within five years; and others, once within two years. Gather from this: if a commandment so lucid and expressed with such perspicuity — a commandment which is the basis and foundation of the whole law and the bond of the Christian law, which Christ renewed in his Gospel and imposed more strongly upon Christians — if, I say, many authors have dared to cavil at and elude this precept, with what inventions will they not obscure the other precepts, which are not so perspicuous, but ambiguous, and as it were remote conclusions? What Christian, the prejudices of certain Casuists being removed, reading the law just transcribed, would call into question its morally continuous obligation? You have now comprehended how necessary is the meditation of the divine law; since according to it, and not according to the pleasures of the Casuists, you shall be judged. And the burden by which Theologians — above all the curators and directors of souls — are bound to devote their labor to the study of the Scriptures is the graver, inasmuch as unlettered Christians, ignorant of the Latin tongue, cannot read holy Scripture. The Church has therefore wisely forbidden them this reading, in order that the Pastors may hold out to them this heavenly and divine food pure and refined from every noxious error. Nor may you rejoin that all the Casuists too study the divine Scriptures. Be it so. But from their commentaries upon the law transcribed above it is clearly evident that they read the holy Scriptures loaded with prejudices and anticipations, and distracted by various affections — if indeed they really read them at all, and do not rather transcribe what the earlier Casuists have taught.

IV. Passing over the innumerable Scriptures of the old Testament which inculcate the reading and serious meditation of the holy Law, I shall relate some testimonies of the new Covenant. Christ the Lord reproved the Pharisees for being ignorant of the holy Scriptures, saying in Matthew 22: And Jesus answering, said to them: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. Again, questioned by the Pharisees on another matter, he sends them back, not to the Jewish Casuists and the Rabbis, but to the Scriptures: Search the Scriptures: for you think in them to have life everlasting: and the same are they that give testimony of me (John 6). St. Paul, in Romans 15, commands the unwearied study of the Scriptures: For what things soever were written, were written for our learning: that through patience and the comfort of the Scriptures, we might have hope. Again, writing to Timothy, he first sets before his eyes, in chapter 3, the evils and calamities of the time to come, and then, that he may guard himself against such great evils, he strongly enjoins upon him the reading of the Scriptures: But thou hast fully known my doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, longsuffering, love, patience... But continue thou in those things which thou hast learned, and which have been committed to thee: knowing of whom thou hast learned them. And because from thy infancy thou hast known the holy scriptures, which can instruct thee to salvation, by the faith which is in Christ Jesus. All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work. But what the Apostle immediately subjoins in chapter 4 must be impressed more deeply upon the soul and seriously meditated: Preach the word: be instant in season, out of season: reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine. For there shall be a time, when they will not endure sound doctrine; but, according to their own desires, they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears: and will indeed turn away their hearing from the truth, but will be turned unto fables. But be thou vigilant, labour in all things, do the work of an evangelist, fulfil thy ministry. A time will come, says Paul, when they will not endure sound doctrine. What is sound doctrine? That which consists of truth alone, say all the Fathers. Doctrine is corrupted by the admixture of falsity. That doctrine, therefore, is certainly corrupt which teaches the use of contrary opinions, of which, if one is true, the other must needs be false. The most tremendous of all the punishments with which God threatens is the neglect of the Scriptures, and a reading of them that is burdensome and full of disgust. The time seems already to have come which Amos foretold in chapter 8: I will send forth a famine into the land: not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord... They shall go about seeking the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. The Lord withdraws both the reading and the understanding of the Scriptures from those who either neglect them or strive to elude them with arbitrary inventions. Turn over the innumerable books of the many Casuists which are read by Parish priests and Confessors as masters in the government of souls: scarcely any exhortations of divine Scripture in them, most rare any argumentations drawn from it. If some testimony is alleged, it is frequently twisted to confirm lax opinions, as is evident in this text: My yoke is sweet — which the Probabilists commonly use in order to accommodate Christian Morals to human appetites. Scarcely one of them expounds the evangelical oracle in its genuine sense: namely, that the yoke of Christ is sweet because it is the yoke of divine love, because it is anointed with the unction of charity, because the Christian law is the law of divine love. But divine love wars with the love of the flesh and of the world.

V. The Councils and all the Fathers most deeply inculcate the reading of the Scriptures upon Priests. The Council of Trent, Session 5, chapter 1, commands that Bishops, Archbishops, and Primates, either by themselves — as they are bound by divine law, when they are able — or through a substitute, interpret sacred Scripture to the people. It prescribes that revenues be established from which the men destined for this office are to be supported. Then, many things being passed over, it subjoins: In the Monasteries of Monks also, where it can conveniently be done, let there likewise be a lecture on sacred Scripture... And in the Convents of the others, in which studies can conveniently flourish, let a lecture on sacred Scripture likewise be held. The Fourth Council of Toledo established the following, which is found in the Decretum, distinction 37, chapter 1: Ignorance, the mother of all vices, is to be shunned most of all in the Priests of God, who have undertaken the office of teaching among the peoples: for the Apostle Paul frequently admonishes Priests to read the holy Scriptures, saying to Timothy: Attend etc. Let Priests therefore know the holy Scriptures and the canons, that all their work may consist in preaching. The chief, therefore, and almost the sole occupation of Priests, and above all of Pastors, is the study of holy Scripture. What if Pastors should occupy the greater part of their life in business affairs, in reckoning up revenues, in settling lawsuits, in domestic and economic cares, and should hand over to certain Religious the administering of the food of holy Scripture to the flock committed to themselves, not to others? Such men, assuredly, would be not Pastors, but hirelings and betrayers of their own ministry. Pastors are bound to feed the flock out of their own selves: they may employ ministers and helpers in those things which they cannot themselves perform. They are exceedingly deceived, and shamefully mock themselves, when they believe that they can fulfill their ministry by the labor of others. They must expend all their strength, their studies, their vigils, and their cares in discharging their own ministry; and when they cannot alone fulfill all its parts, then let them take ministers to their aid. Let them commit the government of temporal things to others, that they themselves may be able to devote themselves wholly to God and to the guarding and forming of their flock. Those Pastors run the road of damnation who commit spiritual things to ministers, reserving to themselves the cares of earthly business.

VI. What are the chief sacred books which holy Pastors and directors of souls ought to read and meditate? They are the books of the Psalms, of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the Prophets, from the old Testament. More abundant still will be the fruit which you will gather from the mature reading of the new Testament. You will not stumble there upon petty questions, cases, and disputations; because the Gospels teach how to live holily, not how to dispute subtly. No lawgiver has inserted into his laws the controversies and petty questions which the wits of men are able to devise. The holy Fathers of the Church, who are our Masters — Justin Martyr, Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and innumerable others — settled questions of morals by the holy Scriptures and the divine traditions, and thus governed the peoples committed to them. These men had engraved deep in their soul the oracle of Christ the Lord, who says in John 14: But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind. On this text St. Thomas writes as follows, lecture 6: He will teach you all things: because whatever a man may teach from without, unless the Holy Spirit give understanding within, he labors in vain: for unless he be first present to the heart of the hearer, the discourse of the Teacher will be idle.

VII. I hear many clamoring that these things are theoretical, not practical. Those who do not hear confessions, who write in their chamber and do not handle the business of human society, most easily publish specious rules which serve nothing for practical execution and direction. There is need of good and solid practice. Explain to us where in the holy Scriptures are found the doctrines by which can be resolved those immense volumes of questions which Caramuel, Diana, Sánchez, Escobar, Castropalao, Candido, Zanardi, Sporer, Tamburini, Gobat, and the other recent Doctors have published?

VIII. I answer that by a few oracles of holy Scripture the greatest part of the questions which luxuriant wits have stirred up is struck down and reduced to nothing; concerning which St. Augustine writes as follows in Sermon 143 de tempore: These, my brethren, are the great deliriums of great Doctors. Nor am I one to disapprove all the controversies which the new Casuists agitate; but I say that many are of no moment, and that more can be resolved by the divine Scriptures alone, by the traditions, and by the doctrine of the Fathers. And because not a few appeal to practice, I am willing to obey them. The controversies which the new Casuists have brought in against the first commandment of charity toward God and the Neighbor — are they not dissolved by the mere words in which God expressed it? Those innumerable questions which they discuss concerning impure touches, concerning conjugal matters, concerning sodomy and other most shameful acts, concerning dances, concerning comedies, concerning the promiscuous conversation of men and women, are overthrown by these divine oracles alone: He that loveth danger shall perish in it (Ecclesiasticus 3). Turn away thy face from a woman dressed up (Ecclesiasticus 10 [recte 9]). If thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out... If thy hand scandalize thee, cut it off, etc. (Matthew 5). From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves (1 Thessalonians 5). If these and six hundred other similar divine oracles were consulted with prejudices laid aside, and without the zeal of twisting such commandments to the desires and appetites of men, those most empty little questions and petty distinctions, agitated in our age with such contention for the obscuring of evangelical truth, would go up in smoke. The disputations which the most recent authors have stirred up concerning homicide, concerning the duel as vindicator of honor, concerning the material lie, concerning amphibologies, concerning thefts, concerning compensations, concerning usury, and other matters, and which fill those immense volumes of the Casuists, can be settled by the most lucid testimonies of divine Scripture, if evangelical truth alone be regarded, and that zeal for pleasing men and hunting after human favor be utterly rooted out.

IX. In like manner the commandments of the Church are clear and manifest, and the examples of holy men lie open to all. It is pleasing to hear what St. Augustine writes in Epistle 119: But this I grieve at exceedingly: that many things which are most wholesomely commanded in the divine books are less cared for, and all things are so full of so many presumptions, that he is more gravely rebuked who during his octave has touched the earth with bare foot, than he who has buried his mind in wine. All such things, therefore, as are neither contained in the authorities of the holy Scriptures, nor found decreed in the Councils of the Bishops, nor strengthened by the custom of the universal Church, but are varied innumerably by the diverse customs of diverse places — so that scarcely, or never at all, can the causes be found which men followed in instituting them — I judge, where the liberty is granted, are to be cut away without any hesitation. I pass over many things which the holy Doctor writes in the same place, and I exhibit a few of those which he adds toward the end of the epistle: And I marvel that this escapes you: that not only in innumerable other matters many things escape me, but even in the holy Scriptures themselves I am ignorant of far more things than I know. And therefore I bear a hope, not unfruitful, in the name of Christ; because I have not only believed my God that on those two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the Prophets, but I have also experienced it, and experience it daily. For no mystery, no discourse however obscure, is opened to me out of the sacred writings, where I do not find these same precepts: The end of the commandment is charity, from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith; and, The fulness of the law is charity. Therefore, O Christian, whether these things or others, so read, so learn, as to remember that it was most truly said: Knowledge puffeth up, charity edifieth. But charity envieth not, is not puffed up. Let knowledge, then, be so employed, as a kind of scaffolding by which may rise the structure of charity, which abideth for ever, even when knowledge shall be destroyed.

X. Not only, says Augustine, have I believed my God revealing it, but I have also daily experienced that the whole law and the Prophets are contained in those two precepts of charity. If Christians would seriously meditate these two commandments alone, they would laugh at and despise the innumerable questions and most vain entanglements of certain Casuists. But so far are many of these from referring the questions that arise back to these two precepts, that on the contrary they attenuate these two commandments, restrict and limit the force of their obligation, in order to be able to soften the other laws.

I. One of the chief offices of Priests is the study of the holy Scriptures, as the divine Scripture itself declares in 2 Paralipomenon, chapter 19: And in Jerusalem also Josaphat appointed Levites, and Priests... and he charged them, saying... Every question that shall come to you concerning the law, concerning the commandment, concerning ceremonies, concerning justifications: shew it them, that they sin not against the Lord. The Church has established that Clerics are not to be admitted to sacred Orders unless they have a title, or a patrimony, whence they can live. To what end this? That, freed from the business of the world, they may be able to devote themselves more intently to the study of divine Scripture and to sacred things, as in the place cited, chapter 31, the divine Scripture itself prescribes: He commanded also the people that dwelt in Jerusalem, to give to the Priests, and the Levites their portion, that they might be able to attend to the law of the Lord.

II. What more? Before Bishops promote Clerics to the Priesthood, they pronounce this prayer, and beseech God, that meditating on thy law day and night, they may believe what they shall read, and teach what they shall believe. All craftsmen are examined upon the rules of their own art. The profession of Priests has annexed to it the study of holy Scripture: therefore trial must be made whether they are versed in this study. For how can they meditate the holy Scriptures day and night, if they are ignorant of them? In this our age Priests are more urgently bound to the study of the divine Scriptures: since, vernacular versions being forbidden to the Laity, it belongs to the Priests to explain the divine Scriptures to the people. For at the same time at which the Church took away vernacular readings from the unlettered, she decreed that Priests should devote their labor more intently to the holy Scriptures, that they might be the more apt for interpreting and expounding them.

