IV. On the Gravity of Sin

What is the gravity of sin, and whence is it to be derived? The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which a sin is more or less offensive to God, and consequently worthy of a greater or lesser punishment. The greater or lesser gravity of sins is to be derived generally: 1. from the object, end, and circumstances, as they are more or less repugnant to rational nature or to law; 2. from the excellence of the virtues or precepts to which sins are opposed; 3. from the various modes by which virtues or laws are violated; 4. from the greater or lesser advertence to the malice of the act, or from the different degree of consent given to the depraved act; 5. from the duration of the evil act, or from its intensity; 6. from its effects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, a. 4; 2. 2. q. 39, a. 2; q. 65, a. 4; Quodl., 5, a. 20; Wirceb. D. 2, c. 1, 2.

Hence sins are distinguished as sins of ignorance, infirmity, and malice. For those are committed from culpable ignorance, these from weakness of powers, the latter from the full affection of the will. Sins are moreover distinguished as deliberate and surreptitious or semi-deliberate; sins of heart, mouth, and deed, according as they are completed by mind alone, or also by words or deed; sins of commission and omission, perpetrated by action against the law or by neglect of the law; spiritual and carnal, according as they are opposed to goods merely spiritual or sensible, or bodily; against oneself, against one's neighbor, against God, according to their various object. Likewise certain graver sins are said in the Scriptures to cry to heaven, namely because they most vehemently provoke the wrath of God, and merit most grave punishments. They are voluntary homicide, Gen. 4:10; the unspeakable crime of impurity, Gen. 18:20; 19:13; injury inflicted upon the poor, especially the widow and orphan, Ex. 3:7; 22:22, 23; defrauding the wages of workers, Deut. 24:14, 15; Jas. 5:4. Furthermore certain sins are specially said to be against the Holy Spirit, which most greatly oppose divine grace, and as it were close the approach to pardon, Matt. 12:31, 32; Mark 3:29; Luke 12:10; 1 John 5:15, 16, namely presumption concerning the mercy of God, Ecclus. 6:6; despair, Eph. 4:19; impugnation of acknowledged truth, Matt. 12:31; obstinacy in sins, Acts 7:51; envy of another's spiritual good; final impenitence, 1 John 5:16.

How many kinds of sin are there? - Sin is either mortal, or venial, according as it is the transgression of a law obliging gravely or lightly, a grave or light offense against God. Mortal sin of itself, as it is such, has some disorder distinct in species from every disorder which is in venial sin. For that depravity which is directly contrary to the last end, and by reason of which man is turned away from it and turned toward a creature as toward his last end, is a proper species of disorder and moral depravity; and this is proper to mortal sin, and cannot be found in venial sin. Suarez, de Peccat., d. 2, s. 5, nn. 2, 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 4; q. 72, a. 5; q. 74, a. 9; q. 88, 89; de Malo, q. 2, a. 8; Quodl. 6, a. 16.

Mortal sins are such: 1. By their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may finally be, contains a grave disorder, as in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc. 2. By their genus, but not the whole genus, when their matter, remaining in the same species, can be grave, although it also can be light, as are sins against justice. But venial by their genus are called sins which, considered according to the matter or nature of the object, do not admit grave guilt, and therefore, so long as they remain within their species, that is, another species does not accede, mortal by its genus, they cannot be mortal. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, a. 8 ad 1; q. 88, a. 5; L. 11, 51; Trid. s. 6, C. 15, cc. 27, 28; E. M.

What things are required for mortal sin? For mortal sin there are required and suffice: 1. grave matter; 2. full advertence to the grave malice; 3. full consent in the prevarication. Proof of the first part. For light matter induces only a light obligation, and therefore its transgression cannot be a grave sin. Proof of the second and third parts: because, since by mortal sin man totally recedes from God, his last end, so that he may totally adhere to creatures, and rest in them as in his end, this cannot happen unless man fully, deliberately, and consequently with full knowledge of the thing, prefers the creature to the Creator. Therefore sin mortal by its whole genus can become venial by reason of imperfect advertence and imperfect consent. He does not sin gravely who indeed knows that he acts badly, but nevertheless does not attend to the gravity or lightness of the matter, namely if he does not even confusedly have knowledge of the gravity; this can more easily be presumed to have been lacking in rude persons and children, but not likewise in others, where the matter treated is notably grave. And indeed the sin would always be grave if someone were so disposed in mind that he wished to act even if there were grave fault. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 10; q. 88, a. 6; 2. 2. q. 35, a. 3; q. 36, a. 3; L. 52 seqq.; E. M.

