I. On Rash Judgment

What is the eighth precept of the Decalogue? - The eighth precept of the Decalogue is: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. Ex. 20:16.; Matt. 18:19. By this precept, insofar as it is negative, false testimony is primarily prohibited, especially in judgment; but secondarily every unjust injury of neighbor in the goods of reputation and honor is prohibited, which is reduced to false testimony as to a principal injury; such are rash judgment, detraction, contumely, lying. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that, all simulation and fallacy removed, simple and naked truth be spoken. Catech. Rom. n. 2.; L. 961.

What is reputation? What is rash judgment? Reputation is: the common opinion about the life, morals, and other qualities of someone, which can increase or diminish his moral estimation. Good reputation therefore is the common opinion about the virtue, wisdom, or deeds excellently performed by another; if this goes out into external verbal testimony, it is called praise; but if into testimony, whether verbal or real, it is called honor. Hence the good reputation of someone can be unjustly injured not only through detraction and contumely, but also through an internal rash judgment about some crime or moral defect of another. One must distinguish rash doubt, suspicion, opinion, and firm judgment. Rash doubt is had when someone without sufficient reason remains suspended, yet without inclining rather into judgment of vice than of virtue. Rash suspicion is given when someone without sufficient motive inclines rather into a judgment of vice than of virtue of another; yet he suspends actual judgment. Rash opinion is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits assent concerning the vice of another, yet with fear concerning the opposite. Finally, rash judgment is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits a determined judgment concerning the vice of another without fear concerning the opposite. L. 962, 965.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.

What kind of sin is rash judgment? Rash judgment is a sin opposed to justice, and from its genus mortal.

The 1st part is proved, because anyone has the right not to be judged by another to be evil as long as he does not give to this other a sufficient motive of judging that he is evil; and therefore rash judgment from its generic concept, and with any other malice prescinded, is repugnant to justice. The 2nd part is proved, because good reputation is a notable good of man; and rash judgment, although it takes away the estimation of only one person, namely of the one judging, and not also the common estimation of others, nevertheless, since it always contains contempt of neighbor, hence even only partial injury of the aforesaid reputation is grave of itself, as detraction would be grave of itself even if made before only one person. He who judges another ill from slight judgments, in a grave matter, contemns him, which is a mortal sin. Hence in 1 Tim. 6:4, evil suspicions also are numbered among mortal sins. From its genus, because more often it is only venial on account of smallness of matter, whether according to itself or with respect to the persons about whom there is question, or on account of imperfection of the act. Matt. 7:1.; L. 962.; Lugo d. 14, n. 11.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3, 4.

When is rash judgment a grave sin? - In order that rash judgment be a mortal sin in the individual case, three conditions are required: 1. That it be firm and deliberate. 2. In grave matter. 3. Rashly conceived, without a grave indication, about a person known to you, not about an indeterminate person or one unknown to you. This is proved, because rash judgment, unless it is firm, in grave matter, and rashly conceived, is not a grave injury of neighbor against the reputation of neighbor; but if it is not sufficiently deliberate, it is not perfect on the part of the act and the consent of the will. Therefore, unless it has the aforesaid three conditions together, it is not perfect on the part of the act and the consent of the will. Therefore, unless it has the aforesaid three conditions together, it is not a mortal sin. L. 962.; Lugo d. 14, n. 11, 23.

What kind of sin is doubt, suspicion, rash opinion? Positive doubt, suspicion, or rash opinion about another's sin is of itself only venial. This is proved, because even an opinion, if it is fearful, concerning another's crime, speaking of itself, does not inflict grave injury on him, since, simply speaking, it does not take away by judgment another's reputation; for it is not a firm judgment. - Positive rash doubt is given when someone ought from graver motives to judge someone to be good and innocent; nevertheless from other lighter motives he positively doubts, or reflexively judges that it is doubtful whether he is good or evil, innocent or guilty.

Of itself, for per accidens it can sometimes become grave; if, e.g., these acts are concerned with very extraordinary sins, or graver ones by reason of the condition of the persons whom they regard, and the opinion or suspicion proceeds from slight indications, the doubt from very slight indications; because such opinion, suspicion, or doubt is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave ordinary sins. Thus also such acts are a grave sin if they proceed from malevolence without cause; for then they proceed from contempt of another, and therefore are reckoned a grave injury. Moreover, because for the most part thoughts of this kind creep into the mind even without deliberation, whoever does not advert with full deliberation both to the gravity of the thing thought and to the lightness of the indications is excused from grave sin. 1 Cor. 13:5.; L. 963, 964.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.; Cajetan ib.; Quodl. 12, a. 34.; Lugo d. 64, n. 17.

What of negative doubt? - A purely negative doubt concerning the innocence or crime of another is no sin. This is proved, because in such doubt, arisen from some indication concerning another's crime, no graver motive existing, no one is held positively to judge another to be good and innocent, and so to expose himself to the danger of error; and therefore by suspending every judgment concerning the goodness or malice, concerning the innocence or crime of another, he does not sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4.; Less. l. 2, c. 11, n. 32-36.; Lugo d. 14, n. 21.

Note: Practically, in doubt that axiom of prudent men is to be observed: In the order of caution worse things are to be presumed, but in the order of charity and justice better things. The reason of the first part is: because each one has the right to guard against evil, especially his own or that of his own; and therefore in the order of caution he can presume worse things, at least practically, and precisely in order to avoid evil. But this does not rest on a rash judgment against someone in particular, but on a general judgment by which someone thinks it can happen that someone who is judged good is truly evil. But the reason of the latter part is: because an error precisely speculative, against truth, is a lesser evil than a practical one against charity and justice; and therefore in the order of charity and justice toward another, better things are to be presumed. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4 ad 3.