III. Some Priests, when they must undergo the examination for hearing confessions, turn over and over the immense volumes of Diana, Bonacina, Tamburini, La Croix, and the Salmanticenses; they strive to commit to memory a medley of cases, distinctions, and disputations. With the whole searching of their mind they scrutinize the recent and the ancient Medullae, the Alphabets, the Promptuaries, the examinations of ordinands. What then? Will you disapprove their study? I do not disapprove it. But I say that Priests, and Pastors and directors of souls, ought first to be versed in the divine Scriptures, to meditate them, and to commit them more deeply to their mind. Grant me this: is not the life of Christians to be instituted and formed according to the norm of the divine Law? If those laws are unknown, how is the life of Christians to be recalled to their rule?

IV. The aforesaid Casuists, you will say, interpret the holy Law and the divine Scriptures. Is it indeed so? Scarcely does any divine text recur in their pages; and if some sacred testimonies are at times alleged, they are not rarely eluded by petty distinctions, by arbitrary interpretations, and by opinions more benign than is just. Now if the Priests themselves do not have an ascertained knowledge of the precepts and rules of the evangelical Law, by what way can they discover whether the aforesaid authors interpret them rightly or otherwise? Books of that kind, you rejoin, are approved. True enough. Are they on that account free from errors? From approved books have been culled the condemned theses. What of the fact that the Church herself has decreed that a doctrine is not therefore true and approved because it belongs to some approved author? Greatly are the Pastors of souls deceived if they believe that they can be excused by the authority of this or that Casuist, when they teach doctrines contrary to the divine Scriptures. Or are the Priests ignorant that Christ the Lord, the supreme Judge, will judge souls not at the tribunal of the Casuists, but at that of the Gospels?

V. It is not for all, you will rejoin, to interpret the Gospels. And further: must Parish priests, Confessors, and Theologians learn the Gospels by heart? There is no need that they commit all things to memory; but it is enough that they have the spirit of the Law and its commandments thoroughly examined, and, when difficulties occur, that they consult the sacred books and employ the graver interpreters, and first of all the holy Fathers of the Church. Parish priests and Confessors turn over the thick and immense volumes of Diana, Bonacina, Tamburini, Laymann, La Croix, the Salmanticenses, and Castropalao; with prodigious labor they commit to memory controversies, wranglings, distinctions, subdistinctions, definitions, divisions. Assuredly the divine precepts which are contained in the holy book of the new Testament, of Proverbs, of Wisdom, of Ecclesiasticus, are more easily learned than the interminable disputations of the said volumes. What of the fact that the quarrelsome disputations of these men are not rarely entangled, obscure, full of circumlocutions, hedged about with entanglements and cavils, which often excite anything rather than the fervor of divine love and the zeal of evangelical perfection? On the contrary, the evangelical precepts are splendid, perspicuous, easy; and they teach how to live rightly, not how to wrangle futilely. To this is added that God infuses the light for understanding the holy Scriptures into those who approach the meditation of them with a humble and docile heart. Those divine teachings of Proverbs and of Ecclesiasticus, the evangelical parables, and the epistles of Paul and of the other Apostles, and the single verses of holy Scripture, illuminate more than the innumerable disputations of men. Priests imbued with this knowledge of the holy Scriptures can also read the moral Theologians; because then they are excellently able to discern whether the opinions and judgments of these men are conformed to the evangelical doctrine.

VI. What? Do you dare to disapprove the custom, introduced so many years since, of examining Confessors and Parish priests upon the opinions which the Casuists dispute on both sides? Far be it from me to wish to disapprove customs which are good. With humble deference only do I suggest what seems to me best, and indeed necessary. But this very counsel of mine I submit to the judgment of Superiors and of the Wise. If, the usage which now obtains being abandoned, a new custom had to be introduced, a prodigious labor would have to be undergone, and great disturbance and confusion would ensue. All this is false. Does the reading and meditation of the holy Scriptures beget confusion? Nay rather, it takes away quarrels and intestine disagreements, and in place of disputations introduces the observance of the laws. But, to press the argument more strongly, I ask again: is the study of the Scriptures necessary for Priests, Pastors, and Directors of souls, or not? If you deny it, you gainsay the divine Scriptures. If you affirm it: then the custom must be corrected, and the competence of Pastors and Confessors must be explored in the holy Scriptures as well. The mere knowledge that this examination must be undergone would urge all who desire either to be initiated into the Priesthood, or to undertake the care of souls, or the burden of hearing confessions, to bend all their powers to the study of the Scriptures. Who would deny that Priests would turn out wiser and better-mannered if they spent the good part of that time which they wear away in reading and thoroughly learning the books of Diana, Bonacina, Tamburini, La Croix, and the Salmanticenses, in meditating the holy books? And if, in place of the Medullae, whether ancient or recent, they continually turned the pages of the Pauline epistles?

VII. And in what manner, you ask, ought this examination to be conducted? With the highest moderation and prudence. Let Clerics be asked how many are the books of the old Testament, how many of the new covenant, how many the epistles of Paul; some upon some parable of the Gospel, others upon the epistle to Timothy. Priests ought to be asked what is the spirit of the evangelical Law; what is the image of the Christian life; whether Christians are pressed by a precept of yearning after evangelical perfection; what these words signify: Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect; what these others: If thy eye... if thy hand scandalize thee, pluck it out, cut it off, etc.; He that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple; Lend, hoping for nothing thereby; It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Let them be asked how Saints Augustine and Chrysostom and the other Fathers interpret the testimonies praised and others like them: for these are the masters and the true interpreters of the Scriptures.

VIII. As to those things which regard ecclesiastical institutions, the Catechism of Trent, or the Roman Catechism, must be read; and upon it and upon the Council of Trent they must be examined more severely. When they have been instructed in such doctrine, they can also read the moral authors, especially concerning the ecclesiastical precepts and the other things which regard ceremonies and discipline.

To thee now, Christ Jesus, I turn my humble prayer. Fearful and confounded, I look up at thy most tremendous vengeance upon the sons of men. Trembling, I shudder at the spirit of slumber and of blindness, seized by which men walk the way of perdition; for I know this to be the most deadly of all punishments, which so many ages ago the Prophet Amos foretold in chapter 8: Behold the days come, saith the Lord, and I will send forth a famine into the land: not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord... They shall go about seeking the word of the Lord, and shall not find it. To such a pass of evils has the matter now come, that many neither seek nor find thy word, O Lord. They seek the word of men in the books of men; but they do not seek the word of God in the books of God. If Princes, Kings, Emperors were to write to us, and that in a familiar style; if they were to propose rewards; if they were to invite us to their royal palaces, to their thrones, there to reign with them — with what diligence, with what attention would such letters be read by us! And thy divine Scriptures, which are letters sent to us, and delivered to us — above all to us Priests — to be guarded, read, and explained, we neglect, we treat with disgust; nay, casting them aside, we delight in the acorns and refuse of men? The blindness is darker, and the punishment more deadly, than can be expressed by me in fitting speech. Awake, I beseech you, Priests of God, Pastors and Directors of souls, and in the spirit of contrition and humility seek the word of God in the books of God.

I. Tradition, taken generally, is doctrine which is communicated to another either by voice or by writing, as St. Paul says in 2 Thessalonians 2: Hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word, or by our epistle. Taken more strictly, tradition is doctrine communicated by the living voice. If we regard the author, one is divine, another human. If the matter, one comprehends faith and morals, another discipline, rites, and ceremonies. Again, one is necessary, another free; one immutable and perpetual, another mutable and temporary; one, finally, universal, another particular.

II. Divine tradition is the doctrine of God, not written, but revealed by God to our forefathers, and communicated to their successors from ear to ear. This tradition is wont to be called Dominical, because it was communicated by Christ the Lord to the Apostles, and by these to their successors. Of this kind is the tradition concerning the number of the Sacraments, and concerning the perpetual Virginity of Blessed Mary. Another is the apostolic, which the Apostles, at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, received and communicated to the Church without writing, as the Council of Trent teaches, Session 4.

III. The Heretics of every age have almost all denied the divine and apostolic traditions, that they might the more freely publish their errors. The Heretics of the latest age, the Lutherans and Calvinists, have raged against the traditions beyond the rest, inasmuch as these cut their throats. All Catholics teach that besides the written word there are apostolic-divine traditions, and they prove it by the testimonies both of the divine Scriptures and of the Fathers. The divine Scriptures are ready to hand: Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee (Deuteronomy 32). Again, Ecclesiasticus, chapter 8: Let not the discourse of the ancients escape thee, for they have learned of their fathers. St. Paul says to the Thessalonians, chapter 2: Therefore, brethren, stand fast; and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word, or by our epistle.

IV. In every state of the Church the divine traditions have obtained. From Adam to Moses there was no written law. Whence did the holy Patriarchs — Adam, Abel, Seth, Enos, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the others — learn the worship of God, the rites of the sacrifices, and the mysteries of Religion? Whence did they draw their doctrine concerning the creation of the world, the coming of the Messias, the remedy of original sin, and the future state? From the written word? There was then none. Therefore from the word delivered from mouth to mouth, from ear to ear. After the Mosaic law the divine traditions likewise obtained, as is evident from the testimonies adduced. Did not the Jews believe by divine tradition that the holy books were enrolled in the canon? Christ the Lord sent his Apostles, instructed by his voice alone, to preach his divine law through the whole world. For the space of many years they promulgated this new law without a written word. Matthew consigned his Gospel to letters when he had resolved to go to preach to the gentiles, and after the preaching he had made to the Hebrews. Let the Lutherans and Calvinists explain to us by what doctrine the Church of Christ was governed before the Evangelists delivered the Gospels in writing, and Paul with the other Apostles wrote his epistles. Not, assuredly, by written doctrine. Therefore by doctrine handed down.¹ The testimonies of the Fathers I pass over for brevity's sake.

¹ See Tome 1, Apparatus, Book 3, Dissertation 3.

I. The common description of Councils is this: An assembly of the Prelates of the Church, convoked by a legitimate Superior for the settling of controversies of faith and morals. One kind of Council is general, to which come the Bishops of the whole catholic world, the Roman Pontiff presiding either in person or through his Legates; another is national, in which the Bishops of a kingdom or nation assemble under the direction of a Patriarch or Primate. A provincial Council is composed of the Bishops over whom an Archbishop or Metropolitan presides. A diocesan Synod consists of the Priests, or Parish priests, of a single diocese, the Bishop presiding, who alone has the right of suffrage; wherefore it is not a Council properly so called.

II. The origin of Councils flows from divine law: for in the old Testament itself God ordained Councils, as is found in Numbers, chapter 11: Gather unto me seventy men of the ancients of Israel, etc.; and again Deuteronomy, chapter 17: If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment... thou shalt come to the Priests, etc. And Matthew, chapter 18: Where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

III. General Councils which have been neither convoked nor confirmed by the Roman Pontiff are endowed with no firm authority, as is evident in the Council of Rimini in the cause of Arius, and in the Conciliabulum of Ephesus in the cause of Dioscorus. But those which have been confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, and received with the accession of the Church's consent, are, according to all Catholics, of infallible authority in controversies of faith and morals. This infallibility of Councils flows not from the multitude of the Bishops, but from the protection of the Holy Spirit; which protection and inspiration Christ himself lucidly pledges in the holy Scriptures. These Councils do not constitute new articles of faith or new truths of morals; but they declare the articles and truths revealed by God, and lest they err in such definitions, the Holy Spirit assists them.

IV. National, provincial, and diocesan Councils, although they are not endowed with the privilege of infallibility, are nevertheless of such authority that they would be guilty of the gravest temerity who should not acquiesce in their canons. For although Councils of this kind can absolutely be deceived, yet in very fact they are most rarely deceived. Scarcely one or another occurs — besides the Councils of Carthage under St. Cyprian concerning the rebaptizing of Heretics — which has erred in articles of faith and morals. Wherefore the Seventh general Synod established the following concerning diocesan Synods, in Action 3, in the synodal letters of Theodore, Patriarch of Jerusalem: Local Synods, moreover, we do not turn away from, but rather we love, embrace, and receive them; and their divinely inspired canonical constitutions, their corrections, and their useful legislations we honor with the highest observance.

V. Hence it follows that Theologians ought to consult these sacred Synods, and to receive their decrees with great deference in those things which regard the rules of faith and morals. Those things which pertain to the peculiar discipline and ceremonies of the nations, let them be observed according to the approved customs of the regions and nations. Wherefore who can sufficiently deplore the not few Moralists who, when they hear the decrees of the Synods objected against them, immediately rejoin that the Synods are either national, or provincial, or diocesan, destitute of the privilege of infallibility? What of the fact that the decrees of the whole Gallican Church assembled in her general Assemblies are derided and lashed with insults by the new Casuists, or by certain partisans of the Casuists? Nor do we maintain that those Synods are immune from the danger of erring — as neither were Augustine, nor Chrysostom, nor Thomas, nor any of the Doctors of the Church. Are the Fathers on that account to be held cheap? Moreover, are Caramuel, Bonacina, Machado, Escobar, Castropalao, Tamburini, Gobat, La Croix, and the other Casuists endowed with the gift of infallibility? The assertors of the new benignity make more of a certain roll — and that not very numerous — of Casuists, whose volumes swarm both with proscribed and with lax opinions, than of the decrees of a diocesan, or provincial, or even national Synod. These men ought to reflect that the Holy Spirit has appointed Bishops, not Casuists, to rule his Church. Bishops and Parish priests are the pastors of the Christian people, not the Casuists. The sheep must hear the voices of the Pastors. The Holy Spirit assists Synods in a peculiar manner, inasmuch as they are assembled for the profit and instruction of the Faithful. Let all the Synods held during the last two centuries be read: scarcely one will occur which contains any lax opinion; all display most wholesome decrees and the best rules of Christian discipline. Whence it is evident how gravely those Confessors hallucinate who make nothing of reading Genet, Pontas, Natalis Alexander, Merbes, and other similar authors who resolve moral controversies by the decrees of the Synods, saying: What are the Gallican, Spanish, Italian Synods to us? They do not decide practical cases; they do not bring forward weighty reasons; they do not distinguish materially and formally, as our Moralists do. By these illusions not a few are bewitched. So far has the custom prevailed of quarreling, caviling, wrangling, distinguishing, and subdistinguishing in the handing down of the most simple and most holy evangelical Morals, that they who are prepossessed by this inveterate custom can scarcely be recalled to a better way. We nevertheless do not omit to beg these men, and earnestly to adjure them, to read the holy word of God at its divine fountain; and if doubts occur, to go to the sacred Councils and the holy Fathers for the legitimate interpretation.