In a case of doubt, what are the signs of imperfect advertence and deliberation? - The signs of imperfect advertence are: 1. If you apprehended that it was evil faintly, and as if half-asleep. 2. If afterward, when you consider better, you judge that you would not have done it if you had apprehended it in that way. 3. If you labored under a most vehement passion, apprehension, or distraction, or were disturbed, so that you almost did not know what you were doing. The signs of imperfect consent are: 1. If someone was so disposed that although he easily could have carried out the sin, nevertheless he did not carry it out. 2. If someone doubts whether he consented, especially if he is a God-fearing man. 3. If someone is accustomed to be so affected that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally, because such a person does not easily consent. 4. If someone remembers that he proceeded very timidly and hesitantly. 5. If he was half-asleep, not fully master of himself, etc., and judges that he would not have done it if he had been fully awake. The continuation alone of a depraved thought is not a judgment of consent having been given, because a temptation can be long-lasting, to which one resists according to his strength. Struggl, q. 2, n. 6; L. 54, 55; l. 6, n. 476.

Does he sin gravely who deliberates about giving consent to an object gravely evil, if at last he does not consent? - The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. For if this is imperfect, i.e., if it is only a certain hesitation, or omission of resistance from dullness, sluggishness, or negligence, it does not exceed venial sin. But if the deliberation is full, insofar namely as the will is prepared and affected toward either side, it will be a mortal sin, because the will then shows itself ready to place God after sin; and it has a deliberate affection toward evil.

What things are required for venial sin? For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect. These indeed are required, because, these being removed, there can be no knowledge and willing of evil, and therefore no sin. But they suffice, because, these being posited, the knowledge and willing of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some manner. E. M.

Can several venial sins constitute one mortal sin? R. Negatively, by reason of multiplication, and speaking per se. For the essences of things are immutable. - R. Affirmatively, by reason of lightness of matter, if this, although light in itself, nevertheless acceding to others coalesces into one and constitutes grave matter by reason of continuation, as from several small fragments taken several times on a fast day. Struggl, q. 2, n. 26; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 88, a. 4.

In what ways does venial sin become mortal per accidens? 1. By reason of erroneous conscience, as is clear. 2. By reason of an attached end gravely evil, as if someone lies lightly in order to commit fornication. But it suffices in confession to confess the fornication; it is not necessary also to explain the lie. - 3. By reason of the last end, which someone constitutes even in a light thing, e.g., in a game, in a person inordinately loved, etc. "If someone, from love of gaming, were prepared to commit any mortal sin whatever, it would be a sin of rashness, and indeed most grave, but without species." L. 60. 4. By reason of absolute and formal contempt, "namely when therefore formally and absolutely the precept is violated because you refuse to be subject to it or to the superior, which is a sin of consummate pride; or when therefore you do not wish to obey the precept because it is a precept, and this is a sin of formal disobedience; both of these gravely fight against the charity owed to the superior. Therefore it is one thing to contemn the law or the legislator, even human, not as such a person, but as legislator, which is mortal; another thing to contemn the thing commanded, which is venial if the matter is light." L. 61; l. 4, n. 161; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 2; q. 186, a. 9 ad 3; a. 10 ad 3. 5. By reason of the grave scandal of others, which gravely repugns to charity. 6. By reason of grave harm to others, which gravely repugns to justice. 7. By reason of the proximate occasion and proximate danger of sinning.

"In this matter it is most certain that a work venial in itself or indifferent passes into mortal sin, if the one acting exposes himself to an occasion so proximate that it places him in a moral and proximate danger of sinning mortally. But this moral proximate occasion, or this moral proximate danger, occurs when from its genus the occasion is such that it frequently induces men of similar condition to mortal sin, or it is established by experience that it has such an effect in this man.... just as he is exposed to the danger of incurring temporal harm who undertakes a work at such a time and place and with such circumstances that he can scarcely avoid that harm.... And in this probable danger of sinning mortally, the circumstances of that sin to whose danger he exposed himself must be confessed.... Since it is of the same malice to place oneself in moral danger of committing some crime as to commit it.

For by the same precept by which one is bound to avoid a crime, he is also obliged to avoid its proximate danger." Sanch., in Dec., l. 1, c. 8, nn. 1, 4. - Except: 1. unless such caution is used that the danger ceases; 2. unless a grave cause is present; for then the danger is not morally voluntary, but one is compelled unwillingly by that necessity to undergo it. Sanch., l. c., nn. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 9; L. 63; E. M.

Does he sin gravely who would wish to avoid only mortal sins, and would have the purpose of committing all venial sins? R. Negatively, speaking per se, apart from the case of peculiar frailty, so that a proximate danger of sinning gravely would be induced. For neither will the multiplication of venial sins ever constitute a mortal sin, because the individual venial sins will always remain in an inferior species; nor does a mind so disposed per se induce a proximate danger of sinning. But, speaking practically, he who spurns small things is gradually disposed also to spurn greater things. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 49, 50; Suarez, de Rel., tr. 8, l. 1, c. 4, n. 18; Ithur., Cas. 35, n. 28; L. l. 4, n. 12; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 87, aa. 3, 4.