I.

1. An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity.

2. Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept and of itself.

3. It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in a lifetime.

4. If one be interrogated by the public Power, I counsel him to confess the faith openly, as glorious to God and to the faith; to keep silence I do not condemn as of itself sinful.

5. The will cannot make the assent of faith in itself more firm than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves.

6. Hence one can prudently repudiate the supernatural assent which he has.

7. The assent of supernatural faith, useful to salvation, stands with a merely probable knowledge of revelation; nay, with a fear whereby one fears lest God has not spoken.

8. Only faith in one God seems necessary with the necessity of means, but not explicit faith in God as rewarder.

9. Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive, suffices for justification.

10. A man is capable of absolution, however much he labor under ignorance of the mysteries of the faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he know not the mystery of the most Holy Trinity and of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

11. It suffices to have believed those mysteries once.

12. Two other propositions in this matter the Gallican Clergy proscribed in the year 1730. The first is this: The Christian religion is evidently credible: for it is evident that whoever embraces it is prudent; but it is not evidently true, for either it teaches obscurely, or the things it teaches are obscure. Nay, those who say the Christian religion is evidently true must needs confess that it is evidently false. Infer hence that it is not evident: 1. That there now exists on earth any true Religion — for whence have you it that not all flesh has corrupted its way? 2. That, of all the religions on earth, the Christian is the most verisimilar — for have you traversed all lands, or do you know them to have been traversed by others? 3. That the Divinity of Christ was manifested by the Apostles and by the demons — for if you teach this, you must teach that Christ is manifestly God. 4. That the oracles of the Prophets were poured forth by the breathing of God — for what would you oppose to me, whether I deny that those were true vaticinations, or affirm them conjectures? 5. That the miracles recorded as wrought by Christ were true — although no one can prudently deny these.

The censure which the Gallican Clergy pronounced upon the aforesaid proposition is this: The doctrine contained in this proposition is impious, blasphemous, erroneous, and favors the enemies of the Christian religion.

13. The other is this: It is not evident, with moral evidence properly so called, and physical evidence, that the Christian Religion is true.

Censure: This proposition, containing doctrine consonant with the preceding proposition, is temerarious, and leads into error.

14. Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin. It was condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII.

15. Nothing is to be believed which exceeds the power of our intellect. The Council of Rheims condemned this proposition of Peter Abelard in the year 1148.

16. When in great sinners all love is wanting, faith also is wanting; and even if they seem to believe, it is not divine faith, but human. Similar is proposition 51 of Paschasius Quesnel.

I. "And indeed in practice I judge that absolution should never, or most rarely, be denied on account of ignorance of Christian doctrine: because ignorant rustics do not conveniently have a Teacher, and the Confessor can instruct them; nor have they any great capacity for learning. Nay (as we shall say at number 23), this perfect instruction is not necessary for absolving them." Thomas Sanchez, book 2 of the Summa, chapter 3, number 21.

Let the religious censors now weigh how unjustly they have carped at a typographical error, and out of place, since the doctrine is in very deed lax. For that passage is straightway retracted by Fr. Sanchez, and he substitutes: nay, this perfect instruction is not necessary.

Titius, a young Catholic who was devoting himself to medical studies, was accustomed to hear everything called into doubt by his companions. One among them openly asserted that pagan morals were preferable to Christian morals, and handed Titius—who defended the contrary with all his strength—a book by a celebrated author in which the following words are read: “In antiquity the virtues that were most admired were almost exclusively those which are distinctively masculine. Courage, self-assertion, magnanimity, and, above all, patriotism were the leading features of the ideal type; and chastity, modesty, and charity, the gentler and the domestic virtues, which are especially feminine, were greatly undervalued. . . . The change from the heroic to the saintly ideal, from the ideal of Paganism to the ideal of Christianity, was a change from a type which was essentially male, to one which was essentially feminine. . . . Pagan sentiment was chiefly a glorification of the masculine qualities of strength, and courage, and conscious virtue, while Christian sentiment is chiefly a glorification of the feminine qualities of gentleness, humility, and love.”¹ Since Titius had no answer to make, he approached a priest who was his friend and asked for help with the difficulties. Hence it is asked:

1 W. H. Lecky, European Morals, vol. ii, pp. 382–384.

1. Is self-assertion a virtue?

2. What is to be said about the pagan conception of magnanimity?

3. Can the distinction between masculine and feminine virtues be admitted, and can the Christian religion be said to favor the latter?

1. Is self-assertion a virtue?

Self-assertion may be understood merely in the sense of defence of one’s own rights and opinions, and in this sense it seems to belong to the virtue of fortitude. But like self-love, which generally implies excess, self-assertion ordinarily means the thrusting of oneself forward unduly, the tendency of a masterful and ambitious character. In this sense it is a vice, and belongs to pride, ambition, or vainglory.

2. What is to be said of the pagan idea of magnanimity ?

Aristotle describes the magnanimous man in a celebrated chapter of the Ethics.¹ The magnanimous man, according to Aristotle, has great gifts and great natural virtues, but these are all spoiled by pride. He is fully conscious of his merits, he considers them his own, without referring them to God, and claims for them great honor as due to himself from men. He knows how inferior other men are to himself, and despises them. Magnanimity has to be seasoned with the Christian doctrine about God and man’s relation to Him, the foundation of Christian humility, before it can become a Christian virtue. This is admirably done by St. Thomas.²

1 Book iv, chapter 3.

2 II-II, question 129.

3. Can the distinction between masculine and feminine virtues be admitted, and can it be said that the Christian religion favors the latter?³

3 Compare Catholic Encyclopedia, under the word “Honor.”

A virtue is nothing but a habit of well-doing, and as both men and women should have, and practise, all the virtues, no distinction can be admitted between masculine and feminine virtues. The type of Christian perfection is Christ Himself, in Whom all virtues are seen in their fullest development and luster, and as both men and women are bound to form themselves after the model which He set them, it cannot be said that Christianity favors the gentler at the expense of the robuster virtues. The Christian type is a harmonious blending of the gentle and robust virtues; a Christian hero, like St. Louis of France, shows the combination in all its perfection; he is gentle and humble, but he is also strong and high-minded; in a heroine like St. Teresa, we have the same harmonious blending in a female saint. This element of truth in Lecky’s observations may be conceded — the Christian religion insists on meekness, humility, chastity, and charity, and defends the weak; while Paganism was too indulgent and condescending to brute force and strength. But while insisting on the gentler virtues, Christianity by no means forgets the more virile. Perhaps it may be allowed, too, that as man still remains to a great extent a savage, the virtues of courage, fortitude, and others of the same kind do not need to be insisted on so much. Perhaps the tendency of unregenerate human nature is to admire them too highly, and so it is not advisable for Christian teaching to stress them as well.

Caius, a missionary priest who is very busy, received several non-Catholics into the Church. He does not labor to instruct them before reception; rather, after a catechism has been given and some instruction received from certain lay people, when they declare that they understand the catechism and wish to be received into the Church, he receives them immediately without delay, saying within himself that the less instructed especially cannot understand difficult questions about the motives of credibility of the Catholic religion, and that they will gradually understand everything necessary. Nevertheless, because of certain things recently discovered by him, he is troubled by scruples about this manner of proceeding, and indeed about the lawfulness of administering the sacraments to some of them; for he heard one of his converts say that he had entered the Church led only by greater probability and that afterward he had not attained greater certainty. Hence it is asked:

1. What dispositions are required in order that non-Catholics may be received into the Church?

2. What motives of credibility of the Catholic religion are required and sufficient so that the less instructed especially may be able to embrace the faith?

3. Is it lawful to absolve one who doubts about the faith?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What dispositions must non-Catholics have to be received into the Church?

They must believe with a firm faith all that the Catholic Church proposes to be believed, and they must have the purpose of performing all the duties which are of obligation for Catholics. With regard to the faith, it is not sufficient to believe everything implicitly. It is necessary as a means of salvation to believe explicitly that God exists, that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him, and probably also the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and of the Incarnation. It is of precept to believe explicitly the articles of the Faith contained in the Creed, the sacraments which the faithful are under the obligation of receiving, the Lord’s Prayer, and the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. Hence the necessity of instruction in all these matters.

2. What motives of credibility of the Catholic religion are necessary and sufficient so that especially the illiterate may be able to embrace the Faith?

The Council of the Vatican teaches that miracles and prophecy are motives of credibility which are suited to the capacity of all. The existence, history, and fertility in good of the Catholic Church is also a motive by itself for embracing and persevering in the Faith, and it is suited to the capacity even of the illiterate. The motives should be such as to render the Catholic religion evidently credible, and, moreover, such as can not be displaced by future experience or learning. On this account, although motives which are respectively sufficient to produce moral certainty in illiterate minds, though not in others, might be sufficient to enable the illiterate to make an act of faith, yet even the illiterate should be furnished with something more solid and stable before being admitted into the Church.

3. Is it allowable to absolve one who doubts about the Faith?

No, it is not. If he positively doubts whether some article of the Faith is true, he is a heretic. If he doubts negatively or suspends his assent, he sins gravely against the Faith, and can not be absolved as long as he remains in that state.

4. The case. Caius, a missionary priest and a busy man, received many converts into the Church. He did not take great pains in their instruction, but gave them a catechism, and after they had received a certain amount of instruction from some pious lay people, on their declaring that they knew the catechism and wished to be received into the Church, he received them, saying to himself, that the illiterate especially could not understand difficult questions about the motives of credibility of the Catholic religion, and that they would by degrees learn all that was necessary.

In this Caius made a mistake. It would have been better to receive a few converts well instructed than many badly instructed. Ignorance of their religion is one of the causes why so many Catholics lead un-Catholic lives, and profess such un-Catholic sentiments. Many ill-instructed converts leave the Church when difficulties arise. Caius should, at least, see that his converts have a good knowledge of the catechism. It is not necessary for them to go into difficult questions about the motives of credibility, but they should have some clear idea why they wish to become Catholics, and in some way that reason should be reducible to one or other of the ordinary motives of credibility.

Caius began to have scruples about his method of dealing with converts when he heard one of them say that he came into the Church because he thought that more probably it was the true Church of God, and that he has never had greater certainty than that. Caius had reason to be troubled, for this convert had never been a Catholic at all, inasmuch as he never had the Faith, as we gather from the twenty-first proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Supernatural assent of faith useful for salvation stands with merely probable knowledge of revelation, even with a fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Caius may not administer the sacraments to such as these until they are better instructed and until they firmly, without any doubt, believe the Catholic faith.

Caius, an Anglican minister who was dying, summoned Titius, a Catholic priest, and asked to be received into the Catholic Church, which he firmly believed to be the one Church of Christ. As to other matters, Titius found him excellently disposed; nevertheless, he wished absolutely that his reception into the Church be kept secret, lest his wife and children be deprived of the pension to which widows of Anglican ministers have a right. Titius, however, doubted whether he could receive him under this condition or not. Hence it is asked:

1. Is it ever lawful to deny the faith?

2. Must the faith be professed externally, and when?

3. What must be done in the reception of converts?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Is it ever lawful to deny the Faith?

No, it is never lawful to deny the Faith: “He that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven.”¹

1 Matt. x. 33.

2. Must the Faith be openly professed, and when?

Yes, it is at times necessary to profess the Faith openly; it is not sufficient to believe merely internally. This is required by the natural and divine law, as well as by positive law. A solemn profession of faith must, by positive law, be made by converts on their reception into the Church, by bishops at their consecration, by priests at their ordination, and by certain ecclesiastical functionaries on their assumption of office. We are chiefly concerned in this case with profession of faith which is required by natural and divine law. Like all positive precepts it always obliges, but not for always; in other words, there are certain occasions when the precept must be fulfilled; it does not oblige on all occasions whatever. The general rule is that the Faith must be openly professed whenever the honor of God, the spiritual good of one’s neighbor, or one’s own good requires it.

3. What is to be done in the reception of converts?

Inquiry must first of all be made about the baptism of the convert, he must be instructed, and where the bishop requires it, the leave to receive him must be obtained from the bishop. If the convert has not been validly baptized, he is only required to make a profession of faith, and he is baptized according to the Ritual with the longer form, unless an indult has been obtained to use the shorter form prescribed for infants. If he was baptized before, but the validity of the baptism is doubtful, he must make a profession of faith, and then conditional baptism is conferred (in England privately with holy water and without the ceremonies); then he is conditionally absolved from censures, and after making a general confession of his whole life he receives sacramental absolution conditionally. If he was validly baptized, he makes profession of his faith, is absolved from censures, and then makes his confession and is absolved. Youths before puberty are not absolved from censures.

4. The case. Caius, an Anglican minister, called Titius, a Catholic priest, and asked to be received into the Church. Caius was dying. Titius found him well disposed in other respects, but he desired that his conversion should be kept secret for fear lest his wife and children should be deprived of a pension to which they would have a right as the widow and children of an Anglican minister. Titius doubted whether this could be allowed.

No; Caius could not be received on that condition. The conversion of one in his position is likely to give great honor to God and to the true religion, and to be a cause of conversion to others.¹ In all probability the society which granted such pensions as are mentioned in the case would never dream of depriving Caius’ widow and children of theirs because of his conversion on his death-bed. Perhaps, through some friendly source, assurance on this point could be obtained and communicated to Caius, who might then be received unconditionally.

1 Cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F., nn. 44, 84. 2d ed.

In a certain town, when the Anglican elementary schools needed money, the Anglicans decided to sing, on a certain Thursday in their church, the oratorio which is called Messiah, to the hearing of which the people would be admitted for a price, and the proceeds would be applied to the needs of the schools. But since the Anglican singers were not sufficient, they asked certain Catholics, among others Caius, to furnish help.

To Caius, who asked whether any religious function was to be performed at the same time, the reply was made that the Anglican minister would pour forth a general prayer at the beginning, and that nothing else besides Messiah would be done. Caius does not wish to deny help to his fellow citizens, especially since they themselves often help Catholics; nevertheless, he does not know whether in this case it is lawful to assent to the request. Hence it is asked:

1. What is participation in sacred rites, and to what extent is it prohibited with heretics?

"When they say the King owes his crown to the choice of his people, they tell us that they mean to say no more than that some of the King's predecessors have been called to the throne by some sort of choice. Thus they hope to render their proposition safe by rendering it nugatory." (Burke, Reflections on French Revolution.)

1. The great question about civil power is, not whence it first came in remote antiquity, but whence it is now derived and flows continually as from its source, whether from the free consent of subjects so long as that lasts, or whether it obtains independently of their consent. Can subjects overthrow the ruler, or alter the polity itself, as often as they have a mind so to do? or has the ruler a right to his position even against the will of his people? A parallel question is, can a province annexed to an empire secede when it chooses, as South Carolina and other Confederates once attempted secession from the American Union?

2. These questions raise two totally different issues, which must be first carefully distinguished and then severally answered. The first point at issue is whether subjects may dethrone their ruler, a people alter their polity, or a province secede from an empire, at discretion. The second point is, whether the same may be done under pressure of dire injustice. One little matter of phraseology must be rectified before an answer is returned to this first point. The question whether subjects may dethrone their ruler at discretion, from the terms in which it is drawn, can lead to none but a negative answer. From the fact that they are subjects, and this man, or this body of men, their ruler, their allegiance cannot be wholly discretionary. That sovereign is a mere man of straw, there is no soul and substance of sovereign power in him, who may be knocked down and carted away for rubbish, any moment his so-called subjects please. Rousseau is quite clear on this point. The true debateable form of the question is, whether the people, being themselves sovereign, can remove at will the official persons who actually administer the State; whether they can change the polity, and whether the inhabitants of a province can secede. The answer now is simple: all depends upon the polity of the particular country where the case comes for discussion. And if so it be that the constitution makes no provision one way or another, any dispute that may occur must be settled by amicable arrangement among the parties concerned: if they cannot amicably agree, they must fight. To save this last eventuality, it were well that any claim which the people in any country may have to remove princes and statesmen from office, to alter the polity, or to divide the empire, should be made matter of the clearest understanding and most express and unambiguous stipulation. Even so, such a provision must be generally viewed with disfavour by the political philosopher, seeing how it tends to the weakening and undermining of government; whereas the same considerations that make out government to be at all a boon and a necessity to human nature, argue incapacity and instability in the governing power to be a deplorable evil. We must add, that where the people keep in their hands any power to alter the polity, or transfer the administration to other hands, there they hold part at least of the sovereignty; and the alteration or transference is effected by them, not as subjects, but as partial ruler.

3. The second point we raised was, whether a dethronement, or an alteration of polity, or a secession, may be brought about, not indeed at discretion for any cause, but under pressure of dire injustice. It comes to this: May the civil power be resisted when it does grievous wrong? Let us begin our reply with another question: May children strike their parents? No. Not even in self-defence? when the parent is going about to do the child some grievous bodily hurt? That is an unpleasant question, but the answer is plain. We can make no exceptions to the rule of self-defence. Self-defence in extreme cases may raise the arm of a child against its parent: in a similar extremity it may set a people in conflict with their civil ruler. Still we regard with horror the idea of striking a parent, and speak of it generally as a thing never to be done: so should we regard and speak of rebellion. We should not parade it before men's eyes as a deed to be contemplated, admired, and readily put in execution. "I confess to you, Sir," writes Burke, "I never liked this continual talk of resistance and revolution, or the practice of making the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread."

4. The conditions under which the civil authority may be withstood in self-defence, are fairly stated in the Dublin Review for April, 1865, p. 292. We must premise, that such a course of self-defence once publicly entered upon is like a rock rolled over the brow of a steep mountain: down it rolls and rebounds from point to point, gathering momentum in the descent, till in the end the ruler, once defied, has to be dethroned, the polity subverted, the empire rent, or they who made the resistance must perish.

"Resistance is lawful:—(1) When a government has become substantially and habitually tyrannical, and that is when it has lost sight of the common good, and pursues its own selfish objects to the manifest detriment of its subjects, especially where their religious interests are concerned. (2) When all legal and pacific means have been tried in vain to recall the ruler to a sense of his duty. (3) When there is a reasonable probability that resistance will be successful, and not entail greater evils than it seeks to remove. (4) When the judgment formed as to the badness of the government, and the prudence of resistance thereto, is not the opinion only of private persons or of a mere party: but is that of the larger and better portion of the people, so that it may morally be considered as the judgment of the community as a whole."

5. Side by side with this we will set the teaching of Leo XIII., Encyclical, Quod Apostolici.

"If ever it happens that civil power is wielded by rulers recklessly and beyond all bounds, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow of insurgents rising up against them by independent action (proprio marte), lest the tranquillity of order be more and more disturbed, or society receive greater injury thereby: and when things are come to such a pass that there appears no other ray or hope of preservation, the same authority teaches that a remedy must be sought in the merits of Christian patience and in earnest prayers to God."

The words we have italicized seem to point to conditions (4) and (3) respectively, as laid down by the writer in the Dublin Review.

For an instance of a king dethroned, not proprio marte, but with every appearance at least of an act of the whole nation, see the dethronement of Edward II., as related by Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, I., pp. 186, 187, Rolls Series.

6. "We save ourselves the more virulent and destructive diseases of revolution, sedition, and civil war, by submitting to the milder type of a change of ministry." (Times, April 7, 1880.)

7. It is not monarchical governments alone that can ever be resisted lawfully: but what is sauce for the king's goose is sauce also for the people's gander. There is no special sanctity attaching to democracy.

It might seem that, since resistance requires to be justified by the approval of "the larger and better portion of the people" (n. 4, condition [4]) no just resistance can ever be offered to the will of the democratic majority. But the said majority may be in divers ways coerced and cajoled, a mere packed majority, while the malcontents may be, if not "the larger," clearly "the better" portion of the community. (s. iv., n. 5, p. 321.)

Readings.—St. Thos., De Regimine Principum, i., 6; 2a 2æ, q. 42, art. 2; 2a 2æ, q, 69, art. 4, in corp.; Locke, Of Civil Government, nn. 200, 201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 223, 224, 225, 227, 229, 230, 232.

A convert to the Catholic faith is a knight of Pythias. He was a knight for many years before he became a Catholic. He carries a few thousand dollars life insurance in the order. As he is a poor man, it would be a great hardship for him to quit the order and forfeit this insurance. What shall he do about it?

Answer.—There are two categories of so-called secret societies, forbidden to Catholics: (a) societies, like the Masons, that are forbidden under censure, i. e., under pain of excommunication; (b) societies, like the Knights of Pythias, that are forbidden under pain of sin, but not under censure.

On October 11, 1869, Pope Pius IX issued his famous Bull, Apostolicae Sedis, in which among many other censures, reserved to the Holy See, is the censure of excommunication pronounced against “those giving their names to the Masonic or Carbonari sect, or to other sects of the same kind, which plot either openly or secretly against the Church or lawful authorities; and likewise those furnishing favor of any kind to those sects and not denouncing their hidden leaders and chiefs, until they have denounced them.”

Two qualifications are required in order that a society or organization fall under the bann of excommunication: (a) its members must constitute a sect, that is, they must be united very closely together by the profession of the same principles, that the society as a body professes and advocates; (b) it must war against the Church or against the State, even though it exist for other purposes also.

The societies generally understood to possess these two qualifications and therefore to be forbidden under pain of excommunication are:

1. The Masons. Pope Clement XII, in 1738, first excommunicated the Masons. Then Benedict XIV, in 1751, reaffirmed the censure, as did Leo XII, in 1825, Pius VIII, in 1829, Pius IX, in 1869, in the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, just mentioned, and finally Leo XIII, in 1884, in the Bull “Humanum genus.”

2. The Carbonari, a secret political society organized in Italy, in the beginning of the last century, whose purpose was the overthrow of the existing government and the establishment of a republic. They were excommunicated by Pius VIII and Leo XII.

3. The Fenians. This society was prohibited under censure of excommunication, by the Holy Office, January 12, 1870.

4. Societies of Anarchists and Nihilists, in Russia especially, but wherever they may exist, since their purpose brings them under the ban of excommunication.

No Catholic, therefore, may belong to any of the above named societies, without committing mortal sin, and at the same time incurring excommunication, which excommunication is reserved to the Holy See.

In the second category of forbidden societies, namely, of those that are forbidden under pain of mortal sin, but without the censure of excommunication, are to be placed the three societies, expressly mentioned in the official papal documents, that is to say:

1. Odd Fellows; 2. Knights of Pythias; 3. Sons of Temperance.

There are other societies also forbidden under pain of mortal sin, v. g., the Good Templars, Cremation Societies, etc., but our concern is at present with the three first mentioned. On February 13, 1896, the following letter was sent to the archbishops of the United States, from the Apostolic Delegation at Washington, D. C., for the information and guidance of the Ordinaries and clergy of the United States:

‘Apostolic Delegation, United States of America.

Washington, D. C., Feb. 13, 1896.

Your Grace:

Under date of August 13, 1895, I received from the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda instructions regarding the application of the well-known decree of the Holy Office condemning the three societies, “Odd Fellows,” “Knights of Pythias,” and “Sons of Temperance.” According to these instructions which I communicated to your Grace at the time, the condemnation was to be considered absolute, and wherever peculiar circumstances seemed to merit special consideration in particular cases, the matter was to be referred by the Ordinary to Rome. In consequence, many Bishops have, since that time, sent cases to the Propaganda which have been referred to the Holy Office for consideration. The Supreme Congregation, after deliberation on such cases, has, by a decree dated January 18, 1896, determined on a course which is explained by the words which I quote from the decree itself:—

“It was asked whether, every other participation in those same sects having been removed, it is at least lawful to retain one’s own name in the membership rolls, and also to continue at the appointed time in the payment of the aforesaid assessment or debt.

“Since Our Most Holy Lord committed this very grave doubt to this Sacred Supreme Congregation for resolution, that same Sacred Congregation, after mature consideration of the matter, judged that the answer should be:—Generally speaking, it is not lawful; and according to the intention. The intention is that the matter can be tolerated when the following conditions and circumstances concur together in the case, namely: 1. If they originally gave their names to the sect in good faith, before it became known to them that the society had been condemned. 2. If scandal is absent, or is removed by an appropriate declaration that he does this lest he lose his right to the emoluments or the benefit of time in paying the debt; abstaining meanwhile, as stated above, from every communion with the sect and from every participation, even material. 3. If grave harm would come to himself or his family from renunciation. 4. Finally, provided that there is no danger whatever of perversion for that man or his family on the part of the sectaries, especially with regard to a case of illness or death; and likewise that there is no danger of a funeral being conducted with rites foreign to Catholic rites.

“When these matters were reported to Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, they were approved and confirmed in their entirety. But since this is a most grave matter, full of dangers and difficulties, which concerns not only very many dioceses but also ecclesiastical provinces, that same Most Holy Lord ordered that, for the sake of observing a uniform rule, Your Eminence and your successors in the Apostolic Delegation may provide for particular cases.”

I beg your Grace to communicate the above disposition of the Holy See as soon as possible, to your Suffragans and through them to the Confessors. With sentiments of highest esteem and fraternal charity, I remain,

For His Eminence, Apostolic Pro-Delegate, Most faithfully yours in Xt,

D. SBARRETTI, Auditor.

From this decree of the Holy Office, it is evident that members of the three societies, or of any one of them, can not be absolved unless they absolutely renounce their adherence to the prohibited societies. This renunciation must be external, complete and made in good faith; because the aims and purposes of these societies are known to be dangerous to religion and to society, although the individual members of them may be quite ignorant of this fact.

Since, however, besides their leading aims, which are for the most part a matter of secrecy, these societies have for their secondary object mutual assistance in temporal things, the question arises whether a member, who having joined the association in good faith, has given his share toward the accumulation of a benefit fund, a proportionate part of which was to be returned to him or his family with just interest, either as savings or as relief money in case of sickness or death—whether such a member must so far renounce his connection with the society as to sustain a serious loss. To this, the Holy Office answers: As a rule, such financial loss is not a valid reason for continuing in the society, since it is impossible for a man to remain a nominal member of a society, without either furthering its main object, though unwillingly and unconsciously, or else giving scandal to those who do not know the true reasons for his remaining a nominal member, and who will naturally assume that such membership means practical co-operation in the aims and purposes of the society.

Nevertheless, there may be cases where there is no scandal given by the person continuing a nominal member, and where there exists no danger for his faith and where withdrawal would mean serious pecuniary loss. In such cases, provided the man joined the society in good faith, not knowing that it was forbidden, the pastor or confessor may make application in order to obtain permission to give the man absolution although he allows his name to remain on the rolls of the society in order to be entitled to the insurance for which he has been paying perhaps for many years. If such be the case, the Apostolic Delegate in Washington has been empowered by the Holy See, to allow a mere nominal membership to continue, according to his judgment of the case, for the sole purpose of securing for the applicant an external title to what really belongs to him, without identifying him with the dangerous or unlawful character of the forbidden society.

In summing up the case before us, we would say that:

1. Since the man in question became a Knight of Pythias in good faith, that is before his conversion to the Catholic Church,

2. Since he can not now withdraw from the order without serious pecuniary loss, being a poor man; then

3. If his nominal membership create no special danger for his spiritual interests, and

4. If such membership give no scandal, then application ought to be made to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington by the man’s confessor, or through him by the bishop, to obtain permission for the gentleman to continue a nominal member of the K. P.’s, in order to be able to claim legally the insurance that belongs to him and to his family. The confessor has no power or jurisdiction to judge whether the conditions that may permit nominal membership are verified or not; neither has the ordinary such power. The Apostolic Delegate alone is the competent authority to determine whether the circumstances of the case call for a special permission or authorization to continue a nominal member of the society.

A young man, brought up as a Protestant, has for some time been convinced that the Catholic is the only true Church. He resolves accordingly to enter it, but there are serious difficulties in his way. He lives with his parents, who are strict Protestants, and the least hint of his intention would at once arouse their anger; it would be impossible for him to continue to live peaceably in his parents' house; he would have to hear all manner of bitter remarks and finally would be compelled to quit his home. He will not be in a position to support himself for about three years; after that time he will be free from his parents' authority and able to take the important step openly. Being perplexed as to how to act, he succeeds in having a private conversation with the local Catholic priest, to whom he reveals his difficulties. The priest, as is his duty, has recourse to the Bishop. How will the latter decide the case?

The question is this: Is the young man bound to confess his faith in spite of all obstacles, and publicly to be received into the Catholic Church, or may the Bishop allow him to be received secretly, and to keep the fact of his conversion concealed until he can leave his father's house?

Against an affirmative answer may be quoted our Lord's words: " Qui confitebitur me coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram Patre meo " (Matth. x, 32); and also the threat: " Qui me erubuerit et meos sermones, hunc Filius hominis erubescet, cum venerit in majestate sua " (Luke ix, 26). To obtain a just appreciation of these severe words, we must notice the contrasting clause, added by our Lord Himself. To the words, " Qui 'confitebitur me," etc., the contrasting clause is not: " Qui me confessus non fuerit," etc., as it is with reference to faith: " Qui non crediderit, condemnabitur," but it is: " Qui negaverit me," " Qui me erubuerit." Christ shows us plainly in this way that it is not permissible positively to deny His name and doctrine, and that false shame is no sufficient reason for a man's concealing his faith.

After setting aside this objection, we may adduce the following principle in support of an affirmative answer: Praecepta affirmativa obligant semper, sed non pro semper, or Praecepta affirmativa non obligant ad semper, sed certis duntaxat temporibus agendum. The Confessio exterma fidei is precisely a praeceptum affirmativum. It is, moreover, a generally accepted doctrine that weighty reasons, such as the certainty of incurring serious injury, relieve us from the duty of obeying laws that are not absolutely necessary to our salvation. The Confessio externa fidei is a law of this kind. It is permissible to conceal our religious convictions, where neither the honor of God, nor our own salvation, nor our neighbor's welfare, require us to reveal them, provided that we have good reasons for keeping them secret.

In the case under consideration a Confessio externa does not affect the honor of God nor the welfare of a neighbor. The young man's own salvation might be imperiled in his present circumstances, as, should it be made his duty to proclaim his faith, he might put off his conversion, and possibly never be converted.

My conclusion is, therefore, that the Bishop can give the young man permission to be received into the Catholic Church secretly, and can at the same time dispense him from observing the commandments of the Church, although he ought to hear Mass occasionally, when he is able to do so. He can easily receive the Sacraments secretly, in some other town for instance.

Another question arises in connection with this subject: What is the young man to do if his parents wish him to accompany them to a Protestant church? How is he to behave? If he cannot avoid yielding to their wishes or commands, he may go with them, but he must not take part in the singing or prayers of the service.

In support of the opinions expressed above, we may quote the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas: “If a disturbance among unbelievers arises from an open profession of faith without any benefit to the faith or to the faithful, it is not praiseworthy in such a case to profess the faith publicly; hence the Lord says in Matthew 7: ‘Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor scatter your pearls before swine, lest they turn and tear you to pieces.’ But if some benefit to the faith is hoped for or necessity is present, a man must profess the faith publicly, disregarding the disturbance among unbelievers; hence it is said in Matthew 15 that, when the disciples told the Lord that the Pharisees had been scandalized on hearing His word, the Lord answered: let them alone—that is, let them be disturbed—they are blind and leaders of the blind” (II.—II. qu. 3, a. 2, ad 3).—Professor Josef Aertnys, C.SS.R.

Jovan, after being baptized and brought up in the Greek Church, now desires to be received into the Catholic Church. Is his baptism to be regarded as valid?

IV. The Scientific or the Religious Ideal. Scientific and Religious Liberty : Their

Alleged Antagonism.

Summary : Is the scientific ideal opposed to the religious ? —Error of M. Bouché-Leclercq.—Exact notion of scientific theories : their object and their ambition.— The complete work of the scientist. — Though not disregarded by religion, scientific theories can neither confirm nor contradict it.—Impossibility of conflict between religion and natural sciences.—Objection founded on the alleged conflict with history and philosophy. — Incomplete answer. — Science is not the supreme good.—Sacrifices often asked of it.—Insignificance of those which religion asks of it accidentally.—Abundant compensation. — Parallel functions of science and religion. — The habit of faith not inconsistent with the scientific spirit.—Humanity needs both science and religion.—The problem of their reconciliation difficult, but important.

The copious literature of Tolerance has been recently enriched by a book written in France by a professor of the Sorbonne, entitled L’Intolérance Religieuse et la Politique. We have already quoted it. Its author, M. Bouché-Leclercq, is one of the survivors of rationalistic Liberalism. Though he repudiates religion, he does not approve of the open war between the Church and the State ; and he even proposes a modus vivendi, pressing rather heavily, it is true, on Catholics. However, he augurs very ill for the future of the faith and positive religions. No reconciliation between science and revelation appears to him possible, for he declares that there is “ an essential contradiction between the scientific ideal, which is the unremitting pursuit of truth through a succession of temporary or provisional theories, and the ideal of positive religions, which is the preservation of truth already acquired, and henceforth unassailable.”¹

¹ Op. cit., p. 354. 2 Quoted above, p. 232.

If the conflict between science and positive religions were as implacable as he declares, the modern world, which is entirely on the side of science, and the State which represents it, instead of begging concessions of tolerance from religion, would set to work to persecute it; or at most they would grant a temporary and, so to speak, compassionate tolerance to the Church and to Catholics, as to a set of old-fashioned persons, clinging to a transitory expression of religious sentiment: their good-nature would go no farther.

Happily this is not the case—the essentiality of the contradiction is imaginary ; so, indeed, is the contradiction itself, as we shall endeavour to prove. M. Bouché-Leclercq is mistaken, both as to religion and as to science.

What does he mean by his provisional theories ? Is he using unsuitable and inexact language ? Does he wish, in the interests of science, to associate himself with M. Payot2 in proclaiming the necessity of the relativist principle ? He cannot do it without falling into that absolutism of statement which he so unreasonably condemns. Relativism is no more a postulate of science than stagnation is a postulate of religion.

Does M. Bouché-Leclercq speak of the provisional theories of the natural sciences in the proper sense of the word ? The ideal of these sciences does not by any means consist in the pursuit of a truth which is continually escaping from our grasp ; and, on the other hand, the religious ideal is not the mere preservation of acquired truths. The acquired truth of religion is composed of a limited number of dogmas, derived from Divine revelation; but their clear understanding has sometimes taken centuries of work and preparation. Similarly, every science has its acquired truths¹ and its provisional theories. But these do not imply any attitude with regard to truth, different from the attitude of revealed religion, for the good and sufficient reason that, being entirely directed to the exact representation of external phenomena, they do not aim at the acquisition of absolute truth.

¹ Such are the results derived from experiments ; and such, also, is a part, very difficult to define, of physical theories, of which M. Duhem says : “ By a continuous tradition, every theory of physical science transmits to that which follows it that part of natural classification which it has been able to construct ” (La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure, p. 48. See also Physique de Croyant, p. 41).

Poincaré similarly says : “ At first sight it seems as if theories lasted only for a day ; but there is something in them which survives. If one of them has enabled us to discover a real relation between two things, that relation is finally acquired, and we shall find it again in a new form in the later theories which follow to take the place of the former ” (La Valeur de la Science; Paris, 1905).

Formerly, no doubt, and even fifty years ago, scientists put forward their theories as explanations, some certain and others conjectural, of the real truths concealed beneath the phenomena whose laws they recorded. Acoustics asserted and demonstrated the undulations which produce sound ; with reference to the propagation of light, various hypotheses were made, the most important of which were the emission or corpuscular theory and the undulatory theory. According to the latter, all bodies were supposed to be filled by an extremely subtle elastic medium called ether, through which waves of light were constantly throbbing ; but since then modern scientists, tired of fruitless strife and defeat, have ceased to look to their methods of observation for what those methods cannot teach them. Their theories are constructed, not to explain phenomena, but to represent and classify and generalize them, and to foresee the conditions of their recurrence, and thus to group them into rational systems, by which much mental labour is saved and the investigators are put on the track of new discoveries. They do not go deep enough to discover real causes, but in their places put symbols between which the same relations exist as would exist between the realities which are represented by those symbols in their statements and calculations.

For example, the theory of luminous vibrations does not assert any real motion, but it provides an excellent basis to express in figures the experimental laws of light. Its value consists in the precision with which it represents a great number of laws. It establishes between luminous phenomena a logical connection which gives it its beauty, and it exhibits its fecundity in the various deductions which are drawn from it. Though superior to other theories less simple, less complete, or less exact, it does not profess to exclude them as false, so long as they remain in sufficient correlation with the phenomena of which they are the signs and symbols ; for the vibratory theory, like the electro-magnetic theory, which tends to replace it, not pretending to tell us anything of the real causes of the luminous phenomena, does not present itself as objectively true or objectively false. “ The object of Fresnel was not to know whether there is such a medium as ether, whether it is formed of atoms or not, or whether these atoms move in this or that direction: it was to foresee the optical phenomena.”¹ This conception of scientific theories attracts scientific men of the sceptical school like H. Poincaré,² and of the Christian school like M. Duhem.³ The scientific ideal ceases, then, to be the pursuit of ontological truth, and becomes the reduction of all partial theories to unity ; and these succeed one another provisionally, because they are symbolical, and they must necessarily be continually modified and completed to fit in with new discoveries.

¹ H. Poincaré, La Science et l’Hypothèse, pp. 189, 190. Before this he had said : “ We are not concerned whether ether really exists ; that is the business of metaphysicians ” (Leçons sur les Théories Mathématiques de la Lumière, Preface ; Paris, 1889).

² See Sur la Valeur Objective des Théories Physiques (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1902, p. 263). “ The scientific fact,” says Poincaré, “ is nothing but the bare fact translated into appropriate language.” And again : “ Science is principally a classification, a way of connecting facts ... a system of relations ” (La Valeur de la Science, pp. 231, 265, 266).

³ See the work, La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure ; and the pamphlet, Physique de Croyant, written in answer to the article of M. Rey, quoted below, p. 288.

With these remarks, we may take leave of M. Bouché-Leclercq. His assertion holds good only as long as he⁴ clings to an antiquated scientific ideal, now almost abandoned. But modern conceptions furnish us with new material, which may be utilized to put an end to the old quarrel between science and religion.

⁴ In company with M. Le Dantec, who, with thorough Breton tenacity, seeks to know from biology what life is, and so puts forward his Biologie destructive in opposition to religion. See his Conference, Biologie Constructive et Biologie Destructive, given at the jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 308-318). “ When a scientific theory professes to tell us what heat is, or what electricity is, or what life is, it is condemned beforehand ” (Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science, p. 267).

Science is one thing, the scientist another. In practice the latter oversteps the limits of the former ; for who is there who does not yield to what M. Rey¹ calls the common temptation to do a little metaphysics ? And so we may say that the scientist proceeds by three stages, which we may compare to the three stories of a building. In the first we have the exact observation of facts and experimental laws—facts and laws which have their phenomenal reality, and communicate their objective value to the statements in which they are expressed ; in the second, we come to the rational classification of these facts and laws— the theoretical interpretation. Without expressing any opinion on the real facts, this interpretation supplies a logical, convenient, and suggestive representation by symbols. This is the work which properly belongs to science, and secures all its benefits. Lastly, these same theories, and sometimes also extra-scientific prejudices, lead scientists to set up a second series of hypotheses concerning the reality underlying the phenomena, so much the more clearly cherished because they seem as if arising spontaneously from the representative theories founded on experience. The scientist will thus become an atomist or a dynamist in cosmology ; a materialist or a determinist in natural history ; a transformist in biology. But we must remark that not one of these hypotheses is strictly contained in the physical theories or their manifold applications. They are formulated only by the aid of metaphysical principles or postulates, and the philosophic scepticism of many scientists leads them to neglect the prudent counsels of this other branch of human knowledge. They hope to deduce everything from experience, but unconsciously they overstep its teaching, and for want of philosophic discernment they proceed by guesswork to fill up the gap, which is sometimes very wide, between the theories and their hypothetical conclusions on man and the universe.

¹ La Philosophie Scientifique de M. Duhem (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1904, p. 699).

Take, for example, the naturalist, and watch him at his work. He will apply himself in the first place to the careful consideration of actual organisms and reproductions. Comparative studies of living beings will lead him to a theoretical systematization, in which all the species observed by him will occupy their logical place, in which compartments will be reserved even for intermediaries not yet discovered, but which the series of beings seems to demand, as the calculations of Leverrier postulated a new planet. That is strictly scientific work—the only work indispensable to progress in scientific discovery. The naturalist, however, following his natural inclination to announce as an established fact what is really only a hypothesis, will easily discover ontological relations between species which seem logically to be connected, and will proclaim that one is derived from the other. He will declare himself a transformist, but he will make this declaration, not as a scientist, but in the name of a parasitic philosophy which he has grafted on his science.¹

¹ It is much less as a scientist that M. Le Dantec declares that he “ abandons the language of humanity in the strictest sense ” and reduces man, soul included, to a mere piece of automatic machinery. He boasts of his destructive biology, which, as he says, does not teach him to live well, but only to live without the fear of death (Biologie destructive, Biologie constructive, Conference quoted above). There is neither science nor philosophy here. The two preceding speakers, Poincaré and M. Lanson, had used much more reserved and more scientific language.

These preliminary explanations suggest a very important question : At what stage are those contacts produced which are so incorrectly called the conflicts between science and religion ?

On the first story of our scientific building peace and good understanding prevail. Nothing appears possible beyond a little friction, a slight temporary and accidental irritation. In fact, no philosophical or religious doctrine could for long deny or contradict observations founded on palpable evidence. Poincaré wittily observes that Galileo and the Grand Inquisitor were not at issue on a question of fact;² but the same scientist is wrong in saying that a man, when he puts on his working clothes and enters his laboratory, must leave his faith behind him.³ It will be a delicate task to discover the points of intersection between observation and the scientific theory which accompanies it, for the proposition which formulates a scientific fact or law “ is generally a mixture of experimental discovery, possessing objective importance, and of theoretical explanation, simply symbolical, without any objective significance.”¹ M. Duhem adds that if a natural philosopher desires to speak of an optical phenomenon, he will speak of the vibrations of ether ; in other words, he will express the phenomenon in the language of his favourite theory.

² La Valeur de la Science, p. 231.

³ Le Libre Examen en Matière Scientifique, Conference at the Jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 285-295). The reference is specially to p. 288.

¹ Duhem, Physique de Croyant, p. 27. 2 Ibid., p. 19.

On the second story — that is, in the stage of theories—science and faith cannot come into conflict, because the scientific theory affirms nothing concerning objective reality. “ By its own nature and essence every principle of theoretical physics is useless in metaphysical or theological discussions.”2 And in this sense we may assent to the statement of M. Lanson : “ If there is not a German science, or a French science, or a Belgian science, but one science common to all nations, still less is there a science of a party, a monarchist or Republican science, a Catholic or Socialist science.”³

³ L’Esprit Scientifique et la Méthode de l’Histoire littéraire. Conference at the Jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 296-307 ; see p. 306).

Does this mean that the philosopher or the theologian can despise scientific theories ? Poincaré would perhaps condemn the pretensions of metaphysical research, for, according to him nothing can enable us to know the nature of things.⁴ As for ourselves, who give its due place to philo-sophy, we believe also in a harmonious correspondence of the classifying genius with the Spirit which has created that genius and all other things. We admit instinctively and, as it were, necessarily between the reality of things and their ideal classification certain analogies, closer and more probable according as the classification is more comprehensive and perfect. The plan which is formed as the result of scientific observations tends to reproduce the original plan on which all things were created. “ Every branch of learning appears to me a praiseworthy effort directed towards knowledge of the order which presides over a determinate category of phenomena.”¹ Thus the scientific theory creates a prejudice favourable or unfavourable to a philosophical or religious doctrine, but nothing more. We remember that in these scientific theories the scientist treads ground on which he is independent, in which he need not hope for or fear any clashing with religion.

⁴ La Valeur de la Science, p. 266.

¹ A. de Lapparent, La Recherche Scientifique, et la Foi. Letter to the Revue Pratique d’Apologétique, t. 2, p. 267.

The highest story only is the stage on which science and religion are brought into contact and relation, and sometimes into conflict.

This is enough to reassure mere unscientific mortals. This upper story, as we have seen, is not one of discoveries or inventions ; the scientist has not constructed it as a scientist. Even if the atmosphere there is troubled, and a wind of discord blows through, there is no reason to tremble for that earthly happiness or progress about which human nature shows such eagerness and anxiety. It is never with science properly so called that religion can find itself in conflict, but with something that we may call meta-science. The pretended conflicts of science and religion have never existed, except between religion and a certain philosophy that calls itself scientific.

This is enough to show that impiety has only misused the popularity of science in order to attack the faith or to make unlimited tolerance an essential condition of progress. Neither the act of faith nor submission to doctrinal authority need disturb the scientist in his truly scientific work.

There remains, it is true, his metaphysical work. For those branches of natural science which are devoted to the exploration of the material world with such valuable results, this is negligible, or of only secondary importance. It engages the attention principally of conceited inquirers, who hope to bring out of the facts of science either speculative answers on the nature and origin of life, ideas, and morals, or practical rules for the direction of our individual and social energy, the formulae of our duties, the key to our happiness.¹ Certainly, in all departments of knowledge strictly scientific inquiries and objective perceptions remain independent of metaphysical or religious doctrines. This remark applies also to psychology, and even to mysticism, in so far as they are experimental.² Nevertheless, hitherto the interest of observations of the psychical order has been identified with that of spiritualist or determinist teachings, and of supernatural or naturalistic explanations which inquirers rightly or wrongly professed to deduce from them. Few biologists or psychologists, and perhaps no sociologist, have confined themselves within the special limits of science.

¹ To this class belong those attempts to form a so-called “ scientific ” code of morality, which professes to do without the help even of philosophy. But these are no longer in fashion, and at present M. Durkheim is almost the only person to plead the cause of a moral code founded exclusively on science.

² “ The object of experimental psychology,” Father Maréchal forcibly remarks, “ is to deduce the laws of the relations of mental phenomena, but not to discover the ontological causes of the phenomena themselves ” (Le Sentiment de Présence, chez les Profanes et les Mystiques). Speaking of mystical phenomena, the Abbé Pacheu adds : “ The observation and description of facts, if men are well informed, cannot but be the same for all ” (L’Expérience Mystique et l’Activité Sub-consciente, p. 301). M. Delacroix, the secular writer who has the reputation of being the best informed on these sacred matters, writes to the author : “ As you say, it is not the part of psychology either to acknowledge or to deny the supernatural ” (ibid., p. 305).

There remain also history and historical criticism, in reference to which Renan says : “ Religions present themselves as facts, and must be discussed as facts.”¹ How can we gainsay this ? The speculative, moral, or social conclusions of certain writers who have a great reputation as philosophers or scientists, and also their historical conclusions, frequently come into contact with religious dogmas or assertions which necessarily depend on those dogmas, or at least with theories, beliefs, and opinions which are accredited and in favour in the Church, and these contacts are by no means always friendly.

¹ Discourse in answer to Pasteur’s discourse on admission to the French Academy. M. Bouché-Leclercq similarly says : “ However high they soar, revealed religions take their standing-ground on the earth, and they are bound to show the time and place at which the revelation they assert was made. And it is on this point that they have to justify themselves before historical criticism.”

Full liberty of expression and diffusion is claimed for every formal declaration put forth in the name of science, and the intolerance of the Church refuses it to science. Every scientist is called upon to give up preconceived ideas. The Catholic has his freedom of thought limited by his faith. Here is intolerance, here is slavery, which furnish the modern world with weapons against all authoritative religion.

Is it sufficient, in order to dispose of the first objection, to answer that a true dogma cannot contradict a truth of reason, and that therefore the religious barrier forbids nothing to scientists but error ? There is a double reply at once. Man can only make progress by groping his way. He fails before he succeeds ; he passes through error to arrive at the truth ; he must be allowed freedom to make unsuccessful attempts, or even wrongly to contradict articles of the Creeds. And, on the other hand, religious authority does not impose dogmas alone. It blocks the way by propositions not yet defined, but which it considers important to its cause ; it makes us subject not only to an infallible Pope, but also to Commissions and Congregations which are liable to error ; and in this connection men will triumphantly point to a small number of censures passed upon propositions which are nowadays universally accepted.

The page which bears the names of Catholic men of science is very glorious to the Church, and very useful for our argument ; but it is going a little too far to profess that it supplies a complete refutation of the objection. Certainly, we thoroughly appreciate the warning which Poincaré gave to an assembly of freethinkers : “ Do not imagine that I wish to deny science to men of faith, and especially to Catholics. God forbid ! I should not be such a fool as to deprive humanity of the services of a Pasteur.” And we are glad to hear him admit that “ believers have as much of the critical spirit as any other men.” “ I know many,” he added, “ and Pasteur is only the most illustrious among them.”¹

¹ Conference quoted, p. 288.

Again, it may be asked whether these Christians were not scientists in spite of their religion ; whether they have not had to overcome difficulties and obstacles in order to gain their reputation ; whether they do not owe their distinction to the emancipating influence of their environment. Perhaps, also, they are famous in those branches of science which have nothing to do—at least, at the present day—with religious questions, such as pure mathematics and astronomy. In such matters there would be no possibility of conflict with religion.

For this reason these answers appear to us incomplete, though we do not say that they are entirely devoid of truth. Some concession seems to be required, and our mind cannot be satisfied except by rising to a plane higher than that in which the difficulty lies.

It may be that in some departments of science in which the interests of religion are directly involved religion requires from scientists precautions which may entail sacrifices. It may call upon them to move slowly and carefully, and not to throw things into complete disorder ; and thus it to some extent hampers their investigations, and puts some restriction on their movements. Will it never go farther than is required ? Will the judgment of those who speak in the name of religion be so sound, so comprehensive, and at the same time so promptly given, as to place no unnecessary restriction on liberty ? Will their intention even be always so pure and honest as to take no counsel but from the light of reason ? We cannot expect such perfection of judgment and intention in every case without looking for a miracle which is nowhere promised, and forgetting the traditional symbol of the Church—a boat tossed on the waves of a stormy sea. The qualified representatives of the Church, and still more its self-constituted defenders, are but men. Their knowledge may be small, their prudence may be outwitted, even their virtue may fail. Their interference will sometimes be awkward, inopportune, or exaggerated. Excessive zeal, after all, should surprise us less and distress us less than the moral scandals from the pain of which God has not spared His Church.

This we grant freely and sincerely, but in making this admission we feel that we are the more justified in protesting against the absurd pretension implied in the complaint against religion and the Church. Science and all its branches and all its advances are represented as blessings so precious that they are worth purchasing at the price of any loss or sacrifice, while religion is a useless thing that is not deserving of the least attention. Unless they maintain some such proposition, our readers will admit that the famous objection as to the conflict between religion and science cannot be sustained, and that it leaves untouched our principles and our conclusions on the subject of tolerance and religion.

To explain. On a concrete question, let us reason without passion or prejudice—in other words, let us adopt what is called a scientific attitude.

If Science impersonate could appear before us, Religion and Science might well join hands, for what would religion have to fear ? Science, in the full light and in peaceful possession of truth, would not sin by impatience, or be in too great a hurry to reveal her secrets; but instead of a personification, we have only the disciples of Science, the best of whom call themselves eternal beginners, always labouring at the construction of a monument which is never completed, and in which every successive course of stones is only laid finally after many fresh beginnings.

If scientists themselves (all dogma set aside) had that interior liberty of which Poincaré makes a duty ; if they possessed those qualities which M. Lanson eloquently describes—“ disinterested desire for information, sincere probity, laborious patience, submission to facts ; if they were not too ready to believe either in themselves or in others ; and if they had a continual desire for criticism, control, and verification,”¹ we should be almost ready to vote with the famous philosopher for the suppression of all barriers. Not a single barrier is raised without cost, and all are irksome. Men of the character we have just described would give to religion and to society itself guarantees of perfect security. But, unfortunately, Poincaré dare not promise us or even expect complete freedom from prejudice among scientists. He recognizes the frauds which have given Haeckel such an unfortunate notoriety ;¹ while Madame Curie has shown us that scientists, in their pursuit of truth, do not necessarily forget all other desires; and the orator who followed Poincaré at Brussels condescended to go into details : “ Scientists and ourselves have in common all the same human weakness, the same short sight, the wavering attention, the blind passions, the same inability to put ourselves in another person’s place, the perpetual risk of deceiving ourselves and of being deceived.”2

¹ Lanson, Conference quoted, p. 299.

¹ Conference quoted, p. 290. 2 Ibid., p. 298.

There is no close corporation of scientists : the first comer is permitted to usurp the title ; and these are the men who claim entire freedom to write or say anything they please.

It must be admitted that entire freedom is no longer insisted upon with the same distinctness, and when to the question whether there are doctrines which are socially dangerous, and of which society can get rid as it gets rid of criminals, Poincaré replies, “ No lie can be ultimately advantageous,”³ he practically assumes without any justification that all doctrines are so many truths.

³ Ibid., p. 290.

We also think that no lie can be ultimately advantageous, and precisely for that reason we would not refuse to the civil power the right to protect itself against the propagation of falsehood and error.

Is not the remark which M. Lanson makes as a literary critic equally applicable in other matters ? He says : “ We have been too much inclined to believe that it was sufficient to have ideas, and have not fully realized that literature, like everything else, requires ideas that have been proved to be true.”¹

¹ L’Esprit Scientifique et la Méthode d’Histoire Littéraire, p. 304.

But if this is the fact, and if it is really impossible to identify scientists with science and ideas with truth, then all the liberty which Poincaré claims for science and all the good that he says of harmless truth unfortunately does not apply, even from the scientific point of view, to those who call themselves scientists or to what they call their ideas.

It is perfectly natural and intelligible that a Government anxious for the public welfare should be disturbed by the social repercussions of so many fanciful theories, that are labelled “ scientific ” just as easily as London merchants used to label their English goods “ made in Germany,” because German goods were in fashion. And how much more is the prudent and even protective action of the Church justified ! Charged with the spiritual interests of a multitude easily scandalized and easily led away, is she wrong in taking care that scientific novelties shall not be introduced without any control or examination ? Is she wrong in refusing to risk the higher life of souls for an advantage which is always less important, and sometimes problematical ? The personal dignity of every man forbids that dangerous experiments shall be made even on the vilest bodies in the interests of medicine or surgery. Is it not the part of a wise democracy to forbid the dangerous experiments in social or educational matters which modern sociologists or educators would like to try, as it were in anima vili, on the people or their children ?

This argument is not weakened by the optimistic view which prophesies a final victory for truth, for, while we are waiting for that victory to be won, error will have disturbed many souls, driven many more to utter ruin, and produced irreparable disasters.

But do not the restrictions of liberty tend to embarrass and retard the progress of science ? Granted ; but even then they are not necessarily condemned, unless we regard the least important scientific discovery as the supreme good of humanity.

From our whole exposition of socialism it is evident that only a very superficial observer could possibly consider it the invention of some designing trickster or the artificial product of political adventurers. We have pointed repeatedly to the remoter origin and deeper sources of socialism. Yet it will be worth our while to review the actual causes of the socialist movement and to present them here arranged in proper order. We are the more willing to undertake this duty, since it will give us the opportunity to shed more light, not only upon the real significance of socialism, but also upon its intimate connection with liberalism.

Socialists themselves acknowledge that they have only drawn the logical conclusions from principles set up by liberals; and liberalism is accused by Catholics generally of having given birth to socialism. The liberals, on their part, with horror and indignation disclaim all connection with socialism. Liberalism does not profess, so say its defenders, to abolish private property: it only makes ownership free. Nor does it profess to advocate a servile industrial organization: it only advocates unrestricted freedom for all.

Notwithstanding all the protestations of the liberals, we cannot but consider socialism as the lineal descendant of liberalism, however much the parent may try to disown its offspring. The question is this, whether the principles set up and defended by liberals logically lead to socialism or not; and this question we believe must be answered in the affirmative.¹

¹ On Feb. 23, 1890, Bebel said in the Reichstag: “You know as well as we that the more faith in a life to come disappears from among the people, the more the people will clamor for having their heaven on earth.” This thought is not quite original with Bebel. Heine had said the same fifty years before. Remarking on the subversive influence of German philosophy on religion he continues: “The overthrow of the old beliefs has also uprooted the former morality. . . . The destruction of a belief in heaven is of consequence not only in morals but also in politics. The common people chafe at their earthly misery and yearn for happiness on earth. Communism is the natural outcome of these changed views, and it is spreading all over Germany. (Heine’s Works, vol. III. Hamburg, 1876, pp. 113-115.)

1. The deepest roots of socialism are atheism and materialism. If it is once admitted that all ends with this life, that man has no higher destiny than the lower animals which wallow in the mud, who, then, can require of the poor and oppressed, whose life is a continued struggle for existence, that they bear their hard lot with patience and resignation, and look on with indifference while their neighbors are clad in purple and fine linen, and daily revel at sumptuous banquets?

Is not the inextinguishable yearning for perfect happiness implanted also in the breast of the workingman? If you despoil him of every hope of a better life to come, what right have you to prevent him from striving to obtain happiness on earth as best he can, and therefore to make imperative demands for his share of earthly goods? Is he not a man as well as his employer, who thrives on the laborer’s exertions? Who can prove to workingmen from the standpoint of atheism that it is meet and just that one should pine in poverty and want, while another enjoys abundance of all things, since all have the same nature, and no reason can be given on atheistic grounds why the goods of this world should belong to one rather than to another? If the atheistic and materialistic theory is true, the demands of socialism are certainly just—that all the goods and enjoyments of this life should be equally divided among all; that it is, therefore, unjust that one should live in a magnificent palace and enjoy all pleasures without labor, while another is living in a squalid cellar or cold garret, and cannot, even with the greatest effort, obtain enough bread to appease his hunger.

Already in 1847, in a speech before the Prussian Diet, BISMARCK expressed this same idea in the following words: “I do not understand how in those states (which are not based on religion) the ideas of the communists, for instance, concerning the immorality of private ownership and the high moral value of theft as of an attempt to restore the inborn rights of men, can rightfully be prevented from asserting themselves if they have the power to do so. For, also these ideas are looked upon by their originators as very humanistic, yea, as the prime flower of humanism. Therefore, gentlemen, let us not curtail the Christian sentiments of our people.”¹

¹ Cf. Busch, Bismarck und seine Leute während des Krieges mit Frankreich, vol. I, p. 210.

Now, who is it that has preached and propagated atheism in all its forms? Who has sought by all ways and means to restrict the influence of Christianity in the school and in public life? Who is it that proclaimed extreme Darwinism as a dogma and popularized it for the ignorant masses? Who is it that even in our own day, in speech and in writing, in the chairs of universities and in public assemblies, preaches the grossest atheism? It is the representatives of liberalism, beginning with the French Encyclopedists down to our own university professors, who combat and decry the faith in God and in Christ the Saviour as stupidity and superstition. More especially Hegel and Feuerbach are the intellectual progenitors of the socialist heroes Marx and Engels (cf. above, p. 37 sqq.). Hence Marx himself utters the sarcastic taunt against the liberals, that atheism seems to them a venial fault compared with the crime of criticising the traditional conditions of property.¹ Wherein they have sinned therein they are punished.

¹ Capital, Introduction, p. ix. Virchow, one of the chief luminaries of liberalism, publicly maintained in the Prussian Diet, May 8, 1891, that he could not understand how a reasonable man could imagine that men are on earth in order to prepare for heaven.

It is especially by its baneful influence on the schools that liberalism has disseminated unbelief in the great mass of the people. For the last century already the universities have been hotbeds of infidelity. A pitifully small minority of university professors still make open profession of Christianity. By far the greater number is indifferent if not hostile to the Christian religion, or at most professes some milk-and-water kind of Christianity.

From the universities the streamlets of infidelity are trickling farther and farther. Wherever liberalism dares to show its true nature it endeavors to banish religious influences from the elementary schools, and, as it is called, to secularize them. And in doing so liberalism is but consistent with its principles.

Lately a liberal university professor—Dodel-Port— published a book which permits us to look behind the scenes perhaps more than is agreeable to some of the professor’s associates. His work is entitled, “ Moses and Darwin.” What, the author asks, is taught at our universities? Darwin and always Darwin. The doctrines of creation, of paradise, of the fall of the first man, the narration of miracles, he tells us, have been cast aside by modern science and relegated into the realm of fables. The representative “scientists” teach that there is no personal God, that man was developed from animality, that there is no immortal soul and no free will, and that in the history of mankind everything is determined by mechanical laws as in the rest of nature, etc. This is the teaching of the universities.

But what is taught in the (German) elementary schools? The very reverse. There the children are imbued with a belief in Moses, in the existence of God, the creation of the world, the fall of man, miracles, etc.

Is this contradiction to go on forever? No, is the verdict of our author. Off with the customary mask of hypocrisy! Let us show our true colors. Eject Moses and his miracles from the elementary school, that not every student of the higher branches may be forced to fight out the hard struggle between two systems which are diametrically opposed.

From the liberal point of view this demand is perfectly justified; but from it we can also perceive to whom is due that infidelity which is infecting all classes of the population and has blessed us with modern socialism and its revolutionary ideas.¹

¹ In the session of the Reichstag of May 23, 1878, Dr. Jörg remarked very aptly: "The most urgent necessity is the regeneration of the school. Personally I fear less the socialism of the present than the socialism of the future which is growing up among our young people. Owing to mistaken political calculations the schools have more and more been withdrawn from religious influences and thereby their doors have unwittingly been opened to socialism. Modern pedagogy, or, I might say, the modern schoolcraze, has become a seminary of socialism. Willy nilly, the effect is to raise the children above their level and thus to sow dissatisfaction broadcast among the people. Thus I wish to be understood, if I tell you openly that a wretched, burdened laborer who does not pray, who has forgotten or never learned it, will fall an easy prey to socialism as soon as it comes to fetch him.” If this be true of German elementary schools, what shall we say of our American public schools with their fads and pretensions?

Socialists are fully aware that their atheism is based on modern infidel science. Engels terms “the German labor movement the inheritor of classical German philosophy.” Bebel has repeatedly acknowledged his indebtedness to modern scientists. On September 16, 1878, he said in the Reichstag: “Gentlemen, you attack our views on religion because they are atheistic and materialistic. I acknowledge the correctness of the impeachment. ... I am firmly convinced that socialism finally leads to atheism. But who has established the scientific and philosophical foundations of those atheistic doctrines which cause you so much anxiety and displeasure? Was that done by socialists? Edgar and Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, David Strauss, Ernest Renan—were they socialists? They were men of science... . We have adopted our atheistic tenets in accordance with our scientific convictions, and we feel obliged in conscience to spread them among the masses. Why should that be forbidden to one party which is allowed to the other?” The spokesmen of modern science will be at a loss to find a suitable reply; for, even if they do not make open profession of infidelity, they are, at least for the most part, infected with the principles of Strauss and Renan.

2. The second great principle of the revolutionary party is equality. Here again socialism takes the same stand as liberalism, and draws the last consequence from its principles. Who invented the watchword liberty, equality, and fraternity, and thus gave an appearance of right and even of duty to the bloody French Revolution? It was the representatives of liberalism. The worthies of the Revolution—the Jacobins and Girondists—were the true forefathers of the modern liberals, who delight in their principles and phraseology, and continually spout liberty and equality. In virtue of this liberty and equality the ancient order of things was subverted; the privileges of the nobility and the prerogatives of the Church were abolished; every memory of ancient institutions was effaced; the people were declared sovereign; and, finally, the “citizen Capet” was brought to the scaffold. True, when the liberal bourgeoisie had once taken hold of the reins of government, they were eager to put a stop to the further development of their principles. After the Church had been persecuted and, as far as this was possible to human power, suppressed, the heroes of the Revolution— Robespierre at their head—were eager to introduce the worship of a Supreme Being in order to check the masses. After the property of the Church and of the nobility had been seized upon, and individuals had enriched themselves from the wealth of the nation, it was declared in the constitution that private property was sacred and inviolable. After the aristocracy had been removed and the hierarchy of the Church had been suppressed, they determined to establish an aristocracy of genius and wealth. Was such a step consistent? Had they any right to demand of the people to be satisfied with that equality which conferred upon it a semblance of freedom, but left it totally bereft of protection, and finally surrendered it to the power of the capitalists? Was the people not entitled to require that they should redeem their promises, and finally establish perfect equality in real earnest? We consider that demand as logical and just, according to the principles of liberalism.

3. The close relation of socialism to liberalism may be still more clearly shown in reference to the adopted theory of value. He who accepts this modern socialistic theory of value—that the exchange-value of all productions is only the result of labor, or accumulated labor—cannot possibly consider as just the conditions of modern production in which the laborer is always at a disadvantage, but must logically come to the principles of socialism. But who first established the socialistic theory of value? Is this theory the invention of socialism? By no means; it is the traditional doctrine of liberalism. Adam Smith, Ricardo, Say, and all the so-called classical political economists belong to the liberal school; and they have almost without exception laid down the principle that all value is to be credited to labor. Lassalle, as we have already shown, in establishing his theory of value could point to a stately line of liberal social economists. In recent times this theory, however, is either wholly abandoned, or at least essentially modified by liberals. They soon discovered what a dangerous weapon they put into the hands of socialism. But it was too late. The fact cannot be concealed from the world that liberalism forged the most dangerous weapon which socialism is using for the subversion of the existing social order.

4. Not only theoretically, but also practically, did liberalism pave the way for socialism. The way was smoothed chiefly by the introduction and enforcement of unlimited industrial competition, with all the liberties and privileges which it brings in its train. All protecting organizations which, in the course of time, had arisen to counteract unlimited competition, whether in theory or in practice, were, in the name of freedom, violently suppressed. Even the laws against usury were abolished in the interest of freedom. Thus society was disintegrated, the weaker industries were isolated and, owing to unlimited competition, fell victims to the superior power of capital. Moreover, since modern discoveries were made to serve merely the interests of a few capitalists, the solid middle class, which formed the strongest support of the existing social order, began more and more to: disappear, and society was divided into two hostile classes—-the wealthier bourgeoisie, on the one hand, with their inveterate hatred of the Church and the nobility, with their insatiable avarice and reckless oppression of the laborers as of an inferior race; on the other hand, the huge masses of the poor, particularly laborers in factories, filled with hatred and revenge against their capitalist oppressors. Thus a fertile soil was prepared for social democracy. It needed only agitators to make the “disinherited” acquainted with the results of agnostic science, and to fling the firebrand of rebellion into the masses of the laborers—and there stood social democracy fullfledged.

5. Moreover, liberalism endeavored to bring about a centralization in all departments of social economy, not only by utilizing modern discoveries in the field of industry, but still more by its control of education, and even of science, religion, and politics. Now, socialism, according to its very nature, aims at the greatest possible centralization. The means of production, the organization of labor, the distribution of produce, education, instruction—all is to be controlled by the state. The state takes upon itself the duties of the separate community, of the family, and of the individual. Hence Schäffle¹ logically concludes that “all centralization of the liberal state advances the cause of socialism and harmonizes with its principle.”

¹ Quintessence of Socialism. English version edited by B. Bosanquet, London, p. 52.

But who has employed all means to centralize education, Church government, marriage discipline, the care of the poor? Who has abolished the independence of municipalities, churches, and religious orders, and given all into the hands of the state? This is the work of liberalism. Socialism is, therefore, nothing else than the logical development of the liberal idea of the state. The state is the source of all right, say the liberals; to this principle socialism can rightfully appeal against liberalism and in favor of its own entire programme.

Thus it is beyond a doubt that liberalism and socialism are closely related to each other, and that there is, therefore, no possibility of an efficient stand against socialism from the side of liberalism. Liberalism has but one means against socialism—the police. As soon as it tries other remedies its inconsistency and inefficiency against socialism become lamentably evident.

129. Thesis III. All men are obliged to accept Divine Revelation, when it has been made known to them, and to believe the mysteries which it may contain.

Explanation. We know indeed that a supernatural Revelation has been given to mankind. This, however, it is the province, not of Philosophy, but of Theology and kindred sciences to prove and discuss. Prescinding, therefore, from the actual state of things, we examine, from the standpoint of natural reason, what man's duties are in regard to Revelation if the latter should be made.

Part 1. Man is obliged to accept Divine Revelation. Proof. God is the Supreme Lord and Master of all His creatures. He has the right, therefore, to enjoin upon us the acceptance of certain truths which natural reason by itself is incapable of discovering, and to command the performance of certain acts of worship. This right connotes, on our part, the duty of accepting such truths and of performing such acts, when God's will in these matters shall have been made known to us. Now this is to accept Divine Revelation. Consequently, we are obliged to accept Divine Revelation when it has been made known to us.

Part 2. Man is obliged to believe in revealed mysteries. Proof. A mystery is a truth which human reason cannot comprehend. We may understand the meaning of the subject and the predicate of the proposition in which the incomprehensible truth is enunciated; we may know that such a predicate belongs to such a subject, but we cannot perceive how or why they are thus connected. Even in the natural order, many of the physical phenomena are incomprehensible truths, and may, therefore, be called, in a certain sense, natural mysteries. Revealed or supernatural mysteries are those truths which can be learned only by Divine Revelation; for example, that the three Divine Persons are one God. Now, God's infinite knowledge necessarily includes truths which surpass our finite understanding; such truths He is surely able to make known to us, and He has the right to demand our belief in the same as an homage of our understanding. Therefore, we are under obligation to believe the mysteries which God may be pleased to reveal.

130. Objections.

1. It is unworthy of a man to believe what he does not understand. Answer. If such belief were without a sufficient reason, yes; but if it is supported by the best of reasons, namely, the infallible authority of God, belief is truly worthy of man, and the contrary course would be most unreasonable.

2. Dogmatic teaching enslaves the intellect. Answer. An entire reliance upon authority in every science would be detrimental to intellectual development. But to reject the momentous truths of Revelation, because they come from authority, would be more unreasonable than to refuse belief in the existence of the Roman Empire, because we must depend ultimately for our knowledge of this historic fact upon human testimony.

3. The knowledge of mysteries is useless. Answer. On the contrary, it is most useful; besides giving us an occasion to honor God by the homage of our intellect, it wonderfully and consolingly expands our knowledge of God and of our own destinies.

4. Dogmatic teaching begets intolerance. Answer. Truth begets a theoretic intolerance, or a firmness of conviction which is intolerant of error. But we deny that such a state of mind, whether it rests upon authoritative teaching, or upon demonstration, causes practical intolerance, or an unjust interference with civil and religious liberty. The persecution of the Church in recent times, carried on in many lands by the opponents of Revelation, shows what begets intolerance.

131. If God deigns to bestow a Revelation upon us, He must necessarily give us the means of recognizing it as such. Chief among these means are miracles and prophecies. Miracles are effects perceptible by the senses, which transcend the powers and the order of all nature. We have demonstrated (Ment. Phil., Cosmol., Chap. III.) that miracles are possible, and can be known as such with certainty. Prophecies are accurate predictions of such future events as depend upon free causes, and cannot be known in advance with certainty, except by the omniscient God.

132. Thesis IV. Miracles and prophecies are infallible proofs of a Divine Revelation.

Explanation. In this thesis we maintain that if, unmistakably, miracles have been worked or prophecies been made in confirmation of a doctrine, that doctrine is thereby known to be approved by the Creator as His own Divine Revelation. The immediate inference from the thesis would be that such a doctrine must be accepted by all men.

Proof. A true miracle can be wrought by God alone. Hence, it is a Divine seal, stamped as it were upon the doctrine, in express confirmation of which the miracle is worked. The Divine origin of such a doctrine, therefore, is infallibly true, because it is impossible for God to affix His seal to a falsehood.

A prophecy is an accurate prediction of a future event that is not dependent upon necessary causes. But God alone is the author of such a prediction, for He alone can possess such knowledge. Therefore, prophecies made in confirmation of a doctrine which is published as coming from God, are infallible proofs that such a doctrine is a Divine Revelation.

133. God is at perfect liberty to choose the manner of His Revelation. As a matter of fact, however, He has chosen to manifest it to the vast majority of men, not immediately, i. e., by directly acting upon the intellect with an overpowering illumination, but mediately, i. e., through the medium of other men whom He has commissioned to publish His revealed truths. Thus, the evidence of Revelation does not overmaster the rational faculties, but leaves a man free to accept it, and, in this manner, to increase his merit. This acceptance is an act of the highest prudence, while the rejection of Divine Revelation would be unreasonable and a grievous wrong. Indeed, from man's complete dependence upon God, and his consequent duty to reverence the Divine teachings and to accept them with loving promptness, it follows, logically, that every one who conceives a well-grounded suspicion that a Divine Revelation has been made, is obliged in conscience to inquire into the matter with more than ordinary diligence.

134. Thesis V. Indifference in the matter of religion is a grievous wrong.

Proof. This indifference may be theoretical or practical Theoretical indifference is an opinion that all systems or forms of religion, though contradictory to one another, are equally pleasing to God and useful to man. This doctrine is false, and an insult to God. It is false, because all truth, and, a fortiori, revealed truth, is one and not self-contradictory. It is an insult to God, because it represents Infinite Truth as pleased with error. Practical indifference is a refusal to give God the homage which man owes Him essentially (Thesis I.). As both kinds of indifference imply a great moral disorder, they are both grievously wrong.

135. It is evident:

1. That God cannot make contradictory revelations. Therefore, there can be only one true religion in the world; for all systems of religion contradict one another on some points of doctrine.

2. That God cannot be glorified or pleased by falsehood. In this, as in other matters, He overlooks mistakes that are caused by invincible ignorance. Nevertheless, once a reasonable suspicion concerning this matter exists in the mind, a man is obliged to do his utmost in order to discover the truth about supernatural Revelation, namely, whether a Revelation has been made and where it may be found.

3. That, if God has made a Revelation to direct men to their last end, He must, in His infinite wisdom, have provided reliable means to distinguish it from all false systems usurping its place.

136. Objections.

1. One does enough, if he is an honest man. Answer. A man who does not practise religion is not an honest man, for he defrauds God of the worship which is justly His due.

2. Among so many jarring creeds, it is impossible to discover the true religion. Answer. Still, one form of religion is divinely true, which alone can be pleasing to God. Now, God's providence and goodness are doubted by thinking that the true form of religion is beyond the reach of an earnest mind seeking the truth and at the same time humbly asking God's aid to find it.

3. No one should change his religion. Answer. Certainly not, unless his religion is false.

4. Then every man on earth ought to set about inquiring into the truth of his religion. Answer. Only those need inquire who have good reason for doubting the truth of their religion.

137. History attests and Theology confirms the facts, that a Revelation was made to mankind in the very beginning; that this was subsequently amplified and developed by further revelations; that it was finally perfected by the teachings of the Son of God Himself, and that this Christian Revelation has been entrusted, in its completeness, to an infallible Church, to be preserved and expounded until the end of time. These are truths beyond the reach of Philosophy. Nevertheless, Reason leads us by the radiance of her own natural light to the portal of supernatural religion, and is there met by a Heavenly guide, with a brightness of illumination so dazzling that all natural lights in its presence must pale to dimness. In that sacred temple, across whose threshold she may pass with man, Reason finds many truths above her grasp, which she calls mysteries, yet none are opposed to her own inherent principles. There she may abide in peace under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, who rules there.

138. Was a Divine Revelation necessary for mankind? That form of Revelation which declares the Beatific Vision to be man's supernatural destiny and teaches him the supernatural means to secure it was not necessary for the attainment of a merely natural end. Absolutely or intrinsically considered, the latter could be attained by reason unassisted supernaturally: it would be physically possible; but, for the overwhelming majority, such an event would be morally impossible. This, too, is the lesson taught by History on its every page. The nations of the earth, even the most highly civilized, had fallen, despite the teachings of primeval Revelation, into the grossest idolatry. Besides, how strangely and wildly some of the most rarely gifted minds have erred in matters of the greatest importance! In our own times also we are made painfully aware of the deplorable tendency of self-sufficient souls to mistake the truth respecting man's duties to God. False philosophies, — Pantheism, Positivism, Agnosticism, Materialism, — are, alas! too widespread and too notoriously prominent in the world of thought to leave us ground for thinking that mankind could have reached even a natural end without the assistance of a supernatural Revelation.

139. Although there should exist many philosophical teachers holding perfectly correct doctrines on the duties of man, still, countless multitudes could not, by this natural means alone, become truly enlightened. Such enlightenment can be accomplished in only two ways, by reasoning and by proclaiming truths with infallible authority. In neither way, however, could the desired effect be brought about for the masses. It could not be done by reasoning, since few, comparatively, would be able to follow the required processes of thought. Nor could authority be of avail, in the hypothesis of a purely natural order. Other men, holding false doctrines, might claim equal authority, and then how could the dispute be settled by natural means to the satisfaction of the people? What natural sign would mark the authoritative teachers of mankind and distinguish them from the propagators of error?

The Churchmen’s Union was inaugurated at the Church House, Westminster, on October 31st, 1898, for the advancement of Liberal religious thought. The members of the Council of this Union are well-known and representative clergymen and laymen belonging to the Church of England. They state that among the chief objects of the Union are the following: —